

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THE TEXT EDITED WITH INTRODUCTION,
NOTES, ETC.

BY

E. B. ENGLAND, LITT.D.
LATE WARDEN OF HULME HALL AND ASSISTANT LECTURER IN CLASSICS
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PREFACE

ONLY two commentaries on the whole of Plato's *Laws* have hitherto been published, that of Fr. Ast, Leipzig, Weidmann, 1814; and that of G. Stallbaum, Leipzig, Hennings, 1859 and 1860. Many critical editions of the text, however, have appeared, of which I will only mention those which I have used in writing my notes. These are the editions of Rutger Ressen, Louvain, 1531; H. Stephanus, 1578; I. Bekker, Berlin, 1817; C. E. Ch. Schneider, Paris, Didot, 1877; C. Fr. Hermann, Leipzig, Teubner, 1852; F. W. Wagner, Leipzig, Engelmann, 1854, 1855; J. G. Baiter, J. C. Orelli, A. W. Winckelmann, Zürich, 1839; M. Schanz, Leipzig, Tauchnitz, 1879 (the first six books only); J. Burnet, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1906. To all these my debt has been great, but I have derived more help from Professor Burnet's edition, with its critical notes and its revised and repunctuated text, than from any of the texts or commentaries, while he and the Clarendon Press have laid me under a further great obligation by allowing me to use the Oxford edition as the basis of my own revision.

Students of the *Laws* have derived valuable assistance from the many translations which have been made, whether into Latin, or into a modern language. Of such I have constantly consulted those of Marsilio Ficino, Venice, 1491 (twenty-two years before the appearance of the first printed Greek text); C. E. Ch. Schneider, F. W. Wagner, and B. Jowett, 2nd ed., Oxford, 1875.

Every page of my notes reveals indebtedness to scholars who have dealt with the text or interpretation of separate passages. The two works of C. Ritter (*Platos Gesetze*, (1) *Darstellung des Inhalts*, and (2) *Kommentar zum griechischen Texte*, Leipzig, Teubner, 1896) deserve special mention.

They approach, from the large number of passages treated, to a regular commentary. *Platon* by Dr. von Wilamowitz-Möllendorf did not come into my hands till this book was in type. Vol. II. contains about fifty emendations in the text of the *Laws*. A few of these may be generally accepted, and all merit careful consideration.

To Professor Burnet, and to my own teacher, Professor Henry Jackson, O.M., I am indebted for much readily given help on passages of special difficulty. The late Professor J. B. Mayor of King's College, London, was good enough to read through and comment on my notes on the first half of Book V.

Two more names I mention with a grateful recognition of invaluable assistance, that of the late Mr. F. H. Dale, C.B., and that of Mrs. James Adam. The former, without whose constant encouragement my work could hardly have been done, read through and discussed with me my notes on nearly the whole of the first ten books. Mrs. Adam has laid me under a great obligation by reading through all the proof-sheets. She has set me right many times, but she is not responsible for all that remains after her criticisms have been adopted. Notes in brackets with the initials F.H.D., A.M.A., J.B.M. record the chief instances where these scholars have differed from without convincing me.

In the text square brackets denote the rejection of enclosed words or letters; angular brackets that the enclosed words or letters have been added conjecturally to the MS. text. Clarendon type has been used to denote all other alterations which have been made in modern times—at any time, that is, since the invention of printing.

References to any other part of Plato are to the pages and divisions of Stephanus's edition, and where the number of the line is added, it is that of Burnet's text.

E. B. E.

High Wray, *April* 1921.

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p. 14 line 14 from bottom. *for* to *read* in

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624 a 4 line 6. *for* Platos *read* Platons
630 a 5 line 4. *for* πυστότης *read* πιστότης
630 c 8 line 3. *for* ὦs *read* ὡs
634 c 5 line 10. *for* by a magistrate or by an old man *read* by an old man to a magistrate or
635 e 4 line 4. *for* λέγω μὲν *read* λέγωμεν
637 d 4 line 11. *for* μεθεύειν *read* μεθύειν
638 b 2 line 6. *for* 456 *read* 356
639 a 7 line 8. *for* pres. *read* pres. ind.
639 c 1 line 8. *for* ἑορ. *read* ἐωρ.
643 c 5 line 4. *for* παιδία *read* παιδιά
643 c 7 line 1. *for* παιδίων *read* παιδιῶν
643 c 7 line 2. *for* παιδείων *read* παιδειῶν
647 a 5 line 3. *for* παιδίαι *read* παιδιαί
647 e 2 line 3. *for* οἷos *read* οἷον
p. 279 line 5. *for* η *read* ᾗ
660 d 8 line 2. *for* applied *read* supplied
665 c 2-7 line 9. *for* αἰχμηταῖσι *read* αἰχματαῖσι
666 d 9 line 4. *add*—MSS. τὴν, Ald. ἦν, Schmidt τὴν ἦν.
666 e 2 line 6. *for* βουά *read* βούα
667 a 1 line 7. *for* διοκοῖ *read* διοικοῖ
667 b 5-c 3 line 22. *for* ἐγκατατετμημένον *read* ἐγκατατετμημένου
667 e 3 line 1. *for* ἐπακολουθῆ *read* ἐπακολουθῇ
668 a 1 line 8. *for* εἴτις *read* εἴ τις
669 e 6 line 12. *for* 648 e *read* 648 c
671 a 6 line 7. *for* afer *read* after
680 e 6 line 5. *for* If . . . proleptically. *read* But cp. below 683 a 5 and 7.

683 b 1 line 8. *for* τε *read* τι
683 e 5 line 33. *for* ἥκιστα *read* ἥκιστα
684 b 5 line 5. *dele* of
687 e 2 line 5. *for* befel *read* befell
688 b 6 line 5. *for* πρεσβευτικὴ *read* πρεσβυτικὴ
688 d 2 line 3. *for* διακωλεύσει *read* διακωλύσει
688 d 2 line 7. *for* ὅθεν δὴ *read* ὀθενδὴ
689 d 5 line 11. *for* προσχρημένῳ *read* προσχρωμένῳ
691 a 1 line 2. *for* e 7 *read* c 7
693 b 2 line 1. *for* νύνδη *read* νυνδή
695 b 2 line 1. *for* absolue *read* absolute
698 b 5 line 10. *for* practical *read* poetical
699 d 8 line 1. *for* τὶ *read* τι
708 a 3 line 7. *for* μάλιστ· *read* μάλιστ'
709 c 1 line 16. *for* μή *read* ἢ μή
710 a 1 line 7. *for* use *read* use it
712 e 7 line 4. *for* διισχυριζόμενον *read* διισχυριζόμενος
717 a 8 line 9. *insert*) *after* "predicate"
719 d 6 line 2. *for* "timeless" (aor.) *read* ("timeless" aor.)
730 c 3 line 4. *for* εἰδοίη *read* εἰδείη
730 d 7 line 3. *for* ἀναγορενὲσθω *read* ἀναγορενέσθω
731 d 6 line 7. *for* proud *read* fond
732 d 6 line 2. *for* ἄνδοα *read* ἄνδρα
739 c 1 line 9. *for* suggsetion *read* suggestion
739 d 5 line 7. *dele* —
739 d 5 line 18 *insert*) *after* considered
745 a 6 line 6. *for* αἰσχροκερδεία *read* αἰσχροκέρδεια
752 d 6 line 4. *for* sterotyped *read* stereotyped
754 d 8 line 5. *for* £20 *read* £16
756 c 6 line 4. *for* e 16 *read* l. 16
756 e 4 f. line 15. *for* e 19 f. *read* l. 19 f.
758 a 8 line 3. *for* a 6 *read* d 6
760 e 7 line 15. *for* inaedifieare *read* inaedificare
763 c 3 line 13. *for* ἀστυνόμων *read* ἀστυνόμων
766 b 3 line 5 *for* it *read* τῶν
773 e 4 line 4. *for* "stands per *read* stands "per
774 c 3 ff. line 24. *for* pecunia *read* penuria
775 b 3 line 3. *for* gen. *read* acc.

INTRODUCTION

THE treasury of pregnant truths which Plato in extreme old age left, under the title of *Laws*, as his last legacy to humanity falls into two distinct parts.

When the three pedestrians of the dialogue had reached the place of noonday rest on their midsummer day's walk from Cnossos to the Cave of Zeus, the Athenian calls upon the others to observe that, while they had been talking about laws half the day, they had not yet made, for their new colony, a single law. If, on this hint, the reader of Plato's treatise will turn to see what proportion it contains of actual legislation, and what of "talk about laws," he will find that the "talk" bears to the "laws" the relation of two to one. Of the 321 of Stephanus's pages occupied by the *Laws* not more than 107 contain definite statutes with their penalties.[1]

To describe this supplement to the actual legislation Plato uses the term προοίμιον, pleased, as usual, to find a linguistic analogy in established usage. Besides meaning *custom*, *convention* or *law*, νόμος was used for a musical "piece" or "theme." Every substantial *piece* had its *prelude*: what better name then could be found for the prefaces to the whole treatise on νόμοι or to particular laws than νόμων προοίμια?

Of one of these two kinds all the supplementary matter consists. Either it is an elucidatory introduction to the

[1] In this latter total are reckoned the necessary directions in Bk. VII. for the nurture of the very young and the education of the adolescent, though the author, while declaring, at 790 b 2, that they are the foundation of all legislation, expressly disclaims for them the name of laws.

subject as a whole, or it is such an introduction to one important law or to a section of the code.

The former, or general, introduction, which is resumed at times in later books, comprises what is at first sight a perplexing variety of subjects. The perplexity becomes less when we find a key to it in the perception that, with Plato, Politics is a branch of the life-long[1] process of Education.

The subject under consideration is Man in Society—*ἄνθρωποι πολιτευόμενοι*.[2] About Man it is clear[3] "that every living creature has a smaller, and inferior, *νοῦς* when it is born than it has when it is full-grown. About Society likewise[4] we conclude that, in its early stages, many possibilities for both good and evil are still unrealized. The education of the former is to be in the hands of nurses and schoolmasters, under the direction of *the most distinguished of all state officials*:[5] that of the latter mainly in those of the lawgiver alone.

The possibilities of development (1) of Human Nature, and (2) of Society, and the agencies by which satisfactory developments may be produced, are therefore the main subjects of the lawgiver's consideration. Roughly speaking, the latter part of Bk. I., Bk. II., the first part of Bk. V. and many individual preludes—including the majority of those in Bk. VII.—cover the ground of (1). The early part of Bk. I., many of the *προοίμια*, Bks. III. and IV. cover that of (2).

Among the preludes to special classes of laws the long theological argument in Bk. X. occupies an outstanding position. Though technically the prelude to laws against impiety, and dangerous superstitions, Cleinias at 887 b 8 speaks of it as fit to rank as "*ὑπὲρ ἁπάντων τῶν νόμων κάλλιστόν τε καὶ ἄριστον προοίμιον*." This claim indicates the supreme importance attached by the lawgiver to religion as a sanction and preservative of law.

Another prelude which stands out from among the rest is the dissertation in the eighth book (825–841), on the unhealthy and the healthy indulgence of sexual appetite.

[1] 807 d 4. [2] 676 b 3. [3] 672 b 8.
[4] 678 b 1–3. [5] 765 d 8.

This is not a preface to a law, for no law is made. The community is not ripe for it. The author's dissertation is merely a λόγος . . . νόμος ἐπιχειρῶν γίγνεσθαι[1]—an argument which does its best to impose itself on men's consciences. He speaks "before a corrupt tribunal" as the "single-handed opponent of overwhelming desire, with reason for his only help and support."[2] The only satisfactory law would be one forbidding all indulgence of the kind except that between lawful husband and wife, with a view to child-production[3]—the pair to be faithful to each other for life—as Plato beautifully expresses it,[4] ἐμμένοντες βεβαίως ταῖς πρώταις τῆς φιλίας ὁμολογίαις. The nearest approach to this which he contemplates as possible at the time is the arousing of the sense of shame whenever this high standard should be publicly transgressed.

The most influential of the *agencies* with which the educator and the lawgiver alike can work are *pleasure* and *pain*,[5] *honour* and *dishonour*.[6] We are told[7] that education consists in being brought to like and to dislike the right things, and so to secure that ἡδοναί and λύπαι, τιμαί and ἀτιμίαι are no longer at variance with ἀρετή and τὸ δίκαιον. At 697 b 2 ff., 716 d 4 ff., and in the first eight pages of Bk. V. stress is laid on the importance of *right regard for* various advantages and characteristics, and the hope of attaining to an honourable rank in the community is at many points held out as an inducement to patriotic and virtuous conduct.[8]

In this connexion two remarkable institutions claim special attention: (1) the Διονύσου πρεσβυτῶν χορός, "Old Men's Dionysiac Chorus," of Bk. II. (665 a 8 ff.); and (2) the Nocturnal Council described in Bk. XII. (951 and 961 ff.). Both institutions are to be powerful *conservatives* of that ἀρετή which is the indispensable condition of the εὐδαιμονία of either state or individual. The second of these two institutions is elaborately devised as the best possible σωτηρία πολιτείας καὶ νόμων.[9] The former is the receptacle of the

[1] 835 e 5. [2] 835 c 5. [3] 839 a 1, 840 d, 841 d.
[4] 840 d 8. [5] 636 d 5 ff. [6] 643 c 8 ff. and 653 a 5 ff.
[7] 689 a. [8] e.g. 697 a 10. [9] 960 d 1 ff.

highest educational wisdom, and constitutes the standard of "Musical" taste for the community—and so acts as a σωτηρία τῆς ὀρθῆς παιδείας,[1] a παιδείας φυλακή.[2] *Enjoyment*, whether spontaneous and individual, or organized and gregarious, may have a good or a bad effect—it may increase or decrease the ἀρετή of both performers and audience. It is a task for the keenest artistic insight, combined with an enlightened and patriotic love of virtue, to guide and to regulate all kinds of artistic representation. The legislator's duty in this matter is explained and enforced in the long dissertation in Bk. II. on the connexion between Art and Morality. The χορὸς Διονύσου does for Art what the Nocturnal Assembly of Bk. XII. is to do for Religion and Philosophy.

In the endeavour to estimate our author's drift we are not left altogether to ourselves. Plato gives us his own view of the significance of his treatise on Laws in two aspects: (1) as to its relation to his *Republic*; (2) as to the appreciation he hoped to secure for it.

(1) On p. 739 he distinctly explains that he renounces, as a practical ideal, the complete communism of the earlier political treatise. The main ideal is, however, to remain in theory, and among "second-best" practicable regulations the legislator must choose those which come nearest to that ideal.[3]

(2) At 811 c 6 ff. Plato naïvely declares that the *Laws* is the sort of book which it would do everybody good to study, and further, that agreement or disagreement with its teaching is to be a test to which *all literature* must submit. The same

[1] 653 a 1. [2] 654 d 8.

[3] On one point—that of sexual relations—the author of the *Laws* seems to have abandoned his former advocacy of communism. In the passage above referred to in Bk. VIII. where Plato reaches the high-water-mark of monogamous morality, there is no indication of a theoretically superior state of things. Here, too, there is a "first-best," and a "second-best," but the first-best is the cordial recognition, in its regulation by the state and society, of the monogamous ideal; the second-best is the partial acknowledgement of its superiority by a society which is ashamed to disown it, but shrinks from adopting it as imperative and official.

appreciation of all publications on the subject of Law is expressed at 858 e 5 ff., where Plato claims that such writings ought to be considered as *literature*, and ought to be written in a persuasive and kindly style. Again, at 957 c 4 ff., "the study of Law is of all others the surest to make the learner a better man."

More than this: Law itself must be an object of an almost instinctive reverence. "While to be consistently and continuously law-abiding is to be one of the surest roads to rank and distinction,[1] a still higher civic excellence is that of the man who feels bound, whenever occasion offers, to take upon himself the duty of a modern policeman. "The man who interferes to prevent wrongdoing[2] is worthy of twice the honour of the merely law-abiding citizen." . . . "The man who helps the magistrate to punish offenders is the perfect citizen, the paragon of virtue." Often, after ordaining the penalty for an offence, he points to the duty of the by-stander to help to bring an offender to justice—ordaining at least the penalty of social disgrace if this duty be not fulfilled. To a modern Englishman this demand seems significant of oppressive interference, by an almost personified state, with individual liberty. Nor is this the only regulation which he might resent on the same ground. Many restrictions are placed on the citizen's freedom by the legislator of the *Laws*. For instance: (1) the family κλῆρος must never be sold or divided,[3] nor (2) must other property be acquired by its owner than land, its stock and equipment, and its produce,[4] and even this kind of property was limited in amount by law.[5] (3) Testators are much restricted in disposing of their property after death.[6] (4) Parents are compelled to send their children to school.[7]

On the other hand the liberty of the individual citizen is, in important aspects, recognized by Plato as a state necessity as well. "Do not," he says, "make your magistrates big and irresponsible: the statesman must cherish *freedom*, as

[1] 729 d 4 ff. [2] 730 d 2. [3] 741 b.
[4] 741 e 1, e 7 ff., 846 d. [5] 744 e. [6] 922 b ff.
[7] 804 d. His comment on this regulation is "Don't forget, parents, that your children belong to the state more than they do to you."

well as *wisdom* and fellow-feeling."[1] But this freedom cannot, as things are, be complete. A spontaneous, enlightened social instinct ought to bring every man *voluntarily* to undergo these and other necessary state restrictions.[2] He should realize that it is to his own advantage as much as—even more than—to that of the state, if the common good comes first in everybody's thoughts, and his own private interest second: "τὸ μὲν γὰρ κοινὸν συνδεῖ, τὸ δὲ ἴδιον διασπᾷ τὰς πολεῖς."[3] Such, however, is human nature that, though a man may see this, the allurement of pleasure and the dread of pain prove stronger than wisdom. Only a divinely inspired man, if such were to arise,[4] could act aright without the constraining bonds of man-made τάξις and νόμος. These fetters are no disgrace to Wisdom, but only to the blindness of men. Wisdom's supreme authority is sacred and universal. Positive, compulsory Law and Order have only a delegated power, and would be unnecessary if men were perfect.[5]

Much thought and discussion, along with much experience of life, may enable men to grasp the idea of a service "which is perfect freedom"—may even open their minds to the vision of a Divine Law—of a wisdom whose sphere altogether transcends their own capabilities of insight. Three or four passages in the *Laws*—which at first sight seem merely pessimistic—are probably meant as helps to a humble attitude towards the supreme Νοῦς. Three times[6] he calls men "God's puppets." He even says that their so being is the best thing about them.[7] Great natural and historical catastrophes, he says, impress on him the *littleness* of all that human forethought and endeavour can achieve.[8] Again, "after all, men's affairs are not much worth being in earnest about, but we cannot help being in earnest all the same—more's the pity!" To such views, he tells us, he is brought when he contemplates the stupendous nature of the divine excellence.[9] "Bear with me, Megillus! My words of depreciation were due to a sudden revelation of our insignifi-

[1] 693 b 2. [2] 875. [3] 875 a 6.
[4] 875 c 3 ff. [5] 875 c 6 ff. [6] 644 d 7 ff., 803 c 4 ff., 804 b 3.
[7] 803 c 5. [8] 709 a. [9] 804 b.

cance in the face of God. Perhaps there *is* some good in mankind, perhaps he deserves our care, after all."[1]

Such lofty themes as these stand side by side, in the treatise, with humble pictures of every-day life. As O. Apelt says, in an admirable short *aperçu* prefixed to a critical study of some passages in the *Laws* (Jena Progr. 1906), "Based, as the work largely is, on the various experiences of daily life, and so bringing, as it does, the 'divine' Plato down to our human level, the very informality of its construction and style heightens this sense of familiarity. Its natural abandon touches us more nearly than the perfection of art. The one thing on which the author's heart is set is *safely to house a rich harvest*,[2] and he does not trouble himself much to sift and arrange his matter by art and rule. Not that he gives his thoughts a dull and trivial form—he would not be Plato if he did that—but the tone is often louder, and the expression more far-fetched, or more poetical than usual. The balance and finish of the *Republic's* style are wanting. The sentence construction is particularly loose. The talk pours forth as it does in actual conversation; the rush of thought gives it at each turn a fresh form; but the thought gets expressed all the same."

We are richly the gainers by this pouring out of the aged philosopher's stores of meditation on daily life. Many an unforgettable piece of practical wisdom we may glean from the pages of the *Laws*. For example: "There is a most deadly evil at home in most men's hearts. Nobody takes himself to task for it: nobody tries to get rid of it—it is

[1] More truly pessimistic is the mysterious and isolated speculation contained in 896 d 5–897 d 1. Here he feels constrained, by his doctrine of *ψυχή*, to recognize, at all events in the lowly sphere of human mind and character, and in man's immediate physical surroundings, a rival to the supreme *Νοῦς*. No motive is assigned to this so-called *ψυχή*. The language in which its activity is described is altogether of a negative character. It is a mere personification of unwisdom and misrule. It is as if Plato said "it must be there, but I do not understand it, and can say nothing more about it." The whole *κόσμος* is manifestly under the sway of the *ἀρίστη ψυχή* and all that proceeds *μανικῶς τε καὶ ἀτάκτως* does but serve to make its brilliancy more visible.

[2] At 752 a 8 we get a hint of Plato's sense that the time left him is short, and his powers limited: "*ἔσται ταῦτ'*," he says, "*ἂν θεὸς ἐθέλῃ καὶ γήρως ἐπικρατῶμεν τό γε τοσοῦτον.*"

self-love, and the belief that it is right to be one's own best friend: whereas in fact all kinds of mischief flow from this source. Here, as elsewhere, the lover is blind, and cannot distinguish right from wrong or good from bad: more respect, he thinks, is due to himself, than to the truth."[1]

"A good way to get on good terms with friends and comrades is to think *their* services to you greater than they do themselves, and to hold *your* services to them of less importance than your friends think them."[2]

"There is nothing deadly about complete ignorance of a subject: it is much worse when much has been learnt in a bad way."[3]

"A slave should be safer from wrong than a free man: it is a sham goodness which only avoids wrongdoing when it is difficult."[4]

"It is a disgrace for a mistress to be called in the morning by her maids: *she* ought to call them."[5]

"No man is fit to rule who has not first been under rule himself; moreover, to have served well is a better title to distinction than to have been a good ruler. For among a man's rulers are the Gods, as well as his elders and betters among men."[6]

"Παισὶν δὲ αἰδῶ χρὴ πολλήν, οὐ χρυσὸν καταλιπεῖν.[7] The best way to give this to children—and to yourself at the same time—is, not to admonish them so much as we do, but to let them see that *we* never fail to do what such admonition would direct."[8]

"What you do not see, in your little corner of the mighty universe, is, that things do not happen in it for *your* sake: you, like all that takes place there, are what you are in order that *its* perfection may be complete."[9]

To conclude this rough sketch of the contents of Plato's *Laws*, we may ask what is the abiding impression left by its perusal. Is it not this? Not only has he given us a code of political and social law which has been the foundation of much subsequent legislation, but he leaves us with increased reverence for the rule of right and goodness, and a quickened faith in its ultimate victory over folly, superstition, and vice.

[1] 731 d 6. [2] 729 c 8 ff. [3] 819 a 3.
[4] 777 d 2. [5] 808 a 3. [6] 762 e 1 ff.
[7] 729 b 1. [8] 729 c 2. [9] 903 b 4.

ANALYSIS OF BOOK I

624 a 1. Spartan and Cretan institutions, which claim to have been the work of divinely inspired legislators, are based on the assumption that the state is a fighting machine. If it cannot fight, it loses its independence, and the power of enjoying its property.

626 c 5. But there are other fights besides (1) those with foreign states. (2) A country may be at variance with itself. (3) A man's "better self" has to contend with his baser inclinations (and for a right termination of the third kind of fight the noblest qualities of all are required).

626 e 5. In fights (2) and (3) the victory of the better elements is spoken of as a victory of the whole being.

627 c 2. In civil strife the important thing is to reconcile the combatants, not to exterminate, or reduce to impotence, the vanquished side.

628 c 4. This opens up a wider view for the νομοθέτης. *Of course he aims, in his legislation, at producing the greatest excellence*, and therefore he must not organize his state solely with a view to external war, for this develops only an inferior kind of excellence. Instead of thinking of war when there is peace, he ought rather to be thinking of peace when he is conducting war.

629 a 4. Success in civil strife demands higher qualities than success in foreign warfare, inasmuch as, to succeed in the former, a man must win the trust of his fellow citizens. This cannot be done without more virtues than that of bodily courage. He must have all the virtues.

630 b 8. Therefore, in framing laws, big or small, the νομοθέτης must have in view the production of excellence of all kinds, and, in estimating different kinds of excellence, he must put the mind before the body, and, of the virtues of the mind, he must esteem those most highly which have least to do with the body, and most

with the mind. Herein we have the key to the proper classification of laws.

632 d 8. As all life is a fight, and as, in all fights, the excellence of the fighter depends prominently on his καρτέρησις (power of resistance), it may be expected that in other virtues there will be an element like that which is prominent in bodily courage. A legislation which tries only to encourage the power of resistance to bodily pain and danger, is a lame, left-handed kind of legislation. There are all the temptations of *pleasure* to be resisted, and these are ignored by such legislation.

635 e 4. In other words, if the Spartan and Cretan institutions are to stand examination, they must be able to show that they develop *temperance*, which comes next above courage, in order of precedence, of the virtues of the character.

An exclusively military life stimulates excessive pugnacity, and a too exclusive devotion to bodily development has, incidentally, brought unnatural vice in its train. The two questions (1) "what pleasures ought not to be sought?" and (2) "what pains ought not to be avoided?" go to the foundations of the philosophy of Law.

636 e 4. It is urged that, if the discipline of the military state is rigid, it makes for virtue by putting down excess—such excess, for instance, as any degree of intoxication—with a strong hand.

637 b 7. This contention opens up the consideration of the proper way of ensuring virtue. *Ought the ultimate controlling power to be external or internal?* Even where a foreigner would think there was the extremity of licence, there may be safeguards to morality in the καρτέρησις—the power of saying no—possessed by the individual.

637 d 3. Take the question of wine-drinking;[1] Is it absolutely wrong that any man should, on any occasion, take enough wine to intoxicate him—as we say, "to get into his head"?[2] Are we not

[1] Here follows an apparent digression, for the length of which the author apologizes beforehand. The ensuing discussion of μέθη (1) throws fresh and original light on the nature and process of *education*, the moral effects of pleasure and pain, and the testing and formation of character; and (2) introduces us to a kind of mechanism by which, in dealing with μουσική, the νομοθέτης can guide this process in the right direction. This second division forms the main subject of Bk. II. Incidentally, the demonstration of the similarity of the suggested process of education in temperance to the process of education in courage, emphasizes the closeness of connexion between the two virtues.

[2] In the *Republic*, p. 403, we are told that the φύλακες are never to get into this state.

in danger of associating *μέθη* in our minds with attendant evils which may conceivably be dissociated from it? It may perhaps be admitted that, in human experience, these evils always *have*, so far, accompanied *μέθη*.

640 a 4. Every assembly of men who meet with a common purpose must have a leader. The leader of an army must be *brave*: the leader of a drinking-party must be *sober*.

641 a 3. "But even if it *be* well-conducted, what *good* will it do? Can it produce anything to stand side by side with the *victory* which an army aims at winning?" The answer is, not only do the victories it ensures leave no unhappy memories, such as are left by the victories of armies, but—astonishing as it may seem—it is a valuable means of *education*.

643 a 2. Education in general is the training of the young for the activities of life, but, as used by the wise lawgiver, the word means *the formation of a virtuous character*. In this sense *παιδεία* is *πρῶτον τῶν καλλίστων* in good men's eyes.

644 b 6. A wise calculation (*λογισμός*), on the part of the state, of the advantage, or disadvantage, to be secured by any course of action—i.e. a balancing of prospective pleasure and pain—results in, or rather embodies itself in, *law*. This law must be such as will come to the aid of a man's better self, when pulled this way and that by the attractions of pleasure, and the fear of pain. Thus *law* becomes a sort of conscience to the state, which dictates external and internal policy, and throws light on the nature of *ἐπιτηδεύματα*—such as drinking-bouts—and on the aims to be pursued by the process of education.

645 d 1. Much wine heightens the sense of pleasure and pain, heightens anger and desire, while it confuses and deadens the intellect and the judgement. You ask: "Who would willingly put himself into a state in which his moral character is, for the time, made worse?" In return I ask: "Does not every one, when he incurs great bodily fatigue, or takes a strong drug, knowingly put his *body*, for a time, into a worse state?"

646 d 8. You ask again: "What *good* can *μέθη* do, which will stand comparison with the muscular efficiency produced by hard bodily exercise, and the cure wrought by the drug?" Well: there are two kinds of fear. One, the fear of pain; the other, the fear of disgrace. This last we call *shame*; and while we fight the former, we encourage the latter. At Sparta you fight the former kind by making the young undergo dangers and hardships; i.e. they are artificially put in positions similar to those which, in

real life, will call for the exercise of the virtue of courage. These artificially contrived exercises not only train; they enable the educators to form an opinion of the strength and worth of individual characters. A similar power of endurance is demanded when temptations to pleasure have to be faced. What better occasion can be imagined for practising the young in the right sort of fear or for discerning which of them are temperate, than a symposium presided over and watched by sober seniors? The young are there brought by wine into a state in which they are specially susceptible to temptations. They are thus at once trained to endurance, and their characters can then best be judged by their educators.

If a *φάρμακον* existed which would temporarily stimulate fear in the same way that wine stimulates the tendency to *ὕβρις* and self-indulgence of all kinds, it would be a valuable agent, and would save much trouble in the training in *ἀνδρεία*. Why then should we discard the use of pleasant wine as a training in *σωφροσύνη*?

ANALYSIS OF BOOK II

652. The right use of wine may do more than test character; it may be a preservative of the effects of Education. What is real Education? Long before the judgement is mature, the *habits* may be formed of *liking* and *disliking* the right things, and it is just in the formation of such habits that real *education* consists. But the feelings of pleasure and pain thus fostered tend to lose their strength in the workaday world. The gods have arranged *holidays* to keep these feelings alive, and have sent us the Muses, Apollo *and Dionysus*, to teach us how to celebrate these festal days.

What Apollo and the Muses do for us is to add, to the child's innate delight in flinging itself about and making noises, the delight in the *systematizing* of these noises and motions—in other words, they inspire us with the sense of and love of *ῥυθμός* and *ἁρμονία*.

For choice performances are not only for the festivals of adults; they are also for the education of the young.

This is the main way in which that training of the likes and dislikes by habit is secured. It is not only, remember, the *skill* of

the young χορευτής that must be kept in view by the educator, it is his *taste* as well. There is a *moral* and an immoral χορεία, and the child must be habituated to *like* the *moral* sort.

What is moral μουσική and χορεία? We can only say that μουσική (is a langauge, and) interprets the mind; and if the mind and intention is good, the μουσική will be good. E.g, anyone can tell from mien and tone whether a man is a coward or not; so it is that songs and dances may be made to reveal *all* the virtues and vices. But μουσική is a language which it needs a trained eye and ear to read. *Everybody's* judgement is not to be taken on the question what is the best μουσική? Here again we come to the importance of good habituation: not only will a taste for bad μουσική, if indulged, make a man himself bad, but nothing but habituation to the good can ensure a genuine pronouncement on the side of what is right and good.[1]

Poets, who compose the materials of χορεία, must be under constraint and guidance. The wise Egyptians have for ever stereotyped their art, and allow no deviation from fixed forms. What has been done once can be done again. Let our legislators look to it then, and make arrangements for the proper supervision of poets and musicians.

657 c. To return to the question of what is the right μουσική. Delight is the spring of motion in the young and active, and the more mature and aged, whose activity is flagging, feel a reflected delight in watching and superintending the performances of the young. The popular notion that the best μουσική is that which gives most pleasure is right *in a sense*. But it is these mature and aged people whose judgement must settle the question of what is pleasantest—i.e. *best*. A child may take more delight in a puppet-show than in a tragedy, so we must correct the bald statement that the best μουσική is that which gives most pleasure, by adding "*to the best judges*," and these, as we maintain, are the old and experienced; it may even happen that there is *one* man who is the best judge of all, and, if so, he should decide. The matter ought never to be settled by the noisy crowd in the theatre, as it is in Italy and Sicily—and with disastrous results to the poets, who are made worse by their audience, instead of making their audience better, as they should.

Again, then, we are brought to see that education *draws* the

[1] It would seem to follow from this that the *first* educators must have been inspired by the gods, and the education and training of the young by habit was the means of passing this inspiration on to other generations.

young in the direction that wise experience finds out to be the right one, and that the drawing consists in the right formation of the sentiments of pleasure and pain. To secure this end the lawgiver must call in the aid of the poet—*acting under the lawgiver's direction.*

660 e. The main duty laid on the poet will be that of convincing the young that no physical or worldly advantage, even when coupled with the lowest of the virtues—bravery—are of any good to a man—are even *bad* for him—if he has not the higher virtues as well. I would make it a crime for a poet, or anyone else, to talk as if there were any real *gain* for a man apart from *goodness*, or any *pleasure* in doing *wrong.*

663 a. You tell the young stories full of impossibilities, and they believe them. *Use* this childish belief: even if I had not *proved* that virtue means happiness, you can see the necessity of *making the child believe it.* The *chanting* which fills the ear and moves the tongue of the child must *enchant* him to believe that heaven has ordained that real pleasure lies in goodness, and is inseparable from it.

664 c. For this same *chanting* let three kinds of chorus be constituted: (1) the Muses' chorus of children; (2) Apollo's chorus of the youthful; and (3) the mature, from thirty onwards to sixty, must serve the *Music* of the state in diverse ways. Some of these —the oldest, no doubt—must tell *myths* to the young, while the younger men perhaps will actually sing; but the main use of the mature will be *to form a standard of taste*, and regulate the Music of the whole state. And this chorus, as being the repository of real wisdom, is the most valuable to the state of all the three.

664 e. Now, inasmuch as to the mature all kinds of activity are no longer promoted by the imperative instinct which will not let the young keep quiet,—and which we saw to be the soil out of which all the Muses' art was developed,—the gift of Dionysus comes in to supply an artificial stimulus to activity and to *suppleness* of mind and body. Hence the chorus of the mature is to be called the *Chorus of Dionysus.*

666. The very "fire" which wine puts into the mature and elderly—and which is beneficent in the way described above—is superfluous, and may even be dangerous, if applied to the already "fiery" young.

666 e. The "old men's chorus," then, must mean something quite different to what it does in Sparta; nor must the education of the young be what it is there—i.e. the *manufacture of soldiers.*

The *chanting* of this "chorus" must be, not the Music of the theatre and the dancing-ground but, the *enchanting* of the young, *to make them love virtue.*

667 b 5. What then is ἡ καλλίστη ᾠδή? Is it merely that which gives most pleasure? In all pleasant things—in all gifts of heaven—there is something else besides pleasure. About them all we ask, not only (1) are they pleasant? but (2), does the intellect pronounce them to be correct? and (3) does the moral judgement pronounce them to be good?

In the realm of art, where we deal with *representations* or *imitations*, the *pleasure* which these representations give proclaims them the gift of heaven (χάρις). But it is the *intellect*, not the feeling of pleasure or pain, which answers the question: "Is it like?" Therefore, even if there is no question of the *good* or *harm* it does, *pleasure* can no longer be the only criterion of a work of art.

668 b. But, if it is to be more than a toy, or harmless amusement, the artistic representation must manage to represent something *morally beneficial.*

668 c. The true and competent judge, then, must have (1) a knowledge of the thing to be represented, (2) the power of comparing or measuring the e.g. picture by or with the thing represented; and (3) the *judgement* to pronounce on its moral character and effect.

669 b 5. *Music* needs greater skill in the critic than do the other arts. Music represents *states of mind and character*; not only do these need more experience for their recognition, but the *evil* they can do is more *intimate*, and reaches further. And our poets and musicians are no Muses; anyone can see by their senseless vagaries that they are capable of doing much harm.

670 a 6. So you see there is good reason in saying that the *chorus of the mature* must know more about Music than the other two choirs. They must have the trained faculties that the other choirs have, but they must add, secondly, the technical knowledge necessary for the poet and musician, and, thirdly, they must know what sort of Music does them good, and will make the young love virtue.

671 a 4. Now let us consider *wine* as a help towards securing this object. Wine, we agreed, makes the mature, for the time, more plastic and susceptible to external influences, but it also makes a man over-confident—even shameless, sometimes. Therefore an assembly of mature drinkers will need a ruler of the feast,

no less than does the symposium of the young. These rulers would naturally be men over sixty,—to see the rules kept, and to keep the peace.

672 a 4. So far, then, from the "madness" caused by wine being an evil, inflicted by a malignant power, as some say, the "fire" it puts into the blood has the same effect on us, when we are grown up, as the exuberant spirits and activity of childhood have on children. In both cases this liveliness is the soil out of which Music grows.

672 e. You two Dorians would, I know, like nothing better than a full discussion of the *gymnastic* training necessary for the *bodily* half of Music—i.e. *dancing*—which springs from the same soil as the other half; and you would discuss the subject admirably. But first let us finish off the topic of wine-drinking, by pointing out that the adoption of this mechanism by the state for educational purposes involves strict limitation by law of the *production* and *use* of wine. No city that adopts these regulations will need to have many vineyards.

ANALYSIS OF BOOK III

676. What is the nature of political organization? Since the world began there must have been countless civilizations which have arisen and been wiped out, with all their arts and devices, by natural cataclysms. After each cataclysm only a few scattered, uncivilized men must have been left on the mountain tops, and these would have to begin their civilization and the formation of communities all over again. To learn the nature and ground-work of political organizations the best way will be to follow, in imagination, the steps by which such scattered remains of unsophisticated humanity would coalesce and grow into a political community.

678 c. On overcoming the horror of the plains, caused by the recent catastrophe, these men would be driven, in the course of many generations, by social instinct to congregate; their wits would be sharpened by intercourse, and the arts would gradually revive—and among them the art of acquiring property, the art of lying, and the art of war.

679 e 6. In the course of this sketch we may be able to see

where and how *laws* come into being. The first form of community would be like what Homer described that of the Cyclopes to be, i.e. a *family* in which the father's will was the only law.

680 d 7. This *family* would naturally grow, in after generations, into a *clan*, of which the representative of the *father* of the original family would be the *chieftain*; it would have its own rough notions of what to do and what to avoid, and its own character. One clan might be braver, or more orderly, than another.

681 c 1. The next step is taken when separate clans — each wedded to its own customs, and each with its own character — coalesce to form a community. There would then have to be some compromise and common understanding as to what, of all the various customs, it would be good for the united community to adopt. *Here we have the beginning of the positive enactment of laws.*

681 d 7. Whereas the first community would settle probably on the lower slopes of the hills, the third stage would be reached when—all memory of the dangers of the plain having vanished—men ventured, in course of time, to build a city on an elevation in a plain. In this same age men would begin to traverse the sea, and city would begin to war with city. This brings us to the time of the Trojan war, and the beginning of history.

682 d 5. We next come to the foundation of the Dorian Confederacy of Sparta, Argos, and Messene; we return, that is, to an examination of the same Dorian institutions with which Book I. began.

683 c 8. How was it that that confederacy, in spite of all the advantages which its founders had, and of the formidable aspect which it presented to foreign powers, was yet a failure?

686 c 7. When we talk of the success or failure of a nation, we must not think exclusively of its ability to force its will on other nations, or of its lack of this power. The question is not, "is a state, or a man, strong?" but "is it (or he) wise enough to make a proper use of its strength?" *That* is what tests its *laws* and its lawgivers. The worst *un*wisdom (folly) is that of the state, or man, when *conscience* points one way, and *desire* another. That state of folly means ruin to a community, and to an individual: and there is no mental disability in a man which is such a complete disqualification for any political office as this want of harmony between the desires and the judgement.

689 e 4. There are seven *titles to power* over one's fellows: there is

(1) The right of *parents* over children and descendants;

(2) The right of those who are *royally born* to govern those who are not;

(3) The right of the *older* to rule the younger;

(4) The right of *masters* to rule their slaves;

(5) The right of the *stronger* to rule the weaker;

(6) The right of the *wise* to rule the less wise;

(7) The right which is decided by the fall of the *lot.*

With all these claims in the field, conflicts between claimants are inevitable.

690 d 5. It is an overweening sense of their own importance, and a desire to get too much out of their position, that generally brings ruin on kings. What saved Sparta, when Argos and Messene sank, was that the kingly power was *halved* by the fortunate birth of twins in the royal house, and was further *restricted* by the recognition, on the part of its legislators, of some of the other claims to power, besides that of *birth*—and the appointment of co-existing authorities.

692 d 1. So great was the defection of Argos and Messene, whose monarchs were left with an *unrestricted* power, that, as far as the interests of Hellas went, they largely nullified the good which Sparta was able to do.

693 a 5. A wise lawgiver then will recognize many fountains of authority in a state, and will see that only in this way can he secure the three main civic requisites, i.e. *freedom*, *statesmanship*, and *unity* (or *public spirit.*)

693 d 2. If these three objects are to be secured, the government must be neither an extreme *autocracy*, nor an extreme *democracy*, but must be a judicious mixture of the two.

694 a 3. *Persia's* history shows us how all its misfortunes came with the withdrawal of all restrictions from the kingly power.

698 a 9. In the days of *Athens's* glory *a respect for law* tempered the desire of every man to do as he liked; but this desire got the better of law in time—showing itself first in the realm of *Art*, where the untrained and uneducated *many* asserted their right to judge as against the educated and judicious few.

702 a 2. "How," asks the Athenian, "can we test the truth of all these principles at which, in our discussion, we have arrived?" Cleinias answers that there is a practical way open to them, in which they can embody and perhaps test their political principles; for he has himself been entrusted—with a few other citizens—with the task of framing *laws for a new colony.*

ANALYSIS OF BOOK IV

704. A city should not be a seaport, but should be at least ten miles inland from a harbour, on soil which produces many kinds of crops, but none in such abundance as to leave a surplus for exportation. Foreign trade is demoralizing; so is a navy: it takes the steadfastness out of a land-army to know they can get out of harm's way by taking to their ships; besides, sea-fighting gives no scope for merit, and no chance of winning honour. It was Marathon and Plataea which, respectively, began and completed the discomfiture of the barbarians, and the salvation of Hellas. If it *was* the navy which saved her, it would have been better for her to perish than so to be saved. Wrong living is worse than death.

707 e. If the colonists of the new city come, like a swarm of bees, all from the same home, they will pull together the better for it, but then prejudice against any improvement in constitution or legislation will be invincible. It will be better to undertake the difficult task of welding a heterogeneous populace into one. No man who is not equal to a great and difficult task is fit to be a lawgiver or the founder of a city.

709 a. For all his cleverness, however, the lawgiver may find *chance* too strong for him. Still, that is no reason for pronouncing *skill* worthless. If skill is helpless against bad luck, good luck is useless without skill.

709 d. Given a heaven-sent lawgiver then, what must a city like our colony ask of luck? This: that absolute power and influence over the whole body should be with one virtuous, wide-minded man, who can rule himself as well as the state, and who will take the lawgiver into his confidence and follow his advice. For our purposes it will be best, I say, for the power to be in one man's hands, always supposing that he possesses the above-mentioned virtues and qualifications. The difficulty of endowing a city with a perfect polity will be greater, the more the supreme power is, in the first case, limited, or subdivided. It is true that it is asking a great deal of Chance, to postulate such a conjunction of virtue and liberality of mind in a ruling power of any kind. But it is the only way to get a perfect polity, and it is an easy one.

712. If you have faith enough to take *this* from me, you will perhaps listen to me when I tell you what the best polity is, and what are the best laws.

After soliciting divine help let us proceed to consider the form of polity to be chosen.

713. The ordinary titles given by political philosophers—those ending in *-cracy*—all denote that one particular part of the community is supreme over the others; this is never the case in a *real* polity.

In the Golden Age Cronos appointed δαίμονες—superior beings—to rule over mankind; this analogy will explain what I think the right course at the present day. There is in man a divine part—his *mind*—and this divine element must do as Cronos did, and appoint subordinate ministers for our government. These ministers of mind's ordaining are the ordinances which we call *Laws*. These must be sovereign over the state, and over every member of it. But as we have seen that no real polity exists where one element of the populace is supreme over the others, so no laws have any binding force, which are made in the interest of any separate element in the state. To be binding they must be made in the best interest of the state as a whole; and *obedience to these laws* is the crowning virtue of the statesman and the administrator,—the main title to honour and office.

No state can thrive unless the rulers are the *slaves* of the *Law*.

I would begin by charging the citizens to remember that God's rule is inevitable and all-pervading, and that righteousness and vengeance against unrighteousness are his constant attendants. Therefore wickedness is folly, and though the wicked man may prosper for a time, his prosperity will only make his ruin the more disastrous both to himself and to society.

716 c. How then is man to please God?

In all God's works "Measure" is discernible. Like, as the proverb says, clings to like, and man's wisdom is to live by *measure*. To break bounds, to be lawless, is impiety, and even the offerings and the prayers of an impious man are hateful to God. For the pious, however, it is the first of duties to pay worship and honour to all Gods, both the higher and the lower; next after them to the memory of "divine" men, and next to one's *parents*. To our parents and to their care we owe our being: nothing that we can do for them can overpay them, and remember that the time when we can repay is the time of their greatest need—when the payment is most valuable. The greatest care must be taken never, by word or deed, to show disrespect to parents. When they are angry with us, we must

not resent it. When they die, we must pay due honour to their ashes.

718. So much for our duties to our superiors. We must go to the *laws* to learn how our life is to be adorned by duties done to our family, to our fellow-citizens, or even to strangers.

Before each class or chapter of laws it will be well to set a *preface*, to explain the principle of the enactments, to recommend their adoption, and generally to bring the subjects of the laws into such a state of mind as will be favourable to their acceptance.

719. As it is, the way of evil is easy, and the path of virtue hard: the voice of the law is *precise* and *prosaic*; all the more need for some adornment of the subject. Such a preface may be compared with the confidential talk which a skilful physician will hold with an enlightened patient, before prescribing his medicine and treatment.

720. As a sample, take the bare law as to marriage—which may well be among the first things to be regulated—and add a disquisition on the principles on which it is founded, and the desirability of the objects it seeks to attain.

722. Even Megillus, with all his Spartan love of brevity, prefers a law with such a preface to one without. And the Athenian assures him that the excess of benefit is far beyond the excess in length. Further, the Athenian compares such a preamble to the prelude with which a skilful musician brings his audience into accord with his main theme, and hints incidentally that great skill, comparable to that of the musician, will be necessary for its composition; for the "themes" of different classes of laws differ widely, and all laws, with some trifling exceptions, need to be accompanied by such a preamble.

Fortified with this instrument, we will make a second start. As to religion and religious duties, what has been already said may suffice. Next follow duties affecting (1) our own souls, (2) our bodies, and (3) our property.

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ANALYSIS OF BOOK V

726. Honour the soul next to Heaven! There are in practice many wrong methods of honouring the soul which must be avoided—such as self-opinionatedness, and self-indulgence.

728 d 2. As to our duties to the *Body*, and *Property*, we must remember that a *middle* state is best in both.—Duties there are also to one's *family*, *relatives*, *friends*, *the state*, and *foreigners*.

730 b 1. Of desirable personal qualities *Truth* stands highest; next comes *Justice*—and personal efforts to see *right* done and *wrong* punished; honourable too are *Temperance* and *Wisdom*—provided these virtues are of a *social* character, and tend to spread to others and help others. Even *Anger* is necessary, in its place—but *Mercy* too.

731 d 6. The most general, ugly, and disastrous blemish in human character is *selfishness*. It clouds the judgement, and is fruitful in folly and error.

732 d 8. Such conduct as has been recommended is not only right in itself, and so pleasing to Heaven; it is *best* and *pleasantest* for man.

733 d 7. This may be seen from the consideration of various kinds of *lives*—that of the *temperate*, the *intellectual*, the *brave*, or the *healthy* as contrasted with that of the *intemperate*, the *simpleton*, the *coward*, or the *diseased*, respectively. The *balance of happiness* will throughout be found on the side of the former, though the latter may have moments of acuter enjoyment.

734 e 3. The political framework of a state consists of (*a*) the Magistrates, who are of a superior nature to the ordinary citizen; and (*b*) the Laws, which the magistrates have to administer.

735 a 7. Applicants for citizenship in our colony must be tested, and the unsatisfactory applicants rejected—summarily, or on some specious pretext.

736 c 5. As it is a new foundation, all citizens can start fair, unhampered by debts, and the overshadowing influence of great estates which mar the peace of an old-established state. But peace will not reign long here unless the *pride of possession* can be mitigated, and the love of gain for itself eradicated.

737 c 1. Supposing for the sake of argument that the size of the territory, the nature of the soil, and the size of the neighbouring state will admit, we will imagine a community of

5040 householders. The number lends itself readily to many kinds of sub-division.

738 b 2. Advantage must be taken of any *religious* association the land enjoys, and of all possible religious sentiment on the part of the members of the community—such, e.g., as respect for *Oracles*. Each local division must have a patron deity, whose shrine and τέμενος will form the centre of tribal life, and social intercourse among the tribesmen.

739. This is a practical treatise: it will try to find ways out of all kinds of difficulties, and where perfection is impossible, it will advise a course which may be only *second*, or even *third* best. But it holds that the philosophic lawgiver's first duty is to hold up before his hearers an *ideal perfection*, so that we may make *comparison with it* a test for every proposal. The nearer it comes to the *ideal* state of things, the better it is.

739 e 8. Our first deviation from the ideal will be in the matter of *property*. In an ideal state all will be in common, but our citizens are to be allowed to possess *land* and *houses*. They must always remember, however, that the land is part of the *state*, and owned by the *state* as well as by themselves; and also that it is *sacred*, as being a part of the divine *Mother Earth*: hence let their holding be *sacred to them*, an *inviolable unit*. It must be a main object of high statesmanship so to regulate the size of families that each generation shall be roughly of the same size as the preceding one.

741 a 6. I would charge the citizens to respect the equal distribution of property, and the numerical arrangements connected with it. It must be a sacred duty with them to preserve their holding intact, and to shrink from adding to their property by trade; for this would upset the numerical distribution. Trade in general is debasing to the character, and should be discouraged.

741 e 6. No citizen shall be allowed to possess *gold* or *silver money*. The baser, small, currency which will be allowed, will be in use chiefly among artificers and slaves. If a citizen has to go abroad on public or private business, he will be furnished with money for his journey by the state.

742 c 2. Dowries are to be forbidden; and so is *credit* and *usury*.

742 d 1. The wise lawgiver and politician will not look first to the *greatness* and *wealth* of his country, but to its *virtue* and *happiness*. It is impossible for the *very* rich to be *very* good. To be the former a man must have no scruples about *gaining*, and no impulses towards *spending* more than is absolutely necessary.

743 c 5. The absence of *money*, and *money-making*, and *credit*, will remove many obstacles to peace and good-feeling—there will be *far fewer lawsuits*—and men will have time to spare for the real interests of their (1) *souls* and (2) *bodies*. *Property* must take its place as of only *third-rate* importance. This order must be recognized by the state in all honours it confers; and the law-giver must test his laws by asking if they recognize this order of precedence.

744 a 8. Still, property must count for something in the state. Our new citizens will (unfortunately) not all bring equal properties with them when they come. Those who have much will be able to add to their store—and this will be permitted within certain limits.—And so we will have *Four Classes* in the state, arranged on a property qualification. The state must see to it that there is no *abject poverty*, and that there are *no millionaires*. It must be a *crime* to divide the κλῆρος, and a *crime* to hold more than *four times* its original amount of land. Any property gained beyond that must go to the state, and the gods. There shall be a *Public Register* of all surplus property—of all, i.e., beyond the original κλῆρος, which any citizens hold.

745 b 3. The city must stand on the middle of its territory, with a central "acropolis sacred to Hestia, Zeus and Athena." From this shall radiate lines dividing (1) the *city* and (2) the *country* into twelve parts—not necessarily equal in size, but equal in productive power.

745 e 2. Each κλῆρος shall consist of two parts, one near the city, and one at a distance, and there shall be a *dwelling-house* on both.

745 e 7. In all this I say again that the lawgiver must have an *ideal*, and, in practice, you must come as near it as you can.

746 d 3. Let *mathematics* preside over all tribal and other divisions, as well as over all *measures* and *weights* in daily use, and let them all be arranged so as to fit in with and be readily interchanged with each other.

There is no mental discipline so efficacious as mathematics, if it be kept *liberal*, as a *science*, and not debased for purposes of trade. We do not want our citizens to be Egyptians or Phoenicians. (It may not be their fault, poor fellows: there is something magical in *climate* and *situation*, as all politicians ought to know.)

ANALYSIS OF BOOK VI

751. We have now to choose fit persons as magistrates, and assign to them administrative duties. It is imperative that they should be *capable*. Not only must candidates for office have a good record, but the electorate must be trained in the constitution and its ways.

752. In the case of a newly formed state, with new laws, and a heterogeneous population, such education is impossible. In the *first* election of officials, then, the parent state must intervene. To begin with, they must help the colonists to select from among themselves and the parent state a body of 37 νομοφύλακες. This body is to be permanent, and future elections to it, in days when the state has taken shape, must be conducted in the following manner. Voters to be all who bear arms, or have seen service, whether in cavalry or infantry; election—in the most sacred temple—to proceed by three stages; at the first stage 300, at the second 100, at the final 37 are to be elected. For the first election, however, and for all arrangements as to elections and qualifications of all magistrates, a committee of 200—half colonists and half Cnossians—is to have full powers.

754 d 4. The body of νομοφύλακες must (1) exercise general supervision over the laws of the state, and (2) must keep the register of each man's property; and (3) if it be proved to them that any man possesses more than a trifle above the legal amount, they are to ordain the confiscation of all but the original κλῆρος. A νομοφύλαξ must be over 50 and under 70. In addition to the three duties named above they will have many others which we shall have occasion to mention in connexion with the laws concerned.

Now as to the other magistrates.

755 b 6. The three στρατηγοί are to be elected, by all who are serving, or have served as soldiers, from a preliminary list nominated by the νομοφύλακες, but subject to the criticism of a popular vote. They must then pass the δοκιμασία. The *Hipparchs* are to be elected in the same manner, only the actual voters (according to **756 b 1**) are to be the cavalry. The Taxiarchs and Phylarchs are to be nominated by their superior officers and elected by the hoplites and cavalry respectively. The officers of the light-armed auxiliaries are to be appointed by the generals. The first elections are to be presided over by the νομοφύλακες; subsequent ones by the πρυτάνεις—of whom more hereafter—and

the presiding magistrates must decide between candidates who on successive occasions have obtained equal votes.

756 b 7. Next as to the *βουλή*.

Three hundred and sixty *βουλευταί* are to be elected—90 by each of the four property-classes. All members of the community may vote. On the first four days candidates are *nominated*—an unlimited number—from each of the four classes respectively; on the fifth day 180 of each class are to be selected by all voters from among the nominees, and 90 out of each 180 *selected by lot*. These, when they have passed the *δοκιμασία*, are to serve as *βουλευταί* for the year. On the third day of nomination the fourth class are not compelled to nominate, and on the fourth day the third and fourth classes are not compelled to nominate. At all other stages, nomination and voting are compulsory.

757. In this form of election, while the introduction of the *lot* prevents the richer classes from having *absolute* power, the *preponderance* of power given to these classes is for the good of the community. *True equality* consists, not in giving equal power to every man, but in giving power *in proportion to worth*. This can really be done by God alone, but it is our duty to *attempt* it, and not to acquiesce either in the absolute power of one or a few—i.e. in oligarchy or tyranny—or on the other hand in the absolute equality of all—i.e. democracy. We must never lose sight of the difference between the worth of different individuals, though of that true equality—which consists of inequality—we can, in our human communities, only get *a passable imitation*. This is one reason why we must submit to have our judgement "watered" by the *lot*; another reason is that the lot *may* be guided by a higher and wiser power. At the same time the lot must not be our master.

758. That there may always be some officials on the look-out for dangers—whether external or internal—to the state: that there may be representatives of the state ready to deal with foreign states, and to preside over state assemblies, a twelfth part of the *βουλή* must, in monthly rotation, form a standing committee called *πρυτάνεις*.

758 e. For *local surveillance* both in country and in town the twelvefold divisions (cp. above, 745 b 6 ff.) will form convenient administrative areas. Besides providing for the charge of religious edifices and the land annexed to them, we must institute three kinds of local magistrates: (1) *ἀστυνόμοι* for the supervision of the city, (2) *ἀγορανόμοι* for that of the market-place and trade, (3) *ἀγρονόμοι* for the defence and policing of the country districts.

As to the religious officials, families already enjoying hereditary priesthoods are to be left in possession of them. In their appointment we must observe a similar admixture of choice by lot to that advocated in the case of the *βουλευταί*, and the *δοκιμασία* must be strict. The Delphic Oracle will communicate directions as to worship and religion generally to six (?) official *ἐξηγηταί* elected from groups of the local tribes, and partly selected from among a larger number by the Oracle. Like the priests and priestesses they must be over sixty, but while the former only hold office for a year, the *ἐξηγηταί* are appointed for life. Vacancies caused by death are to be filled in by the tribe from which the deceased *ἐξηγητής* came. Temple treasurers are to be appointed from the highest property-class by an election and *δοκιμασία* like that of the *στρατηγοί*.

760 a 6. For the protection of the city we have the generals and other military officers, as well as the *πρυτάνεις*, and we shall deal later with two other classes of city officials, i.e. the Astynomi and Agoranomi. As to the *country districts*, to each of the twelve equal divisions a tribe will be assigned by lot, and this tribe will have to appoint five Phrourarchs, who must each choose twelve active young men, of their tribe, between 25 and 30 years old. Each tribal corps (of five officers and sixty men) shall serve for a month in one tribal area, and the whole body shall rotate twice through the areas, first from left to right, then backwards, that they may learn the country thoroughly in different seasons. This will take two years, after which a fresh corps will be appointed. Their duties will be (1) to watch the frontiers and construct defensive works of all kinds, (2) to keep internal peace and facilitate communication within the country, (3) to guard against floods on the one hand, and drought on the other, (4) to add to the amenities of the landscape, and provide gymnasia and public baths, (5) they are to constitute a tribunal for petty causes. They may "commandeer" slaves and beasts of burden for the public work—studying the convenience of the owners as far as possible in so doing. Any abuse of power or any corruption is to be regarded as a serious and disgraceful offence. They shall live a military life, under strict discipline, and with frugal fare: any desertion or dereliction on the part of the officers shall be punishable by the rank and file, the *νομοφύλακες* being the supreme authority in such cases. This discipline should create devotion to and respect for *loyal service*, which is far more important and valuable to a state and to individuals than *skilful command*.

763 c 3. For the City three Astynomi—chosen partly by lot, and partly by universal vote, from among the members of the highest property-class—are each to take four divisions of the city area into his charge. Their duty will resemble the non-military part of the duty of the Agronomi—roads, water-supply, town-planning will be under their charge. By a similar method of election five Ἀgoranomi are to be appointed from the two highest classes—to police the *ἀγορά* and have charge of the temple-buildings and fountains in it, and to enforce the state laws as to trade. Astynomi and Agoranomi are to try petty causes separately, larger ones in conjunction.

764 c 5. The next officials to be elected are those who have charge of *Education*—mental and physical. Of these there are two kinds: (1) those who superintend schools and school-work, and (2) those who have charge of the arrangements for public contests. In this latter class the variety of subjects will necessitate a sub-division of provinces into (1) athletic contests and chariot-races; (2) musical and dramatic individual performances, and (3) choric performances. For the third class one superintendent will suffice, who must be at least forty. For contests between single performers also one superintendent official will suffice; he must be at least thirty. The choric and the solo superintendents must be chosen in the following manner: only musical adepts will be eligible, and only such will be compelled to elect—the *νομοφύλακες* being the judges of who are such.—Of the ten who get most votes the lot is to choose one, who must further stand a *δοκιμασία* in which the only point considered is his musical ability. They are to hold office for a year.—For chariot-races and other gymnastic contests the superintendents—three out of a preliminary twenty—are to be elected from the third and second property-classes, and pass the requisite *δοκιμασία*—the three highest classes being compelled to vote.

765 d 4. The superintendent of Education proper is by far the most important official in the whole state, for the first stage of the growth of plant, animal, or man has more influence than any other upon its ultimate development; and the higher the organization the greater the possibilities for evil as well as for good. He must be above fifty, and the father of legitimate offspring; he must be a *νομοφύλαξ*, and be selected by the whole body of state officials —not counting the *βουλευταί* or *πρυτάνεις* as such—and the election must be by ballot, in the temple of Apollo, and be succeeded by the *δοκιμασία*.

766 c 2. Vacancies in any office—or among the guardians of orphans—are to be filled up by the original appointers. In the latter case the vacancy must be filled up within ten days, and the appointers—relatives on both sides—are to be fined a drachma a day each as long as they are in default.

766 d 3. As to *Law Courts*—the judges in which are a kind of magistrate—full details cannot be settled till all the laws are made; but we may give here a *sketch* of the principles of their constitution.—We expect wisdom and enlightenment from our judges—not bare decisions only, but reasoned judgements—therefore they must be *few and good.* At the same time certain public offences must be tried by a democratic tribunal, for everyone is wronged by offences against the state; and there must be no kind of court of first instance in which any citizen is disqualified from holding a place—this is a fundamental right of every member of the community. (In some courts at all events the position of the public seems somewhat to resemble that of a modern *jury.*) Private causes should be first tried before an informal assembly of friends and neighbours, with two appeal courts above it.—In private causes, *if both sides agree* to refer the decision of the matter to a particular court, the decision shall be final. Where one man impeaches another, whether the offence be private or public, there are to be two appeals. The final court of appeal for all causes is to be instituted thus: on the last day of the old year all the state officials are to assemble in a temple, and choose on oath one judge from each set of officials; and then to scrutinize the list.—Bouleutae and the magistrates who choose the magistrates must be present when the court delivers judgement; it must be open to the public, and judges are to be liable to impeachment for unjust judgement before the *νομοφύλακες.*

768 d 7. So much for the *magistracy* — the framework of government— : now we turn to the Laws, and in these we must not expect finality at the first attempt. With a view to their modification as the result of time and experience, we must endeavour to imbue the Nomophylakes with the true legislator's spirit; they must see clearly that the result of all legislation is *the perfection of the individual,* and the removal, and the discrediting of all that hinders it. Neither individual nor state must be content to survive the abandonment of this ideal.

771 a 5. All laws should have their foundation in religion. The number of households indicated above is 5040. There is an adaptability and a consonance with the general order of things

about this number which should make our people regard it as *sacred.* Each twelfth part of this number is to form a community with a patron deity of its own; and two monthly festivals, one in town, and one in the country are to be celebrated by it. The effect of these will be not only religious, but *social*; they will bring the people of the community together, and make them known to each other. Above all they will facilitate suitable *marriages* between the families. The diversions, especially for the young, at these festivals will be under the superintendence of the directors of choruses, and the νομοφύλακες. It will take at least ten years to make satisfactory arrangements for these festivals; when once fixed, they should only be altered by an unanimous vote, and with religious sanction.

772 d 5. Every man should be married by thirty-five.

The *sort of marriage* must be that which is *best for the state*, not that which is most to the taste of the individual.—Rich should not aim at marrying with rich; if they do, wealth will pile itself up at one end of the scale, and poverty increase at the other. Like should not seek like in character either: the marriage of people of opposite temperaments will keep the balance more level in character as well as property. Another important point in the exhortation to be addressed to young men will be that *marriage is a duty to the community.*—A man who is unmarried at thirty-five must pay a yearly tax according to his property-class, and shall be held dishonoured thereby.—Another penal offence will be the giving or receiving a dowry beyond what is necessary for the trousseau suitable for each class.—Relatives on the father's or mother's side shall have power to act as legal representatives of bride or bridegroom, in proportion to their nearness—the father's side to have precedence.—For wedding ceremonies the Exegetae must be consulted.—There must be a sumptuary law to limit the sum expended on the wedding-feast. Above all the bridegroom and bride must be abstemious as to wine on the occasion: then if ever "to begin well" is a sacred duty.—The newly-married pair should migrate to the country-house of the family; so much separation will improve the family relationship, and the young couple will rear their family, like good citizens, by themselves.

776 b 5. Next to marriage comes the subject of Property, and the property that will need the most careful treatment is *household slaves.* Very various are the opinions expressed as to the character and value of slaves, and very difficult it is to give rules for their treatment—mainly because both slaves and masters are

of such different characters. There are slaves who might be trusted to be masters, and there are masters who would be better as slaves. Two practical precepts may be given on this head : (1) slaves should not be of the same race as their masters ; (2) we should guard against injustice towards slaves more rigidly than against injustice to a free man.—Nowhere does a man display his goodness more clearly than in his treatment of his dependants. Still, when they have deserved it, slaves should be *punished*, but *you should not argue with them*—nor should you ever be *familiar* or *intimate* with them ; it will make the relationship worse both for the slaves and for yourselves.

778 b. Though the house must naturally be built before the family settles in it, the importance of *marriage* is an excuse for postponing the question of *Building* till now.—*Temples* should be built round the agora, and on elevated ground all about the city. —Adjoining the temples should be the official residences of the magistrates, and the law-courts for capital cases.—The city need not have walls : they make a city unhealthy ; they tempt armies to retire within them, and diminish the caution of the guards ; the rural and other forces and the frontier and rural defence-works will render walls superfluous. At the same time, a partial substitute for walls may be provided, if it is thought necessary, by turning the blind side of all houses towards the streets, and building them in continuous blocks. The Astynomi will have to arrange the houses with this object, and to take care that no private building shall be an obstacle to defensive operations.—The surface-drainage will also be in their charge. Here, as elsewhere, the Nomophylakes must revise and emend the laws, where necessary, with a view to public convenience.

779 d 7. In dealing with *the regulation of the life of the newly married couple* we enter upon difficult and dangerous ground. There is a general notion that the lawgiver should only touch public life, and leave private life alone. I expect much ridicule and opposition, therefore, to my proposal to make both husband and wife members of *syssitia*, and so to interfere with the private life of women, who have hitherto been allowed to shrink completely from all publicity. The syssitia for men was a great innovation, and nothing but a fortunate chain of circumstances could have served to establish it where it exists. Now I say that much of the good which such an institution might do is lost at present *because women are not included.* Not only is law and order more efficacious for good in a civic community than in an

individual, but *its absence is more mischievous.* The danger is all the greater in this case, because women are morally worse than men to begin with (!). In view of the immense changes which history and observation of other nations show us to have taken place in men's feelings about all manner of things, I do not despair of the possibility of assent to this legislation.

782 d 10. The fact is, there are three imperative desires, on the satisfaction of which the existence of the race depends: that for food, that for drink, and that for sexual union—and the good, both of individuals and the state, depends on these desires being satisfied *in the right way.* To put it shortly, the right principle which should guide men in the satisfaction of these desires is that the good of the community should come to count for more than the pleasure of the individual. The means to be taken to bridle these dangerous impulses are also three—fear, habit, and philosophy, and the help must be invoked of the Muses, and the religious festivals.

783 b 2. I will leave the subject here, in the hope that the spirit of my remarks may pervade the legislature, and that in the complete code room may be found for such a regulation of private life as I have advocated.

783 d 8. All communion heightens the effect of right endeavour, but also increases the mischief of carelessnes or slackness. In this marriage-union both the parties should strive above all to give the state the best citizens they can produce. A class of wise women officials should exist in the state to enlighten the newly married in the methods for securing this end, with powers to keep them up to their duty during the first ten years of their married life. Failure of offspring during these ten years should be held to be a ground for divorce. The ultimate tribunal in cases of divorce should be the relatives of both sides, with Nomophylakes as assessors. When right feeling pervades a community, many of these regulations will remain a dead letter, but they should be there for the punishment of offenders.

785 a 3. *Birth registers* should be kept by public officials in each φρατρία.

785 b 2. A woman should marry between 16 and 20, a man between 30 and 35.—No woman magistrate must be under 40; no man magistrate under 30.—The age for military service for a man is between 20 and 60; for a woman—if she has to serve—between 40 and 50.

NOMOI

(A–E)

ΑΘΗΝΑΙΟΣ ΞΕΝΟΣ ΚΛΕΙΝΙΑΣ ΚΡΗΣ
ΜΕΓΙΛΛΟΣ ΛΑΚΕΔΑΙΜΟΝΙΟΣ

BOOK I

SHORT ANALYSIS

622 a–632 d 7.—Spartan and Cretan State institutions teach us that law should foster virtue—i.e. aim at producing human perfection—but they take too narrow a view of what virtue is—they look to bravery alone, and that is only a part, and that the least valuable part, of virtue.

632 d 8–636 e 4.—How virtue is to be fostered—e.g. temperance. In the case of courage and temperance the processes seem similar.

636 e 4 to end of Book. *Μέθη.*

637 b 7.—*Μέθη* bad because unregulated.

641 a 3 to end of Book. The right use of *μέθη.*

643 a 2.—What education implies.

644 b 6.—Education consists in the regulation of the effects of pleasure and pain.

645 d 1.—The practical application of *μέθη* in education.

St. II p. 624

ΑΘ. Θεὸς ἤ τις ἀνθρώπων ὑμῖν, ὦ ξένοι, εἴληφε τὴν αἰτίαν τῆς τῶν νόμων διαθέσεως; a

ΚΛ. Θεός, ὦ ξένε, θεός, ὥς γε τὸ δικαιότατον εἰπεῖν· παρὰ μὲν ἡμῖν Ζεύς, παρὰ δὲ Λακεδαιμονίοις, ὅθεν ὅδε ἐστίν, οἶμαι φάναι τούτους Ἀπόλλωνα. ἦ γάρ; 5

ΜΕ. Ναί.

ΑΘ. Μῶν οὖν καθ' Ὅμηρον λέγεις ὡς τοῦ Μίνω φοιτῶντος πρὸς τὴν τοῦ πατρὸς ἑκάστοτε συνουσίαν δι' ἐνάτου b ἔτους καὶ κατὰ τὰς παρ' ἐκείνου φήμας ταῖς πόλεσιν ὑμῖν θέντος τοὺς νόμους;

ΚΛ. Λέγεται γὰρ οὕτω παρ' ἡμῖν· καὶ δὴ καὶ τὸν ἀδελφόν γε αὐτοῦ Ῥαδάμανθυν—ἀκούετε γὰρ τὸ ὄνομα—δικαιό- 5 τατον γεγονέναι. τοῦτον οὖν φαῖμεν ἂν ἡμεῖς γε οἱ Κρῆτες, 625 ἐκ τοῦ τότε διανέμειν τὰ περὶ τὰς δίκας, ὀρθῶς τοῦτον τὸν ἔπαινον αὐτὸν εἰληφέναι.

ΑΘ. Καὶ καλόν γε τὸ κλέος ὑεῖ τε Διὸς μάλα πρέπον. ἐπειδὴ δὲ ἐν τοιούτοις ἤθεσι τέθραφθε νομικοῖς σύ τε καὶ ὅδε, προσδοκῶ οὐκ ἂν ἀηδῶς περί τε πολιτείας τὰ νῦν καὶ νόμων τὴν διατριβήν, λέγοντάς τε καὶ ἀκούοντας ἅμα κατὰ τὴν πορείαν, ποιήσασθαι. πάντως δ' ἥ γε ἐκ Κνωσοῦ ὁδὸς εἰς τὸ τοῦ Διὸς ἄντρον καὶ ἱερόν, ὡς ἀκούομεν, ἱκανή, καὶ ἀνάπαυλαι κατὰ τὴν ὁδόν, ὡς εἰκός, πνίγους ὄντος τὰ νῦν, ἐν τοῖς ὑψηλοῖς δένδρεσίν εἰσι σκιαραί, καὶ ταῖς ἡλικίαις πρέπον ἂν ἡμῶν εἴη τὸ διαναπαύεσθαι πυκνὰ ἐν αὐταῖς, λόγοις τε ἀλλήλους παραμυθουμένους τὴν ὁδὸν ἅπασαν οὕτω μετὰ ῥᾳστώνης διαπεραῖναι.

ΚΛ. Καὶ μὴν ἔστιν γε, ὦ ξένε, προϊόντι κυπαρίττων τε ἐν τοῖς ἄλσεσιν ὕψη καὶ κάλλη θαυμάσια, καὶ λειμῶνες ἐν οἷσιν ἀναπαυόμενοι διατρίβοιμεν ἄν.

ΑΘ. Ὀρθῶς λέγεις.

ΚΛ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν· ἰδόντες δὲ μᾶλλον φήσομεν. ἀλλ' ἴωμεν ἀγαθῇ τύχῃ.

ΑΘ. Ταῦτ' εἴη. καί μοι λέγε· κατὰ τί τὰ συσσίτιά τε ὑμῖν συντέταχεν ὁ νόμος καὶ τὰ γυμνάσια καὶ τὴν τῶν ὅπλων ἕξιν;

ΚΛ. Οἶμαι μέν, ὦ ξένε, καὶ παντὶ ῥᾴδιον ὑπολαβεῖν εἶναι τά γε ἡμέτερα. τὴν γὰρ τῆς χώρας πάσης Κρήτης φύσιν ὁρᾶτε ὡς οὐκ ἔστι, καθάπερ ἡ τῶν Θετταλῶν, πεδιάς, διὸ δὴ καὶ τοῖς μὲν ἵπποις ἐκεῖνοι χρῶνται μᾶλλον, δρόμοισιν δὲ ἡμεῖς· ἥδε γὰρ ἀνώμαλος αὖ καὶ πρὸς τὴν τῶν πεζῇ δρόμων ἄσκησιν μᾶλλον σύμμετρος. ἐλαφρὰ δὴ τὰ ὅπλα ἀναγκαῖον ἐν τῷ τοιούτῳ κεκτῆσθαι καὶ μὴ βάρος ἔχοντα θεῖν· τῶν δὴ τόξων καὶ τοξευμάτων ἡ κουφότης ἁρμόττειν δοκεῖ. ταῦτ' οὖν πρὸς τὸν πόλεμον ἡμῖν ἅπαντα ἐξήρτυται, καὶ πάνθ' ὁ νομοθέτης, ὥς γ' ἐμοὶ φαίνεται, πρὸς τοῦτο βλέπων συνετάττετο· ἐπεὶ καὶ τὰ συσσίτια κινδυνεύει συναγαγεῖν, ὁρῶν ὡς πάντες ὁπόταν στρατεύωνται, τόθ' ὑπ' αὐτοῦ τοῦ πράγματος ἀναγκάζονται φυλακῆς αὑτῶν ἕνεκα συσσιτεῖν τοῦτον τὸν χρόνον. ἄνοιαν δή μοι δοκεῖ καταγνῶναι τῶν πολλῶν ὡς οὐ μανθανόντων ὅτι πόλεμος ἀεὶ πᾶσιν διὰ βίου συνεχής ἐστι πρὸς ἁπάσας τὰς πόλεις. εἰ δὴ πολέμου γε ὄντος φυλακῆς ἕνεκα δεῖ συσσιτεῖν καί τινας ἄρχοντας καὶ ἀρχομένους διακεκοσμημένους εἶναι φύλακας αὐτῶν, τοῦτο καὶ ἐν εἰρήνῃ δραστέον. ἦν γὰρ καλοῦσιν οἱ πλεῖστοι τῶν

ἀνθρώπων εἰρήνην, τοῦτ' εἶναι μόνον ὄνομα, τῷ δ' ἔργῳ πάσαις πρὸς πάσας τὰς πόλεις ἀεὶ πόλεμον ἀκήρυκτον κατὰ φύσιν εἶναι. καὶ σχεδὸν ἀνευρήσεις, οὕτω σκοπῶν, τὸν Κρητῶν νομοθέτην ὡς εἰς τὸν πόλεμον ἅπαντα δημοσίᾳ καὶ ἰδίᾳ τὰ νόμιμα ἡμῖν ἀποβλέπων συνετάξατο, καὶ κατὰ ταῦτα οὕτω φυλάττειν παρέδωκε τοὺς νόμους, ὡς τῶν ἄλλων οὐδενὸς οὐδὲν ὄφελος ὂν οὔτε κτημάτων οὔτ' ἐπιτηδευμάτων, ἂν μὴ τῷ πολέμῳ ἄρα κρατῇ τις, πάντα δὲ τὰ τῶν νικωμένων ἀγαθὰ τῶν νικώντων γίγνεσθαι.

ΑΘ. Καλῶς γε, ὦ ξένε, φαίνῃ μοι γεγυμνάσθαι πρὸς τὸ διειδέναι τὰ Κρητῶν νόμιμα. τόδε δέ μοι φράζε ἔτι σαφέστερον· ὂν γὰρ ὄρον ἔθου τῆς εὖ πολιτευομένης πόλεως, δοκεῖς μοι λέγειν οὕτω κεκοσμημένην οἰκεῖν δεῖν, ὥστε πολέμῳ νικᾶν τὰς ἄλλας πόλεις. ἦ γάρ;

ΚΛ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν· οἶμαι δὲ καὶ τῷδε οὕτω συνδοκεῖν.

ΜΕ. Πῶς γὰρ ἂν ἄλλως ἀποκρίναιτο, ὦ θεῖε, Λακεδαιμονίων γε ὁστισοῦν;

ΑΘ. Πότερ' οὖν δὴ πόλεσι μὲν πρὸς πόλεις ὀρθὸν τοῦτ' ἐστί, κώμῃ δὲ πρὸς κώμην ἕτερον;

ΚΛ. Οὐδαμῶς.

ΑΘ. Ἀλλὰ ταὐτόν;

ΚΛ. Ναί.

ΑΘ. Τί δέ; πρὸς οἰκίαν οἰκίᾳ τῶν ἐν τῇ κώμῃ, καὶ πρὸς ἄνδρα ἀνδρὶ ἑνὶ πρὸς ἕνα, ταὐτὸν ἔτι;

ΚΛ. Ταὐτόν.

ΑΘ. Αὐτῷ δὲ πρὸς αὑτὸν πότερον ὡς πολεμίῳ πρὸς πολέμιον διανοητέον; ἢ πῶς ἔτι λέγομεν;

ΚΛ. Ὦ ξένε Ἀθηναῖε—οὐ γάρ σε Ἀττικὸν ἐθέλοιμ' ἂν προσαγορεύειν· δοκεῖς γάρ μοι τῆς θεοῦ ἐπωνυμίας ἄξιος εἶναι μᾶλλον ἐπονομάζεσθαι· τὸν γὰρ λόγον ἐπ' ἀρχὴν ὀρθῶς ἀναγαγὼν σαφέστερον ἐποίησας, ὥστε ῥᾷον ἀνευρήσεις ὅτι νυνδὴ ὑφ' ἡμῶν ὀρθῶς ἐρρήθη τὸ πολεμίους εἶναι πάντας πᾶσιν δημοσίᾳ τε, καὶ ἰδίᾳ ἑκάστους αὐτοὺς σφίσιν αὐτοῖς.

ΑΘ. Πῶς εἴρηκας, ὦ θαυμάσιε;

ΚΛ. Κἀνταῦθα, ὦ ξένε, τὸ νικᾶν αὐτὸν αὑτὸν πασῶν νικῶν πρώτη τε καὶ ἀρίστη, τὸ δὲ ἡττᾶσθαι αὐτὸν ὑφ' ἑαυτοῦ πάντων αἴσχιστόν τε ἅμα καὶ κάκιστον. ταῦτα γὰρ ὡς πολέμου ἐν ἑκάστοις ἡμῶν ὄντος πρὸς ἡμᾶς αὐτοὺς σημαίνει.

ΑΘ. Πάλιν τοίνυν τὸν λόγον ἀναστρέψωμεν. ἐπειδὴ γὰρ εἷς ἕκαστος ἡμῶν ὁ μὲν κρειττων αὐτοῦ, ὁ δὲ ἥττων
627 ἐστί, πότερα φῶμεν οἰκίαν τε καὶ κώμην καὶ πόλιν ἕχειν ταὐτὸν τοῦτο ἐν αὑταῖς ἢ μὴ φῶμεν;

ΚΛ. Τὸ κρείττω τε ἑαυτῆς εἶναι λέγεις τινά, τὴν δ' ἥττω;

ΑΘ. Ναί.

5 ΚΛ. Καὶ τοῦτο ὀρθῶς ἤρου· πάνυ γὰρ ἔστι καὶ σφόδρα τὸ τοιοῦτον, οὐχ ἥκιστα ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν. ἐν ὁπόσαις μὲν γὰρ οἱ ἀμείνονες νικῶσιν τὸ πλῆθος καὶ τοὺς χείρους, ὀρθῶς ἂν αὕτη κρειττων τε ἑαυτῆς λέγοιθ' ἡ πόλις, ἐπαινοῖτό τε ἂν δικαιότατα τῇ τοιαύτῃ νίκῃ· τοὐναντίον δέ, ὅπου
10 τἀναντία.

b ΑΘ. Τὸ μὲν τοίνυν εἴ ποτέ ἐστίν που τὸ χεῖρον κρεῖττον τοῦ ἀμείνονος ἐάσωμεν—μακροτέρου γὰρ λόγου—τὸ δὲ ὑπὸ σοῦ λεγόμενον μανθάνω νῦν, ὡς ποτε πολῖται, συγγενεῖς καὶ τῆς αὐτῆς πόλεως γεγονότες, ἄδικοι καὶ πολλοὶ συνελθόντες,
5 δικαίους ἐλάττους ὄντας βιάσονται δουλούμενοι, καὶ ὅταν μὲν κρατήσωσιν, ἥττων ἡ πόλις αὑτῆς ὀρθῶς αὕτη λέγοιτ' ἂν ἅμα καὶ κακή, ὅπου δ' ἂν ἡττῶνται, κρειττων τε καὶ ἀγαθή.

c ΚΛ. Καὶ μάλα ἄτοπον, ὦ ξένε, τὸ νῦν λεγόμενον· ὅμως δὲ ὁμολογεῖν οὕτως ἀναγκαιότατον.

ΑΘ. Ἔχε δή. καὶ τόδε πάλιν ἐπισκεψώμεθα· πολλοὶ ἀδελφοί που γένοιντ' ἂν ἑνὸς ἀνδρός τε καὶ μιᾶς ὑείς, καὶ
5 δὴ καὶ θαυμαστὸν οὐδὲν τοὺς πλείους μὲν ἀδίκους αὐτῶν γίγνεσθαι, τοὺς δὲ ἐλάττους δικαίους.

ΚΛ. Οὐ γὰρ οὖν.

ΑΘ. Καὶ οὐκ ἂν εἴη γε πρέπον ἐμοί τε καὶ ὑμῖν τοῦτο θηρεύειν, ὅτι νικώντων μὲν τῶν πονηρῶν ἥ τε οἰκία καὶ ἡ
10 συγγένεια αὕτη πᾶσα ἥττων αὐτῆς λέγοιτ' ἄν, κρειττων δὲ
d ἡττωμένων· οὐ γὰρ εὐσχημοσύνης τε καὶ ἀσχημοσύνης ῥημάτων ἕνεκα τὰ νῦν σκοπούμεθα πρὸς τὸν τῶν πολλῶν λόγον, ἀλλ' ὀρθότητός τε καὶ ἁμαρτίας πέρι νόμων, ἥτις
5 ποτ' ἐστὶν φύσει.

ΚΛ. Ἀληθέστατα, ὦ ξένε, λέγεις.

ΜΕ. Καλῶς μὲν οὖν, ὥς γε ἐμοὶ συνδοκεῖν, τό γε τοσοῦτον, τὰ νῦν.

ΑΘ. Ἴδωμεν δὴ καὶ τόδε· τούτοις τοῖς ἄρτι λεγομένοις ἀδελφοῖς γένοιτ' ἄν πού τις δικαστής;

ΚΛ. Πάνυ γε.

ΑΘ. Πότερος οὖν ἀμείνων, ὅστις τοὺς μὲν ἀπολέσειεν αὐτῶν ὅσοι κακοί, τοὺς δὲ βελτίους ἄρχειν αὐτοὺς αὐτῶν προστάξειεν, ἢ ὅδε ὃς ἂν τοὺς μὲν χρηστοὺς ἄρχειν, τοὺς χείρους δ' ἐάσας ζῆν ἄρχεσθαι ἑκόντας ποιήσειεν; τρίτον δέ που δικαστὴν πρὸς ἀρετὴν εἴπωμεν, εἴ τις εἴη τοιοῦτος ὅστις παραλαβὼν συγγένειαν μίαν διαφερομένην, μήτε ἀπολέσειεν μηδένα, διαλλάξας δέ, εἰς τὸν ἐπίλοιπον χρόνον, νόμους αὐτοῖς θείς, πρὸς ἀλλήλους παραφυλάττειν δύναιτο ὥστε εἶναι φίλους.

ΚΛ. Μακρῷ ἀμείνων γίγνοιτ' ἂν ὁ τοιοῦτος δικαστής τε καὶ νομοθέτης.

ΑΘ. Καὶ μὴν τοὐναντίον γε ἢ πρὸς πόλεμον ἂν βλέπων αὐτοῖς τοὺς νόμους διανομοθετοῖ.

ΚΛ. Τοῦτο μὲν ἀληθές.

ΑΘ. Τί δ' ὁ τὴν πόλιν συναρμόττων; πρὸς πόλεμον αὐτῆς ἂν τὸν ἔξωθεν βλέπων τὸν βίον κοσμοῖ μᾶλλον, ἢ πρὸς πόλεμον τὸν ἐν αὐτῇ γιγνόμενον ἑκάστοτε, ἣ δὴ καλεῖται στάσις; ὃν μάλιστα μὲν ἅπας ἂν βούλοιτο μήτε γενέσθαι ποτὲ ἐν ἑαυτοῦ πόλει γενόμενόν τε ὡς τάχιστα ἀπαλλάττεσθαι.

ΚΛ. Δῆλον ὅτι πρὸς τοῦτον.

ΑΘ. Πότερα δὲ ἀπολομένων αὖ τῶν ἑτέρων εἰρήνην τῆς στάσεως γενέσθαι, νικησάντων δὲ ποτέρων, δέξαιτ' ἄν τις, μᾶλλον ἢ φιλίας τε καὶ εἰρήνης ὑπὸ διαλλαγῶν γενομένης, οὕτω τοῖς ἔξωθεν πολεμίοις προσέχειν ἀνάγκην εἶναι τὸν νοῦν;

ΚΛ. Οὕτω πᾶς ἂν ἐθέλοι πρότερον ἢ 'κείνως περὶ τὴν αὑτοῦ γίγνεσθαι πόλιν.

ΑΘ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ νομοθέτης ὡσαύτως;

ΚΛ. Τί μήν;

ΑΘ. Ἆρα οὖν οὐ τοῦ ἀρίστου ἕνεκα πάντα ἂν τὰ νόμιμα τιθείη πᾶς;

ΚΛ. Πῶς δ' οὔ;

ΑΘ. Τό γε μὴν ἄριστον οὔτε ὁ πόλεμος οὔτε ἡ στάσις, ἀπευκτὸν δὲ τὸ δεηθῆναι τούτων, εἰρήνη δὲ πρὸς ἀλλήλους ἅμα καὶ φιλοφροσύνη, καὶ δὴ καὶ τὸ νικᾶν, ὡς ἔοικεν, αὐτὴν αὐτὴν πόλιν οὐκ ἦν τῶν ἀρίστων ἀλλὰ τῶν ἀναγκαίων· ὅμοιον ὡς εἰ κάμνον σῶμα ἰατρικῆς καθάρσεως τυχὸν ἡγοῖτό

τις ἄριστα πράττειν τότε, τῷ δὲ μηδὲ τὸ παράπαν δεηθέντι σώματι μηδὲ προσέχοι τὸν νοῦν, ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ πρὸς πόλεως εὐδαιμονίαν ἢ καὶ ἰδιώτου διανοούμενος οὕτω τις οὔτ' ἄν ποτε πολιτικὸς γένοιτο ὀρθῶς, πρὸς τὰ ἔξωθεν πολεμικὰ ἀποβλέπων μόνον καὶ πρῶτον, οὔτ' ἂν νομοθέτης ἀκριβής, εἰ μὴ χάριν εἰρήνης τὰ πολέμου νομοθετοῖ μᾶλλον ἢ τῶν πολεμικῶν ἕνεκα τὰ τῆς εἰρήνης.

ΚΛ. Φαίνεται μέν πως ὁ λόγος οὗτος, ὦ ξένε, ὀρθῶς εἰρῆσθαι, θαυμάζω γε μὴν εἰ τά τε παρ' ἡμῖν νόμιμα καὶ ἔτι τὰ περὶ Λακεδαίμονα μὴ πᾶσαν τὴν σπουδὴν τούτων ἕνεκα πεποίηται.

ΑΘ. Τάχ' ἂν ἴσως· δεῖ δὲ οὐδὲν σκληρῶς ἡμᾶς αὐτοὺς διαμάχεσθαι τὰ νῦν ἀλλ' ἠρέμα ἀνερωτᾶν, ὡς μάλιστα περὶ ταῦτα ἡμῶν τε καὶ ἐκείνων σπουδαζόντων. καί μοι τῷ λόγῳ συνακολουθήσατε. προστησώμεθα γοῦν Τύρταιον, τὸν φύσει μὲν Ἀθηναῖον, τῶνδε δὲ πολίτην γενόμενον, ὃς δὴ μάλιστα ἀνθρώπων περὶ ταῦτα ἐσπούδακεν εἰπὼν ὅτι—

οὔτ' ἂν μνησαίμην οὔτ' ἐν λόγῳ ἄνδρα τιθείμην

οὔτ' εἴ τις πλουσιώτατος ἀνθρώπων εἴη, φησίν, οὔτ' εἰ πολλὰ ἀγαθὰ κεκτημένος, εἰπὼν σχεδὸν ἅπαντα, ὃς μὴ περὶ τὸν πόλεμον ἄριστος γίγνοιτ' ἀεί. ταῦτα γὰρ ἀκήκοάς που καὶ σὺ τὰ ποιήματα· ὅδε μὲν γὰρ οἶμαι διακορὴς αὐτῶν ἐστι.

ΜΕ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

ΚΛ. Καὶ μὴν καὶ παρ' ἡμᾶς ἐλήλυθε κομισθέντα ἐκ Λακεδαίμονος.

ΑΘ. Ἴθι νυν ἀνερώμεθα κοινῇ τουτονὶ τὸν ποιητὴν οὕτωσί πως· "Ὦ Τύρταιε, ποιητὰ θειότατε—δοκεῖς γὰρ δὴ σοφὸς ἡμῖν εἶναι καὶ ἀγαθός, ὅτι τοὺς μὲν ἐν τῷ πολέμῳ διαφέροντας διαφερόντως ἐγκεκωμίακας—ἤδη οὖν τυγχάνομεν ἐγώ τε καὶ ὅδε καὶ Κλεινίας ὁ Κνώσιος οὑτοσὶ συμφερόμενοί σοι περὶ τούτου σφόδρα, ὡς δοκοῦμεν· εἰ δὲ περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν λέγομεν ἀνδρῶν ἢ μή, βουλόμεθα σαφῶς εἰδέναι. λέγε οὖν ἡμῖν· ἆρα εἴδη δύο πολέμου καθάπερ ἡμεῖς ἡγῇ καὶ σὺ σαφῶς; ἢ πῶς;" πρὸς ταῦτ' οἶμαι κἂν πολὺ φαυλότερος εἴποι Τυρταίου τις τἀληθές, ὅτι δύο, τὸ μὲν ὃ καλοῦμεν ἅπαντες στάσιν, ὃς δὴ πάντων πολέμων χαλεπώτατος, ὡς ἔφαμεν ἡμεῖς νυνδή· τὸ δὲ ἄλλο πολέμου θήσομεν οἶμαι γένος ἅπαντες ᾧ πρὸς τοὺς ἐκτός τε καὶ ἀλλοφύλους χρώ-

μεθα διαφερόμενοι, πολὺ πρᾳότερον ἐκείνου.

ΚΛ. Πῶς γὰρ οὔ;

ΑΘ. Φέρε δή, πότερον, καὶ πρὸς ποτέρους ἐπαινῶν τὸν πόλεμον, οὕτως ὑπερεπήνεσας, τοὺς δὲ ἔψεξας τῶν ἀνδρῶν; ἔοικας μὲν γὰρ πρὸς τοὺς ἐκτός· εἴρηκας γοῦν ὧδε ἐν τοῖς ποιήμασιν, ὡς οὐδαμῶς τοὺς τοιούτους ἀνεχόμενος, οἳ μὴ e τολμήσωσιν μὲν ὁρᾶν φόνον αἱματόεντα,

καὶ δηίων ὀρέγοιντ' ἐγγύθεν ἱστάμενοι.

οὐκοῦν τὰ μετὰ ταῦτα εἴποιμεν ἂν ἡμεῖς ὅτι "Σὺ μὲν ἐπαινεῖς, ὡς ἔοικας, ὦ Τύρταιε, μάλιστα τοὺς πρὸς τὸν ὀθνεῖόν 5 τε καὶ ἔξωθεν πόλεμον γιγνομένους ἐπιφανεῖς." φαίη ταῦτ' ἄν που καὶ ὁμολογοῖ;

ΚΛ. Τί μήν;

ΑΘ. Ἡμεῖς δέ γε ἀγαθῶν ὄντων τούτων ἔτι φαμὲν ἀμεί- 630
νους εἶναι καὶ πολὺ τοὺς ἐν τῷ μεγίστῳ πολέμῳ γιγνομένους ἀρίστους διαφανῶς· ποιητὴν δὲ καὶ ἡμεῖς μάρτυρ' ἔχομεν, Θέογνιν, πολίτην τῶν ἐν Σικελίᾳ Μεγαρέων, ὅς φησιν—

πιστὸς ἀνὴρ χρυσοῦ τε καὶ ἀργύρου ἀντερύσασθαι 5
ἄξιος ἐν χαλεπῇ, Κύρνε, διχοστασίῃ.

τοῦτον δή φαμεν ἐν πολέμῳ χαλεπωτέρῳ ἀμείνονα ἐκείνου πάμπολυ γίγνεσθαι, σχεδὸν ὅσον ἀμείνων δικαιοσύνη καὶ σωφροσύνη καὶ φρόνησις εἰς ταὐτὸν ἐλθοῦσαι μετ' ἀνδρείας, b αὐτῆς μόνης ἀνδρείας. πιστὸς μὲν γὰρ καὶ ὑγιὴς ἐν στάσεσιν οὐκ ἄν ποτε γένοιτο ἄνευ συμπάσης ἀρετῆς· διαβάντες δ' εὖ καὶ μαχόμενοι ἐθέλοντες ἀποθνήσκειν ἐν ᾧ πολέμῳ φράζει Τύρταιος τῶν μισθοφόρων εἰσὶν πάμπολλοι, ὧν 5 οἳ πλεῖστοι γίγνονται θρασεῖς καὶ ἄδικοι καὶ ὑβρισταὶ καὶ ἀφρονέστατοι σχεδὸν ἁπάντων, ἐκτὸς δή τινων εὖ μάλα ὀλίγων. ποῖ δὴ τελευτᾷ νῦν ἡμῖν οὗτος ὁ λόγος, καὶ τί φανερόν ποτε ποιῆσαι βουληθεὶς λέγει ταῦτα; δῆλον ὅτι c τόδε, ὡς παντὸς μᾶλλον καὶ ὁ τῇδε παρὰ Διὸς νομοθέτης, πᾶς τε οὗ καὶ σμικρὸν ὄφελος, οὐκ ἄλλοσε ἢ πρὸς τὴν μεγίστην ἀρετὴν μάλιστα βλέπων ἀεὶ θήσει τοὺς νόμους· ἔστι δέ, ὥς φησιν Θέογνις, αὕτη πιστότης ἐν τοῖς δεινοῖς, ἥν 5 τις δικαιοσύνην ἂν τελέαν ὀνομάσειεν. ἣν δ' αὖ Τύρταιος ἐπῄνεσεν μάλιστα, καλὴ μὲν καὶ κατὰ καιρὸν κεκοσμημένη

τῷ ποιητῇ, τετάρτη μέντοι ὅμως ἀριθμῷ τε καὶ δυνάμει τοῦ
d τιμία εἶναι λέγοιτ' ἂν ὀρθότατα.

ΚΛ. Ὦ ξένε, τὸν νομοθέτην ἡμῶν ἀποβάλλομεν εἰς τοὺς πόρρω νομοθέτας.

ΑΘ. Οὐχ ἡμεῖς γε, ὦ ἄριστε, ἀλλ' ἡμᾶς αὐτούς, ὅταν
5 οἰώμεθα πάντα τά τ' ἐν Λακεδαίμονι καὶ τὰ τῇδε πρὸς τὸν πόλεμον μάλιστα βλέποντας Λυκοῦργόν τε καὶ Μίνω τίθεσθαι τὰ νόμιμα.

ΚΛ. Τὸ δὲ πῶς χρῆν ἡμᾶς λέγειν;

ΑΘ. Ὥσπερ τό τε ἀληθὲς οἶμαι καὶ τὸ δίκαιον ὑπέρ γε
e **θείου ἀνδρὸς** διαλεγομένους λέγειν, οὐχ ὡς πρὸς ἀρετῆς τι μόριον, καὶ ταῦτα τὸ φαυλότατον, ἐτίθει βλέπων, ἀλλὰ πρὸς πᾶσαν ἀρετήν, καὶ κατ' εἴδη ζητεῖν αὐτῶν τοὺς νόμους οὐδ' ἅπερ οἱ τῶν νῦν εἴδη προτιθέμενοι ζητοῦσιν. οὗ γὰρ ἂν
5 ἕκαστος ἐν χρείᾳ γίγνηται, τοῦτο ζητεῖ νῦν παραθέμενος, ὁ μὲν τὰ περὶ τῶν κλήρων καὶ ἐπικλήρων, ὁ δὲ τῆς αἰκίας πέρι, ἄλλοι δὲ ἄλλ' ἄττα μυρία τοιαῦτα· ἡμεῖς δέ φαμεν εἶναι τὸ
631 περὶ νόμους ζήτημα τῶν εὖ ζητούντων ὥσπερ νῦν ἡμεῖς ἠρξάμεθα. καὶ σοῦ τὴν μὲν ἐπιχείρησιν τῆς ἐξηγήσεως περὶ τοὺς νόμους παντάπασιν ἄγαμαι· τὸ γὰρ ἀπ' ἀρετῆς ἄρχεσθαι, λέγοντα ὡς ἐτίθει ταύτης ἕνεκα τοὺς νόμους, ὀρθόν·
5 ὅτι δὲ πάντα εἰς μόριον ἀρετῆς, καὶ ταῦτα τὸ σμικρότατον, ἐπαναφέροντα ἔφησθ' αὐτὸν νομοθετεῖν, οὔτε ὀρθῶς ἔτι μοι κατεφάνης λέγων τόν τε ὕστερον νῦν λόγον τοῦτον πάντα εἴρηκα διὰ ταῦτα. πῇ δὴ οὖν σε ἔτ' ἂν ἐβουλόμην διελό-
b μενον λέγειν αὐτός τε ἀκούειν; βούλει σοι φράζω;

ΚΛ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

ΑΘ. "Ὦ ξένε," ἐχρῆν εἰπεῖν, "οἱ Κρητῶν νόμοι οὐκ εἰσὶν μάτην διαφερόντως ἐν πᾶσιν εὐδόκιμοι τοῖς Ἕλλησιν·
5 ἔχουσιν γὰρ ὀρθῶς, τοὺς αὐτοῖς χρωμένους εὐδαίμονας ἀποτελοῦντες. πάντα γὰρ τἀγαθὰ πορίζουσιν. διπλᾶ δὲ ἀγαθά ἐστιν, τὰ μὲν ἀνθρώπινα, τὰ δὲ θεῖα· ἧρτηται δ' ἐκ τῶν θείων θάτερα, καὶ ἐὰν μὲν δέχηταί τις τὰ μείζονα **παρίστα-**
c **ται** καὶ τὰ ἐλάττονα, εἰ δὲ μή, στέρεται ἀμφοῖν. ἔστι δὲ τὰ μὲν ἐλάττονα ὧν ἡγεῖται μὲν ὑγίεια, κάλλος δὲ δεύτερον, τὸ δὲ τρίτον ἰσχὺς εἴς τε δρόμον καὶ εἰς τὰς ἄλλας πάσας κινήσεις τῷ σώματι, τέταρτον δὲ δὴ πλοῦτος οὐ τυφλὸς
5 ἀλλ' ὀξὺ βλέπων, ἅπερ ἅμ' ἕπηται φρονήσει· ὃ δὴ πρῶτον αὖ τῶν θείων ἡγεμονοῦν ἐστιν ἀγαθῶν, ἡ φρόνησις, δεύ-

τερον δὲ μετὰ νοῦ σώφρων ψυχῆς ἕξις, ἐκ δὲ τούτων μετ' ἀνδρείας κραθέντων τρίτον ἂν εἴη δικαιοσύνη, τέταρτον δὲ ἀνδρεία. ταῦτα δὲ πάντα ἐκείνων ἔμπροσθεν τέτακται φύ- d
σει, καὶ δὴ καὶ τῷ νομοθέτῃ τακτέον οὕτως. μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα τὰς ἄλλας προστάξεις τοῖς πολίταις εἰς ταῦτα βλεπούσας αὐτοῖς εἶναι διακελευστέον· τούτων δὲ τὰ μὲν ἀνθρώπινα εἰς τὰ θεῖα, τὰ δὲ θεῖα εἰς τὸν ἡγεμόνα νοῦν σύμπαντα 5
βλέπειν· περί τε γάμους ἀλλήλοις ἐπικοινουμένους, μετά τε ταῦτα ἐν ταῖς τῶν παίδων γεννήσεσιν καὶ τροφαῖς ὅσοι τε ἄρρενες καὶ ὅσαι θήλειαι νέων τε ὄντων καὶ ἐπὶ τὸ πρε- e
σβύτερον ἰόντων μέχρι γήρως τιμῶντα ὀρθῶς ἐπιμελεῖσθαι δεῖ καὶ ἀτιμάζοντα, ἐν πάσαις ταῖς τούτων ὁμιλίαις τάς τε λύπας αὐτῶν καὶ τὰς ἡδονὰς καὶ τὰς ἐπιθυμίας συμπάντων τε ἐρώτων τὰς σπουδὰς ἐπεσκεμμένον καὶ παραπεφυλαχότα, 632
ψέγειν τε ὀρθῶς καὶ ἐπαινεῖν δι' αὐτῶν τῶν νόμων· ἐν ὀργαῖς τε αὖ καὶ ἐν φόβοις, ὅσαι τε διὰ δυστυχίαν ταραχαὶ ταῖς ψυχαῖς γίγνονται καὶ ὅσαι ἐν εὐτυχίαις τῶν τοιούτων ἀπο-
φυγαί, ὅσα τε κατὰ νόσους ἢ κατὰ πολέμους ἢ πενίας ἢ τὰ 5
τούτοις ἐναντία γιγνόμενα προσπίπτει τοῖς ἀνθρώποις παθήματα, ἐν πᾶσιν τοῖς τοιούτοις τῆς ἑκάστων διαθέσεως διδακτέον καὶ ὁριστέον τό τε καλὸν καὶ μή. μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα b
ἀνάγκη τὸν νομοθέτην τὰς κτήσεις τῶν πολιτῶν καὶ τὰ ἀναλώματα φυλάττειν ὅντιν' ἂν γίγνηται τρόπον, καὶ τὰς πρὸς ἀλλήλους πᾶσιν τούτοις κοινωνίας καὶ διαλύσεις ἑκοῦσίν τε καὶ ἄκουσιν καθ' ὁποῖον ἂν ἕκαστον πράττωσιν τῶν 5
τοιούτων πρὸς ἀλλήλους ἐπισκοπεῖν, τό τε δίκαιον [καὶ μὴ] ἐν οἷς ἔστιν [τε] καὶ ἐν οἷς ἐλλείπει, καὶ τοῖς μὲν εὐπειθέσιν τῶν νόμων τιμὰς ἀπονέμειν, τοῖς δὲ δυσπειθέσι δίκας τακτὰς ἐπιτιθέναι, μέχριπερ ἂν πρὸς τέλος ἁπάσης πολιτείας ἐπ- c
εξελθών, ἴδῃ τῶν τελευτησάντων τίνα δεῖ τρόπον ἑκάστοις γίγνεσθαι τὰς ταφὰς καὶ τιμὰς ἄστινας αὐτοῖς ἀπονέμειν δεῖ· κατιδὼν δὲ ὁ θεὶς τοὺς νόμους ἅπασιν τούτοις φύλακας ἐπιστήσει, τοὺς μὲν διὰ φρονήσεως, τοὺς δὲ δι' ἀληθοῦς 5
δόξης ἰόντας, ὅπως πάντα ταῦτα συνδήσας ὁ νοῦς ἑπόμενα σωφροσύνῃ καὶ δικαιοσύνῃ ἀποφήνῃ, ἀλλὰ μὴ πλούτῳ μηδὲ φιλοτιμίᾳ.'' οὕτως, ὦ ξένοι, ἔγωγε ἤθελον ἂν ὑμᾶς καὶ ἔτι d
νῦν βούλομαι διεξελθεῖν πῶς ἐν τοῖς τοῦ Διὸς λεγομένοις νόμοις τοῖς τε τοῦ Πυθίου Ἀπόλλωνος, οὓς Μίνως τε καὶ Λυκοῦργος ἐθέτην, ἔνεστίν τε πάντα ταῦτα, καὶ ὅπῃ τάξιν

τινὰ εἰληφότα διάδηλά ἐστιν τῷ περὶ νόμων ἐμπείρῳ τέχνῃ εἴτε καί τισιν ἔθεσιν, τοῖς δὲ ἄλλοις ἡμῖν οὐδαμῶς ἐστι καταφανῆ.

ΚΛ. Πῶς οὖν, ὦ ξένε, λέγειν χρὴ τὰ μετὰ ταῦτα;

ΑΘ. Ἐξ ἀρχῆς πάλιν ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ χρῆναι διεξελθεῖν, καθάπερ ἠρξάμεθα, τὰ τῆς ἀνδρείας πρῶτον ἐπιτηδεύματα, ἔπειτα ἕτερον καὶ αὖθις ἕτερον εἶδος τῆς ἀρετῆς διέξιμεν, ἐὰν βούλησθε· ὅπως δ' ἂν τὸ πρῶτον διεξέλθωμεν, πειρασώμεθα αὐτὸ παράδειγμα θέμενοι καὶ τἆλλ' οὕτω διαμυθολογοῦντες παραμύθια ποιήσασθαι τῆς ὁδοῦ, ὕστερον δὲ ἀρετῆς πάσης ἅ γε νυνδὴ διήλθομεν ἐκεῖσε βλέποντα ἀποφανοῦμεν, ἂν θεὸς ἐθέλῃ.

ΜΕ. Καλῶς λέγεις, καὶ πειρῶ πρῶτον κρίνειν τὸν τοῦ Διὸς ἐπαινέτην τόνδε ἡμῖν.

ΑΘ. Πειράσομαι, καὶ σέ τε καὶ ἐμαυτόν· κοινὸς γὰρ ὁ λόγος. λέγετε οὖν· τὰ συσσίτιά φαμεν καὶ τὰ γυμνάσια πρὸς τὸν πόλεμον ἐξηυρῆσθαι τῷ νομοθέτῃ;

ΜΕ. Ναί.

ΑΘ. Καὶ τρίτον ἢ τέταρτον; ἴσως γὰρ ἂν οὕτω χρείη διαριθμήσασθαι καὶ περὶ τῶν τῆς ἄλλης ἀρετῆς εἴτε μερῶν εἴτε ἅττ' αὐτὰ καλεῖν χρεών ἐστι, δηλοῦντα μόνον ἃ λέγει.

ΜΕ. Τρίτον τοίνυν, ἔγωγ' εἴποιμ' ἄν καὶ Λακεδαιμονίων ὁστισοῦν, τὴν θήραν ηὗρε.

ΑΘ. Τέταρτον δέ, ἢ πέμπτον εἰ δυναίμεθα, λέγειν πειρώμεθα.

ΜΕ. Ἔτι τοίνυν καὶ τὸ τέταρτον ἔγωγε πειρώμην ἂν λέγειν, τὸ περὶ τὰς καρτερήσεις τῶν ἀλγηδόνων πολὺ παρ' ἡμῖν γιγνόμενον, ἔν τε ταῖς πρὸς ἀλλήλους ταῖς χερσὶ μάχαις καὶ ἐν ἁρπαγαῖς τισιν διὰ πολλῶν πληγῶν ἑκάστοτε γιγνομέναις. ἔτι δὲ καὶ κρυπτεία τις ὀνομάζεται θαυμαστῶς πολύπονος πρὸς τὰς καρτερήσεις, χειμώνων τε ἀνυποδησίαι καὶ ἀστρωσίαι καὶ ἄνευ θεραπόντων αὐτοῖς ἑαυτῶν διακονήσεις νύκτωρ τε πλανωμένων διὰ πάσης τῆς χώρας καὶ μεθ' ἡμέραν. ἔτι δὲ κἀν ταῖς γυμνοπαιδίαις δειναὶ καρτερήσεις παρ' ἡμῖν γίγνονται τῇ τοῦ πνίγους ῥώμῃ διαμαχομένων, καὶ πάμπολλα ἕτερα, σχεδὸν ὅσα οὐκ ἂν παύσαιτό τις ἑκάστοτε διεξιών.

ΑΘ. Εὖ γε, ὦ Λακεδαιμόνιε ξένε, λέγεις. τὴν ἀνδρείαν δέ, φέρε, τί θῶμεν; πότερον ἁπλῶς οὕτως εἶναι πρὸς φόβους

καὶ λύπας διαμάχην μόνον, ἢ καὶ πρὸς πόθους τε καὶ ἡδονὰς καί τινας δεινὰς θωπείας κολακικάς, αἳ καὶ τῶν σεμνῶν οἰομένων εἶναι τοὺς θυμοὺς ποιοῦσιν κηρίνους; d

ΜΕ. Οἶμαι μὲν οὕτω· πρὸς ταῦτα σύμπαντα.

ΑΘ. Εἰ γοῦν μεμνήμεθα τοὺς ἔμπροσθεν λόγους, ἤττω τινὰ ὅδε καὶ πόλιν ἔλεγεν αὐτὴν αὑτῆς καὶ ἄνδρα. ἦ γάρ, ὦ ξένε Κνώσιε; 5

ΚΛ. Καὶ πάνυ γε.

ΑΘ. Νῦν οὖν πότερα λέγομεν τὸν τῶν λυπῶν ἥττω κακὸν ἢ καὶ τὸν τῶν ἡδονῶν; e

ΚΛ. Μᾶλλον, ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ, τὸν τῶν ἡδονῶν· καὶ πάντες που μᾶλλον λέγομεν τὸν ὑπὸ τῶν ἡδονῶν κρατούμενον τοῦτον τὸν ἐπονειδίστως ἥττονα ἑαυτοῦ πρότερον ἢ τὸν ὑπὸ τῶν λυπῶν. 5

ΑΘ. Ὁ Διὸς οὖν δὴ καὶ ὁ Πυθικὸς νομοθέτης οὐ δήπου χωλὴν τὴν ἀνδρείαν νενομοθετήκατον, πρὸς τἀριστερὰ μόνον δυναμένην ἀντιβαίνειν, πρὸς τὰ δεξιὰ καὶ κομψὰ καὶ θωπευτικὰ ἀδυνατοῦσαν; ἢ πρὸς ἀμφότερα; 634

ΚΛ. Πρὸς ἀμφότερα ἔγωγε ἀξιῶ. 5

ΑΘ. Λέγωμεν τοίνυν πάλιν ἐπιτηδεύματα ποῖα ἔσθ' ὑμῖν ἀμφοτέραις ταῖς πόλεσιν, ἃ γεύοντα τῶν ἡδονῶν καὶ οὐ φεύγοντα αὐτάς, καθάπερ τὰς λύπας οὐκ ἔφευγεν, ἀλλ' ἄγοντα εἰς μέσας, ἠνάγκαζε καὶ ἔπειθεν τιμαῖς ὥστε κρατεῖν αὐτῶν·—ποῦ δὴ τοῦτ' ἔστιν ταὐτὸν περὶ τὰς ἡδονὰς συντεταγμένον ἐν τοῖς νόμοις; λεγέσθω τί τοῦτ' ἐστὶν ὃ καὶ ἀπεργάζεται ὑμῖν ὁμοίως πρός τε ἀληθόνας καὶ πρὸς ἡδονὰς τοὺς αὐτοὺς ἀνδρείους, νικῶντάς τε ἃ δεῖ νικᾶν καὶ οὐδαμῶς ἥττους πολεμίων τῶν ἐγγύτατα ἑαυτῶν καὶ χαλεπωτάτων. b 5

ΜΕ. Οὕτω μὲν τοίνυν, ὦ ξένε, καθάπερ πρὸς τὰς ἀληθόνας εἶχον νόμους ἀντιτεταγμένους πολλοὺς εἰπεῖν, οὐκ ἂν ἴσως εὐπορίην κατὰ μεγάλα μέρη καὶ διαφανῆ λέγων περὶ τῶν ἡδονῶν· κατὰ δὲ σμικρὰ ἴσως εὐπορίην ἄν. c

ΚΛ. Οὐ μὴν οὐδ' ἂν αὐτὸς ἔγωγε ἐν τοῖς κατὰ Κρήτην νόμοις ἔχοιμι ἐμφανὲς ὁμοίως ποιεῖν τὸ τοιοῦτον.

ΑΘ. Ὦ ἄριστοι ξένων, καὶ οὐδέν γε θαυμαστόν. ἀλλ' ἂν ἄρα τις ἡμῶν περὶ τοὺς ἑκάστων οἴκοι νόμους ψέξῃ τι, βουλόμενος ἰδεῖν τό τε ἀληθὲς ἅμα καὶ τὸ βέλτιστον, μὴ χαλεπῶς ἀλλὰ πράως ἀποδεχώμεθα ἀλλήλων. 5

ΚΛ. Ὀρθῶς, ὦ ξένε Ἀθηναῖε, εἴρηκας, καὶ πειστέον.
d ΑΘ. Οὐ γὰρ ἄν, ὦ Κλεινία, τηλικοῖσδε ἀνδράσιν πρέποι τὸ τοιοῦτον.

ΚΛ. Οὐ γὰρ οὖν.

ΑΘ. Εἰ μὲν τοίνυν ὀρθῶς ἢ μή τις ἐπιτιμᾷ τῇ τε Λακωνικῇ καὶ τῇ Κρητικῇ πολιτείᾳ, λόγος ἂν ἕτερος εἴη· τὰ δ' οὖν λεγόμενα πρὸς τῶν πολλῶν ἴσως ἐγὼ μᾶλλον ἔχοιμ' ἂν ὑμῶν ἀμφοτέρων λέγειν. ὑμῖν μὲν γάρ, εἴπερ καὶ μετρίως κατεσκεύασται τὰ τῶν νόμων, εἰς τῶν καλλίστων ἂν εἴη νόμων μὴ ζητεῖν τῶν νέων μηδένα ἐᾶν ποῖα καλῶς
e αὐτῶν ἢ μὴ καλῶς ἔχει, μιᾷ δὲ φωνῇ καὶ ἐξ ἑνὸς στόματος πάντας συμφωνεῖν ὡς πάντα καλῶς κεῖται θέντων θεῶν, καὶ ἐάν τις ἄλλως λέγῃ, μὴ ἀνέχεσθαι τὸ παράπαν ἀκούοντας· γέρων δὲ εἴ τίς τι συννοεῖ τῶν παρ' ὑμῖν, πρὸς ἄρχοντά τε καὶ πρὸς ἡλικιώτην μηδενὸς ἐναντίον νέου ποιεῖσθαι τοὺς τοιούτους λόγους.

ΚΛ. Ὀρθότατά γε, ὦ ξένε, λέγεις, καὶ καθάπερ μάντις,
635 ἀπὼν τῆς τότε διανοίας τοῦ τιθέντος αὐτά, νῦν ἐπιεικῶς μοι δοκεῖς ἐστοχάσθαι καὶ σφόδρα ἀληθῆ λέγειν.

ΑΘ. Οὐκοῦν ἡμῖν τὰ νῦν ἐρημία μὲν νέων, αὐτοὶ δ' ἕνεκα γήρως ἀφείμεθ' ὑπὸ τοῦ νομοθέτου διαλεγόμενοι περὶ αὐτῶν τούτων μόνοι πρὸς μόνους μηδὲν ἂν πλημμελεῖν;

ΚΛ. Ἔστι ταῦτα οὕτως· [εἰς ἃ] καὶ μηδέν γε ἀνῇς ἐπιτιμῶν τοῖς νόμοις ἡμῶν· οὐ γὰρ τό γε γνῶναί τι τῶν μὴ καλῶν ἄτιμον, ἀλλὰ ἴασιν ἐξ αὐτοῦ συμβαίνει γίγνεσθαι
b τῷ μὴ φθόνῳ τὰ λεγόμενα ἀλλ' εὐνοίᾳ δεχομένῳ.

ΑΘ. Καλῶς· οὐ μὴν ἐπιτιμῶν γε ἐρῶ τοῖς νόμοις πω, πρὶν βεβαίως εἰς δύναμιν διασκέψασθαι, μᾶλλον δὲ ἀπορῶν. ὑμῖν γὰρ ὁ νομοθέτης μόνοις Ἑλλήνων καὶ βαρβάρων, ὧν ἡμεῖς πυνθανόμεθα, τῶν μεγίστων ἡδονῶν καὶ παιδιῶν ἐπέταξεν ἀπέχεσθαι καὶ μὴ γεύεσθαι, τὸ δὲ τῶν λυπῶν καὶ φόβων, ὅπερ ἄρτι διεληλύθαμεν, ἡγήσατο εἴ τις ἐκ παίδων
c φευξεῖται διὰ τέλους, ὁπόταν εἰς ἀναγκαίους ἔλθῃ πόνους καὶ φόβους καὶ λύπας, φευξεῖσθαι τοὺς ἐν ἐκείνοις γεγυμνασμένους καὶ δουλεύσειν αὐτοῖς. ταὐτὸν δὴ τοῦτ', οἶμαι, καὶ πρὸς τὰς ἡδονὰς ἔδει διανοεῖσθαι τὸν αὐτὸν νομοθέτην,
5 λέγοντα αὐτὸν πρὸς ἑαυτὸν ὡς ἡμῖν ἐκ νέων εἰ ἄπειροι τῶν μεγίστων ἡδονῶν οἱ πολῖται γενήσονται, καὶ ἀμελέτητοι γιγνόμενοι ἐν ταῖς ἡδοναῖς καρτερεῖν καὶ μηδὲν τῶν αἰσχρῶν

ἀναγκάζεσθαι ποιεῖν, ἕνεκα τῆς γλυκυθυμίας τῆς πρὸς τὰς ἡδονὰς ταὐτὸν πείσονται τοῖς ἡττωμένοις τῶν φόβων, δουλεύσουσι τρόπον ἕτερον καὶ ἔτ' αἰσχίω τοῖς γε δυναμένοις καρτερεῖν ἐν ταῖς ἡδοναῖς καὶ τοῖς κεκτημένοις τὰ περὶ τὰς ἡδονάς, ἀνθρώποις ἐνίοτε παντάπασι κακοῖς, καὶ τὴν ψυχὴν τῇ μὲν δούλην τῇ δὲ ἐλευθέραν ἕξουσιν, καὶ οὐκ ἄξιοι ἁπλῶς ἀνδρεῖοι καὶ ἐλευθέριοι ἔσονται προσαγορεύεσθαι. σκοπεῖτε οὖν εἴ τι τῶν νῦν λεγομένων ὑμῖν κατὰ τρόπον δοκεῖ λέγεσθαι.

ΚΛ. Δοκεῖ μὲν ἡμῖν γέ πως λεγομένου τοῦ λόγου· περὶ δὲ τηλικούτων εὐθὺς πεπιστευκέναι ῥᾳδίως μὴ νέων τε ᾖ μᾶλλον καὶ ἀνοήτων.

ΑΘ. Ἀλλ' εἰ τὸ μετὰ ταῦτα διεξίοιμεν ὧν προυθέμεθα, ὦ Κλεινία τε καὶ Λακεδαιμόνιε ξένε—μετ' ἀνδρείαν γὰρ δὴ σωφροσύνης πέρι λέγωμεν—<μῶν> τι διαφέρον ἐν ταύταις ταῖς πολιτείαις ἢ ταῖς τῶν εἰκῇ πολιτευομένων ἀνευρήσομεν, ὥσπερ τὰ περὶ τὸν πόλεμον νυνδή;

ΜΕ. Σχεδὸν οὐ ῥᾴδιον· ἀλλ' ἔοικεν γὰρ τά τε συσσίτια καὶ τὰ γυμνάσια καλῶς ηὑρῆσθαι πρὸς ἀμφοτέρας.

ΑΘ. Ἔοικεν δῆτα, ὦ ξένοι, χαλεπὸν εἶναι τὸ περὶ τὰς πολιτείας ἀναμφισβητήτως ὁμοίως ἔργῳ καὶ λόγῳ γίγνεσθαι· κινδυνεύει γάρ, καθάπερ ἐν τοῖς σώμασιν, οὐ δυνατὸν εἶναι προστάξαι τι πρὸς ἓν σῶμα ἓν ἐπιτήδευμα, ἐν ᾧ οὐκ ἂν φανείη ταὐτὸν τοῦτο τὰ μὲν βλάπτον τὰ ἡμῶν σώματα, τὰ δὲ καὶ ὠφελοῦν. ἐπεὶ καὶ τὰ γυμνάσια ταῦτα καὶ τὰ συσσίτια πολλὰ μὲν ἄλλα νῦν ὠφελεῖ τὰς πόλεις, πρὸς δὲ τὰς στάσεις χαλεπά—δηλοῦσιν δὲ Μιλησίων καὶ Βοιωτῶν καὶ Θουρίων παῖδες—καὶ δὴ καὶ **πάλαι ὃν νόμιμον** δοκεῖ τοῦτο τὸ ἐπιτήδευμα **τὰς** κατὰ φύσιν [τὰς] περὶ τὰ ἀφροδίσια ἡδονὰς οὐ μόνον ἀνθρώπων ἀλλὰ καὶ θηρίων, διεφθαρκέναι. καὶ τούτων τὰς ὑμετέρας πόλεις πρώτας ἄν τις αἰτιῷτο καὶ ὅσαι τῶν ἄλλων μάλιστα ἅπτονται τῶν γυμνασίων· καὶ εἴτε παίζοντα εἴτε σπουδάζοντα ἐννοεῖν δεῖ τὰ τοιαῦτα, ἐννοητέον ὅτι τῇ θηλείᾳ καὶ τῇ τῶν ἀρρένων φύσει εἰς κοινωνίαν ἰούσῃ τῆς γεννήσεως ἡ περὶ ταῦτα ἡδονὴ κατὰ φύσιν ἀποδεδόσθαι δοκεῖ, ἀρρένων δὲ πρὸς ἄρρενας ἢ θηλειῶν πρὸς θηλείας παρὰ φύσιν καὶ τῶν πρώτων τὸ τόλμημ' εἶναι δι' ἀκράτειαν ἡδονῆς. πάντες δὲ δὴ Κρητῶν τὸν περὶ Γανυμήδη μῦθον κατηγοροῦμεν ὡς λογοποιησάντων τούτων· ἐπειδὴ παρὰ Διὸς

αὐτοῖς οἱ νόμοι πεπιστευμένοι ἦσαν γεγονέναι, τοῦτον τὸν μῦθον προστεθηκέναι κατὰ τοῦ Διός, ἵνα ἑπόμενοι δὴ τῷ θεῷ καρπῶνται καὶ ταύτην τὴν ἡδονήν. τὸ μὲν οὖν τοῦ μύθου χαιρέτω, νόμων δὲ πέρι διασκοπουμένων ἀνθρώπων ὀλίγου πᾶσά ἐστιν ἡ σκέψις περί τε τὰς ἡδονὰς καὶ τὰς λύπας ἔν τε πόλεσιν καὶ ἐν ἰδίοις ἤθεσιν· δύο γὰρ αὗται πηγαὶ μεθεῖνται φύσει ῥεῖν, ὧν ὁ μὲν ἀρυτόμενος ὅθεν τε δεῖ καὶ ὁπότε καὶ ὁπόσον εὐδαιμονεῖ, καὶ πόλις ὁμοίως καὶ ἰδιώτης καὶ ζῷον ἅπαν, ὁ δ' ἀνεπιστημόνως ἅμα καὶ ἐκτὸς τῶν καιρῶν τἀναντία ἂν ἐκείνῳ ζῴη.

ΜΕ. Λέγεται μὲν ταῦτα, ὦ ξένε, καλῶς πως· οὐ μὴν ἀλλ' ἀφασία γ' ἡμᾶς λαμβάνει τί ποτε χρὴ λέγειν πρὸς ταῦτα, ὅμως δ' ἔμοιγε ὀρθῶς δοκεῖ τὸ τὰς ἡδονὰς φεύγειν διακελεύεσθαι τόν γε ἐν Λακεδαίμονι νομοθέτην, περὶ δὲ τῶν ἐν Κνωσῷ νόμων ὅδε, ἂν ἐθέλῃ, βοηθήσει. τὰ δ' ἐν Σπάρτῃ κάλλιστ' ἀνθρώπων δοκεῖ μοι κεῖσθαι τὰ περὶ τὰς ἡδονάς· οὗ γὰρ μάλιστ' ἄνθρωποι καὶ μεγίσταις προσπίπτουσιν ἡδοναῖς καὶ ὕβρεσι καὶ ἀνοίᾳ πάσῃ, τοῦτ' ἐξέβαλεν ὁ νόμος ἡμῶν ἐκ τῆς χώρας συμπάσης, καὶ οὔτ' ἂν ἐπ' ἀγρῶν ἴδοις, οὔτ' ἐν ἄστεσιν ὅσων Σπαρτιάταις μέλει, συμπόσια οὐδ' ὁπόσα τούτοις συνεπόμενα πάσας ἡδονὰς κινεῖ κατὰ δύναμιν, οὐδ' ἔστιν ὅστις ἂν ἀπαντῶν κωμάζοντί τινι μετὰ μέθης οὐκ ἂν τὴν μεγίστην δίκην εὐθὺς ἐπιθείη, καὶ οὐδ' ἂν Διονύσια πρόφασιν ἔχοντ' αὐτὸν ῥύσαιτο, ὥσπερ ἐν ἀμάξαις εἶδόν ποτε παρ' ὑμῖν ἐγώ, καὶ ἐν Τάραντι δὲ παρὰ τοῖς ἡμετέροις ἀποίκοις πᾶσαν ἐθεασάμην τὴν πόλιν περὶ τὰ Διονύσια μεθύουσαν· παρ' ἡμῖν δ' οὐκ ἔστ' οὐδὲν τοιοῦτον.

ΑΘ. Ὦ Λακεδαιμόνιε ξένε, ἐπαινετὰ μὲν πάντ' ἐστὶν τὰ τοιαῦτα, ὅπου τινὲς ἔνεισιν καρτερήσεις, ὅπου δὲ ἀνεῖνται, βλακικώτερα· ταχὺ γάρ σου λάβοιτ' ἄν τις τῶν παρ' ἡμῶν ἀμυνόμενος, δεικνὺς τὴν τῶν γυναικῶν παρ' ὑμῖν ἄνεσιν. ἅπασιν δὴ τοῖς τοιούτοις, καὶ ἐν Τάραντι καὶ παρ' ἡμῖν καὶ παρ' ὑμῖν δέ, μία ἀπόκρισις ἀπολύεσθαι δοκεῖ τοῦ μὴ κακῶς ἔχειν ἀλλ' ὀρθῶς· πᾶς γὰρ ἀποκρινόμενος ἐρεῖ θαυμάζοντι ξένῳ, τὴν παρ' αὐτοῖς ἀήθειαν ὁρῶντι, "Μὴ θαύμαζε, ὦ ξένε· νόμος ἔσθ' ἡμῖν οὗτος, ἴσως δ' ὑμῖν περὶ αὐτῶν τούτων ἕτερος." ἡμῖν δ' ἐστὶ νῦν, ὦ φίλοι ἄνδρες, οὐ περὶ τῶν ἀνθρώπων τῶν ἄλλων ὁ λόγος, ἀλλὰ περὶ τῶν νομοθετῶν

αὐτῶν κακίας τε καὶ ἀρετῆς. ἔτι γὰρ οὖν εἴπωμεν πλείω περὶ ἁπάσης μέθης· οὐ γὰρ σμικρόν ἐστιν τὸ ἐπιτήδευμα οὐδὲ φαύλου διαγνῶναι νομοθέτου. λέγω δ' οὐκ οἴνου περὶ πόσεως τὸ παράπαν ἢ μή, μέθης δὲ αὐτῆς πέρι, πότερον ὥσπερ Σκύθαι χρῶνται καὶ Πέρσαι χρηστέον, καὶ ἔτι Καρχηδόνιοι καὶ Κελτοὶ καὶ Ἴβηρες καὶ Θρᾷκες, πολεμικὰ σύμπαντα ὄντα ταῦτα γένη, ἢ καθάπερ ὑμεῖς· ὑμεῖς μὲν γάρ, ὅπερ λέγεις, τὸ παράπαν ἀπέχεσθε, Σκύθαι δὲ καὶ Θρᾷκες ἀκράτῳ παντάπασι χρώμενοι, γυναῖκές τε καὶ αὐτοί, καὶ κατὰ τῶν ἱματίων καταχεόμενοι, καλὸν καὶ εὔδαιμον ἐπιτήδευμα ἐπιτηδεύειν νενομίκασι. Πέρσαι δὲ σφόδρα μὲν χρῶνται καὶ ταῖς ἄλλαις τρυφαῖς ἃς ὑμεῖς ἀποβάλλετε, ἐν τάξει δὲ μᾶλλον τούτων.

ΜΕ. Ὦ λῷστε, διώκομεν δέ γε ἡμεῖς πάντας τούτους, 638
ὅταν ὅπλα εἰς τὰς χεῖρας λάβωμεν.

ΑΘ. Ὦ ἄριστε, μὴ λέγε ταῦτα· πολλαὶ γὰρ δὴ φυγαὶ καὶ διώξεις ἀτέκμαρτοι γεγόνασίν τε καὶ ἔσονται, διὸ φανερὸν ὅρον τοῦτον οὐκ ἄν ποτε λέγοιμεν, ἀλλὰ ἀμφισβητήσιμον, περὶ καλῶν ἐπιτηδευμάτων καὶ μή, νίκην τε καὶ ἥτταν λέγοντες μάχης· ἐπειδὴ γὰρ αἱ μείζους τὰς ἐλάττους πόλεις νικῶσιν μαχόμεναι, καὶ καταδουλοῦνται Συρακόσιοι μὲν Λοκρούς, οἳ δὴ δοκοῦσιν εὐνομώτατοι τῶν περὶ ἐκεῖνον τὸν τόπον γεγονέναι, Κείους δὲ Ἀθηναῖοι· μυρία δὲ ἄλλα τοιαῦτ' ἂν εὕροιμεν. ἀλλὰ περὶ αὐτοῦ ἑκάστου ἐπιτηδεύματος πειρώμεθα λέγοντες πείθειν ἡμᾶς αὐτούς, νίκας δὲ καὶ ἥττας ἐκτὸς λόγου τὰ νῦν θῶμεν, λέγωμεν δ' ὡς τὸ μὲν τοιόνδ' ἐστὶν καλόν, τὸ δὲ τοιόνδε οὐ καλόν. πρῶτον δ' ἀκούσατέ τί μου, περὶ αὐτῶν τούτων ὡς δεῖ τό τε χρηστὸν καὶ τὸ μὴ σκοπεῖν.

ΜΕ. Πῶς οὖν δὴ λέγεις;

ΑΘ. Δοκοῦσί μοι πάντες οἱ λόγῳ τι λαβόντες ἐπιτήδευμα, καὶ προθέμενοι ψέγειν αὐτὸ ἢ ἐπαινεῖν εὐθὺς ῥηθέν, οὐδαμῶς δρᾶν κατὰ τρόπον, ἀλλὰ ταὐτὸν ποιεῖν οἷον εἴ δή τις, ἐπαινέσαντός τινος τυροὺς βρῶμα ὡς ἀγαθόν, εὐθὺς ψέγοι, μὴ διαπυθόμενος αὐτοῦ μήτε τὴν ἐργασίαν μήτε τὴν προσφοράν, ὁντινα τρόπον καὶ οἵστισι καὶ μεθ' ὧν καὶ ὅπως ἔχοντα καὶ ὅπως προσφέρειν ἔχουσιν. νῦν δὴ ταὐτόν μοι δοκοῦμεν ἡμεῖς ἐν τοῖς λόγοις ποιεῖν· περὶ μέθης γὰρ ἀκούσαντες τοσοῦτον μόνον, εὐθὺς οἱ μὲν ψέγειν αὐτό, οἱ δ'

ἐπαινεῖν, καὶ μάλα ἀτόπως. μάρτυσιν γὰρ καὶ ἐπαινέταις χρώμενοι [ἐπαινοῦμεν] ἑκάτεροι, [καὶ] οἱ μέν, ὅτι πολλοὺς παρεχόμεθα, ἀξιοῦμέν τι λέγειν κύριον, οἱ δέ, ὅτι τοὺς μὴ χρωμένους αὐτῷ ὁρῶμεν νικῶντας μαχομένους· ἀμφισβητεῖται δ' αὖ καὶ τοῦτο ἡμῖν· εἰ μὲν δὴ καὶ περὶ ἑκάστων οὕτω καὶ τῶν ἄλλων νομίμων διέξιμεν, οὐκ ἂν ἔμοιγε κατὰ νοῦν εἴη, τρόπον δὲ ἄλλον, ὃν ἐμοὶ φαίνεται δεῖν, ἐθέλω λέγειν περὶ αὐτοῦ τούτου, τῆς μέθης, πειρώμενος ἂν ἄρα δύνωμαι τὴν περὶ ἁπάντων τῶν τοιούτων ὀρθὴν μέθοδον ἡμῖν δηλοῦν, ἐπειδὴ καὶ μυρία ἐπὶ μυρίοις ἔθνη περὶ αὐτῶν ἀμφισβητοῦντα ὑμῖν πόλεσι δυοῖν τῷ λόγῳ διαμάχοιτ' ἄν.

ΜΕ. Καὶ μὴν εἴ τινα ἔχομεν ὀρθὴν σκέψιν τῶν τοιούτων, οὐκ ἀποκνητέον ἀκούειν.

ΑΘ. Σκεψώμεθα δή πῃ τῇδε. φέρε, εἴ τις αἰγῶν τροφήν, καὶ τὸ ζῷον αὐτὸ κτῆμα ὡς ἔστιν καλόν, ἐπαινοῖ, ἄλλος δέ τις ἑωρακὼς αἶγας χωρὶς νεμομένας αἰπόλου ἐν ἐργασίμοις χωρίοις δρώσας κακὰ διαψέγοι, καὶ πᾶν θρέμμα ἄναρχον ἢ μετὰ κακῶν ἀρχόντων ἰδὼν οὕτω μέμφοιτο, τὸν τοῦ τοιούτου ψόγον ἡγούμεθα ὑγιὲς ἄν ποτε ψέξαι καὶ ὁτιοῦν;

ΜΕ. Καὶ πῶς;

ΑΘ. Χρηστὸς δὲ ἄρχων ἔσθ' ἡμῖν ἐν πλοίοις πότερον ἐὰν τὴν ναυτικὴν ἔχῃ ἐπιστήμην μόνον, ἄν τ' οὖν ναυτιᾷ ἄν τε μή, ἢ πῶς ἂν λέγοιμεν;

ΜΕ. Οὐδαμῶς, ἄν γε πρὸς τῇ τέχνῃ ἔχῃ καὶ τοῦτο τὸ πάθος ὃ λέγεις.

ΑΘ. Τί δ' ἄρχων στρατοπέδων; ἆρ' ἐὰν τὴν πολεμικὴν ἔχῃ ἐπιστήμην, ἱκανὸς ἄρχειν, κἂν δειλὸς ὢν ἐν τοῖς δεινοῖς ὑπὸ μέθης τοῦ φόβου ναυτιᾷ;

ΜΕ. Καὶ πῶς;

ΑΘ. Ἂν δὲ αὖ μήτε ἔχῃ τὴν τέχνην δειλός τε ᾖ;

ΜΕ. Παντάπασίν τινα πονηρὸν λέγεις, καὶ οὐδαμῶς ἀνδρῶν ἄρχοντα ἀλλά τινων σφόδρα γυναικῶν.

ΑΘ. Τί δ' ἐπαινέτην ἢ ψέκτην κοινωνίας ἡστινοσοῦν ἢ πέφυκέν τε ἄρχων εἶναι μετ' ἐκείνου τε ὠφέλιμός ἐστιν, ὁ δὲ μήτε ἑωρακὼς εἴη ποτ' ὀρθῶς αὐτὴν αὐτῇ κοινωνοῦσαν μετ' ἄρχοντος, ἀεὶ δὲ ἄναρχον ἢ μετὰ κακῶν ἀρχόντων συνοῦσαν; οἰόμεθα δή ποτε τοὺς τοιούτους θεωροὺς τῶν τοιούτων κοινωνιῶν χρηστόν τι ψέξειν ἢ ἐπαινέσεσθαι;

ΜΕ. Πῶς δ' ἄν, μηδέποτέ γε ἰδόντας μηδὲ συγγενομένους

ὀρθῶς γενομένῳ μηδενὶ τῶν τοιούτων κοινωνημάτων; d

ΑΘ. Ἔχε δή· τῶν πολλῶν κοινωνιῶν συμπότας καὶ συμπόσια θεῖμεν ἂν μίαν τινὰ συνουσίαν εἶναι;

ΜΕ. Καὶ σφόδρα γε.

ΑΘ. Ταύτην οὖν μῶν ὀρθῶς γιγνομένην ἤδη τις πώποτε ἐθεάσατο; καὶ σφῷν μὲν ἀποκρίνασθαι ῥᾴδιον ὡς οὐδεπώποτε τὸ παράπαν—οὐ γὰρ ἐπιχώριον ὑμῖν τοῦτο οὐδὲ νόμιμον—ἐγὼ δὲ ἐντετύχηκά τε πολλαῖς καὶ πολλαχοῦ, καὶ προσέτι πάσας ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν διηρώτηκα, καὶ σχεδὸν ὅλην μὲν οὐδεμίαν ὀρθῶς γιγνομένην ἑώρακα οὐδὲ ἀκήκοα, μόρια e δ' εἴ που σμικρὰ καὶ ὀλίγα, τὰ πολλὰ δὲ σύμπανθ' ὡς εἰπεῖν διημαρτημένα.

ΚΛ. Πῶς δὴ ταῦτα, ὦ ξένε, λέγεις; εἰπὲ ἔτι σαφέστερον· ἡμεῖς μὲν γάρ, ὅπερ εἶπες, ἀπειρίᾳ τῶν τοιούτων, οὐδὲ ἐντυγχάνοντες ἂν ἴσως εὐθύς γε γνοῖμεν τό τε ὀρθὸν καὶ μὴ 640 γιγνόμενον ἐν αὐτοῖς.

ΑΘ. Εἰκὸς λέγεις· ἀλλ' ἐμοῦ φράζοντος πειρῶ μανθάνειν. τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἐν πάσαις τε συνόδοις, καὶ κοινωνίαις πράξεων ὁντινωνοῦν, ὡς ὀρθὸν πανταχοῦ ἑκάστοις ἄρχοντα εἶναι, μανθάνεις;

ΚΛ. Πῶς γὰρ οὔ;

ΑΘ. Καὶ μὴν ἐλέγομεν νυνδὴ μαχομένων ὡς ἀνδρεῖον δεῖ τὸν ἄρχοντ' εἶναι.

ΚΛ. Πῶς δ' οὔ;

ΑΘ. Ὁ μὴν ἀνδρεῖος τῶν δειλῶν ὑπὸ φόβων ἧττον τεθορύβηται.

ΚΛ. Καὶ τοῦτο οὕτως. b

ΑΘ. Εἰ δ' ἦν τις μηχανὴ μηδὲν τὸ παράπαν δεδιότα μηδὲ θορυβούμενον ἐπιστῆσαι στρατοπέδῳ στρατηγόν, ἆρ' οὐ τοῦτ' ἂν παντὶ τρόπῳ ἐπράττομεν;

ΚΛ. Σφόδρα μὲν οὖν.

ΑΘ. Νῦν δέ γε οὐ στρατοπέδου περὶ λέγομεν ἄρξοντος ἐν ἀνδρῶν ὁμιλίαις ἐχθρῶν ἐχθροῖς μετὰ πολέμου, φίλων δ' ἐν εἰρήνῃ πρὸς φίλους κοινωνησόντων φιλοφροσύνης.

ΚΛ. Ὀρθῶς.

ΑΘ. Ἔστιν δέ γε ἡ τοιαύτη συνουσία, εἴπερ ἔσται μετὰ c μέθης, οὐκ ἀθόρυβος. ἦ γάρ;

ΚΛ. Πῶς γάρ; ἀλλ' οἶμαι πᾶν τοὐναντίον.

ΑΘ. Οὐκοῦν πρῶτον μὲν καὶ τούτοις ἄρχοντος δεῖ;

ΚΛ. Τί μήν; ὡς οὐδενί γε πράγματι.

ΑΘ. Πότερον οὖν ἀθόρυβον, εἰ δυνατὸν εἴη, τὸν τοιοῦτον ἄρχοντα ἐκπορίζεσθαι δεῖ;

ΚΛ. Πῶς γὰρ οὔ;

ΑΘ. Καὶ μὴν περί γε συνουσίας, ὡς ἔοικεν, αὐτὸν φρόνιμον εἶναι δεῖ· γίγνεται γὰρ φύλαξ τῆς τε ὑπαρχούσης d φιλίας αὐτοῖς, καὶ ἔτι πλείονος ἐπιμελητὴς ὅπως ἔσται διὰ τὴν τότε συνουσίαν.

ΚΛ. Ἀληθέστατα.

ΑΘ. Οὐκοῦν νήφοντά τε καὶ σοφὸν ἄρχοντα μεθυόντων δεῖ καθιστάναι, καὶ μὴ τοὐναντίον; μεθυόντων γὰρ μεθύων καὶ νέος ἄρχων μὴ σοφός, εἰ μὴ κακὸν ἀπεργάσαιτό τι μέγα, πολλῇ χρῶτ' ἂν ἀγαθῇ τύχῃ.

ΚΛ. Παμπόλλῃ μὲν οὖν.

ΑΘ. Οὐκοῦν εἰ μὲν γιγνομένων ὡς δυνατὸν ὀρθότατα τούτων ἐν ταῖς πόλεσι τῶν συνουσιῶν μέμφοιτό τις, ἐπι- e καλῶν αὐτῷ τῷ πράγματι, τάχ' ἂν ὀρθῶς ἴσως μέμφοιτο· εἰ δὲ ἁμαρτανόμενον ὡς οἷόν τε μάλιστα ἐπιτήδευμά τις ὁρῶν λοιδορεῖ, πρῶτον μὲν δῆλον ὡς ἀγνοεῖ τοῦτ' αὐτὸ γιγνόμενον οὐκ ὀρθῶς, εἶθ' ὅτι πᾶν τούτῳ τῷ τρόπῳ φανεῖται πονηρόν, δεσπότου τε καὶ ἄρχοντος νήφοντος χωρὶς πραττόμενον. ἢ οὐ συννοεῖς τοῦθ', ὅτι μεθύων κυβερνήτης καὶ πᾶς παντὸς 641 ἄρχων ἀνατρέπει πάντα εἴτε πλοῖα εἴτε ἅρματα εἴτε στρατόπεδον, εἶθ' ὅτι ποτ' εἴη τὸ κυβερνώμενον ὑπ' αὐτοῦ;

ΚΛ. Παντάπασιν τοῦτό γε ἀληθὲς εἴρηκας, ὦ ξένε· τοὐπὶ τῷδε δ' ἡμῖν λέγε, τί ποτε, ἂν γίγνηται τοῦτο ὀρθῶς τὸ περὶ τὰς πόσεις νόμιμον, ἀγαθὸν ἂν δράσειεν ἡμᾶς; οἷον, ὃ νυνδὴ ἐλέγομεν, εἰ στράτευμα ὀρθῆς ἡγεμονίας τυγχάνοι, νίκη πολέμου τοῖς ἑπομένοις ἂν γίγνοιτο, οὐ σμικρὸν ἀγαθόν, b καὶ τἆλλ' οὕτω· συμποσίου δὲ ὀρθῶς παιδαγωγηθέντος τί μέγα ἰδιώταις ἢ τῇ πόλει γίγνοιτ' ἄν;

ΑΘ. Τί δέ; παιδὸς ἑνὸς ἢ καὶ χοροῦ παιδαγωγηθέντος κατὰ τρόπον ἕνός, τί μέγα τῇ πόλει φαῖμεν ἂν γίγνεσθαι; ἢ τοῦτο οὕτως ἐρωτηθέντες εἴποιμεν ἂν ὡς ἑνὸς μὲν βραχύ τι τῇ πόλει γίγνοιτ' ἂν ὄφελος, εἰ δ' ὅλως ἐρωτᾷς παιδείαν τῶν παιδευθέντων τί μέγα τὴν πόλιν ὀνίνησιν, οὐ χαλεπὸν εἰπεῖν ὅτι παιδευθέντες μὲν εὖ γίγνοιντ' ἂν ἄνδρες ἀγαθοί, γενό- c μενοι δὲ τοιοῦτοι τά τε ἄλλα πράττοιεν καλῶς, ἔτι δὲ κἂν νικῷεν τοὺς πολεμίους μαχόμενοι. παιδεία μὲν οὖν φέρει

καὶ νίκην, νίκη δ' ἐνίοτε ἀπαιδευσίαν· πολλοὶ γὰρ ὑβριστότεροι διὰ πολέμων νίκας γενόμενοι μυρίων ἄλλων κακῶν δι' ὕβριν ἐνεπλήσθησαν, καὶ παιδεία μὲν οὐδεπώποτε γέγονεν Καδμεία, νῖκαι δὲ ἀνθρώποις πολλαὶ δὴ τοιαῦται γεγόνασίν τε καὶ ἔσονται.

ΚΛ. Δοκεῖς ἡμῖν, ὦ φίλε, τὴν ἐν τοῖς οἴνοις κοινὴν διατριβὴν ὡς εἰς παιδείας μεγάλην μοῖραν τείνουσαν λέγειν, d ἂν ὀρθῶς γίγνηται.

ΑΘ. Τί μήν;

ΚΛ. Ἔχοις ἂν οὖν τὸ μετὰ τοῦτ' εἰπεῖν ὡς ἔστιν τὸ νῦν εἰρημένον ἀληθές;

ΑΘ. Τὸ μὲν ἀληθές, ὦ ξένε, διισχυρίζεσθαι ταῦτα οὕτως ἔχειν, πολλῶν ἀμφισβητούντων, θεοῦ· εἰ δ' ὅπῃ ἐμοὶ φαίνεται δεῖ λέγειν, οὐδεὶς φθόνος, ἐπείπερ ὡρμήκαμέν γε τοὺς λόγους περὶ νόμων καὶ πολιτείας ποιεῖσθαι τὰ νῦν.

ΚΛ. Τοῦτ' αὐτὸ δὴ πειρώμεθα, τὸ σοὶ δοκοῦν περὶ τῶν 10 νῦν ἀμφισβητουμένων καταμαθεῖν. e

ΑΘ. Ἀλλὰ χρὴ ποιεῖν οὕτως, ὑμᾶς τε ἐπὶ τὸ μαθεῖν καὶ ἐμὲ ἐπὶ τὸ δηλῶσαι πειρώμενον ἁμῶς γέ πως, συντεῖναι, τὸν λόγον. πρῶτον δέ μου ἀκούσατε τὸ τοιόνδε. τὴν πόλιν ἅπαντες ἡμῶν Ἕλληνες ὑπολαμβάνουσιν ὡς φιλόλογός τέ ἐστι καὶ πολύλογος, Λακεδαίμονα δὲ καὶ Κρήτην, τὴν μὲν βραχύλογον, τὴν δὲ πολύνοιαν μᾶλλον ἢ πολυλογίαν ἀσκοῦσαν· σκοπῶ δὴ μὴ δόξαν ὑμῖν παράσχωμαι περὶ σμικροῦ 642 πολλὰ λέγειν, μέθης πέρι, σμικροῦ πράγματος, παμμήκη λόγον ἀνακαθαιρόμενος. τὸ δὲ ἡ κατὰ φύσιν αὐτοῦ διόρθωσις οὐκ ἂν δύναιτο ἄνευ μουσικῆς ὀρθότητός ποτε σαφὲς οὐδὲ ἱκανὸν ἐν τοῖς λόγοις ἀπολαβεῖν, μουσικὴ δὲ ἄνευ παιδείας τῆς πάσης οὐκ ἂν αὖ ποτε δύναιτο· ταῦτα δὲ παμπόλλων ἐστὶν λόγων. ὁρᾶτε οὖν τί ποιῶμεν—εἰ ταῦτα μὲν ἐάσαιμεν ἐν τῷ παρόντι, μετεκβαῖμεν δ' εἰς ἕτερόν τινα νόμων πέρι λόγον. b

ΜΕ. Ὦ ξένε Ἀθηναῖε, οὐκ οἶσθ' ἴσως ὅτι τυγχάνει ἡμῶν ἡ ἑστία τῆς πόλεως οὖσα ὑμῶν πρόξενος. ἴσως μὲν οὖν καὶ πᾶσιν τοῖς παισίν, ἐπειδὰν ἀκούσωσιν ὅτι τινός εἰσιν πόλεως πρόξενοι, ταύτῃ τις εὔνοια ἐκ νέων εὐθὺς ἐνδύεται ἕκαστον ἡμῶν τῶν προξένων τῇ πόλει, ὡς δευτέρᾳ οὔσῃ πατρίδι μετὰ τὴν αὐτοῦ πόλιν· καὶ δὴ καὶ ἐμοὶ νῦν ταὐτὸν τοῦτο ἐγγέγονεν. ἀκούων γὰρ τῶν παίδων εὐθύς, εἴ τι μέμφοιντο ἢ καὶ ἐπαινοῖεν Λακεδαιμόνιοι Ἀθηναίους, c

ὡς "Ἡ πόλις ὑμῶν, ὦ Μέγιλλε," ἔφασαν, "ἡμᾶς οὐ καλῶς ἢ καλῶς ἔρρεξε"—ταῦτα δὴ ἀκούων, καὶ μαχόμενος πρὸς αὐτὰ ὑπὲρ ὑμῶν ἀεὶ πρὸς τοὺς τὴν πόλιν εἰς ψόγον ἄγοντας, πᾶσαν εὔνοιαν ἔσχον, καί μοι νῦν ἥ τε φωνὴ προσφιλὴς ὑμῶν, τό τε ὑπὸ πολλῶν λεγόμενον, ὡς ὅσοι Ἀθηναίων εἰσὶν ἀγαθοὶ διαφερόντως εἰσὶν τοιοῦτοι, δοκεῖ ἀληθέστατα λέγεσθαι· μόνοι γὰρ ἄνευ ἀνάγκης αὐτοφυῶς, θεία μοίρᾳ ἀληθῶς καὶ οὔτι πλαστῶς εἰσιν ἀγαθοί. θαρρῶν δὴ ἐμοῦ γε ἕνεκα λέγοις ἂν τοσαῦτα ὁπόσα σοι φίλον.

ΚΛ. Καὶ μήν, ὦ ξένε, καὶ τὸν παρ' ἐμοῦ λόγον ἀκούσας τε καὶ ἀποδεξάμενος, θαρρῶν ὁπόσα βούλει λέγε. τῇδε γὰρ ἴσως ἀκήκοας ὡς Ἐπιμενίδης γέγονεν ἀνὴρ θεῖος, ὃς ἦν ἡμῖν οἰκεῖος, ἐλθὼν δὲ πρὸ τῶν Περσικῶν δέκα ἔτεσιν πρότερον παρ' ὑμᾶς κατὰ τὴν τοῦ θεοῦ μαντείαν, θυσίας τε ἐθύσατό τινας ἃς ὁ θεὸς ἀνεῖλεν, καὶ δὴ καὶ φοβουμένων τὸν Περσικὸν Ἀθηναίων στόλον, εἶπεν ὅτι δέκα μὲν ἐτῶν οὐχ ἥξουσιν, ὅταν δὲ ἔλθωσιν, ἀπαλλαγήσονται πράξαντες οὐδὲν ὧν ἤλπιζον, παθόντες τε ἢ δράσαντες πλείω κακά. τότ' οὖν ἐξενώθησαν ὑμῖν οἱ πρόγονοι ἡμῶν, καὶ εὔνοιαν ἐκ τόσου ἔγωγε ὑμῖν καὶ οἱ ἡμέτεροι ἔχουσιν γονῆς.

ΑΘ. Τὰ μὲν τοίνυν ὑμέτερα ἀκούειν, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἕτοιμ' ἂν εἴη· τὰ δ' ἐμὰ βούλεσθαι μὲν ἕτοιμα, δύνασθαι δὲ οὐ πάνυ ῥᾴδια, ὅμως δὲ πειρατέον. πρῶτον δὴ οὖν πρὸς τὸν λόγον ὁρισώμεθα παιδείαν τί ποτ' ἐστὶν καὶ τίνα δύναμιν ἔχει· διὰ γὰρ ταύτης φαμὲν ἰτέον εἶναι τὸν προκεχειρισμένον ἐν τῷ νῦν λόγον ὑφ' ἡμῶν, μέχριπερ ἂν πρὸς τὸν θεὸν ἀφίκηται.

ΚΛ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν δρῶμεν ταῦτα, εἴπερ σοί γε ἡδύ.

ΑΘ. Λέγοντος τοίνυν ἐμοῦ τί ποτε χρὴ φάναι παιδείαν εἶναι, σκέψασθε ἂν ἀρέσκῃ τὸ λεχθέν.

ΚΛ. Λέγοις ἄν.

ΑΘ. Λέγω δή, καὶ φημι τὸν ὁτιοῦν ἀγαθὸν ἄνδρα μέλλοντα ἔσεσθαι τοῦτο αὐτὸ ἐκ παίδων εὐθὺς μελετᾶν δεῖν, παίζοντά τε καὶ σπουδάζοντα ἐν τοῖς τοῦ πράγματος ἑκάστοις προσήκουσιν. οἷον τὸν μέλλοντα ἀγαθὸν ἔσεσθαι γεωργὸν ἢ τινα οἰκοδόμον, τὸν μὲν οἰκοδομοῦντά τι τῶν παιδείων οἰκοδομημάτων παίζειν χρή, τὸν δ' αὖ γεωργοῦντα, καὶ ὄργανα ἑκατέρῳ σμικρά, τῶν ἀληθινῶν μιμήματα, παρασκευάζειν τὸν τρέφοντα αὐτῶν ἑκάτερον, καὶ δὴ καὶ τῶν μαθημάτων ὅσα ἀναγκαῖα προμεμαθηκέναι προμάνθανειν,

οἷον τέκτονα μετρεῖν ἢ σταθμᾶσθαι καὶ πολεμικὸν ἱππεύειν παίζοντα ἤ τι τῶν τοιούτων ἄλλο ποιεῖν, καὶ πειρᾶσθαι διὰ τῶν παιδιῶν ἐκεῖσε τρέπειν τὰς ἡδονὰς καὶ ἐπιθυμίας τῶν παίδων, οἳ ἀφικομένους αὐτοὺς δεῖ τέλος ἔχειν. κεφάλαιον δὴ παιδείας λέγομεν τὴν ὀρθὴν τροφήν, ἣ τοῦ παίζοντος τὴν ψυχὴν εἰς ἔρωτα μάλιστα ἄξει τούτου ὃ δεήσει γενόμενον ἄνδρ' αὐτὸν τέλειον εἶναι τῆς τοῦ πράγματος ἀρετῆς· ὁρᾶτε οὖν εἰ μέχρι τούτου γε, ὅπερ εἶπον, ὑμῖν ἀρέσκει τὸ λεχθέν.

ΚΛ. Πῶς γὰρ οὔ;

ΑΘ. Μὴ τοίνυν μηδ' ὃ λέγομεν εἶναι παιδείαν ἀόριστον γένηται. νῦν γὰρ ὀνειδίζοντες ἐπαινοῦντές θ' ἑκάστων τὰς τροφάς, λέγομεν ὡς τὸν μὲν πεπαιδευμένον ἡμῶν ὄντα τινά, τὸν δὲ ἀπαίδευτον, ἐνίοτε εἴς τε καπηλείας καὶ ναυκληρίας καὶ ἄλλων τοιούτων μάλα πεπαιδευμένων **σοφίαν** ἀνθρώπων· οὐ γὰρ ταῦτα ἡγουμένων, ὡς ἔοικ', εἶναι παιδείαν ὁ νῦν λόγος ἂν εἴη, τὴν δὲ πρὸς ἀρετὴν ἐκ παίδων παιδείαν, ποιοῦσαν ἐπιθυμητήν τε καὶ ἐραστὴν τοῦ πολίτην γενέσθαι τέλεον, ἄρχειν τε καὶ ἄρχεσθαι ἐπιστάμενον μετὰ δίκης. ταύτην τὴν τροφὴν ἀφορισάμενος ὁ λόγος οὗτος, ὡς ἐμοὶ φαίνεται, νῦν βούλοιτ' ἂν μόνην παιδείαν προσαγορεύειν, τὴν δὲ εἰς χρήματα τείνουσαν ἤ τινα πρὸς ἰσχύν, ἢ καὶ πρὸς ἄλλην τινὰ σοφίαν ἄνευ νοῦ καὶ δίκης, βάναυσόν τ' εἶναι καὶ ἀνελεύθερον καὶ οὐκ ἀξίαν τὸ παράπαν παιδείαν καλεῖσθαι. ἡμεῖς δὴ μηδὲν ὀνόματι διαφερώμεθ' αὐτοῖς, ἀλλ' ὁ νυνδὴ λόγος ἡμῖν ὁμολογηθεὶς μενέτω, ὡς οἵ γε ὀρθῶς πεπαιδευμένοι σχεδὸν ἀγαθοὶ γίγνονται, καὶ δεῖ δὴ τὴν παιδείαν μηδαμοῦ ἀτιμάζειν, ὡς πρῶτον τῶν καλλίστων τοῖς ἀρίστοις ἀνδράσιν παραγιγνόμενον· καὶ εἴ ποτε ἐξέρχεται, δυνατὸν δ' ἐστὶν ἐπανορθοῦσθαι, τοῦτ' ἀεὶ δραστέον διὰ βίου παντὶ κατὰ δύναμιν.

ΚΛ. Ὀρθῶς, καὶ συγχωροῦμεν ἃ λέγεις.

ΑΘ. Καὶ μὴν πάλαι γε συνεχωρήσαμεν ὡς ἀγαθῶν μὲν ὄντων τῶν δυναμένων ἄρχειν αὐτῶν, κακῶν δὲ τῶν μή.

ΚΛ. Λέγεις ὀρθότατα.

ΑΘ. Σαφέστερον ἔτι τοίνυν ἀναλάβωμεν τοῦτ' αὐτὸ ὅτι ποτὲ λέγομεν. καί μοι δι' εἰκόνος ἀποδέξασθε ἐάν πως δυνατὸς ὑμῖν γένωμαι δηλῶσαι τὸ τοιοῦτον.

ΚΛ. Λέγε μόνον.

ΑΘ. Οὐκοῦν ἕνα μὲν ἡμῶν ἕκαστον αὐτὸν τιθῶμεν;

ΚΛ. Ναί.

ΑΘ. Δύο δὲ κεκτημένον ἐν αὑτῷ συμβούλω ἐναντίω τε καὶ ἄφρονε, ὦ προσαγορεύομεν ἡδονὴν καὶ λύπην;

ΚΛ. Ἔστι ταῦτα.

ΑΘ. Πρὸς δὲ τούτοιν ἀμφοῖν αὖ δόξας μελλόντων, οἷν κοινὸν μὲν ὄνομα ἐλπίς, ἴδιον δέ, φόβος μὲν ἡ πρὸ λύπης d ἐλπίς, θάρρος δὲ ἡ πρὸ τοῦ ἐναντίου· ἐπὶ δὲ πᾶσι τούτοις λογισμὸς ὅτι ποτ' αὐτῶν ἄμεινον ἢ χεῖρον, ὃς γενόμενος δόγμα πόλεως κοινὸν νόμος ἐπωνόμασται.

ΚΛ. Μόγις μέν πως ἐφέπομαι, λέγε μὴν τὸ μετὰ ταῦτα ὡς ἑπομένου.

ΜΕ. Καὶ ἐν ἐμοὶ μὴν ταὐτὸν τοῦτο πάθος ἔνι.

ΑΘ. Περὶ δὴ τούτων διανοηθῶμεν οὑτωσί. θαῦμα μὲν ἕκαστον ἡμῶν ἡγησώμεθα τῶν ζῴων θεῖον, εἴτε ὡς παίγνιον ἐκείνων εἴτε ὡς σπουδῇ τινι συνεστηκός· οὐ γὰρ δὴ τοῦτό e γε γιγνώσκομεν, τόδε δὲ ἴσμεν, ὅτι ταῦτα τὰ πάθη ἐν ἡμῖν οἷον νεῦρα ἢ σμήρινθοί τινες ἐνοῦσαι σπῶσίν τε ἡμᾶς καὶ ἀλλήλαις ἀνθέλκουσιν ἐναντίαι οὖσαι ἐπ' ἐναντίας πράξεις, οὗ δὴ διωρισμένη ἀρετὴ καὶ κακία κεῖται. μιᾷ γάρ φησιν ὁ λόγος δεῖν τῶν ἕλξεων συνεπόμενον ἀεὶ καὶ μηδαμῇ ἀπολειπόμενον ἐκείνης, ἀνθέλκειν τοῖς ἄλλοις νεύροις ἕκαστον, ταύτην 645 δ' εἶναι τὴν τοῦ λογισμοῦ ἀγωγὴν χρυσῆν καὶ ἱεράν, τῆς πόλεως κοινὸν νόμον ἐπικαλουμένην, ἄλλας δὲ σκληρὰς καὶ σιδηρᾶς, τὴν δὲ μαλακὴν ἅτε χρυσῆν οὖσαν, τὰς δὲ ἄλλας παντοδαποῖς εἴδεσιν ὁμοίας. δεῖν δὴ τῇ καλλίστῃ ἀγωγῇ τῇ τοῦ νόμου ἀεὶ συλλαμβάνειν· ἅτε γὰρ τοῦ λογισμοῦ καλοῦ μὲν ὄντος, πράου δὲ καὶ οὐ βιαίου, δεῖσθαι ὑπηρετῶν αὐτοῦ τὴν ἀγωγήν, ὅπως ἂν ἐν ἡμῖν τὸ χρυσοῦν γένος νικᾷ τὰ ἄλλα b γένη. καὶ οὕτω δὴ περὶ θαυμάτων ὡς ὄντων ἡμῶν ὁ μῦθος ἀρετῆς σεσωμένος ἂν εἴη, καὶ τὸ κρείττω ἑαυτοῦ καὶ ἧττω εἶναι τρόπον τινὰ φανερὸν ἂν γίγνοιτο μᾶλλον ὃ νοεῖ, καὶ ὅτι πόλιν καὶ ἰδιώτην, τὸν μὲν λόγον ἀληθῆ λαβόντα ἐν ἑαυτῷ περὶ τῶν ἕλξεων τούτων, τούτῳ ἑπόμενον δεῖ ζῆν, πόλιν δὲ ἢ παρὰ θεῶν τινος ἢ παρὰ τούτου τοῦ γνόντος ταῦτα λόγον παραλαβοῦσαν, νόμον θεμένην, αὐτῇ τε ὁμιλεῖν καὶ ταῖς ἄλλαις πόλεσιν. οὕτω καὶ κακία δὴ καὶ ἀρετὴ c σαφέστερον ἡμῖν διηρθρωμένον ἂν εἴη· ἐναργεστέρου δ' αὐτοῦ γενομένου καὶ παιδεία καὶ τἆλλα ἐπιτηδεύματα ἴσως ἔσται μᾶλλον καταφανῆ, καὶ δὴ καὶ τὸ περὶ τῆς ἐν τοῖς οἴνοις

διατριβῆς, ὃ δοξασθείη μὲν ἂν εἶναι φαύλου πέρι μῆκος πολὺ λόγων περιττὸν εἰρημένον, φανείη δὲ τάχ' ἂν ἴσως τοῦ μήκους γ' αὐτῶν οὐκ ἀπάξιον.

ΚΛ. Εὖ λέγεις, καὶ περαίνωμεν ὅτιπερ ἂν τῆς γε νῦν διατριβῆς ἄξιον γίγνηται.

ΑΘ. Λέγε δή· προσφέροντες τῷ θαύματι τούτῳ τὴν μέθην, ποῖόν τί ποτε αὐτὸ ἀπεργαζόμεθα; d

ΚΛ. Πρὸς τί δὲ σκοπούμενος αὐτὸ ἐπανερωτᾷς;

ΑΘ. Οὐδέν πω πρὸς ὅτι, τοῦτο δὲ ὅλως κοινωνῆσαν τούτῳ ποῖόν τι συμπίπτει γίγνεσθαι. ἔτι δὲ σαφέστερον ὃ βούλομαι πειράσομαι φράζειν. ἐρωτῶ γὰρ τὸ τοιόνδε· ἆρα σφοδροτέρας τὰς ἡδονὰς καὶ λύπας καὶ θυμοὺς καὶ ἔρωτας ἢ τῶν οἴνων πόσις ἐπιτείνει;

ΚΛ. Πολύ γε.

ΑΘ. Τί δ' αὖ τὰς αἰσθήσεις καὶ μνήμας καὶ δόξας καὶ e φρονήσεις; πότερον ὡσαύτως σφοδροτέρας; ἢ πάμπαν ἀπολείπει ταῦτα αὐτόν, ἂν κατακορής τις τῇ μέθῃ γίγνηται;

ΚΛ. Ναί, πάμπαν ἀπολείπει.

ΑΘ. Οὐκοῦν εἰς ταὐτὸν ἀφικνεῖται τὴν τῆς ψυχῆς ἕξιν τῇ τότε ὅτε νέος ἦν παῖς;

ΚΛ. Τί μήν;

ΑΘ. Ἥκιστα δὴ τότ' ἂν αὐτὸς αὑτοῦ γίγνοιτο ἐγκρατής.

ΚΛ. Ἥκιστα. 646

ΑΘ. Ἆρ' οὖν πονηρότατος, φαμέν, ὁ τοιοῦτος;

ΚΛ. Πολύ γε.

ΑΘ. Οὐ μόνον ἄρ', ὡς ἔοικεν, ὁ γέρων δὶς παῖς γίγνοιτ' ἄν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ὁ μεθυσθείς.

ΚΛ. Ἄριστα εἶπες, ὦ ξένε.

ΑΘ. Τούτου δὴ τοῦ ἐπιτηδεύματος ἔσθ' ὅστις λόγος ἐπιχειρήσει πείθειν ἡμᾶς ὡς χρὴ γεύεσθαι καὶ μὴ φεύγειν παντὶ σθένει κατὰ τὸ δυνατόν;

ΚΛ. Ἔοικ' εἶναι· σὺ γοῦν φῂς καὶ ἕτοιμος ἦσθα νυνδὴ λέγειν.

ΑΘ. Ἀληθῆ μέντοι μνημονεύεις· καὶ νῦν γ' εἶμ' b ἕτοιμος, ἐπειδήπερ σφώ γε ἐθελήσειν προθύμως ἕφατον ἀκούειν.

ΚΛ. Πῶς δ' οὐκ ἀκουσόμεθα; κἂν εἰ μηδενὸς ἄλλου χάριν, ἀλλὰ τοῦ θαυμαστοῦ τε καὶ ἀτόπου, εἰ δεῖ ἑκόντα ποτὲ ἄνθρωπον εἰς ἅπασαν φαυλότητα ἑαυτὸν ἐμβάλλειν.

ΑΘ. Ψυχῆς λέγεις· ἦ γάρ;

ΚΛ. Ναί.

ΑΘ. Τί δέ; σώματος, ὦ ἑταῖρε, εἰς πονηρίαν, λεπτότητά τε καὶ αἶσχος καὶ ἀδυναμίαν, θαυμάζοιμεν ἂν εἴ ποτέ τις ἑκὼν ἐπὶ τὸ τοιοῦτον ἀφικνεῖται;

ΚΛ. Πῶς γὰρ οὔ;

ΑΘ. Τί οὖν; τοὺς εἰς τὰ ἰατρεῖα αὐτοὺς βαδίζοντας ἐπὶ φαρμακοποσίᾳ ἀγνοεῖν οἰόμεθα ὅτι μετ' ὀλίγον ὕστερον καὶ ἐπὶ πολλὰς ἡμέρας ἕξουσιν τοιοῦτον τὸ σῶμα, οἷον εἰ διὰ τέλους ἔχειν μέλλοιεν, ζῆν οὐκ ἂν δέξαιντο; ἢ τοὺς ἐπὶ τὰ γυμνάσια καὶ πόνους ἰόντας οὐκ ἴσμεν ὡς ἀσθενεῖς εἰς τὸ παραχρῆμα γίγνονται;

ΚΛ. Πάντα ταῦτα ἴσμεν.

ΑΘ. Καὶ ὅτι τῆς μετὰ ταῦτα ὠφελίας ἕνεκα ἑκόντες πορεύονται;

ΚΛ. Κάλλιστα.

ΑΘ. Οὐκοῦν χρὴ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἐπιτηδευμάτων πέρι διανοεῖσθαι τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον;

ΚΛ. Πάνυ γε.

ΑΘ. Καὶ τῆς περὶ τὸν οἶνον ἄρα διατριβῆς ὡσαύτως διανοητέον, εἴπερ ἔνι τοῦτο ἐν τούτοις ὀρθῶς διανοηθῆναι.

ΚΛ. Πῶς δ' οὔ;

ΑΘ. Ἂν ἄρα τινὰ ἡμῖν ὠφελίαν ἔχουσα φαίνηται μηδὲν τῆς περὶ τὸ σῶμα ἐλάττω, τῇ γε ἀρχῇ τὴν σωμασκίαν νικᾷ τῷ τὴν μὲν μετ' ἀλγηδόνων εἶναι, τὴν δὲ μή.

ΚΛ. Ὀρθῶς λέγεις, θαυμάζοιμι δ' ἂν εἴ τι δυναίμεθα τοιοῦτον ἐν αὐτῷ καταμαθεῖν.

ΑΘ. Τοῦτ' αὐτὸ δὴ νῦν, ὡς ἔοιχ', ἡμῖν ἤδη πειρατέον φράζειν. καί μοι λέγε· δύο φόβων εἴδη σχεδὸν ἐναντία δυνάμεθα κατανοῆσαι;

ΚΛ. Ποῖα δή;

ΑΘ. Τὰ τοιάδε· φοβούμεθα μέν που τὰ κακά, προσδοκῶντες γενήσεσθαι.

ΚΛ. Ναί.

ΑΘ. Φοβούμεθα δέ γε πολλάκις δόξαν, ἡγούμενοι δοξάζεσθαι κακοί, πράττοντες ἢ λέγοντές τι τῶν μὴ καλῶν· ὃν δὴ καὶ καλοῦμεν τὸν φόβον ἡμεῖς γε, οἶμαι δὲ καὶ πάντες, αἰσχύνην.

ΚΛ. Τί δ' οὔ;

ΑΘ. Τούτους δὴ δύο ἔλεγον φόβους· ὧν ὁ ἕτερος ἐναντίος μὲν ταῖς ἀλγηδόσιν καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις φόβοις, ἐναντίος δ' ἐστὶ ταῖς πλείσταις καὶ μεγίσταις ἡδοναῖς.

ΚΛ. Ὀρθότατα λέγεις.

ΑΘ. Ἆρ' οὖν οὐ καὶ νομοθέτης, καὶ πᾶς οὗ καὶ σμικρὸν ὄφελος, τοῦτον τὸν φόβον ἐν τιμῇ μεγίστῃ σέβει, καὶ καλῶν αἰδῶ, τὸ τούτῳ θάρρος ἐναντίον ἀναίδειάν τε προσαγορεύει καὶ μέγιστον κακὸν ἰδίᾳ τε καὶ δημοσίᾳ πᾶσι νενόμικεν; b

ΚΛ. Ὀρθῶς λέγεις.

ΑΘ. Οὐκοῦν τά τ' ἄλλα πολλὰ καὶ μεγάλα ὁ φόβος ἡμᾶς οὗτος σῴζει, καὶ τὴν ἐν τῷ πολέμῳ νίκην καὶ σωτηρίαν ἓν πρὸς ἓν οὐδὲν οὕτως σφόδρα ἡμῖν ἀπεργάζεται; δύο γὰρ οὖν ἐστὸν τὰ τὴν νίκην ἀπεργαζόμενα, θάρρος μὲν πολεμίων, φίλων δὲ φόβος αἰσχύνης πέρι κακῆς.

ΚΛ. Ἔστι ταῦτα.

ΑΘ. Ἄφοβον ἡμῶν ἄρα δεῖ γίγνεσθαι καὶ φοβερὸν ἕκαστον· ὧν δ' ἑκάτερον ἕνεκα, διῃρήμεθα. c

ΚΛ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

ΑΘ. Καὶ μὴν ἄφοβόν γε ἕκαστον βουληθέντες ποιεῖν φόβων πολλῶν τινῶν, εἰς φόβον ἄγοντες αὐτὸν μετὰ νόμου, τοιοῦτον ἀπεργαζόμεθα.

ΚΛ. Φαινόμεθα.

ΑΘ. Τί δ' ὅταν ἐπιχειρῶμέν τινα φοβερὸν ποιεῖν μετὰ δίκης; ἆρ' οὐκ ἀναισχυντίᾳ συμβάλλοντας αὐτὸν καὶ προσγυμνάζοντας νικᾶν δεῖ ποιεῖν διαμαχόμενον αὐτοῦ ταῖς ἡδοναῖς; ἢ τῇ μὲν δειλίᾳ τῇ ἐν αὐτῷ προσμαχόμενον καὶ νικῶντα αὐτὴν δεῖ τέλεον οὕτω γίγνεσθαι πρὸς ἀνδρείαν, d ἄπειρος δὲ δήπου καὶ ἀγύμναστος ὢν τῶν τοιούτων ἀγώνων ὁστισοῦν οὐδ' ἂν ἥμισυς ἑαυτοῦ γένοιτο πρὸς ἀρετήν, σώφρων δὲ ἄρα τελέως ἔσται μὴ πολλαῖς ἡδοναῖς καὶ ἐπιθυμίαις προτρεπούσαις ἀναισχυντεῖν καὶ ἀδικεῖν διαμεμαχημένος καὶ νενικηκὼς μετὰ λόγου καὶ ἔργου καὶ τέχνης ἔν τε παιδιαῖς καὶ ἐν σπουδαῖς, ἀλλ' ἀπαθὴς ὢν πάντων τῶν τοιούτων;

ΚΛ. Οὔκουν τόν γ' εἰκότα λόγον ἂν ἔχοι.

ΑΘ. Τί οὖν; φόβου φάρμακον ἔσθ' ὅστις θεὸς ἔδωκεν e ἀνθρώποις, ὥστε ὁπόσῳ πλέον ἂν ἐθέλῃ τις πίνειν αὐτοῦ, τοσούτῳ μᾶλλον αὐτὸν νομίζειν καθ' ἑκάστην πόσιν δυστυχῆ γίγνεσθαι, καὶ φοβεῖσθαι τὰ παρόντα καὶ τὰ μέλλοντα αὐτῷ πάντα, καὶ τελευτῶντα εἰς πᾶν δέος ἰέναι τὸν ἀνδρειότατον 648

ἀνθρώπων, ἐκκοιμηθέντα δὲ καὶ τοῦ πώματος ἀπαλλαγέντα πάλιν ἑκάστοτε τὸν αὐτὸν γίγνεσθαι;

ΚΛ. Καὶ τί τοιοῦτον φαῖμεν ἄν, ὦ ξένε, ἐν ἀνθρώποις γεγονέναι πῶμα;

ΑΘ. Οὐδέν· εἰ δ' οὖν ἐγένετό ποθεν, ἔσθ' ὅτι πρὸς ἀνδρείαν ἦν ἂν νομοθέτῃ χρήσιμον; οἷον τὸ τοιόνδε περὶ αὐτοῦ καὶ μάλα εἴχομεν ἂν αὐτῷ διαλέγεσθαι· Φέρε, ὦ νομοθέτα, εἴτε Κρησὶν εἴθ' οἱστισινοῦν νομοθετεῖς, πρῶτον μὲν τῶν πολιτῶν ἆρ' ἂν δέξαιο βάσανον δυνατὸς εἶναι λαμβάνειν ἀνδρείας τε πέρι καὶ δειλίας;

ΚΛ. Φαίη που πᾶς ἂν δῆλον ὅτι.

ΑΘ. Τί δέ; μετ' ἀσφαλείας καὶ ἄνευ κινδύνων μεγάλων ἢ μετὰ τῶν ἐναντίων;

ΚΛ. Καὶ τοῦτο ‹τὸ› μετὰ τῆς ἀσφαλείας συνομολογήσει πᾶς.

ΑΘ. Χρῷο δ' ἂν εἰς τοὺς φόβους τούτους ἄγων καὶ ἐλέγχων ἐν τοῖς παθήμασιν, ὥστε ἀναγκάζειν ἄφοβον γίγνεσθαι, παρακελευόμενος καὶ νουθετῶν καὶ τιμῶν, τὸν δὲ ἀτιμάζων, ὅστις σοι μὴ πείθοιτο εἶναι τοιοῦτος οἷον σὺ τάττοις ἐν πᾶσιν; καὶ γυμνασάμενον μὲν εὖ καὶ ἀνδρείως ἀζήμιον ἀπαλλάττοις ἄν, κακῶς δέ, ζημίαν ἐπιτιθείς; ἢ τὸ παράπαν οὐκ ἂν χρῷο, μηδὲν ἄλλο ἐγκαλῶν τῷ πώματι;

ΚΛ. Καὶ πῶς οὐκ ἂν χρῷτο, ὦ ξένε;

ΑΘ. Γυμνασία γοῦν, ὦ φίλε, παρὰ τὰ νῦν θαυμαστὴ ῥᾳστώνης ἂν εἴη καθ' ἕνα καὶ κατ' ὀλίγους καὶ καθ' ὁπόσους τις ἀεὶ βούλοιτο· καὶ εἴτε τις ἄρα μόνος ἐν ἐρημίᾳ, τὸ τῆς αἰσχύνης ἐπίπροσθεν ποιούμενος, πρὶν εὖ σχεῖν ἡγούμενος ὁρᾶσθαι μὴ δεῖν, οὕτω πρὸς τοὺς φόβους γυμνάζοιτο, πῶμα μόνον ἀντὶ μυρίων πραγμάτων παρασκευαζόμενος ὀρθῶς ἄν τι πράττοι, εἴτε τις ἑαυτῷ πιστεύων φύσει καὶ μελέτῃ καλῶς παρεσκευάσθαι, μηδὲν ὀκνοῖ μετὰ συμποτῶν πλειόνων γυμναζόμενος ἐπιδείκνυσθαι τὴν ἐν τῇ τοῦ πώματος ἀναγκαίᾳ διαφορᾷ δύναμιν ὑπερθέων καὶ κρατῶν, ὥστε ὑπ' ἀσχημοσύνης μηδὲ ἓν σφάλλεσθαι μέγα μηδ' ἀλλοιοῦσθαι δι' ἀρετήν, πρὸς δὲ τὴν ἐσχάτην πόσιν ἀπαλλάττοιτο πρὶν ἀφικνεῖσθαι, τὴν πάντων ἧττον φοβούμενος ἀνθρώπων τοῦ πώματος.

ΚΛ. Ναί· σωφρονοῖ γὰρ ‹ἄν›, ὦ ξένε, καὶ ὁ τοιοῦτος οὕτω πράττων.

ΑΘ. Πάλιν δὴ πρὸς τὸν νομοθέτην λέγωμεν τάδε· Εἶεν, 649
ὦ νομοθέτα, τοῦ μὲν δὴ φόβου σχεδὸν οὔτε θεὸς ἔδωκεν
ἀνθρώποις τοιοῦτον φάρμακον οὔτε αὐτοὶ μεμηχανήμεθα—
τοὺς γὰρ γόητας οὐκ ἐν θοίνῃ λέγω—τῆς δὲ ἀφοβίας καὶ
τοῦ λίαν θαρρεῖν καὶ ἀκαίρως <καὶ> ἃ μὴ χρὴ πότερον ἔστιν
πῶμα, ἢ πῶς λέγομεν;

ΚΛ. Ἔστιν, φήσει που, τὸν οἶνον φράζων.

ΑΘ. Ἦ καὶ τοὐναντίον ἔχει τοῦτο τῷ νυνδὴ λεγομένῳ;
πιόντα τὸν ἄνθρωπον αὐτὸν αὑτοῦ ποιεῖ πρῶτον ἥλεων εὐθὺς
μᾶλλον ἢ πρότερον, καὶ ὁπόσῳ ἂν πλέον αὐτοῦ γεύηται, b
τοσούτῳ πλειόνων ἐλπίδων ἀγαθῶν πληροῦσθαι καὶ δυνά-
μεως εἰς δόξαν; καὶ τελευτῶν δὴ πάσης ὁ τοιοῦτος παρρησίας
ὡς σοφὸς ὢν μεστοῦται καὶ ἐλευθερίας, πάσης δὲ ἀφοβίας,
ὥστε εἰπεῖν τε ἀόκνως ὁτιοῦν, ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ πρᾶξαι; πᾶς
ἡμῖν, οἶμαι, ταῦτ' ἂν συγχωροῖ.

ΚΛ. Τί μήν;

ΑΘ. Ἀναμνησθῶμεν δὴ τόδε, ὅτι δύ' ἔφαμεν ἡμῶν ἐν
ταῖς ψυχαῖς δεῖν θεραπεύεσθαι, τὸ μὲν ὅπως ὅτι μάλιστα
θαρρήσομεν, τὸ δὲ τοὐναντίον ὅτι μάλιστα φοβησόμεθα. c

ΚΛ. Ἃ τῆς αἰδοῦς ἔλεγες, ὡς οἰόμεθα.

ΑΘ. Καλῶς μνημονεύετε. ἐπειδὴ δὲ τήν τε ἀνδρείαν
καὶ τὴν ἀφοβίαν ἐν τοῖς φόβοις δεῖ καταμελετᾶσθαι, σκε-
πτέον ἆρα τὸ ἐναντίον ἐν τοῖς ἐναντίοις θεραπεύεσθαι δέον
ἂν εἴη.

ΚΛ. Τό γ' οὖν εἰκός.

ΑΘ. Ἃ παθόντες ἄρα πεφύκαμεν διαφερόντως θαρραλέοι
τ' εἶναι καὶ θρασεῖς, ἐν τούτοις δέον ἄν, ὡς ἔοικ', εἴη τὸ
μελετᾶν ὡς ἥκιστα εἶναι ἀναισχύντους τε καὶ θρασύτητος
γέμοντας, φοβεροὺς δὲ εἰς τό τι τολμᾶν ἑκάστοτε λέγειν d
ἢ πάσχειν ἢ καὶ δρᾶν αἰσχρὸν ὁτιοῦν.

ΚΛ. Ἔοικεν.

ΑΘ. Οὐκοῦν ταὐτά ἐστι πάντα ἐν οἷς ἐσμὲν τοιοῦτοι,
θυμός, ἔρως, ὕβρις, ἀμαθία, φιλοκέρδεια, <ἀ>δειλία, καὶ ἔτι
τοιάδε, πλοῦτος, κάλλος, ἰσχύς, καὶ πάνθ' ὅσα δι' ἡδονῆς
αὖ μεθύσκοντα παράφρονας ποιεῖ; τούτων δὲ εὐτελῆ τε καὶ
ἀσινεστέραν πρῶτον μὲν πρὸς τὸ λαμβάνειν πεῖραν, εἶτα
εἰς τὸ μελετᾶν, πλὴν τῆς ἐν οἴνῳ βασάνου καὶ παιδιᾶς, τίνα
ἔχομεν ἡδονὴν εἰπεῖν ἔμμετρον μᾶλλον, ἂν καὶ ὁπωστιοῦν e
μετ' εὐλαβείας γίγνηται; σκοπῶμεν γὰρ δή· δυσκόλου ψυχῆς

καὶ ἀγρίας, ἐξ ἧς ἀδικίαι μυρίαι γίγνονται, πότερον ἰόντα εἰς τὰ συμβόλαια πεῖραν λαμβάνειν, κινδυνεύοντα περὶ
650 αὐτῶν, σφαλερώτερον, ἢ συγγενόμενον μετὰ τῆς τοῦ Διονύσου θεωρίας; ἢ πρὸς τἀφροδίσια ἡττημένης τινὸς ψυχῆς βάσανον λαμβάνειν, ἐπιτρέποντα αὐτοῦ θυγατέρας τε καὶ
υἷεῖς καὶ γυναῖκας, οὕτως, ἐν τοῖς φιλτάτοις κινδυνεύσαντα,
5 ἦθος ψυχῆς θεάσασθαι; καὶ μυρία δὴ λέγων οὐκ ἄν τίς ποτε ἀνύσειεν ὅσῳ διαφέρει τὸ μετὰ παιδιᾶς τὴν ἄλλως ἄνευ μισθοῦ ζημιώδους θεωρεῖν. καὶ δὴ καὶ τοῦτο μὲν αὐτὸ περί
b γε τούτων οὔτ' ἂν Κρῆτας οὔτ' ἄλλους ἀνθρώπους οὐδένας οἰόμεθα ἀμφισβητῆσαι, μὴ οὐ πεῖράν τε ἀλλήλων ἐπιεικῆ ταύτην εἶναι, τό τε τῆς εὐτελείας καὶ ἀσφαλείας καὶ τάχους διαφέρειν πρὸς τὰς ἄλλας βασάνους.

5 ΚΛ. Ἀληθὲς τοῦτό γε.

ΑΘ. Τοῦτο μὲν ἄρ' ἂν τῶν χρησιμωτάτων ἓν εἴη, τὸ γνῶναι τὰς φύσεις τε καὶ ἕξεις τῶν ψυχῶν, τῇ τέχνῃ ἐκείνῃ ἧς ἐστιν ταῦτα θεραπεύειν· ἔστιν δέ που, φαμέν, ὡς οἶμαι, πολιτικῆς. ἦ γάρ;

10 ΚΛ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

BOOK II

SHORT ANALYSIS

652 a–664 c.—Music, if of the right sort, acts as an enchantment, to train, and form, and keep alive, right sensations of pleasure and pain.

664 c–667 b 5.—To direct this art aright, and form standards of taste, great experience is needed: this implies at least maturity, if not old age. Here Dionysus comes to the help of the Muses, and adds to age some of the fire and inspiration of youth. This is a second use of *μέθη*.

667 b 5–671 a 7.—A disquisition on aesthetic criticism, especially (669 b 5 ff.), as applied to music, singing, and dancing.

671 a to end of book. Details as to the constitution and conduct of the chorus of Dionysus: the subject of bodily training is referred to, but not discussed.

B

652 ΑΘ. Τὸ δὴ μετὰ τοῦτο, ὡς ἔοικε, σκεπτέον ἐκεῖνο περὶ αὐτῶν, πότερα τοῦτο μόνον ἀγαθὸν ἔχει, τὸ κατιδεῖν πῶς ἔχομεν τὰς φύσεις, ἢ καί τι μέγεθος ὠφελίας ἄξιον πολλῆς σπουδῆς ἔνεστ' ἐν τῇ κατ' ὀρθὸν χρείᾳ τῆς ἐν οἴνῳ συνουσίας. τί οὖν δὴ λέγομεν; ἔνεσθ', ὡς ὁ λόγος ἔοικεν βούλεσθαι σημαίνειν· ὅπῃ δὲ καὶ ὅπως, ἀκούωμεν προσέχοντες τὸν νοῦν, μή πῃ παραποδισθῶμεν ὑπ' αὐτοῦ. b

ΚΛ. Λέγ' οὖν.

ΑΘ. Ἀναμνησθῆναι τοίνυν ἔγωγε πάλιν ἐπιθυμῶ τί ποτε λέγομεν ἡμῖν εἶναι τὴν ὀρθὴν παιδείαν. τούτου γάρ, ὥς 653 γε ἐγὼ τοπάζω τὰ νῦν, ἔστιν ἐν τῷ ἐπιτηδεύματι τούτῳ καλῶς κατορθουμένῳ σωτηρία.

ΚΛ. Μέγα λέγεις.

ΑΘ. Λέγω τοίνυν τῶν παίδων παιδικὴν εἶναι πρώτην αἴσθησιν ἡδονὴν καὶ λύπην, καὶ ἐν οἷς ἀρετὴ ψυχῇ καὶ

κακία παραγίγνεται πρῶτον, ταῦτ' εἶναι, φρόνησιν δὲ καὶ ἀληθεῖς δόξας βεβαίους εὐτυχὲς ὅτῳ καὶ πρὸς τὸ γῆρας παρεγένετο· τέλεος δ' οὖν ἔστ' ἄνθρωπος ταῦτα καὶ τὰ ἐν
b τούτοις πάντα κεκτημένος ἀγαθά. παιδείαν δὴ λέγω τὴν παραγιγνομένην πρῶτον παισὶν ἀρετήν· ἡδονὴ δὴ καὶ φιλία καὶ λύπη καὶ μῖσος ἂν ὀρθῶς ἐν ψυχαῖς ἐγγίγνωνται μήπω δυναμένων λόγῳ λαμβάνειν, λαβόντων δὲ τὸν λόγον, συμ-
5 φωνήσωσι τῷ λόγῳ ὀρθῶς εἰθίσθαι ὑπὸ τῶν προσηκόντων [ἐθῶν], αὕτη 'σθ' ἡ συμφωνία σύμπασα μὲν ἀρετή, τὸ δὲ περὶ τὰς ἡδονὰς καὶ λύπας τεθραμμένον αὐτῆς ὀρθῶς ὥστε
c μισεῖν μὲν ἃ χρὴ μισεῖν εὐθὺς ἐξ ἀρχῆς μέχρι τέλους, στέργειν δὲ ἃ χρὴ στέργειν, τοῦτ' αὐτὸ ἀποτεμὼν τῷ λόγῳ καὶ παιδείαν προσαγορεύων, κατά γε τὴν ἐμὴν ὀρθῶς ἂν προσαγορεύοις.

5 ΚΛ. Καὶ γάρ, ὦ ξένε, ἡμῖν καὶ τὰ πρότερον ὀρθῶς σοι παιδείας πέρι καὶ τὰ νῦν εἰρῆσθαι δοκεῖ.

ΑΘ. Καλῶς τοίνυν. τούτων γὰρ δὴ τῶν ὀρθῶς τεθραμμένων ἡδονῶν καὶ λυπῶν παιδειῶν οὐσῶν χαλᾶται τοῖς ἀνθρώποις καὶ διαφθείρεται κατὰ πολλὰ ἐν τῷ βίῳ, θεοὶ
d δὲ οἰκτίραντες τὸ τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἐπίπονον πεφυκὸς γένος, ἀναπαύλας τε αὐτοῖς τῶν πόνων ἐτάξαντο τὰς τῶν ἑορτῶν ἀμοιβὰς [τοῖς θεοῖς], καὶ Μούσας Ἀπόλλωνά τε μουσηγέτην καὶ Διόνυσον συνεορταστὰς ἔδοσαν, ἵν' ἐπανορθῶνται, τάς
5 τε τροφὰς γενομένας ἐν ταῖς ἑορταῖς μετὰ θεῶν. ὁρᾶν ἃ χρὴ πότερον ἀληθὴς ἡμῖν κατὰ φύσιν ὁ λόγος ὑμνεῖται τὰ νῦν, ἢ πῶς. φησὶν δὲ τὸ νέον ἅπαν ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν τοῖς τε σώμασι καὶ ταῖς φωναῖς ἡσυχίαν ἄγειν οὐ δύνασθαι,
e κινεῖσθαι δὲ ἀεὶ ζητεῖν καὶ φθέγγεσθαι, τὰ μὲν ἀλλόμενα καὶ σκιρτῶντα, οἷον ὀρχούμενα μεθ' ἡδονῆς καὶ προσπαίζοντα, τὰ δὲ φθεγγόμενα πάσας φωνάς. τὰ μὲν οὖν ἄλλα ζῷα οὐκ ἔχειν αἴσθησιν τῶν ἐν ταῖς κινήσεσιν τάξεων οὐδὲ
5 ἀταξιῶν, οἷς δὴ ῥυθμὸς ὄνομα καὶ ἁρμονία· ἡμῖν δὲ οὓς
654 εἴπομεν τοὺς θεοὺς συγχορευτὰς δεδόσθαι, τούτους εἶναι καὶ τοὺς δεδωκότας τὴν ἔνρυθμόν τε καὶ ἐναρμόνιον αἴσθησιν μεθ' ἡδονῆς, ᾗ δὴ κινεῖν τε ἡμᾶς καὶ χορηγεῖν ἡμῶν τούτους
5 ᾠδαῖς τε καὶ ὀρχήσεσιν ἀλλήλοις συνείροντας, χορούς τε ὠνομακέναι παρὰ <τὸ> τῆς χαρᾶς ἔμφυτον ὄνομα. πρῶτον δὴ τοῦτο ἀποδεξώμεθα; θῶμεν παιδείαν εἶναι πρώτην διὰ Μουσῶν τε καὶ Ἀπόλλωνος, ἢ πῶς;

ΚΛ. Οὕτως.

ΑΘ. Οὐκοῦν ὁ μὲν ἀπαίδευτος ἀχόρευτος ἡμῖν ἔσται, τὸν δὲ πεπαιδευμένον ἱκανῶς κεχορευκότα θετέον; b

ΚΛ. Τί μήν;

ΑΘ. Χορεία γε μὴν ὄρχησίς τε καὶ ᾠδὴ τὸ σύνολόν ἐστιν.

ΚΛ. Ἀναγκαῖον.

ΑΘ. Ὁ καλῶς ἄρα πεπαιδευμένος ᾄδειν τε καὶ ὀρχεῖσθαι δυνατὸς ἂν εἴη καλῶς.

ΚΛ. Ἔοικεν.

ΑΘ. Ἴδωμεν δὴ τί ποτ' ἐστὶ τὸ νῦν αὖ λεγόμενον.

ΚΛ. Τὸ ποῖον δή;

ΑΘ. "Καλῶς ᾄδει," φαμέν, "καὶ καλῶς ὀρχεῖται"· πότερον "εἰ καὶ καλὰ ᾄδει καὶ καλὰ ὀρχεῖται" προσθῶμεν ἢ c μή;

ΚΛ. Προσθῶμεν.

ΑΘ. Τί δ' ἂν τὰ καλά τε ἡγούμενος εἶναι καλὰ καὶ τὰ αἰσχρὰ αἰσχρὰ οὕτως αὐτοῖς χρῆται; βέλτιον ὁ τοιοῦτος πεπαιδευμένος ἡμῖν ἔσται τὴν χορείαν τε καὶ μουσικὴν ἢ ὃς ἂν τῷ μὲν σώματι καὶ τῇ φωνῇ τὸ διανοηθὲν εἶναι καλὸν ἱκανῶς ὑπηρετεῖν δυνηθῇ ἑκάστοτε, χαίρῃ δὲ μὴ τοῖς καλοῖς μηδὲ μισῇ τὰ μὴ καλά, ἢ ἐκεῖνος ὃς ἂν τῇ μὲν φωνῇ καὶ τῷ σώματι μὴ πάνυ δυνατὸς ᾖ κατορθοῦν ᾖ διανοεῖται, τῇ d δὲ ἡδονῇ καὶ λύπῃ κατορθοῖ, τὰ μὲν ἀσπαζόμενος, ὅσα καλά, τὰ δὲ δυσχεραίνων, ὁπόσα μὴ καλά;

ΚΛ. Πολὺ τὸ διαφέρον, ὦ ξένε, λέγεις τῆς παιδείας.

ΑΘ. Οὐκοῦν εἰ μὲν τὸ καλὸν ᾠδῆς τε καὶ ὀρχήσεως πέρι γιγνώσκομεν τρεῖς ὄντες, ἴσμεν καὶ τὸν πεπαιδευμένον τε καὶ ἀπαίδευτον ὀρθῶς· εἰ δὲ ἀγνοοῦμέν γε τοῦτο, οὐδ' εἴ τις παιδείας ἐστὶν φυλακὴ καὶ ὅπου διαγιγνώσκειν ἄν ποτε δυναίμεθα. ἆρ' οὐχ οὕτως; e

ΚΛ. Οὕτω μὲν οὖν.

ΑΘ. Ταῦτ' ἄρα μετὰ τοῦθ' ἡμῖν αὖ καθάπερ κυσὶν ἰχνευούσαις διερευνητέον, σχῆμά τε καλὸν καὶ μέλος κατ' ᾠδὴν καὶ ὄρχησιν· εἰ δὲ ταῦθ' ἡμᾶς διαφυγόντα οἰχήσεται, μάταιος ὁ μετὰ ταῦθ' ἡμῖν περὶ παιδείας ὀρθῆς εἴθ' Ἑλληνικῆς εἴτε βαρβαρικῆς λόγος ἂν εἴη.

ΚΛ. Ναί.

ΑΘ. Εἶεν· τί δὲ δὴ τὸ καλὸν χρὴ φάναι σχῆμα ἢ μέλος

εἶναί ποτε; φέρε, ἀνδρικῆς ψυχῆς ἐν πόνοις ἐχομένης καὶ
655 δειλῆς ἐν τοῖς αὐτοῖς τε καὶ ἴσοις ἆρ' ὅμοια τά τε σχήματα
καὶ τὰ φθέγματα συμβαίνει γίγνεσθαι;

ΚΛ. Καὶ πῶς, ὅτε γε μηδὲ τὰ χρώματα;

ΑΘ. Καλῶς γε, ὦ ἑταῖρε. ἀλλ' ἐν γὰρ μουσικῇ καὶ
σχήματα μὲν καὶ μέλη ἔνεστιν, περὶ ῥυθμὸν καὶ ἁρμονίαν
οὔσης τῆς μουσικῆς, ὥστε εὔρυθμον μὲν καὶ εὐάρμοστον,
εὔχρων δὲ μέλος ἢ σχῆμα οὐκ ἔστιν ἀπεικάσαντα, ὥσπερ
οἱ χοροδιδάσκαλοι ἀπεικάζουσιν, ὀρθῶς φθέγγεσθαι· τὸ δὲ
τοῦ δειλοῦ τε καὶ ἀνδρείου σχῆμα ἢ μέλος ἔστιν τε, καὶ
b ὀρθῶς προσαγορεύειν ἔχει τὰ μὲν τῶν ἀνδρείων καλά, τὰ
τῶν δειλῶν δὲ αἰσχρά. καὶ ἵνα δὴ μὴ μακρολογία πολλή
τις γίγνηται περὶ ταῦθ' ἡμῖν ἅπαντα, ἁπλῶς ἔστω τὰ μὲν
ἀρετῆς ἐχόμενα ψυχῆς ἢ σώματος, εἴτε αὐτῆς εἴτε τινὸς
5 εἰκόνος, σύμπαντα σχήματά τε καὶ μέλη καλά, τὰ δὲ κακίας
αὖ, τοὐναντίον ἅπαν.

ΚΛ. Ὀρθῶς τε προκαλῇ καὶ ταῦθ' ἡμῖν οὕτως ἔχειν
ἀποκεκρίσθω τὰ νῦν.

ΑΘ. Ἔτι δὴ τόδε· πότερον ἅπαντες πάσαις χορείαις
c ὁμοίως χαίρομεν, ἢ πολλοῦ δεῖ;

ΚΛ. Τοῦ παντὸς μὲν οὖν.

ΑΘ. Τί ποτ' ἂν οὖν λέγομεν τὸ πεπλανηκὸς ἡμᾶς εἶναι;
πότερον οὐ ταὐτά ἐστι καλὰ ἡμῖν πᾶσιν, ἢ τὰ μὲν αὐτά,
5 ἀλλ' οὐ δοκεῖ ταὐτὰ εἶναι; οὐ γάρ που ἐρεῖ γέ τις ὡς ποτε
τὰ τῆς κακίας ἢ ἀρετῆς καλλίονα χορεύματα, οὐδ' ὡς αὐτὸς
μὲν χαίρει τοῖς τῆς μοχθηρίας σχήμασιν, οἱ δ' ἄλλοι ἐναντίᾳ
ταύτης μούσῃ τινί· καίτοι λέγουσίν γε οἱ πλεῖστοι μου-
d σικῆς ὀρθότητα εἶναι τὴν ἡδονὴν ταῖς ψυχαῖς πορίζουσαν
δύναμιν. ἀλλὰ τοῦτο μὲν οὔτε ἀνεκτὸν οὔτε ὅσιον τὸ
παράπαν φθέγγεσθαι, τόδε δὲ μᾶλλον εἰκὸς πλανᾶν ἡμᾶς.

ΚΛ. Τὸ ποῖον;

5 ΑΘ. Ἐπειδὴ μιμήματα τρόπων ἐστὶ τὰ περὶ τὰς χορείας,
ἐν πράξεσί τε παντοδαπαῖς γιγνόμενα καὶ τύχαις, καὶ ἤθεσι
καὶ μιμήσεσι διεξιόντων ἑκάστων, οἷς μὲν ἂν πρὸς τρόπου
τὰ ῥηθέντα ἢ μελῳδηθέντα ἢ καὶ ὁπωσοῦν χορευθέντα, ἢ
e κατὰ φύσιν ἢ κατὰ ἔθος ἢ κατ' ἀμφότερα, τούτους μὲν καὶ
τούτοις χαίρειν τε καὶ ἐπαινεῖν αὐτὰ καὶ προσαγορεύειν
καλὰ ἀναγκαῖον, οἷς δ' ἂν παρὰ φύσιν ἢ τρόπον ἤ τινα
συνήθειαν, οὔτε χαίρειν δυνατὸν οὔτε ἐπαινεῖν αἰσχρά τε

προσαγορεύειν. οἷς δ' ἂν τὰ μὲν τῆς φύσεως ὀρθὰ συμ- 5
βαίνῃ, τὰ δὲ τῆς συνηθείας ἐναντία, ἢ τὰ μὲν τῆς συνη-
θείας ὀρθά, τὰ δὲ τῆς φύσεως ἐναντία, οὗτοι δὲ ταῖς ἡδοναῖς
τοὺς ἐπαίνους ἐναντίους προσαγορεύουσιν· ἡδέα γὰρ τούτων 656
ἕκαστα εἶναί φασι, πονηρὰ δέ, καὶ ἐναντίον ἄλλων οὓς
οἴονται φρονεῖν αἰσχύνονται μὲν κινεῖσθαι τῷ σώματι τὰ
τοιαῦτα, αἰσχύνονται δὲ ᾄδειν ὡς ἀποφαινόμενοι καλὰ μετὰ
σπουδῆς, χαίρουσιν δὲ παρ' αὐτοῖς. 5

ΚΛ. Ὀρθότατα λέγεις.

ΑΘ. Μῶν οὖν τι βλάβην ἔσθ' ἥντινα φέρει τῷ χαίροντι
πονηρίας ἢ σχήμασιν ἢ μέλεσιν, ἤ τιν' ὠφελίαν αὖ τοῖς
πρὸς τἀναντία τὰς ἡδονὰς ἀποδεχομένοις;

ΚΛ. Εἰκός γε. 10

ΑΘ. Πότερον εἰκὸς ἢ καὶ ἀναγκαῖον ταὐτὸν εἶναι ὅπερ b
ὅταν τις πονηροῖς ἤθεσιν συνὼν κακῶν ἀνθρώπων μὴ μισῇ,
χαίρῃ δὲ ἀποδεχόμενος, ψέγῃ δὲ ὡς ἐν παιδιᾶς μοίρᾳ, ὀνει-
ρώττων αὐτοῦ τὴν μοχθηρίαν; τότε ὁμοιοῦσθαι δήπου
ἀνάγκη τὸν χαίροντα ὁποτέροις ἂν χαίρῃ, ἐὰν ἄρα καὶ ἐπαι- 5
νεῖν αἰσχύνηται· καίτοι τοῦ τοιούτου τί μεῖζον ἀγαθὸν ἢ
κακὸν φαῖμεν ἂν ἡμῖν ἐκ πάσης ἀνάγκης γίγνεσθαι;

ΚΛ. Δοκῶ μὲν οὐδέν.

ΑΘ. Ὅπου δὴ νόμοι καλῶς εἰσι κείμενοι ἢ καὶ εἰς τὸν c
ἔπειτα χρόνον ἔσονται ‹περὶ› τὴν περὶ τὰς Μούσας παιδείαν
τε καὶ παιδιάν, οἰόμεθα ἐξέσεσθαι τοῖς ποιητικοῖς, ὅτιπερ ἂν
αὐτὸν τὸν ποιητὴν ἐν τῇ ποιήσει τέρπῃ ῥυθμοῦ ἢ μέλους
ἢ ῥήματος ἐχόμενον, τοῦτο διδάσκοντα καὶ τοὺς τῶν 5
εὐνόμων παῖδας καὶ νέους ἐν τοῖς χοροῖς, ὅτι ἂν τύχῃ
ἀπεργάζεσθαι πρὸς ἀρετὴν ἢ μοχθηρίαν;

ΚΛ. Οὔτοι δὴ τοῦτό γε λόγον ἔχει· πῶς γὰρ ἄν;

ΑΘ. Νῦν δέ γε αὐτὸ ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν ἐν πάσαις ταῖς d
πόλεσιν ἔξεστι δρᾶν, πλὴν κατ' Αἴγυπτον.

ΚΛ. Ἐν Αἰγύπτῳ δὲ δὴ πῶς τὸ τοιοῦτον φῂς νενομοθε-
τῆσθαι;

ΑΘ. Θαῦμα καὶ ἀκοῦσαι. πάλαι γὰρ δήποτε, ὡς ἔοικεν, 5
ἐγνώσθη παρ' αὐτοῖς οὗτος ὁ λόγος ὃν τὰ νῦν λέγομεν ἡμεῖς,
ὅτι καλὰ μὲν σχήματα, καλὰ δὲ μέλη δεῖ μεταχειρίζεσθαι
ταῖς συνηθείαις τοὺς ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν νέους· ταξάμενοι δὲ
ταῦτα, ἅττα ἐστὶ καὶ ὁποῖ' ἅττα ἀπέφηναν ἐν τοῖς ἱεροῖς,
καὶ παρὰ ταῦτ' οὐκ ἐξῆν οὔτε ζωγράφοις, οὔτ' ἄλλοις ὅσοι e

σχήματα καὶ **ὁμοιώματα** ἀπεργάζονται, καινοτομεῖν οὐδ' ἐπινοεῖν ἄλλ' ἄττα ἢ τὰ πάτρια, οὐδὲ νῦν ἔξεστιν, οὔτε ἐν τούτοις οὔτε ἐν μουσικῇ συμπάσῃ. σκοπῶν δὲ εὑρήσεις αὐτόθι τὰ μυριοστὸν ἔτος γεγραμμένα ἢ τετυπωμένα—οὐχ ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν μυριοστὸν ἀλλ' ὄντως—τῶν νῦν δεδημιουργημένων οὔτε τι καλλίονα οὔτ' αἰσχίω, <κατὰ> τὴν αὐτὴν δὲ τέχνην ἀπειργασμένα.

ΚΛ. Θαυμαστὸν λέγεις.

ΑΘ. Νομοθετικὸν μὲν οὖν καὶ πολιτικὸν ὑπερβαλλόντως. ἀλλ' ἕτερα φαῦλ' ἂν εὕροις αὐτόθι· τοῦτο δ' οὖν τὸ περὶ μουσικὴν ἀληθές τε καὶ ἄξιον ἐννοίας, ὅτι δυνατὸν ἄρ' ἦν περὶ τῶν τοιούτων νομοθετεῖσθαι <καὶ> βεβαίως **καθιεροῦν** τὰ μέλη τὰ τὴν ὀρθότητα φύσει παρεχόμενα. τοῦτο δὲ θεοῦ ἢ θείου τινὸς ἀνδρὸς ἂν εἴη, καθάπερ ἐκεῖ φασιν τὰ τὸν πολὺν τοῦτον σεσωμένα χρόνον μέλη τῆς Ἴσιδος ποιήματα γεγονέναι. ὥσθ', ὅπερ ἔλεγον, εἰ δύναιτό τις ἐλεῖν αὐτῶν καὶ ὁπωσοῦν τὴν ὀρθότητα, θαρροῦντα χρὴ εἰς νόμον ἄγειν καὶ τάξιν αὐτά· ὡς ἡ τῆς ἡδονῆς καὶ λύπης ζήτησις **τοῦ** καινῇ ζητεῖν ἀεὶ μουσικῇ χρῆσθαι σχεδὸν οὐ μεγάλην τινὰ δύναμιν ἔχει πρὸς τὸ διαφθεῖραι τὴν καθιερωθεῖσαν χορείαν ἐπικαλοῦσα ἀρχαιότητα. τὴν γοῦν ἐκεῖ οὐδαμῶς ἔοικε δυνατὴ γεγονέναι διαφθεῖραι, πᾶν δὲ τοὐναντίον.

ΚΛ. Φαίνεται οὕτως ἂν ταῦτα ἔχειν ἐκ τῶν ὑπὸ σοῦ τὰ νῦν λεχθέντων.

ΑΘ. Ἆρ' οὖν θαρροῦντες λέγομεν τὴν τῇ μουσικῇ καὶ τῇ παιδιᾷ μετὰ χορείας χρείαν ὀρθὴν εἶναι τοιῷδέ τινι τρόπῳ; χαίρομεν ὅταν οἰώμεθα εὖ πράττειν, καὶ ὁπόταν χαίρωμεν, οἰόμεθα εὖ πράττειν αὖ; μῶν οὐχ οὕτως;

ΚΛ. Οὕτω μὲν οὖν.

ΑΘ. Καὶ μὴν ἔν γε τῷ τοιούτῳ, χαίροντες, ἡσυχίαν οὐ δυνάμεθα ἄγειν.

ΚΛ. Ἔστι ταῦτα.

ΑΘ. Ἆρ' οὖν οὐχ ἡμῶν οἱ μὲν νέοι αὐτοὶ χορεύειν ἕτοιμοι, τὸ δὲ τῶν πρεσβυτέρων ἡμῶν ἐκείνους αὖ θεωροῦντες διάγειν ἡγούμεθα πρεπόντως, χαίροντες τῇ ἐκείνων παιδιᾷ τε καὶ ἑορτάσει, ἐπειδὴ τὸ παρ' ἡμῖν ἡμᾶς ἐλαφρὸν ἐκλείπει νῦν, ὃ ποθοῦντες καὶ ἀσπαζόμενοι τίθεμεν οὕτως ἀγῶνας τοῖς δυναμένοις ἡμᾶς ὅτι μάλιστ' εἰς τὴν νεότητα μνήμῃ ἐπεγείρειν;

ΚΛ. Ἀληθέστατα.

ΑΘ. Μῶν οὖν οἰόμεθα καὶ κομιδῇ μάτην τὸν νῦν λεγόμενον λόγον περὶ τῶν ἑορταζόντων λέγειν τοὺς πολλούς, ὅτι e τοῦτον δεῖ σοφώτατον ἡγεῖσθαι καὶ κρίνειν νικᾶν, ὃς ἂν ἡμᾶς εὐφραίνεσθαι καὶ χαίρειν ὅτι μάλιστα ἀπεργάζηται; δεῖ γὰρ δή, ἐπείπερ ἀφείμεθά γε παίζειν ἐν τοῖς τοιούτοις, τὸν πλείστους καὶ μάλιστα χαίρειν ποιοῦντα, τοῦτον μάλιστα 5 τιμᾶσθαί τε, καὶ ὅπερ εἶπον νυνδή, τὰ νικητήρια φέρειν. ἆρ' οὐκ ὀρθῶς λέγεταί τε τοῦτο καὶ πράττοιτ' ἄν, εἰ ταύτῃ 658 γίγνοιτο;

ΚΛ. Τάχ' ἄν.

ΑΘ. Ἀλλ', ὦ μακάριε, μὴ ταχὺ τὸ τοιοῦτον κρίνωμεν, ἀλλὰ διαιροῦντες αὐτὸ κατὰ μέρη σκοπώμεθα τοιῷδέ τινι 5 τρόπῳ· τί ἄν, εἴ ποτέ τις οὕτως ἁπλῶς ἀγῶνα θείη ὁντινοῦν, μηδὲν ἀφορίσας μήτε γυμνικὸν μήτε μουσικὸν μήθ' ἱππικόν, ἀλλὰ πάντας συναγαγὼν τοὺς ἐν τῇ πόλει προείποι, θεὶς νικητήρια, τὸν βουλόμενον ἥκειν ἀγωνιούμενον ἡδονῆς πέρι μόνον, ὃς [δ'] ἂν τέρψῃ τοὺς θεατὰς μάλιστα, μηδὲν ἐπιτατ- b τόμενος ᾧτινι τρόπῳ, νικήσῃ δὲ αὐτὸ τοῦτο ὅτι μάλιστα ἀπεργασάμενος καὶ κριθῇ τῶν ἀγωνισαμένων ἥδιστος γεγονέναι—τί ποτ' ἂν ἡγούμεθα ἐκ ταύτης τῆς προρρήσεως συμβαίνειν; 5

ΚΛ. Τοῦ πέρι λέγεις;

ΑΘ. Εἰκός που τὸν μέν τινα ἐπιδεικνύναι, καθάπερ Ὅμηρος, ῥαψῳδίαν, ἄλλον δὲ κιθαρῳδίαν, τὸν δέ τινα τραγῳδίαν, τὸν δ' αὖ κωμῳδίαν, οὐ θαυμαστὸν δὲ εἴ τις καὶ θαύματα ἐπιδεικνὺς μάλιστ' ἂν νικᾶν ἡγοῖτο· τούτων δὴ c τοιούτων καὶ ἑτέρων ἀγωνιστῶν μυρίων ἐλθόντων ἔχομεν εἰπεῖν τίς ἂν νικῷ δικαίως;

ΚΛ. Ἄτοπον ἤρου· τίς γὰρ ἂν ἀποκρίνοιτό σοι τοῦτο ὡς γνοὺς ἄν ποτε πρὶν [ἀκοῦσαί τε] καὶ τῶν ἀθλητῶν ἑκάστων 5 αὐτήκοος αὐτὸς γενέσθαι;

ΑΘ. Τί οὖν δή; βούλεσθε ἐγὼ σφῷν τὴν ἄτοπον ἀπόκρισιν ταύτην ἀποκρίνωμαι;

ΚΛ. Τί μήν;

ΑΘ. Εἰ μὲν τοίνυν τὰ πάνυ σμικρὰ κρίνοι παιδία, κρι- 10 νοῦσιν τὸν τὰ θαύματα ἐπιδεικνύντα· ἦ γάρ;

ΚΛ. Πῶς γὰρ οὔ; d

ΑΘ. Ἐὰν δέ γ' οἱ μείζους παῖδες, τὸν τὰς κωμῳδίας· τραγῳδίαν δὲ αἵ τε πεπαιδευμέναι τῶν γυναικῶν καὶ τὰ νέα

μειράκια καὶ σχεδὸν ἴσως τὸ πλῆθος πάντων.

ΚΛ. Ἴσως δῆτα.

ΑΘ. Ῥαψῳδὸν δέ, καλῶς Ἰλιάδα καὶ Ὀδύσσειαν ἤ τι τῶν Ἡσιοδείων διατιθέντα, τάχ' ἂν ἡμεῖς οἱ γέροντες ἥδιστα ἀκούσαντες νικᾶν ἂν φαῖμεν πάμπολυ. τίς οὖν ὀρθῶς ἂν νενικηκὼς εἴη, τοῦτο μετὰ τοῦτο· ἦ γάρ;

ΚΛ. Ναί.

e ΑΘ. Δῆλον ὡς ἔμοιγε καὶ ὑμῖν ἀναγκαῖόν ἐστιν φάναι τοὺς ὑπὸ τῶν ἡμετέρων ἡλικιωτῶν κριθέντας ὀρθῶς ἂν νικᾶν. τὸ γὰρ ἔθος ἡμῖν τῶν νῦν δὴ πάμπολυ δοκεῖ τῶν ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν ἁπάσαις καὶ πανταχοῦ βέλτιστον γίγνεσθαι.

ΚΛ. Τί μήν;

ΑΘ. Συγχωρῶ δὴ τό γε τοσοῦτον καὶ ἐγὼ τοῖς πολλοῖς, δεῖν τὴν μουσικὴν ἡδονῇ κρίνεσθαι, μὴ μέντοι τῶν γε ἐπιτυχόντων, ἀλλὰ σχεδὸν ἐκείνην εἶναι μοῦσαν καλλίστην ἥτις τοὺς βελτίστους καὶ ἱκανῶς πεπαιδευμένους τέρπει, μάλιστα
659 δὲ ἥτις ἕνα τὸν ἀρετῇ τε καὶ παιδείᾳ διαφέροντα· διὰ ταῦτα δὲ ἀρετῆς φαμεν δεῖσθαι τοὺς τούτων κριτάς, ὅτι τῆς τε ἄλλης μετόχους αὐτοὺς εἶναι δεῖ φρονήσεως καὶ δὴ καὶ τῆς ἀνδρείας. οὔτε γὰρ παρὰ θεάτρου δεῖ τόν γε ἀληθῆ κριτὴν κρίνειν μανθάνοντα, καὶ ἐκπληττόμενον ὑπὸ θορύβου τῶν πολλῶν καὶ τῆς αὑτοῦ ἀπαιδευσίας, οὔτ' αὖ γιγνώσκοντα δι' ἀνανδρίαν καὶ δειλίαν ἐκ ταὐτοῦ στόματος οὗπερ τοὺς θεοὺς
b ἐπεκαλέσατο μέλλων κρίνειν, ἐκ τούτου ψευδόμενον ἀποφαίνεσθαι ῥᾳθύμως τὴν κρίσιν· οὐ γὰρ μαθητὴς ἀλλὰ διδάσκαλος, ὥς γε τὸ δίκαιον, θεατῶν μᾶλλον ὁ κριτὴς καθίζει, καὶ ἐναντιωσόμενος τοῖς τὴν ἡδονὴν μὴ προσηκόντως μηδὲ ὀρθῶς ἀποδιδοῦσι θεαταῖς· [ἐξῆν γὰρ δὴ τῷ παλαιῷ τε καὶ Ἑλληνικῷ νόμῳ,] καθάπερ ὁ Σικελικός τε καὶ Ἰταλικὸς νόμος νῦν, τῷ πλήθει τῶν θεατῶν ἐπιτρέπων καὶ τὸν νικῶντα διακρίνων χειροτονίαις, διέφθαρκε μὲν τοὺς ποιητὰς αὐτούς
c —πρὸς γὰρ τὴν τῶν κριτῶν ἡδονὴν ποιοῦσιν οὖσαν φαύλην, ὥστε αὐτοὶ αὐτοὺς οἱ θεαταὶ παιδεύουσιν—διέφθαρκεν δ' αὐτοῦ τοῦ θεάτρου τὰς ἡδονάς· δέον γὰρ αὐτοὺς ἀεὶ βελτίω τῶν αὑτῶν ἠθῶν ἀκούοντας βελτίω τὴν ἡδονὴν ἴσχειν, νῦν αὐτοῖς δρῶσιν πᾶν τοὐναντίον συμβαίνει. τί ποτ' οὖν ἡμῖν τὰ νῦν αὖ διαπεπερανθέντα τῷ λόγῳ σημαίνειν βούλεται; σκοπεῖσθ' εἰ τόδε.

ΚΛ. Τὸ ποῖον;

ΑΘ. Δοκεῖ μοι τρίτον ἢ τέταρτον ὁ λόγος εἰς ταὐτὸν περιφερόμενος ἥκειν, ὡς ἄρα παιδεία μέν ἐσθ' ἡ παίδων d
ὁλκή τε καὶ ἀγωγὴ πρὸς τὸν ὑπὸ τοῦ νόμου λόγον ὀρθὸν εἰρημένον, καὶ τοῖς ἐπιεικεστάτοις καὶ πρεσβυτάτοις δι' ἐμπειρίαν συνδεδογμένον ὡς ὄντως ὀρθός ἐστιν· ἵν' οὖν ἡ ψυχὴ τοῦ παιδὸς μὴ ἐναντία χαίρειν καὶ λυπεῖσθαι ἐθίζηται τῷ 5
νόμῳ καὶ τοῖς ὑπὸ τοῦ νόμου πεπεισμένοις, ἀλλὰ συνέπηται χαίρουσά τε καὶ λυπουμένη τοῖς αὐτοῖς τούτοις οἷσπερ ὁ γέρων, τούτων ἕνεκα, ἃς ᾠδὰς καλοῦμεν, ὄντως μὲν ἐπῳδαὶ e
ταῖς ψυχαῖς αὗται νῦν γεγονέναι, πρὸς τὴν τοιαύτην ἡν λέγομεν συμφωνίαν ἐσπουδασμέναι, διὰ δὲ τὸ σπουδὴν μὴ δύνασθαι φέρειν τὰς τῶν νέων ψυχάς, παιδιαί τε καὶ ᾠδαὶ καλεῖσθαι καὶ πράττεσθαι, καθάπερ τοῖς κάμνουσίν τε καὶ 5
ἀσθενῶς ἴσχουσιν τὰ σώματα ἐν ἡδέσι τισὶν σιτίοις καὶ πώμασιτὴν χρηστὴν πειρῶνται τροφὴν προσφέρειν οἷς μέλει 660
τούτων, τὴν δὲ τῶν πονηρῶν ἐν ἀηδέσιν, ἵνα τὴν μὲν ἀσπάζωνται, τὴν δὲ μισεῖν ὀρθῶς ἐθίζωνται. ταὐτὸν δὴ καὶ τὸν ποιητικὸν ὁ ὀρθὸς νομοθέτης ἐν τοῖς καλοῖς ῥήμασι καὶ ἐπαινετοῖς πείσει τε, καὶ ἀναγκάσει μὴ πείθων, τὰ τῶν 5
σωφρόνων τε καὶ ἀνδρείων καὶ πάντως ἀγαθῶν ἀνδρῶν ἔν τε ῥυθμοῖς σχήματα καὶ ἐν ἁρμονίαισιν μέλη ποιοῦντα ὀρθῶς ποιεῖν.

ΚΛ. Νῦν οὖν οὕτω δοκοῦσίν σοι, πρὸς Διός, ὦ ξένε, ἐν b
ταῖς ἄλλαις πόλεσι ποιεῖν; ἐγὼ μὲν γὰρ καθ' ὅσον αἰσθάνομαι, πλὴν παρ' ἡμῖν ἢ παρὰ Λακεδαιμονίοις, ἃ σὺ νῦν λέγεις οὐκ οἶδα πραττόμενα, καινὰ δὲ ἄττα ἀεὶ γιγνόμενα περί τε τὰς ὀρχήσεις καὶ περὶ τὴν ἄλλην μουσικὴν σύμπασαν, 5
οὐχ ὑπὸ νόμων μεταβαλλόμενα ἀλλ' ὑπό τινων ἀτάκτων ἡδονῶν, πολλοῦ δεουσῶν τῶν αὐτῶν εἶναι καὶ κατὰ ταὐτά, ὡς σὺ κατ' Αἴγυπτον ἀφερμηνεύεις, ἀλλ' οὐδέποτε τῶν αὐτῶν. c

ΑΘ. Ἀριστά γ', ὦ Κλεινία. εἰ δ' ἔδοξά σοι ἃ σὺ λέγεις λέγειν ὡς νῦν γιγνόμενα, οὐκ ἂν θαυμάζοιμι εἰ μὴ σαφῶς λέγων ἃ διανοοῦμαι τοῦτο ἐποίησα καὶ ἔπαθον· ἀλλ' ἃ βούλομαι γίγνεσθαι περὶ μουσικήν, τοιαῦτ' ἄττα εἶπον ἴσως 5
ὥστε σοὶ δόξαι ταῦτα ἐμὲ λέγειν. λοιδορεῖν γὰρ πράγματα ἀνίατα καὶ πόρρω προβεβηκότα ἁμαρτίας οὐδαμῶς ἡδύ, ἀναγκαῖον δ' ἐνίοτέ ἐστιν. ἐπειδὴ δὲ ταῦτα συνδοκεῖ καὶ d
σοί, φέρε, φῂς παρ' ὑμῖν καὶ τοῖσδε μᾶλλον ἢ παρὰ τοῖς ἄλλοις Ἕλλησιν γίγνεσθαι τὰ τοιαῦτα;

ΚΛ. Τί μήν;

ΑΘ. Τί δ', εἰ καὶ παρὰ τοῖς ἄλλοις γίγνοιθ' οὕτω; πότερον αὐτὰ καλλιόνως οὕτως εἶναι φαῖμεν ἂν ἢ καθάπερ νῦν γίγνεται γιγνόμενα;

ΚΛ. Πολύ που τὸ διαφέρον, εἰ καθάπερ παρά τε τοῖσδε καὶ παρ' ἡμῖν, καὶ ἔτι καθάπερ εἶπες σὺ νυνδὴ δεῖν εἶναι, γίγνοιτο.

ΑΘ. Φέρε δή, συνομολογησώμεθα τὰ νῦν. ἄλλο τι παρ' ὑμῖν ἐν πάσῃ παιδείᾳ καὶ μουσικῇ τὰ λεγόμενά ἐστι τάδε; τοὺς ποιητὰς ἀναγκάζετε λέγειν ὡς ὁ μὲν ἀγαθὸς ἀνὴρ σώφρων ὢν καὶ δίκαιος εὐδαίμων ἐστὶ καὶ μακάριος, ἐάν τε μέγας καὶ ἰσχυρὸς ἐάν τε μικρὸς καὶ ἀσθενὴς ᾖ, καὶ ἐὰν πλουτῇ καὶ μή· ἐὰν δὲ ἄρα πλουτῇ μὲν Κινύρα τε καὶ Μίδα μᾶλλον, ᾖ δὲ ἄδικος, ἄθλιός τ' ἐστὶ καὶ ἀνιαρῶς ζῇ. καὶ "Οὔτ' ἂν μνησαίμην," φησὶν ὑμῖν ὁ ποιητής, εἴπερ ὀρθῶς λέγει, "οὔτ' ἐν λόγῳ ἄνδρα τιθείμην," ὃς μὴ πάντα τὰ λεγόμενα καλὰ μετὰ δικαιοσύνης πράττοι καὶ κτῷτο, καὶ δὴ "καὶ δὴ ἵων" τοιοῦτος ὢν "ὀρέγοιτο ἐγγύθεν ἱστάμενος," ἄδικος δὲ ὢν μήτε τολμῷ "ὁρῶν φόνον αἱματόεντα" μήτε νικῷ θέων "Θρηίκιον Βορέην," μήτε ἄλλο αὐτῷ μηδὲν τῶν λεγομένων ἀγαθῶν γίγνοιτό ποτε. τὰ γὰρ ὑπὸ τῶν πολλῶν λεγόμεν' ἀγαθὰ οὐκ ὀρθῶς λέγεται. λέγεται γὰρ ὡς ἄριστον μὲν ὑγιαίνειν, δεύτερον δὲ κάλλος, τρίτον δὲ πλοῦτος, μυρία δὲ ἄλλα ἀγαθὰ λέγεται· καὶ γὰρ ὀξὺ ὁρᾶν καὶ ἀκούειν καὶ πάντα ὅσα ἔχεται τῶν αἰσθήσεων εὐαισθήτως ἔχειν, ἔτι δὲ καὶ τὸ ποιεῖν τυραννοῦντα ὅτι ἂν ἐπιθυμῇ, καὶ τὸ δὴ τέλος ἁπάσης μακαριότητος εἶναι τὸ πάντα ταῦτα κεκτημένον ἀθάνατον εἶναι γενόμενον ὅτι τάχιστα. ὑμεῖς δὲ καὶ ἐγώ που τάδε λέγομεν, ὡς ταὐτά ἐστι σύμπαντα δικαίοις μὲν καὶ ὁσίοις ἀνδράσιν ἄριστα κτήματα, ἀδίκοις δὲ κάκιστα σύμπαντα, ἀρξάμενα ἀπὸ τῆς ὑγιείας· καὶ δὴ καὶ τὸ ὁρᾶν καὶ τὸ ἀκούειν καὶ αἰσθάνεσθαι καὶ τὸ παράπαν ζῆν μέγιστον μὲν κακὸν τὸν σύμπαντα χρόνον ἀθάνατον ὄντα καὶ κεκτημένον πάντα τὰ λεγόμενα ἀγαθὰ πλὴν δικαιοσύνης τε καὶ ἀρετῆς ἁπάσης, ἔλαττον δέ, ἂν ὡς ὀλίγιστον ὁ τοιοῦτος χρόνον ἐπιζῶν ᾖ. ταῦτα δὴ λέγειν, οἶμαι, τοὺς παρ' ὑμῖν ποιητάς, ἅπερ ἐγώ, πείσετε καὶ ἀναγκάσετε, καὶ ἔτι τούτοις ἑπομένους ῥυθμούς τε καὶ ἁρμονίας ἀποδιδόντας παιδεύειν οὕτω τοὺς νέους ἡμῶν. ἦ γάρ; ὁρᾶτε· ἐγὼ μὲν γὰρ λέγω

σαφῶς τὰ μὲν κακὰ λεγόμενα ἀγαθὰ τοῖς ἀδίκοις εἶναι, d
τοῖς δὲ δικαίοις κακά, τὰ δ' ἀγαθὰ τοῖς μὲν ἀγαθοῖς ὄντως
ἀγαθά, τοῖς δὲ κακοῖς κακά· ὅπερ οὖν ἠρόμην, ἆρα συμφω-
νοῦμεν ἐγώ τε καὶ ὑμεῖς, ἢ πῶς;

ΚΛ. Τὰ μὲν ἔμοιγε φαινόμεθά πως, τὰ δ' οὐδαμῶς. 5

ΑΘ. Ἆρ' οὖν ὑγιειάν τε κεκτημένον καὶ πλοῦτον καὶ
τυραννίδα διὰ τέλους, καὶ ἔτι προστίθημι ὑμῖν ἰσχὺν δια-
φέρουσαν καὶ ἀνδρείαν μετ' ἀθανασίας καὶ μηδὲν ἄλλο αὐτῷ e
τῶν λεγομένων κακῶν εἶναι γιγνόμενον, ἀδικίαν δὲ καὶ ὕβριν
ἔχοντα ἐν αὑτῷ μόνον, τὸν οὕτω ζῶντα ἴσως ὑμᾶς οὐ πείθω
μὴ οὐκ ἄρα εὐδαίμονα ἀλλ' ἄθλιον γίγνεσθαι σαφῶς;

ΚΛ. Ἀληθέστατα λέγεις. 5

ΑΘ. Εἶεν· τί οὖν τὸ μετὰ τοῦτ' εἰπεῖν ἡμᾶς χρεών;
ἀνδρεῖος γὰρ δὴ καὶ ἰσχυρὸς καὶ καλὸς καὶ πλούσιος, καὶ
ποιῶν ὅτιπερ ἐπιθυμοῖ τὸν βίον ἅπαντα, οὐχ ὑμῖν δοκεῖ, 662
εἴπερ ἄδικος εἴη καὶ ὑβριστής, ἐξ ἀνάγκης αἰσχρῶς ἂν ζῆν;
ἢ τοῦτο μὲν ἴσως ἂν συγχωρήσαιτε, τό γε αἰσχρῶς;

ΚΛ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

ΑΘ. Τί δέ; τὸ καὶ κακῶς; 5

ΚΛ. Οὐκ ἂν ἔτι τοῦθ' ὁμοίως.

ΑΘ. Τί δέ; τὸ καὶ ἀηδῶς καὶ μὴ συμφερόντως αὐτῷ;

ΚΛ. Καὶ πῶς ἂν ταῦτά γ' ἔτι συγχωροῖμεν;

ΑΘ. Ὅπως; εἰ θεὸς ἡμῖν, ὡς ἔοικεν, ὦ φίλοι, δοίη τις b
συμφωνίαν, ὡς νῦν γε σχεδὸν ἀπᾴδομεν ἀπ' ἀλλήλων. ἐμοὶ
γὰρ δὴ φαίνεται ταῦτα οὕτως ἀναγκαῖα, ὡς οὐδέ, ὦ φίλε
Κλεινία, Κρήτῃ νῆσος σαφῶς· καὶ νομοθέτης ὢν ταύτῃ
πειρῴμην ἂν τούς τε ποιητὰς ἀναγκάζειν φθέγγεσθαι καὶ 5
πάντας τοὺς ἐν τῇ πόλει, ζημίαν τε ὀλίγου μεγίστην ἐπιτι-
θείην ἄν, εἴ τις ἐν τῇ χώρᾳ φθέγξαιτο ὡς εἰσίν τινες ἄνθρω-
ποί ποτε πονηροὶ μέν, ἡδέως δὲ ζῶντες, ἢ λυσιτελοῦντα c
μὲν ἄλλα ἐστὶ καὶ κερδαλέα, δικαιότερα δὲ ἄλλα, καὶ πόλλ'
ἄττ' ἂν παρὰ τὰ νῦν λεγόμενα ὑπό τε Κρητῶν καὶ Λακε-
δαιμονίων, ὡς ἔοικε, καὶ δήπου καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἀνθρώπων,
διάφορα πείθοιμ' ἂν τοὺς πολίτας μοι φθέγγεσθαι. φέρε 5
γάρ, ὦ πρὸς Διός τε καὶ Ἀπόλλωνος, ὦ ἄριστοι τῶν ἀνδρῶν,
εἰ τοὺς νομοθετήσαντας ὑμῖν αὐτοὺς τούτους ἐροίμεθα θεούς·
"Ἆρ' ὁ δικαιότατός ἐστιν βίος ἥδιστος, ἢ δύ' ἐστόν τινε βίω, d
οἷν ὁ μὲν ἥδιστος ὢν τυγχάνει, δικαιότατος δ' ἕτερος;" εἰ δὴ
δύο φαῖεν, ἐροίμεθ' ἂν ἴσως αὐτοὺς πάλιν, εἴπερ ὀρθῶς

ἐπανερωτῶμεν· "Ποτέρους δὲ εὐδαιμονεστέρους χρὴ λέγειν,
5 τοὺς τὸν δικαιότατον ἢ τοὺς τὸν ἥδιστον διαβιοῦντας βίον;"
εἰ μὲν δὴ φαῖεν τοὺς τὸν ἥδιστον, ἄτοπος αὐτῶν ὁ λόγος
ἂν γίγνοιτο. βούλομαι δέ μοι μὴ ἐπὶ θεῶν λέγεσθαι τὸ
e τοιοῦτον, ἀλλ' ἐπὶ πατέρων καὶ νομοθετῶν μᾶλλον, καί μοι
τὰ ἔμπροσθεν ἠρωτημένα πατέρα τε καὶ νομοθέτην ἠρωτή-
σθω, ὁ δ' εἰπέτω ὡς ὁ ζῶν τὸν ἥδιστον βίον ἐστὶν μακαριώτα-
τος· εἶτα μετὰ ταῦτα ἔγωγ' ἂν φαίην· "Ὦ πάτερ, οὐχ ὡς
5 εὐδαιμονέστατά με ἐβούλου ζῆν; ἀλλ' ἀεὶ διακελευόμενος
οὐδὲν ἐπαύου ζῆν με ὡς δικαιότατα." ταύτῃ μὲν οὖν ὁ
τιθέμενος εἴτε νομοθέτης εἴτε καὶ πατὴρ ἄτοπος ἂν οἶμαι καὶ
ἄπορος φαίνοιτο τοῦ συμφωνούντως ἑαυτῷ λέγειν· εἰ δ' αὖ
τὸν δικαιότατον εὐδαιμονέστατον ἀποφαίνοιτο βίον εἶναι,
10 ζητοῖ που πᾶς ἂν ὁ ἀκούων, οἶμαι, τί ποτ' ἐν αὐτῷ τὸ τῆς
663 ἡδονῆς κρεῖττον ἀγαθόν τε καὶ καλὸν ὁ νόμος ἐνὸν ἐπαινεῖ.
τί γὰρ δὴ δικαίῳ χωριζόμενον ἡδονῆς ἀγαθὸν ἂν γίγνοιτο;
φέρε, κλέος τε καὶ ἔπαινος πρὸς ἀνθρώπων τε καὶ θεῶν ἆρ'
ἐστὶν ἀγαθὸν μὲν καὶ καλόν, ἀηδὲς δέ, δύσκλεια δὲ τἀναντία;
5 ἥκιστα, ὦ φίλε νομοθέτα, φήσομεν. ἀλλὰ τὸ μήτε τινὰ
ἀδικεῖν μήτε ὑπό τινος ἀδικεῖσθαι μῶν ἀηδὲς μέν, ἀγαθὸν δὲ
ἢ καλόν, τὰ δ' ἕτερα ἡδέα μέν, αἰσχρὰ δὲ καὶ κακά;

ΚΛ. Καὶ πῶς;

ΑΘ. Οὐκοῦν ὁ μὲν μὴ χωρίζων λόγος ἡδύ τε καὶ δίκαιον
b [καὶ ἀγαθόν τε καὶ καλὸν] πιθανός γ', εἰ μηδὲν ἕτερον, πρὸς
τό τινα ἐθέλειν ζῆν τὸν ὅσιον καὶ δίκαιον βίον, ὥστε νομο-
θέτῃ γε αἴσχιστος λόγων καὶ ἐναντιώτατος ὃς ἂν μὴ φῇ
ταῦτα οὕτως ἔχειν· οὐδεὶς γὰρ ἂν ἑκὼν ἐθέλοι πείθεσθαι
5 πράττειν τοῦτο ὅτῳ μὴ τὸ χαίρειν τοῦ λυπεῖσθαι πλέον
ἕπεται. σκοτοδινίαν δὲ τὸ πόρρωθεν ὁρώμενον πᾶσίν τε ὡς
ἔπος εἰπεῖν καὶ δὴ καὶ τοῖς παισὶ παρέχει, νομοθέτης
δ' οἶμαι δόξαν εἰς τοὐναντίον τούτου καταστήσει, τὸ σκότος
c ἀφελών, καὶ πείσει ἁμῶς γέ πως ἔθεσι καὶ ἐπαίνοις καὶ
λόγοις ὡς ἐσκιαγραφημένα τὰ δίκαιά ἐστι καὶ ἄδικα, τὰ μὲν
ἄδικα, τῷ τοῦ δικαίου ἐναντίως, φαινόμενα ἐκ μὲν ἀδίκου καὶ
κακοῦ ἑαυτοῦ θεωρούμενα, ἡδέα, τὰ δὲ δίκαια ἀηδέστατα, ἐκ
5 δὲ δικαίου πάντα τἀναντία παντὶ πρὸς ἀμφότερα.

ΚΛ. Φαίνεται.

ΑΘ. Τὴν δ' ἀλήθειαν τῆς κρίσεως ποτέραν κυριωτέραν
εἶναι φῶμεν; πότερα τὴν τῆς χείρονος ψυχῆς ἢ τὴν τῆς

βελτίονος;

ΚΛ. Ἀναγκαῖόν που τὴν τῆς ἀμείνονος. d

ΑΘ. Ἀναγκαῖον ἄρα τὸν ἄδικον βίον οὐ μόνον αἰσχίω καὶ μοχθηρότερον, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀηδέστερον τῇ ἀληθείᾳ τοῦ δικαίου τε εἶναι καὶ ὁσίου βίου.

ΚΛ. Κινδυνεύει κατά γε τὸν νῦν λόγον, ὦ φίλοι. 5

ΑΘ. Νομοθέτης δὲ οὖ τι καὶ σμικρὸν ὄφελος, εἰ καὶ μὴ τοῦτο ἦν οὕτως ἔχον, ὡς καὶ νῦν αὐτὸ ἤρηχ' ὁ λόγος ἔχειν, εἴπερ τι καὶ ἄλλο ἐτόλμησεν ἂν ἐπ' ἀγαθῷ ψεύδεσθαι πρὸς τοὺς νέους, ἔστιν ὅτι τούτου ψεῦδος λυσιτελέστερον ἂν ἐψεύσατό ποτε καὶ δυνάμενον μᾶλλον ποιεῖν μὴ βίᾳ ἀλλ' e ἑκόντας πάντας πάντα τὰ δίκαια;

ΚΛ. Καλὸν μὲν ἡ ἀλήθεια, ὦ ξένε, καὶ μόνιμον· ἔοικε μὴν οὐ ῥᾴδιον εἶναι πείθειν.

ΑΘ. Εἶεν· τὸ μέντοι **Σιδώνιον** μυθολόγημα ῥᾴδιον 5 ἐγένετο πείθειν, οὕτως ἀπίθανον ὄν, καὶ ἄλλα μυρία.

ΚΛ. Ποῖα;

ΑΘ. Τὸ σπαρέντων ποτὲ ὀδόντων ὁπλίτας ἐξ αὐτῶν φῦναι. καίτοι μέγα γ' ἐστὶ νομοθέτῃ παράδειγμα τοῦ πείσειν ὅτι ἂν ἐπιχειρῇ τις πείθειν τὰς τῶν νέων ψυχάς, 664 ὥστε οὐδὲν ἄλλο αὐτὸν δεῖ σκοποῦντα ἀνευρίσκειν ἢ τί πείσας μέγιστον ἀγαθὸν ἐργάσαιτο ἂν πόλιν, τούτου δὲ πέρι πᾶσαν μηχανὴν εὑρίσκειν ὁντινά ποτε τρόπον ἡ τοιαύτη συνοικία πᾶσα περὶ τούτων ἓν καὶ ταὐτὸν ὅτι μάλιστα 5 φθέγγοιτ' ἀεὶ διὰ βίου παντὸς ἔν τε ᾠδαῖς καὶ μύθοις καὶ λόγοις. εἰ δ' οὖν ἄλλῃ πῃ δοκεῖ ἢ ταύτῃ, πρὸς ταῦτα οὐδεὶς φθόνος ἀμφισβητῆσαι τῷ λόγῳ.

ΚΛ. Ἀλλ' οὔ μοι φαίνεται πρός γε ταῦτα δύνασθαι ἡμῶν b ἀμφισβητῆσαί ποτ' ἂν οὐδέτερος.

ΑΘ. Τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο τοίνυν ἐμὸν ἂν εἴη λέγειν. φημὶ γὰρ ἅπαντας δεῖν ἐπᾴδειν τρεῖς ὄντας τοὺς χορεύειν ἔτι νέαις οὔσαις ταῖς ψυχαῖς καὶ ἁπαλαῖς τῶν παίδων, τά τε ἄλλα 5 καλὰ λέγοντας πάντα ὅσα διεληλύθαμέν τε καὶ ἔτι διέλθοιμεν ἄν, τὸ δὲ κεφάλαιον αὖ τοῦτο ἔστω· τὸν αὐτὸν ἥδιστόν τε καὶ ἄριστον ὑπὸ θεῶν βίον λέγεσθαι φάσκοντες, ἀληθέστατα ἐροῦμεν ἅμα, καὶ μᾶλλον πείσομεν οὓς δεῖ c πείθειν ἢ ἐὰν ἄλλως πως φθεγγώμεθα λέγοντες.

ΚΛ. Συγχωρητέον ἃ λέγεις.

ΑΘ. Πρῶτον μὲν τοίνυν ὁ Μουσῶν χορὸς ὁ παιδικὸς

ὀρθότατ' ἂν εἰσίοι πρῶτος τὰ τοιαῦτα εἰς τὸ μέσον ἀσόμενος ἁπάσῃ σπουδῇ καὶ ὅλῃ τῇ πόλει, δεύτερος δὲ ὁ μέχρι τριάκοντα ἐτῶν, τόν τε Παιᾶνα ἐπικαλούμενος μάρτυρα τῶν λεγομένων ἀληθείας πέρι καὶ τοῖς νέοις ἴλεων μετὰ πειθοῦς
d γίγνεσθαι ἐπευχόμενος· δεῖ δὲ δὴ καὶ ἔτι τρίτους τοὺς ὑπὲρ τριάκοντα ἔτη μέχρι τῶν ἑξήκοντα γεγονότας ᾄδειν· τοὺς δὲ μετὰ ταῦτα—οὐ γὰρ ἔτι δυνατοὶ φέρειν ᾠδάς—μυθολόγους περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν ἠθῶν διὰ θείας φήμης καταλελεῖφθαι.

ΚΛ. Λέγεις δέ, ὦ ξένε, τίνας τούτους τοὺς χοροὺς τοὺς τρίτους; οὐ γὰρ πάνυ συνίεμεν σαφῶς ὅτι ποτὲ βούλει φράζειν αὐτῶν πέρι.

ΑΘ. Καὶ μὴν εἰσίν γε οὗτοι σχεδὸν ὧν χάριν οἱ πλεῖστοι
e τῶν ἔμπροσθεν ἐρρήθησαν λόγων.

ΚΛ. Οὔπω μεμαθήκαμεν, ἀλλ' ἔτι σαφέστερον πειρῶ φράζειν.

ΑΘ. Εἴπομεν, εἰ μεμνήμεθα, κατ' ἀρχὰς τῶν λόγων, ὡς ἡ φύσις ἁπάντων τῶν νέων διάπυρος οὖσα ἡσυχίαν οὐχ οἵα τε ἄγειν οὔτε κατὰ τὸ σῶμα οὔτε κατὰ τὴν φωνὴν εἴη, φθέγγοιτο δ' ἀεὶ ἀτάκτως καὶ πηδῷ, τάξεως δ' αἴσθησιν τούτων ἀμφοτέρων, τῶν ἄλλων μὲν ζώων οὐδὲν ἐφάπτοιτο, ἡ δὲ ἀνθρώπου φύσις ἔχοι μόνη τοῦτο· τῇ δὴ τῆς κινήσεως
665 τάξει ῥυθμὸς ὄνομα εἴη, τῇ δὲ αὖ τῆς φωνῆς, τοῦ τε ὀξέος ἅμα καὶ βαρέος συγκεραννυμένων, ἁρμονία ὄνομα προσαγορεύοιτο, χορεία δὲ τὸ συναμφότερον κληθείη. θεοὺς δὲ ἔφαμεν ἐλεοῦντας ἡμᾶς συγχορευτάς τε καὶ χορηγοὺς ἡμῖν δεδωκέναι τόν τε Ἀπόλλωνα καὶ Μούσας, καὶ δὴ καὶ τρίτον ἔφαμεν, εἰ μεμνήμεθα, Διόνυσον.

ΚΛ. Πῶς δ' οὐ μεμνήμεθα;

ΑΘ. Ὁ μὲν τοίνυν τοῦ Ἀπόλλωνος καὶ τῶν Μουσῶν
b χορὸς εἴρηνται, τὸν δὲ τρίτον καὶ τὸν λοιπὸν χορὸν ἀνάγκη τοῦ Διονύσου λέγεσθαι.

ΚΛ. Πῶς δή; λέγε· μάλα γὰρ ἄτοπος γίγνοιτ' ἂν ὥς γε ἐξαίφνης ἀκούσαντι Διονύσου πρεσβυτῶν χορός, εἰ ἄρα οἱ ὑπὲρ τριάκοντα καὶ πεντήκοντα δὲ γεγονότες ἔτη μέχρι ἑξήκοντα αὐτῷ χορεύσουσιν.

ΑΘ. Ἀληθέστατα μέντοι λέγεις. λόγου δὴ δεῖ πρὸς ταῦτα οἶμαι, ὅπῃ τοῦτο εὔλογον οὕτω γιγνόμενον ἂν γίγνοιτο.

ΚΛ. Τί μήν;

ΑΘ. Ἆρ' οὖν ἡμῖν τά γε ἔμπροσθεν ὁμολογεῖται;

ΚΛ. Τοῦ πέρι;

ΑΘ. Τὸ δεῖν πάντ' ἄνδρα καὶ παῖδα, ἐλεύθερον καὶ δοῦλον, θῆλύν τε καὶ ἄρρενα, καὶ ὅλῃ τῇ πόλει ὅλην τὴν πόλιν αὐτὴν αὑτῇ ἐπᾴδουσαν μὴ παύεσθαί ποτε ταῦτα ἃ διεληλύθαμεν, ἀμῶς γέ πως ἀεὶ μεταβαλλόμενα καὶ πάντως παρεχόμενα ποικιλίαν, ὥστε ἀπληστίαν εἶναί τινα τῶν ὕμνων τοῖς ᾄδουσιν καὶ ἡδονήν.

ΚΛ. Πῶς δ' οὐχ ὁμολογοῖτ' ἂν δεῖν ταῦτα οὕτω πράττεσθαι;

ΑΘ. Ποῦ δὴ τοῦθ' ἡμῖν τὸ ἄριστον τῆς πόλεως, ἡλικίαις τε καὶ ἅμα φρονήσεσιν πιθανώτατον ὂν τῶν ἐν τῇ πόλει, ᾄδον τὰ κάλλιστα μέγιστ' ἂν ἐξεργάζοιτο ἀγαθά; ἢ τοῦτο ἀνοήτως οὕτως ἀφήσομεν, ὃ κυριώτατον ἂν εἴη τῶν καλλίστων τε καὶ ὠφελιμωτάτων ᾠδῶν;

ΚΛ. Ἀλλὰ ἀδύνατον τὸ μεθιέναι, ὥς γε τἀνῦν λεγόμενα.

ΑΘ. Πῶς οὖν πρέπον ἂν εἴη τοῦτο; ὁρᾶτε εἰ τῇδε.

ΚΛ. Πῇ δή;

ΑΘ. Πᾶς που γιγνόμενος πρεσβύτερος ὄκνου πρὸς τὰς ᾠδὰς μεστός, καὶ χαίρειτε ἧττον πράττων τοῦτο καὶ ἀνάγκης γιγνομένης αἰσχύνοιτ' ἂν μᾶλλον, ὅσῳ πρεσβύτερος καὶ σωφρονέστερος γίγνεται, τόσῳ μᾶλλον. ἆρ' οὐχ οὕτως;

ΚΛ. Οὕτω μὲν οὖν.

ΑΘ. Οὐκοῦν ἐν θεάτρῳ γε καὶ παντοίοις ἀνθρώποις ᾄδειν ἐστὸς ὀρθὸς ἔτι μᾶλλον αἰσχύνοιτ' ἄν· καὶ ταῦτά γ' εἰ καθάπερ οἱ περὶ νίκης χοροὶ ἀγωνιζόμενοι πεφωνασκηκότες ἰσχνοί τε καὶ ἄσιτοι ἀναγκάζοιντο ᾄδειν οἱ τοιοῦτοι, παντάπασίν που ἀηδῶς τε καὶ αἰσχυντηλῶς ᾄδοντες ἀπροθύμως ἂν τοῦτ' ἐργάζοιντο;

ΚΛ. Ἀναγκαιότατα μέντοι λέγεις.

ΑΘ. Πῶς οὖν αὐτοὺς παραμυθησόμεθα προθύμους εἶναι πρὸς τὰς ᾠδάς; ἆρ' οὐ νομοθετήσομεν πρῶτον μὲν τοὺς παῖδας μέχρι ἐτῶν ὀκτωκαίδεκα τὸ παράπαν οἴνου μὴ γεύεσθαι, διδάσκοντες ὡς οὐ χρὴ πῦρ ἐπὶ πῦρ ὀχετεύειν εἴς τε τὸ σῶμα καὶ τὴν ψυχήν, πρὶν ἐπὶ τοὺς πόνους ἐγχειρεῖν πορεύεσθαι, τὴν ἐμμανῆ εὐλαβουμένους ἕξιν τῶν νέων· μετὰ δὲ τοῦτο οἴνου μὲν δὴ γεύεσθαι τοῦ μετρίου μέχρι τριάκοντα ἐτῶν, μέθης δὲ καὶ πολυοινίας τὸ παράπαν τὸν νέον ἀπέχεσθαι· τετταράκοντα δὲ ἐπιβαίνοντα ἐτῶν ἐν τοῖς συσσιτίοις εὐωχηθέντα καλεῖν τούς τε ἄλλους θεοὺς καὶ δὴ

καὶ Διόνυσον παρακαλεῖν εἰς τὴν τῶν πρεσβυτέρων τελετὴν
ἅμα καὶ παιδιάν, ἣν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ἐπίκουρον τῆς τοῦ γήρως
αὐστηρότητος ἐδωρήσατο [τὸν οἶνον] φάρμακον, ὥστε
ἀνηβᾶν ἡμᾶς, καὶ δυσθυμίας λήθη γίγνεσθαι μαλακώτερον ἐκ
c σκληροτέρου τὸ τῆς ψυχῆς ἦθος, καθαπερ ‹εἰ› εἰς πῦρ
σίδηρον ἐντεθέντα γιγνόμενον, καὶ οὕτως εὐπλαστότερον
εἶναι; πρῶτον μὲν δὴ διατεθεὶς οὕτως ἕκαστος ἆρ' οὐκ ἂν
ἐθέλοι προθυμότερόν γε, ἧττον αἰσχυνόμενος, οὐκ ἐν πολλοῖς
ἀλλὰ ἐν μετρίοις, καὶ οὐκ ἐν ἀλλοτρίοις ἀλλ' ἐν οἰκείοις,
ᾄδειν τε καὶ ὃ πολλάκις εἰρήκαμεν ἐπᾴδειν;

ΚΛ. Καὶ πολύ γε.

ΑΘ. Εἰς μέν γε τὸ προάγειν τοίνυν αὐτοὺς μετέχειν
ἡμῖν ᾠδῆς οὗτος ὁ τρόπος οὐκ ἂν παντάπασιν ἀσχήμων
d γίγνοιτο.

ΚΛ. Οὐδαμῶς.

ΑΘ. Ποίαν δὲ ἥσουσιν οἱ ἄνδρες φωνήν; ἣ μοῦσαν [ἢ]
δῆλον ὅτι πρέπουσαν αὐτοῖς δεῖ γέ τινα.

ΚΛ. Πῶς γὰρ οὔ;

ΑΘ. Τίς ἂν οὖν πρέποι θείοις ἀνδράσιν; ἆρ' ἂν ἡ τῶν
χορῶν;

ΚΛ. Ἡμεῖς γοῦν, ὦ ξένε, καὶ οἵδε οὐκ ἄλλην ἄν τινα
δυναίμεθα ᾠδὴν ἢ ἣν ἐν τοῖς χοροῖς ἐμάθομεν συνήθεις
ᾄδειν γενόμενοι.

ΑΘ. Εἰκότως γε· ὄντως γὰρ οὐκ ἐπήβολοι γεγόνατε τῆς
e καλλίστης ᾠδῆς. στρατοπέδου γὰρ πολιτείαν ἔχετε ἀλλ'
οὐκ ἐν ἄστεσι κατῳκηκότων, ἀλλ' οἷον ἁθρόους πώλους ἐν
ἀγέλῃ νεμομένους φορβάδας τοὺς νέους κέκτησθε· λαβὼν
δ' ὑμῶν οὐδεὶς τὸν αὑτοῦ, παρὰ τῶν συννόμων σπάσας
σφόδρα ἀγριαίνοντα καὶ ἀγανακτοῦντα, ἱππόκομόν τε ἐπέ-
στησεν ἰδίᾳ καὶ παιδεύει ψήχων τε καὶ ἡμερῶν, καὶ πάντα
προσήκοντα ἀποδιδοὺς τῇ παιδοτροφίᾳ ὅθεν οὐ μόνον ἀγαθὸς
667 ἂν στρατιώτης εἴη, πόλιν δὲ καὶ ἄστη δυνάμενος διοικεῖν,
ὃν δὴ κατ' ἀρχὰς εἴπομεν τῶν Τυρταίου πολεμικῶν εἶναι
πολεμικώτερον, τέταρτον ἀρετῆς ἀλλ' οὐ πρῶτον τὴν
ἀνδρείαν κτῆμα τιμῶντα ἀεὶ καὶ πανταχοῦ, ἰδιώταις τε καὶ
συμπάσῃ πόλει.

ΚΛ. Οὐκ οἶδα ἡμῶν, ὦ ξένε, ὅπῃ πάλιν αὖ τοὺς νομοθέτας
φαυλίζεις.

ΑΘ. Οὐκ, ὠγαθέ, προσέχων τούτῳ τὸν νοῦν δρῶ τοῦτο,

εἴπερ· ἀλλ' ὁ λόγος ὅπῃ φέρει, ταύτῃ πορευώμεθα, εἰ βούλεσθε. εἰ γὰρ ἔχομεν μοῦσαν τῆς τῶν χορῶν καλλίω καὶ τῆς ἐν τοῖς κοινοῖς θεάτροις, πειρώμεθα ἀποδοῦναι τούτοις οὕς φαμεν ἐκείνην μὲν αἰσχύνεσθαι, ζητεῖν δέ, ἥτις καλλίστη, ταύτης κοινωνεῖν.

ΚΛ. Πάνυ γε.

ΑΘ. Οὐκοῦν πρῶτον μὲν δεῖ τόδε γε ὑπάρχειν ἅπασιν ὅσοις συμπαρέπεταί τις χάρις, ἢ τοῦτο αὐτὸ μόνον αὐτοῦ τὸ σπουδαιότατον εἶναι, ἤ τινα ὀρθότητα, ἢ τὸ τρίτον ὠφελίαν; οἷον δὴ λέγω ἐδωδῇ μὲν καὶ πόσει καὶ συμπάσῃ τροφῇ παρέπεσθαι μὲν τὴν χάριν, ἣν ἡδονὴν ἂν προσείποιμεν· ἣν δὲ ὀρθότητά τε καὶ ὠφελίαν, ὅπερ ὑγιεινὸν τῶν προσφερομένων λέγομεν ἑκάστοτε, τοῦτ' αὐτὸ εἶναι ἐν αὐτοῖς καὶ τὸ ὀρθότατον.

ΚΛ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

ΑΘ. Καὶ μὴν καὶ τῇ μαθήσει παρακολουθεῖν μὲν τό γε τῆς χάριτος, τὴν ἡδονήν, τὴν δὲ ὀρθότητα καὶ τὴν ὠφελίαν καὶ τὸ εὖ καὶ τὸ καλῶς τὴν ἀλήθειαν εἶναι τὴν ἀποτελοῦσαν.

ΚΛ. Ἔστιν οὕτως.

ΑΘ. Τί δὲ τῇ τῶν ὁμοίων ἐργασίᾳ ὅσαι τέχναι εἰκαστικαί; ἆρ' οὐκ, ἂν τοῦτο ἐξεργάζωνται, τὸ μὲν ἡδονὴν ἐν αὐτοῖς γίγνεσθαι παρεπόμενον, ἐὰν γίγνηται, χάριν αὐτὸ δικαιότατον ἂν εἴη προσαγορεύειν;

ΚΛ. Ναί.

ΑΘ. Τὴν δέ γε ὀρθότητά που τῶν τοιούτων ἡ ἰσότης ἄν, ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πᾶν εἰπεῖν, ἐξεργάζοιτο τοῦ τε τοσούτου καὶ τοῦ τοιούτου πρότερον, ἀλλ' οὐχ ἡδονή.

ΚΛ. Καλῶς.

ΑΘ. Οὐκοῦν ἡδονῇ κρίνοιτ' ἂν μόνον ἐκεῖνο ὀρθῶς, ὃ μήτε τινὰ ὠφελίαν μήτε ἀλήθειαν μήτε ὁμοιότητα ἀπεργαζόμενον παρέχεται, μηδ' αὖ γε βλάβην, ἀλλ' αὐτοῦ τούτου μόνου ἕνεκα γίγνοιτο τοῦ συμπαρεπομένου τοῖς ἄλλοις, τῆς χάριτος, ἣν δὴ κάλλιστά τις ὀνομάσαι ἂν ἡδονήν, ὅταν μηδὲν αὐτῇ τούτων ἐπακολουθῇ;

ΚΛ. Ἀβλαβῆ λέγεις ἡδονὴν μόνον.

ΑΘ. Ναί, καὶ παιδιάν γε εἶναι τὴν αὐτὴν ταύτην λέγω τότε, ὅταν μήτε τι βλάπτῃ μήτε ὠφελῇ σπουδῆς ἢ λόγου ἄξιον.

ΚΛ. Ἀληθέστατα λέγεις.

ΑΘ. Ἆρ' οὖν οὐ πᾶσαν μίμησιν φαῖμεν ἂν ἐκ τῶν νῦν λεγομένων ἥκιστα ἡδονῇ προσήκειν κρίνεσθαι καὶ δόξῃ μὴ ἀληθεῖ—καὶ δὴ καὶ πᾶσαν ἰσότητα· οὐ γὰρ εἴ τῳ δοκεῖ ἢ εἴ τις χαίρει τῳ, τό γε ἴσον ἴσον οὐδὲ τὸ σύμμετρον ἂν εἴη σύμμετρον ὅλως—ἀλλὰ τῷ ἀληθεῖ πάντων μάλιστα, ἥκιστα δὲ ὁτῳοῦν ἄλλῳ;

ΚΛ. Παντάπασι μὲν οὖν.

ΑΘ. Οὐκοῦν μουσικήν γε πᾶσάν φαμεν εἰκαστικήν τε εἶναι καὶ μιμητικήν;

ΚΛ. Τί μήν;

ΑΘ. Ἥκιστ' ἄρα ὅταν τις μουσικὴν ἡδονῇ φῇ κρίνεσθαι, τοῦτον ἀποδεκτέον τὸν λόγον, καὶ ζητητέον ἥκιστα ταύτην ὡς σπουδαίαν, εἴ τις ἄρα που καὶ γίγνοιτο, ἀλλ' ἐκείνην τὴν ἔχουσαν τὴν ὁμοιότητα τῷ τοῦ καλοῦ μιμήματι.

ΚΛ. Ἀληθέστατα.

ΑΘ. Καὶ τούτοις δὴ τοῖς τὴν καλλίστην ᾠδήν τε ζητοῦσι καὶ μοῦσαν ζητητέον, ὡς ἔοικεν, οὐχ ἥτις ἡδεῖα ἀλλ' ἥτις ὀρθή· μιμήσεως γὰρ ἦν, ὥς φαμεν, ὀρθότης, εἰ τὸ μιμηθὲν ὅσον τε καὶ οἷον ἦν ἀποτελοῖτο.

ΚΛ. Πῶς γὰρ οὔ;

ΑΘ. Καὶ μὴν τοῦτό γε πᾶς ἂν ὁμολογοῖ περὶ τῆς μουσικῆς, ὅτι πάντα τὰ περὶ αὐτὴν ἐστιν ποιήματα μίμησίς τε καὶ ἀπεικασία· καὶ τοῦτό γε μῶν οὐκ ἂν σύμπαντες ὁμολογοῖεν ποιηταί τε καὶ ἀκροαταὶ καὶ ὑποκριταί;

ΚΛ. Καὶ μάλα.

ΑΘ. Δεῖ δὴ καθ' ἕκαστόν γε, ὡς ἔοικε, γιγνώσκειν τῶν ποιημάτων ὅτι ποτ' ἐστὶν τὸν μέλλοντα ἐν αὐτῷ μὴ ἁμαρτήσεσθαι· μὴ γὰρ γιγνώσκων τὴν οὐσίαν, τί ποτε βούλεται καὶ ὅτου ποτ' ἐστὶν εἰκὼν ὄντως, σχολῇ τήν γε ὀρθότητα τῆς βουλήσεως ἢ καὶ ἁμαρτίαν αὐτοῦ διαγνώσεται.

ΚΛ. Σχολῇ· πῶς δ' οὔ;

ΑΘ. Ὁ δὲ τὸ ὀρθῶς μὴ γιγνώσκων ἆρ' ἄν ποτε τό γε εὖ καὶ τὸ κακῶς δυνατὸς εἴη διαγνῶναι; λέγω δὲ οὐ πάνυ σαφῶς, ἀλλ' ὧδε σαφέστερον ἴσως ἂν λεχθείη.

ΚΛ. Πῶς;

ΑΘ. Εἰσὶν δήπου κατὰ τὴν ὄψιν ἡμῖν ἀπεικασίαι μυρίαι.

ΚΛ. Ναί.

ΑΘ. Τί οὖν εἴ τις καὶ ἐν τούτοις ἀγνοοῖ τῶν μεμιμημένων ὅτι ποτ' ἐστὶν ἕκαστον [τῶν σωμάτων]; ἆρ' ἄν ποτε

τό γε ὀρθῶς αὐτῶν εἰργασμένον γνοίη; λέγω δὲ τὸ τοιόνδε, οἷον τοὺς ἀριθμοὺς τοῦ σώματος καὶ ἑκάστων τῶν μερῶν τὰς θέσεις εἰ ἔχει, ὅσοι τέ εἰσιν καὶ ὁποῖα παρ' ὁποῖα αὐτῶν κείμενα τὴν προσήκουσαν τάξιν ἀπείληφεν—καὶ ἔτι δὴ χρώματά τε καὶ σχήματα—ἢ πάντα ταῦτα τεταραγμένως εἴργασται· μῶν δοκεῖ ταῦτ' ἄν ποτε διαγνῶναί τις τὸ παράπαν ἀγνοῶν ὅτι ποτ' ἐστὶ τὸ μεμιμημένον ζῷον;

ΚΛ. Καὶ πῶς;

ΑΘ. Τί δ' εἰ γιγνώσκοιμεν ὅτι τὸ γεγραμμένον ἢ τὸ πεπλασμένον ἐστὶν ἄνθρωπος, καὶ τὰ μέρη πάντα τὰ ἑαυτοῦ καὶ χρώματα ἅμα καὶ σχήματα ἀπείληφεν ὑπὸ τῆς τέχνης; ἆρά γε ἀναγκαῖον ἤδη τῷ ταῦτα γνόντι καὶ ἐκεῖνο ἑτοίμως γιγνώσκειν, εἴτε καλὸν εἴτε ὅπῃ ποτὲ ἐλλιπὲς ἂν εἴη κάλλους;

ΚΛ. Πάντες μεντἂν ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν, ὦ ξένε, τὰ καλὰ τῶν ζῴων ἐγιγνώσκομεν.

ΑΘ. Ὀρθότατα λέγεις. ἆρ' οὖν οὐ περὶ ἑκάστην εἰκόνα, καὶ ἐν γραφικῇ καὶ ἐν μουσικῇ καὶ πάντῃ, τὸν μέλλοντα ἔμφρονα κριτὴν ἔσεσθαι δεῖ ταῦτα τρία ἔχειν, ὅ τέ ἐστι πρῶτον γιγνώσκειν, ἔπειτα ὡς ὀρθῶς, ἔπειθ' ὡς εὖ, τὸ τρίτον, εἴργασται τῶν εἰκόνων ἡτισοῦν [ῥήμασί τε καὶ μέλεσι καὶ τοῖς ῥυθμοῖς];

ΚΛ. Ἔοικε γοῦν.

ΑΘ. Μὴ τοίνυν ἀπείπωμεν λέγοντες τὸ περὶ τὴν μουσικὴν ᾗ χαλεπόν· ἐπειδὴ γὰρ ὑμνεῖται περὶ αὐτὴν διαφερόντως ἢ τὰς ἄλλας εἰκόνας, εὐλαβείας δὴ δεῖται πλείστης πασῶν εἰκόνων. ἁμαρτών τε γάρ τις μέγιστ' ἂν βλάπτοιτο, ἤθη κακὰ φιλοφρονούμενος, χαλεπώτατόν τε αἰσθέσθαι διὰ τὸ τοὺς ποιητὰς φαυλοτέρους εἶναι ποιητὰς αὐτῶν τῶν Μουσῶν. οὐ γὰρ ἂν ἐκεῖναί γε ἐξαμάρτοιέν ποτε τοσοῦτον ὥστε ῥήματα ἀνδρῶν ποιήσασαι τὸ **σχῆμα** γυναικῶν καὶ μέλος ἀποδοῦναι, καὶ μέλος ἐλευθέρων αὖ καὶ σχήματα συνθεῖσαι ῥυθμοὺς δούλων καὶ ἀνελευθέρων προσαρμόττειν, οὐδ' αὖ ῥυθμοὺς καὶ σχῆμα ἐλευθέριον ὑποθεῖσαι μέλος ἢ λόγον ἐναντίον ἀποδοῦναι τοῖς ῥυθμοῖς, ἔτι δὲ θηρίων φωνὰς καὶ ἀνθρώπων καὶ ὀργάνων καὶ πάντας ψόφους εἰς ταὐτὸν οὐκ ἄν ποτε συνθεῖεν, ὡς ἕν τι μιμούμεναι· ποιηταὶ δὲ ἀνθρώπινοι σφόδρα τὰ τοιαῦτα ἐμπλέκοντες καὶ συγκυκῶντες ἀλόγως, γέλωτ' ἂν παρασκευάζοιεν τῶν ἀνθρώπων ὅσους

φησὶν Ὀρφεὺς λαχεῖν ὥραν τῆς τέρψιος. ταῦτά γε γὰρ ὁρῶσι πάντα κυκώμενα, καὶ ἔτι διασπῶσιν οἱ ποιηταὶ ῥυθμὸν μὲν καὶ σχήματα μέλους χωρίς, λόγους ψιλοὺς εἰς μέτρα τιθέντες, μέλος δ' αὖ καὶ ῥυθμὸν ἄνευ ῥημάτων, ψιλῇ κιθαρίσει τε καὶ αὐλήσει προσχρώμενοι, ἐν οἷς δὴ παγχάλεπον ἄνευ λόγου γιγνόμενον ῥυθμόν τε καὶ ἁρμονίαν γιγνώσκειν ὅτι τε βούλεται καὶ ὅτῳ ἔοικε τῶν ἀξιολόγων μιμημάτων· ἀλλὰ ὑπολαβεῖν ἀναγκαῖον ὅτι τὸ τοιοῦτόν γε πολλῆς ἀγροικίας μεστὸν πᾶν, ὁπόσον τάχους τε καὶ ἀπταισίας καὶ φωνῆς θηριώδους σφόδρα φίλον ὥστ' αὐλήσει γε χρῆσθαι καὶ κιθαρίσει πλὴν ὅσον ὑπὸ ὄρχησίν τε καὶ ᾠδήν, ψιλῷ δ' ἑκατέρῳ πᾶσά τις ἀμουσία καὶ θαυματουργία γίγνοιτ' ἂν τῆς χρήσεως. ταῦτα μὲν ἔχει ταύτῃ λόγον· ἡμεῖς δέ γε οὐχ ὅτι μὴ δεῖ ταῖς Μούσαις ἡμῶν προσχρῆσθαι τοὺς ἥδη τριακοντούτας καὶ τῶν πεντήκοντα πέραν γεγονότας σκοπούμεθα, ἀλλ' ὅτι ποτὲ δεῖ. τόδε μὲν οὖν ἐκ τούτων ὁ λόγος ἡμῖν δοκεῖ μοι σημαίνειν ἤδη, τῆς γε χορικῆς μούσης ὅτι πεπαιδεῦσθαι δεῖ βέλτιον τοὺς πεντηκοντούτας ὅσοισπερ ἂν ἄδειν προσήκῃ. τῶν γὰρ ῥυθμῶν καὶ τῶν ἁρμονιῶν ἀναγκαῖον αὐτοῖς ἐστιν εὐαισθήτως ἔχειν καὶ γιγνώσκειν· ἢ πῶς τις τὴν ὀρθότητα γνώσεται τῶν μελῶν, [ᾧ προσῆκεν ἢ μὴ προσῆκεν τοῦ δωριστί, καὶ τοῦ ῥυθμοῦ ὃν ὁ ποιητὴς αὐτῷ προσῆψεν,—ὀρθῶς ἢ μή];

ΚΛ. Δῆλον ὡς οὐδαμῶς.

ΑΘ. Γελοῖος γὰρ ὅ γε πολὺς ὄχλος ἡγούμενος ἱκανῶς γιγνώσκειν τό τε εὐάρμοστον καὶ εὔρυθμον καὶ μή, ὅσοι προσάδειν αὐλῷ καὶ βαίνειν ἐν ῥυθμῷ γεγόνασι διηναγκασμένοι, ὅτι δὲ δρῶσιν ταῦτα ἀγνοοῦντες αὐτῶν ἕκαστα, οὐ συλλογίζονται. τὸ δέ που προσήκοντα μὲν ἔχον πᾶν μέλος ὀρθῶς ἔχει, μὴ προσήκοντα δὲ ἡμαρτημένως.

ΚΛ. Ἀναγκαιότατα.

ΑΘ. Τί οὖν ὁ μηδ' ὅτι ποτ' ἔχει γιγνώσκων; ἆρα, ὅπερ εἴπομεν, ὡς ὀρθῶς γε αὐτὸ ἔχει, γνώσεταί ποτε ἐν ὁτῳοῦν;

ΚΛ. Καὶ τίς μηχανή;

ΑΘ. Τοῦτ' οὖν, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἀνευρίσκομεν αὖ τὰ νῦν, ὅτι τοῖς ᾠδοῖς ἡμῖν, οὓς νῦν παρακαλοῦμεν καὶ ἑκόντας τινὰ τρόπον ἀναγκάζομεν ἄδειν, μέχρι γε τοσούτου πεπαιδεῦσθαι σχεδὸν ἀναγκαῖον, μέχρι τοῦ δυνατὸν εἶναι συνακολουθεῖν ἕκαστον ταῖς τε βάσεσιν τῶν ῥυθμῶν καὶ ταῖς χορδαῖς ταῖς

τῶν μελῶν, ἵνα καθορῶντες τάς τε ἁρμονίας καὶ τοὺς ῥυθμούς,
ἐκλέγεσθαί τε τὰ προσήκοντα οἷοί τ' ὦσιν ἃ τοῖς τηλικούτοις
τε καὶ τοιούτοις ᾄδειν πρέπον, καὶ οὕτως ᾄδωσιν, καὶ ᾄδοντες
αὐτοί τε ἡδονὰς τὸ παραχρῆμα ἀσινεῖς ἥδωνται καὶ τοῖς
νεωτέροις ἡγεμόνες ἠθῶν χρηστῶν ἀσπασμοῦ προσήκοντος
γίγνωνται· μέχρι δὲ τοσούτου παιδευθέντες ἀκριβεστέραν ἂν
παιδείαν τῆς ἐπὶ τὸ πλῆθος φερούσης εἶεν μετακεχειρισμένοι
καὶ τῆς περὶ τοὺς ποιητὰς αὐτούς. τὸ γὰρ τρίτον οὐδεμία
ἀνάγκη ποιητῇ γιγνώσκειν, εἴτε καλὸν εἴτε μὴ καλὸν τὸ
μίμημα, τὸ δὲ ἁρμονίας καὶ ῥυθμοῦ σχεδὸν ἀνάγκη, τοῖς δὲ
πάντα τὰ τρία τῆς ἐκλογῆς ἕνεκα τοῦ καλλίστου καὶ δευτέρου,
ἢ μηδέποτε ἱκανὸν ἐπῳδὸν γίγνεσθαι νέοις πρὸς ἀρετήν. καὶ
ὅπερ ὁ λόγος ἐν ἀρχαῖς ἐβουλήθη, τὴν τῷ τοῦ Διονύσου
χορῷ βοήθειαν ἐπιδεῖξαι καλῶς λεγομένην, εἰς δύναμιν
εἴρηκεν· σκοπώμεθα δὴ εἰ τοῦθ' οὕτω γέγονεν. θορυβώδης
μέν που ὁ σύλλογος ὁ τοιοῦτος ἐξ ἀνάγκης προϊούσης τῆς
πόσεως ἐπὶ μᾶλλον ἀεὶ συμβαίνει γιγνόμενος, ὅπερ ὑπεθέ-
μεθα κατ' ἀρχὰς ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι γίγνεσθαι περὶ τῶν νῦν
λεγομένων.

ΚΛ. Ἀνάγκη.

ΑΘ. Πᾶς δέ γε αὐτὸς αὑτοῦ κουφότερος αἴρεται καὶ
γέγηθέν τε καὶ παρρησίας ἐμπίμπλαται καὶ ἀνηκουστίας ἐν
τῷ τοιούτῳ τῶν πέλας, ἄρχων δ' ἱκανὸς ἀξιοῖ ἑαυτοῦ τε καὶ
τῶν ἄλλων γεγονέναι.

ΚΛ. Τί μήν;

ΑΘ. Οὐκοῦν ἔφαμεν, ὅταν γίγνηται ταῦτα, καθάπερ τινὰ
σίδηρον τὰς ψυχὰς τῶν πινόντων διαπύρους γιγνομένας
μαλθακωτέρας γίγνεσθαι καὶ νεωτέρας, ὥστε εὐαγώγους
συμβαίνειν τῷ δυναμένῳ τε καὶ ἐπισταμένῳ παιδεύειν τε
καὶ πλάττειν, καθάπερ ὅτ' ἦσαν νέαι; τοῦτον δ' εἶναι τὸν
πλάστην τὸν αὐτὸν ὥσπερ τότε, τὸν ἀγαθὸν νομοθέτην, οὗ
νόμους εἶναι δεῖ συμποτικούς, δυναμένους τὸν εὔελπιν καὶ
θαρραλέον ἐκεῖνον γιγνόμενον καὶ ἀναισχυντότερον τοῦ
δέοντος, καὶ οὐκ ἐθέλοντα τάξιν καὶ τὸ κατὰ μέρος σιγῆς
καὶ λόγου καὶ πόσεως καὶ μούσης ὑπομένειν, ἐθέλειν ποιεῖν
πάντα τούτοις τἀναντία, καὶ εἰσιόντι τῷ μὴ καλῷ θάρρει
τὸν κάλλιστον διαμαχόμενον φόβον εἰσπέμπειν οἵους τ'
εἶναι μετὰ δίκης, ὃν αἰδῶ τε καὶ αἰσχύνην θεῖον φόβον
ὠνομάκαμεν;

ΚΛ. Ἔστιν ταῦτα.

ΑΘ. Τούτων δέ γε τῶν νόμων εἶναι νομοφύλακας καὶ συνδημιουργοὺς αὐτοῖς τοὺς ἀθορύβους καὶ νήφοντας τῶν μὴ νηφόντων στρατηγούς, ὧν δὴ χωρὶς μέθῃ διαμάχεσθαι δεινότερον ἢ πολεμίοις εἶναι μὴ μετὰ ἀρχόντων ἀθορύβων, καὶ τὸν αὖ μὴ δυνάμενον ἐθέλειν πείθεσθαι τούτοις καὶ τοῖς ἡγεμόσιν τοῖς τοῦ Διονύσου, τοῖς ὑπὲρ ἑξήκοντα ἔτη γεγονόσιν, ἴσην καὶ μείζω τὴν αἰσχύνην φέρειν ἢ τὸν τοῖς τοῦ Ἄρεως ἀπειθοῦντα ἄρχουσιν.

ΚΛ. Ὀρθῶς.

ΑΘ. Οὐκοῦν εἴ γε εἴη τοιαύτη μὲν μέθη, τοιαύτη δὲ παιδιά, μῶν οὐκ ὠφεληθέντες ἂν οἱ τοιοῦτοι συμπόται καὶ μᾶλλον φίλοι ἢ πρότερον ἀπαλλάττοιντο ἀλλήλων, ἀλλ᾽ οὐχ ὥσπερ τὰ νῦν ἐχθροί, κατὰ νόμους δὴ πᾶσαν τὴν συνουσίαν συγγενόμενοι, καὶ ἀκολουθήσαντες ὁπότε ἀφηγοῖντο οἱ νήφοντες τοῖς μὴ νήφουσιν;

ΚΛ. Ὀρθῶς, εἴ γε δὴ εἴη τοιαύτη οἵαν νῦν λέγεις.

ΑΘ. Μὴ τοίνυν ἐκεῖνό γ᾽ ἔτι τῆς τοῦ Διονύσου δωρεᾶς ψέγωμεν ἁπλῶς, ὡς ἔστιν κακὴ καὶ εἰς πόλιν οὐκ ἀξία παραδέχεσθαι. καὶ γὰρ ἔτι πλείω τις ἂν ἐπεξέλθοι λέγων· ἐπεὶ καὶ τὸ μέγιστον ἀγαθὸν ὃ δωρεῖται λέγειν μὲν ὄκνος εἰς τοὺς πολλοὺς διὰ τὸ κακῶς τοὺς ἀνθρώπους αὐτὸ ὑπολαβεῖν καὶ γνῶναι λεχθέν.

ΚΛ. Τὸ ποῖον δή;

ΑΘ. Λόγος τις ἅμα καὶ φήμη ὑπορρεῖ πως ὡς ὁ θεὸς οὗτος ὑπὸ τῆς μητρυᾶς Ἥρας διεφορήθη τῆς ψυχῆς τὴν γνώμην, διὸ τάς τε βακχείας καὶ πᾶσαν τὴν μανικὴν ἐμβάλλει χορείαν τιμωρούμενος· ὅθεν καὶ τὸν οἶνον ἐπὶ τοῦτ᾽ αὐτὸ δεδώρηται. ἐγὼ δὲ τὰ μὲν τοιαῦτα τοῖς ἀσφαλὲς ἡγουμένοις εἶναι λέγειν περὶ θεῶν ἀφίημι λέγειν, τὸ δὲ τοσόνδε οἶδα, ὅτι πᾶν ζῷον, ὅσον αὐτῷ προσήκει νοῦν ἔχειν τελεωθέντι, τοῦτον καὶ τοσοῦτον οὐδὲν ἔχον ποτὲ φύεται· ἐν τούτῳ δὴ τῷ χρόνῳ ἐν ᾧ μήπω κέκτηται τὴν οἰκείαν φρόνησιν πᾶν μαίνεταί τε καὶ βοᾷ ἀτάκτως, καὶ ὅταν ἀκταινώσῃ ἑαυτὸ τάχισ·α, ἀτάκτως αὖ πηδᾷ. ἀναμνησθῶμεν δὲ ὅτι μουσικῆς τε καὶ γυμναστικῆς ἔφαμεν ἀρχὰς ταύτας εἶναι.

ΚΛ. Μεμνήμεθα· τί δ᾽ οὔ;

ΑΘ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ ὅτι τὴν ῥυθμοῦ τε καὶ ἁρμονίας αἴσθησιν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ἡμῖν ἐνδεδωκέναι τὴν ἀρχὴν ταύτην

ἔφαμεν, Ἀπόλλωνα δὲ καὶ Μούσας καὶ Διόνυσον τούτων αἰτίους γεγονέναι;

ΚΛ. Πῶς γὰρ οὔ;

ΑΘ. Καὶ δὴ καὶ τὸν οἶνόν γε, ὡς ἔοικεν, ὁ τῶν ἄλλων λόγος, ἵνα μανῶμεν, φησὶν ἐπὶ τιμωρίᾳ τῇ τῶν ἀνθρώπων δεδόσθαι· ὁ δὲ νῦν λεγόμενος ὑφ' ἡμῶν φάρμακον ἐπὶ τοὐναντίον φησὶν αἰδοῦς μὲν ψυχῆς κτήσεως ἕνεκα δεδόσθαι, σώματος δὲ ὑγιείας τε καὶ ἰσχύος.

ΚΛ. Κάλλιστα, ὦ ξένε, τὸν λόγον ἀπεμνημόνευκας.

ΑΘ. Καὶ τὰ μὲν δὴ τῆς χορείας ἡμίσεα διαπεπεράνθω· τὰ δ' ἡμίσεα, ὅπως ἂν ἔτι δοκῇ, περανοῦμεν ἢ καὶ ἐάσομεν.

ΚΛ. Ποῖα δὴ λέγεις, καὶ πῶς ἑκάτερα διαιρῶν;

ΑΘ. Ὅλη μέν που χορεία ὅλη παίδευσις ἦν ἡμῖν, τούτου δ' αὖ τὸ μὲν ῥυθμοί τε καὶ ἁρμονίαι, τὸ κατὰ τὴν φωνήν.

ΚΛ. Ναί.

ΑΘ. Τὸ δέ γε κατὰ τὴν τοῦ σώματος κίνησιν ῥυθμὸν μὲν κοινὸν τῇ τῆς φωνῆς εἶχε κινήσει, σχῆμα δὲ ἴδιον· ἐκεῖ δὲ μέλος ἡ τῆς φωνῆς κίνησις.

ΚΛ. Ἀληθέστατα.

ΑΘ. Τὰ μὲν τοίνυν τῆς φωνῆς μέχρι τῆς ψυχῆς πρὸς ἀρετὴν παιδείας οὐκ οἶδ' ὅντινα τρόπον ὠνομάσαμεν μουσικήν.

ΚΛ. Ὀρθῶς μὲν οὖν.

ΑΘ. Τὰ δέ γε τοῦ σώματος, ἃ παιζόντων ὄρχησιν εἴπομεν, ἐὰν μέχρι τῆς τοῦ σώματος ἀρετῆς ἡ τοιαύτη κίνησις γίγνηται, τὴν ἔντεχνον ἀγωγὴν ἐπὶ τὸ τοιοῦτον αὐτοῦ γυμναστικὴν προσείπωμεν.

ΚΛ. Ὀρθότατα.

ΑΘ. Τὸ δὲ τῆς μουσικῆς, ὃ νυνδὴ σχεδὸν ἥμισυ διεληλυθέναι τῆς χορείας εἴπομεν καὶ διαπεπεράνθαι, καὶ νῦν οὕτως εἰρήσθω· τὸ δ' ἥμισυ λέγωμεν, ἢ πῶς καὶ πῇ ποιητέον;

ΚΛ. Ὦ ἄριστε, Κρησὶν καὶ Λακεδαιμονίοις διαλεγόμενος, μουσικῆς πέρι διελθόντων ἡμῶν, ἐλλειπόντων δὲ γυμναστικῆς, τί ποτε οἴει σοι πότερον ἡμῶν ἀποκρινεῖσθαι πρὸς ταύτην τὴν ἐρώτησιν;

ΑΘ. Ἀποκεκρίσθαι ἔγωγ' ἄν σε φαίην σχεδὸν ταῦτ' ἐρόμενον σαφῶς, καὶ μανθάνω ὡς ἐρώτησις οὖσα αὕτη

τὰ νῦν ἀπόκρισίς τέ ἐστιν, ὡς εἶπον, καὶ ἔτι πρόσταξις διαπεράνασθαι τὰ περὶ γυμναστικῆς.

ΚΛ. Ἄρισθ' ὑπέλαβές τε καὶ οὕτω δὴ ποίει.

ΑΘ. Ποιητέον· οὐδὲ γὰρ πάνυ χαλεπόν ἐστιν εἰπεῖν ὑμῖν γε ἀμφοτέροις γνώριμα. πολὺ γὰρ ἐν ταύτῃ τῇ τέχνῃ πλέον ἐμπειρίας ἢ ἐν ἐκείνῃ μετέχετε.

ΚΛ. Σχεδὸν ἀληθῆ λέγεις.

ΑΘ. Οὐκοῦν αὖ ταύτης ἀρχὴ μὲν τῆς παιδιᾶς τὸ κατὰ φύσιν πηδᾶν εἰθίσθαι πᾶν ζῷον, τὸ δὲ ἀνθρώπινον, ὡς ἔφαμεν, αἴσθησιν λαβὸν τοῦ ῥυθμοῦ ἐγέννησέν τε ὄρχησιν καὶ ἔτεκεν, τοῦ δὲ μέλους ὑπομιμνῄσκοντος καὶ ἐγείροντος τὸν ῥυθμόν, κοινωθέντ' ἀλλήλοις χορείαν καὶ παιδιὰν ἐτεκέτην.

ΚΛ. Ἀληθέστατα.

ΑΘ. Καὶ τὸ μέν, φαμέν, ἤδη διειλήλυθαμεν αὐτοῦ, τὸ δὲ πειρασόμεθα ἐφεξῆς διελθεῖν.

ΚΛ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

ΑΘ. Ἐπὶ τοίνυν τῇ τῆς μέθης χρείᾳ τὸν κολοφῶνα πρῶτον ἐπιθῶμεν, εἰ καὶ σφῷν συνδοκεῖ.

ΚΛ. Ποῖον δὴ καὶ τίνα λέγεις;

ΑΘ. Εἰ μέν τις πόλις ὡς οὔσης σπουδῆς τῷ ἐπιτηδεύματι τῷ νῦν εἰρημένῳ χρήσεται μετὰ νόμων καὶ τάξεως, ὡς τοῦ σωφρονεῖν ἕνεκα μελέτῃ χρωμένη, καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἡδονῶν μὴ ἀφέξεται ὡσαύτως καὶ κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν λόγον, τοῦ κρατεῖν αὐτῶν ἕνεκα μηχανωμένη, τοῦτον μὲν τὸν τρόπον ἅπασι τούτοις χρηστέον· εἰ δ' ὡς παιδιᾷ τε, καὶ ἐξέσται τῷ βουλομένῳ καὶ ὅταν βούληται καὶ μεθ' ὧν ἂν βούληται πίνειν μετ' ἐπιτηδευμάτων ὑντινωνοῦν ἄλλων, οὐκ ἂν τιθείμην ταύτην τὴν ψῆφον, ὡς δεῖ ποτε μέθῃ χρῆσθαι ταύτην τὴν πόλιν ἢ τοῦτον τὸν ἄνδρα, ἀλλ' ἔτι μᾶλλον τῆς Κρητῶν καὶ Λακεδαιμονίων χρείας προσθείμην ἂν τῷ τῶν Καρχηδονίων νόμῳ, μηδέποτε μηδένα ἐπὶ στρατοπέδου γεύεσθαι τούτου τοῦ πώματος, ἀλλ' ὑδροποσίαις συγγίγνεσθαι τοῦτον τὸν χρόνον ἅπαντα, καὶ κατὰ πόλιν μήτε δούλην μήτε δοῦλον γεύεσθαι μηδέποτε, μηδὲ ἄρχοντας τοῦτον τὸν ἐνιαυτὸν ὃν ἂν ἄρχωσιν, μηδ' αὖ κυβερνήτας μηδὲ δικαστὰς ἐνεργοὺς ὄντας οἴνου γεύεσθαι τὸ παράπαν, μηδ' ὅστις βουλευσόμενος εἰς βουλὴν ἀξίαν τινὰ λόγου συνέρχεται, μηδέ γε μεθ' ἡμέραν μηδένα τὸ παράπαν εἰ μὴ σωμασκίας ἢ

νόσων ἕνεκα, μηδ' αὖ νύκτωρ ὅταν ἐπινοῇ τις παῖδας ποιεῖσθαι ἀνὴρ ἢ καὶ γυνή. καὶ ἄλλα δὲ πάμπολλα ἄν τις λέγοι ἐν οἷς τοῖς νοῦν τε καὶ νόμον ἔχουσιν ὀρθὸν οὐ ποτέος οἶνος· ὥστε κατὰ τὸν λόγον τοῦτον οὐδ' ἀμπελώνων ἂν πολλῶν δέοι οὐδ' ἧτινι πόλει, τακτὰ δὲ τά τ' ἄλλ' ἂν εἴη γεωργήματα καὶ πᾶσα ἡ δίαιτα, καὶ δὴ τά γε περὶ οἶνον σχεδὸν ἁπάντων ἐμμετρότατα καὶ ὀλίγιστα γίγνοιτ' ἄν. οὗτος, ὦ ξένοι, ἡμῖν, εἰ συνδοκεῖ, κολοφὼν ἐπὶ τῷ περὶ οἴνου λόγῳ ῥηθέντι εἰρήσθω.

ΚΛ. Καλῶς, καὶ συνδοκεῖ.

BOOK III

SHORT ANALYSIS

Book III. is, in general, a study of the origin and development of civic communities, undertaken specially with the view of finding how laws arose, and what is the effect of laws on the organism.

676–682 e.—Prehistoric times: early forms of polity and the origin of law.

683–693 c.—The Dorian Confederacy: reasons for the decline of Argos and Messene and for the rise of Sparta.

693 d–698 a.—Persia as a type of autocracy: the evils of too great power in the governor.

698 b–701 e.—Athens as a type of democracy: the evils of too great freedom in the governed.

Γ

676 ΑΘ. Ταῦτα μὲν οὖν δὴ ταύτῃ· πολιτείας δὲ ἀρχὴν τίνα ποτὲ φῶμεν γεγονέναι; μῶν οὐκ ἐνθένδε τις ἂν αὐτὴν ῥᾷστά τε καὶ κάλλιστα κατίδοι;

ΚΛ. Πόθεν;

ΑΘ. Ὅθενπερ καὶ τὴν τῶν πόλεων ἐπίδοσιν εἰς ἀρετὴν μεταβαίνουσαν ἅμα καὶ κακίαν ἑκάστοτε θεατέον.

ΚΛ. Λέγεις δὲ πόθεν;

ΑΘ. Οἶμαι μὲν ἀπὸ χρόνου μήκους τε καὶ ἀπειρίας καὶ b τῶν μεταβολῶν ἐν τῷ τοιούτῳ.

ΚΛ. Πῶς λέγεις;

ΑΘ. Φέρε, ἀφ' οὗ πόλεις τ' εἰσὶν καὶ ἄνθρωποι πολιτευόμενοι, δοκεῖς ἄν ποτε κατανοῆσαι χρόνου πλῆθος ὅσον γέγονεν;

ΚΛ. Οὔκουν ῥᾴδιόν γε οὐδαμῶς.

ΑΘ. Τὸ δέ γε ὡς ἁπλετόν τι καὶ ἀμήχανον ἂν εἴη;

ΚΛ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν τοῦτό γε.

ΑΘ. Μῶν οὖν οὐ μυρίαι μὲν ἐπὶ μυρίαις ἡμῖν γεγόνασι πόλεις ἐν τούτῳ τῷ χρόνῳ, κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τοῦ πλήθους λόγον οὐκ ἐλάττους ἐφθαρμέναι; πεπολιτευμέναι δ' αὖ πάσας πολιτείας πολλάκις ἑκασταχοῦ; καὶ τοτὲ μὲν ἐξ ἐλαττόνων μείζους, τοτὲ δ' ἐκ μειζόνων ἐλάττους, καὶ χείρους ἐκ βελτιόνων γεγόνασι καὶ βελτίους ἐκ χειρόνων;

ΚΛ. Ἀναγκαῖον.

ΑΘ. Ταύτης δὴ πέρι λάβωμεν, εἰ δυναίμεθα, τῆς μεταβολῆς τὴν αἰτίαν· τάχα γὰρ ἂν ἴσως δείξειεν ἡμῖν τὴν πρώτην τῶν πολιτειῶν γένεσιν καὶ μετάβασιν.

ΚΛ. Εὖ λέγεις, καὶ προθυμεῖσθαι δεῖ, σὲ μὲν ὃ διανοῇ περὶ αὐτῶν ἀποφαινόμενον, ἡμᾶς δὲ συνεπομένους.

ΑΘ. Ἆρ' οὖν ὑμῖν οἱ παλαιοὶ λόγοι ἀλήθειαν ἔχειν τινὰ δοκοῦσιν; 677

ΚΛ. Ποῖοι δή;

ΑΘ. Τὸ πολλὰς ἀνθρώπων φθορὰς γεγονέναι κατακλυσμοῖς τε καὶ νόσοις καὶ ἄλλοις πολλοῖς, ἐν οἷς βραχύ τι τῶν ἀνθρώπων λείπεσθαι γένος.

ΚΛ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν πιθανὸν τὸ τοιοῦτον πᾶν παντί.

ΑΘ. Φέρε δή, νοήσωμεν μίαν τῶν πολλῶν ταύτην τὴν τῷ κατακλυσμῷ ποτε γενομένην—

ΚΛ. Τὸ ποῖόν τι περὶ αὐτῆς διανοηθέντες;

ΑΘ. Ὡς οἱ τότε περιφυγόντες τὴν φθορὰν σχεδὸν ὄρειοί b τινες ἂν εἶεν νομῆς, ἐν κορυφαῖς που σμικρὰ ζώπυρα τοῦ τῶν ἀνθρώπων διασεσωμένα γένους.

ΚΛ. Δῆλον.

ΑΘ. Καὶ δὴ τοὺς τοιούτους γε ἀνάγκη που τῶν ἄλλων ἀπείρους εἶναι τεχνῶν καὶ τῶν ἐν τοῖς ἄστεσι πρὸς ἀλλήλους μηχανῶν εἴς τε πλεονεξίας καὶ φιλονικίας καὶ ὁπόσ' ἄλλα κακουργήματα πρὸς ἀλλήλους ἐπινοοῦσιν.

ΚΛ. Εἰκὸς γοῦν.

ΑΘ. Θῶμεν δὴ τὰς ἐν τοῖς πεδίοις πόλεις καὶ πρὸς c θαλάττῃ κατοικούσας ἅρδην ἐν τῷ τότε χρόνῳ διαφθείρεσθαι;

ΚΛ. Θῶμεν.

ΑΘ. Οὐκοῦν ὄργανά τε πάντα ἀπόλλυσθαι, καὶ εἴ τι τέχνης ἦν ἐχόμενον σπουδαίως ηὑρημένον ἢ πολιτικῆς ἢ καὶ σοφίας τινὸς ἑτέρας, πάντα ἔρρειν ταῦτα ἐν τῷ τότε χρόνῳ φήσομεν; πῶς γὰρ ἄν, ὦ ἄριστε, εἴ γε ἔμενεν τάδε

οὕτω τὸν πάντα χρόνον ὡς νῦν διακεκόσμηται, καινὸν ἀνηυρίσκετό ποτε καὶ ὁτιοῦν;

d ΚΛ. Τοῦτο ὅτι μὲν μυριάκις μύρια ἔτη διελάνθανεν ἄρα τοὺς τότε, χίλια δὲ ἀφ' οὗ [γέγονεν] ἢ δὶς τοσαῦτα ἔτη τὰ μὲν Δαιδάλῳ καταφανῆ γέγονεν, τὰ δὲ Ὀρφεῖ, τὰ δὲ Παλαμήδει, τὰ δὲ περὶ μουσικὴν Μαρσύᾳ καὶ Ὀλύμπῳ,
5 περὶ λύραν δὲ Ἀμφίονι, τὰ δὲ ἄλλα ἄλλοις πάμπολλα ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν, χθὲς καὶ πρώην γεγονότα.

ΑΘ. Ἄριστ', ὦ Κλεινία, τὸν φίλον ὅτι παρέλιπες, τὸν ἀτεχνῶς χθὲς γενόμενον.

ΚΛ. Μῶν φράζεις Ἐπιμενίδην;

e ΑΘ. Ναί, τοῦτον· πολὺ γὰρ ὑμῖν ὑπερεπήδησε τῷ μηχανήματι τοὺς σύμπαντας, ὦ φίλε, ὃ λόγῳ μὲν Ἡσίοδος ἐμαντεύετο πάλαι, τῷ δὲ ἔργῳ ἐκεῖνος ἀπετέλεσεν, ὡς ὑμεῖς φατε.

5 ΚΛ. Φαμὲν γὰρ οὖν.

ΑΘ. Οὐκοῦν οὕτω δὴ λέγωμεν ἔχειν τότε, ὅτ' ἐγένετο ἡ φθορά, τὰ περὶ τοὺς ἀνθρώπους πράγματα, μυρίαν μέν τινα φοβερὰν ἐρημίαν, γῆς δ' ἀφθόνου πλῆθος πάμπολυ, ζῴων δὲ τῶν ἄλλων ἐρρόντων, βουκόλι' ἄττα, καὶ εἴ τί που
10 αἰγῶν περιλειφθὲν ἐτύγχανεν γένος, σπάνια καὶ ταῦτα
678 νέμουσιν εἶναι ζῆν τὸ κατ' ἀρχάς;

ΚΛ. Τί μήν;

ΑΘ. Πόλεως δὲ καὶ πολιτείας πέρι καὶ νομοθεσίας, ὧν νῦν ὁ λόγος ἡμῖν παρέστηκεν, ἆρ' ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν οἰόμεθα
5 καὶ μνήμην εἶναι τὸ παράπαν;

ΚΛ. Οὐδαμῶς.

ΑΘ. Οὐκοῦν ἐξ ἐκείνων τῶν διακειμένων οὕτω τὰ νῦν γέγονεν ἡμῖν σύμπαντα, πόλεις τε καὶ πολιτεῖαι καὶ τέχναι καὶ νόμοι, καὶ πολλὴ μὲν πονηρία, πολλὴ δὲ καὶ ἀρετή;

10 ΚΛ. Πῶς λέγεις;

b ΑΘ. Ἆρ' οἰόμεθα, ὦ θαυμάσιε, τοὺς τότε, ἀπείρους ὄντας πολλῶν μὲν καλῶν τῶν κατὰ τὰ ἄστη, πολλῶν δὲ καὶ τῶν ἐναντίων, τελέους πρὸς ἀρετὴν ἢ πρὸς κακίαν γεγονέναι;

ΚΛ. Καλῶς εἶπες, καὶ μανθάνομεν ὃ λέγεις.

5 ΑΘ. Οὐκοῦν προϊόντος μὲν τοῦ χρόνου, πληθύοντος δ' ἡμῶν τοῦ γένους, εἰς πάντα τὰ νῦν καθεστηκότα προελήλυθεν πάντα;

ΚΛ. Ὀρθότατα.

ΑΘ. Οὐκ ἐξαίφνης γε, ὡς εἰκός, κατὰ σμικρὸν δὲ ἐν παμπόλλῳ τινὶ χρόνῳ.

ΚΛ. Καὶ μάλα πρέπει τοῦθ' οὕτως.

ΑΘ. Ἐκ γὰρ τῶν ὑψηλῶν εἰς τὰ πεδία καταβαίνειν, οἶμαι, πᾶσιν φόβος ἔναυλος ἐγεγόνει.

ΚΛ. Πῶς δ' οὔ;

ΑΘ. Ἆρ' οὐχ ἅσμενοι μὲν ἑαυτοὺς ἑώρων δι' ὀλιγότητα ἐν τοῖς περὶ ἐκεῖνον τὸν χρόνον, ‹τὰ› πορεῖα δέ, ὥστ' ἐπ' ἀλλήλους τότε πορεύεσθαι κατὰ γῆν ἢ κατὰ θάλατταν, σὺν ταῖς τέχναις ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν πάντα σχεδὸν ἀπωλώλει; συμμίσγειν οὖν ἀλλήλοις οὐκ ἦν οἶμαι σφόδρα δυνατόν· σίδηρος γὰρ καὶ χαλκὸς καὶ πάντα τὰ μεταλλεῖα συγκεχυμένα ἠφάνιστο, ὥστε ἀπορία πᾶσα ἦν τοῦ ἀνακαθαίρεσθαι τὰ τοιαῦτα, δρυοτομίας τε εἶχον σπάνιν. εἰ γάρ πού τι καὶ περιγεγονὸς ἦν ὄργανον ἐν ὄρεσι, ταῦτα μὲν ταχὺ κατατριβέντα ἠφάνιστο, ἄλλα δὲ οὐκ ἔμελλεν γενήσεσθαι, πρὶν πάλιν ἡ τῶν μεταλλέων ἀφίκοιτο εἰς ἀνθρώπους τέχνη.

ΚΛ. Πῶς γὰρ ἄν;

ΑΘ. Γενεαῖς δὴ πόσαις ὕστερον οἰόμεθα τοῦθ' οὕτως γεγονέναι;

ΚΛ. Δῆλον ὅτι παμπόλλαις τισίν.

ΑΘ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ τέχναι, ὅσαιπερ σιδήρου δέονται καὶ χαλκοῦ καὶ τῶν τοιούτων ἁπάντων, τὸν αὐτὸν χρόνον καὶ ἔτι πλείονα ἠφανισμέναι ἂν εἶεν ἐν τῷ τότε;

ΚΛ. Τί μήν;

ΑΘ. Καὶ τοίνυν στάσις ἅμα καὶ πόλεμος ἀπωλώλει κατὰ τὸν τότε χρόνον πολλαχῇ.

ΚΛ. Πῶς;

ΑΘ. Πρῶτον μὲν ἠγάπων καὶ ἐφιλοφρονοῦντο ἀλλήλους δι' ἐρημίαν, ἔπειτα οὐ περιμάχητος ἦν αὐτοῖς ἡ τροφή. νομῆς γὰρ οὐκ ἦν σπάνις, εἰ μή τισιν κατ' ἀρχὰς ἴσως, ᾗ δὴ τὸ πλεῖστον διέζων ἐν τῷ τότε χρόνῳ· γάλακτος γὰρ καὶ κρεῶν οὐδαμῶς ἐνδεεῖς ἦσαν, ἔτι δὲ θηρεύοντες οὐ φαύλην οὐδ' ὀλίγην τροφὴν παρείχοντο. καὶ μὴν ἀμπεχόνης γε καὶ στρωμνῆς καὶ οἰκήσεων καὶ σκευῶν ἐμπύρων τε καὶ ἀπύρων ηὐπόρουν· αἱ πλαστικαὶ γὰρ καὶ ὅσαι πλεκτικαὶ τῶν τεχνῶν οὐδὲ ἓν προσδέονται σιδήρου, ταῦτα δὲ πάντα τούτῳ τῷ τέχνα θεὸς ἔδωκε πορίζειν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις, ἵν' ὁπότε εἰς τὴν τοιαύτην ἀπορίαν ἔλθοιεν, ἔχοι βλάστην

καὶ ἐπίδοσιν τὸ τῶν ἀνθρώπων γένος· πένητες μὲν δὴ διὰ τὸ τοιοῦτον σφόδρα οὐκ ἦσαν, οὐδ' ὑπὸ πενίας ἀναγκαζόμενοι διάφοροι ἑαυτοῖς ἐγίγνοντο· πλούσιοι δ' οὐκ ἄν ποτε ἐγένοντο ἄχρυσοί τε καὶ ἀνάργυροι ὄντες, ὃ τότε ἐν ἐκείνοις παρῆν. ᾗ δ' ἄν ποτε συνοικίᾳ μήτε πλοῦτος συνοικῇ μήτε πενία, σχεδὸν ἐν ταύτῃ γενναιότατα ἤθη γίγνοιτ' ἄν· οὔτε γὰρ ὕβρις οὔτ' ἀδικία, ζῆλοί τε αὖ καὶ φθόνοι οὐκ ἐγγίγνονται. ἀγαθοὶ μὲν δὴ διὰ ταῦτά τε ἦσαν καὶ διὰ τὴν λεγομένην εὐήθειαν· ἃ γὰρ ἤκουον καλὰ καὶ αἰσχρά, εὐήθεις ὄντες ἡγοῦντο ἀληθέστατα λέγεσθαι καὶ ἐπείθοντο. ψεῦδος γὰρ ὑπονοεῖν οὐδεὶς ἠπίστατο διὰ σοφίαν, ὥσπερ τὰ νῦν, ἀλλὰ περὶ θεῶν τε καὶ ἀνθρώπων τὰ λεγόμενα ἀληθῆ νομίζοντες ἔζων κατὰ ταῦτα· διόπερ ἦσαν τοιοῦτοι παντάπασιν οἷους αὐτοὺς ἡμεῖς ἄρτι διεληλύθαμεν.

ΚΛ. Ἐμοὶ γοῦν δὴ καὶ τῷδε οὕτως ταῦτα συνδοκεῖ.

ΑΘ. Οὐκοῦν εἴπομεν ὅτι γενεαὶ διαβιοῦσαι πολλαὶ τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον τῶν πρὸ κατακλυσμοῦ γεγονότων καὶ τῶν νῦν ἀτεχνότεροι μὲν καὶ ἀμαθέστεροι πρός τε τὰς ἄλλας μέλλουσιν εἶναι τέχνας καὶ πρὸς τὰς πολεμικάς, ὅσαι τε πεζαὶ καὶ ὅσαι κατὰ θάλατταν γίγνονται τὰ νῦν, καὶ ὅσαι δὴ κατὰ πόλιν μόνον αὐτοῦ, δίκαι καὶ στάσεις λεγόμεναι, λόγοις ἔργοις τε μεμηχανημέναι πάσας μηχανὰς εἰς τὸ κακουργεῖν τε ἀλλήλους καὶ ἀδικεῖν, εὐηθέστεροι δὲ καὶ ἀνδρειότεροι καὶ ἅμα σωφρονέστεροι καὶ σύμπαντα δικαιότεροι; τὸ δὲ τούτων αἴτιον ἤδη διεληλύθαμεν.

ΚΛ. Ὀρθῶς λέγεις.

ΑΘ. Λελέχθω δὴ ταῦτα ἡμῖν καὶ τὰ τούτοις συνεπόμενα ἔτι πάντα εἰρήσθω τοῦδ' ἕνεκα, ἵνα νοήσωμεν τοῖς τότε νόμων τίς ποτ' ἦν χρεία καὶ τίς ἦν νομοθέτης αὐτοῖς.

ΚΛ. Καὶ καλῶς γε εἴρηκας.

ΑΘ. Ἆρ' οὖν ἐκεῖνοι μὲν οὔτ' ἐδέοντο νομοθετῶν οὔτε πω ἐφίλει κατὰ τούτους τοὺς χρόνους γίγνεσθαι τὸ τοιοῦτον; οὐδὲ γὰρ γράμματα ἔστι πω τοῖς ἐν τούτῳ τῷ μέρει τῆς περιόδου γεγονόσιν, ἀλλ' ἔθεσι καὶ τοῖς λεγομένοις πατρίοις νόμοις ἑπόμενοι ζῶσιν.

ΚΛ. Εἰκὸς γοῦν.

ΑΘ. Πολιτείας δέ γε ἤδη καὶ τρόπος ἐστίν τις οὗτος.

ΚΛ. Τίς;

ΑΘ. Δοκοῦσί μοι πάντες τὴν ἐν τούτῳ τῷ χρόνῳ πολι-

τείαν δυναστείαν καλεῖν, ἣ καὶ νῦν ἔτι πολλαχοῦ καὶ ἐν Ἕλλησι καὶ κατὰ βαρβάρους ἐστίν· λέγει δ' αὐτήν που καὶ Ὅμηρος γεγονέναι περὶ τὴν τῶν Κυκλώπων οἴκησιν, εἰπὼν—

τοῖσιν δ' οὔτ' ἀγοραὶ βουληφόροι οὔτε θέμιστες,
ἀλλ' οἵ γ' ὑψηλῶν ὀρέων ναίουσι κάρηνα
ἐν σπέσσι γλαφυροῖσι, θεμιστεύει δὲ ἕκαστος
παίδων ἠδ' ἀλόχων, οὐδ' ἀλλήλων ἀλέγουσιν. c

ΚΛ. Ἔοικέν γε ὁ ποιητὴς ὑμῖν οὗτος γεγονέναι χαρίεις. καὶ γὰρ δὴ καὶ ἄλλα αὐτοῦ διεληλύθαμεν μάλ' ἀστεῖα, οὐ μὴν πολλά γε· οὐ γὰρ σφόδρα χρώμεθα οἱ Κρῆτες τοῖς ξενικοῖς ποιήμασιν.

ΜΕ. Ἡμεῖς δ' αὖ χρώμεθα μέν, καὶ ἔοικέν γε κρατεῖν τῶν τοιούτων ποιητῶν, οὐ μέντοι Λακωνικόν γε ἀλλά τινα μᾶλλον Ἰωνικὸν βίον διεξέρχεται ἑκάστοτε. νῦν μὴν εὖ d τῷ σῷ λόγῳ ἔοικε μαρτυρεῖν, τὸ ἀρχαῖον αὐτῶν ἐπὶ τὴν ἀγριότητα διὰ μυθολογίας ἐπανενεγκών.

ΑΘ. Ναί· συμμαρτυρεῖ γάρ, καὶ λάβωμέν γε αὐτὸν μηνυτὴν ὅτι τοιαῦται πολιτεῖαι γίγνονταί ποτε.

ΚΛ. Καλῶς.

ΑΘ. Μῶν οὖν οὐκ ἐκ τούτων τῶν κατὰ μίαν οἴκησιν καὶ κατὰ γένος διεσπαρμένων ὑπὸ ἀπορίας τῆς ἐν ταῖς φθοραῖς, ἐν αἷς τὸ πρεσβύτατον ἄρχει διὰ τὸ τὴν ἀρχὴν αὐτοῖς ἐκ e πατρὸς καὶ μητρὸς γεγονέναι, οἷς ἑπόμενοι καθάπερ ὄρνιθες ἀγέλην μίαν ποιήσουσι, πατρονομούμενοι καὶ βασιλείαν πασῶν δικαιοτάτην βασιλευόμενοι;

ΚΛ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

ΑΘ. Μετὰ δὲ ταῦτά γε εἰς τὸ κοινὸν μείζους ποιοῦντες πόλεις πλείους συνέρχονται, καὶ ἐπὶ γεωργίας τὰς ἐν ταῖς ὑπωρείαις τρέπονται πρώτας, περιβόλους τε αἱμασιώδεις 681 τινὰς τειχῶν ἐρύματα τῶν θηρίων ἕνεκα ποιοῦνται, μίαν οἰκίαν αὖ κοινὴν καὶ μεγάλην ἀποτελοῦντες.

ΚΛ. Τὸ γοῦν εἰκὸς ταῦθ' οὕτως γίγνεσθαι.

ΑΘ. Τί δέ; τόδε ἆρα οὐκ εἰκός;

ΚΛ. Τὸ ποῖον;

ΑΘ. Τῶν οἰκήσεων τούτων μειζόνων αὐξανομένων ἐκ τῶν ἐλαττόνων καὶ πρώτων, ἑκάστην τῶν σμικρῶν παρεῖναι κατὰ γένος ἔχουσαν τόν τε πρεσβύτατον ἄρχοντα καὶ αὐτῆς

b ἔθη ἄττα ἴδια διὰ τὸ χωρὶς ἀλλήλων οἰκεῖν, ἕτερα ἀφ' ἑτέρων ὄντων τῶν γεννητόρων τε καὶ θρεψάντων, ἃ εἰθίσθησαν περὶ θεούς τε καὶ ἑαυτούς, κοσμιωτέρων μὲν κοσμιώτερα καὶ ἀνδρικῶν ἀνδρικώτερα, καὶ κατὰ τρόπον οὕτως
5 ἑκάστους τὰς αὑτῶν **ἂν αἱρέσεις** εἰς τοὺς παῖδας ἀποτυπουμένους καὶ παίδων παῖδας, ὃ λέγομεν, ἥκειν ἔχοντας ἰδίους νόμους εἰς τὴν μείζονα συνοικίαν.

ΚΛ. Πῶς γὰρ οὔ;

c ΑΘ. Καὶ μὴν τούς γε αὐτῶν νόμους ἀρέσκειν ἑκάστοις ἀναγκαῖόν που, τοὺς δὲ τῶν ἄλλων ὑστέρους.

ΚΛ. Οὕτως.

ΑΘ. Ἀρχῇ δὴ νομοθεσίας οἷον ἐμβάντες ἐλάθομεν, ὡς
5 ἔοικεν.

ΚΛ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

ΑΘ. Τὸ γοῦν μετὰ ταῦτα ἀναγκαῖον αἱρεῖσθαι τοὺς συνελθόντας τούτους κοινούς τινας ἑαυτῶν, οἳ δὴ τὰ πάντων ἰδόντες νόμιμα, τά σφισιν ἀρέσκοντα αὐτῶν μάλιστα εἰς
10 τὸ κοινὸν τοῖς ἡγεμόσι καὶ ἀγαγοῦσι τοὺς δήμους οἷον
d βασιλεῦσι φανερὰ δείξαντες ἑλέσθαι τε δόντες, αὐτοὶ μὲν νομοθέται κληθήσονται, τοὺς δὲ ἄρχοντας καταστήσαντες, ἀριστοκρατίαν τινὰ ἐκ τῶν δυναστειῶν ποιήσαντες ἢ καί τινα βασιλείαν, ἐν ταύτῃ τῇ μεταβολῇ τῆς πολιτείας οἰκή-
5 σουσιν.

ΚΛ. Ἐφεξῆς γοῦν ἂν οὕτω τε καὶ ταύτῃ γίγνοιτο.

ΑΘ. Τρίτον τοίνυν εἴπωμεν ἔτι πολιτείας σχῆμα γιγνόμενον, ἐν ᾧ δὴ πάντα εἶδη καὶ παθήματα πολιτειῶν καὶ ἅμα πόλεων συμπίπτει γίγνεσθαι.

10 ΚΛ. Τὸ ποῖον δὴ τοῦτο;

e ΑΘ. Ὃ μετὰ τὸ δεύτερον καὶ Ὅμηρος ἐπεσημήνατο, λέγων τὸ τρίτον οὕτω γεγονέναι. "κτίσσε δὲ Δαρδανίην" γάρ πού φησιν, "ἐπεὶ οὔπω Ἴλιος ἱρὴ

ἐν πεδίῳ πεπόλιστο, πόλις μερόπων ἀνθρώπων,
5 ἀλλ' ἔθ' ὑπωρείας ᾤκουν πολυπιδάκου Ἴδης."

682 λέγει γὰρ δὴ ταῦτα τὰ ἔπη καὶ ἐκεῖνα, ἃ περὶ τῶν Κυκλώπων εἴρηκεν, κατὰ θεόν πως εἰρημένα καὶ κατὰ φύσιν· θεῖον γὰρ οὖν δὴ καὶ τὸ ποιητικὸν ἐνθεαστικὸν ὂν γένος ὑμνῳδοῦν, πολλῶν τῶν κατ' ἀλήθειαν γιγνομένων σύν τισιν
5 Χάρισιν καὶ Μούσαις ἐφάπτεται ἑκάστοτε.

ΚΛ. Καὶ μάλα.

ΑΘ. Εἰς δὴ τὸ πρόσθεν προέλθωμεν ἔτι τοῦ νῦν ἐπελθόντος ἡμῖν μύθου· τάχα γὰρ ἂν σημήνειέ τι τῆς ἡμετέρας περὶ βουλήσεως. οὐκοῦν χρή;

ΚΛ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν. b

ΑΘ. Κατῳκίσθη δή, φαμέν, ἐκ τῶν ὑψηλῶν εἰς μέγα τε καὶ καλὸν πεδίον Ἴλιον, ἐπὶ λόφον τινὰ οὐχ ὑψηλὸν καὶ ἔχοντα ποταμοὺς πολλοὺς ἄνωθεν ἐκ τῆς Ἴδης ὡρμημένους. 5

ΚΛ. Φασὶ γοῦν.

ΑΘ. Ἆρ' οὖν οὐκ ἐν πολλοῖς τισι χρόνοις τοῖς μετὰ τὸν κατακλυσμὸν τοῦτο οἰόμεθα γεγονέναι;

ΚΛ. Πῶς δ' οὐκ ἐν πολλοῖς;

ΑΘ. Δεινὴ γοῦν ἔοικεν αὐτοῖς λήθη τότε παρεῖναι τῆς 10
νῦν λεγομένης φθορᾶς, ὅθ' οὕτως ὑπὸ ποταμοὺς πολλοὺς c
καὶ ἐκ τῶν ὑψηλῶν ῥέοντας πόλιν ὑπέθεσαν, πιστεύσαντες οὐ σφόδρα ὑψηλοῖς τισιν λόφοις.

ΚΛ. Δῆλον οὖν ὡς παντάπασί τι<να> μακρὸν ἀπεῖχον χρόνον τοῦ τοιούτου πάθους. 5

ΑΘ. Καὶ ἄλλαι γε οἶμαι πόλεις τότε κατῴκουν ἤδη πολλαί, πληθυόντων τῶν ἀνθρώπων.

ΚΛ. Τί μήν;

ΑΘ. Αἵ γέ που καὶ ἐπεστρατεύσαντο αὐτῇ, καὶ κατὰ θάλατταν δὲ ἴσως, ἀφόβως ἤδη πάντων χρωμένων τῇ θαλάττῃ. 10

ΚΛ. Φαίνεται. d

ΑΘ. Δέκα δ' ἔτη που μείναντες Ἀχαιοὶ τὴν Τροίαν ἀνάστατον ἐποίησαν.

ΚΛ. Καὶ μάλα.

ΑΘ. Οὐκοῦν ἐν τούτῳ τῷ χρόνῳ, ὄντι δεκέτει, ὃν τὸ 5
Ἴλιον ἐπολιορκεῖτο, τὰ τῶν πολιορκούντων ἑκάστων οἴκοι κακὰ πολλὰ συνέβαινεν γιγνόμενα περὶ τὰς στάσεις τῶν νέων, οἳ καὶ ἀφικομένους τοὺς στρατιώτας εἰς τὰς αὑτῶν πόλεις τε καὶ οἰκίας οὐ καλῶς οὐδ' ἐν δίκῃ ὑπεδέξαντο, e
ἀλλ' ὥστε θανάτους τε καὶ σφαγὰς καὶ φυγὰς γενέσθαι παμπόλλας· οἳ πάλιν ἐκπεσόντες κατῆλθον μεταβαλόντες ὄνομα, Δωριῆς ἀντ' Ἀχαιῶν κληθέντες διὰ τὸ τὸν συλλέξαντα εἶναι τὰς τότε φυγὰς Δωριᾶ. καὶ δὴ ταῦτά γε ἤδη πάνθ' ὑμεῖς, ὦ Λακεδαιμόνιοι, τἀντεῦθεν μυθολογεῖτέ τε καὶ 5
διαπεραίνετε.

ΜΕ. Τί μήν;

ΑΘ. Ὅθεν δὴ κατ' ἀρχὰς ἐξετραπόμεθα περὶ νόμων διαλεγόμενοι, περιπεσόντες μουσικῇ τε καὶ ταῖς μέθαις, νῦν ἐπὶ τὰ αὐτὰ πάλιν ἀφίγμεθα ὥσπερ κατὰ θεόν, καὶ ὁ λόγος ἡμῖν οἷον λαβὴν ἀποδίδωσιν· ἥκει γὰρ ἐπὶ τὴν εἰς Λακεδαίμονα κατοίκισιν αὐτήν, ἣν ὑμεῖς ὀρθῶς ἔφατε κατοικεῖσθαι —καὶ Κρήτην ὡς ἀδελφοῖς νόμοις. νῦν οὖν δὴ τοσόνδε πλεονεκτοῦμεν τῇ πλάνῃ τοῦ λόγου, διὰ πολιτειῶν τινων καὶ κατοικισμῶν διεξελθόντες· ἐθεασάμεθα πρώτην τε καὶ δευτέραν καὶ τρίτην πόλιν, ἀλλήλων, ὡς οἰόμεθα, ταῖς κατοικίσεσιν ἐχομένας ἐν χρόνου τινὸς μήκεσιν ἁπλέτοις, νῦν δὲ δὴ τετάρτη τις ἡμῖν αὕτη πόλις, εἰ δὲ βούλεσθε, ἔθνος ἥκει κατοικιζόμενόν τέ ποτε καὶ νῦν κατῳκισμένον. ἐξ ὧν ἁπάντων εἴ τι καὶ συνεῖναι δυνάμεθα τί τε καλῶς ἢ μὴ κατῳκίσθη, καὶ ποῖοι νόμοι σῴζουσιν αὐτῶν τὰ σῳζόμενα καὶ ποῖοι φθείρουσι τὰ φθειρόμενα, καὶ ἀντὶ ποίων ποῖα μετατεθέντα εὐδαίμονα πόλιν ἀπεργάζοιτ' ἄν, ὦ Μέγιλλέ τε καὶ Κλεινία, ταὐτὰ δὴ πάλιν οἷον ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἡμῖν λεκτέον, εἰ μή τι τοῖς εἰρημένοις ἐγκαλοῦμεν λόγοις.

ΜΕ. Εἰ γοῦν, ὦ ξένε, τις ἡμῖν ὑπόσχοιτο θεὸς ὡς, ἐὰν ἐπιχειρήσωμεν τὸ δεύτερον τῇ τῆς νομοθεσίας σκέψει, τῶν νῦν εἰρημένων λόγων οὐ χείρους οὐδ' ἐλάττους ἀκουσόμεθα, μακρὰν ἂν ἔλθοιμι ἔγωγε, καί μοι βραχεῖ' ἂν δόξειεν ἡ νῦν παροῦσα ἡμέρα γίγνεσθαι. καίτοι σχεδόν γ' ἐστὶν ἡ ἐκ θερινῶν εἰς τὰ χειμερινὰ τοῦ θεοῦ τρεπομένου.

ΑΘ. Χρὴ δὴ ταῦτα, ὡς ἔοικεν, σκοπεῖν.

ΜΕ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

ΑΘ. Γενώμεθα δὴ ταῖς διανοίαις ἐν τῷ τότε χρόνῳ, ὅτε Λακεδαίμων μὲν καὶ Ἄργος καὶ Μεσσήνη καὶ τὰ μετὰ τούτων ὑποχείρια τοῖς προγόνοις ὑμῶν, ὦ Μέγιλλε, ἱκανῶς ἐγεγόνει· τὸ δὲ δὴ μετὰ τοῦτο ἔδοξεν αὐτοῖς, ὥς γε λέγεται τὸ τοῦ μύθου, τριχῇ τὸ στράτευμα διανείμαντας, τρεῖς πόλεις κατοικίζειν, Ἄργος, Μεσσήνην, Λακεδαίμονα.

ΜΕ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

ΑΘ. Καὶ βασιλεὺς μὲν Ἄργους Τήμενος ἐγίγνετο, Μεσσήνης δὲ Κρεσφόντης, Λακεδαίμονος δὲ Προκλῆς καὶ Εὐρυσθένης.

ΜΕ. Πῶς γὰρ οὔ;

ΑΘ. Καὶ πάντες δὴ τούτοις ὤμοσαν οἱ τότε βοηθήσειν,

ἐάν τις τὴν βασιλείαν αὐτῶν διαφθείρῃ. e

ΜΕ. Τί μήν;

ΑΘ. Βασιλεία δὲ καταλύεται, ὦ πρὸς Διός, ἢ καί τις ἀρχὴ πώποτε κατελύθη, μῶν ὑπό τινων ἄλλων ἢ σφῶν αὐτῶν; ἢ νυνδὴ μέν, ὀλίγον ἔμπροσθεν τούτοις περιτυχόντες τοῖς λόγοις, οὕτω ταῦτ' ἐτίθεμεν, νῦν δ' ἐπιλελήσμεθα;

ΜΕ. Καὶ πῶς;

ΑΘ. Οὐκοῦν νῦν δὴ μᾶλλον βεβαιωσόμεθα τὸ τοιοῦτον· περιτυχόντες γὰρ ἔργοις γενομένοις, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἐπὶ τὸν αὐτὸν λόγον ἐληλύθαμεν, ὥστε οὐ περὶ κενόν τι ζητήσομεν [τὸν αὐτὸν λόγον], ἀλλὰ περὶ γεγονός τε καὶ ἔχον ἀλήθειαν. 684 γέγονεν δὴ τάδε· βασιλεῖαι τρεῖς βασιλευομέναις πόλεσιν τριτταῖς ὤμοσαν ἀλλήλαις ἑκάτεραι, κατὰ νόμους οὓς ἔθεντο τοῦ τε ἄρχειν καὶ ἄρχεσθαι κοινούς, οἱ μὲν μὴ βιαιοτέραν τὴν ἀρχὴν ποιήσεσθαι προϊόντος τοῦ χρόνου καὶ γένους, οἱ δέ, ταῦτα ἐμπεδούντων τῶν ἀρχόντων, μήτε αὐτοὶ τὰς βασιλείας ποτὲ καταλύσειν μήτ' ἐπιτρέψειν ἐπιχειροῦσιν ἑτέροις, βοηθήσειν δὲ βασιλῆς τε βασιλεῦσιν ἀδικουμένοις b καὶ δήμοις, καὶ δῆμοι δήμοις καὶ βασιλεῦσιν ἀδικουμένοις. ἆρ' οὐχ οὕτως;

ΜΕ. Οὕτω μὲν οὖν.

ΑΘ. Οὐκοῦν τό γε μέγιστον ταῖς καταστάσεσιν τῶν πολιτειῶν ὑπῆρχεν ταῖς ἐν ταῖς τρισὶ πόλεσι νομοθετουμέναις, εἴτε οἱ βασιλῆς ἐνομοθέτουν εἴτ' ἄλλοι τινές;

ΜΕ. Ποῖον;

ΑΘ. Τὸ βοηθούς γε εἶναι τὰς δύο ἐπὶ τὴν μίαν ἀεὶ πόλιν, τὴν τοῖς τεθεῖσιν νόμοις ἀπειθοῦσαν.

ΜΕ. Δῆλον.

ΑΘ. Καὶ μὴν τοῦτό γε οἱ πολλοὶ προστάττουσιν τοῖς c νομοθέταις, ὅπως τοιούτους θήσουσιν τοὺς νόμους οὓς ἑκόντες οἱ δῆμοι καὶ τὰ πλήθη δέξονται, καθάπερ ἂν εἴ τις γυμνασταῖς ἢ ἰατροῖς προστάττοι μεθ' ἡδονῆς θεραπεύειν τε καὶ ἰᾶσθαι τὰ θεραπευόμενα σώματα.

ΜΕ. Παντάπασι μὲν οὖν.

ΑΘ. Τὸ δέ γ' ἐστὶν ἀγαπητὸν πολλάκις εἰ καί τις μετὰ λύπης μὴ μεγάλης δύναιτο εὐεκτικά τε καὶ ὑγιῆ σώματα ἀπεργάζεσθαι.

ΜΕ. Τί μήν;

ΑΘ. Καὶ τόδε γε ἔτι τοῖς τότε ὑπῆρχεν οὐ σμικρὸν εἰς d

ῥᾳστώνην τῆς θέσεως τῶν νόμων.

ΜΕ. Τὸ ποῖον;

ΑΘ. Οὐκ ἦν τοῖς νομοθέταις ἡ μεγίστη τῶν μέμψεων ἰσότητα αὐτοῖς τινα κατασκευάζουσιν τῆς οὐσίας, ἥπερ ἐν ἄλλῃ νομοθετουμέναις πόλεσι πολλαῖς γίγνεται, ἐάν τις ζητῇ γῆς τε κτῆσιν κινεῖν καὶ χρεῶν διάλυσιν, ὁρῶν ὡς οὐκ ἂν δύναιτο ἄνευ τούτων γενέσθαι ποτὲ τὸ ἴσον ἱκανῶς· ὡς ἐπιχειροῦντι δὴ νομοθέτῃ κινεῖν τῶν τοιούτων τι πᾶς ἀπαντᾷ λέγων μὴ κινεῖν τὰ ἀκίνητα, καὶ ἐπαρᾶται γῆς τε ἀναδασμοὺς εἰσηγουμένῳ καὶ χρεῶν ἀποκοπάς, ὥστ' εἰς ἀπορίαν καθίστασθαι πάντ' ἄνδρα. τοῖς δὲ δὴ Δωριεῦσι καὶ τοῦθ' οὕτως ὑπῆρχεν καλῶς καὶ ἀνεμεσήτως, γῆν τε ἀναμφισβητήτως διανέμεσθαι, καὶ χρέα μεγάλα καὶ παλαιὰ οὐκ ἦν.

ΜΕ. Ἀληθῆ.

ΑΘ. Πῇ δή ποτε οὖν, ὦ ἄριστοι, κακῶς οὕτως αὐτοῖς ἐχώρησεν ἡ κατοίκισίς τε καὶ νομοθεσία;

685 ΜΕ. Πῶς δὴ καὶ τί μεμφόμενος αὐτῶν λέγεις;

ΑΘ. Ὅτι τριῶν γενομένων τῶν οἰκήσεων τὰ δύο αὐτῶν μέρη ταχὺ τήν τε πολιτείαν καὶ τοὺς νόμους διέφθειρεν, τὸ δὲ ἓν μόνον ἔμεινεν, τὸ τῆς ὑμετέρας πόλεως.

ΜΕ. Οὐ πάνυ ῥᾴδιον ἐρωτᾷς.

ΑΘ. Ἀλλὰ μὴν δεῖ γε ἡμᾶς τοῦτο ἐν τῷ νῦν σκοποῦντας καὶ ἐξετάζοντας, περὶ νόμων παίζοντας παιδιὰν πρεσβυτικὴν σώφρονα, διελθεῖν τὴν ὁδὸν ἁλύπως, ὡς ἔφαμεν ἡνίκα ἠρχόμεθα πορεύεσθαι.

ΜΕ. Τί μήν; καὶ ποιητέον γε ὡς λέγεις.

ΑΘ. Τίν' οὖν ἂν σκέψιν καλλίω ποιησαίμεθα περὶ νόμων ἢ τούτων οἳ ταύτας διακεκοσμήκασιν; ἢ πόλεων περὶ τίνων εὐδοκιμωτέρων τε καὶ μειζόνων κατοικίσεων σκοποίμεθ' ἄν;

ΜΕ. Οὐ ῥᾴδιον ἀντὶ τούτων ἑτέρας λέγειν.

ΑΘ. Οὐκοῦν ὅτι μὲν διενοοῦντό γε οἱ τότε τὴν κατασκευὴν ταύτην οὐ Πελοποννήσῳ μόνον ἔσεσθαι βοηθὸν ἱκανήν, σχεδὸν δῆλον, ἀλλὰ καὶ τοῖς Ἕλλησιν πᾶσιν, εἴ τις τῶν βαρβάρων αὐτοὺς ἀδικοῖ, καθάπερ οἱ περὶ τὸ Ἴλιον οἰκοῦντες τότε, πιστεύοντες τῇ τῶν Ἀσσυρίων δυνάμει τῇ περὶ Νῖνον γενομένῃ, θρασυνόμενοι τὸν πόλεμον ἤγειραν τὸν ἐπὶ Τροίαν. ἦν γὰρ ἔτι τὸ τῆς ἀρχῆς ἐκείνης σχῆμα τὸ σῳζόμενον οὐ σμικρόν· καθάπερ νῦν τὸν μέγαν βασιλέα φοβούμεθα ἡμεῖς, καὶ τότε ἐκείνην τὴν συσταθεῖσαν σύν-

ταξιν ἐδέδισαν οἱ τότε. μέγα γὰρ ἔγκλημα πρὸς αὐτοὺς
ἡ τῆς Τροίας ἅλωσις τὸ δεύτερον ἐγεγόνει· τῆς ἀρχῆς γὰρ d
τῆς ἐκείνων ἦν μόριον. πρὸς δὴ ταῦτ' ἦν πάντα ἡ τοῦ
στρατοπέδου τοῦ τότε διανεμηθεῖσα εἰς τρεῖς πόλεις κατα-
σκευὴ μία ὑπὸ βασιλέων ἀδελφῶν, παίδων Ἡρακλέους,
καλῶς, ὡς ἐδόκει, ἀνηυρημένη καὶ κατακεκοσμημένη καὶ 5
διαφερόντως τῆς ἐπὶ τὴν Τροίαν ἀφικομένης. πρῶτον μὲν
γὰρ τοὺς Ἡρακλείδας τῶν Πελοπιδῶν ἀμείνους ἡγοῦντο
ἀρχόντων ἄρχοντας ἔχειν, ἔπειτ' αὖ τὸ στρατόπεδον τοῦτο
τοῦ ἐπὶ Τροίαν ἀφικομένου διαφέρειν πρὸς ἀρετήν· νενικη- e
κέναι γὰρ τούτους, ἡττῆσθαι δ' ὑπὸ τούτων ἐκείνους, Ἀχαιοὺς
ὄντας ὑπὸ Δωριῶν. ἆρ' οὐχ οὕτως οἰόμεθα καί τινι διανοίᾳ
ταύτῃ κατασκευάζεσθαι τοὺς τότε;

ΜΕ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν. 5

ΑΘ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ τὸ βεβαίως οἴεσθαι ταῦθ' ἕξειν εἰκὸς
αὐτοὺς καὶ χρόνον τιν' ἂν πολὺν μένειν, ἅτε κεκοινωνηκότας 686
μὲν πολλῶν πόνων καὶ κινδύνων ἀλλήλοις, ὑπὸ γένους δὲ
ἑνὸς τῶν βασιλέων ἀδελφῶν ὄντων διακεκοσμῆσθαι, πρὸς
τούτοις δ' ἔτι καὶ πολλοῖς μάντεσι κεχρημένους εἶναι τοῖς
τε ἄλλοις καὶ τῷ Δελφικῷ Ἀπόλλωνι; 5

ΜΕ. Πῶς δ' οὐκ εἰκός;

ΑΘ. Ταῦτα δὴ τὰ μεγάλα οὕτως προσδοκώμενα διέπτατο,
ὡς ἔοικε, τότε ταχύ, πλὴν ὅπερ εἴπομεν νυνδὴ σμικροῦ
μέρους τοῦ περὶ τὸν ὑμέτερον τόπον, καὶ τοῦτο δὴ πρὸς τὰ b
δύο μέρη πολεμοῦν οὐ πώποτε πέπαυται μέχρι τὰ νῦν· ἐπεὶ
γενομένη γε ἡ τότε διάνοια καὶ συμφωνήσασα εἰς ἕν, ἀν-
υπόστατον ἄν τινα δύναμιν ἔσχε κατὰ πόλεμον.

ΜΕ. Πῶς γὰρ οὔ; 5

ΑΘ. Πῶς οὖν καὶ πῇ διώλετο; ἆρ' οὐκ ἄξιον ἐπισκοπεῖν
τηλικοῦτον καὶ τοιοῦτον σύστημα ἥτις ποτὲ τύχη διέφθειρε;

ΜΕ. Σχολῇ γὰρ οὖν δή τις ἂν ἀλλό‹σε› σκοπῶν, ἢ νόμους
ἢ πολιτείας ἄλλας θεάσαιτο σῳζούσας καλὰ καὶ μεγάλα c
πράγματα ἢ καὶ τοὐναντίον διαφθειρούσας τὸ παράπαν, εἰ
ἀμελήσειε τούτων.

ΑΘ. Τοῦτο μὲν ἄρα, ὡς ἔοικεν, εὐτυχῶς πως ἐμβεβή-
καμέν γε εἴς τινα σκέψιν ἱκανήν. 5

ΜΕ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

ΑΘ. Ἆρ' οὖν, ὦ θαυμάσιε, λελήθαμεν ἄνθρωποι πάντες,
καὶ τὰ νῦν δὴ ἡμεῖς, οἰόμενοι μὲν ἑκάστοτέ τι καλὸν ὁρᾶν

πρᾶγμα γενόμενον καὶ θαυμαστὰ ἂν ἐργασάμενον, εἴ τις ἄρα
d ἠπιστήθη καλῶς αὐτῷ χρῆσθαι κατά τινα τρόπον, τὸ δὲ νῦν
γε ἡμεῖς τάχ' ἂν ἴσως περὶ τοῦτο αὐτὸ οὔτ' ὀρθῶς διανοοί-
μεθα οὔτε κατὰ φύσιν, καὶ δὴ καὶ περὶ τὰ ἄλλα πάντες
πάντα, περὶ ὧν ἂν οὕτω διανοηθῶσιν;

5 ΜΕ. Λέγεις δὲ δὴ τί, καὶ περὶ τίνος σοι φῶμεν μάλιστ' εἰρῆσθαι τοῦτον τὸν λόγον;

ΑΘ. Ὠγαθέ, καὶ αὐτὸς ἐμαυτοῦ νυνδὴ κατεγέλασα. ἀποβλέψας γὰρ πρὸς τοῦτον τὸν στόλον οὗ πέρι διαλεγό-
μεθα, ἔδοξέ μοι πάγκαλός τε εἶναι καὶ θαυμαστὸν <ἂν>
10 κτῆμα παραπεσεῖν τοῖς Ἕλλησιν, ὅπερ εἶπον, εἴ τις ἄρα
e αὐτῷ τότε καλῶς ἐχρήσατο.

ΜΕ. Οὐκοῦν εὖ καὶ ἐχόντως νοῦν σύ τε πάντα εἶπες καὶ ἐπῃνέσαμεν ἡμεῖς;

ΑΘ. Ἴσως· ἐννοῶ γε μὴν ὡς πᾶς, ὃς ἂν ἴδῃ τι μέγα
5 καὶ δύναμιν ἔχον πολλὴν καὶ ῥώμην, εὐθὺς ἔπαθε τοῦτο, ὡς εἴπερ ἐπίσταιτο ὁ κεκτημένος αὐτῷ χρῆσθαι τοιούτῳ τε ὄντι καὶ τηλικούτῳ, θαυμάστ' ἂν καὶ πολλὰ κατεργασάμενος εὐδαιμονοῖ.

687 ΜΕ. Οὐκοῦν ὀρθὸν καὶ τοῦτο; ἢ πῶς λέγεις;

ΑΘ. Σκόπει δὴ ποῖ βλέπων ὁ τὸν ἔπαινον τοῦτον περὶ ἑκάστου τιθέμενος ὀρθῶς λέγει· πρῶτον δὲ περὶ αὐτοῦ τοῦ
νῦν λεγομένου, πῶς, εἰ κατὰ τρόπον ἠπιστήθησαν τάξαι τὸ
5 στρατόπεδον οἱ τότε διακοσμοῦντες, τοῦ καιροῦ πως ἂν ἔτυχον; ἆρ' οὐκ εἰ συνέστησάν τε ἀσφαλῶς αὐτὸ διέσῳζόν τε εἰς τὸν ἀεὶ χρόνον, ὥστε αὐτούς τε ἐλευθέρους εἶναι καὶ ἄλλων ἄρχοντας ὧν βουληθεῖεν, καὶ ὅλως ἐν ἀνθρώποις πᾶσι
b καὶ Ἕλλησι καὶ βαρβάροις πράττειν ὅτι ἐπιθυμοῖεν αὐτοί τε καὶ οἱ ἔκγονοι—μῶν οὐ τούτων χάριν **ἐπαινοῖεν** ἄν;

ΜΕ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

ΑΘ. Ἆρ' οὖν καὶ ὃς ἂν ἰδὼν πλοῦτον μέγαν ἢ τιμὰς
5 διαφερούσας γένους, ἢ καὶ ὁτιοῦν τῶν τοιούτων, εἴπῃ ταὐτὰ ταῦτα, πρὸς τοῦτο βλέπων εἶπεν, ὡς διὰ τοῦτο αὐτῷ γενησό-
μενα ὧν ἂν ἐπιθυμῇ πάντα ἢ τὰ πλεῖστα καὶ ὅσα ἀξιώτατα λόγου;

ΜΕ. Ἔοικε γοῦν.

c ΑΘ. Φέρε δή, πάντων ἀνθρώπων ἐστὶ κοινὸν ἐπιθύμημα ἕν τι τὸ νῦν ὑπὸ τοῦ λόγου δηλούμενον [ὡς αὐτός φησιν ὁ λόγος];

ΜΕ. Τὸ ποῖον;

ΑΘ. Τὸ κατὰ τὴν τῆς αὐτοῦ ψυχῆς ἐπίταξιν τὰ γιγνόμενα γίγνεσθαι, μάλιστα μὲν ἅπαντα, εἰ δὲ μή, τά γε ἀνθρώπινα.

ΜΕ. Τί μήν;

ΑΘ. Οὐκοῦν ἐπείπερ βουλόμεθα πάντες τὸ τοιοῦτον ἀεί, παῖδές τε ὄντες καὶ ἄνδρες πρεσβῦται, τοῦτ' αὐτὸ καὶ εὐχοίμεθ' ἂν ἀναγκαίως διὰ τέλους;

ΜΕ. Πῶς δ' οὔ;

ΑΘ. Καὶ μὴν τοῖς γε φίλοις που συνευχοίμεθ' ἂν ταῦτα d ἅπερ ἐκεῖνοι ἑαυτοῖσιν.

ΜΕ. Τί μήν;

ΑΘ. Φίλος μὲν υἱὸς πατρί, παῖς ὢν ἀνδρί.

ΜΕ. Πῶς δ' οὔ;

ΑΘ. Καὶ μὴν ὢν γ' ὁ παῖς εὔχεται ἑαυτῷ γίγνεσθαι, πολλὰ ὁ πατὴρ ἀπεύξαιτ' ἂν τοῖς θεοῖς μηδαμῶς κατὰ τὰς τοῦ υἱέος εὐχὰς γίγνεσθαι.

ΜΕ. Ὅταν ἀνόητος ὢν καὶ ἔτι νέος εὔχηται, λέγεις;

ΑΘ. Καὶ ὅταν γε ὁ πατὴρ ὢν γέρων ἢ καὶ σφόδρα νεανίας, μηδὲν τῶν καλῶν καὶ τῶν δικαίων γιγνώσκων, εὔχηται e μάλα προθύμως ἐν παθήμασιν ἀδελφοῖς ὢν τοῖς γενομένοις Θησεῖ πρὸς τὸν δυστυχῶς τελευτήσαντα Ἱππόλυτον, ὁ δὲ παῖς γιγνώσκῃ, τότε, δοκεῖς, παῖς πατρὶ συνεύξεται;

ΜΕ. Μανθάνω ὃ λέγεις. λέγειν γάρ μοι δοκεῖς ὡς οὐ τοῦτο εὐκτέον οὐδὲ ἐπεικτέον, ἕπεσθαι πάντα τῇ ἑαυτοῦ βουλήσει, τὴν βούλησιν δὲ μηδὲν μᾶλλον τῇ ἑαυτοῦ φρονήσει· τοῦτο δὲ καὶ πόλιν καὶ ἕνα ἡμῶν ἕκαστον καὶ εὔχεσθαι δεῖν καὶ σπεύδειν, ὅπως νοῦν ἕξει.

ΑΘ. Ναί, καὶ δὴ καὶ πολιτικόν γε ἄνδρα νομοθέτην ὡς 688 ἀεὶ δεῖ πρὸς τοῦτο βλέποντα τιθέναι τὰς τάξεις τῶν νόμων αὐτός τε ἐμνήσθην, καὶ ὑμᾶς ἐπαναμιμνήσκω—κατ' ἀρχὰς εἰ μεμνήμεθα τὰ λεχθέντα—ὅτι τὸ μὲν σφῶν ἦν παρακέλευμα ὡς χρεὼν εἴη τὸν ἀγαθὸν νομοθέτην πάντα πολέμου χάριν 5 τὰ νόμιμα τιθέναι, τὸ δὲ ἐμὸν ἔλεγον ὅτι τοῦτο μὲν πρὸς μίαν ἀρετὴν οὐσῶν τεττάρων κελεύοι τίθεσθαι τοὺς νόμους, δέοι δὲ δὴ πρὸς πᾶσαν μὲν βλέπειν, μάλιστα δὲ καὶ πρὸς b πρώτην τὴν τῆς συμπάσης ἡγεμόνα ἀρετῆς, φρόνησις δ' εἴη τοῦτο καὶ νοῦς καὶ δόξα μετ' ἔρωτός τε καὶ ἐπιθυμίας τούτοις ἑπομένης. ἥκει δὴ πάλιν ὁ λόγος εἰς ταὐτόν, καὶ ὁ λέγων

ἐγὼ νῦν λέγω πάλιν ἅπερ τότε, εἰ μὲν βούλεσθε, ὡς παίζων, εἰ δ', ὡς σπουδάζων, ὅτι δή φημι εὐχῇ χρῆσθαι σφαλερὸν εἶναι νοῦν μὴ κεκτημένον, ἀλλὰ τἀναντία ταῖς βουλήσεσίν οἱ γίγνεσθαι. σπουδάζοντα δ' εἴ με τιθέναι βούλεσθε, τίθετε· πάνυ γὰρ οὖν προσδοκῶ νῦν ὑμᾶς εὑρήσειν, τῷ λόγῳ ἑπομένους ὃν ὀλίγον ἔμπροσθε προυθέμεθα, τῆς τῶν βασιλέων τε φθορᾶς καὶ ὅλου τοῦ διανοήματος οὐ δειλίαν οὖσαν τὴν αἰτίαν, οὐδ' ὅτι τὰ περὶ τὸν πόλεμον οὐκ ἠπίσταντο ἄρχοντές τε καὶ οὓς προσῆκεν ἄρχεσθαι, τῇ λοιπῇ δὲ πάσῃ κακίᾳ διεφθαρμένα, καὶ μάλιστα τῇ περὶ τὰ μέγιστα τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων πραγμάτων ἀμαθίᾳ. ταῦτ' οὖν ὡς οὕτω γέγονε περὶ τὰ τότε, καὶ νῦν, εἴ που, γίγνεται, καὶ ἐς τὸν ἔπειτα χρόνον οὐκ ἄλλως συμβήσεται, ἐὰν βούλησθε, πειράσομαι ἰὼν κατὰ τὸν ἐξῆς λόγον ἀνευρίσκειν τε καὶ ὑμῖν δηλοῦν κατὰ δύναμιν ὡς οὖσιν φίλοις.

ΚΛ. Λόγῳ μὲν τοίνυν σε, ὦ ξένε, ἐπαινεῖν ἐπαχθέστερον, ἔργῳ δὲ σφόδρα ἐπαινεσόμεθα· προθύμως γὰρ τοῖς λεγομένοις ἐπακολουθήσομεν, ἐν οἷς ὅ γε ἐλευθέρως ἐπαινῶν καὶ μὴ μάλιστ' ἐστὶν καταφανής.

ΜΕ. Ἄριστ', ὦ Κλεινία, καὶ ποιῶμεν ἃ λέγεις.

ΚΛ. Ἔσται ταῦτα, ἐὰν θεὸς ἐθέλῃ. λέγε μόνον.

ΑΘ. Φαμὲν δή νυν, καθ' ὁδὸν ἰόντες τὴν λοιπὴν τοῦ λόγου, τὴν μεγίστην ἀμαθίαν τότε ἐκείνην τὴν δύναμιν ἀπολέσαι καὶ νῦν ταὐτὸν τοῦτο πεφυκέναι ποιεῖν, ὥστε τόν γε νομοθέτην, εἰ τοῦθ' οὕτως ἔχει, πειρατέον ταῖς πόλεσιν φρόνησιν μὲν ὅσην δυνατὸν ἐμποιεῖν, τὴν δ' ἄνοιαν ὅτι μάλιστα ἐξαιρεῖν.

ΚΛ. Δῆλον.

ΑΘ. Τίς οὖν ἡ μεγίστη δικαίως ἂν λέγοιτο ἀμαθία; σκοπεῖτε εἰ συνδόξει καὶ σφῷν λεγόμενον· ἐγὼ μὲν δὴ τὴν τοιάνδε τίθεμαι.

ΚΛ. Ποίαν;

ΑΘ. Τὴν ὅταν τῷ τι δόξαν καλὸν ἢ ἀγαθὸν εἶναι μὴ φιλῇ τοῦτο ἀλλὰ μισῇ, τὸ δὲ πονηρὸν καὶ ἄδικον δοκοῦν εἶναι φιλῇ τε καὶ ἀσπάζηται. ταύτην τὴν διαφωνίαν λύπης τε καὶ ἡδονῆς πρὸς τὴν κατὰ λόγον δόξαν ἀμαθίαν φημὶ εἶναι τὴν ἐσχάτην, μεγίστην δέ, ὅτι τοῦ πλήθους ἐστὶ τῆς ψυχῆς· τὸ γὰρ λυπούμενον καὶ ἡδόμενον αὐτῆς ὅπερ δῆμός τε καὶ πλῆθος πόλεώς ἐστιν. ὅταν οὖν ἐπιστήμαις ἢ δόξαις ἢ λόγῳ

ἐναντιῶται, τοῖς φύσει ἀρχικοῖς, ἡ ψυχή, τοῦτο ἄνοιαν προσαγορεύω, πόλεώς τε, ὅταν ἄρχουσιν καὶ νόμοις μὴ πείθηται τὸ πλῆθος, ταὐτόν, καὶ δὴ καὶ ἑνὸς ἀνδρός, ὁπόταν καλοὶ ἐν ψυχῇ λόγοι ἐνόντες μηδὲν ποιῶσιν πλέον ἀλλὰ δὴ τούτοις πᾶν τοὐναντίον, ταύτας πάσας ἀμαθίας τὰς πλημμελεστάτας ἔγωγ' ἂν θείην πόλεώς τε καὶ ἑνὸς ἑκάστου τῶν πολιτῶν, ἀλλ' c οὐ τὰς τῶν δημιουργῶν, εἰ ἄρα μου καταμανθάνετε, ὦ ξένοι, ὃ λέγω.

ΚΛ. Μανθάνομέν τε, ὦ φίλε, καὶ συγχωροῦμεν ἃ λέγεις.

ΑΘ. Τοῦτο μὲν τοίνυν οὕτω κείσθω δεδογμένον καὶ λεγόμενον, ὡς τοῖς ταῦτ' ἀμαθαίνουσι τῶν πολιτῶν οὐδὲν ἐπιτρεπτέον ἀρχῆς ἐχόμενον, καὶ ὡς ἀμαθέσιν ὀνειδιστέον, ἂν καὶ πάνυ λογιστικοί τε ὦσι καὶ πάντα τὰ κομψὰ καὶ ὅσα πρὸς τάχος τῆς ψυχῆς πεφυκότα διαπεπονημένοι ἅπαντα, d τοὺς δὲ τοὐναντίον ἔχοντας τούτων ὡς σοφούς τε προσρητέον, ἂν καὶ τὸ λεγόμενον μήτε γράμματα μήτε νεῖν ἐπίστωνται, καὶ τὰς ἀρχὰς δοτέον ὡς ἔμφροσιν. πῶς γὰρ ἄν, ὦ φίλοι, ἄνευ συμφωνίας γένοιτ' ἂν φρονήσεως καὶ τὸ σμικρότατον εἶδος; οὐκ ἔστιν, ἀλλ' ἡ καλλίστη καὶ μεγίστη τῶν συμφωνιῶν μεγίστη δικαιόταt' ἂν λέγοιτο σοφία, ἧς ὁ μὲν κατὰ λόγον ζῶν μέτοχος, ὁ δὲ ἀπολειπόμενος οἰκοφθόρος καὶ περὶ πόλιν οὐδαμῇ σωτὴρ ἀλλὰ πᾶν τοὐναντίον ἀμαθαίνων εἰς ταῦτα ἑκάστοτε φανεῖται. ταῦτα μὲν οὖν, καθάπερ εἴπομεν e ἄρτι, λελεγμένα τεθήτω ταύτῃ.

ΚΛ. Κείσθω γὰρ οὖν.

ΑΘ. Ἄρχοντας δὲ δὴ καὶ ἀρχομένους ἀναγκαῖον ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν εἶναί που.

ΚΛ. Τί μήν;

ΑΘ. Εἶεν· ἀξιώματα δὲ δὴ τοῦ τε ἄρχειν καὶ ἄρχεσθαι 690 ποῖά ἐστι καὶ πόσα, ἔν τε πόλεσιν μεγάλαις καὶ σμικραῖς ἔν τε οἰκίαις ὡσαύτως; ἆρ' οὐχὶ ἓν μὲν τό τε πατρὸς καὶ μητρός; καὶ ὅλως γονέας ἐκγόνων ἄρχειν ἀξίωμα ὀρθὸν πανταχοῦ ἂν εἴη;

ΚΛ. Καὶ μάλα.

ΑΘ. Τούτῳ δέ γε ἑπόμενον γενναίους ἀγεννῶν ἄρχειν· καὶ τρίτον ἔτι τούτοις συνέπεται τὸ πρεσβυτέρους μὲν ἄρχειν δεῖν, νεωτέρους δὲ ἄρχεσθαι.

ΚΛ. Τί μήν;

b ΑΘ. Τέταρτον δ' αὖ δούλους μὲν ἄρχεσθαι, δεσπότας δὲ ἄρχειν.

ΚΛ. Πῶς γὰρ οὔ;

ΑΘ. Πέμπτον γε οἶμαι τὸ κρείττονα μὲν ἄρχειν, τὸν ἧττω δὲ ἄρχεσθαι.

ΚΛ. Μάλα γε ἀναγκαῖον ἀρχὴν εἴρηκας.

ΑΘ. Καὶ πλείστην γε ἐν σύμπασιν τοῖς ζῴοις οὖσαν καὶ κατὰ φύσιν, ὡς ὁ Θηβαῖος ἔφη ποτὲ Πίνδαρος. τὸ δὲ μέγιστον, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἀξίωμα ἕκτον ἂν γίγνοιτο, ἕπεσθαι μὲν τὸν ἀνεπιστήμονα κελεῦον, τὸν δὲ φρονοῦντα ἡγεῖσθαί τε καὶ
c ἄρχειν. καίτοι τοῦτό γε, ὦ Πίνδαρε σοφώτατε, σχεδὸν οὐκ ἂν παρὰ φύσιν ἔγωγε φαίην γίγνεσθαι, κατὰ φύσιν δέ, τὴν τοῦ νόμου ἑκόντων ἀρχὴν ἀλλ' οὐ βίαιον πεφυκυῖαν.

ΚΛ. Ὀρθότατα λέγεις.

ΑΘ. Θεοφιλῆ δέ γε καὶ εὐτυχῆ τινα λέγοντες ἑβδόμην ἀρχήν, εἰς κλῆρόν τινα προάγομεν, καὶ λαχόντα μὲν ἄρχειν, δυσκληροῦντα δὲ ἀπιόντα ἄρχεσθαι τὸ δικαιότατον εἶναί φαμεν.

ΚΛ. Ἀληθέστατα λέγεις.

d ΑΘ. "Ὁρᾷς δή," φαῖμεν ἄν, "ὦ νομοθέτα," πρός τινα παίζοντες τῶν ἐπὶ νόμων θέσιν ἰόντων ῥᾳδίως, "ὅσα ἐστὶ πρὸς ἄρχοντας ἀξιώματα, καὶ ὅτι πεφυκότα πρὸς ἄλληλα ἐναντίως; νῦν γὰρ δὴ στάσεων πηγήν τινα ἀνηυρήκαμεν ἡμεῖς, ἣν δεῖ σε θεραπεύειν. πρῶτον δὲ μεθ' ἡμῶν ἀνάσκεψαι πῶς τε καὶ τί παρὰ ταῦτα ἁμαρτόντες οἱ περί τε Ἄργος καὶ Μεσσήνην βασιλῆς αὐτοὺς ἅμα καὶ τὴν τῶν Ἑλλήνων
e δύναμιν, οὖσαν θαυμαστὴν ἐν τῷ τότε χρόνῳ, διέφθειραν. ἆρ' οὐκ ἀγνοήσαντες τὸν Ἡσίοδον ὀρθότατα λέγοντα ὡς τὸ ἥμισυ τοῦ παντὸς πολλάκις ἐστὶ πλέον; [ὁπόταν ᾖ τὸ μὲν ὅλον λαμβάνειν ζημιῶδες, τὸ δ' ἥμισυ μέτριον, τότε τὸ
5 μέτριον τοῦ ἀμέτρου πλέον ἡγήσατο, ἄμεινον ὂν χείρονος.]"

ΚΛ. Ὀρθότατά γε.

ΑΘ. Πότερον οὖν οἰόμεθα περὶ βασιλέας τοῦτ' ἐγγιγνόμενον ἑκάστοτε διαφθείρειν πρότερον, ἢ ἐν τοῖσιν δήμοις;

691 ΚΛ. Τὸ μὲν εἰκὸς καὶ τὸ πολύ, βασιλέων τοῦτ' εἶναι νόσημα ὑπερηφάνως ζώντων διὰ τρυφάς.

ΑΘ. Οὐκοῦν δῆλον ὡς πρῶτον τοῦτο οἱ τότε βασιλῆς ἔσχον, τὸ πλεονεκτεῖν τῶν τεθέντων νόμων, καὶ ὃ λόγῳ τε
5 καὶ ὅρκῳ ἐπῄνεσαν, οὐ συνεφώνησαν αὐτοῖς, ἀλλὰ ἡ δια-

φωνία, ὡς ἡμεῖς φαμεν, οὖσα ἀμαθία μεγίστη, δοκοῦσα δὲ σοφία, πάντ' ἐκεῖνα διὰ πλημμέλειαν καὶ ἀμουσίαν τὴν πικρὰν διέφθειρεν;

ΚΛ. Ἔοικε γοῦν.

ΑΘ. Εἶεν· τί δὴ τὸν νομοθέτην ἔδει τότε τιθέντα εὐ- b
λαβηθῆναι τούτου περὶ τοῦ πάθους τῆς γενέσεως; ἆρ' ὧ πρὸς θεῶν νῦν μὲν οὐδὲν σοφὸν γνῶναι τοῦτο οὐδ' εἰπεῖν χαλεπόν, εἰ δὲ προϊδεῖν ἦν τότε, σοφώτερος ἂν ἦν ἡμῶν ὁ προϊδών;

ΜΕ. Τὸ ποῖον δὴ λέγεις; 5

ΑΘ. Εἰς τὸ γεγονὸς παρ' ὑμῖν, ὦ Μέγιλλε, ἔστιν νῦν γε κατιδόντα γνῶναι, καὶ γνόντα εἰπεῖν ῥᾴδιον, ὃ τότε ἔδει γίγνεσθαι.

ΜΕ. Σαφέστερον ἔτι λέγε. 10

ΑΘ. Τὸ τοίνυν σαφέστατον ἂν εἴη τὸ τοιόνδε.

ΜΕ. Τὸ ποῖον;

ΑΘ. Ἐάν τις μείζονα διδῷ τοῖς ἐλάττοσι [δύναμιν] c
παρεὶς τὸ μέτριον, πλοίοις τε ἱστία καὶ σώμασιν τροφὴν καὶ ψυχαῖς ἀρχάς, ἀνατρέπεταί που πάντα, καὶ ἐξυβρίζοντα τὰ μὲν εἰς νόσους θεῖ, τὰ δ' εἰς ἔκγονον ὕβρεως ἀδικίαν. τί οὖν δή ποτε λέγομεν; ἆρά γε τὸ τοιόνδε, ὡς Οὐκ ἔστ', 5
ὦ φίλοι ἄνδρες, θνητῆς ψυχῆς φύσις ἥτις ποτὲ δυνήσεται τὴν μεγίστην ἐν ἀνθρώποις ἀρχὴν φέρειν νέα καὶ ἀνυπεύ- d
θυνος, ὥστε μὴ τῆς μεγίστης νόσου ἀνοίας πληρωθεῖσα αὐτῆς τὴν διάνοιαν, μῖσος ἔχειν πρὸς τῶν ἐγγύτατα φίλων, ὃ γενόμενον ταχὺ διέφθειρεν αὐτὴν καὶ πᾶσαν τὴν δύναμιν ἠφάνισεν αὐτῆς; τοῦτ' οὖν εὐλαβηθῆναι γνόντας τὸ μέτριον μεγάλων νομοθετῶν. ὡς οὖν δὴ τότε γενόμενον, νῦν ἔστιν 5
μετριώτατα τοπάσαι· τὸ δ' ἔοικεν εἶναι—

ΜΕ. Τὸ ποῖον;

ΑΘ. Θεὸς εἶναι κηδόμενος ὑμῶν τις, ὃς τὰ μέλλοντα προορῶν, δίδυμον ὑμῖν φυτεύσας τὴν τῶν βασιλέων γένεσιν ἐκ μονογενοῦς, εἰς τὸ μέτριον μᾶλλον συνέστειλε. καὶ μετὰ e
τοῦτο ἔτι φύσις τις ἀνθρωπίνη μεμειγμένη θείᾳ τινὶ δυνάμει, κατιδοῦσα ὑμῶν τὴν ἀρχὴν φλεγμαίνουσαν ἔτι, μείγνυσιν τὴν κατὰ γῆρας σώφρονα δύναμιν τῇ κατὰ γένος αὐθάδει ῥώμῃ, 692
τὴν τῶν ὀκτὼ καὶ εἴκοσι γερόντων ἰσόψηφον εἰς τὰ μέγιστα τῇ τῶν βασιλέων ποιήσασα δυνάμει. ὃ δὲ τρίτος σωτὴρ ὑμῖν ἔτι σπαργῶσαν καὶ θυμουμένην τὴν ἀρχὴν ὁρῶν, οἷον

ψάλιον ἐνέβαλεν αὐτῇ τὴν τῶν ἐφόρων δύναμιν, ἐγγὺς τῆς κληρωτῆς ἀγαγὼν δυνάμεως· καὶ κατὰ δὴ τοῦτον τὸν λόγον ἡ βασιλεία παρ' ὑμῖν, ἐξ ὧν ἔδει σύμμεικτος γενομένη καὶ μέτρον ἔχουσα, σωθεῖσα αὐτὴ σωτηρίας τοῖς ἄλλοις γέγονεν αἰτία. ἐπεὶ ἐπί γε Τημένῳ καὶ Κρεσφόντῃ καὶ τοῖς τότε νομοθέταις, οἵτινες ἄρα ἦσαν νομοθετοῦντες, οὐδ' ἡ Ἀριστοδήμου μερὶς ἐσώθη ποτ' ἄν—οὐ γὰρ ἱκανῶς ἦσαν νομοθεσίας ἔμπειροι· σχεδὸν γὰρ οὐκ ἄν ποτ' ὠήθησαν ὅρκοις μετριάσαι ψυχὴν νέαν, λαβοῦσαν ἀρχὴν ἐξ ἧς δυνατὸν ἦν τυραννίδα γενέσθαι—νῦν δ' ὁ θεὸς ἔδειξεν οἵαν ἔδει καὶ δεῖ δὴ τὴν μενοῦσαν μάλιστα ἀρχὴν γίγνεσθαι. τὸ δὲ παρ' ἡμῶν γιγνώσκεσθαι ταῦτα, ὅπερ εἶπον ἔμπροσθεν, νῦν μὲν γενόμενον οὐδὲν σοφόν—ἐκ γὰρ παραδείγματος ὁρᾶν γεγονότος οὐδὲν χαλεπόν—εἰ δ' ἦν τις προορῶν τότε ταῦτα καὶ δυνάμενος μετριάσαι τὰς ἀρχὰς καὶ μίαν ἐκ τριῶν ποιῆσαι, τά τε νοηθέντα ἂν καλὰ τότε πάντα ἀπέσωσε καὶ οὐκ ἄν ποτε ὁ Περσικὸς ἐπὶ τὴν Ἑλλάδα οὐδ' ἄλλος οὐδεὶς στόλος ἂν ὥρμησε, καταφρονήσας ὡς ὄντων ἡμῶν βραχέος ἀξίων.

ΚΛ. Ἀληθῆ λέγεις.

ΑΘ. Αἰσχρῶς γοῦν ἠμύναντο αὐτούς, ὦ Κλεινία. τὸ δ' αἰσχρὸν λέγω οὐχ ὡς οὐ νικῶντές γε οἱ τότε καὶ κατὰ γῆν καὶ κατὰ θάλατταν καλὰς νενικήκασι μάχας· ἀλλὰ ὅ φημι αἰσχρὸν τότ' εἶναι, τόδε λέγω, τὸ πρῶτον μὲν ἐκείνων τῶν πόλεων τριῶν οὐσῶν μίαν ὑπὲρ τῆς Ἑλλάδος ἀμῦναι, τὼ δὲ δύο κακῶς οὕτως εἶναι διεφθαρμένα, ὥστε ἡ μὲν καὶ Λακεδαίμονα διεκώλυεν ἐπαμύνειν αὐτῇ, πολεμοῦσα αὐτῇ κατὰ κράτος, ἡ δ' αὖ πρωτεύουσα ἐν τοῖς τότε χρόνοις τοῖς περὶ τὴν διανομήν, ἢ περὶ τὸ Ἄργος, παρακαλουμένη ἀμύνειν τὸν βάρβαρον οὔθ' ὑπήκουσεν οὔτ' ἤμυνεν. πολλὰ δὲ λέγων ἄν τις τὰ τότε γενόμενα περὶ ἐκεῖνον τὸν πόλεμον τῆς Ἑλλάδος οὐδαμῶς εὐσχήμονα ἂν κατηγοροῖ· οὐδ' αὖ ἀμύνασθαι τήν γε Ἑλλάδα λέγων ὀρθῶς ἂν λέγοι, ἀλλ' εἰ μὴ τό τε Ἀθηναίων καὶ τὸ Λακεδαιμονίων κοινῇ διανόημα ἤμυνεν τὴν ἐπιοῦσαν δουλείαν, σχεδὸν ἂν ἤδη πάντ' ἦν μεμειγμένα τὰ τῶν Ἑλλήνων γένη ἐν ἀλλήλοις, καὶ βάρβαρα ἐν Ἕλλησι καὶ Ἑλληνικὰ ἐν βαρβάροις, καθάπερ ὧν Πέρσαι τυραννοῦσι τὰ νῦν διαπεφορημένα καὶ συμπεφορημένα κακῶς [ἐσπαρμένα] κατοικεῖται. ταῦτ', ὦ Κλεινία καὶ Μέγιλλε, ἔχομεν ἐπιτιμᾶν τοῖς τε πάλαι πολιτικοῖς λεγομένοις καὶ

νομοθέταις καὶ τοῖς νῦν, ἵνα τὰς αἰτίας αὐτῶν ἀναζητοῦντες, ἀνευρίσκωμεν τί παρὰ ταῦτα ἔδει πράττειν ἄλλο· οἷον δὴ b καὶ τὸ παρὸν εἴπομεν, ὡς ἄρα οὐ δεῖ μεγάλας ἀρχὰς οὐδ' αὖ ἀμείκτους νομοθετεῖν, διανοηθέντας τὸ τοιόνδε, ὅτι πόλιν ἐλευθέραν τε εἶναι δεῖ καὶ ἔμφρονα καὶ ἑαυτῇ φίλην, καὶ τὸν νομοθετοῦντα πρὸς ταῦτα βλέποντα δεῖ νομοθετεῖν. μὴ 5 θαυμάσωμεν δὲ εἰ πολλάκις ἤδη προθέμενοι ἄττα, εἰρήκαμεν ὅτι πρὸς ταῦτα δεῖ νομοθετεῖν βλέποντα τὸν νομοθέτην, τὰ δὲ προτεθέντα οὐ ταὐτὰ ἡμῖν φαίνεται ἑκάστοτε· ἀλλὰ c ἀναλογίζεσθαι χρή, ὅταν πρὸς τὸ σωφρονεῖν φῶμεν δεῖν βλέπειν, ἢ πρὸς φρόνησιν ἢ φιλίαν, ὡς ἔσθ' οὗτος ὁ σκοπὸς οὐχ ἕτερος ἀλλ' ὁ αὐτός, καὶ ἄλλα δὴ πολλὰ ἡμᾶς τοιαῦτα ἂν γίγνηται ῥήματα μὴ διαταραττέτω. 5

ΚΛ. Πειρασόμεθα ποιεῖν οὕτως ἐπανιόντες τοὺς λόγους· καὶ νῦν δὴ τὸ περὶ τῆς φιλίας τε καὶ φρονήσεως καὶ ἐλευθερίας, πρὸς ὅτι βουλόμενος ἔμελλες λέγειν δεῖν στοχάζεσθαι τὸν νομοθέτην, λέγε. d

ΑΘ. Ἄκουσον δή νυν. εἰσὶν πολιτειῶν οἷον μητέρες δύο τινές, ἐξ ὧν τὰς ἄλλας γεγονέναι λέγων ἄν τις ὀρθῶς λέγοι, καὶ τὴν μὲν προσαγορεύειν μοναρχίαν ὀρθόν, τὴν δ' αὖ δημοκρατίαν, καὶ τῆς μὲν τὸ Περσῶν γένος ἄκρον ἔχειν, τῆς 5 δὲ ἡμᾶς· αἱ δ' ἄλλαι σχεδὸν ἅπασαι, καθάπερ εἶπον, ἐκ τούτων εἰσὶ διαπεποικιλμέναι. δεῖ δὴ οὖν καὶ ἀναγκαῖον μεταλαβεῖν ἀμφοῖν τούτοιν, εἴπερ ἐλευθερία τ' ἔσται καὶ φιλία μετὰ φρονήσεως· ὃ δὴ βούλεται ἡμῖν ὁ λόγος προσ- e τάττειν, λέγων ὡς οὐκ ἄν ποτε τούτων πόλις ἄμοιρος γενομένη πολιτευθῆναι δύναιτ' ἂν καλῶς.

ΚΛ. Πῶς γὰρ ἄν;

ΑΘ. Ἡ μὲν τοίνυν τὸ μοναρχικόν, ἡ δὲ τὸ ἐλεύθερον 5 ἀγαπήσασα μειζόνως ἢ ἔδει μόνον, οὐδετέρα τὰ μέτρια κέκτηται τούτων, αἱ δὲ ὑμέτεραι, ἥ τε Λακωνικὴ καὶ Κρητική, μᾶλλον· Ἀθηναῖοι δὲ καὶ Πέρσαι τὸ μὲν πάλαι οὕτω 694 πως, τὸ νῦν δὲ ἧττον. τὰ δ' αἴτια διέλθωμεν· ἢ γάρ;

ΚΛ. Πάντως, εἴ γέ που μέλλομεν ὃ προυθέμεθα περαίνειν.

ΑΘ. Ἀκούωμεν δή. Πέρσαι γάρ, ὅτε μὲν τὸ μέσον μᾶλλον δουλείας τε καὶ ἐλευθερίας ἦγον ἐπὶ Κύρου, πρῶτον μὲν ἐλεύθεροι ἐγένοντο, ἔπειτα δὲ ἄλλων πολλῶν δεσπόται. 5 ἐλευθερίας γὰρ ἄρχοντες μεταδιδόντες ἀρχομένοις καὶ ἐπὶ τὸ ἴσον ἄγοντες, μᾶλλον φίλοι τε ἦσαν στρατιῶται στρατη-

b γοῖς καὶ προθύμους αὐτοὺς ἐν τοῖς κινδύνοις παρείχοντο· καὶ εἴ τις αὖ φρόνιμος ἦν ἐν αὐτοῖς καὶ βουλεύειν δυνατός, οὐ φθονεροῦ τοῦ βασιλέως ὄντος, διδόντος δὲ παρρησίαν καὶ τιμῶντος τοὺς εἴς τι δυναμένους συμβουλεύειν, κοινὴν τὴν τοῦ φρονεῖν εἰς τὸ μέσον παρείχετο δύναμιν, καὶ πάντα δὴ τότε ἐπέδωκεν αὐτοῖς δι' ἐλευθερίαν τε καὶ φιλίαν καὶ νοῦ κοινωνίαν.

ΚΛ. Ἔοικέν γέ πως τὰ λεγόμενα οὕτω γεγονέναι.

c ΑΘ. Πῇ δὴ οὖν ποτε ἀπώλετο ἐπὶ Καμβύσου καὶ πάλιν ἐπὶ Δαρείου σχεδὸν ἐσώθη; βούλεσθε οἷον μαντείᾳ διανοηθέντες χρώμεθα;

ΚΛ. Φέρει γοῦν ἡμῖν σκέψιν τοῦ ἐφ' ὅπερ ὡρμήκαμεν.

5 ΑΘ. Μαντεύομαι δὴ νῦν περί γε Κύρου, τὰ μὲν ἄλλ' αὐτὸν στρατηγόν τε ἀγαθὸν εἶναι καὶ φιλόπολιν, παιδείας δὲ ὀρθῆς οὐχ ἥφθαι τὸ παράπαν, οἰκονομίᾳ τε οὐδὲν τὸν νοῦν προσεσχηκέναι.

ΚΛ. Πῶς δὴ τὸ τοιοῦτον φῶμεν;

d ΑΘ. Ἔοικεν ἐκ νέου στρατεύεσθαι διὰ βίου, ταῖς γυναιξὶν παραδοὺς τοὺς παῖδας τρέφειν. αἱ δὲ ὡς εὐδαίμονας αὐτοὺς ἐκ τῶν παίδων εὐθὺς καὶ μακαρίους ἤδη γεγονότας καὶ ἐπιδεεῖς ὄντας τούτων οὐδενὸς ἔτρεφον· κωλύουσαι δὲ ὡς οὖσιν ἱκανῶς εὐδαίμοσιν μήτε αὐτοῖς ἐναντιοῦσθαι μηδένα εἰς μηδέν, ἐπαινεῖν τε ἀναγκάζουσαι πάντας τὸ λεγόμενον ἢ πραττόμενον ὑπ' αὐτῶν, ἔθρεψαν τοιούτους τινάς.

ΚΛ. Καλήν, ὡς ἔοικας, τροφὴν εἴρηκας.

e ΑΘ. Γυναικείαν μὲν οὖν βασιλίδων γυναικῶν νεωστὶ γεγονυιῶν πλουσίων, καὶ ἐν ἀνδρῶν ἐρημίᾳ, διὰ τὸ μὴ σχολάζειν ὑπὸ πολέμων καὶ πολλῶν κινδύνων, τοὺς παῖδας τρεφουσῶν.

5 ΚΛ. Ἔχει γὰρ λόγον.

ΑΘ. Ὁ δὲ πατήρ γε αὐτοῖς αὖ ποίμνια μὲν καὶ πρόβατα καὶ ἀγέλας ἀνδρῶν τε καὶ ἄλλων πολλῶν πολλὰς ἐκτᾶτο,
695 αὐτοὺς δὲ οἷς ταῦτα παραδώσειν ἔμελλεν ἠγνόει τὴν πατρῴαν οὐ παιδευομένους τέχνην, οὖσαν Περσικήν—ποιμένων ὄντων Περσῶν, τραχείας χώρας ἐκγόνων—σκληρὰν καὶ ἱκανὴν ποιμένας ἀπεργάζεσθαι μάλα ἰσχυροὺς καὶ δυναμένους θυραυλεῖν
5 καὶ ἀγρυπνεῖν καὶ εἰ στρατεύεσθαι δέοι στρατεύεσθαι· διεφθαρμένην δὲ παιδείαν ὑπὸ τῆς λεγομένης εὐδαιμονίας τὴν Μηδικὴν περιεῖδεν ὑπὸ γυναικῶν τε καὶ εὐνούχων παιδευb θέντας αὐτοῦ τοὺς υἱεῖς, ὅθεν ἐγένοντο οἷους ἦν αὐτοὺς εἰκὸς

γενέσθαι, τροφῇ ἀνεπιπλήκτῳ τραφέντας. παραλαβόντες δ' οὖν οἱ παῖδες τελευτήσαντος Κύρου τρυφῆς μεστοὶ καὶ ἀνεπιπληξίας, πρῶτον μὲν τὸν ἕτερον ἄτερος ἀπέκτεινε τῷ ἴσῳ ἀγανακτῶν, μετὰ δὲ τοῦτο αὐτὸς μαινόμενος ὑπὸ μέθης τε καὶ ἀπαιδευσίας τὴν ἀρχὴν ἀπώλεσεν ὑπὸ Μήδων τε καὶ τοῦ λεγομένου τότε εὐνούχου, καταφρονήσαντος τῆς Καμβύσου μωρίας.

ΚΛ. Λέγεται δὴ ταῦτά γε, καὶ ἔοικεν σχεδὸν οὕτω πως γεγονέναι.

ΑΘ. Καὶ μὴν καὶ πάλιν εἰς Πέρσας ἐλθεῖν τὴν ἀρχὴν διὰ Δαρείου καὶ τῶν ἑπτὰ λέγεταί που.

ΚΛ. Τί μήν;

ΑΘ. Θεωρῶμεν δὴ συνεπόμενοι τῷ λόγῳ. Δαρεῖος γὰρ βασιλέως οὐκ ἦν υἱός, παιδείᾳ τε οὐ διατρυφώσῃ τεθραμμένος, ἐλθὼν δ' εἰς τὴν ἀρχὴν καὶ λαβὼν αὐτὴν ἕβδομος, διείλετο ἑπτὰ μέρη τεμόμενος, ὧν καὶ νῦν ἔτι σμικρὰ ὀνείρατα λέλειπται, καὶ νόμους ἠξίου θέμενος οἰκεῖν ἰσότητα κοινήν τινα εἰσφέρων, καὶ τὸν τοῦ Κύρου δασμόν, ὃν ὑπέσχετο Πέρσαις, εἰς τὸν νόμον ἐνέδει, φιλίαν πορίζων καὶ κοινωνίαν πᾶσιν Πέρσαις, χρήμασι καὶ δωρεαῖς τὸν Περσῶν δῆμον προσαγόμενος· τοιγαροῦν αὐτῷ τὰ στρατεύματα μετ' εὐνοίας προσεκτήσατο χώρας οὐκ ἐλάττους ὧν κατέλιπε Κῦρος. μετὰ δὲ Δαρεῖον ὁ τῇ βασιλικῇ καὶ τρυφώσῃ πάλιν παιδευθεὶς παιδείᾳ Ξέρξης—"Ὦ Δαρεῖε," εἰπεῖν ἐστιν δικαιότατον ἴσως, "ὃς τὸ Κύρου κακὸν οὐκ ἔμαθες, ἐθρέψω δὲ Ξέρξην ἐν τοῖς αὐτοῖς ἤθεσιν ἐν οἷσπερ Κῦρος Καμβύσην"—ὁ δέ, ἅτε τῶν αὐτῶν παιδειῶν γενόμενος ἔκγονος, παραπλήσια ἀπετέλεσεν τοῖς Καμβύσου παθήμασιν· καὶ σχεδὸν ἔκ γε τοσούτου βασιλεὺς ἐν Πέρσαις οὐδείς πω μέγας ἐγγέγονεν ἀληθῶς, πλήν γε ὀνόματι. τὸ δ' αἴτιον οὐ τύχης, ὡς ὁ ἐμὸς λόγος, ἀλλ' ὁ κακὸς βίος ὃν οἱ τῶν διαφερόντως πλουσίων καὶ τυράννων παῖδες τὰ πολλὰ ζῶσιν· οὐ γὰρ μή ποτε γένηται παῖς καὶ ἀνὴρ καὶ γέρων ἐκ ταύτης τῆς τροφῆς διαφέρων πρὸς ἀρετήν. ἆ δή, φαμέν, τῷ νομοθέτῃ σκεπτέον, καὶ ἡμῖν δὲ ἐν τῷ νῦν παρόντι. δίκαιον μήν, ὦ Λακεδαιμόνιοι, τοῦτό γε τῇ πόλει ὑμῶν ἀποδιδόναι, ὅτι πενίᾳ καὶ πλούτῳ καὶ ἰδιωτείᾳ καὶ βασιλείᾳ διαφέρουσαν οὐδ' ἡντινοῦν τιμὴν καὶ τροφὴν νέμετε, ἃς μὴ τὸ κατ' ἀρχὰς ὑμῖν θεῖον παρὰ θεοῦ διεμαντεύσατό τινος. οὐ γὰρ δὴ δεῖ

κατὰ πόλιν γε εἶναι τὰς τιμὰς ὑπερεχούσας, ὅτι τίς ἐστιν πλούτῳ διαφέρων, ἐπεὶ οὐδ' ὅτι ταχὺς ἢ καλὸς ἢ ἰσχυρὸς ἄνευ τινὸς ἀρετῆς, οὐδ' ἀρετῆς ἧς ἂν σωφροσύνη ἀπῇ.

ΜΕ. Πῶς τοῦτο, ὦ ξένε, λέγεις;

ΑΘ. Ἀνδρεία που μόριον ἀρετῆς ἔν;

ΜΕ. Πῶς γὰρ οὔ;

ΑΘ. Δίκασον τοίνυν αὐτὸς τὸν λόγον ἀκούσας εἴ σοι δέξαι' ἂν σύνοικον ἢ γείτονα εἶναί τινα σφόδρα μὲν ἀνδρεῖον, μὴ σώφρονα δὲ ἀλλ' ἀκόλαστον.

c ΜΕ. Εὐφήμει.

ΑΘ. Τί δέ; τεχνικὸν μὲν καὶ περὶ ταῦτα σοφόν, ἄδικον δέ;

ΜΕ. Οὐδαμῶς.

ΑΘ. Ἀλλὰ μὴν τό γε δίκαιον οὐ φύεται χωρὶς τοῦ σωφρονεῖν.

ΜΕ. Πῶς γὰρ ἄν;

ΑΘ. Οὐδὲ μὴν ὅν γε σοφὸν ἡμεῖς νυνδὴ προυθέμεθα, τὸν τὰς ἡδονὰς καὶ λύπας κεκτημένον συμφώνους τοῖς ὀρθοῖς λόγοις καὶ ἑπομένας.

ΜΕ. Οὐ γὰρ οὖν.

ΑΘ. Ἔτι δὴ καὶ τόδε ἐπισκεψώμεθα τῶν ἐν ταῖς πό-
d λεσιν τιμήσεων ἕνεκα, ποῖαί τε ὀρθαὶ καὶ μὴ γίγνονται ἑκάστοτε.

ΜΕ. Τὸ ποῖον;

ΑΘ. Σωφροσύνη ἄνευ πάσης τῆς ἄλλης ἀρετῆς ἐν ψυχῇ τινι μεμονωμένη τίμιον ἢ ἄτιμον γίγνοιτ' ἂν κατὰ δίκην;

ΜΕ. Οὐκ ἔχω ὅπως εἴπω.

ΑΘ. Καὶ μὴν εἴρηκάς γε μετρίως· εἰπὼν γὰρ δὴ ὧν ἠρόμην ὁποτερονοῦν, παρὰ μέλος ἔμοιγ' ἂν δοκεῖς φθέγξασθαι.

ΜΕ. Καλῶς τοίνυν γεγονὸς ἂν εἴη.

ΑΘ. Εἶεν· τὸ μὲν δὴ πρόσθημα ὧν τιμαί τε καὶ ἀτιμίαι
e οὐ λόγου, ἀλλά τινος μᾶλλον ἀλόγου σιγῆς, ἄξιον ἂν εἴη.

ΜΕ. Σωφροσύνην μοι φαίνῃ λέγειν.

ΑΘ. Ναί. τὸ δέ γε τῶν ἄλλων πλεῖστα ἡμᾶς ὠφελοῦν μετὰ τῆς προσθήκης μάλιστ' ἂν τιμώμενον ὀρθότατα τιμῷτο, καὶ τὸ δεύτερον δευτέρως· καὶ οὕτω δὴ κατὰ τὸν ἑξῆς λόγον τὰς ἐφεξῆς τιμὰς λαγχάνον ἕκαστον ὀρθῶς ἂν λαγχάνοι.

697 ΜΕ. Ἔχει ταύτῃ.

ΑΘ. Τί οὖν; οὐ νομοθέτου καὶ ταῦτα αὖ φήσομεν εἶναι διανέμειν;

ΜΕ. Καὶ μάλα.

ΑΘ. Βούλει δὴ τὰ μὲν ἅπαντα καὶ ἐφ' ἕκαστον ἔργον καὶ κατὰ σμικρὰ ἐκείνῳ δῶμεν νεῖμαι, τὸ δὲ τριχῇ διελεῖν, ἐπειδὴ νόμων ἐσμὲν καὶ αὐτοί πως ἐπιθυμηταί, πειραθῶμεν, διατεμεῖν χωρὶς τά τε μέγιστα καὶ δεύτερα καὶ τρίτα;

ΜΕ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

ΑΘ. Λέγομεν τοίνυν ὅτι πόλιν, ὡς ἔοικεν, τὴν μέλλουσαν σῴζεσθαί τε καὶ εὐδαιμονήσειν εἰς δύναμιν ἀνθρωπίνην δεῖ καὶ ἀναγκαῖον τιμάς τε καὶ ἀτιμίας διανέμειν ὀρθῶς. ἔστιν δὲ ὀρθῶς ἄρα τιμιώτατα μὲν καὶ πρῶτα τὰ περὶ τὴν ψυχὴν ἀγαθὰ κεῖσθαι, σωφροσύνης ὑπαρχούσης αὐτῇ, δεύτερα δὲ τὰ περὶ τὸ σῶμα καλὰ καὶ ἀγαθά, καὶ τρίτα τὰ περὶ τὴν οὐσίαν καὶ χρήματα λεγόμενα· τούτων δὲ ἂν ἐκτός τις βαίνῃ νομοθέτης ἢ πόλις, εἰς τιμὰς ἢ χρήματα προάγουσα ἥ τι τῶν ὑστέρων εἰς τὸ πρόσθεν τιμαῖς τάττουσα, οὔθ' ὅσιον οὔτε πολιτικὸν ἂν δρῴη πρᾶγμα. εἰρήσθω ταῦτα ἢ πῶς ἡμῖν;

ΜΕ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν εἰρήσθω σαφῶς.

ΑΘ. Ταῦτα μὲν τοίνυν ἡμᾶς ἐπὶ πλέον ἐποίησεν εἰπεῖν ἡ Περσῶν περὶ διάσκεψις τῆς πολιτείας· ἀνευρίσκομεν δὲ **ἔπει εἰπεῖν ἐνὶ** χείρους αὐτοὺς γεγονότας, τὴν δὲ αἰτίαν φαμέν, ὅτι τὸ ἐλεύθερον λίαν ἀφελόμενοι τοῦ δήμου, τὸ δεσποτικὸν δ' ἐπαγαγόντες μᾶλλον τοῦ προσήκοντος, τὸ φίλον ἀπώλεσαν καὶ τὸ κοινὸν ἐν τῇ πόλει. τούτου δὲ φθαρέντος, οὔθ' ἡ τῶν ἀρχόντων βουλὴ ὑπὲρ ἀρχομένων καὶ τοῦ δήμου βουλεύεται, ἀλλ' ἕνεκα τῆς αὑτῶν ἀρχῆς, ἄν τι καὶ σμικρὸν πλέον ἑκάστοτε ἡγῶνται ἔσεσθαί σφισιν, ἀναστάτους μὲν πόλεις, ἀνάστατα δὲ ἔθνη φίλια πυρὶ καταφθείραντες, ἐχθρῶς τε καὶ ἀνηλεήτως μισοῦντες μισοῦνται· ὅταν τε εἰς χρείαν τοῦ μάχεσθαι περὶ ἑαυτῶν τοὺς δήμους ἀφικνῶνται, οὐδὲν κοινὸν ἐν αὐτοῖς αὖ μετὰ προθυμίας τοῦ ἐθέλειν κινδυνεύειν καὶ μάχεσθαι ἀνευρίσκουσιν, ἀλλὰ κεκτημένοι μυριάδας ἀπεράντους λογισμῷ, ἀχρήστους εἰς πόλεμον πάσας κέκτηνται, καὶ καθάπερ ἐνδεεῖς ἀνθρώπων μισθούμενοι, ὑπὸ μισθωτῶν καὶ ὀθνείων ἀνθρώπων ἡγοῦνται ποτε σωθήσεσθαι. πρὸς δὲ τούτοις ἀμαθαίνειν ἀναγκάζονται, λέγοντες ἔργοις ὅτι λῆρος πρὸς χρυσόν τε καὶ ἄργυρόν ἐστιν ἑκάστοτε τὰ

λεγόμενα τίμια καὶ καλὰ κατὰ πόλιν.

ΜΕ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

ΑΘ. Τὰ μὲν δὴ περί γε Περσῶν, ὡς οὐκ ὀρθῶς τὰ νῦν διοικεῖται διὰ τὴν σφόδρα δουλείαν τε καὶ δεσποτείαν, τέλος ἐχέτω.

ΜΕ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

ΑΘ. Τὰ δὲ περὶ [τὴν] τῆς Ἀττικῆς αὖ πολιτείας τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο ὡσαύτως ἡμᾶς διεξελθεῖν χρεών, ὡς ἡ παντελὴς καὶ b ἀπὸ πασῶν ἀρχῶν ἐλευθερία τῆς μέτρον ἐχούσης ἀρχῆς ὑφ' ἑτέρων οὐ σμικρῷ χείρων· ἡμῖν γὰρ κατ' ἐκεῖνον τὸν χρόνον, ὅτε ἡ Περσῶν ἐπίθεσις τοῖς Ἕλλησιν, ἴσως δὲ σχεδὸν ἅπασιν τοῖς τὴν Εὐρώπην οἰκοῦσιν, ἐγίγνετο, πολιτεία τε ἦν παλαιὰ καὶ ἐκ τιμημάτων ἀρχαί τινες τεττάρων, καὶ δεσπότις ἐνῆν τις αἰδώς, δι' ἣν δουλεύοντες τοῖς τότε νόμοις ζῆν ἠθέλομεν. καὶ πρὸς τούτοις δὴ τὸ μέγεθος τοῦ στόλου κατά τε γῆν καὶ κατὰ θάλατταν γενόμενον, φόβον ἄπορον ἐμβαλόν, δουλείαν c ἔτι μείζονα ἐποίησεν ἡμᾶς τοῖς τε ἄρχουσιν καὶ τοῖς νόμοις δουλεῦσαι, καὶ διὰ πάντα ταῦθ' ἡμῖν συνέπεσε πρὸς ἡμᾶς αὐτοὺς σφόδρα φιλία. σχεδὸν γὰρ δέκα ἔτεσιν πρὸ τῆς ἐν Σαλαμῖνι ναυμαχίας ἀφίκετο Δᾶτις Περσικὸν στόλον ἄγων, πέμψαντος Δαρείου διαρρήδην ἐπί τε Ἀθηναίους καὶ Ἐρετριᾶς, ἐξανδραποδισάμενον ἀγαγεῖν, θάνατον αὐτῷ προειπὼν μὴ πράξαντι ταῦτα. καὶ ὁ Δᾶτις τοὺς μὲν Ἐρετριᾶς ἔν τινι d βραχεῖ χρόνῳ παντάπασιν κατὰ κράτος τε εἷλεν μυριάσι συχναῖς, καί τινα λόγον εἰς τὴν ἡμετέραν πόλιν ἀφῆκεν φοβερόν, ὡς οὐδεὶς Ἐρετριῶν αὐτὸν ἀποπεφευγὼς εἴη· συνάψαντες γὰρ ἄρα τὰς χεῖρας σαγηνεύσαιεν πᾶσαν τὴν Ἐρετρικὴν οἱ στρατιῶται τοῦ Δάτιδος. ὁ δὴ λόγος, εἴτ' ἀληθὴς εἴτε καὶ ὅπῃ ἀφίκετο, τούς τε ἄλλους Ἕλληνας καὶ δὴ καὶ Ἀθηναίους ἐξέπληττεν, καὶ πρεσβευομένοις αὐτοῖς e πανταχόσε βοηθεῖν οὐδεὶς ἤθελεν πλήν γε Λακεδαιμονίων· οὗτοι δὲ ὑπό τε τοῦ πρὸς Μεσσήνην ὄντος τότε πολέμου καὶ εἰ δή τι διεκώλυεν ἄλλο αὐτούς—οὐ γὰρ ἴσμεν λεγόμενον— ὕστεροι δ' οὖν ἀφίκοντο τῆς ἐν Μαραθῶνι μάχης γενομένης μιᾷ ἡμέρᾳ. μετὰ δὲ τοῦτο παρασκευαί τε μεγάλαι λεγόμεναι καὶ ἀπειλαὶ ἐφοίτων μυρίαι παρὰ βασιλέως. προϊόντος δὲ τοῦ χρόνου, Δαρεῖος μὲν τεθνάναι ἐλέχθη, νέος δὲ καὶ σφοδρὸς ὁ υἱὸς αὐτοῦ παρειληφέναι τὴν ἀρχὴν καὶ οὐδαμῶς 699 ἀφίστασθαι τῆς ὁρμῆς. οἱ δὲ Ἀθηναῖοι πᾶν τοῦτο ᾤοντο ἐπὶ

σφᾶς αὐτοὺς παρασκευάζεσθαι διὰ τὸ Μαραθῶνι γενόμενον, καὶ ἀκούοντες Ἄθων τε διορυττόμενον καὶ Ἑλλήσποντον ζευγνύμενον καὶ τὸ τῶν νεῶν πλῆθος, ἡγήσαντο οὔτε κατὰ γῆν σφίσιν εἶναι σωτηρίαν οὔτε κατὰ θάλατταν· οὔτε γὰρ βοηθήσειν αὐτοῖς οὐδένα—μεμνημένοι ὡς οὐδ' ὅτε τὸ πρότερον ἦλθον καὶ τὰ περὶ Ἐρέτριαν διεπράξαντο, σφίσι γε οὐδεὶς τότε ἐβοήθησεν οὐδ' ἐκινδύνευσεν συμμαχόμενος· ταὐτὸν δὴ προσεδόκων καὶ τότε γενήσεσθαι τό γε κατὰ γῆν—καὶ κατὰ θάλατταν δ' αὖ πᾶσαν ἀπορίαν ἑώρων σωτηρίας, νεῶν χιλίων καὶ ἔτι πλεόνων ἐπιφερομένων. μίαν δὴ σωτηρίαν συνενόουν, λεπτὴν μὲν καὶ ἄπορον, μόνην δ' οὖν, βλέψαντες πρὸς τὸ πρότερον γενόμενον, ὡς ἐξ ἀπόρων καὶ τότε ἐφαίνετο γενέσθαι τὸ νικῆσαι μαχομένους· ἐπὶ δὲ τῆς ἐλπίδος ὀχούμενοι ταύτης ηὕρισκον καταφυγὴν αὐτοῖς εἰς αὐτοὺς μόνους εἶναι καὶ τοὺς θεούς. ταῦτ' οὖν αὐτοῖς πάντα φιλίαν ἀλλήλων ἐνεποίει, ὁ φόβος ὁ τότε παρὼν ὅ τε ἐκ τῶν νόμων τῶν ἔμπροσθεν γεγονώς, ὃν δουλεύοντες τοῖς πρόσθεν νόμοις ἐκέκτηντο, ἣν αἰδῶ πολλάκις ἐν τοῖς ἄνω λόγοις εἴπομεν, ᾗ καὶ δουλεύειν ἔφαμεν δεῖν τοὺς μέλλοντας ἀγαθοὺς ἔσεσθαι, ἧς ὁ δειλὸς ἐλεύθερος καὶ ἄφοβος· ὃν εἰ τότε μὴ δέος ἔλαβεν, οὐκ ἄν ποτε συνελθὼν ἠμύνατο, οὐδ' ἤμυνεν ἱεροῖς τε καὶ τάφοις καὶ πατρίδι καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις οἰκείοις τε ἅμα καὶ φίλοις, ὥσπερ τότ' ἐβοήθησεν, ἀλλὰ κατὰ σμικρὰ ἂν ἐν τῷ τότε ἡμῶν ἕκαστος σκεδασθεὶς ἄλλος ἄλλοσε διεσπάρη.

ΜΕ. Καὶ μάλα, ὦ ξένε, ὀρθῶς τε εἴρηκας καὶ σαυτῷ τε καὶ τῇ πατρίδι πρεπόντως.

ΑΘ. Ἔστι ταῦτα, ὦ Μέγιλλε· πρὸς γὰρ σὲ τὰ ἐν τῷ τότε χρόνῳ γενόμενα, κοινωνὸν τῇ τῶν πατέρων γεγονότα φύσει, δίκαιον λέγειν. ἐπισκόπει μὴν καὶ σὺ καὶ Κλεινίας εἴ τι πρὸς τὴν νομοθεσίαν προσήκοντα λέγομεν· οὐ γὰρ μύθων ἕνεκα διεξέρχομαι, οὗ λέγω δ' ἕνεκα. ὁρᾶτε γάρ· ἐπειδή τινα τρόπον ταὐτὸν ἡμῖν συμβεβήκει πάθος ὅπερ Πέρσαις, ἐκείνοις μὲν ἐπὶ πᾶσαν δουλείαν ἄγουσιν τὸν δῆμον, ἡμῖν δ' αὖ τοὐναντίον ἐπὶ πᾶσαν ἐλευθερίαν προτρέπουσι τὰ πλήθη, πῶς δὴ καὶ τί λέγωμεν τοὐντεῦθεν, οἱ προγεγονότες ἡμῖν ἔμπροσθεν λόγοι τρόπον τινὰ καλῶς εἰσιν εἰρημένοι.

ΜΕ. Λέγεις εὖ· πειρῶ δ' ἔτι σαφέστερον ἡμῖν σημῆναι τὸ νῦν λεγόμενον. 700

ΑΘ. Ἔσται ταῦτα. οὐκ ἦν, ὦ φίλοι, ἡμῖν ἐπὶ τῶν

παλαιῶν νόμων ὁ δῆμός τινων κύριος, ἀλλὰ τρόπον τινὰ ἑκὼν ἐδούλευε τοῖς νόμοις.

ΜΕ. Ποίοις δὴ λέγεις;

ΑΘ. Τοῖς περὶ τὴν μουσικὴν πρῶτον τὴν τότε, ἵνα ἐξ ἀρχῆς διέλθωμεν τὴν τοῦ ἐλευθέρου λίαν ἐπίδοσιν βίου. διῃρημένη γὰρ δὴ τότε ἦν ἡμῖν ἡ μουσικὴ κατὰ εἴδη τε ἑαυτῆς ἄττα καὶ σχήματα, καί τι ἦν εἶδος ᾠδῆς εὐχαὶ πρὸς θεούς, ὄνομα δὲ ὕμνοι ἐπεκαλοῦντο· καὶ τούτῳ δὴ τὸ ἐναντίον ἦν ᾠδῆς ἕτερον εἶδος—θρήνους δέ τις ἂν αὐτοὺς μάλιστα ἐκάλεσεν—καὶ παίωνες ἕτερον, καὶ ἄλλο, Διονύσου γένεσις οἶμαι, διθύραμβος λεγόμενος. νόμους τε αὐτὸ τοῦτο τοὔνομα ἐκάλουν, ᾠδὴν ὡς τινα ἑτέραν· ἐπέλεγον δὲ κιθαρῳδικούς. τούτων δὴ διατεταγμένων καὶ ἄλλων τινῶν, οὐκ ἐξῆν ἄλλῳ εἰς ἄλλο καταχρῆσθαι μέλους εἶδος· τὸ δὲ κῦρος τούτων, γνῶναί τε καὶ ἅμα γνόντα δικάσαι, ζημιοῦν τε αὖ τὸν μὴ πειθόμενον, οὐ σύριγξ ἦν οὐδέ τινες ἄμουσοι βοαὶ πλήθους, καθάπερ τὰ νῦν, οὐδ' αὖ κρότοι ἐπαίνους ἀποδιδόντες, ἀλλὰ τοῖς μὲν γεγονόσι περὶ παίδευσιν δεδογμένον ἀκούειν ἦν αὐτοῖς μετὰ σιγῆς διὰ τέλους, παισὶ δὲ καὶ παιδαγωγοῖς καὶ τῷ πλείστῳ ὄχλῳ ῥάβδου κοσμούσης ἡ νουθέτησις ἐγίγνετο. ταῦτ' οὖν οὕτω τεταγμένως ἤθελεν ἄρχεσθαι τῶν πολιτῶν τὸ πλῆθος, καὶ μὴ τολμᾶν κρίνειν διὰ θορύβου· μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα, προϊόντος τοῦ χρόνου, ἄρχοντες μὲν τῆς ἀμούσου παρανομίας ποιηταὶ ἐγίγνοντο φύσει μὲν ποιητικοί, ἀγνώμονες δὲ περὶ τὸ δίκαιον τῆς Μούσης καὶ τὸ νόμιμον, βακχεύοντες καὶ μᾶλλον τοῦ δέοντος κατεχόμενοι ὑφ' ἡδονῆς, κεραννύντες δὲ θρήνους τε ὕμνοις καὶ παίωνας διθυράμβοις, καὶ αὐλῳδίας δὴ ταῖς κιθαρῳδίαις μιμούμενοι, καὶ πάντα εἰς πάντα συνάγοντες, μουσικῆς ἄκοντες ὑπ' ἀνοίας καταψευδόμενοι ὡς ὀρθότητα μὲν οὐκ ἔχοι οὐδ' ἡντινοῦν μουσική, ἡδονῇ δὲ τῇ τοῦ χαίροντος, εἴτε βελτίων εἴτε χείρων ἂν εἴη τις, κρίνοιτο ὀρθότατα. τοιαῦτα δὴ ποιοῦντες ποιήματα, λόγους τε ἐπιλέγοντες τοιούτους, τοῖς πολλοῖς ἐνέθεσαν παρανομίαν εἰς τὴν μουσικὴν καὶ τόλμαν ὡς ἱκανοῖς οὖσιν κρίνειν· ὅθεν δὴ τὰ θέατρα ἐξ ἀφώνων φωνήεντ' ἐγένοντο, ὡς ἐπαΐοντα ἐν μούσαις τό τε καλὸν καὶ μή, καὶ ἀντὶ ἀριστοκρατίας ἐν αὐτῇ θεατροκρατία τις πονηρὰ γέγονεν. εἰ γὰρ δὴ καὶ δημοκρατία ἐν αὐτῇ τις μόνον ἐγένετο ἐλευθέρων ἀνδρῶν, οὐδὲν ἂν πάνυ γε δεινὸν ἦν τὸ γεγονός· νῦν δὲ ἦρξε μὲν ἡμῖν ἐκ μουσικῆς

ἡ πάντων εἰς πάντα σοφίας δόξα καὶ παρανομία, συνεφέσπετο δὲ ἐλευθερία. ἄφοβοι γὰρ ἐγίγνοντο ὡς εἰδότες, ἡ δὲ ἄδεια ἀναισχυντίαν ἐνέτεκεν· τὸ γὰρ τὴν τοῦ βελτίονος δόξαν μὴ φοβεῖσθαι διὰ θράσος, τοῦτ' αὐτό ἐστιν σχεδὸν b ἡ πονηρὰ ἀναισχυντία, διὰ δή τινος ἐλευθερίας λίαν ἀποτετολμημένης.

ΜΕ. Ἀληθέστατα λέγεις.

ΑΘ. Ἐφεξῆς δὴ ταύτῃ τῇ ἐλευθερίᾳ ἡ τοῦ μὴ ἐθέλειν τοῖς 5 ἄρχουσι δουλεύειν γίγνοιτ' ἄν, καὶ ἑπομένη ταύτῃ φεύγειν πατρὸς καὶ μητρὸς καὶ πρεσβυτέρων δουλείαν καὶ νουθέτησιν, καὶ ἐγγὺς τοῦ τέλους οὖσιν νόμων ζητεῖν μὴ ὑπηκόοις εἶναι, πρὸς αὐτῷ δὲ ἤδη τῷ τέλει ὅρκων καὶ πίστεων καὶ τὸ παράπαν c θεῶν μὴ φροντίζειν, τὴν λεγομένην παλαιὰν Τιτανικὴν φύσιν ἐπιδεικνῦσι καὶ μιμουμένοις, ἐπὶ τὰ αὐτὰ πάλιν ἐκεῖνα ἀφικομένους, χαλεπὸν αἰῶνα διάγοντας μὴ λῆξαί ποτε κακῶν. τίνος δὴ καὶ ταῦθ' ἡμῖν αὖ χάριν ἐλέχθη; δεῖν φαίνεται ἔμοιγε 5 οἱόνπερ ἵππον τὸν λόγον ἑκάστοτε ἀναλαμβάνειν, καὶ μὴ καθάπερ ἀχάλινον κεκτημένον τὸ στόμα, βίᾳ ὑπὸ τοῦ λόγου φερόμενον, κατὰ τὴν παροιμίαν ἀπό τινος ὄνου πεσεῖν, ἀλλ' d ἐπανερωτᾶν τὸ νυνδὴ λεχθέν, τὸ τίνος δὴ χάριν [ἕνεκα] ταῦτα ἐλέχθη;

ΜΕ. Καλῶς.

ΑΘ. Ταῦτα τοίνυν εἴρηται ἐκείνων ἕνεκα. 5

ΜΕ. Τίνων;

ΑΘ. Ἐλέξαμεν ὡς τὸν νομοθέτην δεῖ τριῶν στοχαζόμενον νομοθετεῖν, ὅπως ἡ νομοθετουμένη πόλις ἐλευθέρα τε ἔσται καὶ φίλη ἑαυτῇ καὶ νοῦν ἕξει. ταῦτ' ἦν· ἦ γάρ;

ΜΕ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν. 10

ΑΘ. Τούτων ἕνεκα δὴ πολιτείας τήν τε δεσποτικωτάτην e προελόμενοι καὶ τὴν ἐλευθερικωτάτην, ἐπισκοποῦμεν νυνὶ ποτέρα τούτων ὀρθῶς πολιτεύεται· λαβόντες δὲ αὐτῶν ἑκατέρας μετριότητά τινα, τῶν μὲν τοῦ δεσπόζειν, τῶν δὲ τοῦ ἐλευθεριάσαι, κατείδομεν ὅτι τότε διαφερόντως ἐν αὐταῖς 5 ἐγένετο εὐπραγία, ἐπὶ δὲ τὸ ἄκρον ἀγαγόντων ἑκατέρων, τῶν μὲν δουλείας, τῶν δὲ τοὐναντίου, οὐ συνήνεγκεν οὔτε τοῖς οὔτε τοῖς.

ΜΕ. Ἀληθέστατα λέγεις. 702

ΑΘ. Καὶ μὴν αὐτῶν γ' ἕνεκα καὶ τὸ Δωρικὸν ἐθεασάμεθα κατοικιζόμενον στρατόπεδον καὶ τὰς τοῦ Δαρδάνου ὑπωρείας

τε καὶ τὴν ἐπὶ θαλάττῃ κατοίκισιν, καὶ τοὺς πρώτους δὴ τοὺς περιλιπεῖς γενομένους τῆς φθορᾶς, ἔτι δὲ τοὺς ἔμπροσθεν τούτων γενομένους ἡμῖν λόγους περί τε μουσικῆς καὶ μέθης καὶ τὰ τούτων ἔτι πρότερα. ταῦτα γὰρ πάντα εἴρηται τοῦ κατιδεῖν ἕνεκα πῶς ποτ' ἂν πόλις ἄριστα οἰκοίη, καὶ ἰδίᾳ πῶς ἄν τις βέλτιστα τὸν αὑτοῦ βίον διαγάγοι· εἰ δὲ δή τι πεποιήκαμεν προὔργου, τίς ποτ' ἂν ἔλεγχος γίγνοιτο ἡμῖν πρὸς ἡμᾶς αὐτοὺς λεχθείς, ὦ Μέγιλλέ τε καὶ Κλεινία;

ΚΛ. Ἐγώ τινα, ὦ ξένε, μοι δοκῶ κατανοεῖν. ἔοικεν κατὰ τύχην τινὰ ἡμῖν τὰ τῶν λόγων τούτων πάντων ὧν διεξήλθομεν γεγονέναι· σχεδὸν γὰρ εἰς χρείαν αὐτῶν ἔγωγ' ἐλήλυθα τὰ νῦν, καὶ κατά τινα αὖ καιρὸν σύ τε παραγέγονας ἅμα καὶ Μέγιλλος ὅδε. οὐ γὰρ ἀποκρύψομαι σφὼ τὸ νῦν ἐμοὶ συμβαῖνον, ἀλλὰ καὶ πρὸς οἰωνόν τινα ποιοῦμαι. ἡ γὰρ πλείστη τῆς Κρήτης ἐπιχειρεῖ τινα ἀποικίαν ποιήσασθαι, καὶ προστάττει τοῖς Κνωσίοις ἐπιμεληθῆναι τοῦ πράγματος, ἡ δὲ τῶν Κνωσίων πόλις ἐμοί τε καὶ ἄλλοις ἐννέα· ἅμα δὲ καὶ νόμους τῶν τε αὐτόθι, εἴ τινες ἡμᾶς ἀρέσκουσιν, τίθεσθαι κελεύει, καὶ εἴ τινες ἑτέρωθεν, μηδὲν ὑπολογιζομένους τὸ ξενικὸν αὐτῶν, ἂν βελτίους φαίνωνται. νῦν οὖν ἐμοί τε καὶ ὑμῖν ταύτην δῶμεν χάριν· ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων ἐκλέξαντες, τῷ λόγῳ συστησώμεθα πόλιν, οἷον ἐξ ἀρχῆς κατοικίζοντες, καὶ ἅμα μὲν ἡμῖν οὗ ζητοῦμεν ἐπίσκεψις γενήσεται, ἅμα δὲ ἐγὼ τάχ' ἂν χρησαίμην εἰς τὴν μέλλουσαν πόλιν ταύτῃ τῇ συστάσει.

ΑΘ. Οὐ πόλεμόν γε ἐπαγγέλλεις, ὦ Κλεινία· ἀλλ' εἰ μή τι Μεγίλλῳ πρόσαντες, τὰ παρ' ἐμοῦ γε ἡγοῦ σοι πάντα κατὰ νοῦν ὑπάρχειν εἰς δύναμιν.

ΚΛ. Εὖ λέγεις.

ΜΕ. Καὶ μὴν καὶ τὰ παρ' ἐμοῦ.

ΚΛ. Κάλλιστ' εἰρήκατον. ἀτὰρ πειρώμεθα λόγῳ πρῶτον κατοικίζειν τὴν πόλιν.

BOOK IV

SHORT ANALYSIS

704–707 e.—Foreign trade and a navy are dangers to the honesty and the bravery of a people. Therefore our colony should not be too near the sea, and its soil should produce various but not over-abundant crops.

707 e–708 e.—Better face the difficulty of welding into one a heterogeneous mass of colonists than that of overcoming the general prejudice against any improvement in polity or legislation which you will encounter if they all come from one city.

708 e–709 e.—Though bad luck may thwart the highest skill, without skill the best of luck cannot be utilized.

709 e–712 b.—The best chance for the establishment of a perfect polity is that a "divine" lawgiver should enjoy the complete confidence of a revered and public-spirited despot.

712 b–716.—The only true polity is one in which Law is supreme, and in which laws are made in the interest of the whole community.

716–718 b.—Our whole duty towards God and all superior powers and existences is here set forth.

718 b to end of book.—The need of rational, persuasive, and artistic prefaces to the laws.

Δ

ΑΘ. Φέρε δή, τίνα δεῖ διανοηθῆναί ποτε τὴν πόλιν 704
ἔσεσθαι; λέγω δὲ οὔτι τοὔνομα αὐτῆς ἐρωτῶν ὅτι ποτ' ἔστι
τὰ νῦν, οὐδὲ εἰς τὸν ἔπειτα χρόνον ὅτι δεήσει καλεῖν αὐτήν—
τοῦτο μὲν γὰρ τάχ' ἂν ἴσως καὶ ὁ κατοικισμὸς αὐτῆς ἤ τις
τόπος, ἢ ποταμοῦ τινος ἢ κρήνης ἢ θεῶν ἐπωνυμία τῶν ἐν τῷ 5
τόπῳ προσθείη τὴν αὐτῶν φήμην καινῇ γενομένῃ τῇ πόλει— b
τόδε δὲ περὶ αὐτῆς ἐστιν ὃ βουλόμενος μᾶλλον ἐπερωτῶ,
πότερον ἐπιθαλαττίδιος ἔσται τις ἢ χερσαία.

ΚΛ. Σχεδόν, ὦ ξένε, ἀπέχει θαλάττης γε ἡ πόλις, ἧς πέρι τὰ νυνδὴ λεχθέντα ἡμῖν, εἷς τινας ὀγδοήκοντα σταδίους.

ΑΘ. Τί δέ; λιμένες ἆρ' εἰσὶν κατὰ ταῦτα αὐτῆς, ἢ τὸ παράπαν ἀλίμενος;

ΚΛ. Εὐλίμενος μὲν οὖν ταύτῃ γε ὡς δυνατόν ἐστιν μάλιστα, ὦ ξένε.

c ΑΘ. Παπαί, οἷον λέγεις. τί δὲ περὶ αὐτὴν ἡ χώρα; πότερα πάμφορος ἢ καί τινων ἐπιδεής;

ΚΛ. Σχεδὸν οὐδενὸς ἐπιδεής.

ΑΘ. Γείτων δὲ αὐτῆς πόλις ἆρ' ἔσται τις πλησίον;

ΚΛ. Οὐ πάνυ, διὸ καὶ κατοικίζεται· παλαιὰ γάρ τις ἐξοίκησις ἐν τῷ τόπῳ γενομένη τὴν χώραν ταύτην ἔρημον ἀπείργασται χρόνον ἀμήχανον ὅσον.

ΑΘ. Τί δὲ πεδίων τε καὶ ὀρῶν καὶ ὕλης; πῶς μέρος ἑκάστων ἡμῖν εἴληχεν;

ΚΛ. Προσέοικε τῇ τῆς ἄλλης Κρήτης φύσει ὅλῃ.

d ΑΘ. Τραχυτέραν αὐτὴν ἢ πεδιεινοτέραν ἂν λέγοις.

ΚΛ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

ΑΘ. Οὐ τοίνυν ἀνίατός γε ἂν εἴη πρὸς ἀρετῆς κτῆσιν. εἰ μὲν γὰρ ἐπιθαλαττία τε ἔμελλεν εἶναι καὶ εὐλίμενος καὶ μὴ πάμφορος ἀλλ' ἐπιδεὴς πολλῶν, μεγάλου τινὸς ἔδει σωτῆρός τε αὐτῇ καὶ νομοθετῶν θείων τινῶν, εἰ μὴ πολλά τε ἔμελλεν ἤθη καὶ ποικίλα καὶ φαῦλα ἕξειν τοιαύτη φύσει γενομένη· νῦν δὲ παραμύθιον ἔχει τὸ τῶν ὀγδοήκοντα σταδίων. ἐγγύτερον μέντοι τοῦ δέοντος κεῖται τῆς θαλάττης, 705 σχεδὸν ὅσον εὐλιμενωτέραν αὐτὴν φῆς εἶναι, ὅμως δὲ ἀγαπητὸν καὶ τοῦτο. πρόσοικος γὰρ θάλαττα χώρᾳ τὸ μὲν παρ' ἑκάστην ἡμέραν ἡδύ, μάλα γε μὴν ὄντως ἁλμυρὸν καὶ πικρὸν γειτόνημα· ἐμπορίας γὰρ καὶ χρηματισμοῦ διὰ καπηλείας ἐμπιμπλᾶσα αὐτήν, ἦθη παλίμβολα καὶ ἄπιστα ταῖς ψυχαῖς ἐντίκτουσα, αὐτήν τε πρὸς αὑτὴν τὴν πόλιν ἄπιστον καὶ ἄφιλον ποιεῖ καὶ πρὸς τοὺς ἄλλους ἀνθρώπους ὡσαύτως. παραμύθιον δὲ δὴ πρὸς ταῦτα καὶ τὸ πάμφορος εἶναι κέκτηται, b τραχεῖα δὲ οὖσα δῆλον ὡς οὐκ ἂν πολύφορός [τε εἴη καὶ πάμφορος] ἅμα· τοῦτο γὰρ ἔχουσα, πολλὴν ἐξαγωγὴν ἂν παρεχομένη, νομίσματος ἀργυροῦ καὶ χρυσοῦ πάλιν ἀντεμπίμπλαιτ' ἄν, οὗ μεῖζον κακὸν ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν πόλει ἀνθ' ἑνὸς ἓν οὐδὲν ἂν γίγνοιτο εἰς γενναίων καὶ δικαίων ἠθῶν κτῆσιν, ὡς ἔφαμεν εἰ μεμνήμεθα, ἐν τοῖς πρόσθεν λόγοις.

ΚΛ. Ἀλλὰ μεμνήμεθα, καὶ συγχωροῦμεν τότε λέγειν ἡμᾶς ὀρθῶς καὶ τὰ νῦν.

ΑΘ. Τί δὲ δή; ναυπηγησίμης ὕλης ὁ τόπος ἡμῖν τῆς c χώρας πῶς ἔχει;

ΚΛ. Οὐκ ἔστιν οὔτε τις ἐλάτη λόγου ἀξία οὔτ' αὖ πεύκη, κυπάριττός τε οὐ πολλή· πίτυν τ' αὖ καὶ πλάτανον ὀλίγην ἂν εὕροι τις, οἷς δὴ πρὸς τὰ τῶν ἐντὸς τῶν πλοίων μέρη 5 ἀναγκαῖον τοῖς ναυπηγοῖς χρῆσθαι ἑκάστοτε.

ΑΘ. Καὶ ταῦτα οὐκ ἂν κακῶς ἔχοι τῇ χώρᾳ τῆς φύσεως.

ΚΛ. Τί δή;

ΑΘ. Μιμήσεις πονηρὰς μιμεῖσθαι τοὺς πολεμίους μὴ ῥᾳδίως δύνασθαί τινα πόλιν ἀγαθόν. d

ΚΛ. Εἰς δή τι τῶν εἰρημένων βλέψας εἶπες ὃ λέγεις;

ΑΘ. Ὦ δαιμόνιε, φύλαττέ με εἰς τὸ κατ' ἀρχὰς εἰρημένον ἀποβλέπων, τὸ περὶ τῶν Κρητικῶν νόμων ὡς πρὸς ἕν τι βλέποιεν, καὶ δὴ καὶ τοῦτ' ἐλεγέτην αὐτὸ εἶναι σφῷ 5 τὸ πρὸς τὸν πόλεμον, ἐγὼ δὲ ὑπολαβὼν εἶπον ὡς ὅτι μὲν εἰς ἀρετήν ποι βλέποι τὰ τοιαῦτα νόμιμα κείμενα, καλῶς ἔχοι, τὸ δὲ ὅτι πρὸς μέρος ἀλλ' οὐ πρὸς πᾶσαν σχεδόν, οὐ πάνυ συνεχώρουν· νῦν οὖν ὑμεῖς μοι τῆς παρούσης νομο- e θεσίας ἀντιφυλάξατε ἑπόμενοι, ἐὰν ἄρα τι μὴ πρὸς ἀρετὴν τεῖνον ἢ πρὸς ἀρετῆς μόριον νομοθετῶ. τοῦτον γὰρ δὴ τίθεσθαι τὸν νόμον ὀρθῶς ὑποτίθεμαι μόνον, ὃς ἂν δίκην τοξότου ἑκάστοτε στοχάζηται τούτου ὅτῳ ἂν συνεχῶς τούτων 706 ἀεὶ καλόν τι συνέπηται μόνῳ, τὰ δὲ ἄλλα σύμπαντα παραλείπῃ, ἐάν τε τις πλοῦτος ἐάν τε ἄρα τι τῶν ἄλλων τῶν τοιούτων ὂν τυγχάνῃ ἄνευ τῶν προειρημένων. τὴν δὲ δὴ μίμησιν ἔλεγον τὴν τῶν πολεμίων τὴν κακὴν τοιάνδε γί- 5 γνεσθαι, ὅταν οἰκῇ μέν τις πρὸς θαλάττῃ, λυπῆται δ' ὑπὸ πολεμίων, οἷον—φράσω γὰρ οὔτι μνησικακεῖν βουλόμενος ὑμῖν—Μίνως γὰρ δή ποτε τοὺς οἰκοῦντας τὴν Ἀττικὴν παρεστήσατο εἰς χαλεπήν τινα φορὰν δασμοῦ, δύναμιν b πολλὴν κατὰ θάλατταν κεκτημένος, οἱ δ' οὔτε πω πλοῖα ἐκέκτηντο, καθάπερ νῦν, πολεμικά, οὔτ' αὖ τὴν χώραν πλήρη ναυπηγησίμων ξύλων ὥστ' εὐμαρῶς ναυτικὴν παρασχέσθαι δύναμιν· οὔκουν οἱοί τ' ἐγένοντο διὰ μιμήσεως ναυτικῆς 5 αὐτοὶ ναῦται γενόμενοι εὐθὺς τότε τοὺς πολεμίους ἀμύνασθαι. ἔτι γὰρ ἂν πλεονάκις ἑπτὰ ἀπολέσαι παῖδας αὐτοῖς συνήνεγκεν, πρὶν ἀντὶ πεζῶν ὁπλιτῶν μονίμων ναυτικοὺς c

γενομένους ἐθισθῆναι, πυκνὰ ἀποπηδῶντας, δρομικῶς εἰς τὰς ναῦς ταχὺ πάλιν ἀποχωρεῖν, καὶ δοκεῖν μηδὲν αἰσχρὸν ποιεῖν μὴ τολμῶντας ἀποθνῄσκειν μένοντας ἐπιφερομένων πολεμίων, ἀλλ' εἰκυίας αὐτοῖς γίγνεσθαι προφάσεις καὶ σφόδρα ἑτοίμας ὅπλα τε ἀπολλῦσιν καὶ φεύγουσι δή τινας οὐκ αἰσχράς, ὥς φασιν, φυγάς. ταῦτα γὰρ ἐκ ναυτικῆς ὁπλιτείας ῥήματα φιλεῖ συμβαίνειν, οὐκ ἄξια ἐπαίνων πολλακισ-
d μυρίων, ἀλλὰ τοὐναντίον· ἔθη γὰρ πονηρὰ οὐδέποτε ἐθίζειν δεῖ, καὶ ταῦτα τὸ τῶν πολιτῶν βέλτιστον μέρος. ἦν δέ που τοῦτό γε καὶ παρ' Ὁμήρου λαβεῖν, ὅτι τὸ ἐπιτήδευμα ἦν τὸ τοιοῦτον οὐ καλόν. Ὀδυσσεὺς γὰρ αὐτῷ λοιδορεῖ τὸν Ἀγαμέμνονα, τῶν Ἀχαιῶν τότε ὑπὸ τῶν Τρώων κατεχομένων τῇ μάχῃ, κελεύοντα τὰς ναῦς εἰς τὴν θάλατταν καθέλκειν, ὁ δὲ χαλεπαίνει τε αὐτῷ καὶ λέγει—

e ὃς κέλεαι πολέμοιο συνεσταότος καὶ αὐτῆς
νῆας ἐυσέλμους ἅλαδ' ἔλκειν, ὄφρ' ἔτι μᾶλλον
Τρωσὶ μὲν εὐκτὰ γένηται ἐελδομένοισί περ ἔμπης,
ἡμῖν δ' αἰπὺς ὄλεθρος ἐπιρρέπῃ· οὐ γὰρ Ἀχαιοὶ
5 σχήσουσιν πολέμου νηῶν ἅλαδ' ἑλκομενάων,
ἀλλ' ἀποπαπτανέουσιν, ἐρωήσουσι δὲ χάρμης·
707 ἔνθα κε σὴ βουλὴ δηλήσεται, οἵ' ἀγορεύεις.

ταῦτ' οὖν ἐγίγνωσκε καὶ ἐκεῖνος, ὅτι κακὸν ἐν θαλάττῃ τριήρεις ὁπλίταις παρεστῶσαι μαχομένοις· καὶ λέοντες ἂν ἐλάφους ἐθισθεῖεν φεύγειν τοιούτοις ἔθεσι χρώμενοι. πρὸς
5 δὲ τούτοις αἱ διὰ τὰ ναυτικὰ πόλεων δυνάμεις ἅμα σωτηρίας τιμὰς οὐ τῷ καλλίστῳ τῶν πολεμικῶν ἀποδιδόασιν· διὰ κυβερνητικῆς γὰρ καὶ πεντηκονταρχίας καὶ ἐρετικῆς, καὶ
b παντοδαπῶν καὶ οὐ πάνυ σπουδαίων ἀνθρώπων γιγνομένης, τὰς τιμὰς ἑκάστοις οὐκ ἂν δύναιτο ὀρθῶς ἀποδιδόναι τις. καίτοι πῶς ἂν ἔτι πολιτεία γίγνοιτο ὀρθὴ τούτου στερομένη;

ΚΛ. Σχεδὸν ἀδύνατον. ἀλλὰ μήν, ὦ ξένε, τήν γε περὶ
5 Σαλαμῖνα ναυμαχίαν τῶν Ἑλλήνων πρὸς τοὺς βαρβάρους γενομένην ἡμεῖς γε οἱ Κρῆτες τὴν Ἑλλάδα φαμὲν σῶσαι.

ΑΘ. Καὶ γὰρ οἱ πολλοὶ τῶν Ἑλλήνων τε καὶ βαρβάρων
c λέγουσι ταῦτα. ἡμεῖς δέ, ὦ φίλε, ἐγώ τε καὶ ὅδε, Μέγιλλος, φαμὲν τὴν πεζὴν μάχην τὴν ἐν Μαραθῶνι γενομένην καὶ ἐν Πλαταιαῖς, τὴν μὲν ἄρξαι τῆς σωτηρίας τοῖς Ἕλλησι,

τὴν δὲ τέλος ἐπιθεῖναι, καὶ τὰς μὲν βελτίους τοὺς Ἕλληνας ποιῆσαι, τὰς δὲ οὐ βελτίους, ἵν' οὕτως λέγωμεν περὶ τῶν τότε συσσωσασῶν ἡμᾶς μαχῶν· πρὸς γὰρ τῇ περὶ Σαλαμῖνα τὴν περὶ τὸ Ἀρτεμίσιόν σοι προσθήσω κατὰ θάλατταν μάχην. ἀλλὰ γὰρ ἀποβλέποντες νῦν πρὸς πολιτείας ἀρετὴν καὶ χώρας φύσιν σκοπούμεθα καὶ νόμων τάξιν, οὐ τὸ σῴζεσθαί τε καὶ εἶναι μόνον ἀνθρώποις τιμιώτατον ἡγούμενοι, καθάπερ οἱ πολλοί, τὸ δ' ὡς βελτίστους γίγνεσθαί τε καὶ εἶναι τοσοῦτον χρόνον ὅσον ἂν ὦσιν· εἴρηται δ' ἡμῖν οἶμαι καὶ τοῦτο ἐν τοῖς πρόσθεν.

ΚΛ. Τί μήν;

ΑΘ. Τοῦτο τοίνυν σκοπώμεθα μόνον, εἰ κατὰ τὴν αὐτὴν ὁδὸν ἐρχόμεθα βελτίστην οὖσαν πόλεσι κατοικίσεων πέρι καὶ νομοθεσιῶν.

ΚΛ. Καὶ πολύ γε.

ΑΘ. Λέγε δὴ τοίνυν τὸ τούτοις ἑξῆς· τίς ὁ κατοικιζόμενος ὑμῖν λεὼς ἔσται; πότερον ἐξ ἁπάσης Κρήτης ὁ ἐθέλων, ὡς ὄχλου τινὸς ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν ἑκάσταις γεγενημένου πλείονος ἢ κατὰ τὴν ἐκ τῆς γῆς τροφήν; οὐ γάρ που τὸν βουλόμενόν γε Ἑλλήνων συνάγετε. καίτοι τινὰς ὑμῖν ἔκ τε Ἄργους ὁρῶ καὶ Αἰγίνης καὶ ἄλλοθεν τῶν Ἑλλήνων εἰς τὴν χώραν κατῳκισμένους. τὸ δὲ δὴ παρὸν ἡμῖν, λέγε, πόθεν ἔσεσθαι φῂς στρατόπεδον τῶν πολιτῶν τὰ νῦν;

ΚΛ. Ἔκ τε Κρήτης συμπάσης ἔοικεν γενήσεσθαι, καὶ τῶν ἄλλων δὲ Ἑλλήνων μάλιστ' ‹ἄν› μοι φαίνονται τοὺς ἀπὸ Πελοποννήσου προσδέξασθαι συνοίκους. καὶ γὰρ ὃ νῦν δὴ λέγεις, ἀληθὲς φράζεις, ὡς ἐξ Ἄργους εἰσίν, καὶ τό γε μάλιστ' εὐδοκιμοῦν τὰ νῦν ἐνθάδε γένος, τὸ Γορτυνικόν· ἐκ Γόρτυνος γὰρ τυγχάνει ἀπῳκηκὸς ταύτης τῆς Πελοποννησιακῆς.

ΑΘ. Οὐ τοίνυν εὔκολος ὁμοίως γίγνοιτ' ἂν ὁ κατοικισμὸς ταῖς πόλεσιν, ὅταν μὴ τὸν τῶν ἐσμῶν γίγνηται τρόπον, ἓν γένος ἀπὸ μιᾶς ἰὸν χώρας οἰκίζηται, φίλον παρὰ φίλων, στενοχωρίᾳ τινὶ πολιορκηθὲν γῆς ἢ τισιν ἄλλοις τοιούτοις παθήμασιν ἀναγκασθέν. ἔστιν δ' ὅτε καὶ στάσεσιν βιαζόμενον ἀναγκάζοιτ' ἂν ἑτέρωσε ἀποξενοῦσθαι πόλεώς τι μόριον· ἤδη δέ ποτε καὶ συνάπασα πόλις τινῶν ἔφυγεν, ἄρδην κρείττονι κρατηθεῖσα πολέμῳ. ταῦτ' οὖν πάντ' ἐστὶ τῇ μὲν ῥᾴω κατοικίζεσθαί τε καὶ νομοθετεῖσθαι, τῇ δὲ χαλε-

πώτερα. τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἕν τι εἶναι γένος ὁμόφωνον καὶ ὁμόνομον ἔχει τινὰ φιλίαν, κοινωνὸν ἱερῶν ὂν καὶ τῶν τοιούτων πάντων, νόμους δ' ἑτέρους καὶ πολιτείας ἄλλας τῶν οἴκοθεν οὐκ εὐπετῶς ἀνέχεται, τὸ δ' ἐνίοτε πονηρίᾳ νόμων ἐστασιακὸς καὶ διὰ συνήθειαν ζητοῦν ἔτι χρῆσθαι τοῖς αὐτοῖς ἤθεσιν δι' ἃ καὶ πρότερον ἐφθάρη, χαλεπὸν τῷ κατοικί-
d ζοντι καὶ νομοθετοῦντι καὶ δυσπειθὲς γίγνεται· τὸ δ' αὖ παντοδαπὸν ἐς ταὐτὸν συνερρυηκὸς γένος ὑπακοῦσαι μέν τινων νόμων καινῶν τάχα ἂν ἐθελήσειε μᾶλλον, τὸ δὲ συμπνεῦσαι, καὶ καθάπερ ἵππων ζεῦγος καθ' ἕνα εἰς ταὐτόν, τὸ
5 λεγόμενον, συμφυσῆσαι, χρόνου πολλοῦ καὶ παγχάλεπον. ἀλλ' ὄντως ἐστὶν νομοθεσία καὶ πόλεων οἰκισμοὶ πάντων τελεωτάτων πρὸς ἀρετὴν ἀνδρῶν.

ΚΛ. Εἰκός· ὅπῃ δ' αὖ βλέπων τοῦτ' εἴρηκας, φράζ' ἔτι σαφέστερον.

e ΑΘ. Ὠγαθέ, ἔοικα περὶ νομοθετῶν ἐπανιὼν καὶ σκοπῶν ἅμα ἐρεῖν τι καὶ φαῦλον· ἀλλ' ἐὰν πρὸς καιρόν τινα λέγωμεν, πρᾶγμ' οὐδὲν γίγνοιτ' ἂν ἔτι. καίτοι τί ποτε δυσχεραίνω; σχεδὸν γάρ τοι πάντα οὕτως ἔοικ' ἔχειν τὰ ἀνθρώπινα.

5 ΚΛ. Τοῦ δὴ πέρι λέγεις;

709 ΑΘ. Ἔμελλον λέγειν ὡς οὐδείς ποτε ἀνθρώπων οὐδὲν νομοθετεῖ, τύχαι δὲ καὶ συμφοραὶ παντοῖαι πίπτουσαι παντοίως νομοθετοῦσι τὰ πάντα ἡμῖν. ἢ γὰρ πόλεμός τις βιασάμενος ἀνέτρεψε πολιτείας καὶ μετέβαλε νόμους, ἢ
5 πενίας χαλεπῆς ἀπορία· πολλὰ δὲ καὶ νόσοι ἀναγκάζουσι καινοτομεῖν, λοιμῶν τε ἐμπιπτόντων, καὶ χρόνον ἐπὶ πολὺν ἐνιαυτῶν πολλῶν πολλάκις ἀκαιρίας. ταῦτα δὴ πάντα προϊδών τις ᾄξειεν ἂν εἰπεῖν ὅπερ ἐγὼ νυνδή, τὸ θνητῶν μὲν
b μηδένα νομοθετεῖν μηδέν, τύχας δ' εἶναι σχεδὸν ἅπαντα· τὰ ἀνθρώπινα πράγματα· τὸ δ' ἔστιν περί τε ναυτιλίαν καὶ κυβερνητικὴν καὶ ἰατρικὴν καὶ στρατηγικὴν πάντα ταῦτ' εἰπόντα δοκεῖν εὖ λέγειν, ἀλλὰ γὰρ ὁμοίως αὖ καὶ τόδε
5 ἔστιν λέγοντα εὖ λέγειν ἐν τοῖς αὐτοῖς τούτοις.

ΚΛ. Τὸ ποῖον;

ΑΘ. Ὡς θεὸς μὲν πάντα, καὶ μετὰ θεοῦ τύχη καὶ καιρὸς τἀνθρώπινα διακυβερνῶσι σύμπαντα· ἡμερώτερον μὴν τρίτον
c συγχωρῆσαι τούτοις δεῖν ἕπεσθαι τέχνην· καιρῷ γὰρ χειμῶνος συλλαβέσθαι κυβερνητικὴν ἢ μή, μέγα πλεονέκτημα ἔγωγ' ἂν θείην. ἢ πῶς;

ΚΛ. Οὕτως.

ΑΘ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ὡσαύτως [κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν ἂν ἔχοι λόγον] καὶ δὴ καὶ νομοθεσία ταὐτὸν τοῦτο δοτέον· τῶν ἄλλων συμπιπτόντων, ὅσα δεῖ χώρᾳ συντυχεῖν, εἰ μέλλοι ποτὲ εὐδαιμόνως οἰκήσειν, τὸν νομοθέτην ἀληθείας ἐχόμενον τῇ τοιαύτῃ παραπεσεῖν ἑκάστοτε πόλει δεῖν.

ΚΛ. Ἀληθέστατα λέγεις.

ΑΘ. Οὐκοῦν ὅ γε πρὸς ἕκαστόν τι τῶν εἰρημένων ἔχων τὴν τέχνην κἂν εὔξασθαί που δύναιτο ὀρθῶς τι παρὸν αὐτῷ διὰ τύχης τῆς τέχνης ἂν μόνον ἐπιδέον;

ΚΛ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

ΑΘ. Οἵ τε ἄλλοι γε δὴ πάντες οἱ νυνδὴ ῥηθέντες, κελευόμενοι τὴν αὑτῶν εὐχὴν εἰπεῖν, εἴποιεν ἄν. ἦ γάρ;

ΚΛ. Τί μήν;

ΑΘ. Ταὐτὸν δὴ καὶ νομοθέτης οἶμαι δράσει.

ΚΛ. Ἔγωγ' οἶμαι.

ΑΘ. "Φέρε δή, νομοθέτα," πρὸς αὐτὸν φῶμεν, "τί σοι καὶ πῶς πόλιν ἔχουσαν δῶμεν, ὃ λαβὼν ἕξεις ὥστ' ἐκ τῶν λοιπῶν αὐτὸς τὴν πόλιν ἱκανῶς διοικῆσαι;"

ΚΛ. Τί μετὰ τοῦτ' εἰπεῖν ὀρθῶς ἔστιν ἄρα;

ΑΘ. Τοῦ νομοθέτου φράζομεν τοῦτο, ἦ γάρ;

ΚΛ. Ναί.

ΑΘ. Τόδε· "Τυραννουμένην μοι δότε τὴν πόλιν," φήσει· "τύραννος δ' ἔστω νέος καὶ μνήμων καὶ εὐμαθὴς καὶ ἀνδρεῖος καὶ μεγαλοπρεπὴς φύσει· ὃ δὲ καὶ ἐν τοῖς πρόσθεν ἐλέγομεν δεῖν ἕπεσθαι σύμπασιν τοῖς τῆς ἀρετῆς μέρεσι, καὶ νῦν τῇ τυράννου ψυχῇ τοῦτο συνεπέσθω, ἐὰν μέλλῃ τῶν ἄλλων ὑπαρχόντων ὄφελος εἶναί τι."

ΚΛ. Σωφροσύνην μοι δοκεῖ φράζειν, ὦ Μέγιλλε, δεῖν εἶναι τὴν συνεπομένην ὁ ξένος. ἦ γάρ;

ΑΘ. Τὴν δημώδη γε, ὦ Κλεινία, καὶ οὐχ ἥν τις σεμνύνων ἂν λέγοι, φρόνησιν προσαναγκάζων εἶναι τὸ σωφρονεῖν, ἀλλ' ὅπερ εὐθὺς παισὶν καὶ θηρίοις, τοῖς μὲν ἀκρατῶς ἔχειν πρὸς τὰς ἡδονάς, σύμφυτον ἐπανθεῖ, τοῖς δὲ ἐγκρατῶς· ὃ καὶ μονούμενον ἔφαμεν τῶν πολλῶν ἀγαθῶν λεγομένων οὐκ ἄξιον εἶναι λόγου. ἔχετε γὰρ ὃ λέγω που.

ΚΛ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

ΑΘ. Ταύτην τοίνυν ἡμῖν ὁ τύραννος τὴν φύσιν ἐχέτω πρὸς ἐκείναις ταῖς φύσεσιν, εἰ μέλλει πόλις ὡς

δυνατόν ἐστι τάχιστα καὶ ἄριστα σχήσειν πολιτείαν ἣν λαβοῦσα εὐδαιμονέστατα διάξει. θάττων γὰρ ταύτης καὶ ἀμείνων πολιτείας διάθεσις οὔτ' ἔστιν οὔτ' ἄν ποτε γένοιτο.

c ΚΛ. Πῶς δὴ καὶ τίνι λόγῳ τοῦτο, ὦ ξένε, λέγων ἄν τις ὀρθῶς λέγειν αὐτὸν πείθοι;

ΑΘ. Ῥᾴδιόν που τοῦτό γε νοεῖν ἐστ', ὦ Κλεινία, κατὰ φύσιν ὡς ἔστι τοῦθ' οὕτω.

5 ΚΛ. Πῶς λέγεις; εἰ τύραννος γένοιτο, φῄς, νέος, σώφρων, εὐμαθής, μνήμων, ἀνδρεῖος, μεγαλοπρεπής;

ΑΘ. Εὐτυχής, πρόσθες, μὴ κατ' ἄλλο, ἀλλὰ τὸ γενέσθαι τε ἐπ' αὐτοῦ νομοθέτην ἄξιον ἐπαίνου, καί τινα τύχην εἰς

d ταὐτὸν ἀγαγεῖν αὐτώ. γενομένου γὰρ τούτου, πάντα σχεδὸν ἀπείργασται τῷ θεῷ, ἅπερ ὅταν βουληθῇ διαφερόντως εὖ πρᾶξαί τινα πόλιν. δεύτερον δέ, ἐάν ποτέ τινες δύο ἄρχοντες γίγνωνται τοιοῦτοι, τρίτον δ' αὖ καὶ κατὰ λόγον ὡσαύτως

5 χαλεπώτερον ὅσῳ πλείους, ὅσῳ δ' ἐναντίον, ἐναντίως.

ΚΛ. Ἐκ τυραννίδος ἀρίστην φῂς γενέσθαι πόλιν ἄν, ὡς φαίνῃ, μετὰ νομοθέτου γε ἄκρου καὶ τυράννου κοσμίου, καὶ ῥᾷστά τε καὶ τάχιστ' ἂν μεταβαλεῖν εἰς τοῦτο ἐκ τοῦ τοιούτου,

e δεύτερον δὲ ἐξ ὀλιγαρχίας, ἢ πῶς λέγεις; [καὶ τὸ τρίτον ἐκ δημοκρατίας.]

ΑΘ. Οὐδαμῶς, ἀλλ' ἐκ τυραννίδος μὲν πρῶτον, δεύτερον δὲ ἐκ βασιλικῆς πολιτείας, τρίτον δὲ ἔκ τινος δημοκρατίας.

5 τὸ δὲ τέταρτον, ὀλιγαρχία, τὴν τοῦ τοιούτου γένεσιν χαλεπώτατα δύναιτ' ἂν προσδέξασθαι· πλεῖστοι γὰρ ἐν αὐτῇ δυνάσται γίγνονται. λέγομεν δὴ ταῦτα γίγνεσθαι τότε, ὅταν ἀληθὴς μὲν νομοθέτης γένηται φύσει, κοινὴ δὲ αὐτῷ τις συμβῇ ῥώμη πρὸς τοὺς ἐν τῇ πόλει μέγιστον δυναμένους·

711 οὗ δ' ἂν τοῦτο ἀριθμῷ μὲν βραχύτατον, ἰσχυρότατον δέ, καθάπερ ἐν τυραννίδι, γένηται, ταύτῃ καὶ τότε τάχος καὶ ῥᾳστώνη τῆς μεταβολῆς γίγνεσθαι φιλεῖ.

ΚΛ. Πῶς; οὐ γὰρ μανθάνομεν.

5 ΑΘ. Καὶ μὴν εἴρηταί γ' ἡμῖν οὐχ ἅπαξ ἀλλ' οἶμαι πολλάκις· ὑμεῖς δὲ τάχα οὐδὲ τεθέασθε τυραννουμένην πόλιν.

ΚΛ. Οὐδέ γε ἐπιθυμητὴς ἔγωγ' εἰμὶ τοῦ θεάματος.

b ΑΘ. Καὶ μὴν τοῦτό γ' ἂν ἴδοις ἐν αὐτῇ τὸ νυνδὴ λεγόμενον.

ΚΛ. Τὸ ποῖον;

ΑΘ. Οὐδὲν δεῖ πόνων οὐδέ τινος παμπόλλου χρόνου τῷ τυράννῳ μεταβαλεῖν βουληθέντι πόλεως ἧθη, πορεύεσθαι δὲ αὐτὸν δεῖ πρῶτον ταύτῃ, ὅπῃπερ ἂν ἐθελήσῃ, ἐάν τε πρὸς ἀρετῆς ἐπιτηδεύματα, προτρέπεσθαι τοὺς πολίτας, ἐάν τε ἐπὶ τοὐναντίον, αὐτὸν πρῶτον πάντα ὑπογράφοντα τῷ πράττειν, τὰ μὲν ἐπαινοῦντα καὶ τιμῶντα, τὰ δ' αὖ πρὸς ψόγον ἄγοντα, καὶ τὸν μὴ πειθόμενον ἀτιμάζοντα καθ' ἑκάστας τῶν πράξεων.

ΚΛ. Καὶ πῶς οἰόμεθα ταχὺ συνακολουθήσειν τοὺς ἄλλους πολίτας τῷ τὴν τοιαύτην πειθὼ καὶ ἅμα βίαν εἰληφότι;

ΑΘ. Μηδεὶς ἡμᾶς πειθέτω, ὦ φίλοι, ἄλλῃ θᾶττον καὶ ῥᾷον μεταβάλλειν ἄν ποτε πόλιν τοὺς νόμους ἢ τῇ τῶν δυναστευόντων ἡγεμονίᾳ, μηδὲ νῦν γε ἄλλῃ γίγνεσθαι μηδ' αὖθίς ποτε γενήσεσθαι. καὶ γὰρ οὖν ἡμῖν οὐ τοῦτ' ἐστὶν ἀδύνατον οὐδὲ χαλεπῶς ἂν γενόμενον· ἀλλὰ τόδ' ἐστὶ τὸ χαλεπὸν γενέσθαι, καὶ ὀλίγου δὴ τὸ γεγονὸς ἐν τῷ πολλῷ χρόνῳ, ὅταν δὲ συμβῇ, μυρία καὶ πάντ' ἐν πόλει ἀγαθὰ ἀπεργάζεται, ἐν ᾗ ποτ' ἂν ἐγγένηται.

ΚΛ. Τὸ ποῖον δὴ λέγεις;

ΑΘ. Ὅταν ἔρως θεῖος τῶν σωφρόνων τε καὶ δικαίων ἐπιτηδευμάτων ἐγγένηται μεγάλαις τισὶν δυναστείαις, ἢ κατὰ μοναρχίαν δυναστευούσαις ἢ κατὰ πλούτων ὑπεροχὰς διαφερούσαις ἢ γενῶν, ἢ τὴν Νέστορος ἐάν ποτέ τις ἐπανενέγκῃ φύσιν, ὃν τῇ τοῦ λέγειν ῥώμῃ φασὶ πάντων διενεγκόντα ἀνθρώπων πλέον ἔτι τῷ σωφρονεῖν διαφέρειν. τοῦτ' οὖν ἐπὶ μὲν Τροίας, ὥς φασι, γέγονεν, ἐφ' ἡμῶν δὲ οὐδαμῶς, εἰ δ' οὖν γέγονεν ἢ καὶ γενήσεται τοιοῦτος ἢ νῦν ἡμῖν ἔστιν τις, μακαρίως μὲν αὐτὸς ζῇ, μακάριοι δὲ οἱ συνήκοοι τῶν ἐκ τοῦ σωφρονοῦντος στόματος ἰόντων λόγων. ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ συμπάσης δυνάμεως ὁ αὐτὸς πέρι λόγος, ὡς ὅταν εἰς ταὐτὸν τῷ φρονεῖν τε καὶ σωφρονεῖν ἡ μεγίστη δύναμις ἐν ἀνθρώπῳ συμπέσῃ, τότε πολιτείας τῆς ἀρίστης καὶ νόμων τῶν τοιούτων φύεται γένεσις, ἄλλως δὲ οὐ μή ποτε γένηται. ταῦτα μὲν οὖν καθαπερεὶ μῦθός τις λεχθεὶς κεχρησμῳδήσθω καὶ ἐπιδεδείχθω τῇ μὲν χαλεπὸν ὂν τὸ πόλιν εὔνομον γίγνεσθαι, τῇ δ', εἴπερ γένοιτο ὃ λέγομεν, πάντων τάχιστόν τε καὶ ῥᾷστον μακρῷ.

ΚΛ. Πῶς;

ΑΘ. Πειρώμεθα προσαρμόττοντες τῇ πόλει σοι, καθάπερ παῖδες πρεσβῦται, πλάττειν τῷ λόγῳ τοὺς νόμους.

ΚΛ. Ἴωμεν δὴ καὶ μὴ μέλλωμεν ἔτι.

ΑΘ. Θεὸν δὴ πρὸς τὴν τῆς πόλεως κατασκευὴν ἐπικαλώμεθα· ὁ δὲ ἀκούσειέν τε, καὶ ἀκούσας ἵλεως εὐμενής τε ἡμῖν ἔλθοι συνδιακοσμήσων τήν τε πόλιν καὶ τοὺς νόμους.

ΚΛ. Ἔλθοι γὰρ οὖν.

ΑΘ. Ἀλλὰ τίνα δή ποτε πολιτείαν ἔχομεν ἐν νῷ τῇ πόλει προστάττειν;

ΚΛ. Οἷον δὴ τί λέγεις βουληθείς; φράζ' ἔτι σαφέστερον. οἷον δημοκρατίαν τινὰ ἢ ὀλιγαρχίαν ἢ ἀριστοκρατίαν ἢ βασιλικήν; οὐ γὰρ δὴ τυραννίδα γέ που λέγοις ἄν, ὥς γ' ἡμεῖς ἂν οἰηθεῖμεν.

ΑΘ. Φέρε δὴ τοίνυν, πότερος ὑμῶν ἀποκρίνασθαι πρότερος ἂν ἐθέλοι, τὴν οἵκοι πολιτείαν εἰπὼν τίς τούτων ἐστίν;

ΜΕ. Μῶν οὖν τὸν πρεσβύτερον ἐμὲ δικαιότερον εἰπεῖν πρότερον;

ΚΛ. Ἴσως.

ΜΕ. Καὶ μὴν συννοῶν γε, ὦ ξένε, τὴν ἐν Λακεδαίμονι πολιτείαν οὐκ ἔχω σοι φράζειν οὕτως ἥντινα προσαγορεύειν αὐτὴν δεῖ. καὶ γὰρ τυραννίδι δοκεῖ μοι προσεοικέναι—τὸ γὰρ τῶν ἐφόρων θαυμαστῶς ὡς τυραννικὸν ἐν αὐτῇ γέγονε —καί τις ἐνίοτέ μοι φαίνεται πασῶν τῶν πόλεων δημοκρατουμένη μάλιστ' ἐοικέναι. τὸ δ' αὖ μὴ φάναι ἀριστοκρατίαν αὐτὴν εἶναι παντάπασιν ἄτοπον· καὶ μὲν δὴ βασιλεία γε διὰ βίου τ' ἐστὶν ἐν αὐτῇ καὶ ἀρχαιοτάτη πασῶν καὶ πρὸς πάντων ἀνθρώπων καὶ ἡμῶν αὐτῶν λεγομένη. ἐγὼ δὲ οὕτω νῦν ἐξαίφνης ἀνερωτηθείς, ὄντως, ὅπερ εἶπον, οὐκ ἔχω διορισάμενος εἰπεῖν τίς τούτων ἐστὶν τῶν πολιτειῶν.

ΚΛ. Ταὐτόν σοι πάθος, ὦ Μέγιλλε, καταφαίνομαι πεπονθέναι· πάνυ γὰρ ἀπορῶ τὴν ἐν Κνωσῷ πολιτείαν τούτων τινὰ διισχυριζόμενος εἰπεῖν.

ΑΘ. Ὄντως γάρ, ὦ ἄριστοι, πολιτειῶν μετέχετε· ἃς δὲ ὠνομάκαμεν νῦν, οὐκ εἰσὶν πολιτεῖαι, πόλεων δὲ οἰκήσεις δεσποζομένων τε καὶ δουλευουσῶν μέρεσιν ἑαυτῶν τισι, τὸ τοῦ δεσπότου δὲ ἑκάστη προσαγορεύεται κράτος. χρὴν δ' εἴπερ του τοιούτου τὴν πόλιν ἔδει ἐπονομάζεσθαι, τὸ τοῦ ἀληθῶς τῶν [τὸν] νοῦν ἐχόντων δεσπόζοντος θεοῦ ὄνομα λέγεσθαι.

ΚΛ. Τίς δ' ὁ θεός;

ΑΘ. Ἦ οὖν μύθῳ σμικρά γ' ἔτι προσχρηστέον, εἰ μέλλομεν ἐμμελῶς πως δηλῶσαι τὸ νῦν ἐρωτώμενον;

ΚΛ. Οὐκοῦν χρὴ ταύτῃ δρᾶν ;

ΑΘ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν. τῶν γὰρ δὴ πόλεων ὧν ἔμπροσθε τὰς συνοικήσεις διήλθομεν, ἔτι προτέρα τούτων πάμπολυ λέγεταί τις ἀρχή τε καὶ οἴκησις γεγονέναι ἐπὶ Κρόνου μάλ' εὐδαίμων, ἧς μίμημα ἔχουσά ἐστιν ἥτις τῶν νῦν ἄριστα οἰκεῖται.

ΚΛ. Σφόδρ' ἄν, ὡς ἔοικ', εἴη περὶ αὐτῆς δέον ἀκούειν.

ΑΘ. Ἐμοὶ γοῦν φαίνεται· διὸ καὶ παρήγαγον αὐτὴν εἰς τὸ μέσον τοῖς λόγοις.

ΚΛ. Ὀρθότατά γε δρῶν· καὶ τόν γε ἑξῆς περαίνων ἂν μῦθον, εἴπερ προσήκων ἐστίν, μάλ' ὀρθῶς ἂν ποιοίης.

ΑΘ. Δραστέον ὡς λέγετε. φήμην τοίνυν παραδεδέγμεθα τῆς τῶν τότε μακαρίας ζωῆς ὡς ἄφθονά τε καὶ αὐτόματα πάντ' εἶχεν. ἡ δὲ τούτων αἰτία λέγεται τοιάδε τις. γιγνώσκων ὁ Κρόνος ἄρα, καθάπερ ἡμεῖς διεληλύθαμεν, ὡς ἀνθρωπεία φύσις οὐδεμία ἱκανὴ τὰ ἀνθρώπινα διοικοῦσα αὐτοκράτωρ πάντα, μὴ οὐχ ὕβρεώς τε καὶ ἀδικίας μεστοῦσθαι, ταῦτ' οὖν διανοούμενος ἐφίστη τότε βασιλέας τε καὶ ἄρχοντας ταῖς πόλεσιν ἡμῶν, οὐκ ἀνθρώπους ἀλλὰ γένους θειοτέρου τε καὶ ἀμείνονος, δαίμονας, οἷον νῦν ἡμεῖς δρῶμεν τοῖς ποιμνίοις καὶ ὅσων ἥμεροί εἰσιν ἀγέλαι· οὐ βοῦς βοῶν οὐδὲ αἶγας αἰγῶν ἄρχοντας ποιοῦμεν αὐτοῖσί τινας, ἀλλ' ἡμεῖς αὐτῶν δεσπόζομεν, ἄμεινον ἐκείνων γένος. ταὐτὸν δὴ καὶ ὁ θεὸς [ἄρα καὶ] φιλάνθρωπος ὤν, [τὸ] γένος ἄμεινον ἡμῶν ἐφίστη τὸ τῶν δαιμόνων, ὃ διὰ πολλῆς μὲν αὐτοῖς ῥᾳστώνης, πολλῆς δ' ἡμῖν, ἐπιμελούμενον ἡμῶν, εἰρήνην τε καὶ αἰδῶ καὶ εὐνομίαν καὶ ἀφθονίαν δίκης παρεχόμενον, ἀστασίαστα καὶ εὐδαίμονα τὰ τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἀπηργάζετο γένη. λέγει δὴ καὶ νῦν οὗτος ὁ λόγος, ἀληθείᾳ χρώμενος, ὡς ὅσων ἂν πόλεων μὴ θεὸς ἀλλά τις ἄρχῃ θνητός, οὐκ ἔστιν κακῶν αὐτοῖς οὐδὲ πόνων ἀνάφυξις· ἀλλὰ μιμεῖσθαι δεῖν ἡμᾶς οἴεται πάσῃ μηχανῇ τὸν ἐπὶ τοῦ Κρόνου λεγόμενον βίον, καὶ ὅσον ἐν ἡμῖν ἀθανασίας ἔνεστι, τούτῳ πειθομένους δημοσίᾳ καὶ ἰδίᾳ τάς τ' οἰκήσεις καὶ τὰς πόλεις διοικεῖν, τὴν τοῦ νοῦ διανομὴν ἐπονομάζοντας νόμον. εἰ δ' ἄνθρωπος εἷς ἢ ὀλιγαρχία τις, ἢ καὶ δημοκρατία ψυχὴν ἔχουσα ἡδονῶν καὶ ἐπιθυμιῶν ὀρεγομένην καὶ πληροῦσθαι τούτων δεομένην, στέγουσαν δὲ οὐδὲν ἀλλ' ἀνηνύτῳ καὶ ἀπλήστῳ κακῷ [νοσήματι] συνεχομένην, ἄρξει δὴ πόλεως ἤ τινος ἰδιώτου κατα-

πατήσας ὁ τοιοῦτος τοὺς νόμους, ὃ νυνδὴ ἐλέγομεν, οὐκ ἔστι σωτηρίας μηχανή. σκοπεῖν δὴ δεῖ τοῦτον τὸν λόγον ἡμᾶς,
b ὦ Κλεινία, πότερον αὐτῷ πεισόμεθα ἢ πῶς δράσομεν.

ΚΛ. Ἀνάγκη δήπου πείθεσθαι.

ΑΘ. Ἐννοεῖς οὖν ὅτι νόμων εἴδη τινές φασιν εἶναι τοσαῦτα ὅσαπερ πολιτειῶν, πολιτειῶν δὲ ἄρτι διεληλύθαμεν
5 ὅσα λέγουσιν οἱ πολλοί; μὴ δὴ φαύλου πέρι νομίσῃς εἶναι τὴν νῦν ἀμφισβήτησιν, περὶ δὲ τοῦ μεγίστου· τὸ γὰρ δίκαιον καὶ ἄδικον οἷ χρὴ βλέπειν, πάλιν ἡμῖν ἀμφισβητούμενον ἐλήλυθεν. οὔτε γὰρ πρὸς τὸν πόλεμον οὔτε πρὸς ἀρετὴν
c ὅλην βλέπειν δεῖν φασι τοὺς νόμους, ἀλλ' ἥτις ἂν καθεστηκυῖα ᾖ πολιτεία, ταύτῃ ἰδεῖν τὸ συμφέρον, ὅπως ἄρξει τε ἀεὶ καὶ μὴ καταλυθήσεται, καὶ τὸν φύσει ὅρον τοῦ δικαίου λέγεσθαι κάλλιστ' οὕτω.

5 ΚΛ. Πῶς;

ΑΘ. Ὅτι τὸ τοῦ κρείττονος συμφέρον ἐστίν.

ΚΛ. Λέγ' ἔτι σαφέστερον.

ΑΘ. Ὧδε. τίθεται δήπου, φασίν, τοὺς νόμους ἐν τῇ πόλει ἑκάστοτε τὸ κρατοῦν. ἦ γάρ;

10 ΚΛ. Ἀληθῆ λέγεις.

d ΑΘ. Ἆρ' οὖν οἴει, φασίν, ποτὲ δῆμον νικήσαντα, ἤ τινα πολιτείαν ἄλλην, ἢ καὶ τύραννον, θήσεσθαι ἑκόντα πρὸς ἄλλο τι πρῶτον νόμους ἢ τὸ συμφέρον ἑαυτῷ τῆς ἀρχῆς τοῦ μένειν;

ΚΛ. Πῶς γὰρ ἄν;

5 ΑΘ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ ὃς ἂν ταῦτα τὰ τεθέντα παραβαίνῃ, κολάσει ὁ θέμενος ὡς ἀδικοῦντα, δίκαια εἶναι ταῦτ' ἐπονομάζων;

ΚΛ. Ἔοικε γοῦν.

ΑΘ. Ταῦτ' ἄρ' ἀεὶ καὶ οὕτω καὶ ταύτῃ τὸ δίκαιον ἂν ἔχοι.

10 ΚΛ. Φησὶ γοῦν οὗτος ὁ λόγος.

ΑΘ. Ἔστι γὰρ τοῦτο ἓν ἐκείνων **τῶν ἀξιωμάτων**
e ἀρχῆς πέρι.

ΚΛ. Ποίων δή;

ΑΘ. Τῶν ἃ τότε ἐπεσκοποῦμεν, τίνας τίνων ἄρχειν δεῖ. καὶ ἐφάνη δὴ γονέας μὲν ἐκγόνων, νεωτέρων δὲ πρεσβυτέ-
5 ρους, γενναίους δὲ ἀγεννῶν, καὶ σύχν' ἄττα ἦν ἄλλ', εἰ
715 μεμνήμεθα, καὶ ἐμπόδια ἕτερα ἑτέροισι· καὶ δὴ καὶ ἓν ἦν αὐτῶν τοῦτο, καὶ ἔφαμέν που " κατὰ φύσιν " τὸν Πίνδαρον " ἄγειν δικαιοῦντα τὸ βιαιότατον," ὡς φάναι.

ΚΛ. Ναί, ταῦτ' ἦν ἃ τότε ἐλέχθη.

ΑΘ. Σκόπει δὴ ποτέροις τισὶν ἡ πόλις ἡμῖν ἐστιν παραδοτέα. γέγονεν γὰρ δὴ μυριάκις ἤδη τὸ τοιοῦτον ἔν τισι πόλεσιν.

ΚΛ. Τὸ ποῖον;

ΑΘ. Ἀρχῶν περιμαχήτων γενομένων, οἱ νικήσαντες τά τε πράγματα κατὰ τὴν πόλιν οὕτως ἐσφετέρισαν σφόδρα, ὥστε ἀρχῆς μηδ' ὁτιοῦν μεταδιδόναι τοῖς ἡττηθεῖσιν, μήτε αὐτοῖς μήτε ἐκγόνοις, παραφυλάττοντες δὲ ἀλλήλους ζῶσιν, ὅπως μή ποτέ τις εἰς ἀρχὴν ἀφικόμενος ἐπαναστῇ μεμνημένος τῶν ἔμπροσθεν γεγονότων κακῶν. ταύτας δήπου φαμὲν ἡμεῖς νῦν οὔτ' εἶναι πολιτείας, οὔτ' ὀρθοὺς νόμους ὅσοι μὴ συμπάσης τῆς πόλεως ἕνεκα τοῦ κοινοῦ ἐτέθησαν· οἱ δ' ἑνεκά τινων, στασιώτας ἀλλ' οὐ πολίτας τούτους φαμέν, καὶ τὰ τούτων δίκαια ἃ φασιν εἶναι, μάτην εἰρῆσθαι. λέγεται δὲ τοῦδ' ἕνεκα ταῦθ' ἡμῖν, ὡς ἡμεῖς τῇ σῇ πόλει ἀρχὰς οὔθ' ὅτι πλούσιός ἐστίν τις δώσομεν, οὔθ' ὅτι τῶν τοιούτων ἄλλο οὐδὲν κεκτημένος, ἰσχὺν ἢ μέγεθος ἤ τι γένος· ὃς δ' ἂν τοῖς τεθεῖσι νόμοις εὐπειθέστατός τε ᾖ καὶ νικᾷ ταύτην τὴν νίκην ἐν τῇ πόλει, τούτῳ φαμὲν καὶ τὴν τῶν θεῶν ὑπηρεσίαν δοτέον εἶναι τὴν μεγίστην τῷ πρώτῳ, καὶ δευτέραν τῷ τὰ δεύτερα κρατοῦντι, καὶ κατὰ λόγον οὕτω τοῖς ἐφεξῆς τὰ μετὰ ταῦθ' ἕκαστα ἀποδοτέον εἶναι. τοὺς δ' ἄρχοντας λεγομένους νῦν ὑπηρέτας τοῖς νόμοις ἐκάλεσα οὔτι καινοτομίας ὀνομάτων ἕνεκα, ἀλλ' ἡγοῦμαι παντὸς μᾶλλον εἶναι παρὰ τοῦτο σωτηρίαν τε πόλει καὶ τοὐναντίον. ἐν ᾗ μὲν γὰρ ἂν ἀρχόμενος ᾖ καὶ ἄκυρος νόμος, φθορὰν ὁρῶ τῇ τοιαύτῃ ἑτοίμην οὖσαν· ἐν ᾗ δὲ ἂν δεσπότης τῶν ἀρχόντων, οἱ δὲ ἄρχοντες δοῦλοι τοῦ νόμου, σωτηρίαν καὶ πάντα ὅσα θεοὶ πόλεσιν ἔδοσαν ἀγαθὰ γιγνόμενα καθορῶ.

ΚΛ. Ναὶ μὰ Δία, ὦ ξένε· καθ' ἡλικίαν γὰρ ὀξὺ βλέπεις.

ΑΘ. Νέος μὲν γὰρ ὢν πᾶς ἄνθρωπος τὰ τοιαῦτα ἀμβλύτατα αὐτὸς αὑτοῦ ὁρᾷ, γέρων δὲ ὀξύτατα.

ΚΛ. Ἀληθέστατα.

ΑΘ. Τί δὴ τὸ μετὰ ταῦτα; ἆρ' οὐχ ἥκοντας μὲν καὶ παρόντας θῶμεν τοὺς ἐποίκους, τὸν δ' ἑξῆς αὐτοῖς διαπεραντέον ἂν εἴη λόγον;

ΚΛ. Πῶς γὰρ οὔ;

ΑΘ. "Ἄνδρες" τοίνυν φῶμεν πρὸς αὐτούς, "ὁ μὲν δὴ

θεός, ὥσπερ καὶ ὁ παλαιὸς λόγος, ἀρχήν τε καὶ τελευτὴν καὶ
716 μέσα τῶν ὄντων ἁπάντων ἔχων, εὐθείᾳ περαίνει κατὰ φύσιν
περιπορευόμενος· τῷ δὲ ἀεὶ συνέπεται δίκη τῶν ἀπολειπο-
μένων τοῦ θείου νόμου τιμωρός, ἧς ὁ μὲν εὐδαιμονήσειν
μέλλων ἐχόμενος συνέπεται ταπεινὸς καὶ κεκοσμημένος, ὃ
5 δέ τις ἐξαρθεὶς ὑπὸ μεγαλαυχίας, ἢ χρήμασιν ἐπαιρόμενος
ἢ τιμαῖς, ἢ καὶ σώματος εὐμορφίᾳ ἅμα νεότητι καὶ ἀνοίᾳ
φλέγεται τὴν ψυχὴν μεθ' ὕβρεως, ὡς οὔτε ἄρχοντος οὔτε
τινὸς ἡγεμόνος δεόμενος, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἄλλοις ἱκανὸς ὢν ἡγεῖ-
b σθαι, καταλείπεται ἔρημος θεοῦ, καταλειφθεὶς δὲ καὶ ἔτι
ἄλλους τοιούτους προσλαβὼν σκιρτᾷ ταράττων πάντα ἅμα,
καὶ πολλοῖς τισιν ἔδοξεν εἶναί τις, μετὰ δὲ χρόνον οὐ πολὺν
ὑποσχὼν τιμωρίαν οὐ μεμπτὴν τῇ δίκῃ ἑαυτόν τε καὶ οἶκον
5 καὶ πόλιν ἄρδην ἀνάστατον ἐποίησεν. πρὸς ταῦτ' οὖν οὕτω
διατεταγμένα τί χρὴ δρᾶν ἢ διανοεῖσθαι καὶ τί μὴ τὸν
ἔμφρονα;"

ΚΛ. Δῆλον δὴ τοῦτό γε· ὡς τῶν συνακολουθησόντων
ἐσόμενον τῷ θεῷ δεῖ διανοηθῆναι πάντα ἄνδρα.

c ΑΘ. "Τίς οὖν δὴ πρᾶξις φίλη καὶ ἀκόλουθος θεῷ; μία,
καὶ ἕνα λόγον ἔχουσα ἀρχαῖον, ὅτι τῷ μὲν ὁμοίῳ τὸ ὅμοιον
ὄντι μετρίῳ φίλον ἂν εἴη, τὰ δ' ἄμετρα οὔτε ἀλλήλοις οὔτε
τοῖς ἐμμέτροις. ὁ δὴ θεὸς ἡμῖν πάντων χρημάτων μέτρον
5 ἂν εἴη μάλιστα, καὶ πολὺ μᾶλλον ἤ πού τις, ὥς φασιν,
ἄνθρωπος· τὸν οὖν τῷ τοιούτῳ προσφιλῆ γενησόμενον, εἰς
δύναμιν ὅτι μάλιστα καὶ αὐτὸν τοιοῦτον ἀναγκαῖον γίγνε-
d σθαι, καὶ κατὰ τοῦτον δὴ τὸν λόγον ὁ μὲν σώφρων ἡμῶν
θεῷ φίλος, ὅμοιος γάρ, ὁ δὲ μὴ σώφρων ἀνόμοιός τε καὶ
διάφορος, καὶ <ὁ> ἄδικος, καὶ τὰ ἄλλ' οὕτως κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν
λόγον ἔχει. νοήσωμεν δὴ τούτοις ἑπόμενον εἶναι τὸν
5 τοιόνδε λόγον, ἁπάντων κάλλιστον καὶ ἀληθέστατον οἶμαι
λόγων, ὡς τῷ μὲν ἀγαθῷ θύειν καὶ προσομιλεῖν ἀεὶ τοῖς
θεοῖς εὐχαῖς καὶ ἀναθήμασιν καὶ συμπάσῃ θεραπείᾳ θεῶν
κάλλιστον καὶ ἄριστον καὶ ἀνυσιμώτατον πρὸς τὸν εὐδαί-
e μονα βίον καὶ δὴ καὶ διαφερόντως πρέπον, τῷ δὲ κακῷ
τούτων τἀναντία πέφυκεν. ἀκάθαρτος γὰρ τὴν ψυχὴν ὅ γε
κακός, καθαρὸς δὲ ὁ ἐναντίος, παρὰ δὲ μιαροῦ δῶρα οὔτε
717 ἄνδρ' ἀγαθὸν οὔτε θεὸν ἔστιν ποτὲ τό γε ὀρθὸν δέχεσθαι·
μάτην οὖν περὶ θεοὺς ὁ πολύς ἐστι πόνος τοῖς ἀνοσίοις,
τοῖσιν δὲ ὁσίοις εὐκαιρότατος ἅπασιν. σκοπὸς μὲν οὖν

ἡμῖν οὗτος οὗ δεῖ στοχάζεσθαι· βέλη δὲ αὐτοῦ καὶ οἷον ἡ
τοῖς βέλεσιν ἕφεσις τὰ ποῖ' ἂν λεγόμενα ὀρθότατα φέροιτ' 5
ἄν; πρῶτον μέν, φαμέν, τιμὰς τὰς μετ' Ὀλυμπίους τε καὶ
τοὺς τὴν πόλιν ἔχοντας θεοὺς τοῖς χθονίοις ἄν τις θεοῖς
ἄρτια [καὶ δεύτερα] καὶ ἀριστερὰ νέμων ὀρθότατα τοῦ τῆς
εὐσεβείας σκοποῦ τυγχάνοι, τὰ δὲ τούτων ἄνωθεν [τὰ περιττὰ] b
καὶ ἀντίφωνα, τοῖς ἔμπροσθεν ῥηθεῖσιν νυνδή. μετὰ θεοὺς
δὲ τούσδε καὶ τοῖς δαίμοσιν ὅ γε ἔμφρων ὀργιάζοιτ' ἄν,
ἥρωσιν δὲ μετὰ τούτους. ἐπακολουθοῖ δ' αὐτοῖς ἱδρύματα
ἴδια πατρῴων θεῶν κατὰ νόμον ὀργιαζόμενα, γονέων δὲ 5
μετὰ ταῦτα τιμαὶ ζώντων· οἷς θέμις ὀφείλοντα ἀποτίνειν
τὰ πρῶτά τε καὶ μέγιστα ὀφειλήματα, χρεῶν πάντων πρε-
σβύτατα, νομίζειν δέ, ἃ κέκτηται καὶ ἔχει, πάντα εἶναι τῶν
γεννησάντων καὶ θρεψαμένων πρὸς τὸ παρέχειν αὐτὰ εἰς c
ὑπηρεσίαν ἐκείνοις κατὰ δύναμιν πᾶσαν, ἀρχόμενον ἀπὸ τῆς
οὐσίας, δεύτερα τὰ τοῦ σώματος, τρίτα τὰ τῆς ψυχῆς, ἀπο-
τίνοντα δανείσματα ἐπιμελείας τε καὶ ὑπερπονούντων ὠδῖνας
παλαιὰς ἐπὶ νέοις δανεισθείσας, ἀποδιδόντα δὲ παλαιοῖς ἐν 5
τῷ γήρᾳ σφόδρα κεχρημένοις. παρὰ δὲ πάντα τὸν βίον
ἔχειν τε καὶ ἐσχηκέναι χρὴ πρὸς αὐτοῦ γονέας εὐφημίαν
διαφερόντως, διότι κούφων καὶ πτηνῶν λόγων βαρυτάτη d
ζημία—πᾶσι γὰρ ἐπίσκοπος τοῖς περὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα ἐτάχθη
Δίκης Νέμεσις ἄγγελος—θυμουμένοις τε οὖν ὑπείκειν δεῖ
καὶ ἀποπιμπλᾶσι τὸν θυμόν, ἐάν τ' ἐν λόγοις ἐάν τ' ἐν ἔργοις
δρῶσιν τὸ τοιοῦτον, συγγιγνώσκοντα, ὡς εἰκότως μάλιστα 5
πατὴρ υἱεῖ δοξάζων ἀδικεῖσθαι θυμοῖτ' ἂν διαφερόντως.
τελευτησάντων δὲ γονέων ταφὴ μὲν ἡ σωφρονεστάτη καλ-
λίστη, μήτε ὑπεραίροντα τῶν εἰθισμένων ὄγκων μήτ' ἐλλεί-
ποντα ὧν οἱ προπάτορες τοὺς ἑαυτῶν γεννητὰς ἐτίθεσαν, e
τάς τε αὖ κατ' ἐνιαυτὸν τῶν ἤδη τέλος ἐχόντων ὡσαύτως
ἐπιμελείας τὰς κόσμον φερούσας ἀποδιδόναι· τῷ δὲ μὴ
παραλείπειν μνήμην ἐνδελεχῆ παρεχόμενον, τούτῳ μάλιστ' 718
ἀεὶ πρεσβεύειν, δαπάνης τε τῆς διδομένης ὑπὸ τύχης τὸ
μέτριον τοῖς κεκμηκόσιν νέμοντα. ταῦτ' ἂν ποιοῦντες καὶ
κατὰ ταῦτα ζῶντες ἑκάστοτε ἕκαστοι τὴν ἀξίαν ἂν παρὰ θεῶν
καὶ ὅσοι κρείττονες ἡμῶν κομιζοίμεθα, ἐν ἐλπίσιν ἀγαθαῖς 5
διάγοντες τὸ πλεῖστον τοῦ βίου.'' ἃ δὲ πρὸς ἐκγόνους καὶ
συγγενεῖς καὶ φίλους καὶ πολίτας, ὅσα τε ξενικὰ πρὸς θεῶν
θεραπεύματα καὶ ὁμιλίας συμπάντων τούτων ἀποτελοῦντα

b τὸν αὐτοῦ βίον φαιδρυνάμενον κατὰ νόμον κοσμεῖν δεῖ, τῶν νόμων αὐτῶν ἡ διέξοδος, τὰ μὲν πείθουσα, τὰ δὲ μὴ ὑπείκοντα πειθοῖ τῶν ἠθῶν βίᾳ καὶ δίκῃ κολάζουσα, τὴν πόλιν ἡμῖν συμβουληθέντων θεῶν μακαρίαν τε καὶ εὐδαί-
5 μονα ἀποτελεῖ· ἃ δὲ χρὴ μὲν αὖ καὶ ἀναγκαῖον εἰπεῖν νομοθέτην ὅστις ἅπερ ἐγὼ διανοεῖται, ἐν δὲ σχήματι νόμου ἀναρμοστεῖ λεγόμενα, τούτων πέρι δοκεῖ μοι ‹δεῖν› δεῖγμα
c προενεγκόντα αὐτῷ τε καὶ ἐκείνοις οἷς νομοθετήσει, τὰ λοιπὰ πάντα εἰς δύναμιν διεξελθόντα, τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο ἄρχεσθαι τῆς θέσεως τῶν νόμων.

‹ΚΛ.› Ἔστιν δὲ δὴ τὰ τοιαῦτα ἐν τίνι μάλιστα σχήματι
5 κείμενα;

‹ΑΘ.› Οὐ πάνυ ῥᾴδιον ἐν ἑνὶ περιλαβόντα εἰπεῖν αὐτὰ οἷόν τινι τύπῳ, ἀλλ' οὑτωσί τινα τρόπον λάβωμεν, ἄν τι δυνώμεθα περὶ αὐτῶν βεβαιώσασθαι.

ΚΛ. Λέγε τὸ ποῖον.

10 ΑΘ. Βουλοίμην ἂν αὐτοὺς ὡς εὐπειθεστάτους πρὸς ἀρετὴν εἶναι, καὶ δῆλον ὅτι πειράσεται τοῦτο ὁ νομοθέτης ἐν ἁπάσῃ ποιεῖν τῇ νομοθεσίᾳ.

d ΚΛ. Πῶς γὰρ οὔ;

ΑΘ. Τὰ τοίνυν δὴ λεχθέντα ἔδοξέν τί μοι προὔργου δρᾶν εἰς τὸ περὶ ὧν ἂν παραινῇ, μὴ παντάπασιν ὠμῆς ψυχῆς λαβόμενα, ἡμερώτερόν τε ἂν ἀκούειν καὶ εὐμενέστερον· ὥστε
5 εἰ καὶ μὴ μέγα τι, σμικρὸν δέ, τὸν ἀκούοντα, ὅπερ φημί, εὐμενέστερον γιγνόμενον εὐμαθέστερον ἀπεργάσεται, πάνυ ἀγαπητόν. οὐ γὰρ πολλή τις εὐπέτεια οὐδὲ ἀφθονία τῶν προθυμουμένων ὡς ἀρίστων ὅτι μάλιστα καὶ ὡς τάχιστα
e γίγνεσθαι, τὸν δὲ Ἡσίοδον οἱ πολλοὶ σοφὸν ἀποφαίνουσι λέγοντα ὡς ἡ μὲν ἐπὶ τὴν κακότητα ὁδὸς λεία καὶ ἀνιδιτὶ παρέχει πορεύεσθαι, μάλα βραχεῖα οὖσα, τῆς δὲ ἀρετῆς, φησίν,

5 ἱδρῶτα θεοὶ προπάροιθεν ἔθηκαν
ἀθάνατοι, μακρὸς δὲ καὶ ὄρθιος οἶμος ἐς αὐτήν,
719 καὶ τρηχὺς τὸ πρῶτον· ἐπὴν δ' εἰς ἄκρον ἵκηαι,
ῥηιδίη δὴ ἔπειτα φέρειν, χαλεπὴ περ ἐοῦσα.

ΚΛ. Καὶ καλῶς γ' ἔοικεν λέγοντι.

ΑΘ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν. ὁ δὲ προάγων λόγος ὅ γέ μοι

ἀπείργασται, βούλομαι ὑμῖν εἰς τὸ μέσον αὐτὸ θεῖναι.

ΚΛ. Τίθει δή.

ΑΘ. Λέγωμεν δὴ τῷ νομοθέτῃ διαλεγόμενοι τόδε· "Εἰπὲ ἡμῖν, ὦ νομοθέτα· εἴπερ ὅτι χρὴ πράττειν ἡμᾶς καὶ λέγειν b εἰδείης, ἆρα οὐ δῆλον ὅτι καὶ ἂν εἴποις;"

ΚΛ. Ἀναγκαῖον.

ΑΘ. "Σμικρῷ μὲν δὴ πρόσθεν ἆρα οὐκ ἠκούσαμέν σου λέγοντος ὡς τὸν νομοθέτην οὐ δεῖ τοῖς ποιηταῖς ἐπιτρέπειν 5 ποιεῖν ὃ ἂν αὐτοῖς ᾖ φίλον; οὐ γὰρ ἂν εἰδέναι τί ποτ' ἐναντίον τοῖς νόμοις ἂν λέγοντες βλάπτοιεν τὴν πόλιν."

ΚΛ. Ἀληθῆ μέντοι λέγεις.

ΑΘ. Ὑπὲρ δὴ τῶν ποιητῶν εἰ τάδε λέγοιμεν πρὸς αὐτόν, ἆρ' ἂν τὰ λεχθέντα εἴη μέτρια; 10

ΚΛ. Ποῖα;

ΑΘ. Τάδε· "Παλαιὸς μῦθος, ὦ νομοθέτα, ὑπό τε αὐτῶν c ἡμῶν ἀεὶ λεγόμενός ἐστιν καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις πᾶσιν συνδεδογμένος, ὅτι ποιητής, ὁπόταν ἐν τῷ τρίποδι τῆς Μούσης καθίζηται, τότε οὐκ ἔμφρων ἐστίν, οἷον δὲ κρήνη τις τὸ ἐπιὸν ῥεῖν ἑτοίμως ἐᾷ, καὶ τῆς τέχνης οὔσης μιμήσεως 5 ἀναγκάζεται, ἐναντίως ἀλλήλοις ἀνθρώπους ποιῶν διατιθεμένους, ἐναντία λέγειν αὐτῷ πολλάκις, οἶδεν δὲ οὔτ' εἰ ταῦτα οὔτ' εἰ θάτερα ἀληθῆ τῶν λεγομένων. τῷ δὲ νομοθέτῃ τοῦτο d οὐκ ἔστι ποιεῖν ἐν τῷ νόμῳ, δύο περὶ ἑνός, ἀλλὰ ἕνα περὶ ἑνὸς ἀεὶ δεῖ λόγον ἀποφαίνεσθαι. σκέψαι δ' ἐξ αὐτῶν τῶν ὑπὸ σοῦ νυνδὴ λεχθέντων. οὔσης γὰρ ταφῆς τῆς μὲν ὑπερβεβλημένης, τῆς δὲ ἐλλειπούσης, τῆς δὲ μετρίας, τὴν 5 μίαν ἑλόμενος σύ, τὴν μέσην, ταύτην προστάττεις καὶ ἐπῄνεσας ἁπλῶς. ἐγὼ δέ, εἰ μὲν γυνή μοι διαφέρουσα εἴη πλούτῳ καὶ θάπτειν αὐτὴν διακελεύοιτο ἐν τῷ ποιήματι, τὸν ὑπερβάλλοντα ἂν τάφον ἐπαινοίην, φειδωλὸς δ' αὖ τις καὶ πένης ἀνὴρ e τὸν καταδεᾶ, μέτρον δὲ οὐσίας κεκτημένος καὶ μέτριος αὐτὸς ὢν τὸν αὐτὸν ἂν ἐπαινέσαι. σοὶ δὲ οὐχ οὕτω ῥητέον ὡς νῦν εἶπες μέτριον εἰπών, ἀλλὰ τί τὸ μέτριον καὶ ὁπόσον ῥητέον, ἢ τὸν τοιοῦτον λόγον μήπω σοι διανοοῦ γίγνεσθαι νόμον." 5

ΚΛ. Ἀληθέστατα λέγεις.

ΑΘ. Πότερον οὖν ἡμῖν ὁ τεταγμένος ἐπὶ τοῖς νόμοις μηδὲν τοιοῦτον προαγορεύῃ ἐν ἀρχῇ τῶν νόμων, ἀλλ' εὐθὺς ὃ δεῖ ποιεῖν καὶ μὴ φράζῃ τε, καὶ ἐπαπειλήσας τὴν ζημίαν, ἐπ' ἄλλον τρέπηται νόμον, παραμυθίας δὲ καὶ πειθοῦς τοῖς 720

νομοθετουμένοις μηδὲ ἓν προσδιδῷ; καθάπερ ἰατρὸς δέ τις, ὁ μὲν οὕτως, ὁ δ' ἐκείνως ἡμᾶς εἴωθεν ἑκάστοτε θεραπεύειν— ἀναμιμνῃσκώμεθα δὲ τὸν τρόπον ἑκάτερον, ἵνα τοῦ νομοθέτου δεώμεθα, καθάπερ ἰατροῦ δέοιντο ἂν παῖδες τὸν πρᾳότατον αὐτὸν θεραπεύειν τρόπον ἑαυτούς. οἷον δὴ τί λέγομεν; εἰσὶν πού τινες ἰατροί, φαμέν, καί τινες ὑπηρέται τῶν ἰατρῶν, ἰατροὺς δὲ καλοῦμεν δήπου καὶ τούτους.

b ΚΛ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

ΑΘ. Ἐάν τε γε ἐλεύθεροι ὦσιν ἐάν τε δοῦλοι, κατ' ἐπίταξιν δὲ τῶν δεσποτῶν καὶ θεωρίαν καὶ κατ' ἐμπειρίαν τὴν τέχνην κτῶνται, κατὰ φύσιν δὲ μή, καθάπερ οἱ ἐλεύθεροι αὐτοί τε μεμαθήκασιν οὕτω τούς τε αὑτῶν διδάσκουσι παῖδας. θείης ἂν ταῦτα δύο γένη τῶν καλουμένων ἰατρῶν;

ΚΛ. Πῶς γὰρ οὔ;

ΑΘ. Ἆρ' οὖν καὶ συννοεῖς ὅτι, δούλων καὶ ἐλευθέρων
c ὄντων τῶν καμνόντων ἐν ταῖς πόλεσι, τοὺς μὲν δούλους σχεδόν τι οἱ δοῦλοι τὰ πολλὰ ἰατρεύουσιν περιτρέχοντες καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἰατρείοις περιμένοντες, καὶ οὔτε τινὰ λόγον ἑκάστου πέρι νοσήματος ἑκάστου τῶν οἰκετῶν οὐδεὶς τῶν τοιούτων ἰατρῶν δίδωσιν οὐδ' ἀποδέχεται, προστάξας δ' αὐτῷ τὰ δόξαντα ἐξ ἐμπειρίας, ὡς ἀκριβῶς εἰδώς, καθάπερ τύραννος αὐθάδης, οἴχεται ἀποπηδήσας πρὸς ἄλλον κάμνοντα οἰκέτην, καὶ ῥᾳστώνην οὕτω τῷ δεσπότῃ παρασκευάζει τῶν καμ-
d νόντων τῆς ἐπιμελείας· ὁ δὲ ἐλεύθερος ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πλεῖστον τὰ τῶν ἐλευθέρων νοσήματα θεραπεύει τε καὶ ἐπισκοπεῖ, καὶ ταῦτα ἐξετάζων ἀπ' ἀρχῆς καὶ κατὰ φύσιν, τῷ κάμνοντι κοινούμενος αὐτῷ τε καὶ τοῖς φίλοις, ἅμα μὲν αὐτὸς μανθάνει τι παρὰ τῶν νοσούντων, ἅμα δὲ καὶ καθ' ὅσον οἷός τέ ἐστιν, διδάσκει τὸν ἀσθενοῦντα αὐτόν, καὶ οὐ πρότερον ἐπέταξεν πρὶν ἄν πῃ συμπείσῃ, τότε δὲ μετὰ πειθοῦς ἡμερούμενον ἀεὶ
e παρασκευάζων τὸν κάμνοντα, εἰς τὴν ὑγίειαν ἄγων ἀποτελεῖν πειρᾶται; πότερον οὕτως ἢ ἐκείνως ἰατρός τε ἰώμενος ἀμείνων καὶ γυμναστὴς γυμνάζων· διχῇ τὴν μίαν ἀποτελῶν δύναμιν, ἢ μοναχῇ καὶ κατὰ τὸ χεῖρον τοῖν δυοῖν καὶ ἀγριώτερον ἀπεργαζόμενος;

ΚΛ. Πολύ που διαφέρον, ὦ ξένε, τὸ διπλῇ.

ΑΘ. Βούλει δὴ καὶ θεασώμεθα τὸ διπλοῦν τοῦτο καὶ ἁπλοῦν ἐν ταῖς νομοθεσίαις αὐταῖς γιγνόμενον;

ΚΛ. Πῶς γὰρ οὐ βούλομαι;

ΑΘ. Φέρε δὴ πρὸς θεῶν, τίν' ἄρα πρῶτον νόμον θεῖτ' ἂν ὁ νομοθέτης; ἆρ' οὐ κατὰ φύσιν τὴν περὶ γενέσεως ἀρχὴν πρώτην πόλεων πέρι κατακοσμήσει ταῖς τάξεσιν; 721

ΚΛ. Τί μήν;

ΑΘ. Ἀρχὴ δ' ἐστὶ τῶν γενέσεων πάσαις πόλεσιν ἆρ' οὐχ ἡ τῶν γάμων σύμμειξις καὶ κοινωνία;

ΚΛ. Πῶς γὰρ οὔ;

ΑΘ. Γαμικοὶ δὴ νόμοι πρῶτοι κινδυνεύουσιν τιθέμενοι καλῶς ἂν τίθεσθαι πρὸς ὀρθότητα πάσῃ πόλει.

ΚΛ. Παντάπασι μὲν οὖν.

ΑΘ. Λέγωμεν δὴ πρῶτον τὸν ἁπλοῦν, ἔχοι δ' ἄν πως ἴσως ὧδε—

Γαμεῖν δέ, ἐπειδὰν ἐτῶν ᾖ τις τριάκοντα, μέχρι ἐτῶν πέντε καὶ τριάκοντα, εἰ δὲ μή, ζημιοῦσθαι χρήμασίν τε καὶ ἀτιμίᾳ, χρήμασι μὲν τόσοις καὶ τόσοις, τῇ καὶ τῇ δὲ ἀτιμίᾳ. b

Ὁ μὲν ἁπλοῦς ἔστω τις τοιοῦτος περὶ γάμων, ὁ δὲ διπλοῦς ὅδε—

Γαμεῖν δέ, ἐπειδὰν ἐτῶν ᾖ τις τριάκοντα, μέχρι τῶν πέντε καὶ τριάκοντα, διανοηθέντα ὡς ἔστιν ᾗ τὸ ἀνθρώπινον γένος φύσει τινὶ μετείληφεν ἀθανασίας, οὗ καὶ πέφυκεν ἐπιθυμίαν ἴσχειν πᾶς πᾶσαν· τὸ γὰρ γενέσθαι κλεινὸν καὶ μὴ ἀνώνυμον c κεῖσθαι τετελευτηκότα τοῦ τοιούτου ἐστὶν ἐπιθυμία. γένος οὖν ἀνθρώπων ἐστίν τι συμφυὲς τοῦ παντὸς χρόνου, ὃ διὰ τέλους αὐτῷ συνέπεται καὶ συνέψεται, τούτῳ τῷ τρόπῳ ἀθάνατον ὄν, τῷ παῖδας παίδων καταλειπόμενον, ταὐτὸν καὶ ἓν ὂν ἀεί, γενέσει τῆς ἀθανασίας μετειληφέναι· τούτου δὴ ἀποστερεῖν ἑκόντα ἑαυτὸν οὐδέποτε ὅσιον, ἐκ προνοίας δὲ ἀποστερεῖ ὃς ἂν παίδων καὶ γυναικὸς ἀμελῇ. πειθόμενος μὲν οὖν τῷ νόμῳ ἀζήμιος ἀπαλλάττοιτο ἄν, μὴ πειθόμενος δὲ d αὖ, μηδὲ γαμῶν ἔτη τριάκοντα γεγονὼς καὶ πέντε, ζημιούσθω μὲν κατ' ἐνιαυτὸν τόσῳ καὶ τόσῳ, ἵνα μὴ δοκῇ τὴν μοναυλίαν οἱ κέρδος καὶ ῥᾳστώνην φέρειν, καὶ μὴ μετεχέτω δὲ τιμῶν ὧν ἂν οἱ νεώτεροι ἐν τῇ πόλει τοὺς πρεσβυτέρους αὐτῶν τιμῶσιν ἑκάστοτε.

Τοῦτον δὴ παρ' ἐκεῖνον τὸν νόμον ἀκούσαντα ἔξεστιν περὶ ἑνὸς ἑκάστου διανοηθῆναι, πότερον αὐτοὺς διπλοῦς οὕτω δεῖ γίγνεσθαι τῷ μήκει τὸ σμικρότατον, διὰ τὸ πείθειν τε e ἅμα καὶ ἀπειλεῖν, ἢ τῷ ἀπειλεῖν μόνον χρωμένους ἁπλοῦς γίγνεσθαι τοῖς μήκεσιν.

ΜΕ. Πρὸς μὲν τοῦ Λακωνικοῦ τρόπου, ὦ ξένε, τὸ τὰ βραχύτερα ἀεὶ προτιμᾶν· τούτων μὴν τῶν γραμμάτων εἴ τις κριτὴν ἐμὲ κελεύοι γίγνεσθαι πότερα βουλοίμην ἂν ἐν τῇ πόλει μοι γεγραμμένα τεθῆναι, τὰ μακρότερ' ἂν ἑλοίμην, καὶ δὴ καὶ περὶ παντὸς νόμου κατὰ τοῦτο τὸ παράδειγμα, εἰ γίγνοιτο ἑκάτερα, ταὐτὸν τοῦτ' ἂν αἱροίμην. οὐ μὴν ἀλλά που καὶ Κλεινίᾳ τῷδ' ἀρέσκειν δεῖ τὰ νῦν νομοθετούμενα· τούτου γὰρ ἡ πόλις ἡ νῦν τοῖς τοιούτοις [νόμοις] χρῆσθαι διανοουμένη.

ΚΛ. Καλῶς γ', ὦ Μέγιλλε, εἶπες.

ΑΘ. Τὸ μὲν οὖν περὶ πολλῶν ἢ ὀλίγων γραμμάτων ποιήσασθαι τὸν λόγον λίαν εὔηθες—τὰ γὰρ οἶμαι βέλτιστα, ἀλλ' οὐ τὰ βραχύτατα οὐδὲ τὰ μήκη τιμητέον—τὰ δ' ἐν τοῖς νυνδὴ νόμοις ῥηθεῖσιν οὐ διπλῷ θάτερα τῶν ἑτέρων διάφορα μόνον εἰς ἀρετὴν τῆς χρείας, ἀλλ' ὅπερ ἐρρήθη νυνδή, τὸ τῶν διττῶν ἰατρῶν γένος ὀρθότατα παρετέθη. πρὸς τοῦτο δὲ οὐδεὶς ἔοικε διανοηθῆναι πώποτε τῶν νομοθετῶν, ὡς ἐξὸν δυοῖν χρῆσθαι πρὸς τὰς νομοθεσίας, πειθοῖ καὶ βίᾳ, καθ' ὅσον οἷόν τε ἐπὶ τὸν ἄπειρον παιδείας ὄχλον, τῷ ἑτέρῳ χρῶνται μόνον· οὐ γὰρ πειθοῖ κεραννύντες τὴν μάχην νομοθετοῦσιν, ἀλλ' ἀκράτῳ μόνον τῇ βίᾳ. ἐγὼ δ', ὦ μακάριοι, καὶ τρίτον ἔτι περὶ τοὺς νόμους ὁρῶ γίγνεσθαι δέον, οὐδαμῇ τὰ νῦν γιγνόμενον.

ΚΛ. Τὸ ποῖον δὴ λέγεις;

ΑΘ. Ἐξ αὐτῶν ὧν νῦν διειλέγμεθα ἡμεῖς κατὰ θεόν τινα γεγονός. σχεδὸν γὰρ ἐξ ὅσου περὶ τῶν νόμων ἤργμεθα λέγειν, ἐξ ἑωθινοῦ μεσημβρία τε γέγονε καὶ ἐν ταύτῃ παγκάλῃ ἀναπαύλῃ τινὶ γεγόναμεν, οὐδὲν ἀλλ' ἢ περὶ νόμων διαλεγόμενοι, νόμους δὲ ἄρτι μοι δοκοῦμεν λέγειν ἄρχεσθαι, τὰ δ' ἔμπροσθεν ἦν πάντα ἡμῖν προοίμια νόμων. τί δὲ ταῦτ' εἴρηκα; τόδε εἰπεῖν βουληθείς, ὅτι λόγων πάντων καὶ ὅσων φωνὴ κεκοινώνηκεν προοίμιά τέ ἐστιν καὶ σχεδὸν οἷόν τινες ἀνακινήσεις, ἔχουσαί τινα ἔντεχνον ἐπιχείρησιν χρήσιμον πρὸς τὸ μέλλον περαίνεσθαι. καὶ δή που κιθαρῳδικῆς ᾠδῆς λεγομένων νόμων καὶ πάσης μούσης προοίμια θαυμαστῶς ἐσπουδασμένα πρόκειται· τῶν δὲ ὄντως νόμων ὄντων, οὓς δὴ πολιτικοὺς εἶναί φαμεν, οὐδεὶς πώποτε οὔτ' εἶπέ τι προοίμιον οὔτε συνθέτης γενόμενος ἐξήνεγκεν εἰς τὸ φῶς, ὡς οὐκ ὄντος φύσει. ἡμῖν δὲ ἡ νῦν διατριβὴ γεγοννῖα, ὡς ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ,

σημαίνει ὡς ὄντος, οἵ τέ γε δὴ διπλοῖ ἔδοξαν νυνδή μοι λεχθέντες νόμοι οὐκ εἶναι ἁπλῶς οὕτω πως διπλοῖ, ἀλλὰ δύο μέν τινε, νόμος τε καὶ προοίμιον τοῦ νόμου· ὃ δὴ τυραννικὸν ἐπίταγμα ἀπεικασθὲν ἐρρήθη τοῖς ἐπιτάγμασιν τοῖς τῶν ἰατρῶν οὓς εἴπομεν ἀνελευθέρους, τοῦτ' εἶναι νόμος ἄκρατος, τὸ δὲ πρὸ τούτου ῥηθέν, πειστικὸν λεχθὲν ὑπὸ τοῦδε, ὄντως μὲν εἶναι πειστικόν, προοιμίου μὴν τοῦ περὶ λόγους δύναμιν ἔχειν. ἵνα γὰρ εὐμενῶς, καὶ διὰ τὴν εὐμένειαν εὐμαθέστερον, τὴν ἐπίταξιν, ὃ δή ἐστιν ὁ νόμος, δέξηται ᾧ τὸν νόμον ὁ νομοθέτης λέγει τούτου χάριν εἰρῆσθαί μοι κατεφάνη πᾶς ὁ λόγος οὗτος, ὃν πείθων εἶπεν ὁ λέγων· διὸ δὴ κατά γε τὸν ἐμὸν λόγον τοῦτ' αὐτό, προοίμιον, ἀλλ' οὐ λόγος ἂν ὀρθῶς προσαγορεύοιτο εἶναι τοῦ νόμου. ταῦτ' οὖν εἰπών, τί τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο ἄν μοι βουληθείην εἰρῆσθαι; τόδε, ὡς τὸν νομοθέτην πρὸ πάντων τε ἀεὶ τῶν νόμων χρεών ἐστιν μὴ ἀμοίρους αὐτοὺς προοιμίων ποιεῖν καὶ καθ' ἕκαστον, ᾗ διοίσουσιν ἑαυτῶν ὅσον νυνδὴ τὼ λεχθέντε διηνεγκάτην.

ΚΛ. Τό γ' ἐμὸν οὐκ ἂν ἄλλως νομοθετεῖν διακελεύοιτο ἡμῖν τὸν τούτων ἐπιστήμονα.

ΑΘ. Καλῶς μὲν τοίνυν, ὦ Κλεινία, δοκεῖς μοι τό γε τοσοῦτον λέγειν, ὅτι πᾶσίν γε νόμοις ἔστιν προοίμια καὶ ὅτι πάσης ἀρχόμενον νομοθεσίας χρὴ προτιθέναι παντὸς τοῦ λόγου τὸ πεφυκὸς προοίμιον ἑκάστοις—οὐ γὰρ σμικρὸν τὸ μετὰ τοῦτό ἐστιν ῥηθησόμενον, οὐδ' ὀλίγον διαφέρον ἢ σαφῶς ἢ μὴ σαφῶς αὐτὰ μνημονεύεσθαι—τὸ μέντοι μεγάλων πέρι λεγομένων νόμων καὶ σμικρῶν εἰ ὁμοίως προοιμιάζεσθαι προστάττοιμεν, οὐκ ἂν ὀρθῶς λέγοιμεν. οὐδὲ γὰρ ἄσματος οὐδὲ λόγου παντὸς δεῖ τὸ τοιοῦτον δρᾶν—καίτοι πέφυκέν γε εἶναι πᾶσιν, ἀλλ' οὐ χρηστέον ἅπασιν—αὐτῷ δὲ τῷ τε ῥήτορι καὶ τῷ μελῳδῷ καὶ νομοθέτῃ τὸ τοιοῦτον ἑκάστοτε ἐπιτρεπτέον.

ΚΛ. Ἀληθέστατα δοκεῖς μοι λέγειν. ἀλλὰ δὴ μηκέτ', ὦ ξένε, διατριβὴν πλείω τῆς μελλήσεως ποιώμεθα, ἐπὶ δὲ τὸν λόγον ἐπανέλθωμεν καὶ ἀπ' ἐκείνων ἀρχώμεθα, εἴ σοι φίλον, ὧν οὐχ ὡς προοιμιαζόμενος εἶπες τότε. πάλιν οὖν, οἷόν φασιν οἱ παίζοντες, ἀμεινόνων ἐξ ἀρχῆς δευτέρων ἐπαναπολήσωμεν, ὡς προοίμιον ἀλλ' οὐ τὸν τυχόντα λόγον περαίνοντες, καθάπερ ἄρτι· λάβωμεν δ' αὐτῶν ἀρχὴν ὁμολογοῦντες προοιμιάζεσθαι. καὶ τὰ μὲν περὶ θεῶν τιμῆς προγόνων τε

θεραπείας, καὶ τὰ νυνδὴ λεχθέντα ἱκανά· τὰ δ' ἑξῆς πειρώμεθα λέγειν, μέχριπερ ἂν σοι πᾶν τὸ προοίμιον ἱκανῶς εἰρῆσθαι δοκῇ. μετὰ δὲ τοῦτο ἤδη τοὺς νόμους αὐτοὺς διέξει λέγων.

724 ΑΘ. Οὐκοῦν περὶ θεῶν μὲν καὶ τῶν μετὰ θεοὺς καὶ γονέων ζώντων τε πέρι καὶ τελευτησάντων τότε ἱκανῶς προοιμιασάμεθα, ὡς νῦν λέγομεν· τὸ δὲ ἀπολειπόμενον ἔτι τοῦ τοιούτου φαίνῃ μοι σὺ διακελεύεσθαι τὰ νῦν οἷον πρὸς τὸ φῶς ἐπανάγειν.

ΚΛ. Παντάπασι μὲν οὖν.

ΑΘ. Ἀλλὰ μὴν μετά γε τὰ τοιαῦτα, ὡς χρὴ τὰ περὶ τὰς αὐτῶν ψυχὰς καὶ τὰ σώματα καὶ τὰς οὐσίας σπουδῆς b τε πέρι καὶ ἀνέσεως ἴσχειν, προσῆκόν τ' ἐστὶ καὶ κοινότατον ἀναπεμπαζομένους τόν τε λέγοντα καὶ τοὺς ἀκούοντας παιδείας γίγνεσθαι κατὰ δύναμιν ἐπηβόλους· ταῦτ' οὖν ἡμῖν αὐτὰ μετ' ἐκεῖνα ὄντως ἐστὶν ῥητέα τε καὶ ἀκουστέα.

ΚΛ. Ὀρθότατα λέγεις.

BOOK V

SHORT ANALYSIS

726–734 e 2.—Conclusion of the General Prelude, the first part of which came at 715 e 7–718 a 6 : "Honour the soul in the right way, and cherish the right kind of human characteristics."

734 e 3–747 e 11.—Regulations (1) As to selection of members of the community, and the rejection of undesirable citizens. (2) As to Numbers of Households. (3) As to Arrangement and Division of Landed Property. (4) Limitations as to the nature and the acquisition of Property.

E

ΑΘ. Ἀκούοι δὴ πᾶς ὅσπερ νυνδὴ τὰ περὶ θεῶν τε ἤκουε 726
καὶ τῶν φίλων προπατόρων· πάντων γὰρ τῶν αὑτοῦ κτημάτων
[μετὰ θεοὺς] ψυχὴ θειότατον, οἰκειότατον ὄν. τὰ δ' αὑτοῦ διττὰ
πάντ' ἐστὶ πᾶσιν. τὰ μὲν οὖν κρείττω καὶ ἀμείνω δεσπόζοντα,
τὰ δὲ ἥττω καὶ χείρω δοῦλα· τῶν οὖν αὑτοῦ τὰ δεσπόζοντα 5
ἀεὶ προτιμητέον τῶν δουλευόντων. οὕτω δὴ τὴν αὑτοῦ ψυχήν,
μετὰ θεοὺς ὄντας δεσπότας καὶ τοὺς τούτοις ἑπομένους, τιμᾶν 727
δεῖν λέγων δευτέραν, ὀρθῶς παρακελεύομαι. τιμᾷ δ' ὡς ἔπος
εἰπεῖν ἡμῶν οὐδεὶς ὀρθῶς, δοκεῖ δέ· θεῖον γὰρ ἀγαθόν που
τιμή, τῶν δὲ κακῶν οὐδὲν τίμιον, ὁ δ' ἡγούμενος ἢ τισι
λόγοις ἢ δώροις αὐτὴν αὔξειν ἢ τισιν ὑπείξεσιν, μηδὲν 5
βελτίω δὲ ἐκ χείρονος αὐτὴν ἀπεργαζόμενος, τιμᾶν μὲν
δοκεῖ, δρᾷ δὲ τοῦτο οὐδαμῶς. αὐτίκα παῖς εὐθὺς γενό-
μενος ἄνθρωπος πᾶς ἡγεῖται πάντα ἱκανὸς εἶναι γιγνώσκειν,
καὶ τιμᾶν οἴεται ἐπαινῶν τὴν αὑτοῦ ψυχήν, καὶ προθυμούμενος b
ἐπιτρέπει πράττειν ὅτι ἂν ἐθέλῃ, τὸ δὲ νῦν λεγόμενόν ἐστιν
ὡς δρῶν ταῦτα βλάπτει καὶ οὐ τιμᾷ· δεῖ δέ, ὥς φαμεν,
μετά γε θεοὺς δευτέραν. οὐδέ γε ὅταν ἄνθρωπος τῶν αὑτοῦ

ἑκάστοτε ἁμαρτημάτων μὴ ἑαυτὸν αἴτιον ἡγῆται καὶ τῶν πλείστων κακῶν καὶ μεγίστων, ἀλλὰ ἄλλους, ἑαυτὸν δὲ ἀεὶ ἀναίτιον ἐξαιρῇ, τιμῶν τὴν αὑτοῦ ψυχήν, ὡς δὴ δοκεῖ—ὁ δὲ πολλοῦ δεῖ δρᾶν τοῦτο· βλάπτει γάρ. οὐδ' ὁπόταν ἡδοναῖς παρὰ λόγον τὸν τοῦ νομοθέτου καὶ ἔπαινον χαρίζηται—τότε οὐδαμῶς τιμᾷ, ἀτιμάζει δὲ κακῶν καὶ μεταμελείας ἐμπιμπλὰς αὐτήν. οὐδέ γε ὁπόταν αὖ τἀναντία τοὺς ἐπαινουμένους πόνους καὶ φόβους καὶ ἀλγηδόνας καὶ λύπας μὴ διαπονῇ καρτερῶν ἀλλὰ ὑπείκῃ—τότε οὐ τιμᾷ ὑπείκων· ἄτιμον γὰρ αὐτὴν ἀπεργάζεται δρῶν τὰ τοιαῦτα σύμπαντα. οὐδ' ὁπόταν ἡγῆται τὸ ζῆν πάντως ἀγαθὸν εἶναι, τιμᾷ, ἀτιμάζει δ' αὐτὴν καὶ τότε· τὰ γὰρ ἐν Ἅιδου πράγματα πάντα κακὰ ἡγουμένης τῆς ψυχῆς εἶναι, ὑπείκει καὶ οὐκ ἀντιτείνει διδάσκων τε καὶ ἐλέγχων ὡς οὐκ οἶδεν οὐδ' εἰ τἀναντία πέφυκεν μέγιστα εἶναι πάντων ἀγαθῶν ἡμῖν τὰ περὶ τοὺς θεοὺς τοὺς ἐκεῖ. οὐδὲ μὴν πρὸ ἀρετῆς ὁπόταν αὖ προτιμᾷ τις κάλλος—τοῦτ' ἔστιν οὐχ ἕτερον ἢ ἡ τῆς ψυχῆς ὄντως καὶ πάντως ἀτιμία. ψυχῆς γὰρ σῶμα ἐντιμότερον οὗτος ὁ λόγος φησὶν εἶναι ψευδόμενος· οὐδὲν γὰρ γηγενὲς Ὀλυμπίων ἐντιμότερον, ἀλλ' ὁ περὶ ψυχῆς ἄλλως δοξάζων ἀγνοεῖ ὡς θαυμαστοῦ τούτου κτήματος ἀμελεῖ. οὐδέ γε ὁπόταν χρήματά τις ἐρᾷ κτᾶσθαι μὴ καλῶς, ἢ μὴ δυσχερῶς φέρῃ κτώμενος, δώροις ἄρα τιμᾷ τότε τὴν αὑτοῦ ψυχήν—παντὸς μὲν οὖν λείπει—τὸ γὰρ αὐτῆς τίμιον ἅμα καὶ καλὸν ἀποδίδοται σμικροῦ χρυσοῦ· πᾶς γὰρ ὅ τ' ἐπὶ γῆς καὶ ὑπὸ γῆς χρυσὸς ἀρετῆς οὐκ ἀντάξιος. ὡς δὲ εἰπεῖν συλλήβδην, ὃς ἅπερ ἂν νομοθέτης αἰσχρὰ εἶναι καὶ κακὰ διαριθμούμενος τάττῃ καὶ τοὐναντίον ἀγαθὰ καὶ καλά, τῶν μὲν ἀπέχεσθαι μὴ ἐθέλῃ πάσῃ μηχανῇ, τὰ δὲ ἐπιτηδεύειν σύμπασαν κατὰ δύναμιν, οὐκ οἶδεν ἐν τούτοις πᾶσιν πᾶς ἄνθρωπος ψυχὴν θειότατον ὂν ἀτιμότατα καὶ κακοσχημονέστατα διατιθείς. τὴν γὰρ λεγομένην δίκην τῆς κακουργίας τὴν μεγίστην οὐδεὶς ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν λογίζεται, ἔστιν δ' ἡ μεγίστη τὸ ὁμοιοῦσθαι τοῖς οὖσιν κακοῖς ἀνδράσιν, ὁμοιούμενον δὲ τοὺς μὲν ἀγαθοὺς φεύγειν ἄνδρας καὶ λόγους καὶ ἀποσχίζεσθαι, τοῖς δὲ προσκολλᾶσθαι διώκοντα κατὰ τὰς συνουσίας· προσπεφυκότα δὲ τοῖς τοιούτοις ἀνάγκη ποιεῖν καὶ πάσχειν ἃ πεφύκασιν ἀλλήλους οἱ τοιοῦτοι ποιεῖν καὶ λέγειν. τοῦτο οὖν δὴ τὸ πάθος δίκη μὲν οὐκ ἔστιν—καλὸν γὰρ τό γε δίκαιον καὶ ἡ δίκη—τιμωρία δέ, ἀδικίας ἀκόλουθος

πάθη, ἧς ὅ τε τυχὼν καὶ μὴ τυγχάνων ἄθλιος, ὁ μὲν οὐκ
ἰατρευόμενος, ὁ δέ, ἵνα ἕτεροι πολλοὶ σῴζωνται, ἀπολλύμενος. 5
τιμὴ δ' ἐστὶν ἡμῖν, ὡς τὸ ὅλον εἰπεῖν, τοῖς μὲν ἀμείνοσιν
ἕπεσθαι, τὰ δὲ χείρονα, γενέσθαι δὲ βελτίω δυνατά, τοῦτ'
αὐτὸ ὡς ἄριστα ἀποτελεῖν.

Ψυχῆς οὖν ἀνθρώπῳ κτῆμα οὐκ ἔστιν εὐφυέστερον εἰς
τὸ φυγεῖν μὲν τὸ κακόν, ἰχνεῦσαι δὲ καὶ ἑλεῖν τὸ πάντων d
ἄριστον, καὶ ἑλόντα αὖ κοινῇ συνοικεῖν τὸν ἐπίλοιπον βίον·
διὸ δεύτερον ἐτάχθη τιμῇ, τὸ δὲ τρίτον—πᾶς ἂν τοῦτό γε
νοήσειεν—τὴν τοῦ σώματος εἶναι κατὰ φύσιν τιμήν· τὰς δ'
αὖ τιμὰς δεῖ σκοπεῖν, καὶ τούτων τίνες ἀληθεῖς καὶ ὅσαι 5
κίβδηλοι, τοῦτο δὲ νομοθέτου. μηνύειν δή μοι φαίνεται
τάσδε καὶ τοιάσδε τινὰς αὐτὰς εἶναι, τίμιον εἶναι σῶμα οὐ
τὸ καλὸν οὐδὲ ἰσχυρὸν οὐδὲ τάχος ἔχον οὐδὲ μέγα, οὐδέ
γε τὸ ὑγιεινόν—καίτοι πολλοῖς ἂν τοῦτό γε δοκοῖ—καὶ μὴν e
οὐδὲ τὰ τούτων γ' ἐναντία, τὰ δ' ἐν τῷ μέσῳ ἁπάσης ταύτης
τῆς ἕξεως ἐφαπτόμενα σωφρονέστατα ἅμα τε ἀσφαλέστατα
εἶναι μακρῷ· τὰ μὲν γὰρ χαύνους τὰς ψυχὰς καὶ θρασείας
ποιεῖ, τὰ δὲ ταπεινάς τε καὶ ἀνελευθέρους. ὡς δ' αὖτως 5
ἡ τῶν χρημάτων καὶ κτημάτων κτῆσις, καὶ τιμήσεως κατὰ
τὸν αὐτὸν ῥυθμὸν ἔχει· τὰ μὲν ὑπέρογκα γὰρ ἑκάστων
τούτων ἔχθρας καὶ στάσεις ἀπεργάζεται ταῖς πόλεσιν καὶ 729
ἰδίᾳ, τὰ δ' ἐλλείποντα δουλείας ὡς τὸ πολύ. μὴ δή τις
φιλοχρημονείτω παίδων γ' ἕνεκα, ἵνα ὅτι πλουσιωτάτους
καταλίπῃ· οὔτε γὰρ ἐκείνοις οὔτε αὖ τῇ πόλει ἄμεινον. ἡ
γὰρ τῶν νέων ἀκολάκευτος οὐσία, τῶν δ' ἀναγκαίων μὴ 5
ἐνδεής, αὕτη πασῶν μουσικωτάτη τε καὶ ἀρίστη· συμφω-
νοῦσα γὰρ ἡμῖν καὶ συναρμόττουσα εἰς ἅπαντα ἄλυπον τὸν
βίον ἀπεργάζεται. παισὶν δὲ αἰδῶ χρὴ πολλήν, οὐ χρυσὸν b
καταλείπειν. οἰόμεθα δὲ ἐπιπλήττοντες τοῖς νέοις ἀναι-
σχυντοῦσιν τοῦτο καταλείψειν· τὸ δ' ἔστιν οὐκ ἐκ τοῦ νῦν
παρακελεύματος τοῖς νέοις γιγνόμενον, ὃ παρακελεύονται
λέγοντες ὡς δεῖ πάντα αἰσχύνεσθαι τὸν νέον. ὁ δὲ ἔμφρων 5
νομοθέτης τοῖς πρεσβυτέροις ἂν μᾶλλον παρακελεύοιτο
αἰσχύνεσθαι τοὺς νέους, καὶ πάντων μάλιστα εὐλαβεῖσθαι
μή ποτέ τις αὐτὸν ἴδῃ τῶν νέων ἢ καὶ ἐπακούσῃ δρῶντα ἢ
λέγοντά τι τῶν αἰσχρῶν, ὡς ὅπου ἀναισχυντοῦσι γέροντες, c
ἀνάγκη καὶ νέους ἐνταῦθα εἶναι ἀναιδεστάτους· παιδεία γὰρ
νέων διαφέρουσά ἐστιν ἅμα καὶ αὐτῶν οὐ τὸ νουθετεῖν, ἀλλ'

ἅπερ ἂν ἄλλον νουθετῶν εἴποι τις, φαίνεσθαι ταῦτα αὐτὸν
5 δρῶντα διὰ βίου. συγγένειαν δὲ καὶ ὁμογνίων θεῶν κοινωνίαν πᾶσαν ταὐτοῦ φύσιν αἵματος ἔχουσαν τιμῶν τις καὶ
σεβόμενος, εὔνους ἂν γενεθλίους θεοὺς εἰς παίδων αὑτοῦ
σπορὰν ἴσχοι κατὰ λόγον. καὶ μὴν τό γε φίλων καὶ ἑταίρων
d πρὸς τὰς ἐν βίῳ ὁμιλίας εὐμενεῖς ἄν τις κτῷτο, μείζους μὲν
καὶ σεμνοτέρας τὰς ἐκείνων ὑπηρεσίας εἰς αὐτὸν ἡγούμενος
ἢ 'κεῖνοι, ἐλάττους δ' αὖ τὰς αὑτοῦ διανοούμενος εἰς τοὺς
φίλους χάριτας αὐτῶν τῶν φίλων τε καὶ ἑταίρων. εἰς μὴν
5 πόλιν καὶ πολίτας μακρῷ ἄριστος ὅστις πρὸ τοῦ 'Ολυμπίασιν καὶ ἁπάντων ἀγώνων πολεμικῶν τε καὶ εἰρηνικῶν
νικᾶν δέξαιτ' ἂν δόξῃ ὑπηρεσίας τῶν οἴκοι νόμων [ὡς
e ὑπηρετηκὼς πάντων κάλλιστ' ἀνθρώπων αὐτοῖς ἐν τῷ βίῳ].
πρὸς δ' αὖ τοὺς ξένους διανοητέον ὡς ἁγιώτατα συμβόλαια
ὄντα· σχεδὸν γὰρ πάντ' ἐστὶ τὰ τῶν ξένων [καὶ εἰς τοὺς
ξένους] ἁμαρτήματα παρὰ τὰ τῶν πολιτῶν εἰς θεὸν ἀνηρτη-
5 μένα τιμωρὸν μᾶλλον. ἔρημος γὰρ ὢν ὁ ξένος ἑταίρων τε
καὶ συγγενῶν ἐλεεινότερος ἀνθρώποις καὶ θεοῖς· ὁ δυνάμενος οὖν τιμωρεῖν μᾶλλον βοηθεῖ προθυμότερον, δύναται
730 δὲ διαφερόντως ὁ ξένιος ἑκάστων δαίμων καὶ θεὸς τῷ ξενίῳ
συνεπόμενοι Διί. πολλῆς οὖν εὐλαβείας, ᾧ καὶ σμικρὸν
προμηθείας ἔνι, μηδὲν ἁμάρτημα περὶ ξένους ἁμαρτόντα ἐν
τῷ βίῳ πρὸς τὸ τέλος αὐτοῦ πορευθῆναι. ξενικῶν δ' αὖ
5 καὶ ἐπιχωρίων ἁμαρτημάτων τὸ περὶ τοὺς ἱκέτας μέγιστον
γίγνεται ἁμάρτημα ἑκάστοις· μεθ' οὗ γὰρ ἱκετεύσας μάρτυρος ὁ ἱκέτης θεοῦ ἀπέτυχεν ὁμολογιῶν, φύλαξ διαφέρων
οὗτος τοῦ παθόντος γίγνεται, ὥστ' οὐκ ἄν ποτε ἀτιμώρητος
πάθοι ὁ τυχὼν ὧν ἔπαθε.

b Τὰ μὲν οὖν περὶ γονέας τε καὶ ἑαυτὸν καὶ τὰ ἑαυτοῦ,
περὶ πόλιν τε καὶ φίλους καὶ συγγένειαν, ξενικά τε καὶ
ἐπιχώρια, διεληλύθαμεν σχεδὸν ὁμιλήματα, τὸ δὲ ποῖός τις
ὢν αὐτὸς ἂν κάλλιστα διαγάγοι τὸν βίον, ἑπόμενον τούτῳ
5 διεξελθεῖν· ὅσα μὴ νόμος, ἀλλ' ἔπαινος παιδεύων καὶ ψόγος
ἑκάστους εὐηνίους μᾶλλον καὶ εὐμενεῖς τοῖς τεθήσεσθαι
μέλλουσιν νόμοις ἀπεργάζεται, ταῦτ' ἐστὶν μετὰ τοῦτο ἡμῖν
c ῥητέον. ἀλήθεια δὴ πάντων μὲν ἀγαθῶν θεοῖς ἡγεῖται,
πάντων δὲ ἀνθρώποις· ἧς ὁ γενήσεσθαι μέλλων μακάριός
τε καὶ εὐδαίμων ἐξ ἀρχῆς εὐθὺς μέτοχος εἴη, ἵνα ὡς πλεῖστον
χρόνον ἀληθὴς ὢν διαβιοῖ. πιστὸς γάρ· ὁ δὲ ἄπιστος ᾧ

φίλον ψεῦδος ἑκούσιον, ὅτῳ δὲ ἀκούσιον, ἄνους. ὧν οὐδέ- 5
τερον ζηλωτόν. ἄφιλος γὰρ δὴ πᾶς ὅ τε ἄπιστος καὶ ἀμαθής,
χρόνου δὲ προϊόντος γνωσθείς, εἰς τὸ χαλεπὸν γῆρας ἐρημίαν
αὑτῷ πᾶσαν κατεσκευάσατο ἐπὶ τέλει τοῦ βίου, ὥστε ζώντων
καὶ μὴ ἑταίρων καὶ παίδων σχεδὸν ὁμοίως ὀρφανὸν αὐτῷ d
γενέσθαι τὸν βίον. τίμιος μὲν δὴ καὶ ὁ μηδὲν ἀδικῶν, ὁ
δὲ μηδ' ἐπιτρέπων τοῖς ἀδικοῦσιν ἀδικεῖν πλέον ἢ διπλασίας
τιμῆς ἄξιος ἐκείνου· ὁ μὲν γὰρ ἑνός, ὁ δὲ πολλῶν ἀντάξιος
ἑτέρων, μηνύων τὴν τῶν ἄλλων τοῖς ἄρχουσιν ἀδικίαν. ὁ δὲ 5
καὶ συγκολάζων εἰς δύναμιν τοῖς ἄρχουσιν, ὁ μέγας ἀνὴρ
ἐν πόλει καὶ τέλειος, οὗτος ἀναγορευέσθω νικηφόρος ἀρετῇ.
τὸν αὐτὸν δὴ τοῦτον ἔπαινον καὶ περὶ σωφροσύνης χρὴ λέ- e
γειν καὶ περὶ φρονήσεως, καὶ ὅσα ἄλλα ἀγαθά τις κέκτηται
δυνατὰ μὴ μόνον αὐτὸν ἔχειν ἀλλὰ καὶ ἄλλοις μεταδιδόναι·
καὶ τὸν μὲν μεταδιδόντα ὡς ἀκρότατον χρὴ τιμᾶν, τὸν δ' αὖ
μὴ δυνάμενον, ἐθέλοντα δέ, ἐᾶν δεύτερον, τὸν δὲ φθονοῦντα 5
καὶ ἑκόντα μηδενὶ κοινωνὸν διὰ φιλίας γιγνόμενον ἀγαθῶν
τινων αὐτὸν μὲν ψέγειν, τὸ δὲ κτῆμα μηδὲν μᾶλλον διὰ τὸν 731
κεκτημένον ἀτιμάζειν, ἀλλὰ κτᾶσθαι κατὰ δύναμιν. φιλο-
νικείτω δὲ ἡμῖν πᾶς πρὸς ἀρετὴν ἀφθόνως. ὁ μὲν γὰρ
τοιοῦτος τὰς πόλεις αὔξει, ἁμιλλώμενος μὲν αὐτός, τοὺς
ἄλλους δὲ οὐ κολούων διαβολαῖς· ὁ δὲ φθονερός, τῇ τῶν 5
ἄλλων διαβολῇ δεῖν οἰόμενος ὑπερέχειν, αὐτός τε ἧττον
συντείνει πρὸς ἀρετὴν τὴν ἀληθῆ, τούς τε ἀνθαμιλλωμένους
εἰς ἀθυμίαν καθίστησι τῷ ἀδίκως ψέγεσθαι, καὶ διὰ ταῦτα
ἀγύμναστον τὴν πόλιν ὅλην εἰς ἅμιλλαν ἀρετῆς ποιῶν, b
σμικροτέραν αὐτὴν πρὸς εὐδοξίαν τὸ ἑαυτοῦ μέρος ἀπεργά-
ζεται. θυμοειδῆ μὲν δὴ χρὴ πάντα ἄνδρα εἶναι, πρᾷον δὲ
ὡς ὅτι μάλιστα. τὰ γὰρ τῶν ἄλλων χαλεπὰ καὶ δυσίατα
ἢ καὶ τὸ παράπαν ἀνίατα ἀδικήματα οὐκ ἔστιν ἄλλως ἐκ- 5
φυγεῖν ἢ μαχόμενον καὶ ἀμυνόμενον νικῶντα καὶ τῷ μηδὲν
ἀνιέναι κολάζοντα, τοῦτο δὲ ἄνευ θυμοῦ γενναίου ψυχὴ πᾶσα
ἀδύνατος δρᾶν. τὰ δ' αὖ τῶν ὅσοι ἀδικοῦσιν μέν, ἰατὰ c
δέ, γιγνώσκειν χρὴ πρῶτον μὲν ὅτι πᾶς ὁ ἄδικος οὐχ ἑκὼν
ἄδικος· τῶν γὰρ μεγίστων κακῶν οὐδεὶς οὐδαμοῦ οὐδὲν
ἑκὼν κεκτῆτο ἄν ποτε, πολὺ δὲ ἥκιστα ἐν τοῖς τῶν ἑαυτοῦ
τιμιωτάτοις. ψυχὴ δ', ὡς εἴπομεν, ἀληθείᾳ γέ ἐστιν πᾶσιν 5
τιμιώτατον· ἐν οὖν τῷ τιμιωτάτῳ τὸ μέγιστον κακὸν οὐδεὶς
ἑκὼν μή ποτε λάβῃ καὶ ζῇ διὰ βίου κεκτημένος αὐτό. ἀλλὰ

ἐλεεινὸς μὲν πάντως ὅ γε ἄδικος καὶ ὁ τὰ κακὰ ἔχων, ἐλεεῖν
d δὲ τὸν μὲν ἰάσιμα ἔχοντα ἐγχωρεῖ καὶ ἀνείργοντα τὸν θυμὸν
πραΰνειν καὶ μὴ ἀκραχολοῦντα γυναικείως πικραινόμενον
διατελεῖν, τῷ δ' ἀκράτως καὶ ἀπαραμυθήτως πλημμελεῖ καὶ
κακῷ ἐφιέναι δεῖ τὴν ὀργήν· διὸ δὴ θυμοειδῆ πρέπειν καὶ
5 πρᾷον φαμεν ἑκάστοτε εἶναι δεῖν τὸν ἀγαθόν.

Πάντων δὲ μέγιστον κακῶν ἀνθρώποις τοῖς πολλοῖς ἔμ-
φυτον ἐν ταῖς ψυχαῖς ἐστιν, οὗ πᾶς αὐτῷ συγγνώμην ἔχων
e ἀποφυγὴν οὐδεμίαν μηχανᾶται· τοῦτο δ' ἔστιν ὃ λέγουσιν
ὡς φίλος αὐτῷ πᾶς ἄνθρωπος φύσει τέ ἐστιν καὶ ὀρθῶς
ἔχει τὸ δεῖν εἶναι τοιοῦτον. τὸ δὲ ἀληθείᾳ γε πάντων
ἁμαρτημάτων διὰ τὴν σφόδρα ἑαυτοῦ φιλίαν αἴτιον ἑκάστῳ
5 γίγνεται ἑκάστοτε. τυφλοῦται γὰρ περὶ τὸ φιλούμενον ὁ
φιλῶν, ὥστε τὰ δίκαια καὶ τὰ ἀγαθὰ καὶ τὰ καλὰ κακῶς
732 κρίνει, τὸ αὐτοῦ πρὸ τοῦ ἀληθοῦς ἀεὶ τιμᾶν δεῖν ἡγούμενος·
οὔτε γὰρ ἑαυτὸν οὔτε τὰ ἑαυτοῦ χρὴ τόν γε μέγαν ἄνδρα
ἐσόμενον στέργειν, ἀλλὰ τὰ δίκαια, ἐάν τε παρ' αὐτῷ ἐάν τε
παρ' ἄλλῳ μᾶλλον πραττόμενα τυγχάνῃ. ἐκ ταὐτοῦ δὲ
5 ἁμαρτήματος τούτου καὶ τὸ τὴν ἀμαθίαν τὴν παρ' αὐτῷ
δοκεῖν σοφίαν εἶναι γέγονε πᾶσιν· ὅθεν οὐκ εἰδότες ὡς ἔπος
b εἰπεῖν οὐδέν, οἰόμεθα τὰ πάντα εἰδέναι, οὐκ ἐπιτρέποντες δὲ
ἄλλοις ἃ μὴ ἐπιστάμεθα πράττειν, ἀναγκαζόμεθα ἁμαρτάνειν
αὐτοὶ πράττοντες. διὸ πάντα ἄνθρωπον χρὴ φεύγειν τὸ
σφόδρα φιλεῖν αὐτόν, τὸν δ' ἑαυτοῦ βελτίω διώκειν ἀεί,
μηδεμίαν αἰσχύνην ἐπὶ τῷ τοιούτῳ πρόσθεν ποιούμενον.
5 Ἃ δὲ σμικρότερα μὲν τούτων καὶ λεγόμενα πολλάκις ἐστίν,
χρήσιμα δὲ τούτων οὐχ ἧττον, χρὴ λέγειν ἑαυτὸν ἀναμιμνή-
σκοντα. ὥσπερ γάρ τινος ἀπορρέοντος ἀεὶ δεῖ τοὐναντίον
ἐπιρρεῖν· ἀνάμνησις δ' ἐστὶν ἐπιρροὴ φρονήσεως ἀπολει-
c πούσης· διὸ δὴ γελώτων τε εἴργεσθαι χρὴ τῶν ἐξαισίων
καὶ δακρύων, παραγγέλλειν δὲ παντὶ πάντ' ἄνδρα, καὶ ὅλην
περιχάρειαν πᾶσαν ἀποκρυπτόμενον καὶ περιωδυνίαν εὐσχη-
μονεῖν πειρᾶσθαι, κατά τε εὐπραγίας ἱσταμένου τοῦ δαίμονος
5 ἑκάστου, καὶ κατὰ τύχας οἷον πρὸς ὑψηλὰ καὶ ἀνάντη δαι-
μόνων ἀνθισταμένων τισὶν πράξεσιν, ἐλπίζειν δ' ἀεὶ τοῖς
γε ἀγαθοῖσι τὸν θεὸν ἃ δωρεῖται πόνων μὲν ἐπιπιπτόντων
d ἀντὶ μειζόνων ἐλάττους ποιήσειν τῶν τ' αὖ νῦν παρόντων
ἐπὶ τὸ βέλτιον μεταβολάς, περὶ δὲ τὰ ἀγαθὰ τὰ ἐναντία
τούτων ἀεὶ πάντ' αὐτοῖς παραγενήσεσθαι μετ' ἀγαθῆς τύχης.

ταύταις δὴ ταῖς ἐλπίσιν ἕκαστον χρὴ ζῆν καὶ ταῖς ὑπομνήσεσι πάντων τῶν τοιούτων, μηδὲν φειδόμενον, ἀλλ' ἀεὶ κατά τε παιδιὰς καὶ σπουδὰς ἀναμιμνήσκοντα ἕτερόν τε καὶ ἑαυτὸν σαφῶς.

Νῦν οὖν δὴ περὶ μὲν ἐπιτηδευμάτων, οἷα χρὴ ἐπιτηδεύειν, καὶ περὶ αὐτοῦ ἑκάστου, ποιόν τινα χρεὼν εἶναι, λέλεκται σχεδὸν ὅσα θεῖά ἐστι, τὰ δὲ ἀνθρώπινα νῦν ἡμῖν οὐκ εἴρηται, δεῖ δέ· ἀνθρώποις γὰρ διαλεγόμεθα ἀλλ' οὐ θεοῖς. ἔστιν δὴ φύσει ἀνθρώπειον μάλιστα ἡδοναὶ καὶ λῦπαι καὶ ἐπιθυμίαι, ἐξ ὧν ἀνάγκη τὸ θνητὸν πᾶν ζῷον ἀτεχνῶς οἷον ἐξηρτῆσθαί τε καὶ ἐκκρεμάμενον εἶναι σπουδαῖς ταῖς μεγίσταις· δεῖ δὴ τὸν κάλλιστον βίον ἐπαινεῖν, μὴ μόνον ὅτι τῷ σχήματι κρατεῖ πρὸς εὐδοξίαν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ὡς, ἄν τις ἐθέλῃ γεύεσθαι καὶ μὴ νέος ὢν φυγὰς ἀπ' αὐτοῦ γένηται, κρατεῖ καὶ τούτῳ ὃ πάντες ζητοῦμεν, τῷ χαίρειν πλείω, ἐλάττω δὲ λυπεῖσθαι παρὰ τὸν βίον ἅπαντα. ὡς δὲ ἔσται τοῦτο σαφές, ἂν γεύηταί τις ὀρθῶς, ἑτοίμως καὶ σφόδρα φανήσεται. ἡ δὲ ὀρθότης τίς; τοῦτο ἤδη παρὰ τοῦ λόγου χρὴ λαμβάνοντα σκοπεῖν· εἴτε οὕτως ἡμῖν κατὰ φύσιν πέφυκεν εἴτε ἄλλως παρὰ φύσιν, βίον χρὴ παρὰ βίον ἡδίω καὶ λυπηρότερον ὧδε σκοπεῖν. ἡδονὴν βουλόμεθα ἡμῖν εἶναι, λύπην δὲ οὔθ' αἱρούμεθα οὔτε βουλόμεθα, τὸ δὲ μηδέτερον ἀντὶ μὲν ἡδονῆς οὐ βουλόμεθα, λύπης δὲ ἀλλάττεσθαι βουλόμεθα· λύπην δ' ἐλάττω μετὰ μείζονος ἡδονῆς βουλόμεθα, ἡδονὴν δ' ἐλάττω μετὰ μείζονος λύπης οὐ βουλόμεθα, ἴσα δὲ ἀντὶ ἴσων ἑκάτερα τούτων οὐχ ὡς βουλόμεθα ἔχοιμεν ἂν διασαφεῖν. ταῦτα δὲ πάντα ἐστὶν πλήθει καὶ μεγέθει καὶ σφοδρότησιν ἰσότησίν τε, καὶ ὅσα ἐναντία ἐστὶν πᾶσι τοῖς τοιούτοις πρὸς βούλησιν, διαφέροντά τε καὶ μηδὲν διαφέροντα πρὸς αἵρεσιν ἑκάστων. οὕτω δὴ τούτων ἐξ ἀνάγκης διακεκοσμημένων, ἐν ᾧ μὲν βίῳ ἔνεστι πολλὰ ἑκάτερα καὶ μεγάλα καὶ σφοδρά, ὑπερβάλλει δὲ τὰ τῶν ἡδονῶν, βουλόμεθα, ἐν ᾧ δὲ τὰ ἐναντία, οὐ βουλόμεθα· καὶ αὖ ἐν ᾧ ὀλίγα ἑκάτερα καὶ σμικρὰ καὶ ἠρεμαῖα, ὑπερβάλλει δὲ τὰ λυπηρά, οὐ βουλόμεθα, ἐν ᾧ δὲ τἀναντία, βουλόμεθα. ἐν ᾧ δ' αὖ βίῳ ἰσορροπεῖ, καθάπερ ἐν τοῖς πρόσθεν δεῖ διανοεῖσθαι· τὸν ἰσόρροπον βίον ὡς τῶν μὲν ὑπερβάλλοντα τῷ φίλῳ ἡμῖν βουλόμεθα, τῶν δ' αὖ τοῖς ἐχθροῖς οὐ βουλόμεθα. πάντας δὴ δεῖ διανοεῖσθαι τοὺς βίους ἡμῶν ὡς ἐν

τούτοις ἐνδεδεμένοι πεφύκασιν, καὶ δεῖ **διαιρεῖσθαι** ποίους φύσει βουλόμεθα· εἰ δέ τι παρὰ ταῦτα ἄρα φαμὲν βούλεσθαι, διά τινα ἄγνοιαν καὶ ἀπειρίαν τῶν ὄντων βίων αὐτὰ λέγομεν.

Τίνες δὴ καὶ πόσοι εἰσὶ βίοι, ὧν πέρι δεῖ προελόμενον τὸ βούλητόν τε καὶ [ἑκούσιον ἀβούλητόν τε καὶ] ἀκούσιον ἰδόντα εἰς νόμον ἑαυτῷ ταξάμενον, τὸ φίλον ἅμα καὶ ἡδὺ καὶ ἄριστόν τε καὶ κάλλιστον ἑλόμενον, ζῇ ὡς οἷόν τ' ἐστὶν ἀνθρώπων μακαριώτατα; λέγωμεν δὴ σώφρονα βίον ἕνα εἶναι καὶ φρόνιμον ἕνα καὶ ἕνα τὸν ἀνδρεῖον, καὶ τὸν ὑγιεινὸν βίον ἕνα ταξώμεθα· καὶ τούτοις οὖσιν τέτταρσιν ἐναντίους ἄλλους τέτταρας, ἄφρονα, δειλόν, ἀκόλαστον, νοσώδη. σώφρονα μὲν οὖν βίον ὁ γιγνώσκων θήσει πρᾷον ἐπὶ πάντα, καὶ ἠρεμαίας μὲν λύπας, ἠρεμαίας δὲ ἡδονάς, μαλακὰς δὲ ἐπιθυμίας καὶ ἔρωτας οὐκ ἐμμανεῖς παρεχόμενον, ἀκόλαστον δέ, ὀξὺν ἐπὶ πάντα, καὶ σφοδρὰς μὲν λύπας, σφοδρὰς δὲ ἡδονάς, συντόνους δὲ καὶ οἰστρώδεις ἐπιθυμίας [τε] καὶ ἔρωτας ὡς οἷόν τε ἐμμανεστάτους παρεχόμενον, ὑπερβαλλούσας δὲ ἐν μὲν τῷ σώφρονι βίῳ τὰς ἡδονὰς τῶν ἀχθηδόνων, ἐν δὲ τῷ ἀκολάστῳ τὰς λύπας τῶν ἡδονῶν μεγέθει καὶ πλήθει καὶ πυκνότησιν. ὅθεν ὁ μὲν ἡδίων ἡμῖν τῶν βίων, ὁ δὲ λυπηρότερος ἐξ ἀνάγκης συμβαίνει κατὰ φύσιν γίγνεσθαι, καὶ τόν γε βουλόμενον ἡδέως ζῆν οὐκέτι παρείκει ἑκόντα γε ἀκολάστως ζῆν, ἀλλ' ἤδη δῆλον ὡς, εἰ τὸ νῦν λεγόμενον ὀρθόν, πᾶς ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἄκων ἐστὶν ἀκόλαστος· ἢ γὰρ δι' ἀμαθίαν ἢ δι' ἀκράτειαν ἢ δι' ἀμφότερα, τοῦ σωφρονεῖν ἐνδεὴς ὢν ζῇ ὁ πᾶς ἀνθρώπινος ὄχλος. ταὐτὰ δὲ περὶ νοσώδους τε καὶ ὑγιεινοῦ βίου διανοητέον, ὡς ἔχουσι μὲν ἡδονὰς καὶ λύπας, ὑπερβάλλουσι δὲ ἡδοναὶ μὲν λύπας ἐν ὑγιείᾳ, λῦπαι δὲ ἡδονὰς ἐν νόσοις. ἡμῖν δὲ ἡ βούλησις τῆς αἱρέσεως τῶν βίων οὐχ ἵνα τὸ λυπηρὸν ὑπερβάλλῃ. ὅπου δ' ὑπερβάλλεται, τοῦτον τὸν βίον ἡδίω κεκρίκαμεν. ὁ δὴ σώφρων τοῦ ἀκολάστου καὶ ὁ φρόνιμος τοῦ ἄφρονος, φαῖμεν ἄν, καὶ ὁ τῆς ἀνδρείας τοῦ τῆς δειλίας ἐλάττονα καὶ σμικρότερα καὶ μανότερα ἔχων ἀμφότερα, τῇ τῶν ἡδονῶν ἑκάτερος ἑκάτερον ὑπερβάλλων, τῇ τῆς λύπης ἐκείνων ὑπερβαλλόντων αὐτούς, ὁ μὲν ἀνδρεῖος τὸν δειλόν, ὁ δὲ φρόνιμος τὸν ἄφρονα νικῶσιν, ὥστε ἡδίους εἶναι τοὺς βίους τῶν βίων, σώφρονα καὶ ἀνδρεῖον καὶ φρόνιμον καὶ ὑγιεινὸν δειλοῦ καὶ ἄφρονος

καὶ ἀκολάστου καὶ νοσώδους, καὶ συλλήβδην τὸν ἀρετῆς
ἐχόμενον κατὰ σῶμα ἢ καὶ κατὰ ψυχὴν τοῦ τῆς μοχθηρίας
ἐχομένου βίου ἡδίω τε εἶναι καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ὑπερέχειν ἐκ
περιττοῦ κάλλει καὶ ὀρθότητι καὶ ἀρετῇ καὶ εὐδοξίᾳ, ὥστε
τὸν ἔχοντα αὐτὸν ζῆν εὐδαιμονέστερον ἀπεργάζεσθαι τοῦ e
ἐναντίου τῷ παντὶ καὶ ὅλῳ.

Καὶ τὸ μὲν προοίμιον τῶν νόμων ἐνταυθοῖ λεχθὲν τῶν
λόγων τέλος ἐχέτω, μετὰ δὲ τὸ προοίμιον ἀναγκαῖόν που
νόμον ἕπεσθαι, μᾶλλον δὲ τό γε ἀληθὲς νόμους πολιτείας
ὑπογράφειν. καθάπερ οὖν δή τινα συνυφὴν ἢ καὶ πλέγμ'
ἄλλ' ὁτιοῦν, οὐκ ἐκ τῶν αὐτῶν οἷόν τ' ἐστὶν τήν τε ἐφυφὴν
καὶ τὸν στήμονα ἀπεργάζεσθαι, διαφέρειν δ' ἀναγκαῖον τὸ
τῶν στημόνων πρὸς ἀρετὴν γένος—ἰσχυρόν τε γὰρ καί τινα
βεβαιότητα ἐν τοῖς τρόποις εἰληφός, τὸ δὲ μαλακώτερον καὶ 735
ἐπιεικείᾳ τινὶ δικαίᾳ χρώμενον—ὅθεν δὴ τοὺς τὰς ἀρχὰς ἐν
ταῖς πόλεσιν ἄρξοντας δεῖ διακρίνεσθαί τινα τρόπον ταύτῃ
καὶ τοὺς σμικρᾷ παιδείᾳ βασανισθέντας ἑκάστοτε κατὰ λόγον.
ἐστὸν γὰρ δὴ δύο πολιτείας εἴδη, τὸ μὲν ἀρχῶν καταστάσεις
ἑκάστοις, τὸ δὲ νόμοι ταῖς ἀρχαῖς ἀποδοθέντες.

Τὸ δὲ πρὸ τούτων ἁπάντων δεῖ διανοεῖσθαι τὰ τοιάδε.
πᾶσαν ἀγέλην ποιμὴν καὶ βουκόλος τροφεύς τε ἵππων καὶ b
ὅσα ἄλλα τοιαῦτα παραλαβών, οὐκ ἄλλως μή ποτε ἐπιχειρήσει
θεραπεύειν ἢ πρῶτον μὲν τὸν ἑκάστῃ προσήκοντα καθαρμὸν
καθαρεῖ τῇ συνοικήσει, διαλέξας δὲ τά τε ὑγιῆ καὶ τὰ μὴ καὶ
τὰ γενναῖα καὶ ἀγεννῆ, τὰ μὲν ἀποπέμψει πρὸς ἄλλας τινὰς
ἀγέλας, τὰ δὲ θεραπεύσει, διανοούμενος ὡς μάταιος ἂν ὁ
πόνος εἴη καὶ ἀνήνυτος περί τε σῶμα καὶ ψυχάς, ἃς φύσις
καὶ πονηρὰ τροφὴ διεφθαρκυῖα προσαπόλλυσιν τὸ τῶν ὑγιῶν c
καὶ ἀκηράτων ἠθῶν τε καὶ σωμάτων γένος ἐν ἑκάστοις τῶν
κτημάτων, ἄν τις τὰ ὑπάρχοντα μὴ διακαθαίρηται. τὰ μὲν
δὴ τῶν ἄλλων ζῴων ἐλάττων τε σπουδὴ καὶ παραδείγματος
ἕνεκα μόνον ἄξια παραθέσθαι τῷ λόγῳ, τὰ δὲ τῶν ἀνθρώπων
σπουδῆς τῆς μεγίστης τῷ τε νομοθέτῃ διερευνᾶσθαι καὶ φρά-
ζειν τὸ προσῆκον ἑκάστοις καθαρμοῦ τε πέρι καὶ συμπασῶν
τῶν ἄλλων πράξεων. αὐτίκα γὰρ τὸ περὶ καθαρμοὺς πόλεως d
ὧδ' ἔχον ἂν εἴη· πολλῶν οὐσῶν τῶν διακαθάρσεων αἱ μὲν
ῥᾴους εἰσίν, αἱ δὲ χαλεπώτεραι, καὶ τὰς μὲν τύραννος μὲν ὢν
καὶ νομοθέτης ὁ αὐτός, ὅσαι χαλεπαί τ' εἰσὶν καὶ ἄρισται,
δύναιτ' ἂν καθῆραι, νομοθέτης δὲ ἄνευ τυραννίδος καθιστὰς

πολιτείαν καινὴν καὶ νόμους, εἰ καὶ τὸν πρᾳότατον τῶν καθαρμῶν καθήρειεν, ἀγαπώντως ἂν καὶ τὸ τοιοῦτον δράσειεν. ἔστι δ' ὁ μὲν ἄριστος ἀλγεινός, καθάπερ ὅσα τῶν
e φαρμάκων τοιουτότροπα, ὁ τῇ δίκῃ μετὰ τιμωρίας εἰς τὸ κολάζειν ἄγων, θάνατον ἢ φυγὴν τῇ τιμωρίᾳ τὸ τέλος ἐπιτιθείς· τοὺς γὰρ μέγιστα ἐξημαρτηκότας, ἀνιάτους δὲ ὄντας, μεγίστην δὲ οὖσαν βλάβην πόλεως, ἀπαλλάττειν
5 εἴωθεν. ὁ δὲ πρᾳότερός ἐστι τῶν καθαρμῶν ὁ τοιόσδε ἡμῖν· ὅσοι διὰ τὴν τῆς τροφῆς ἀπορίαν τοῖς ἡγεμόσιν ἐπὶ τὰ τῶν ἐχόντων μὴ ἔχοντες ἑτοίμους αὑτοὺς ἐνδείκνυνται παρε-
736 σκευακότες ἕπεσθαι, τούτοις ὡς νοσήματι πόλεως ἐμπεφυκότι, δι' εὐφημίας ἀπαλλαγήν, ὄνομα ἀποικίαν τιθέμενος, εὐμενῶς ὅτι μάλιστα ἐξεπέμψατο. παντὶ μὲν οὖν νομοθετοῦντι τοῦτο ἁμῶς γέ πως κατ' ἀρχὰς δραστέον, ἡμῖν μὴν
5 ἔτι τούτων ἀκοπώτερα τὰ περὶ ταῦτ' ἐστὶ συμβεβηκότα νῦν· οὔτε γὰρ ἀποικίαν οὔτ' ἐκλογήν τινα καθάρσεως δεῖ μηχανᾶσθαι πρὸς τὸ παρόν, οἷον δέ τινων συρρεόντων [ἐκ]
b πολλῶν τὰ μὲν πηγῶν τὰ δὲ χειμάρρων εἰς μίαν λίμνην, ἀναγκαῖον προσέχοντας τὸν νοῦν φυλάττειν ὅπως ὅτι καθαρώτατον ἔσται τὸ συρρέον ὕδωρ, τὰ μὲν ἐξαντλοῦντας, τὰ δ' ἀποχετεύοντας καὶ παρατρέποντας. πόνος δ', ὡς
5 ἔοικεν, καὶ κίνδυνός ἐστιν ἐν πάσῃ κατασκευῇ πολιτικῇ. τὰ δ' ἐπείπερ λόγῳ γ' ἐστὶν τὰ νῦν ἀλλ' οὐκ ἔργῳ πραττόμενα, πεπεράνθω τε ἡμῖν ἡ συλλογὴ καὶ κατὰ νοῦν ἡ καθαρότης αὐτῆς ἔστω συμβεβηκυῖα· τοὺς γὰρ κακοὺς τῶν ἐπιχει-
c ρούντων εἰς τὴν νῦν πόλιν ὡς πολιτευσομένους συνιέναι πειθοῖ πάσῃ καὶ ἱκανῷ χρόνῳ διαβασανίσαντες, διακωλύσωμεν ἀφικνεῖσθαι, τοὺς δ' ἀγαθοὺς εἰς δύναμιν εὐμενεῖς ἵλεώ τε προσαγώμεθα.

5 Τόδε δὲ μὴ λανθανέτω γιγνόμενον ἡμᾶς εὐτύχημα, ὅτι καθάπερ εἴπομεν τὴν τῶν Ἡρακλειδῶν ἀποικίαν εὐτυχεῖν, ὡς γῆς καὶ χρεῶν ἀποκοπῆς καὶ νομῆς πέρι δεινὴν καὶ ἐπικίνδυνον ἔριν ἐξέφυγεν, ἣν νομοθετεῖσθαι ἀναγκασθείσῃ
d πόλει τῶν ἀρχαίων οὔτε ἐᾶν οἷόν τε ἀκίνητον οὔτ' αὖ κινεῖν δυνατόν ἐστί τινα τρόπον, εὐχὴ δὲ μόνον ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν λείπεται, καὶ σμικρὰ μετάβασις εὐλαβὴς ἐν πολλῷ χρόνῳ σμικρὸν μεταβιβάζουσιν, ἥδε· τῶν κινούντων ἀεὶ κεκτημένων
5 μὲν αὐτῶν γῆν ἄφθονον ὑπάρχειν, κεκτημένων δὲ καὶ ὀφειλέτας αὐτοῖς πολλοὺς ἐθελόντων τε τούτων πῃ τοῖς ἀπορου-

μένοις δι' ἐπιείκειαν κοινωνεῖν, τὰ μὲν ἀφιέντας, τὰ δὲ e
νεμομένους, ἁμῇ γέ πῃ τῆς μετριότητος ἐχομένους καὶ
πενίαν ἡγουμένους εἶναι μὴ τὸ τὴν οὐσίαν ἐλάττω ποιεῖν
ἀλλὰ τὸ τὴν ἀπληστίαν πλείω. σωτηρίας τε γὰρ ἀρχὴ
μεγίστη πόλεως αὕτη γίγνεται, καὶ ἐπὶ ταύτης οἷον κρηπῖδος 5
μονίμου ἐποικοδομεῖν δυνατὸν ὅντινα ἂν ὕστερον ἐποικοδομῇ
τις κόσμον πολιτικὸν προσήκοντα τῇ τοιαύτῃ καταστάσει·
ταύτης δὲ σαθρᾶς οὔσης [τῆς μεταβάσεως], οὐκ εὔπορος ἡ 737
μετὰ ταῦτα πολιτικὴ πρᾶξις οὐδεμιᾷ γίγνοιτ' ἂν πόλει.
ἦν ἡμεῖς μέν, ὥς φαμεν, ἐκφεύγομεν· ὅμως δὲ εἰρῆσθαί γε
ὀρθότερον, εἰ καὶ μὴ ἐξεφεύγομεν, ὅπῃ ποτ' ἂν ἐποιούμεθα
αὐτῆς τὴν φυγήν. εἰρήσθω δή νυν ὅτι διὰ τοῦ μὴ φιλο- 5
χρηματεῖν μετὰ δίκης, ἄλλη δ' οὐκ ἔστιν οὔτ' εὑρεῖα οὔτε
στενὴ τῆς τοιαύτης μηχανῆς διαφυγή· καὶ τοῦτο μὲν οἷον
ἔρμα πόλεως ἡμῖν κείσθω τὰ νῦν. ἀνεγκλήτους γὰρ δεῖ b
τὰς οὐσίας πρὸς ἀλλήλους κατασκευάζεσθαι ἁμῶς γέ πως,
ἢ μὴ προϊέναι πρότερον εἰς τοὔμπροσθεν ἑκόντας εἶναι τῆς
ἄλλης κατασκευῆς οἷς ἦ παλαιὰ ἐγκλήματα πρὸς ἀλλήλους,
[καὶ] ὅσοις νοῦ καὶ σμικρὸν μετῇ· οἷς δέ, ὡς ἡμῖν νῦν, 5
θεὸς ἔδωκε καινήν τε πόλιν οἰκίζειν καὶ μή τινας ἔχθρας
εἶναί πω πρὸς ἀλλήλους, τούτους ἔχθρας αὐτοῖς αἰτίους
γενέσθαι διὰ τὴν διανομὴν τῆς γῆς τε καὶ οἰκήσεων οὐκ
ἀνθρώπινος ἂν εἴη μετὰ κάκης πάσης ἀμαθία.

Τίς οὖν δὴ τρόπος ἂν εἴη τῆς ὀρθῆς διανομῆς; πρῶτον c
μὲν τὸν αὐτῶν ὄγκον τοῦ ἀριθμοῦ δεῖ τάξασθαι, πόσον εἶναι
χρεών· μετὰ δὲ τοῦτο τὴν διανομὴν τῶν πολιτῶν, καθ' ὁπόσα
μέρη πλήθει καὶ ὁπηλίκα διαιρετέον αὐτούς, ἀνομολογητέον·
ἐπὶ δὲ ταῦτα τήν τε γῆν καὶ τὰς οἰκήσεις ὅτι μάλιστα ἴσας 5
ἐπινεμητέον. ὄγκος δὴ πλήθους ἱκανὸς οὐκ ἄλλως ὀρθῶς
γίγνοιτ' ἂν λεχθεὶς ἢ πρὸς τὴν γῆν καὶ πρὸς τὰς τῶν
πλησιοχώρων πόλεις· γῆς μὲν ὁπόση ποσοὺς σώφρονας d
ὄντας ἱκανὴ τρέφειν, πλείονος δὲ οὐδὲν προσδεῖ, πλήθους
δέ, ὁπόσοι τοὺς προσχώρους ἀδικοῦντάς τε αὐτοὺς ἀμύνασθαι
δυνατοὶ καὶ γείτοσιν ἑαυτῶν ἀδικουμένοις βοηθῆσαι μὴ παντά-
πασιν ἀπόρως δύναιντ' ἄν. ταῦτα δέ, ἰδόντες τὴν χώραν καὶ 5
τοὺς γείτονας, ὁριούμεθα ἔργῳ καὶ λόγοις· νῦν δὲ σχήματος
ἕνεκα καὶ ὑπογραφῆς ἵνα περαίνηται, πρὸς τὴν νομοθεσίαν
ὁ λόγος ἴτω.

Πεντάκις μὲν χίλιοι ἕστωσαν καὶ τετταράκοντα, ἀριθμοῦ e

τινος ἕνεκα προσήκοντος, γεωμόροι τε καὶ ἀμυνοῦντες τῇ νομῇ· γῆ δὲ καὶ οἰκήσεις ὡσαύτως τὰ αὐτὰ μέρη διανεμηθήτων, γενόμενα ἀνὴρ καὶ κλῆρος συννομή. δύο μὲν δὴ μέρη τοῦ παντὸς ἀριθμοῦ τὸ πρῶτον νεμηθήτω, μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα τρία τοῦ αὐτοῦ· πέφυκε γὰρ καὶ τέτταρα καὶ πέντε καὶ μέχρι τῶν δέκα ἐφεξῆς. δεῖ δὴ περὶ ἀριθμῶν τό γε τοσοῦτον πάντα
738 ἄνδρα νομοθετοῦντα νενοηκέναι, τίς ἀριθμὸς καὶ ποῖος πάσαις πόλεσιν χρησιμώτατος ἂν εἴη. λέγωμεν δὴ τὸν πλείστας καὶ ἐφεξῆς μάλιστα διανομὰς ἐν αὑτῷ κεκτημένον. ὁ μὲν δὴ πᾶς εἰς πάντα πάσας τομὰς εἴληχεν· ὁ δὲ τῶν τετταράκοντα καὶ πεντακισχιλίων εἷς τε πόλεμον καὶ ὅσα κατ' εἰρήνην [πρὸς ἅπαντα τὰ συμβόλαια καὶ κοινωνήματα], εἰσφορῶν τε πέρι καὶ διανομῶν, οὐ πλείους μιᾶς δεουσῶν ἑξήκοντα δύναιτ' ἂν τέμνεσθαι τομῶν, συνεχεῖς δὲ ἀπὸ μιᾶς
b μέχρι τῶν δέκα.

Ταῦτα μὲν οὖν δὴ καὶ κατὰ σχολὴν δεῖ βεβαίως λαβεῖν, οἷς ἂν ὁ νόμος προστάττῃ λαμβάνειν· ἔχει γὰρ οὖν οὐκ ἄλλως ἢ ταύτῃ· δεῖ δὲ αὐτὰ ῥηθῆναι τῶνδε ἕνεκα κατοικίζοντι πόλιν. οὔτ' ἂν καινὴν ἐξ ἀρχῆς τις ποιῇ οὔτ' ἂν παλαιὰν διεφθαρμένην ἐπισκευάζηται, περὶ θεῶν γε καὶ ἱερῶν, ἅττα τε ἐν τῇ πόλει ἑκάστοις ἱδρῦσθαι δεῖ καὶ ὧντινων ἐπονομάζεσθαι θεῶν ἢ δαιμόνων, οὐδεὶς ἐπιχειρήσει κινεῖν νοῦν ἔχων
c ὅσα ἐκ Δελφῶν ἢ Δωδώνης ἢ παρ' Ἄμμωνος ἤ τινες ἔπεισαν παλαιοὶ λόγοι ὁπηδή τινας πείσαντες, φασμάτων γενομένων ἢ ἐπιπνοίας λεχθείσης θεῶν, πείσαντες δὲ θυσίας τελεταῖς συμμείκτους κατεστήσαντο εἴτε αὐτόθεν ἐπιχωρίους εἴτ' οὖν Τυρρηνικὰς εἴτε Κυπρίας εἴτε ἄλλοθεν ὁθενοῦν, καθιέρωσαν δὲ τοῖς τοιούτοις λόγοις φήμας τε καὶ ἀγάλματα καὶ βωμοὺς καὶ ναούς, τεμένη τε τούτων ἑκάστοις ἐτεμένισαν· τούτων
d νομοθέτῃ τὸ σμικρότατον ἁπάντων οὐδὲν κινητέον, τοῖς δὲ μέρεσιν ἑκάστοις θεὸν ἢ δαίμονα ἢ καί τινα ἥρωα ἀποδοτέον, ἐν δὲ τῇ τῆς γῆς διανομῇ πρώτοις ἐξαίρετα τεμένη τε καὶ πάντα τὰ προσήκοντα ἀποδοτέον, ὅπως ἂν σύλλογοι ἑκάστων τῶν μερῶν κατὰ χρόνους γιγνόμενοι τοὺς προσταχθέντας εἴς τε τὰς χρείας ἑκάστας εὐμάρειαν παρασκευάζωσι, καὶ φιλοφρονῶνταί τε ἀλλήλους μετὰ θυσιῶν καὶ οἰκειῶνται
e καὶ γνωρίζωσιν, οὗ μεῖζον οὐδὲν πόλει ἀγαθὸν ἢ γνωρίμους αὐτοὺς αὐτοῖς εἶναι. ὅπου γὰρ μὴ φῶς ἀλλήλοις ἐστὶν ἀλλήλων ἐν τοῖς τρόποις ἀλλὰ σκότος, οὔτ' ἂν τιμῆς τῆς

ἀξίας οὔτ' ἀρχῶν οὔτε δίκης ποτέ τις ἂν τῆς προσηκούσης ὀρθῶς τυγχάνοι· δεῖ δὴ πάντα ἄνδρα ἓν πρὸς ἓν τοῦτο σπεύδειν ἐν πάσαις πόλεσιν, ὅπως μήτε αὐτὸς κίβδηλός ποτε φανεῖται ὁτῳοῦν, ἁπλοῦς δὲ καὶ ἀληθὴς ἀεί, μήτε ἄλλος τοιοῦτος ὢν αὐτὸν διαπατήσει.

Ἡ δὴ τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο φορά, καθάπερ πεττῶν ἀφ' ἱεροῦ, τῆς 739
τῶν νόμων κατασκευῆς, ἀήθης οὖσα, τάχ' ἂν θαυμάσαι τὸν ἀκούοντα τὸ πρῶτον ποιήσειεν. οὐ μὴν ἀλλ' ἀναλογιζομένῳ καὶ πειρωμένῳ φανεῖται δευτέρως ἂν πόλις οἰκεῖσθαι πρὸς τὸ βέλτιστον. τάχα δ' οὐκ ἄν τις προσδέξαιτο αὐτὴν διὰ τὸ μὴ σύνηθες νομοθέτῃ μὴ τυραννοῦντι· τὸ δ' ἔστιν ὀρθότατον εἰπεῖν μὲν τὴν ἀρίστην πολιτείαν καὶ δευτέραν καὶ τρίτην, δοῦναι δὲ εἰπόντα αἵρεσιν ἑκάστῳ τῷ τῆς συνοικήσεως κυρίῳ. b
ποιῶμεν δὴ κατὰ τοῦτον τὸν λόγον καὶ τὰ νῦν ἡμεῖς, εἰπόντες ἀρετῇ πρώτην πολιτείαν καὶ δευτέραν καὶ τρίτην· τὴν δὲ αἵρεσιν Κλεινίᾳ τε ἀποδιδῶμεν τὰ νῦν καὶ εἴ τις ἄλλος ἀεί ποτε ἐθελήσειεν ἐπὶ τὴν τῶν τοιούτων ἐκλογὴν ἐλθὼν κατὰ τὸν ἑαυτοῦ τρόπον ἀπονείμασθαι τὸ φίλον αὐτῷ τῆς αὐτοῦ πατρίδος.

Πρώτη μὲν τοίνυν πόλις τέ ἐστιν καὶ πολιτεία καὶ νόμοι ἄριστοι, ὅπου τὸ πάλαι λεγόμενον ἂν γίγνηται κατὰ πᾶσαν c
τὴν πόλιν ὅτι μάλιστα· λέγεται δὲ ὡς ὄντως ἐστὶ κοινὰ τὰ φίλων. τοῦτ' οὖν εἴτε που νῦν ἔστιν εἴτ' ἔσται ποτέ— κοινὰς μὲν γυναῖκας, κοινοὺς δὲ εἶναι παῖδας, κοινὰ δὲ χρήματα σύμπαντα—καὶ πάσῃ μηχανῇ τὸ λεγόμενον ἴδιον 5
πανταχόθεν ἐκ τοῦ βίου ἅπαν ἐξῄρηται, μεμηχάνηται δ' εἰς τὸ δυνατὸν καὶ τὰ φύσει ἴδια κοινὰ ἁμῇ γέ πῃ γεγονέναι, οἷον ὄμματα καὶ ὦτα καὶ χεῖρας κοινὰ μὲν ὁρᾶν δοκεῖν καὶ ἀκούειν καὶ πράττειν, ἐπαινεῖν τ' αὖ καὶ ψέγειν καθ' ἓν ὅτι d
μάλιστα σύμπαντας ἐπὶ τοῖς αὐτοῖς χαίροντας καὶ λυπουμένους, καὶ κατὰ δύναμιν οἵτινες νόμοι μίαν ὅτι μάλιστα πόλιν ἀπεργάζονται, τούτων ὑπερβολῇ πρὸς ἀρετὴν οὐδείς ποτε ὅρον ἄλλον θέμενος ὀρθότερον οὐδὲ βελτίω θήσεται. 5
ἡ μὲν δὴ τοιαύτη πόλις, εἴτε που θεοὶ ἢ παῖδες θεῶν αὐτὴν οἰκοῦσι [πλείους ἑνός], οὕτω διαζῶντες εὐφραινόμενοι κατοικοῦσι· διὸ δὴ παράδειγμά γε πολιτείας οὐκ ἄλλῃ χρὴ e
σκοπεῖν, ἀλλ' ἐχομένους ταύτης τὴν ὅτι μάλιστα τοιαύτην ζητεῖν κατὰ δύναμιν. ἣν δὲ νῦν ἡμεῖς ἐπικεχειρήκαμεν, εἴη τε ἂν γενομένη πως ἀθανασίας ἐγγύτατα καὶ ἡ μία δευτέρως·

τρίτην δὲ μετὰ ταῦτα, ἐὰν θεὸς ἐθέλῃ, διαπερανούμεθα. νῦν δ' οὖν ταύτην τίνα λέγομεν καὶ πῶς γενομένην ἂν τοιαύτην;

Νειμάσθων μὲν δὴ πρῶτον γῆν τε καὶ οἰκίας, καὶ μὴ κοινῇ γεωργούντων, ἐπειδὴ τὸ τοιοῦτον μεῖζον ἢ κατὰ τὴν νῦν γένεσιν καὶ τροφὴν καὶ παίδευσιν εἴρηται· νεμέσθων δ' οὖν τοιᾷδε διανοίᾳ πως, ὡς ἄρα δεῖ τὸν λαχόντα τὴν λῆξιν ταύτην νομίζειν μὲν κοινὴν αὐτὴν τῆς πόλεως συμπάσης, πατρίδος δὲ οὔσης τῆς χώρας θεραπεύειν αὐτὴν δεῖ μειζόνως ἢ μητέρα παῖδας, τῷ καὶ δέσποιναν θεὸν αὐτὴν οὖσαν θνητῶν ὄντων γεγονέναι, ταὐτὰ δ' ἔχειν διανοήματα καὶ περὶ τοὺς ἐγχωρίους θεούς τε ἅμα καὶ δαίμονας. ὅπως δ' ἂν ταῦτα εἰς τὸν ἀεὶ χρόνον οὕτως ἔχοντα ὑπάρχῃ, τάδε προσδιανοητέον, ὅσαι εἰσὶ τὰ νῦν ἡμῖν ἑστίαι διανεμηθεῖσαι τὸν ἀριθμόν, ταύτας δεῖν ἀεὶ τοσαύτας εἶναι καὶ μήτε τι πλείους γίγνεσθαι μήτε τί ποτε ἐλάττους. ὧδ' οὖν ἂν τὸ τοιοῦτον βεβαίως γίγνοιτο περὶ πᾶσαν πόλιν· ὁ λαχὼν τὸν κλῆρον καταλειπέτω ἀεὶ ταύτης τῆς οἰκήσεως ἕνα μόνον κληρονόμον τῶν ἑαυτοῦ παίδων, ὃν ἂν αὐτῷ μάλιστα ᾖ φίλον, διάδοχον καὶ θεραπευτὴν θεῶν καὶ γένους καὶ πόλεως τῶν τε ζώντων καὶ ὅσους ἂν ἤδη τέλος εἰς τὸν τότε χρόνον ἔχῃ· τοὺς δὲ ἄλλους παῖδας, οἷς ἂν πλείους ἑνὸς γίγνωνται, θηλείας τε ἐκδόσθαι κατὰ νόμον τὸν ἐπιταχθησόμενον, ἄρρενάς τε, οἷς ἂν τῆς γενέσεως ἐλλείπῃ τῶν πολιτῶν, τούτοις ὑεῖς διανέμειν, κατὰ χάριν μὲν μάλιστα, ἐὰν δέ τισιν ἐλλείπωσιν χάριτες, ἢ πλείους ἐπίγονοι γίγνωνται θήλεις ἢ τινες ἄρρενες ἑκάστων, ἢ καὶ τοὐναντίον ὅταν ἐλάττους ὦσιν, παίδων ἀφορίας γενομένης, πάντων τούτων ἀρχὴν ἣν ἂν θώμεθα μεγίστην καὶ τιμιωτάτην, αὕτη σκεψαμένη τί χρὴ χρῆσθαι τοῖς περιγενομένοις ἢ τοῖς ἐλλείπουσι, ποριζέτω μηχανὴν ὅτι μάλιστα ὅπως αἱ πεντακισχίλιαι καὶ τετταράκοντα οἰκήσεις ἀεὶ μόνον ἔσονται. μηχαναὶ δ' εἰσὶν πολλαί· καὶ γὰρ ἐπισχέσεις γενέσεως οἷς ἂν εὔρους ἢ γένεσις, καὶ τοὐναντίον ἐπιμέλειαι καὶ σπουδαὶ πλήθους γεννημάτων εἰσίν, τιμαῖς τε καὶ ἀτιμίαις καὶ νουθετήσεσι πρεσβυτῶν περὶ νέους [διὰ λόγων νουθετητικῶν] ἁπάντωσαι δύνανται ποιεῖν ὃ λέγομεν. καὶ δὴ καὶ τό γε τέλος, ἂν πᾶσα ἀπορία περὶ τὴν ἀνίσωσιν τῶν πεντακισχιλίων καὶ τετταράκοντα οἴκων γίγνηται, ἐπίχυσις δὲ ὑπερβάλλουσα ἡμῖν πολιτῶν διὰ φιλοφροσύνην τὴν τῶν συνοικούντων ἀλλήλοις συμβαίνῃ καὶ ἀπορῶμεν, τὸ παλαιόν

που ὑπάρχει μηχάνημα, ὃ πολλάκις εἴπομεν, ἐκπομπὴ ἀποικιῶν, φίλη γιγνομένη παρὰ φίλων, ὧν ἂν ἐπιτήδειον εἶναι δοκῇ. ἐάν τ' αὖ καὶ τοὐναντίον ἐπέλθῃ ποτὲ κῦμα κατακλυσμὸν φέρον νόσων, ἢ πολέμων φθορά, ἐλάττους δὲ 741
πολὺ τοῦ τεταγμένου ἀριθμοῦ δι' ὀρφανίας γένωνται, ἑκόντας μὲν οὐ δεῖ πολίτας παρεμβάλλειν νόθῃ παιδείᾳ πεπαιδευμένους, ἀνάγκην δὲ οὐδὲ θεὸς εἶναι λέγεται δυνατὸς βιάζεσθαι.

Ταῦτ' οὖν δὴ τὸν νῦν λεγόμενον λόγον ἡμῖν φῶμεν 5
παραινεῖν λέγοντα· Ὦ πάντων ἀνδρῶν ἄριστοι, τὴν ὁμοιότητα καὶ ἰσότητα καὶ τὸ ταὐτὸν καὶ ὁμολογούμενον τιμῶντες κατὰ φύσιν μὴ ἀνίετε κατά τε ἀριθμὸν καὶ πᾶσαν δύναμιν
τὴν τῶν καλῶν κἀγαθῶν πραγμάτων· καὶ δὴ καὶ νῦν τὸν b
ἀριθμὸν μὲν πρῶτον διὰ βίου παντὸς φυλάξατε τὸν εἰρημένον, εἶτα τὸ τῆς οὐσίας ὕψος τε καὶ μέγεθος, ὃ τὸ πρῶτον ἐνείμασθε μέτριον ὄν, μὴ ἀτιμάσητε τῷ τε ὠνεῖσθαι καὶ τῷ
πωλεῖν πρὸς ἀλλήλους· οὔτε γὰρ ὁ νείμας κλῆρος ὢν θεὸς 5
ὑμῖν σύμμαχος οὔτε ὁ νομοθέτης· νῦν γὰρ δὴ πρῶτον τῷ ἀπειθοῦντι νόμος προστάττει, προειπὼν ἐπὶ τούτοις κληροῦσθαι τὸν ἐθέλοντα ἢ μὴ κληροῦσθαι, ὡς πρῶτον μὲν τῆς c
γῆς ἱερᾶς οὔσης τῶν πάντων θεῶν, εἶτα ἱερέων τε καὶ ἱερειῶν εὐχὰς ποιησομένων ἐπὶ τοῖς πρώτοις θύμασι καὶ δευτέροις καὶ μέχρι τριῶν, τὸν πριάμενον ἢ ἀποδόμενον
ὧν ἔλαχεν οἰκοπέδων ἢ γηπέδων τὰ ἐπὶ τούτοις πρέποντα 5
πάσχειν πάθη· γράψαντες δὲ ἐν τοῖς ἱεροῖς θήσουσι κυπαριττίνας μνήμας εἰς τὸν ἔπειτα χρόνον καταγεγραμμένας, πρὸς τούτοις δ' ἔτι φυλακτήρια τούτων, ὅπως ἂν γίγνηται,
καταστήσουσιν ἐν ταύτῃ τῶν ἀρχῶν ἥτις ἂν ὀξύτατον ὁρᾶν d
δοκῇ, ἵνα αἱ παρὰ ταῦτα ἑκάστοτε παραγωγαὶ γιγνόμεναι μὴ λανθάνωσιν αὐτούς, ἀλλὰ κολάζωσι τὸν ἀπειθοῦντα ἅμα νόμῳ καὶ τῷ θεῷ. ὅσον γὰρ δὴ τὸ νῦν ἐπιταττόμενον ἀγαθὸν
ὂν τυγχάνει πάσαις ταῖς πειθομέναις πόλεσι, τὴν ἑπομένην 5
κατασκευὴν προσλαβόν, κατὰ τὴν παλαιὰν παροιμίαν οὐδεὶς εἴσεταί ποτε κακὸς ὤν, ἀλλ' ἔμπειρός τε καὶ ἐπιεικὴς ἔθεσι
γενόμενος· χρηματισμὸς γὰρ οὔτ' ἔνεστιν σφόδρα ἐν τῇ e
τοιαύτῃ κατασκευῇ, συνέπεταί τε αὐτῇ μηδὲ δεῖν μηδ' ἐξεῖναι χρηματίζεσθαι τῶν ἀνελευθέρων χρηματισμῶν μηδενὶ μηδένα, καθ' ὅσον ἐπονείδιστος λεγομένη βαναυσία ἦθος ἀπο-
τρέπει ἐλεύθερον, μηδὲ τὸ παράπαν ἀξιοῦν ἐκ τῶν τοιούτων 5
συλλέγειν χρήματα.

Πρὸς τούτοις δ' ἔτι νόμος ἕπεται πᾶσι τούτοις, μηδ'
742 ἐξεῖναι χρυσὸν μηδὲ ἄργυρον κεκτῆσθαι μηδένα μηδενὶ
ἰδιώτῃ, νόμισμα δὲ ἕνεκα ἀλλαγῆς τῆς καθ' ἡμέραν, ἣν
δημιουργοῖς τε ἀλλάττεσθαι σχεδὸν ἀναγκαῖον, καὶ πᾶσιν
ὁπόσων χρεία τῶν τοιούτων μισθοὺς μισθωτοῖς, δούλοις καὶ
5 ἐποίκοις, ἀποτίνειν. ὧν ἕνεκά φαμεν τὸ νόμισμα κτητέον
αὐτοῖς μὲν ἔντιμον, τοῖς δὲ ἄλλοις ἀνθρώποις ἀδόκιμον·
κοινὸν δὲ Ἑλληνικὸν νόμισμα ἕνεκά τε στρατειῶν καὶ ἀπο-
δημιῶν εἰς τοὺς ἄλλους ἀνθρώπους, οἷον πρεσβειῶν ἤ καί
b τινος ἀναγκαίας ἄλλης τῇ πόλει κηρυκείας, ἐκπέμπειν τινὰ
ἂν δέῃ, τούτων χάριν ἀνάγκη ἑκάστοτε κεκτῆσθαι τῇ πόλει
νόμισμα Ἑλληνικόν. ἰδιώτῃ δὲ ἂν ἄρα ποτὲ ἀνάγκη τις
γίγνηται ἀποδημεῖν, παρέμενος μὲν τοὺς ἄρχοντας ἀποδη-
5 μείτω, νόμισμα δὲ ἄν ποθεν ἔχων ξενικὸν οἴκαδε ἀφίκηται
περιγενόμενον, τῇ πόλει αὐτὸ καταβαλλέτω πρὸς λόγον
ἀπολαμβάνων τὸ ἐπιχώριον· ἰδιούμενος δὲ ἄν τις φαίνηται,
δημόσιόν τε γιγνέσθω καὶ ὁ συνειδὼς καὶ μὴ φράζων ἀρᾷ
καὶ ὀνείδει μετὰ τοῦ ἀγαγόντος ἔνοχος ἔστω, καὶ ζημίᾳ
c πρὸς τούτοις μὴ ἐλάττονι τοῦ ξενικοῦ κομισθέντος νομί-
σματος. γαμοῦντα δὲ καὶ ἐκδιδόντα μήτ' οὖν διδόναι μήτε
δέχεσθαι προῖκα τὸ παράπαν μηδ' ἡντινοῦν, μηδὲ νόμισμα
παρακατατίθεσθαι ὅτῳ μή τις πιστεύει, μηδὲ δανείζειν ἐπὶ
5 τόκῳ, ὡς ἐξὸν μὴ ἀποδιδόναι τὸ παράπαν τῷ δανεισαμένῳ
μήτε τόκον μήτε κεφάλαιον· ταῦτα δ' ὅτι βέλτιστ' ἐστὶν
πόλει ἐπιτηδεύματα ἐπιτηδεύειν, ὧδε ἄν τις σκοπῶν ὀρθῶς
d ἂν αὐτὰ διακρίνοι, ἐπαναφέρων εἰς τὴν ἀρχὴν ἀεὶ καὶ τὴν
βούλησιν. ἔστιν δὴ τοῦ νοῦν ἔχοντος πολιτικοῦ βούλησις,
φαμέν, οὐχ ἥπερ ἂν οἱ πολλοὶ φαῖεν δεῖν βούλεσθαι τὸν
ἀγαθὸν νομοθέτην, ὡς μεγίστην τε εἶναι τὴν πόλιν ᾗ νοῶν
5 εὖ νομοθετοῖ, καὶ ὅτι μάλιστα πλουσίαν, κεκτημένην δ' αὖ
χρύσεια καὶ ἀργύρεια, καὶ κατὰ γῆν καὶ κατὰ θάλατταν
ἄρχουσαν ὅτι πλείστων· προσθεῖεν δ' ἂν καὶ ὡς ἀρίστην
δεῖν βούλεσθαι τὴν πόλιν εἶναι καὶ ὡς εὐδαιμονεστάτην
e τόν γε ὀρθῶς νομοθετοῦντα. τούτων δὲ τὰ μὲν δυνατά
ἐστιν γίγνεσθαι, τὰ δ' οὐ δυνατά· τὰ μὲν οὖν δυνατὰ βού-
λοιτ' ἂν ὁ διακοσμῶν, τὰ δὲ μὴ δυνατὰ οὔτ' ἂν βούλοιτο
ματαίας βουλήσεις οὔτ' ἂν ἐπιχειροῖ. σχεδὸν μὲν γὰρ
5 εὐδαίμονας ἅμα καὶ ἀγαθοὺς ἀνάγκη γίγνεσθαι—τοῦτο μὲν
οὖν βούλοιτ' ἄν—πλουσίους δ' αὖ σφόδρα καὶ ἀγαθοὺς

ἀδύνατον, οὓς γε δὴ πλουσίους οἱ πολλοὶ καταλέγουσι· λέγουσιν δὲ τοὺς κεκτημένους ἐν ὀλίγοις τῶν ἀνθρώπων πλείστου νομίσματος ἄξια κτήματα, ἃ καὶ κακός τις κεκτῆτ' ἄν. εἰ δ' ἔστιν τοῦτο οὕτως ἔχον, οὐκ ἂν ἔγωγε αὐτοῖς 743 ποτε συγχωροίην τὸν πλούσιον εὐδαίμονα τῇ ἀληθείᾳ γίγνεσθαι μὴ καὶ ἀγαθὸν ὄντα· ἀγαθὸν δὲ ὄντα διαφόρως καὶ πλούσιον εἶναι διαφερόντως ἀδύνατον. "Τί δή;" φαίη τις ἂν ἴσως. Ὅτι, φαῖμεν ἄν, ἥ τε ἐκ δικαίου καὶ ἀδίκου κτῆσις 5 πλέον ἢ διπλασία ἐστὶν τῆς ἐκ τοῦ δικαίου μόνον, τά τε ἀναλώματα μήτε καλῶς μήτε αἰσχρῶς ἐθέλοντα ἀναλίσκεσθαι τῶν καλῶν καὶ εἰς καλὰ ἐθελόντων δαπανᾶσθαι διπλασίῳ ἐλάττονα· οὔκουν ποτὲ ἂν τῶν ἐκ διπλασίων μὲν κτημάτων, b ἡμίσεων δὲ ἀναλωμάτων ὁ τὰ ἐναντία τούτων πράττων γένοιτ' ἂν πλουσιώτερος. ἔστιν δὲ ὁ μὲν ἀγαθὸς τούτων, ὁ δὲ οὐ κακὸς ὅταν ᾖ φειδωλός, τοτὲ δέ ποτε καὶ πάγκακος, ἀγαθὸς δέ, ὅπερ εἴρηται τὰ νῦν, οὐδέποτε. ὁ μὲν γὰρ δι- 5 καίως καὶ ἀδίκως λαμβάνων καὶ μήτε δικαίως μήτε ἀδίκως ἀναλίσκων πλούσιος, ὅταν καὶ φειδωλὸς ᾖ, ὁ δὲ πάγκακος, ὡς τὰ πολλὰ ὢν ἄσωτος, μάλα πένης· ὁ δὲ ἀναλίσκων τε εἰς τὰ καλὰ καὶ κτώμενος ἐκ τῶν δικαίων μόνον οὔτ' ἂν c διαφέρων πλούτῳ ῥᾳδίως ἄν ποτε γένοιτο οὐδ' αὖ σφόδρα πένης. ὥστε ὁ λόγος ἡμῖν ὀρθός, ὡς οὐκ εἰσὶν οἱ παμπλούσιοι ἀγαθοί· εἰ δὲ μὴ ἀγαθοί, οὐδὲ εὐδαίμονες.

Ἡμῖν δὲ ἡ τῶν νόμων ὑπόθεσις ἐνταῦθα ἔβλεπεν, ὅπως 5 ὡς εὐδαιμονέστατοι ἔσονται καὶ ὅτι μάλιστα ἀλλήλοις φίλοι· εἶεν δὲ οὐκ ἄν ποτε πολῖται φίλοι, ὅπου πολλαὶ μὲν δίκαι ἐν ἀλλήλοις εἶεν, πολλαὶ δὲ ἀδικίαι, ἀλλ' ὅπου ὡς ὅτι d σμικρόταται καὶ ὀλίγισται. λέγομεν δὴ μήτε χρυσὸν δεῖν μήτε ἄργυρον ἐν τῇ πόλει, μήτε αὖ χρηματισμὸν πολὺν διὰ βαναυσίας καὶ τόκων μηδὲ βοσκημάτων αἰσχρῶν, ἀλλ' ὅσα γεωργία δίδωσι καὶ φέρει, καὶ τούτων ὁπόσα μὴ χρηματιζό- 5 μενον ἀναγκάσειεν ἀμελεῖν ὧν ἕνεκα πέφυκε τὰ χρήματα· ταῦτα δ' ἐστὶ ψυχὴ καὶ σῶμα, ἃ χωρὶς γυμναστικῆς καὶ τῆς ἄλλης παιδείας οὐκ ἄν ποτε γένοιτο ἄξια λόγου. διὸ e δὴ χρημάτων ἐπιμέλειαν οὐχ ἅπαξ εἰρήκαμεν ὡς χρὴ τελευταῖον τιμᾶν· ὄντων γὰρ τριῶν τῶν ἁπάντων περὶ ἃ πᾶς ἄνθρωπος σπουδάζει, τελευταῖον καὶ τρίτον ἐστὶν ἡ τῶν χρημάτων ὀρθῶς σπουδαζομένη σπουδή, σώματος δὲ πέρι 5 μέση, πρώτη δὲ ἡ τῆς ψυχῆς. καὶ δὴ καὶ νῦν ἦν διεξερχό-

μεθα πολιτείαν, εἰ μὲν τὰς τιμὰς οὕτω τάττεται, ὀρθῶς νενομοθέτηται· εἰ δέ τις τῶν προσταττομένων αὐτόθι νόμων
744 σωφροσύνης ἔμπροσθεν ὑγίειαν ἐν τῇ πόλει φανεῖται ποιῶν τιμίαν, ἢ πλοῦτον ὑγιείας καὶ τοῦ σωφρονεῖν, οὐκ ὀρθῶς ἀναφανεῖται τιθέμενος. τοῦτ' οὖν δὴ πολλάκις ἐπισημαίνεσθαι χρὴ τὸν νομοθέτην—Τί τε βούλομαι; καὶ Εἴ μοι
5 συμβαίνει τοῦτο ἢ καὶ ἀποτυγχάνω τοῦ σκοποῦ;—καὶ οὕτω τάχ' ἂν ἴσως ἐκ τῆς νομοθεσίας αὐτός τε ἐκβαίνοι καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους ἀπαλλάττοι, κατ' ἄλλον δὲ τρόπον οὐδ' ἂν ἕνα ποτέ.

Ὁ δὴ λαχὼν κεκτήσθω, φαμέν, τὸν κλῆρον ἐπὶ τούτοις
b οἷς εἰρήκαμεν. ἦν μὲν δὴ καλὸν καὶ τἆλλα ἴσα πάντ' ἔχοντα ἕνα ἕκαστον ἐλθεῖν εἰς τὴν ἀποικίαν· ἐπειδὴ δὲ οὐ δυνατόν, ἀλλ' ὁ μέν τις πλείω κεκτημένος ἀφίξεται χρήμματα, ὁ δ' ἐλάττονα, δεῖ δὴ πολλῶν ἕνεκα, τῶν τε κατὰ
5 πόλιν καιρῶν ἰσότητος ἕνεκα, τιμήματα ἄνισα γενέσθαι, ἵνα ἀρχαί τε καὶ εἰσφοραὶ καὶ διανομαὶ τὴν τῆς ἀξίας ἑκάστοις τιμὴν μὴ κατ' ἀρετὴν μόνον τήν τε προγόνων καὶ τὴν αὐτοῦ,
c μηδὲ κατὰ σωμάτων ἰσχῦς καὶ εὐμορφίας, ἀλλὰ καὶ κατὰ πλούτου χρῆσιν καὶ πενίαν, τὰς τιμάς τε καὶ ἀρχὰς ὡς ἰσαίτατα τῷ ἀνίσῳ συμμέτρῳ δὲ ἀπολαμβάνοντες μὴ διαφέρωνται. τούτων χάριν τέτταρα μεγέθει τῆς οὐσίας τιμή-
5 ματα ποιεῖσθαι χρεών, πρώτους καὶ δευτέρους καὶ τρίτους καὶ τετάρτους, ἕτερα τισιν ἄλλοις προσαγορευομένους ὀνόμασιν, ὅταν τε μένωσιν ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ τιμήματι καὶ ὅταν πλουσιώτεροι ἐκ πενήτων καὶ ἐκ πλουσίων πένητες γιγνόμενοι
d μεταβαίνωσιν εἰς τὸ προσῆκον ἕκαστοι ἑαυτοῖσιν τίμημα.

Τόδε δ' ἐπὶ τούτοις αὖ νόμου σχῆμα ἔγωγε ἂν τιθείην ὡς ἑπόμενον. δεῖ γὰρ ἐν πόλει που, φαμέν, τῇ τοῦ μεγίστου νοσήματος οὐ μεθεξούσῃ, ὃ διάστασιν ἢ στάσιν ὀρθότερον
5 ἂν εἴη κεκλῆσθαι, μήτε πενίαν τὴν χαλεπὴν ἐνεῖναι παρά τισιν τῶν πολιτῶν μήτε αὖ πλοῦτον, ὡς ἀμφοτέρων τικτόντων ταῦτα ἀμφότερα· νῦν οὖν ὅρον δεῖ τούτων ἑκατέρου τὸν νομοθέτην φράζειν. Ἔστω δὴ πενίας μὲν ὅρος ἡ τοῦ
e κλήρου τιμή, ὃν δεῖ μένειν καὶ ὃν ἄρχων οὐδεὶς οὐδενί ποτε περιόψεται ἐλάττω γιγνόμενον, τῶν τε ἄλλων κατὰ ταὐτὰ οὐδεὶς ὅστις φιλότιμος ἐπ' ἀρετῇ. μέτρον δὲ αὐτὸν θέμενος ὁ νομοθέτης διπλάσιον ἐάσει τούτου κτᾶσθαι καὶ τριπλάσιον
5 καὶ μέχρι τετραπλασίου· πλείονα δ' ἄν τις κτᾶται τούτων, εὑρὼν ἢ δοθέντων ποθὲν ἢ χρηματισάμενος, ἤ τινι τύχῃ

τοιαύτῃ κτησάμενος ἄλλῃ τὰ περιγιγνόμενα τοῦ μέτρου, τῇ 745
πόλει ἂν αὐτὰ καὶ τοῖς τὴν πόλιν ἔχουσιν θεοῖς ἀπονέμων
εὐδόκιμός τε καὶ ἀζήμιος ἂν εἴη· ἐὰν δέ τις ἀπειθῇ τούτῳ
τῷ νόμῳ, φανεῖ μὲν ὁ βουλόμενος ἐπὶ τοῖς ἡμίσεσιν, ὁ δὲ
ὀφλὼν ἄλλο τοσοῦτον μέρος ἀποτείσει τῆς αὐτοῦ κτήσεως, 5
τὰ δ' ἡμίσεα τῶν θεῶν. ἡ δὲ κτῆσις χωρὶς τοῦ κλήρου
πάντων πᾶσα ἐν τῷ φανερῷ γεγράφθω παρὰ φύλαξιν
ἄρχουσιν, οἷς ἂν ὁ νόμος προστάξῃ, ὅπως ἂν αἱ δίκαι περὶ
πάντων ὅσα εἰς χρήματα ῥᾴδιαί τε ὦσι καὶ σφόδρα σαφεῖς. b

Τὸ δὴ μετὰ τοῦτο πρῶτον μὲν τὴν πόλιν ἱδρῦσθαι δεῖ
τῆς χώρας ὅτι μάλιστα ἐν μέσῳ, καὶ τἆλλα ὅσα πρόσφορα
πόλει τῶν ὑπαρχόντων ἔχοντα τόπον ἐκλεξάμενον, ἃ νοῆσαί
τε καὶ εἰπεῖν οὐδὲν χαλεπόν· μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα μέρη δώδεκα 5
διελέσθαι, θέμενον Ἑστίας πρῶτον καὶ Διὸς καὶ Ἀθηνᾶς
ἱερόν, ἀκρόπολιν ὀνομάζοντα, κύκλον περιβάλλοντα, ἀφ'
οὗ τὰ δώδεκα μέρη τέμνειν τήν τε πόλιν αὐτὴν καὶ πᾶσαν c
τὴν χώραν. ἴσα δὲ δεῖ γίγνεσθαι τὰ δώδεκα μέρη τῷ τὰ
μὲν ἀγαθῆς γῆς εἶναι σμικρά, τὰ δὲ χείρονος μείζω. κλή-
ρους δὲ διελεῖν τετταράκοντα καὶ πεντακισχιλίους, τούτων
τε αὖ δίχα τεμεῖν ἕκαστον καὶ συγκληρῶσαι δύο τμήματα, 5
τοῦ τε ἐγγὺς καὶ τοῦ πόρρω μετέχοντα ἑκάτερον, τὸ πρὸς
τῇ πόλει μέρος τῷ πρὸς τοῖς ἐσχάτοις [εἷς κλῆρος], καὶ τὸ
δεύτερον ἀπὸ πόλεως τῷ ἀπ' ἐσχάτων δευτέρῳ, καὶ τἆλλα d
οὕτως πάντα. μηχανᾶσθαι δὲ καὶ ἐν τοῖς δίχα τμήμασι τὸ
νυνδὴ λεγόμενον φαυλότητός τε καὶ ἀρετῆς χώρας, ἐπαν-
ισουμένους τῷ πλήθει τε καὶ ὀλιγότητι τῆς διανομῆς.
νεῖμαι δὲ δὴ καὶ τοὺς ἄνδρας δώδεκα μέρη, τὴν τῆς ἄλλης 5
οὐσίας εἰς ἴσα ὅτι μάλιστα τὰ δώδεκα μέρη συνταξάμενον,
ἀπογραφῆς πάντων γενομένης· καὶ δὴ καὶ μετὰ τοῦτο
δώδεκα θεοῖς δώδεκα κλήρους θέντας, ἐπονομάσαι καὶ καθ-
ιερῶσαι τὸ λαχὸν μέρος ἑκάστῳ τῷ θεῷ, καὶ φυλὴν αὐτὴν e
ἐπονομάσαι. τέμνειν δ' αὖ καὶ τὰ δώδεκα τῆς πόλεως τμή-
ματα τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον ὅνπερ καὶ τὴν ἄλλην χώραν διέ-
νεμον· καὶ δύο νέμεσθαι ἕκαστον οἰκήσεις, τήν τε ἐγγὺς
τοῦ μέσου καὶ τὴν τῶν ἐσχάτων. καὶ τὴν μὲν κατοίκισιν 5
οὕτω τέλος ἔχειν.

Ἐννοεῖν δὲ ἡμᾶς τὸ τοιόνδε ἐστὶν χρεὼν ἐκ παντὸς τρό-
που, ὡς τὰ νῦν εἰρημένα πάντα οὐκ ἄν ποτε εἰς τοιούτους
καιροὺς συμπέσοι, ὥστε συμβῆναι κατὰ λόγον οὕτω σύμ-

746 παντα γενόμενα, ἄνδρας τε οἳ μὴ δυσχερανοῦσι τὴν τοιαύτην
συνοικίαν, ἀλλ' ὑπομενοῦσιν χρήματά τε ἔχοντες τακτὰ καὶ
μέτρια διὰ βίου παντὸς καὶ παίδων γενέσεις ἃς εἰρήκαμεν
ἑκάστοις, καὶ χρυσοῦ στερόμενοι καὶ ἑτέρων ὧν δῆλος ὁ
5 νομοθέτης προστάξων ἐστὶν ἐκ τούτων τῶν νῦν εἰρημένων,
ἔτι δὲ χώρας τε καὶ ἄστεος, ὡς εἴρηκεν, μεσότητάς τε καὶ
ἐν κύκλῳ οἰκήσεις πάντῃ, σχεδὸν οἷον ὀνείρατα λέγων, ἢ
πλάττων καθάπερ ἐκ κηροῦ τινα πόλιν καὶ πολίτας. ἔχει
b δὴ τὰ τοιαῦτα οὐ κακῶς τινα τρόπον εἰρημένα, χρὴ δ' ἐπ-
αναλαμβάνειν πρὸς αὐτὸν τὰ τοιάδε. πάλιν ἄρα ἡμῖν ὁ
νομοθετῶν φράζει τόδε· " Ἐν τούτοις τοῖς λόγοις, ὦ φίλοι,
μηδ' αὐτὸν δοκεῖτέ με λεληθέναι τὸ νῦν λεγόμενον ὡς
5 ἀληθῆ διεξέρχεταί τινα τρόπον. ἀλλὰ γὰρ ἐν ἑκάστοις τῶν
μελλόντων ἔσεσθαι δικαιότατον οἶμαι τόδε εἶναι, τὸν τὸ
παράδειγμα δεικνύντα, οἷον δεῖ τὸ ἐπιχειρούμενον γίγνεσθαι,
μηδὲν ἀπολείπειν τῶν καλλίστων τε καὶ ἀληθεστάτων, ᾧ δὲ
c ἀδύνατόν τι συμβαίνει τούτων γίγνεσθαι, τοῦτο μὲν αὐτὸ
ἐκκλίνειν καὶ μὴ πράττειν, ὅτι δὲ τούτου τῶν λοιπῶν
ἐγγύτατά ἐστιν καὶ συγγενέστατον ἔφυ τῶν προσηκόντων
πράττειν, τοῦτ' αὐτὸ διαμηχανᾶσθαι ὅπως ἂν γίγνηται, τὸν
5 νομοθέτην δ' ἐᾶσαι τέλος ἐπιθεῖναι τῇ βουλήσει, γενομένου
δὲ τούτου, τότ' ἤδη κοινῇ μετ' ἐκείνου σκοπεῖν ὅτι τε συμ-
φέρει τῶν εἰρημένων καὶ τί πρόσαντες εἴρηται τῆς νομο-
θεσίας· τὸ γὰρ ὁμολογούμενον αὐτὸ αὑτῷ δεῖ που πανταχῇ
d ἀπεργάζεσθαι καὶ τὸν τοῦ φαυλοτάτου δημιουργὸν ἄξιον
ἐσόμενον λόγου."

Νῦν δὴ τοῦτ' αὐτὸ προθυμητέον ἰδεῖν μετὰ **τῆς δοξάσης**
τῶν δώδεκα μερῶν διανομῆς, τὸ τίνα τρόπον δῆλον δὴ τὰ
5 δώδεκα μέρη, τῶν ἐντὸς **αὖ** πλείστας ἔχοντα διανομάς,
καὶ τὰ τούτοις συνεπόμενα καὶ ἐκ τούτων γεννώμενα, μέχρι
τῶν τετταράκοντά τε καὶ πεντακισχιλίων—ὅθεν φρατρίας καὶ
δήμους καὶ κώμας, καὶ πρός γε τὰς πολεμικὰς τάξεις τε
e καὶ ἀγωγάς, καὶ ἔτι νομίσματα καὶ μέτρα ξηρά τε καὶ ὑγρὰ
καὶ σταθμά—πάντα ταῦτα ἔμμετρά τε καὶ ἀλλήλοις σύμ-
φωνα δεῖ τόν γε νόμον τάττειν. πρὸς δὲ τούτοις οὐδ'
ἐκεῖνα φοβητέα, δείσαντα τὴν δόξασαν ἂν γίγνεσθαι σμι-
5 κρολογίαν, ἄν τις προστάττῃ πάντα ὁπόσ' ἂν σκεύη κτῶνται,
μηδὲν ἄμετρον αὐτῶν ἐᾶν εἶναι, καὶ κοινῷ λόγῳ νομίσαντα
747 πρὸς πάντα εἶναι χρησίμους τὰς τῶν ἀριθμῶν διανομὰς καὶ

ποικίλσεις, ὅσα τε αὐτοὶ ἐν ἑαυτοῖς ποικίλλονται καὶ ὅσα ἐν μήκεσι καὶ ἐν βάθεσι ποικίλματα, καὶ δὴ καὶ ἐν φθόγγοις καὶ κινήσεσι ταῖς τε κατὰ τὴν εὐθυπορίαν τῆς ἄνω καὶ κάτω φορᾶς καὶ τῆς κύκλῳ περιφορᾶς· πρὸς γὰρ ταῦτα πάντα δεῖ βλέψαντα τόν γε νομοθέτην προστάττειν τοῖς πολίταις πᾶσιν εἰς δύναμιν τούτων μὴ ἀπολείπεσθαι τῆς συντάξεως. πρός τε γὰρ οἰκονομίαν καὶ πρὸς πολιτείαν καὶ πρὸς τὰς b τέχνας πάσας ἓν οὐδὲν οὕτω δύναμιν ἔχει παίδειον μάθημα μεγάλην, ὡς ἡ περὶ τοὺς ἀριθμοὺς διατριβή· τὸ δὲ μέγιστον, ὅτι τὸν νυστάζοντα καὶ ἀμαθῆ φύσει ἐγείρει καὶ εὐμαθῆ καὶ μνήμονα καὶ ἀγχίνουν ἀπεργάζεται, παρὰ τὴν αὑτοῦ φύσιν ἐπιδιδόντα θείᾳ τέχνῃ. ταῦτα δὴ πάντα, ἐὰν μὲν ἄλλοις νόμοις τε καὶ ἐπιτηδεύμασιν ἀφαιρῆταί τις τὴν ἀνελευθερίαν καὶ φιλοχρηματίαν ἐκ τῶν ψυχῶν τῶν μελλόντων αὐτὰ ἱκανῶς τε καὶ ὀνησίμως κτήσεσθαι, καλὰ τὰ παιδεύματα καὶ c προσήκοντα γίγνοιτ' ἄν· εἰ δὲ μή, τὴν καλουμένην ἄν τις πανουργίαν ἀντὶ σοφίας ἀπεργασάμενος λάθοι, καθάπερ Αἰγυπτίους καὶ Φοίνικας καὶ πολλὰ ἕτερα ἀπειργασμένα γένη νῦν ἔστιν ἰδεῖν ὑπὸ τῆς τῶν ἄλλων ἐπιτηδευμάτων καὶ κτημάτων ἀνελευθερίας, εἴτε τις νομοθέτης αὐτοῖς φαῦλος ἂν γενόμενος ἐξηργάσατο τὰ τοιαῦτα εἴτε χαλεπὴ τύχη προσπεσοῦσα εἴτε καὶ φύσις ἄλλη τις τοιαύτη. καὶ γάρ, d ὦ Μέγιλλέ τε καὶ Κλεινία, μηδὲ τοῦθ' ἡμᾶς λανθανέτω περὶ τόπων ὡς οὐκ εἰσὶν ἄλλοι τινὲς διαφέροντες ἄλλων τόπων πρὸς τὸ γεννᾶν ἀνθρώπους ἀμείνους καὶ χείρους, οἷς οὐκ ἐναντία νομοθετητέον· οἱ μέν γέ που διὰ πνεύματα παντοῖα καὶ δι' εἰλήσεις ἀλλόκοτοί τέ εἰσιν καὶ ἐναίσιοι αὐτῶν, οἱ δὲ δι' ὕδατα, οἱ δὲ καὶ δι' αὐτὴν τὴν ἐκ τῆς γῆς τροφήν, ἀνα- διδοῦσαν οὐ μόνον τοῖς σώμασιν ἀμείνω καὶ χείρω, ταῖς δὲ e ψυχαῖς οὐχ ἧττον δυναμένην πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα ἐμποιεῖν, τούτων δ' αὖ πάντων μέγιστον διαφέροιεν ἂν τόποι χώρας ἐν οἷς θεία τις ἐπίπνοια καὶ δαιμόνων λήξεις εἶεν, τοὺς ἀεὶ κατοικιζομένους ἴλεῳ δεχόμενοι καὶ τοὐναντίον. οἷς ὅ γε νοῦν ἔχων νομοθέτης, ἐπισκεψάμενος ὡς ἄνθρωπον οἷόν τ' ἐστὶν σκοπεῖν τὰ τοιαῦτα, οὕτω πειρῷτ' ἂν τιθέναι τοὺς νό- μους. ὃ δὴ καὶ σοὶ ποιητέον, ὦ Κλεινία· πρῶτον τρεπτέον ἐπὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα μέλλοντί γε κατοικίζειν χώραν.

ΚΛ. Ἀλλ', ὦ ξένε Ἀθηναῖε, λέγεις τε παγκάλως ἐμοί τε οὕτως ποιητέον.

BOOK VI

SHORT ANALYSIS

I. Ἀρχόντων αἱρέσεις καὶ ἐπιτηδεύματα.

(1) 752 e 1.—Νομοφύλακες.

(2) 755 b 6.—Στρατηγοί, ἵππαρχοι, ταξίαρχοι, φύλαρχοι.

(3) 756 b 7.—Βουλευταί (757 ἡ ἀληθεστάτη καὶ ἀρίστη ἰσότης; the lot as an auxiliary agent in elections); Πρυτάνεις.

(4) 759.—Ἱερεῖς and other temple officials.

(5) 760 a 6.—Ἀγρονόμοι.

(6) 763 c 3.—Ἀστυνόμοι.

(7) 763 c 4.—Ἀγορανόμοι.

(8) 764 c 5.—Μουσικῆς τε καὶ γυμναστικῆς ἄρχοντες—(*a*) παιδείας, (*b*) ἀγωνίας. (The παιδείας ἐπιμελητής far the most important of all state officials.)

(9) 766 d 2.—Δικασταί.

II. Νομοθεσία.

(768 e 1–771 a 4.—We must make the Νομοφύλακες capable of legislating, for many rectifications and additions to the laws will be needed as time goes on.)

771 a 5.—Distribution of the 5040 households into tribes and other divisions.—Social Festivals.

771 e 1.—Marriage.

773.—The principles which should guide the choice of wife or husband.

774 a.—Marriage a duty to the state.

774 c 3.—Dowries forbidden.

774 e 4.—Legal and religious ceremonies attending marriage.

776 a.—The young couple to remove to the country house.

776 b 5.—Property, especially in slaves—their treatment.

778 b.—Building, public and private.

779 d 7.—The regulation of the first ten years of married life, and the state's interference with private life, especially that of women: advisability and possibility of such interference.

785.—Ages for marriage, military and official service.

Ϛ

ΑΘ. Ἀλλὰ μὴν μετά γε πάντα τὰ νῦν εἰρημένα σχεδὸν 751
ἂν ἀρχῶν εἷέν σοι καταστάσεις τῇ πόλει.

ΚΛ. Ἔχει γὰρ οὖν οὕτω.

ΑΘ. Δύο εἴδη ταῦτα περὶ πολιτείας κόσμον γιγνόμενα
τυγχάνει, πρῶτον μὲν καταστάσεις ἀρχῶν τε καὶ ἀρξόντων, 5
ὅσας τε αὐτὰς εἶναι δεῖ καὶ τρόπον ὄντινα καθισταμένας·
ἔπειτα οὕτω δὴ τοὺς νόμους ταῖς ἀρχαῖς ἑκάσταις ἀποδοτέον,
οὕστινάς τε αὖ καὶ ὅσους καὶ οἵους προσῆκον ἂν ἑκάσταις b
εἴη. σμικρὸν δὲ ἐπισχόντες πρὸ τῆς αἱρέσεως, εἴπομεν
προσήκοντά τινα λόγον περὶ αὐτῆς ῥηθῆναι.

ΚΛ. Τίνα δὴ τοῦτον;

ΑΘ. Τόνδε. παντί που δῆλον τὸ τοιοῦτον, ὅτι μεγάλου 5
τῆς νομοθεσίας ὄντος ἔργου, τοῦ πόλιν εὖ παρεσκευασμένην
ἀρχὰς ἀνεπιτηδείους ἐπιστῆσαι τοῖς εὖ κειμένοις νόμοις, οὐ
μόνον οὐδὲν πλέον εὖ τεθέντων, οὐδ' ὅτι γέλως ἂν πάμπολυς
συμβαίνοι, σχεδὸν δὲ βλάβαι καὶ λῶβαι πολὺ μέγισται ταῖς c
πόλεσι γίγνοιντ' ἂν ἐξ αὐτῶν.

ΚΛ. Πῶς γὰρ οὔ;

ΑΘ. Τοῦτο τοίνυν νοήσωμέν σοι περὶ τῆς νῦν, ὦ φίλε,
πολιτείας τε καὶ πόλεως συμβαῖνον. ὁρᾷς γὰρ ὅτι πρῶτον 5
μὲν δεῖ τοὺς ὀρθῶς ἰόντας ἐπὶ τὰς τῶν ἀρχῶν δυνάμεις βά-
σανον ἱκανὴν αὐτούς τε καὶ γένος ἑκάστων ἐκ παίδων μέχρι
τῆς αἱρέσεως εἶναι δεδωκότας, ἔπειτα οὗ τοὺς μέλλοντας
αἱρήσεσθαι τεθράφθαι [τε] ἐν ἤθεσι νόμων εὖ πεπαιδευμένους
πρὸς τὸ δυσχεραίνοντάς τε καὶ ἀποδεχομένους ὀρθῶς κρίνειν d
καὶ ἀποκρίνειν δυνατοὺς γίγνεσθαι τοὺς ἀξίους ἑκατέρων·
ταῦτα δὲ οἱ νεωστὶ συνεληλυθότες ὄντες τε ἀλλήλων ἀ-
γνῶτες, ἔτι δ' ἀπαίδευτοι, πῶς ἄν ποτε δύναιντο ἀμέμπτως
τὰς ἀρχὰς αἱρεῖσθαι; 5

ΚΛ. Σχεδὸν οὐκ ἄν ποτε.

ΑΘ. Ἀλλὰ γὰρ ἀγῶνα προφάσεις φασὶν οὐ πάνυ δέχε-
σθαι· καὶ δὴ καὶ σοὶ τοῦτο νῦν καὶ ἐμοὶ ποιητέον, ἐπείπερ
σὺ μὲν δὴ τὴν πόλιν ὑπέστης τῷ Κρητῶν ἔθνει προθύμως e
κατοικιεῖν δέκατος αὐτός, ὡς φῄς, τὰ νῦν, ἐγὼ δ' αὖ σοὶ
συλλήψεσθαι κατὰ τὴν παροῦσαν ἡμῖν τὰ νῦν μυθολογίαν. 752
οὔκουν δήπου λέγων γε ἂν μῦθον ἀκέφαλον ἐκὼν καταλί-

ποιμι· πλανώμενος γὰρ ἂν ἁπάντῃ τοιοῦτος ὢν ἄμορφος φαίνοιτο.

ΚΛ. Ἄριστ' εἴρηκας, ὦ ξένε.

ΑΘ. Οὐ μόνον γε, ἀλλὰ καὶ δράσω κατὰ δύναμιν οὕτω.

ΚΛ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν ποιῶμεν ἥπερ καὶ λέγομεν.

ΑΘ. Ἔσται ταῦτ', ἂν θεὸς ἐθέλῃ καὶ γήρως ἐπικρατῶμεν τό γε τοσοῦτον.

ΚΛ. Ἀλλ' εἰκὸς ἐθέλειν.

ΑΘ. Εἰκὸς γὰρ οὖν. ἑπόμενοι δὲ αὐτῷ λάβωμεν καὶ τόδε.

ΚΛ. Τὸ ποῖον;

ΑΘ. Ὡς ἀνδρείως καὶ παρακεκινδυνευμένως ἐν τῷ νῦν ἡ πόλις ἡμῖν ἔσται κατῳκισμένη.

ΚΛ. Περὶ τί βλέπων καὶ ποῖ μάλιστα αὐτὸ εἴρηκας τὰ νῦν;

ΑΘ. Ὡς εὐκόλως καὶ ἀφόβως ἀπείροις ἀνδράσι νομοθετοῦμεν, ὅπως δέξονταί ποτε τοὺς νῦν τεθέντας νόμους. δῆλον δὲ τό γε τοσοῦτον, ὦ Κλεινία, παντὶ σχεδὸν καὶ τῷ μὴ πάνυ σοφῷ, τὸ μὴ ῥᾳδίως γε αὐτοὺς μηδένας προσδέξεσθαι κατ' ἀρχάς, εἰ δὲ μείναιμέν πως τοσοῦτον χρόνον ἕως οἱ γευσάμενοι παῖδες τῶν νόμων καὶ συντραφέντες ἱκανῶς συνήθεις τε αὐτοῖς γενόμενοι τῶν ἀρχαιρεσιῶν τῇ πόλει πάσῃ κοινωνήσειαν· γενομένου γε μὴν οὗ λέγομεν, εἴπερ τινὶ τρόπῳ καὶ μηχανῇ γίγνοιτο ὀρθῶς, πολλὴν ἔγωγε ἀσφάλειαν οἶμαι καὶ μετὰ τὸν τότε παρόντα χρόνον ἂν γενέσθαι τοῦ μεῖναι τὴν παιδαγωγηθεῖσαν οὕτω πόλιν.

ΚΛ. Ἔχει γοῦν λόγον.

ΑΘ. Ἴδωμεν τοίνυν πρὸς τοῦτο εἴ πῃ τινα πόρον ἱκανὸν πορίζοιμεν ἂν κατὰ τάδε. φημὶ γάρ, ὦ Κλεινία, Κνωσίους χρῆναι τῶν ἄλλων διαφερόντως Κρητῶν μὴ μόνον ἀφοσιώσασθαι περὶ τῆς χώρας ἣν νῦν κατοικίζετε, συντόνως δ' ἐπιμεληθῆναι τὰς πρώτας ἀρχὰς εἰς δύναμιν ὅπως ἂν στῶσιν ὡς ἀσφαλέστατα καὶ ἄριστα. τὰς μὲν οὖν ἄλλας καὶ βραχύτερον ἔργον, νομοφύλακας δ' ὑμῖν πρώτους αἱρεῖσθαι ἀναγκαιότατον ἁπάσῃ σπουδῇ.

ΚΛ. Τίνα οὖν ἐπὶ τούτῳ πόρον καὶ λόγον ἀνευρίσκομεν;

ΑΘ. Τόνδε. φημί, ὦ παῖδες Κρητῶν, χρῆναι Κνωσίους, διὰ τὸ πρεσβεύειν τῶν πολλῶν πόλεων, κοινῇ μετὰ τῶν ἀφικομένων εἰς τὴν συνοίκησιν ταύτην ἐξ αὐτῶν τε καὶ

ἐκείνων αἱρεῖσθαι τριάκοντα μὲν καὶ ἑπτὰ τοὺς πάντας, ἐννέα δὲ καὶ δέκα ἐκ τῶν ἐποικησόντων, τοὺς δὲ ἄλλους ἐξ αὐτῆς Κνωσσοῦ· τούτους δ' οἱ Κνώσιοι τῇ πόλει σοι 753
δόντων, καὶ αὐτόν σε πολίτην εἶναι ταύτης τῆς ἀποικίας καὶ ἕνα τῶν ὀκτωκαίδεκα, πείσαντες ἢ τῇ μετρίᾳ δυνάμει βιασάμενοι.

ΚΛ. Τί δῆτα οὐ καὶ σύ τε καὶ ὁ Μέγιλλος, ὦ ξένε, 5
ἐκοινωνησάτην ἡμῖν τῆς πολιτείας;

ΑΘ. Μέγα μέν, ὦ Κλεινία, φρονοῦσιν αἱ Ἀθῆναι, μέγα δὲ καὶ ἡ Σπάρτη, καὶ μακρὰν ἀποικοῦσιν ἑκάτεραι· σοὶ δὲ κατὰ πάντα ἐμμελῶς ἔχει καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις οἰκισταῖς κατὰ ταὐτά, ὥσπερ τὰ περὶ σοῦ νῦν λεγόμενα. ὡς μὲν οὖν γένοιτ' b
ἂν ἐπιεικέστατα ἐκ τῶν ὑπαρχόντων ἡμῖν τὰ νῦν, εἰρήσθω, προελθόντος δὲ χρόνου καὶ μεινάσης τῆς πολιτείας, αἵρεσις αὐτῶν ἔστω τοιάδε τις· Πάντες μὲν κοινωνούντων τῆς τῶν 5
ἀρχόντων αἱρέσεως ὁπόσοιπερ ἂν ὅπλα ἱππικὰ ἢ πεζικὰ τιθῶνται καὶ πολέμου κεκοινωνήκωσιν ἐν ταῖς σφετέραις αὐτῶν τῆς ἡλικίας δυνάμεσιν· ποιεῖσθαι δὲ τὴν αἵρεσιν ἐν
ἱερῷ ὅπερ ἂν ἡ πόλις ἡγῆται τιμιώτατον, φέρειν δ' ἐπὶ τὸν c
τοῦ θεοῦ βωμὸν ἕκαστον εἰς πινάκιον γράψαντα τοὔνομα πατρόθεν καὶ φυλῆς καὶ δήμου ὁπόθεν ἂν δημοτεύηται, παρεγγράφειν δὲ καὶ τὸ αὑτοῦ κατὰ ταὐτὰ οὕτως ὄνομα. τῷ βουλομένῳ δ' ἐξέστω τῶν πινακίων ὅτιπερ ἂν φαίνηται 5
μὴ κατὰ νοῦν αὐτῷ γεγραμμένον ἀνελόντα εἰς ἀγορὰν θεῖναι μὴ ἔλαττον τριάκοντα ἡμερῶν. τὰ δὲ τῶν πινακίων κριθέντα ἐν πρώτοις μέχρι τριακοσίων δεῖξαι τοὺς ἄρχοντας ἰδεῖν
πάσῃ τῇ πόλει, τὴν δὲ πόλιν ὡσαύτως ἐκ τούτων φέρειν d
πάλιν ὃν ἂν ἕκαστος βούληται, τοὺς δὲ τὸ δεύτερον ἐξ αὐτῶν προκριθέντας ἑκατὸν δεῖξαι πάλιν ἅπασιν. τὸ δὲ τρίτον φερέτω μὲν ἐκ τῶν ἑκατὸν ὁ βουληθεὶς ὃν ἂν βούληται, διὰ τομίων πορευόμενος· ἑπτὰ δὲ καὶ τριάκοντα, οἷς ἂν 5
πλεῖσται γένωνται ψῆφοι, κρίναντες ἀποφηνάντων ἄρχοντας.

Τίνες οὖν, ὦ Κλεινία καὶ Μέγιλλε, πάντα ἡμῖν ταῦτ' ἐν
τῇ πόλει καταστήσουσι τῶν ἀρχῶν τε πέρι καὶ δοκιμασιῶν e
αὐτῶν; ἆρα ἐννοοῦμεν ὡς ταῖς πρῶτον οὕτω καταζευγνυμέναις πόλεσιν ἀνάγκη μὲν εἶναί τινας, οἵτινες δὲ εἶεν ἂν
πρὸς πασῶν τῶν ἀρχῶν γεγονότες, οὐκ ἔστιν; δεῖ μὴν ἁμῶς γέ πως, καὶ ταῦτα οὐ φαύλους ἀλλ' ὅτι μάλιστα ἄκρους. 5
ἀρχὴ γὰρ λέγεται μὲν ἥμισυ παντὸς [ἐν ταῖς παροιμίαις]

ἔργου, καὶ τό γε καλῶς ἄρξασθαι πάντες ἐγκωμιάζομεν ἑκάστοτε· τὸ δ' ἔστιν τε, ὡς ἐμοὶ φαίνεται, πλέον ἢ τὸ
754 ἥμισυ, καὶ οὐδεὶς αὐτὸ καλῶς γενόμενον ἐγκεκωμίακεν ἱκανῶς.

ΚΛ. Ὀρθότατα λέγεις.

ΑΘ. Μὴ τοίνυν γιγνώσκοντές γε παρῶμεν αὐτὸ ἄρρητον, μηδὲν διασαφήσαντες ἡμῖν αὐτοῖς τίνα ἔσται τρόπον. ἐγὼ μὲν οὖν οὐδαμῶς εὐπορῶ πλήν γε ἑνὸς εἰπεῖν πρὸς τὸ παρὸν ἀναγκαίου καὶ συμφέροντος λόγου.

ΚΛ. Τίνος δή;

ΑΘ. Φημὶ ταύτῃ τῇ πόλει, ἣν οἰκίζειν μέλλομεν, οἷον πατέρα καὶ μητέρα οὐκ εἶναι πλὴν τὴν κατοικίζουσαν αὐτὴν
b πόλιν, οὐκ ἀγνοῶν ὅτι πολλαὶ τῶν κατοικισθεισῶν διάφοροι ταῖς κατοικισάσαις πολλάκις ἔνιαι γεγόνασίν τε καὶ ἔσονται. νῦν μὴν ἐν τῷ παρόντι, καθάπερ παῖς, εἰ καί ποτε μέλλει διάφορος εἶναι τοῖς γεννήσασιν, ἔν γε τῇ παρούσῃ παιδιᾳ ἀπορίᾳ στέργει τε καὶ στέργεται ὑπὸ τῶν γεννησάντων, καὶ φεύγων ἀεὶ πρὸς τοὺς οἰκείους, ἀναγκαίους μόνους εὑρίσκει συμμάχους· ἃ δὴ νῦν φημὶ Κνωσίοις διὰ τὴν ἐπιμέλειαν
c πρὸς τὴν νέαν πόλιν καὶ τῇ νέᾳ πρὸς Κνωσὸν ὑπάρχειν ἑτοίμως γεγονότα. λέγω δή, καθάπερ εἶπον νυνδή,—δὶς γὰρ τό γε καλὸν ῥηθὲν οὐδὲν βλάπτει—Κνωσίους δεῖν ἐπιμεληθῆναι πάντων τούτων κοινῇ, προσελομένους τῶν εἰς τὴν ἀποικίαν ἀφικομένων, τοὺς πρεσβυτάτους τε καὶ ἀρίστους εἰς δύναμιν ἑλομένους, μὴ ἔλαττον ἑκατὸν ἀνδρῶν· καὶ αὐτῶν Κνωσίων ἔστωσαν ἑκατὸν ἕτεροι. τούτους δὲ ἐλθόντας φημὶ δεῖν εἰς τὴν καινὴν πόλιν συνεπιμεληθῆναι ὅπως αἵ τε ἀρχαὶ
d καταστῶσιν κατὰ νόμους, καταστᾶσαί τε δοκιμασθῶσι· γενομένων δὲ τούτων, τὴν μὲν Κνωσὸν τοὺς Κνωσίους οἰκεῖν, τὴν δὲ νέαν πόλιν αὐτὴν αὐτὴν πειρᾶσθαι σῴζειν τε καὶ εὐτυχεῖν. οἱ δὲ δὴ γενόμενοι τῶν ἑπτὰ καὶ τριάκοντα νῦν τε καὶ εἰς τὸν ἔπειτα σύμπαντα χρόνον ἐπὶ τοῖσδε ἡμῖν ᾠρήσθωσαν· πρῶτον μὲν φύλακες ἔστωσαν τῶν νόμων, ἔπειτα τῶν γραμμάτων ὧν ἂν ἕκαστος ἀπογράψῃ τοῖς ἄρχουσι τὸ πλῆθος τῆς αὐτῶν οὐσίας, πλὴν ὁ μὲν μέγιστον τίμημα
e ἔχων τεττάρων μνῶν, ὁ δὲ τὸ δεύτερον τριῶν, ὁ δὲ τρίτος δυοῖν μναῖν, μνᾶς δὲ ὁ τέταρτος. ἐὰν δέ τις ἕτερον φαίνηταί τι παρὰ τὰ γεγραμμένα κεκτημένος, δημόσιον μὲν ἔστω τὸ τοιοῦτον ἅπαν, πρὸς τούτῳ δὲ δίκην ὑπεχέτω τῷ

βουλομένῳ μετιέναι μὴ καλὴν μηδ' εὐώνυμον ἀλλ' αἰσχράν, ἐὰν ἁλίσκηται διὰ τὸ κέρδος τῶν νόμων καταφρονῶν. αἰσχροκερδείας οὖν αὐτὸν γραψάμενος ὁ βουληθεὶς ἐπεξίτω τῇ δίκῃ ἐν αὐτοῖς τοῖς νομοφύλαξιν· ἐὰν δ' ὁ φεύγων ὄφλῃ, τῶν κοινῶν κτημάτων μὴ μετεχέτω, διανομὴ δὲ ὅταν τῇ πόλει γίγνηταί τις, ἄμοιρος ἔστω πλήν γε τοῦ κλήρου, γεγράφθω δὲ ὠφληκώς, ἕως ἂν ζῇ, ὅπου πᾶς ὁ βουλόμενος αὐτὰ ἀναγνώσεται. μὴ πλέον δὲ εἴκοσιν ἐτῶν νομοφύλαξ ἀρχέτω, φερέσθω δ' εἰς τὴν ἀρχὴν μὴ ἔλαττον ἢ πεντήκοντα γεγονὼς ἐτῶν· ἑξηκοντούτης δὲ ἐνεχθεὶς δέκα μόνον ἀρχέτω ἔτη, καὶ κατὰ τοῦτον τὸν λόγον, ὅπως ἄν τις πλέον ὑπερβὰς [ἑβδομήκοντα] ζῇ. [μηκέτι ἐν τούτοις τοῖς ἄρχουσι τὴν τηλικαύτην ἀρχὴν ὡς ἄρξων διανοηθήτω.]

Τὰ μὲν οὖν περὶ τῶν νομοφυλάκων ταῦτα εἰρήσθω προστάγματα τρία, προϊόντων δὲ εἰς τοὔμπροσθε τῶν νόμων ἕκαστος προστάξει τούτοις τοῖς ἀνδράσιν ὖντινων αὐτοὺς δεῖ πρὸς τοῖς νῦν εἰρημένοις προσεπιμελεῖσθαι· νῦν δ' ἑξῆς ἄλλων ἀρχῶν αἱρέσεως πέρι λέγοιμεν ἄν. δεῖ γὰρ δὴ τὰ μετὰ ταῦτα στρατηγοὺς αἱρεῖσθαι, καὶ τούτοις εἰς τὸν πόλεμον οἷόν τινας ὑπηρεσίας ἱππάρχους καὶ φυλάρχους καὶ τῶν πεζῶν φυλῶν κοσμητὰς τῶν τάξεων, οἷς πρέπον ἂν εἴη τοῦτ' αὐτὸ τοὔνομα μάλιστα, οἷον καὶ οἱ πολλοὶ ταξιάρχους αὐτοὺς ἐπονομάζουσι. τούτων δὴ στρατηγοὺς μὲν ἐξ αὐτῆς τῆς πόλεως ταύτης οἱ νομοφύλακες προβαλλέσθων, αἱρείσθων δ' ἐκ τῶν προβληθέντων πάντες οἱ τοῦ πολέμου κοινωνοὶ γενόμενοί τε ἐν ταῖς ἡλικίαις καὶ γιγνόμενοι ἑκάστοτε. ἐὰν δέ τις ἄρα δοκῇ τινι τῶν μὴ προβεβλημένων ἀμείνων εἶναι τῶν προβληθέντων τινός, ἐπονομάσας ἀνθ' ὅτου ὄντινα προβάλλεται, τοῦτ' αὐτὸ ὀμνὺς ἀντιπροβαλλέσθω τὸν ἕτερον· ὁπότερος δ' ἂν δόξῃ διαχειροτονούμενος, εἰς τὴν αἵρεσιν ἐγκρινέσθω. τρεῖς δέ, οἷς ἂν ἡ πλείστη χειροτονία γίγνηται, τούτους εἶναι στρατηγούς τε καὶ ἐπιμελητὰς τῶν κατὰ πόλεμον, δοκιμασθέντων καθάπερ οἱ νομοφύλακες· ταξιάρχους δὲ αὐτοῖσι προβάλλεσθαι μὲν τοὺς αἱρεθέντας στρατηγοὺς δώδεκα, ἑκάστῃ φυλῇ ταξίαρχον, τὴν δ' ἀντιπροβολὴν εἶναι, καθάπερ τῶν στρατηγῶν ἐγίγνετο τὴν αὐτὴν καὶ περὶ τῶν ταξιαρχῶν, καὶ τὴν ἐπιχειροτονίαν καὶ τὴν κρίσιν. τὸν δὲ σύλλογον τοῦτον ἐν τῷ παρόντι, πρὶν πρυτάνεις τε καὶ βουλὴν ἧρῆσθαι, τοὺς νομοφύλακας συλλέ-

ξαντας εἰς χωρίον ὡς ἱερώτατόν τε καὶ ἱκανώτατον καθίσαι, χωρὶς μὲν τοὺς ὁπλίτας, χωρὶς δὲ τοὺς ἱππέας, τρίτον δ' ἐφεξῆς τούτοις πᾶν ὅσον ἐμπολέμιον· χειροτονούντων δὲ στρατηγοὺς μὲν [καὶ ἱππάρχους] πάντες, ταξιάρχους δὲ οἱ
756 τὴν ἀσπίδα τιθέμενοι, φυλάρχους δὲ αὐτοῖς πᾶν τὸ ἱππικὸν αἱρείσθω, ψιλῶν δὲ ἢ τοξοτῶν ἤ τινος ἄλλου τῶν ἐμπολεμίων ἡγεμόνας οἱ στρατηγοὶ ἑαυτοῖς καθιστάντων. ἱππάρχων δὴ κατάστασις ἂν ἡμῖν ἔτι λοιπὴ γίγνοιτο. τούτους οὖν προβαλλέσθων μὲν οἵπερ καὶ τοὺς στρατηγοὺς προυβάλλοντο, τὴν δὲ αἵρεσιν καὶ τὴν ἀντι<προ>βολὴν τούτων τὴν αὐτὴν γίγνεσθαι καθάπερ ἡ τῶν στρατηγῶν ἐγίγνετο,
b χειροτονείτω δὲ τὸ ἱππικὸν αὐτοὺς ἐναντίον ὁρώντων τῶν πεζῶν, δύο δὲ οἷς ἂν πλείστη χειροτονία γίγνηται, τούτους ἡγεμόνας εἶναι πάντων τῶν ἱππευόντων. τὰς δὲ ἀμφισβητήσεις τῶν χειροτονιῶν μέχρι δυοῖν εἶναι· τὸ δὲ τρίτον ἐὰν ἀμφισβητῇ τις, διαψηφίζεσθαι τούτους οἵσπερ τῆς χειροτονίας μέτρον ἑκάστοις ἕκαστον ἦν.

Βουλὴν δὲ εἶναι μὲν τριάκοντα δωδεκάδας—ἑξήκοντα δὲ καὶ τριακόσιοι γίγνοιντο ἂν πρέποντες ταῖς διανομαῖς—μέρη
c δὲ διανείμαντας τέτταρα [κατὰ ἐνενήκοντα τὸν ἀριθμὸν] τούτων ἐξ ἑκάστου τῶν τιμημάτων φέρειν ἐνενήκοντα βουλευτάς. πρῶτον μὲν ἐκ τῶν μεγίστων τιμημάτων ἅπαντας φέρειν ἐξ ἀνάγκης, ἢ ζημιοῦσθαι τὸν μὴ πειθόμενον τῇ δοξάσῃ ζημίᾳ· ἐπειδὰν δ' ἐνεχθῶσι, τούτους μὲν κατασημήνασθαι, τῇ δὲ ὑστεραίᾳ φέρειν ἐκ τῶν δευτέρων τιμημάτων κατὰ ταὐτὰ καθάπερ τῇ πρόσθεν, τρίτῃ δ' ἐκ τῶν τρίτων τιμημάτων φέρειν μὲν τὸν βουλόμενον, ἐπάναγκες δὲ εἶναι τοῖς τῶν
d τριῶν τιμημάτων, τὸ δὲ τέταρτόν τε καὶ σμικρότατον ἐλεύθερον ἀφεῖσθαι τῆς ζημίας, ὃς ἂν αὐτῶν μὴ βούληται φέρειν. τετάρτῃ δὲ φέρειν μὲν ἐκ τοῦ τετάρτου καὶ σμικροτάτου τιμήματος ἅπαντας, ἀζήμιον δ' εἶναι τὸν ἐκ τοῦ τετάρτου καὶ τρίτου τιμήματος, ἐὰν ἐνεγκεῖν μὴ βούληται· τὸν δ' ἐκ
e τοῦ δευτέρου καὶ πρώτου μὴ φέροντα ζημιοῦσθαι, τὸν μὲν ἐκ τοῦ δευτέρου τριπλασίᾳ τῆς πρώτης ζημίας, τὸν δ' ἐκ τοῦ πρώτου τετραπλασίᾳ. πέμπτῃ δὲ ἡμέρᾳ τὰ κατασημανθέντα ὀνόματα ἐξενεγκεῖν μὲν τοὺς ἄρχοντας ἰδεῖν πᾶσι τοῖς πολίταις, φέρειν δ' ἐκ τούτων αὖ πάντα ἄνδρα ἢ ζημιοῦσθαι τῇ πρώτῃ ζημίᾳ· ὀγδοήκοντα δὲ καὶ ἑκατὸν ἐκλέξαντας ἀφ' ἑκάστων τῶν τιμημάτων, τοὺς ἡμίσεις τούτων

ἀποκληρώσαντας δοκιμάσαι, τούτους δ' εἶναι τὸν ἐνιαυτὸν βουλευτάς.

Ἡ μὲν αἵρεσις οὕτω γιγνομένη μέσον ἂν ἔχοι μοναρχικῆς καὶ δημοκρατικῆς πολιτείας, ἧς ἀεὶ δεῖ μεσεύειν τὴν πολιτείαν· δοῦλοι γὰρ ἂν καὶ δεσπόται οὐκ ἄν ποτε γένοιντο φίλοι, οὐδὲ ἐν ἴσαις τιμαῖς διαγορευόμενοι φαῦλοι καὶ σπουδαῖοι—τοῖς γὰρ ἀνίσοις τὰ ἴσα ἄνισα γίγνοιτ' ἄν, εἰ μὴ τυγχάνοι τοῦ μέτρου—διὰ γὰρ ἀμφότερα ταῦτα στάσεων αἱ πολιτεῖαι πληροῦνται. παλαιὸς γὰρ λόγος ἀληθὴς ὤν, ὡς ἰσότης φιλότητα ἀπεργάζεται, μάλα μὲν ὀρθῶς εἴρηται καὶ ἐμμελῶς· ἥτις δ' ἐστί ποτε ἰσότης ἡ τοῦτο αὐτὸ δυναμένη, διὰ τὸ μὴ σφόδρα σαφὴς εἶναι σφόδρα ἡμᾶς διαταράττει. δυοῖν γὰρ ἰσοτήτοιν οὔσαιν, ὁμωνύμοιν μέν, ἔργῳ δὲ εἰς πολλὰ σχεδὸν ἐναντίαιν, τὴν μὲν ἑτέραν εἰς τὰς τιμὰς πᾶσα πόλις ἱκανὴ παραγαγεῖν καὶ πᾶς νομοθέτης, τὴν μέτρῳ ἴσην καὶ σταθμῷ καὶ ἀριθμῷ, κλήρῳ ἀπευθύνων εἰς τὰς διανομὰς αὐτήν· τὴν δὲ ἀληθεστάτην καὶ ἀρίστην ἰσότητα οὐκέτι ῥᾴδιον παντὶ ἰδεῖν. Διὸς γὰρ δὴ κρίσις ἐστί, καὶ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ἀεὶ σμικρὰ μὲν ἐπαρκεῖ, πᾶν δὲ ὅσον ἂν ἐπαρκέσῃ πόλεσιν ἢ καὶ ἰδιώταις, πάντ' ἀγαθὰ ἀπεργάζεται· τῷ μὲν γὰρ μείζονι πλείω, τῷ δ' ἐλάττονι σμικρότερα νέμει, μέτρια διδοῦσα πρὸς τὴν αὐτῶν φύσιν ἑκατέρῳ, καὶ δὴ καὶ τιμὰς μείζοσι μὲν πρὸς ἀρετὴν ἀεὶ μείζους, τοῖς δὲ τοὐναντίον ἔχουσιν ἀρετῆς τε καὶ παιδείας τὸ πρέπον **ἑκάστοτε** ἀπονέμει κατὰ λόγον. ἔστιν γὰρ δήπου καὶ τὸ πολιτικὸν ἡμῖν ἀεὶ τοῦτ' αὐτὸ τὸ δίκαιον· οὗ καὶ νῦν ἡμᾶς ὀρεγομένους δεῖ καὶ πρὸς ταύτην τὴν ἰσότητα, ὦ Κλεινία, ἀποβλέποντας, τὴν νῦν φυομένην κατοικίζειν πόλιν. ἄλλην τε ἂν ποτέ τις οἰκίζῃ, πρὸς ταὐτὸν τοῦτο σκοπούμενον χρεὼν νομοθετεῖν, ἀλλ' οὐ πρὸς ὀλίγους τυράννους ἢ πρὸς ἕνα ἢ καὶ κράτος δήμου τι, πρὸς δὲ τὸ δίκαιον ἀεί, τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶ τὸ νυνδὴ λεχθέν, τὸ κατὰ φύσιν ἴσον ἀνίσοις ἑκάστοτε δοθέν· ἀναγκαῖόν γε μὴν καὶ τούτοις παρωνυμίοισί ποτε προσχρήσασθαι πόλιν ἅπασαν, εἰ μέλλει στάσεων ἑαυτῇ μὴ προσκοινωνήσειν κατά τι μέρος—τὸ γὰρ ἐπιεικὲς καὶ σύγγνωμον τοῦ τελέου καὶ ἀκριβοῦς παρὰ δίκην τὴν ὀρθήν ἐστιν παρατεθραυμένον, ὅταν γίγνηται—διὸ τῷ τοῦ κλήρου ἴσῳ ἀνάγκη προσχρήσασθαι δυσκολίας τῶν πολλῶν ἕνεκα, θεὸν καὶ ἀγαθὴν τύχην καὶ τότε ἐν εὐχαῖς ἐπικαλουμένους ἀπορθοῦν αὐτοὺς τὸν

κλῆρον πρὸς τὸ δικαιότατον. οὕτω δὴ χρηστέον ἀναγκαίως
758 μὲν τοῖν ἰσοτήτοιν ἀμφοῖν, ὡς δ' ὅτι μάλιστα ἐπ' ὀλιγίστοις
τῇ ἑτέρᾳ, τῇ τῆς τύχης δεομένῃ.

Ταῦτα οὕτως διὰ ταῦτα, ὦ φίλοι, ἀναγκαῖον τὴν μέλλουσαν σῴζεσθαι δρᾶν πόλιν· ἐπειδὴ δὲ ναῦς τε ἐν θαλάττῃ
5 πλέουσα φυλακῆς ἡμέρας δεῖται καὶ νυκτὸς ἀεί, πόλις τε ὡσαύτως ἐν κλύδωνι τῶν ἄλλων πόλεων διαγομένη καὶ παντοδαπαῖσιν ἐπιβουλαῖς οἰκεῖ κινδυνεύουσα ἁλίσκεσθαι, δεῖ δὴ δι' ἡμέρας τε εἰς νύκτα καὶ ἐκ νυκτὸς συνάπτειν πρὸς
b ἡμέραν ἄρχοντας ἄρχουσιν, φρουροῦντάς τε φρουροῦσιν διαδεχομένους ἀεὶ καὶ παραδιδόντας μηδέποτε λήγειν. πλῆθος δὲ οὐ δυνατὸν ὀξέως οὐδέποτε οὐδὲν τούτων πράττειν, ἀναγκαῖον δὲ τοὺς μὲν πολλοὺς τῶν βουλευτῶν ἐπὶ τὸν πλεῖστον
5 τοῦ χρόνου ἐᾶν ἐπὶ τοῖς αὑτῶν ἰδίοισι μένοντας εὐθημονεῖσθαι τὰ κατὰ τὰς αὑτῶν οἰκήσεις, τὸ δὲ δωδέκατον μέρος αὐτῶν ἐπὶ δώδεκα μῆνας νείμαντας, ἓν ἐφ' ἑνὶ παρέχειν αὐ-
c τοὺς φύλακας ἰόντι τέ τινί ποθεν ἄλλοθεν εἴτε καὶ ἐξ αὐτῆς τῆς πόλεως ἑτοίμως ἐπιτυχεῖν, ἄν τε ἀγγέλλειν βούληταί τις ἐάν τ' αὖ πυνθάνεσθαί τι τῶν ὧν προσήκει πόλει πρὸς πόλεις ἄλλας ἀποκρίνεσθαί τε, καὶ ἐρωτήσασαν ἑτέρας, ἀποδέξασθαι
5 τὰς ἀποκρίσεις, καὶ δὴ καὶ τῶν κατὰ πόλιν ἑκάστοτε νεωτερισμῶν ἕνεκα παντοδαπῶν εἰωθότων ἀεὶ γίγνεσθαι, ὅπως
d ἂν μάλιστα μὲν μὴ γίγνωνται, γενομένων δέ, ὅτι τάχιστα αἰσθομένης τῆς πόλεως ἰαθῇ τὸ γενόμενον· **δι' ἃ συλλογῶν** τε ἀεὶ δεῖ τοῦτο εἶναι τὸ προκαθήμενον τῆς πόλεως κύριον καὶ διαλύσεων, τῶν τε κατὰ νόμους τῶν τε ἐξαίφνης προσ-
5 πιπτουσῶν τῇ πόλει. ταῦτα μὲν οὖν πάντα τὸ δωδέκατον ἂν μέρος τῆς βουλῆς εἴη τὸ διακοσμοῦν, τὰ ἔνδεκα ἀναπαυόμενον τοῦ ἐνιαυτοῦ μέρη· κοινῇ δὲ μετὰ τῶν ἄλλων ἀρχῶν δεῖ τὰς φυλακὰς ταύτας φυλάττειν κατὰ πόλιν τοῦτο τὸ μόριον τῆς βουλῆς ἀεί.

10 Καὶ τὰ μὲν κατὰ πόλιν οὕτως ἔχοντα μετρίως ἂν εἴη
e διατεταγμένα· τῆς δὲ ἄλλης χώρας πάσης τίς ἐπιμέλεια καὶ τίς τάξις; ἆρα οὐχ ἡνίκα πᾶσα μὲν ἡ πόλις, σύμπασα δὲ ἡ χώρα κατὰ δώδεκα μέρη διανενέμηται, τῆς πόλεως αὐτῆς ὁδῶν καὶ οἰκήσεων καὶ οἰκοδομιῶν καὶ λιμένων καὶ
5 ἀγορᾶς καὶ κρηνῶν, καὶ δὴ καὶ τεμενῶν καὶ ἱερῶν καὶ πάντων τῶν τοιούτων, ἐπιμελητὰς δεῖ τινας ἀποδεδειγμένους εἶναι;

ΚΛ. Πῶς γὰρ οὔ;

ΑΘ. Λέγωμεν δὴ τοῖς μὲν ἱεροῖς νεωκόρους τε καὶ 759
ἱερέας καὶ ἱερείας δεῖν γίγνεσθαι· ὁδῶν δὲ καὶ οἰκοδομιῶν
καὶ κόσμου τοῦ περὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα, ἀνθρώπων τε, ἵνα μὴ ἀδι-
κῶσιν, καὶ τῶν ἄλλων θηρίων, ἐν αὐτῷ τε τῷ τῆς πόλεως
περιβόλῳ καὶ προαστείῳ ὅπως ἂν τὰ προσήκοντα πόλεσιν 5
γίγνηται, ἑλέσθαι δεῖ τρία μὲν ἀρχόντων εἴδη, περὶ μὲν τὸ
νυνδὴ λεχθὲν ἀστυνόμους ἐπονομάζοντα, τὸ δὲ περὶ ἀγορᾶς
κόσμον ἀγορανόμους. ἱερῶν δὲ ἱερέας, οἷς μέν εἰσιν πάτριαι
ἱερωσύναι καὶ αἷς, μὴ κινεῖν· εἰ δέ, οἷον τὸ πρῶτον κατοι- b
κιζομένοις εἰκὸς γίγνεσθαι περὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα, ἢ μηδενὶ ἢ τισιν
ὀλίγοις, οἷς μὴ καθεστήκοι καταστατέον ἱερέας τε καὶ ἱερείας
νεωκόρους γίγνεσθαι τοῖς θεοῖς. τούτων δὴ πάντων τὰ μὲν
αἱρετὰ χρή, τὰ δὲ κληρωτὰ ἐν ταῖς καταστάσεσι γίγνεσθαι, 5
μειγνύντας πρὸς φιλίαν ἀλλήλοις δῆμον καὶ μὴ δῆμον ἐν
ἑκάστῃ χώρᾳ καὶ πόλει, ὅπως ἂν μάλιστα ὁμονόων εἴη. τὰ
μὲν οὖν τῶν ἱερέων, τῷ θεῷ ἐπιτρέποντα αὐτῷ τὸ κεχαρι-
σμένον γίγνεσθαι, κληροῦν οὕτω τῇ θείᾳ τύχῃ ἀποδιδόντα, c
δοκιμάζειν δὲ τὸν ἀεὶ λαγχάνοντα πρῶτον μὲν ὁλόκληρον
καὶ γνήσιον, ἔπειτα ὡς ὅτι μάλιστα ἐκ καθαρευουσῶν οἰκή-
σεων, φόνου δὲ ἁγνὸν καὶ πάντων τῶν περὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα εἰς
τὰ θεῖα ἁμαρτανομένων αὐτὸν καὶ πατέρα καὶ μητέρα κατὰ 5
ταὐτὰ βεβιωκότας. ἐκ Δελφῶν δὲ χρὴ νόμους περὶ τὰ θεῖα
πάντα κομισαμένους καὶ καταστήσαντας ἐπ' αὐτοῖς ἐξηγητάς,
τούτοις χρῆσθαι. κατ' ἐνιαυτὸν δὲ εἶναι καὶ μὴ μακρότερον d
τὴν ἱερωσύνην ἑκάστην, ἔτη δὲ μὴ ἔλαττον ἑξήκοντα ἡμῖν
εἴη γεγονὼς ὁ μέλλων καθ' ἱεροὺς νόμους περὶ τὰ θεῖα ἱκανῶς
ἁγιστεύσειν· ταὐτὰ δὲ καὶ περὶ τῶν ἱερειῶν ἔστω τὰ νόμιμα.
τοὺς δὲ ἐξηγητὰς τρὶς φερέτωσαν μὲν αἱ τέτταρες φυλαὶ 5
τέτταρας, ἕκαστον ἐξ αὐτῶν, τρεῖς δέ, οἷς ἂν πλείστη γέ-
νηται ψῆφος, δοκιμάσαντας, ἐννέα πέμπειν εἰς Δελφοὺς
ἀνελεῖν ἐξ ἑκάστης τριάδος ἕνα· τὴν δὲ δοκιμασίαν αὐτῶν
καὶ τοῦ χρόνου τὴν ἡλικίαν εἶναι καθάπερ τῶν ἱερέων. οὗτοι e
δὲ ἔστων ἐξηγηταὶ διὰ βίου· τὸν δέ γε λιπόντα προαιρεί-
σθωσαν αἱ τέτταρες φυλαὶ ὅθεν ἂν ἐκλίπῃ. ταμίας τε δὴ
τῶν τε ἱερῶν χρημάτων ἑκάστοις τοῖς ἱεροῖς καὶ τεμενῶν
καὶ καρπῶν τούτων καὶ μισθώσεων κυρίους αἱρεῖσθαι μὲν 5
ἐκ τῶν μεγίστων τιμημάτων τρεῖς εἰς τὰ μέγιστα ἱερά, δύο 760
δ' εἰς τὰ σμικρότερα, πρὸς δὲ τὰ ἐμμελέστατα ἕνα· τὴν δὲ

αἵρεσιν τούτων καὶ τὴν δοκιμασίαν γίγνεσθαι καθάπερ ἡ τῶν στρατηγῶν ἐγίγνετο. καὶ τὰ μὲν αὖ περὶ τὰ ἱερὰ ταῦτα γιγνέσθω.

Ἀφρούρητον δὲ δὴ μηδὲν εἰς δύναμιν ἔστω. πόλεως μὲν οὖν αἱ φρουραὶ πέρι ταύτῃ γιγνέσθωσαν, στρατηγῶν ἐπιμελουμένων καὶ ταξιαρχῶν καὶ ἱππάρχων καὶ φυλάρχων καὶ πρυτάνεων, καὶ δὴ καὶ ἀστυνόμων καὶ ἀγορανόμων, ὁπόταν αἱρεθέντες ἡμῖν καταστῶσίν τινες ἱκανῶς· τὴν δὲ ἄλλην χώραν φυλάττειν πᾶσαν κατὰ τάδε. δώδεκα μὲν ἡμῖν ἡ χώρα πᾶσα εἰς δύναμιν ἴσα μόρια νενέμηται, φυλὴ δὲ μία τῷ μορίῳ ἑκάστῳ ἐπικληρωθεῖσα [κατ' ἐνιαυτὸν] παρεχέτω πέντε οἷον ἀγρονόμους τε καὶ φρουράρχους, τούτοις δ' ἔστω καταλέξασθαι τῆς αὐτῶν φυλῆς ἑκάστῳ δώδεκα τῶν πέντε ἐκ τῶν νέων, μὴ ἔλαττον ἢ πέντε καὶ εἴκοσιν ἔτη γεγονότας, μὴ πλεῖον δὲ ἢ τριάκοντα. τούτοις δὲ διακληρωθήτω τὰ μόρια τῆς χώρας κατὰ μῆνα ἕκαστα ἑκάστοις, ὅπως ἂν πάσης τῆς χώρας ἔμπειροί τε καὶ ἐπιστήμονες γίγνωνται πάντες. δύο δ' ἔτη τὴν ἀρχὴν καὶ τὴν φρουρὰν γίγνεσθαι φρουροῖς τε καὶ ἄρχουσιν. ὅπως δ' ἂν τὸ πρῶτον λάχωσιν τὰ μέρη, [τοὺς τῆς χώρας τόπους,] μεταλλάττοντας ἀεὶ τὸν ἑξῆς τόπον ἑκάστου μηνὸς ἡγεῖσθαι τοὺς φρουράρχους ἐπὶ δεξιὰ κύκλῳ· τὸ δ' ἐπὶ δεξιὰ γιγνέσθω τὸ πρὸς ἕω. περιελθόντος δὲ τοῦ ἐνιαυτοῦ, τῷ δευτέρῳ ἔτει, ἵνα ὡς πλεῖστοι τῶν φρουρῶν μὴ μόνον ἔμπειροι τῆς χώρας γίγνωνται κατὰ μίαν ὥραν τοῦ ἐνιαυτοῦ, πρὸς τῇ χώρᾳ δὲ ἅμα καὶ τῆς ὥρας ἑκάστης περὶ ἕκαστον τὸν τόπον τὸ γιγνόμενον ὡς πλεῖστοι καταμάθωσιν, οἱ τότε ἡγούμενοι πάλιν ἀφηγείσθωσαν εἰς τὸν εὐώνυμον ἀεὶ μεταβάλλοντες τόπον, ἕως ἂν τὸ δεύτερον διεξέλθωσιν ἔτος· τῷ τρίτῳ δὲ ἄλλους ἀγρονόμους αἱρεῖσθαι καὶ φρουράρχους [τοὺς πέντε τῶν δώδεκα ἐπιμελητάς]. ἐν δὲ δὴ ταῖς διατριβαῖς τῷ τόπῳ ἑκάστῳ τὴν ἐπιμέλειαν εἶναι τοιάνδε τινά· πρῶτον μὲν ὅπως εὐερκὴς ἡ χώρα πρὸς τοὺς πολεμίους ὅτι μάλιστα ἔσται, ταφρεύοντάς τε ὅσα ἂν τούτου δέῃ καὶ ἀποσκάπτοντας καὶ ἐνοικοδομήμασιν εἰς δύναμιν εἴργοντας τοὺς ἐπιχειροῦντας ὁτιοῦν τὴν χώραν καὶ τὰ κτήματα κακουργεῖν, χρωμένους δ' ὑποζυγίοις καὶ τοῖς οἰκέταις τοῖς ἐν τῷ τόπῳ ἑκάστῳ πρὸς ταῦτα, δι' ἐκείνων ποιοῦντας, ἐκείνοις ἐπιστατοῦντας, τῶν οἰκείων ἔργων αὐτῶν ἀργίας ὅτι μάλιστα ἐκλεγομένους. δύσβατα δὲ δὴ πάντα ποιεῖν μὲν τοῖς ἐχθροῖς,

τοῖς δὲ φίλοις ὅτι μάλιστα εὔβατα, ἀνθρώποις τε καὶ ὑπο-
ζυγίοις καὶ βοσκήμασιν, ὁδῶν τε ἐπιμελουμένους ὅπως ὡς 5
ἡμερώταται ἔκασται γίγνωνται, καὶ τῶν ἐκ Διὸς ὑδάτων,
ἵνα τὴν χώραν μὴ κακουργῇ, μᾶλλον δ' ὠφελῇ ῥέοντα ἐκ
τῶν ὑψηλῶν εἰς τὰς ἐν τοῖς ὄρεσι νάπας ὅσαι κοῖλαι, τὰς b
ἐκροὰς αὐτῶν εἴργοντας οἰκοδομήμασί τε καὶ ταφρεύμασιν,
ὅπως ἂν τὰ παρὰ τοῦ Διὸς ὕδατα καταδεχόμεναι καὶ πί-
νουσαι, τοῖς ὑποκάτωθεν ἀγροῖς τε καὶ τόποις πᾶσιν νάματα
καὶ κρήνας ποιοῦσαι, καὶ τοὺς αὐχμηροτάτους τόπους πολυ- 5
ύδρους τε καὶ εὐύδρους ἀπεργάζωνται· τά τε πηγαῖα ὕδατα,
ἐάν τέ τις ποταμὸς ἐάν τε καὶ κρήνη ᾖ, κοσμοῦντες φυτεύμασί
τε καὶ οἰκοδομήμασιν εὐπρεπέστερα, καὶ συνάγοντες μεταλ- c
λείαις νάματα, πάντα ἄφθονα ποιῶσιν, ὑδρείαις τε καθ'
ἑκάστας τὰς ὥρας, εἴ τί που ἄλσος ἢ τέμενος περὶ ταῦτα
ἀνειμένον [ᾖ], τὰ ῥεύματα ἀφιέντες εἰς αὐτὰ τὰ τῶν θεῶν
ἱερά, κοσμῶσι. πανταχῇ δὲ ἐν τοῖς τοιούτοις γυμνάσια χρὴ 5
κατασκευάζειν τοὺς νέους αὐτοῖς τε καὶ τοῖς γέρουσι, γεροντικὰ λουτρὰ [θερμὰ] παρέχοντας, ὕλην παρατιθέντας αὖην
καὶ ξηρὰν ἄφθονον, ἐπ' οἰήσει καμνόντων τε νόσοις καὶ d
πόνοις τετρυμένα γεωργικοῖς σώματα δεχομένους εὐμενῶς,
ἰατροῦ δέξιν μὴ πάνυ σοφοῦ βελτίονα συχνῷ.

Ταῦτα μὲν οὖν καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα πάντα κόσμος τε καὶ ὠφελία
τοῖς τόποις γίγνοιτ' ἂν μετὰ παιδιᾶς οὐδαμῇ ἀχαρίτου· 5
σπουδὴ δὲ περὶ ταῦτα ἥδε ἔστω. τοὺς ἑξήκοντα ἑκάστους τὸν
αὑτῶν τόπον φυλάττειν, μὴ μόνον πολεμίων ἕνεκα ἀλλὰ καὶ
τῶν φίλων φασκόντων εἶναι· γειτόνων δὲ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων
πολιτῶν ἢν ἄλλος ἄλλον ἀδικῇ, δοῦλος ἢ ἐλεύθερος, δικάζοντας e
τῷ ἀδικεῖσθαι φάσκοντι, τὰ μὲν σμικρὰ αὐτοὺς τοὺς πέντε ἄρ-
χοντας, τὰ δὲ μείζονα μετὰ τῶν δώδεκα [τοὺς ἑπτακαίδεκα]
δικάζειν μέχρι τριῶν μνῶν, ὅσα ἂν ἕτερος ἑτέρῳ ἐπικαλῇ.
δικαστὴν δὲ καὶ ἄρχοντα ἀνυπεύθυνον οὐδένα δικάζειν καὶ 5
ἄρχειν δεῖ πλὴν τῶν τὸ τέλος ἐπιτιθέντων οἷον βασιλέων·
καὶ δὴ καὶ τοὺς ἀγρονόμους τούτους, ἐὰν ὑβρίζωσί τι περὶ
τοὺς ὧν ἐπιμελοῦνται, προστάξεις τε προστάττοντες ἀνίσους,
καὶ ἐπιχειροῦντες λαμβάνειν τε καὶ φέρειν τῶν ἐν ταῖς 762
γεωργίαις μὴ πείσαντες, καὶ ἐὰν δέχωνταί τι κολακείας
ἕνεκα διδόντων, ἢ [καὶ δίκας] ἀδίκως διανέμωσι, ταῖς μὲν
θωπείαις ὑπείκοντες ὀνείδη φερέσθωσαν ἐν πάσῃ τῇ πόλει,
τῶν δὲ ἄλλων ἀδικημάτων ὅτι ἂν ἀδικῶσι τοὺς ἐν τῷ τόπῳ, 5

τῶν μέχρι μνᾶς ἐν τοῖς κωμήταις καὶ γείτοσιν ὑπεχέτωσαν ἑκόντες δίκας, τῶν δὲ μειζόνων ἑκάστοτε ἀδικημάτων ἢ καὶ
b τῶν ἐλαττόνων, ἐὰν μὴ ᾽θέλωσιν ὑπέχειν, πιστεύοντες τῷ μεθίστασθαι κατὰ μῆνας εἰς ἕτερον ἀεὶ τόπον φεύγοντες ἀποφευξεῖσθαι, τούτων πέρι λαγχάνειν μὲν ἐν ταῖς κοιναῖς δίκαις τὸν ἀδικούμενον, ἐὰν δ᾽ ἕλῃ, τὴν διπλασίαν πραττέσθω
5 τὸν ὑποφεύγοντα καὶ μὴ ἐθελήσαντα ὑποσχεῖν ἑκόντα τιμωρίαν. διαιτάσθων δὲ οἵ τε ἄρχοντες οἵ τ᾽ ἀγρονόμοι τὰ δύο ἔτη τοιόνδε τινὰ τρόπον· πρῶτον μὲν δὴ καθ᾽ ἑκάστους
c τοὺς τόπους εἶναι συσσίτια, ἐν οἷς κοινῇ τὴν δίαιταν ποιητέον ἅπασιν· ὁ δὲ ἀποσυσσιτήσας κἂν ἡντιναοῦν ἡμέραν, ἢ νύκτα ἀποκοιμηθείς, μὴ τῶν ἀρχόντων ταξάντων ἢ πάσης τινὸς ἀνάγκης ἐπιπεσούσης, ἐὰν ἀποφήνωσιν αὐτὸν οἱ πέντε,
5 καὶ γράψαντες θῶσιν ἐν ἀγορᾷ καταλελυκότα τὴν φρουράν, ὀνείδη τε ἐχέτω τὴν πολιτείαν ὡς προδιδοὺς τὸ ἑαυτοῦ μέρος, κολαζέσθω τε πληγαῖς ὑπὸ τοῦ συντυγχάνοντος καὶ
d ἐθέλοντος κολάζειν ἀτιμωρήτως. τῶν δὲ ἀρχόντων αὖ ἐάν τίς τι δρᾷ τοιοῦτον αὐτός, ἐπιμελεῖσθαι μὲν τοῦ τοιούτου πάντας τοὺς ἑξήκοντα χρεών, ὁ δὲ αἰσθόμενός τε καὶ πυθόμενος μὴ ἐπεξιὼν ἐν τοῖς αὐτοῖς ἐνεχέσθω νόμοις καὶ
5 πλείοσι τῶν νέων ζημιούσθω· περὶ τὰς τῶν νέων ἀρχὰς ἠτιμώσθω πάσας. τούτων δὲ οἱ νομοφύλακες ἐπίσκοποι ἀκριβεῖς ἔστωσαν, ὅπως ἢ μὴ γίγνηται τὴν ἀρχὴν ἢ γιγνό-
e μενα τῆς ἀξίας δίκης τυγχάνῃ. δεῖ δὴ πάντ᾽ ἄνδρα διανοεῖσθαι περὶ ἁπάντων ἀνθρώπων ὡς ὁ μὴ δουλεύσας οὐδ᾽ ἂν δεσπότης γένοιτο ἄξιος ἐπαίνου, καὶ καλλωπίζεσθαι χρὴ τῷ καλῶς δουλεῦσαι μᾶλλον ἢ τῷ καλῶς ἄρξαι, πρῶτον
5 μὲν τοῖς νόμοις, ὡς ταύτην τοῖς θεοῖς οὖσαν δουλείαν, ἔπειτ᾽ ἀεὶ τοῖς πρεσβυτέροις τε καὶ ἐντίμως βεβιωκόσι τοὺς νέους. μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα τῆς καθ᾽ ἡμέραν διαίτης δεῖ τῆς ταπεινῆς καὶ ἀπόρου γεγευμένον εἶναι τὰ δύο ἔτη ταῦτα τὸν τῶν ἀγρονόμων γεγονότα. ἐπειδὰν γὰρ δὴ καταλεγῶσιν οἱ
10 δώδεκα, συνελθόντες μετὰ τῶν πέντε, βουλευέσθωσαν ὡς
763 οἷόνπερ οἰκέται οὐχ ἕξουσιν αὐτοῖς ἄλλους οἰκέτας τε καὶ δούλους, οὐδ᾽ ἐκ τῶν ἄλλων γεωργῶν τε καὶ κωμητῶν τοῖς ἐκείνων ἐπὶ τὰ ἴδια χρήσονται ὑπηρετήματα διακόνοις, ἀλλὰ μόνον ὅσα εἰς τὰ δημόσια, τὰ δ᾽ ἄλλα αὐτοὶ δι᾽ αὑτῶν
5 διανοηθήτωσαν ὡς βιωσόμενοι διακονοῦντές τε καὶ διακονούμενοι [ἑαυτοῖς]—πρὸς δὲ τούτοις πᾶσαν τὴν χώραν διεξερευ-

νώμενοι θέρους καὶ χειμῶνος σὺν τοῖς ὅπλοις φυλακῆς τε
καὶ γνωρίσεως ἕνεκα πάντων ἀεὶ τῶν τόπων. κινδυνεύει b
γὰρ οὐδενὸς ἔλαττον μάθημα εἶναι δι' ἀκριβείας ἐπίστασθαι
πάντας τὴν αὐτῶν χώραν· οὗ δὴ χάριν κυνηγέσια καὶ τὴν
ἄλλην θήραν οὐχ ἧττον ἐπιτηδεύειν δεῖ τὸν ἡβῶντα ἢ τῆς
ἄλλης ἡδονῆς ἅμα καὶ ὠφελίας τῆς περὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα γιγνο- 5
μένης πᾶσιν. τούτους οὖν, αὐτούς τε καὶ τὸ ἐπιτήδευμα,
εἴτε τις κρυπτοὺς εἴτε ἀγρονόμους εἴθ' ὅτι καλῶν χαίρει,
τοῦτο προσαγορεύων, προθύμως πᾶς ἀνὴρ εἰς δύναμιν ἐπιτη- c
δευέτω, ὅσοι μέλλουσι τὴν αὐτῶν πόλιν ἱκανῶς σῴζειν.

Τὸ δὲ μετὰ τοῦτο ἀρχόντων αἱρέσεως ἀγορανόμων πέρι καὶ
ἀστυνόμων πέρι ἦν ἡμῖν ἑπόμενον. ἔποιντο δ' ἂν ἀγρονό-
μοις γε ἀστυνόμοι τρεῖς ἑξήκοντα οὖσιν, τριχῇ δώδεκα μέρη 5
τῆς πόλεως διαλαβόντες, μιμούμενοι ἐκείνους τῶν τε ὁδῶν
ἐπιμελούμενοι τῶν κατὰ τὸ ἄστυ καὶ τῶν ἐκ τῆς χώρας
λεωφόρων εἰς τὴν πόλιν ἀεὶ τεταμένων καὶ τῶν οἰκοδομιῶν,
ἵνα κατὰ νόμους γίγνωνται πᾶσαι, καὶ δὴ καὶ τῶν ὑδάτων, d
ὁπόσ' ἂν αὐτοῖς πέμπωσι καὶ παραδιδῶσιν οἱ φρουροῦντες
τεθεραπευμένα, ὅπως εἰς τὰς κρήνας ἱκανὰ καὶ καθαρὰ πο-
ρευόμενα κοσμῇ τε ἅμα καὶ ὠφελῇ τὴν πόλιν. δεῖ δὴ καὶ
τούτους δυνατούς τε εἶναι καὶ σχολάζοντας τῶν κοινῶν ἐπι- 5
μελεῖσθαι· διὸ προβαλλέσθω μὲν πᾶς ἀνὴρ ἐκ τῶν μεγί-
στων τιμημάτων ἀστυνόμον ὃν ἂν βούληται, διαχειροτονη-
θέντων δὲ καὶ ἀφικομένων εἰς ἓξ οἷς ἂν πλεῖσται γίγνωνται, e
τοὺς τρεῖς ἀποκληρωσάντων οἷς τούτων ἐπιμελές, δοκιμα-
σθέντες δὲ ἀρχόντων κατὰ τοὺς τεθέντας αὐτοῖς νόμους.

Ἀγορανόμους δ' ἑξῆς τούτοις αἱρεῖσθαι μὲν ἐκ τῶν δευτέ-
ρων καὶ πρώτων τιμημάτων πέντε, τὰ δ' ἄλλα αὐτῶν γίγνεσθαι 5
τὴν αἵρεσιν καθάπερ ἡ τῶν ἀστυνόμων· [δέκα τῶν ἄλλων
προχειροτονηθέντων τοὺς πέντε ἀποκληρῶσαι, καὶ δοκιμα-
σθέντας αὐτοὺς ἄρχοντας ἀποφῆναι.] χειροτονείτω δὲ πᾶς
πάντα· ὁ δὲ μὴ θέλων, ἐὰν εἰσαγγελθῇ πρὸς τοὺς ἄρχοντας, 764
ζημιούσθω πεντήκοντα δραχμαῖς πρὸς τῷ κακὸς εἶναι δοκεῖν.
ἴτω δ' εἰς ἐκκλησίαν καὶ τὸν κοινὸν σύλλογον ὁ βουλόμενος,
ἐπάναγκες δ' ἔστω τῷ τῶν δευτέρων καὶ πρώτων τιμημάτων,
δέκα δραχμαῖς ζημιουμένῳ ἐὰν μὴ παρὼν ἐξετάζηται τοῖς 5
συλλόγοις· τρίτῳ δὲ τιμήματι καὶ τῷ τετάρτῳ μὴ ἐπάναγκες,
ἀλλὰ ἀζήμιος ἀφείσθω, ἐὰν μή τι παραγγείλωσιν οἱ ἄρχοντες
πᾶσιν ἔκ τινος ἀνάγκης συνιέναι. τοὺς δὲ δὴ ἀγορανόμους b

τὸν περὶ τὴν ἀγορὰν κόσμον διαταχθέντα ὑπὸ νόμων φυλάττειν, καὶ ἱερῶν καὶ κρηνῶν ἐπιμελεῖσθαι τῶν κατ' ἀγοράν, ὅπως μηδὲν ἀδικῇ μηδείς, τὸν ἀδικοῦντα δὲ κολάζειν, πληγαῖς μὲν καὶ δεσμοῖς δοῦλον καὶ ξένον, ἐὰν δ' ἐπιχώριος ὢν τις περὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα ἀκοσμῇ, μέχρι μὲν ἑκατὸν δραχμῶν νομίσματος αὐτοὺς εἶναι κυρίους διαδικάζοντας, μέχρι δὲ διπλασίου τούτου κοινῇ μετὰ ἀστυνόμων ζημιοῦν δικάζοντας τῷ ἀδικοῦντι. τὰ αὐτὰ δὲ καὶ ἀστυνόμοις ἔστω ζημιώματά τε καὶ κολάσεις ἐν τῇ ἑαυτῶν ἀρχῇ, μέχρι μὲν μνᾶς αὐτοὺς ζημιοῦντας, τὴν διπλασίαν δὲ μετὰ ἀγορανόμων.

Μουσικῆς δὲ τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο καὶ γυμναστικῆς ἄρχοντας καθίστασθαι πρέπον ἂν εἴη, διττοὺς ἑκατέρων, τοὺς μὲν παιδείας αὐτῆς ἕνεκα, τοὺς δὲ ἀγωνιστικῆς. παιδείας μὲν βούλεται λέγειν ὁ νόμος γυμνασίων καὶ διδασκαλείων ἐπιμελητὰς κόσμου καὶ παιδεύσεως ἅμα καὶ τῆς περὶ ταῦτα ἐπιμελείας τῶν φοιτήσεών τε πέρι καὶ οἰκήσεων ἀρρένων καὶ θηλειῶν κορῶν, ἀγωνίας δέ, ἔν τε τοῖς γυμνικοῖς καὶ περὶ τὴν μουσικὴν ἀθλοθέτας ἀθληταῖς, διττοὺς αὖ τούτους. [περὶ μουσικὴν μὲν ἑτέρους, περὶ ἀγωνίαν δ' ἄλλους.] ἀγωνιστικῆς μὲν οὖν ἀνθρώπων τε καὶ ἵππων τοὺς αὐτούς, μουσικῆς δὲ ἑτέρους μὲν τοὺς περὶ μονῳδίαν τε καὶ μιμητικήν, οἷον ῥαψῳδῶν καὶ κιθαρῳδῶν καὶ αὐλητῶν καὶ πάντων τῶν τοιούτων ἀθλοθέτας ἑτέρους πρέπον ἂν εἴη γίγνεσθαι, τῶν δὲ περὶ χορῳδίαν ἄλλους. πρῶτον δὴ περὶ τὴν τῶν χορῶν παιδιὰν παίδων τε καὶ ἀνδρῶν καὶ θηλειῶν κορῶν ἐν ὀρχήσεσι καὶ τῇ τάξει τῇ ἁπάσῃ γιγνομένην μουσικῇ τοὺς ἄρχοντας αἱρεῖσθαί που χρεών· ἱκανὸς δὲ εἷς ἄρχων αὐτοῖς, μὴ ἔλαττον τετταράκοντα γεγονὼς ἐτῶν. ἱκανὸς δὲ καὶ περὶ μονῳδίαν εἷς, μὴ ἔλαττον ἢ τριάκοντα γεγονὼς ἐτῶν, εἰσαγωγεύς τε εἶναι καὶ τοῖς ἀμιλλωμένοις τὴν διάκρισιν ἱκανῶς ἀποδιδούς. τὸν δὴ χορῶν ἄρχοντα καὶ διαθετῆρα αἱρεῖσθαι χρὴ τοιόνδε τινὰ τρόπον. ὅσοι μὲν φιλοφρόνως ἐσχήκασι περὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα, εἰς τὸν σύλλογον ἴτωσαν, ἐπιζήμιοι ἐὰν μὴ ἴωσιν—τούτου δὲ οἱ νομοφύλακες κριταί—τοῖς δ' ἄλλοις, ἐὰν μὴ βούλωνται, μηδὲν ἐπάναγκες ἔστω. καὶ τὴν προβολὴν δὴ τὸν αἱρούμενον ἐκ τῶν ἐμπείρων ποιητέον, ἔν τε τῇ δοκιμασίᾳ κατηγόρημα ἓν τοῦτ' ἔστω καὶ ἀπηγόρημα, τῶν μὲν ὡς ἄπειρος ὁ λαχών, τῶν δ' ὡς ἔμπειρος· ὃς δ' ἂν εἷς ἐκ προχειροτονηθέντων δέκα λάχῃ δοκιμασθείς, τὸν

ἐνιαυτὸν τῶν χορῶν ἀρχέτω κατὰ νόμον. κατὰ ταὐτὰ δὲ τούτοις καὶ ταύτῃ ὁ λαχὼν τὸν ἐνιαυτὸν ἐκεῖνον τῶν ἀφικομένων εἰς κρίσιν μονῳδιῶν τε καὶ συναυλιῶν ἀρχέτω, εἰς τοὺς κριτὰς ἀποδιδοὺς ὁ λαχὼν τὴν κρίσιν. μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα χρεὼν ἀγωνίας ἀθλοθέτας αἱρεῖσθαι τῆς περὶ τὰ γυμνάσια ἵππων τε καὶ ἀνθρώπων ἐκ τῶν τρίτων τε καὶ ἔτι τῶν δευτέρων τιμημάτων· εἰς δὲ τὴν αἵρεσιν ἔστω μὲν ἐπάναγκες τοῖς τρισὶν [καὶ] πορεύεσθαι τιμήμασι, τὸ σμικρότατον δὲ ἀζήμιον ἀφείσθω. τρεῖς δ' ἔστωσαν οἱ λαχόντες, τῶν προχειροτονηθέντων μὲν εἴκοσι, λαχόντων δὲ ἐκ τῶν εἴκοσι τριῶν, οὓς ἂν καὶ ψῆφος ἡ τῶν δοκιμαζόντων δοκιμάσῃ· ἐὰν δέ τις ἀποδοκιμασθῇ καθ' ἡντιναοῦν ἀρχῆς λῆξιν καὶ κρίσιν, ἄλλους ἀνθαιρεῖσθαι κατὰ ταὐτὰ καὶ τὴν δοκιμασίαν ὡσαύτως αὐτῶν πέρι ποιεῖσθαι.

Λοιπὸς δὲ ἄρχων περὶ τὰ προειρημένα ἡμῖν ὁ τῆς παιδείας ἐπιμελητὴς πάσης θηλειῶν τε καὶ ἀρρένων. εἷς μὲν δὴ καὶ ὁ τούτων ἄρξων ἔστω κατὰ νόμους, ἐτῶν μὲν γεγονὼς μὴ ἔλαττον ἢ πεντήκοντα, παίδων δὲ γνησίων πατήρ, μάλιστα μὲν υἱέων καὶ θυγατέρων, εἰ δὲ μή, θάτερα· διανοηθήτω δὲ αὐτός τε ὁ προκριθεὶς καὶ ὁ προκρίνων ὡς οὖσαν ταύτην τὴν ἀρχὴν τῶν ἐν τῇ πόλει ἀκροτάτων ἀρχῶν πολὺ μεγίστην. παντὸς γὰρ δὴ φυτοῦ ἡ πρώτη βλάστη καλῶς ὁρμηθεῖσα, πρὸς ἀρετὴν τῆς αὐτοῦ φύσεως κυριωτάτη τέλος ἐπιθεῖναι τὸ πρόσφορον, τῶν τε ἄλλων φυτῶν καὶ τῶν ζῴων ἡμέρων καὶ ἀγρίων [καὶ ἀνθρώπων]· ἄνθρωπος δέ, ὥς φαμεν, ἥμερον, ὅμως μὴν παιδείας μὲν ὀρθῆς τυχὸν καὶ φύσεως εὐτυχοῦς, θειότατον ἡμερώτατόν τε ζῷον γίγνεσθαι φιλεῖ, μὴ ἱκανῶς δὲ ἢ μὴ καλῶς τραφὲν ἀγριώτατον, ὁπόσα φύει γῆ. ὧν ἕνεκα οὐ δεύτερον οὐδὲ πάρεργον δεῖ τὴν παίδων τροφὴν τὸν νομοθέτην ἐᾶν γίγνεσθαι, πρῶτον δὲ ἄρξασθαι χρεὼν τὸν μέλλοντα αὐτῶν ἐπιμελήσεσθαι καλῶς αἱρεθῆναι, τῶν ἐν τῇ πόλει ὃς ἂν ἄριστος εἰς πάντα ᾖ, τοῦτον κατὰ δύναμιν ὅτι μάλιστα αὐτοῖς καθιστάντα προστάττειν ἐπιμελητήν. αἱ πᾶσαι τοίνυν ἀρχαὶ πλὴν βουλῆς καὶ πρυτάνεων εἰς τὸ τοῦ Ἀπόλλωνος ἱερὸν ἐλθοῦσαι φερόντων ψῆφον κρύβδην, τῶν νομοφυλάκων ὄντιν' ἂν ἕκαστος ἡγῆται κάλλιστ' ἂν τῶν περὶ παιδείαν ἄρξαι γενομένων· ᾧ δ' ἂν πλεῖσται ψῆφοι συμβῶσιν, δοκιμασθεὶς ὑπὸ τῶν ἄλλων ἀρχόντων τῶν ἑλομένων, πλὴν νομοφυλάκων, ἀρχέτω ἔτη πέντε, ἕκτῳ δὲ κατὰ

c ταὐτὰ ἄλλον ἐπὶ ταύτην τὴν ἀρχὴν αἱρεῖσθαι.

Ἐὰν δέ τις δημοσίαν ἀρχὴν ἄρχων ἀποθάνῃ πρὶν ἐξήκειν αὐτῷ τὴν ἀρχὴν πλεῖον ἢ τριάκοντα ἐπιδεομένην ἡμερῶν, τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον ἐπὶ τὴν ἀρχὴν ἄλλον καθιστάναι οἷς ἦν τοῦτο προσηκόντως μέλον. καὶ ἐὰν ὀρφανῶν ἐπίτροπος τελευτήσῃ τις, οἱ προσήκοντες καὶ ἐπιδημοῦντες πρὸς πατρὸς καὶ μητρὸς μέχρι ἀνεψιῶν παίδων ἄλλον καθιστάντων
d ἐντὸς δέκα ἡμερῶν, ἢ ζημιούσθων ἕκαστος δραχμῇ τῆς ἡμέρας, μέχριπερ ἂν τοῖς παισὶν καταστήσωσι τὸν ἐπίτροπον.

Πᾶσα δὲ δήπου πόλις ἄπολις ἂν γίγνοιτο, ἐν ᾗ δικαστήρια μὴ καθεστῶτα εἴη κατὰ τρόπον· ἄφωνος δ' αὖ δικαστὴς ἡμῖν καὶ μὴ πλείω τῶν ἀντιδίκων ἐν ταῖς ἀνακρίσεσι φθεγγόμενος, καθάπερ ἐν ταῖς διαίταις, οὐκ ἄν ποτε ἱκανὸς γένοιτο περὶ τὴν τῶν δικαίων κρίσιν· ὧν ἕνεκα οὔτε πολλοὺς ὄντας ῥᾴδιον εὖ δικάζειν οὔτε ὀλίγους φαύλους. σαφὲς δὲ ἀεὶ τὸ
e ἀμφισβητούμενον χρεὼν γίγνεσθαι παρ' ἑκατέρων, ὁ δὲ χρόνος ἅμα καὶ τὸ βραδὺ τό τε πολλάκις ἀνακρίνειν πρὸς τὸ φανερὰν γίγνεσθαι τὴν ἀμφισβήτησιν σύμφορον. ὧν ἕνεκα πρῶτον μὲν εἰς γείτονας ἰέναι χρὴ τοὺς ἐπικαλοῦντας ἀλλήλοις καὶ τοὺς φίλους τε καὶ συνειδότας ὅτι μάλιστα
767 τὰς ἀμφισβητουμένας πράξεις, ἐὰν δ' ἄρα μὴ ἐν τούτοις τις ἱκανὴν κρίσιν λαμβάνῃ, πρὸς ἄλλο δικαστήριον ἴτω· τὸ δὲ τρίτον, ἂν τὰ δύο δικαστήρια μὴ δύνηται διαλλάξαι, τέλος ἐπιθέτω τῇ δίκῃ.

Τρόπον δή τινα καὶ τῶν δικασηρίων αἱ καταστάσεις ἀρχόντων εἰσὶν αἱρέσεις· πάντα μὲν γὰρ ἄρχοντα ἀναγκαῖον καὶ δικαστὴν εἶναί τινων, δικαστὴς δὲ οὐκ ἄρχων καί τινα τρόπον ἄρχων οὐ πάνυ φαῦλος γίγνεται τὴν τόθ' ἡμέραν
b ἥπερ ἂν κρίνων τὴν δίκην ἀποτελῇ. θέντες δὴ καὶ τοὺς δικαστὰς ὡς ἄρχοντας, λέγωμεν τίνες ἂν εἶεν πρέποντες καὶ τίνων ἅρα δικασταὶ καὶ πόσοι ἐφ' ἕκαστον. κυριώτατον μὲν τοίνυν ἔστω δικαστήριον ὅπερ ἂν αὐτοὶ ἑαυτοῖς ἀποφήνωσιν ἕκαστοι, κοινῇ τινας ἑλόμενοι· δύο δὴ τῶν λοιπῶν ἔστω κριτήρια, τὸ μὲν ὅταν τίς τινα ἰδιώτην ἰδιώτης, ἐπαιτιώμενος ἀδικεῖν αὐτόν, ἄγων εἰς δίκην βούληται διακριθῆναι, τὸ δ' ὁπόταν τὸ δημόσιον ὑπό τινος τῶν πολιτῶν ἠγῆταί τις
c ἀδικεῖσθαι καὶ βουληθῇ τῷ κοινῷ βοηθεῖν. λεκτέον δ' ὁποῖοί τ' εἰσὶν καὶ τίνες οἱ κριταί. πρῶτον δὴ δικαστήριον ἡμῖν γιγνέσθω κοινὸν ἅπασι τοῖς τὸ τρίτον ἀμφισβητοῦσιν ἰδιώ-

ταις πρὸς ἀλλήλους, γενόμενον τῇδέ πῃ. πάσας δὴ τὰς ἀρχάς, ὁπόσαι τε κατ' ἐνιαυτὸν καὶ ὁπόσαι πλείω χρόνον ἄρχουσιν, ἐπειδὰν μέλλῃ νέος ἐνιαυτὸς μετὰ θερινὰς τροπὰς τῷ ἐπιόντι μηνὶ γίγνεσθαι, ταύτης τῆς ἡμέρας τῇ πρόσθεν πάντας χρὴ τοὺς ἄρχοντας συνελθεῖν εἰς ἓν ἱερὸν καὶ τὸν θεὸν ὀμόσαντας οἷον ἀπάρξασθαι πάσης ἀρχῆς ἕνα δικαστήν, ὃς ἂν ἐν ἀρχῇ ἑκάστῃ ἄριστός τε εἶναι δόξῃ καὶ ἄριστ' ἂν καὶ ὁσιώτατα τὰς δίκας τοῖς πολίταις αὐτῷ τὸν ἐπιόντα ἐνιαυτὸν φαίνηται διακρίνειν. τούτων δὲ αἱρεθέντων γίγνεσθαι μὲν δοκιμασίαν ἐν τοῖς ἑλομένοις αὐτοῖς, ἐὰν δὲ ἀποδοκιμασθῇ τις, ἕτερον ἀνθαιρεῖσθαι κατὰ ταὐτά, τοὺς δὲ δοκιμασθέντας δικάζειν μὲν τοῖς τἆλλα δικαστήρια φυγοῦσι, τὴν δὲ ψῆφον φανερὰν φέρειν· ἐπηκόους δ' εἶναι καὶ θεατὰς τούτων τῶν δικῶν ἐξ ἀνάγκης μὲν βουλευτὰς καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους ἄρχοντας τοὺς ἑλομένους αὐτούς, τῶν δὲ ἄλλων τὸν βουλόμενον. ἐὰν δέ τις ἐπαιτιᾶταί τινα ἑκόντα ἀδίκως κρῖναι τὴν δίκην, εἰς τοὺς νομοφύλακας ἰὼν κατηγορείτω· ὁ δὲ ὀφλὼν τὴν τοιαύτην δίκην ὑπεχέτω μὲν τοῦ βλάβους τῷ βλαφθέντι τὸ **διπλάσιον** τίνειν, ἐὰν δὲ μείζονος ἄξιος εἶναι δόξῃ ζημίας, προστιμᾶν τοὺς κρίναντας τὴν δίκην ὅτι χρὴ πρὸς τούτῳ παθεῖν αὐτὸν ἢ ἀποτίνειν τῷ κοινῷ καὶ τῷ τὴν δίκην δικασαμένῳ. περὶ δὲ τῶν δημοσίων ἐγκλημάτων ἀναγκαῖον πρῶτον μὲν τῷ πλήθει μεταδιδόναι τῆς κρίσεως—οἱ γὰρ ἀδικούμενοι πάντες εἰσίν, ὁπόταν τις τὴν πόλιν ἀδικῇ, καὶ χαλεπῶς ἂν ἐν δίκῃ φέροιεν ἅμοιροι γιγνόμενοι τῶν τοιούτων διακρίσεων—ἀλλ' ἀρχήν τε εἶναι χρὴ τῆς τοιαύτης δίκης καὶ τελευτὴν εἰς τὸν δῆμον ἀποδιδομένην, τὴν δὲ βάσανον ἐν ταῖς μεγίσταις ἀρχαῖς τρισίν, ἃς ἄν ὅ τε φεύγων καὶ ὁ διώκων συνομολογῆτον· ἐὰν δὲ μὴ δύνησθον κοινωνῆσαι τῆς ὁμολογίας αὐτοί, τὴν βουλὴν ἐπικρίνειν αὐτῶν τὴν αἵρεσιν ἑκατέρου. δεῖ δὲ δὴ καὶ τῶν ἰδίων δικῶν κοινωνεῖν κατὰ δύναμιν ἅπαντας· ὁ γὰρ ἀκοινώνητος ὢν ἐξουσίας τοῦ συνδικάζειν ἡγεῖται τὸ παράπαν τῆς πόλεως οὐ μέτοχος εἶναι. διὰ ταῦτ' οὖν δὴ καὶ κατὰ φυλὰς ἀναγκαῖον δικαστήριά τε γίγνεσθαι καὶ κλήρῳ δικαστὰς ἐκ τοῦ παραχρῆμα ἀδιαφθόρους ταῖς δεήσεσι δικάζειν, τὸ δὲ τέλος κρίνειν πάντων τῶν τοιούτων ἐκεῖνο τὸ δικαστήριον, ὅ φαμεν εἴς γε ἀνθρωπίνην δύναμιν ὡς οἷόν τε ἀδιαφθορώτατα παρεσκευάσθαι, τοῖς μὴ δυναμένοις μήτε ἐν τοῖς γείτοσι μήτε ἐν τοῖς φυλετικοῖς

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δικαστηρίοις ἀπαλλάττεσθαι.

Νῦν δὴ περὶ μὲν δικαστήρια ἡμῖν—ἃ δή φαμεν οὔθ' ὡς ἀρχὰς οὔτε ὡς μὴ ῥᾴδιον εἰπόντα ἀναμφισβητήτως εἰρηκέναι—περὶ μὲν ταῦτα οἷον περιγραφή τις ἔξωθεν περιγεγραμμένη τὰ μὲν εἴρηκεν, τὰ δ' ἀπολείπει σχεδόν· πρὸς γὰρ τέλει νομοθεσίας ἡ δικῶν ἀκριβὴς νόμων θέσις ἅμα καὶ διαίρεσις ὀρθότατα γίγνοιτ' ἂν μακρῷ. ταύταις μὲν οὖν εἰρήσθω πρὸς τῷ τέλει περιμένειν ἡμᾶς, αἱ δὲ περὶ τὰς ἄλλας ἀρχὰς καταστάσεις σχεδὸν τὴν πλείστην εἰλήφασιν νομοθεσίαν· τὸ δὲ ὅλον καὶ ἀκριβὲς περὶ ἑνός τε καὶ πάντων τῶν κατὰ πόλιν καὶ πολιτικὴν πᾶσαν διοίκησιν οὐκ ἔστιν γενέσθαι σαφές, πρὶν ἂν ἡ διέξοδος ἀπ' ἀρχῆς τά τε δεύτερα καὶ τὰ μέσα καὶ πάντα μέρη τὰ ἑαυτῆς ἀπολαβοῦσα πρὸς τέλος ἀφίκηται. νῦν μὴν ἐν τῷ παρόντι μέχρι τῆς τῶν ἀρχόντων αἱρέσεως γενομένης τελευτὴ μὲν τῶν ἔμπροσθεν αὖτη γίγνοιτ' ἂν ἱκανή, νόμων δὲ θέσεως ἀρχὴ καὶ ἀναβολῶν ἅμα καὶ ὄκνων οὐδὲν ἔτι δεομένη.

ΚΛ. Πάντως μοι κατὰ νοῦν, ὦ ξένε, τὰ ἔμπροσθεν εἰρηκώς, τὴν ἀρχὴν νῦν τελευτῇ προσάψας περὶ τῶν τε εἰρημένων καὶ τῶν μελλόντων ῥηθήσεσθαι, ταῦτα ἔτι μᾶλλον ἐκείνων εἴρηκας φιλίως.

ΑΘ. Καλῶς τοίνυν ἂν ἡμῖν ἡ πρεσβυτῶν ἔμφρων παιδιὰ μέχρι δεῦρ' εἴη τὰ νῦν διαπεπαισμένη.

ΚΛ. Καλὴν τὴν σπουδὴν ἔοικας δηλοῦν τῶν ἀνδρῶν.

ΑΘ. Εἰκός γε· τόδε δ' ἐννοήσωμεν εἰ σοὶ δοκεῖ καθάπερ ἐμοί.

ΚΛ. Τὸ ποῖον δὴ καὶ περὶ τίνων;

ΑΘ. Οἶσθ' ὅτι καθάπερ ζωγράφων οὐδὲν πέρας ἔχειν ἡ πραγματεία δοκεῖ περὶ ἑκάστων τῶν ζῴων, ἀλλ' ἢ τοῦ χραίνειν ἢ ἀποχραίνειν, ἢ ὁτιδήποτε καλοῦσι τὸ τοιοῦτον οἱ ζωγράφων παῖδες, οὐκ ἄν ποτε δοκεῖ παύσασθαι κοσμοῦσα, ὥστε ἐπίδοσιν μηκέτ' ἔχειν εἰς τὸ καλλίω τε καὶ φανερώτερα γίγνεσθαι τὰ γεγραμμένα.

ΚΛ. Σχεδὸν ἐννοῶ ἀκούων καὶ αὐτὸς ταῦτα ἃ λέγεις, ἐπεὶ ἐντριβής γε οὐδαμῶς γέγονα τῇ τοιαύτῃ τέχνῃ.

ΑΘ. Καὶ οὐδέν γε ἐβλάβης. χρησώμεθά γε μὴν τῷ νῦν παρατυχόντι περὶ αὐτῆς ἡμῖν λόγῳ τὸ τοιόνδε, ὡς εἴ ποτέ τις ἐπινοήσειε γράψαι τε ὡς κάλλιστον ζῷον καὶ τοῦτ' αὖ μηδέποτε ἐπὶ φαυλότερον ἀλλ' ἐπὶ τὸ βέλτιον ἴσχειν τοῦ ἐπ-

ιόντος ἀεὶ <ἰέναι> χρόνου, συννοεῖς ὅτι θνητὸς ὤν, εἰ μή τινα καταλείψει διάδοχον ὃς ἐπανορθοῦν τε, ἐάν τι σφάλληται τὸ ζῷον ὑπὸ χρόνων, καὶ τὸ παραλειφθὲν ὑπὸ τῆς ἀσθενείας τῆς ἑαυτοῦ πρὸς τὴν τέχνην οἷός τε εἰς τὸ πρόσθεν ἔσται φαιδρύνων ποιεῖν ἐπιδιδόναι, σμικρόν τινα χρόνον αὐτῷ πόνος παραμενεῖ πάμπολυς;

ΚΛ. Ἀληθῆ.

ΑΘ. Τί οὖν; ἆρ' οὐ τοιοῦτον δοκεῖ σοι τὸ τοῦ νομοθέτου βούλημ' εἶναι; πρῶτον μὲν γράψαι τοὺς νόμους πρὸς τὴν ἀκρίβειαν κατὰ δύναμιν ἱκανῶς· ἔπειτα προϊόντος τοῦ χρόνου καὶ τῶν δοξάντων ἔργῳ πειρώμενον, ἆρ' οἴει τινὰ οὕτως ἄφρονα γεγονέναι νομοθέτην, ὥστ' ἀγνοεῖν ὅτι πάμπολλα ἀνάγκη παραλείπεσθαι τοιαῦτα, ἃ δεῖ τινα συνεπόμενον ἐπανορθοῦν, ἵνα μηδαμῇ χείρων, βελτίων δὲ ἡ πολιτεία καὶ ὁ κόσμος ἀεὶ γίγνηται περὶ τὴν ᾠκισμένην αὐτῷ πόλιν;

ΚΛ. Εἰκός—πῶς γὰρ οὔ;—βούλεσθαι πάντα ὁντινοῦν τὸ τοιοῦτον.

ΑΘ. Οὐκοῦν εἴ τίς τινα μηχανὴν ἔχοι πρὸς τοῦτο, ἔργῳ καὶ λόγοις τίνα τρόπον διδάξειεν ἂν ἕτερον εἴτε μείζονα εἴτε ἐλάττω περὶ τοῦτ' ἔχειν ἔννοιαν, ὅπως χρὴ φυλάττειν καὶ ἐπανορθοῦν νόμους, οὐκ ἄν ποτε λέγων ἀπείποι τὸ τοιοῦτον πρὶν ἐπὶ τέλος ἐλθεῖν;

ΚΛ. Πῶς γὰρ ἄν;

ΑΘ. Οὐκοῦν ἐν τῷ νῦν παρόντι ποιητέον ἐμοὶ καὶ σφῷν τοῦτο;

ΚΛ. Τὸ ποῖον δὴ λέγεις;

ΑΘ. Ἐπειδὴ νομοθετεῖν μὲν μέλλομεν, ᾔρηνται δὲ ἡμῖν νομοφύλακες, ἡμεῖς δ' ἐν δυσμαῖς τοῦ βίου, οἱ δ' ὡς πρὸς ἡμᾶς νέοι, ἅμα μέν, ὡς φαμεν, δεῖ νομοθετεῖν ἡμᾶς, ἅμα δὲ πειρᾶσθαι ποιεῖν καὶ τούτους αὐτοὺς νομοθέτας τε καὶ νομοφύλακας εἰς τὸ δυνατόν.

ΚΛ. Τί μήν; εἴπερ οἷοί τέ γ' ἐσμὲν ἱκανῶς.

ΑΘ. Ἀλλ' οὖν πειρατέα γε καὶ προθυμητέα.

ΚΛ. Πῶς γὰρ οὔ;

ΑΘ. Λέγωμεν δὴ πρὸς αὐτούς· Ὦ φίλοι σωτῆρες νόμων, ἡμεῖς περὶ ἑκάστων ὧν τίθεμεν τοὺς νόμους πάμπολλα παραλείψομεν—ἀνάγκη γάρ—οὐ μὴν ἀλλ' ὅσα γε μὴ σμικρὰ καὶ τὸ ὅλον εἰς δύναμιν οὐκ ἀνήσομεν ἀπεριήγητον καθάπερ τινὶ

περιγραφῇ· τοῦτο δὲ δεήσει συμπληροῦν ὑμᾶς τὸ περιηγηθέν.
c ὅποι δὲ βλέποντες δράσετε τὸ τοιοῦτον, ἀκούειν χρή. Μέγιλλος μὲν γὰρ καὶ ἐγὼ καὶ Κλεινίας εἰρήκαμέν τε αὐτὰ ἀλλήλοις οὐκ ὀλιγάκις, ὁμολογοῦμέν τε λέγεσθαι καλῶς· ὑμᾶς δὲ ἡμῖν βουλόμεθα συγγνώμονάς τε ἅμα καὶ μαθητὰς
5 γίγνεσθαι, βλέποντας πρὸς ταῦτα εἰς ἅπερ ἡμεῖς συνεχωρήσαμεν ἀλλήλοις τὸν νομοφύλακά τε καὶ νομοθέτην δεῖν βλέπειν. ἦν δὲ ἡ συγχώρησις ἓν ἔχουσα κεφάλαιον, ὅπως
d ποτὲ ἀνὴρ ἀγαθὸς γίγνοιτ' ἄν, τὴν ἀνθρώπῳ προσήκουσαν ἀρετὴν τῆς ψυχῆς ἔχων ἔκ τινος ἐπιτηδεύματος ἢ τινος ἤθους ἢ ποιᾶς κτήσεως ἢ ἐπιθυμίας ἢ δόξης ἢ μαθημάτων ποτέ τινων, εἴτε ἄρρην τις τῶν συνοικούντων οὖσα ἡ φύσις
5 εἴτε θήλεια, νέων ἢ γερόντων, ὅπως εἰς ταὐτὸν τοῦτο ὃ λέγομεν **τεταμένη** σπουδὴ πᾶσα ἔσται διὰ παντὸς τοῦ βίου, τῶν δ' ἄλλων ὁπόσα ἐμπόδια τούτοις μηδὲν προτιμῶν φανεῖ-
e ται μηδ' ὁστισοῦν, τελευτᾶν δὲ καὶ πόλεως, ἐὰν ἀνάστατον ἀνάγκη φαίνηται γίγνεσθαι, πρὶν ἐθέλειν δούλειον ὑπομείναν ζυγὸν ἄρχεσθαι ὑπὸ χειρόνων, ἢ λείπειν φυγῇ τὴν πόλιν· ὡς πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα ἄρ' ἔσθ' ὑπομενετέον πάσχοντας
5 πρὶν ἀλλάξασθαι πολιτείαν ἢ χείρους ἀνθρώπους πέφυκε ποιεῖν. ταῦτα ἡμεῖς τε ἔμπροσθεν συνωμολογησάμεθα, καὶ νῦν ὑμεῖς ἡμῶν εἰς ταῦτα ἑκάτερα βλέποντες ἐπάνιτε καὶ
771 ψέγετε τοὺς νόμους ὅσοι μὴ ταῦτα δυνατοί, τοὺς δὲ δυνατοὺς ἀσπάζεσθέ τε καὶ φιλοφρόνως δεχόμενοι ζῆτε ἐν αὐτοῖς· τὰ δ' ἄλλα ἐπιτηδεύματα καὶ πρὸς ἄλλα τείνοντα τῶν ἀγαθῶν λεγομένων χαίρειν χρὴ προσαγορεύειν.

5 Ἀρχὴ δὲ ἔστω τῶν μετὰ ταῦτα ἡμῖν νόμων ἥδε τις, ἀφ' ἱερῶν ἠργμένη. τὸν ἀριθμὸν γὰρ δὴ δεῖ πρῶτον ἀναλαβεῖν ἡμᾶς τὸν τῶν πεντακισχιλίων καὶ τετταράκοντα, ὅσας εἶχέν
b τε καὶ ἔχει τομὰς προσφόρους ὅ τε ὅλος ἅμα καὶ ὁ κατὰ φυλάς, ὃ δὴ τοῦ παντὸς ἔθεμεν δωδεκατημόριον, ἐν καὶ εἴκοσιν εἰκοσάκις ὀρθότατα φύν. ἔχει δὲ διανομὰς δώδεκα μὲν ὁ πᾶς ἀριθμὸς ἡμῖν, δώδεκα δὲ καὶ ὁ τῆς φυλῆς· ἑκάστην δὴ τὴν
5 μοῖραν διανοεῖσθαι χρεὼν ὡς οὖσαν ἱεράν, θεοῦ δῶρον, ἑπομένην τοῖς μησὶν καὶ τῇ τοῦ παντὸς περιόδῳ. διὸ καὶ πᾶσαν πόλιν ἄγει μὲν τὸ σύμφυτον ἱεροῦν αὐτάς, ἄλλοι δὲ ἄλλων ἴσως ὀρθότερον ἐνείμαντό τε καὶ εὐτυχέστερον ἐθείωσαν τὴν
c διανομήν· ἡμεῖς δὲ οὖν νῦν φαμεν ὀρθότατα προῃρῆσθαι τὸν τῶν πεντακισχιλίων καὶ τετταράκοντα ἀριθμόν, ὃς πάσας

τὰς διανομὰς ἔχει μέχρι τῶν δώδεκα ἀπὸ μιᾶς ἀρξάμενος
πλὴν ἑνδεκάδος—αὕτη δ' ἔχει σμικρότατον ἴαμα· ἐπὶ θάτερα
γὰρ ὑγιὴς γίγνεται δυοῖν ἑστίαιν ἀπονεμηθείσαιν—ὡς δ'
ἐστὶν ταῦτα ἀληθῶς ὄντα, κατὰ σχολὴν οὐκ ἂν πολὺς ἐπι-
δείξειεν μῦθος. πιστεύσαντες δὴ τὰ νῦν τῇ παρούσῃ φήμῃ
καὶ λόγῳ, νείμωμέν τε ταύτην, καὶ ἑκάστῃ μοίρᾳ θεὸν ἢ θεῶν d
παῖδα ἐπιφημίσαντες, βωμούς τε καὶ τὰ τούτοις προσήκοντα
ἀποδόντες, θυσιῶν πέρι συνόδους ἐπ' αὐτοῖς ποιώμεθα δύο
τοῦ μηνός, δώδεκα μὲν τῇ τῆς φυλῆς διανομῇ, δώδεκα δὲ
αὐτῷ τῷ τῆς πόλεως διαμερισμῷ, θεῶν μὲν δὴ πρῶτον χάριτος
ἕνεκα καὶ τῶν περὶ θεούς, δεύτερον δὲ ἡμῶν αὐτῶν οἰκειό-
τητός τε πέρι καὶ γνωρίσεως ἀλλήλων, ὡς φαῖμεν ἄν, καὶ
ὁμιλίας ἕνεκα πάσης. πρὸς γὰρ δὴ τὴν τῶν γάμων κοινω- e
νίαν καὶ σύμμειξιν ἀναγκαίως ἔχει τὴν ἄγνοιαν ἐξαιρεῖν
παρ' ὧν τέ τις ἄγεται καὶ ᾧ καὶ οἷς ἐκδίδωσι, περὶ παντὸς
ποιούμενον ὅτι μάλιστα τὸ μὴ σφάλλεσθαι μηδαμῶς ἐν τοῖς
τοιούτοις κατὰ τὸ δυνατόν. τῆς οὖν τοιαύτης σπουδῆς ἕνεκα
χρὴ καὶ τὰς παιδιὰς ποιεῖσθαι χορεύοντάς τε καὶ χορευούσας
κόρους καὶ κόρας, καὶ ἅμα δὴ θεωροῦντάς τε καὶ θεωρου- 772
μένους μετὰ λόγου τε καὶ ἡλικίας τινὸς ἐχούσης εἰκυίας
προφάσεις, γυμνοὺς καὶ γυμνὰς μέχριπερ αἰδοῦς σώφρονος
ἑκάστων. τούτων δ' ἐπιμελητὰς πάντων καὶ κοσμητὰς τοὺς
τῶν χορῶν ἄρχοντας γίγνεσθαι καὶ νομοθέτας μετὰ τῶν
νομοφυλάκων, ὅσον ἂν ἡμεῖς ἐκλείπωμεν τάττοντες· ἀνα-
γκαῖον δέ, ὅπερ εἴπομεν, περὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα πάντα ὅσα σμικρὰ
καὶ πολλὰ νομοθέτην μὲν ἐκλείπειν, τοὺς δ' ἐμπείρους ἀεὶ b
κατ' ἐνιαυτὸν γιγνομένους αὐτῶν, ἀπὸ τῆς χρείας μανθάνον-
τας, τάττεσθαι καὶ ἐπανορθουμένους κινεῖν κατ' ἐνιαυτόν,
ἕως ἂν ὅρος ἱκανὸς δόξῃ τῶν τοιούτων νομίμων καὶ ἐπιτηδευ-
μάτων γεγονέναι. χρόνος μὲν οὖν μέτριος ἅμα καὶ ἱκανὸς
γίγνοιτ' ἂν τῆς ἐμπειρίας **δεκαετηρὶς** θυσιῶν τε καὶ χορειῶν,
ἐπὶ πάντα καὶ ἕκαστα ταχθείς, ζῶντος μὲν τοῦ τάξαντος νομο-
θέτου κοινῇ, τέλος δὲ σχόντος, αὐτὰς ἑκάστας τὰς ἀρχὰς c
εἰς τοὺς νομοφύλακας εἰσφερούσας τὸ παραλειπόμενον τῆς
αὐτῶν ἀρχῆς ἐπανορθοῦσθαι, μέχριπερ ἂν τέλος ἔχειν ἕκαστον
δόξῃ τοῦ καλῶς ἐξειργάσθαι, τότε δὲ ἀκίνητα θεμένους, ἤδη
χρῆσθαι μετὰ τῶν ἄλλων νόμων οὓς ἔταξε κατ' ἀρχὰς ὁ θεὶς
αὐτοῖς νομοθέτης· ὧν πέρι κινεῖν μὲν ἑκόντας μηδέποτε
μηδέν, εἰ δέ τις ἀνάγκη δόξειέ ποτε καταλαβεῖν, πάσας μὲν

d τὰς ἀρχὰς χρὴ συμβούλους πάντα δὲ τὸν δῆμον καὶ πάσας θεῶν μαντείας ἐπελθόντας, ἐὰν συμφωνῶσι πάντες, οὕτω κινεῖν, ἄλλως δὲ μηδέποτε μηδαμῶς, ἀλλὰ τὸν κωλύοντα ἀεὶ κατὰ νόμον κρατεῖν.

5 Ὁπόθεν τις οὖν καὶ ὁπηνίκα τῶν πέντε καὶ εἴκοσι γεγονότων ἔτη, σκοπῶν καὶ σκοπούμενος ὑπ' ἄλλων, κατὰ νοῦν ἑαυτῷ καὶ πρέποντα εἰς παίδων κοινωνίαν καὶ γένεσιν
e ἐξηυρηκέναι πιστεύει, γαμείτω μὲν πᾶς ἐντὸς τῶν πέντε καὶ τριάκοντα ἐτῶν, τὸ δὲ πρέπον καὶ τὸ ἁρμόττον ὡς χρὴ ζητεῖν, πρῶτον ἐπακουσάτω· δεῖ γάρ, ὥς φησιν Κλεινίας, ἔμπροσθεν τοῦ νόμου προοίμιον οἰκεῖον ἑκάστῳ προτιθέναι.

5 ΚΛ. Κάλλιστα, ὦ ξένε, διεμνημόνευσας, ἔλαβές τε τοῦ λόγου καιρὸν καὶ μάλ' ἐμοὶ δοκοῦντ' εἶναι σύμμετρον.

ΑΘ. Εὖ λέγεις. Ὦ παῖ, τοίνυν φῶμεν ἀγαθῶν πατέρων
773 φύντι, τοὺς παρὰ τοῖς ἔμφροσιν εὐδόξους γάμους χρὴ γαμεῖν, οἵ σοι παραινοῖεν ἂν μὴ φεύγειν τὸν τῶν πενήτων μηδὲ τὸν τῶν πλουσίων διώκειν διαφερόντως γάμον, ἀλλ' ἐὰν τἆλλα ἰσάζῃ, τὸν ὑποδεέστερον ἀεὶ τιμῶντα εἰς τὴν κοινωνίαν
5 συνιέναι. τῇ τε γὰρ πόλει σύμφορον ἂν εἴη ταύτῃ ταῖς τε συνιούσαις ἑστίαις· τὸ γὰρ ὁμαλὸν καὶ σύμμετρον ἀκράτου μυρίον διαφέρει πρὸς ἀρετήν. κοσμίων τε πατέρων χρὴ
b προθυμεῖσθαι γίγνεσθαι κηδεστὴν τὸν αὐτῷ συνειδότα ἰταμώτερον ἅμα καὶ θᾶττον τοῦ δέοντος πρὸς πάσας τὰς πράξεις φερόμενον· τὸν δ' ἐναντίως πεφυκότα ἐπὶ τἀναντία χρὴ κηδεύματα πορεύεσθαι. καὶ κατὰ παντὸς εἷς ἔστω μῦθος
5 γάμου· τὸν γὰρ τῇ πόλει δεῖ συμφέροντα μνηστεύειν γάμον ἕκαστον, οὐ τὸν ἥδιστον αὑτῷ. φέρεται δέ πως πᾶς ἀεὶ κατὰ φύσιν πρὸς τὸν ὁμοιότατον αὑτῷ, ὅθεν ἀνώμαλος ἡ
c πόλις ὅλη γίγνεται χρήμασίν τε καὶ τρόπων ἤθεσιν· ἐξ ὧν ἃ μὴ βουλόμεθα συμβαίνειν ἡμῖν, καὶ μάλιστα συμβαίνει ταῖς πλείσταις πόλεσι. ταῦτα δὴ διὰ λόγου μὲν νόμῳ προστάττειν, μὴ γαμεῖν πλούσιον πλουσίου, μηδὲ πολλὰ
5 δυνάμενον πράττειν ἄλλου τοιούτου, θάττους δὲ ἤθεσι πρὸς βραδυτέρους καὶ βραδυτέρους πρὸς θάττους ἀναγκάζειν τῇ τῶν γάμων κοινωνίᾳ πορεύεσθαι, πρὸς τῷ γελοῖα εἶναι θυμὸν ἂν ἐγείραι πολλοῖς· οὐ γὰρ ῥᾴδιον ἐννοεῖν ὅτι πόλιν εἶναι
d δεῖ δίκην κρατῆρος κεκραμένην, οὗ μαινόμενος μὲν οἶνος ἐγκεχυμένος ζεῖ, κολαζόμενος δὲ ὑπὸ νήφοντος ἑτέρου θεοῦ καλὴν κοινωνίαν λαβὼν ἀγαθὸν πῶμα καὶ μέτριον ἀπεργά-

ζεται. τοῦτ' οὖν γιγνόμενον ἐν τῇ τῶν παίδων μείξει διορᾶν
ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν δυνατὸς οὐδείς· τούτων δὴ χάριν ἐὰν μὲν 5
νόμῳ τὰ τοιαῦτα ἀναγκαῖον, ἐπᾴδοντα δὲ πείθειν πειρᾶσθαι
τὴν τῶν παίδων ὁμαλότητα αὐτῶν αὐτοῖς τῆς τῶν γάμων
ἰσότητος ἁπλήστου χρημάτων οὔσης περὶ πλείονος ἕκα- e
στον ποιεῖσθαι, καὶ δι' ὀνείδους ἀποτρέπειν τὸν περὶ τὰ
χρήματα ἐν τοῖς γάμοις ἐσπουδακότα, ἀλλὰ μὴ γραπτῷ νόμῳ
βιαζόμενον.

Περὶ γάμων δὴ ταῦτ' ἔστω παραμύθια λεγόμενα, καὶ δὴ 5
καὶ τὰ ἔμπροσθε τούτων ῥηθέντα, ὡς χρὴ τῆς ἀειγενοῦς
φύσεως ἀντέχεσθαι τῷ παῖδας παίδων καταλείποντα ἀεὶ τῷ
θεῷ ὑπηρέτας ἀνθ' αὑτοῦ παραδιδόναι. πάντα οὖν ταῦτα 774
καὶ ἔτι πλείω τις ἂν εἴποι περὶ γάμων [ὡς χρὴ γαμεῖν,]
προοιμιαζόμενος ὀρθῶς· ἂν δ' ἄρα τις μὴ πείθηται ἑκών,
ἀλλότριον δὲ αὐτὸν καὶ ἀκοινώνητον ἐν τῇ πόλει ἔχῃ καὶ
ἄγαμος ὢν γένηται πεντεκαιτριακοντούτης, ζημιούσθω κατ' 5
ἐνιαυτὸν ἕκαστον, ὁ μέγιστον μὲν τίμημα κεκτημένος ἑκατὸν
δραχμαῖς, ὁ δὲ τὸ δεύτερον ἑβδομήκοντα, τρίτον δὲ ἑξή-
κοντα, ὁ δὲ τὸ τέταρτον τριάκοντα. τοῦτο δ' ἔστω τῆς Ἥρας
ἱερόν. ὁ δὲ μὴ ἐκτίνων κατ' ἐνιαυτὸν δεκαπλάσιον ὀφειλέτω· b
πραττέσθω δὲ ὁ ταμίας τῆς θεοῦ, μὴ ἐκπράξας δὲ αὐτὸς
ὀφειλέτω καὶ ἐν ταῖς εὐθύναις τοῦ τοιούτου λόγον ὑπεχέτω
πᾶς. εἰς μὲν οὖν χρήματα ὁ μὴ 'θέλων γαμεῖν ταῦτα
ζημιούσθω, τιμῆς δὲ παρὰ τῶν νεωτέρων ἄτιμος πάσης 5
ἔστω, καὶ μηδεὶς ὑπακουέτω μηδὲν αὐτῷ ἑκὼν τῶν νέων· ἐὰν
δὲ κολάζειν τινὰ ἐπιχειρῇ, πᾶς τῷ ἀδικουμένῳ βοηθείτω καὶ
ἀμυνέτω, μὴ βοηθῶν δὲ ὁ παραγενόμενος δειλός τε ἅμα c
καὶ κακὸς ὑπὸ τοῦ νόμου πολίτης εἶναι λεγέσθω.

Περὶ δὲ προικὸς εἴρηται μὲν καὶ πρότερον, εἰρήσθω δὲ
πάλιν ὡς ἴσα ἀντὶ ἴσων ἐστὶν τὸ μήτε λαμβάνοντι μήτ'
ἐκδιδόντι διὰ χρημάτων ἀπορίαν γηράσκειν τοὺς πένητας· τὰ 5
γὰρ ἀναγκαῖα ὑπάρχοντά ἐστι πᾶσι τῶν ἐν ταύτῃ τῇ πόλει·
ὕβρις δὲ ἧττον γυναιξὶ καὶ δουλεία ταπεινὴ καὶ ἀνελεύθερος
διὰ χρήματα τοῖς γήμασι γίγνοιτο ἄν. καὶ ὁ μὲν πειθόμενος d
ἓν τῶν καλῶν δρᾷη τοῦτ' ἄν· ὁ δὲ μὴ πειθόμενος ἢ διδοὺς ἢ
λαμβάνων πλέον ἢ πεντήκοντα ἄξια δραχμῶν ἐσθῆτος χάριν,
ὁ δὲ μνᾶς, ὁ δὲ τριῶν ἡμιμναίων, ὁ δὲ δυοῖν μναῖν—ὁ τὸ
μέγιστον τίμημα κεκτημένος—ὀφειλέτω μὲν τῷ δημοσίῳ 5
τοσοῦτον ἕτερον, τὸ δὲ δοθὲν ἢ ληφθὲν ἱερὸν ἔστω τῆς

Ἥρας τε καὶ τοῦ Διός, πραττόντων δὲ οἱ ταμίαι τούτοιν
e τοῖν θεοῖν, καθάπερ ἐρρήθη τῶν μὴ γαμούντων πέρι τοὺς
ταμίας ἐκπράττειν ἑκάστοτε τοὺς τῆς Ἥρας ἢ παρ' αὐτῶν
ἑκάστους τὴν ζημίαν ἐκτίνειν.

Ἐγγύην δὲ εἶναι κυρίαν πατρὸς μὲν πρῶτον, δευτέραν
5 πάππου, τρίτην δὲ ἀδελφῶν ὁμοπατρίων, ἐὰν δὲ μηδὲ εἷς ᾖ
τούτων, τὴν πρὸς μητρὸς μετὰ τοῦτο εἶναι κυρίαν ὡσαύτως·
ἐὰν δ' ἄρα τύχη τις ἀήθης συμβαίνῃ, τοὺς ἐγγύτατα γένους
ἀεὶ κυρίους εἶναι μετὰ τῶν ἐπιτρόπων.

Ὅσα δὲ προτέλεια γάμων ἢ τίς ἄλλη περὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα
775 ἱερουργία μελλόντων ἢ γιγνομένων ἢ γεγονότων προσήκουσά
ἐστιν τελεῖσθαι, τοὺς ἐξηγητὰς ἐρωτῶντα χρὴ καὶ πειθόμενον
ἐκείνοις ἕκαστον ἡγεῖσθαι πάντα ἑαυτῷ μετρίως γίγνεσθαι.

Περὶ δὲ τῶν ἑστιάσεων, φίλους μὲν χρὴ καὶ φίλας
5 μὴ πλείους πέντε ἑκατέρων συγκαλεῖν, συγγενῶν δὲ καὶ
οἰκείων ὡσαύτως τοσούτους ἄλλους ἑκατέρων· ἀνάλωμα δὲ
μὴ γίγνεσθαι πλέον ἢ κατὰ τὴν οὐσίαν μηδενί, τῷ μὲν εἰς
χρήματα μεγίστῳ μνᾶν, τῷ δ' ἥμισυ τοῦ τοσούτου, τῷ δ' ἐφ-
b εξῆς οὕτω, καθάπερ ὑποβέβηκεν ἑκάστῳ τὸ τίμημα. καὶ τὸν
μὲν πειθόμενον τῷ νόμῳ ἐπαινεῖν χρὴ πάντας, τὸν δὲ ἀπει-
θοῦντα κολαζόντων οἱ νομοφύλακες ὡς ἀπειρόκαλόν τε ὄντα
καὶ ἀπαίδευτον τῶν περὶ τὰς νυμφικὰς Μούσας νόμων. πίνειν
5 δὲ εἰς μέθην οὔτε ἄλλοθί που πρέπει, πλὴν ἐν ταῖς τοῦ τὸν
οἶνον δόντος θεοῦ ἑορταῖς, οὐδ' ἀσφαλές, οὔτ' οὖν δὴ περὶ
γάμους ἐσπουδακότα, ἐν οἷς ἔμφρονα μάλιστα εἶναι πρέπει
c νύμφην καὶ νυμφίον μεταβολὴν οὐ σμικρὰν βίου μεταλλάτ-
τοντας. ἅμα δὲ καὶ τὸ γεννώμενον ὅπως ὅτι μάλιστα ἐξ
ἐμφρόνων ἀεὶ γίγνηται· σχεδὸν γὰρ ἄδηλον ὁποία νὺξ ἢ
φῶς αὐτὸ γεννήσει μετὰ θεοῦ· καὶ πρὸς τούτοις δεῖ μὴ τῶν
5 σωμάτων διακεχυμένων ὑπὸ μέθης γίγνεσθαι τὴν παιδουργίαν,
ἀλλ' εὐπαγὲς ἁπλανὲς ἡσυχαίόν τε ἐν μήτρᾳ συνίστασθαι
τὸ φυόμενον. ὁ δὲ διῳνωμένος αὐτός τε φέρεται πάντῃ καὶ
d φέρει, λυττῶν κατά τε σῶμα καὶ ψυχήν· σπείρειν οὖν παρά-
φορος ἅμα καὶ κακὸς ὁ μεθύων, ὥστ' ἀνώμαλα καὶ ἄπιστα
καὶ οὐδὲν εὐθύπορον ἦθος οὐδὲ σῶμα ἐκ τῶν εἰκότων γεννῷη
ποτ' ἄν. διὸ μᾶλλον μὲν ὅλον τὸν ἐνιαυτὸν καὶ βίον χρή,
5 μάλιστα δὲ ὁπόσον ἂν γεννᾷ χρόνον, εὐλαβεῖσθαι καὶ μὴ
πράττειν μήτε ὅσα νοσώδη ἑκόντα εἶναι μήτε ὅσα ὕβρεως ἢ
ἀδικίας ἐχόμενα—εἰς γὰρ τὰς τῶν γεννωμένων ψυχὰς καὶ

σώματα ἀναγκαῖον ἐξομοργνύμενον ἐκτυποῦσθαι καὶ τίκτειν πάντῃ φαυλότερα—διαφερόντως δὲ ἐκείνην τὴν ἡμέραν καὶ e
νύκτα ἀπέχεσθαι τῶν περὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα· ἀρχὴ γὰρ καὶ θεὸς ἐν ἀνθρώποις ἱδρυμένη σῴζει πάντα, τιμῆς ἐὰν τῆς προσηκούσης αὐτῇ παρ' ἑκάστου τῶν χρωμένων λαγχάνῃ.

Νομίσαντα δ' εἶναι χρὴ τὸν γαμοῦντα ταῖν οἰκίαιν ταῖν ἐν 5
τῷ κλήρῳ τὴν ἑτέραν οἷον νεοττῶν ἐγγέννησιν καὶ τροφήν, 776
χωρισθέντα ἀπὸ πατρὸς καὶ μητρὸς τὸν γάμον ἐκεῖ ποιεῖσθαι καὶ τὴν οἴκησιν καὶ τὴν τροφὴν αὐτοῦ καὶ τῶν τέκνων. ἐν γὰρ ταῖς φιλίαις ἐὰν μὲν πόθος ἐνῇ τις, κολλᾷ καὶ συνδεῖ πάντα ἤθη· κατακορὴς δὲ συνουσία καὶ οὐκ ἴσχουσα τὸν 5
διὰ χρόνου πόθον ἀπορρεῖν ἀλλήλων ποιεῖ ὑπερβολαῖς πλησμονῆς. ὧν δὴ χάριν μητρὶ καὶ πατρὶ καὶ τοῖς τῆς γυναικὸς οἰκείοις παρέντας χρὴ τὰς αὑτῶν οἰκήσεις, οἷον εἰς ἀποικίαν ἀφικομένους, αὐτοὺς ἐπισκοποῦντάς τε ἅμα b
καὶ ἐπισκοπουμένους οἰκεῖν, γεννῶντάς τε καὶ ἐκτρέφοντας παῖδας, καθάπερ λαμπάδα τὸν βίον παραδιδόντας ἄλλοις ἐξ ἄλλων, θεραπεύοντας ἀεὶ θεοὺς κατὰ νόμους.

Κτήματα δὲ τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο ποῖα ἄν τις κεκτημένος ἐμμε- 5
λεστάτην οὐσίαν κεκτῆτο; τὰ μὲν οὖν πολλὰ οὔτε νοῆσαι χαλεπὸν οὔτε κτήσασθαι, τὰ δὲ δὴ τῶν οἰκετῶν χαλεπὰ πάντῃ. τὸ δ' αἴτιον, οὐκ ὀρθῶς πως καί τινα τρόπον ὀρθῶς c
περὶ αὐτῶν λέγομεν· ἐναντία γὰρ ταῖς χρείαις, καὶ κατὰ τὰς χρείας αὖ, ποιούμεθα περὶ δούλων καὶ τὰ λεγόμενα.

ΜΕ. Πῶς δ' αὖ τοῦτο λέγομεν; οὐ γάρ πω μανθάνομεν, ὦ ξένε, ὅτι τὰ νῦν φράζεις. 5

ΑΘ. Καὶ μάλα γε, ὦ Μέγιλλε, εἰκότως· σχεδὸν γὰρ πάντων τῶν Ἑλλήνων ἡ Λακεδαιμονίων εἰλωτεία πλείστην ἀπορίαν παράσχοιτ' ἂν καὶ ἔριν τοῖς μὲν ὡς εὖ, τοῖς δ' ὡς οὐκ εὖ γεγονυῖά ἐστιν—ἐλάττω δὲ ἥ τε Ἡρακλεωτῶν δουλεία τῆς τῶν Μαριανδυνῶν καταδουλώσεως ἔριν ἂν ἔχοι, d
τὸ Θετταλῶν τ' αὖ πενεστικὸν ἔθνος—εἰς ἃ καὶ πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα βλέψαντας ἡμᾶς τί χρὴ ποιεῖν περὶ κτήσεως οἰκετῶν; ὃ δὴ παριὼν τῷ λόγῳ ἔτυχον εἰπών, καὶ σύ με εἰκότως τί ποτε φράζοιμι ἠρώτησας, τόδε ἐστίν. ἴσμεν ὅτι που πάντες 5
εἴποιμεν ἂν ὡς χρὴ δούλους ὡς εὐμενεστάτους ἐκτῆσθαι καὶ ἀρίστους· πολλοὶ γὰρ ἀδελφῶν ἤδη δοῦλοι καὶ υἱέων τισὶν κρείττους πρὸς ἀρετὴν πᾶσαν γενόμενοι, σεσώκασιν δεσπότας καὶ κτήματα τάς τε οἰκήσεις αὐτῶν ὅλας. ταῦτα γὰρ ἴσμεν e

που περὶ δούλων λεγόμενα.

ΜΕ. Τί μήν;

ΑΘ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ τοὐναντίον, ὡς ὑγιὲς οὐδὲν ψυχῆς δούλης, οὐδὲ πιστεύειν οὐδέποτ' οὐδὲν τῷ γένει δεῖ τὸν νοῦν κεκτημένον; ὁ δὲ σοφώτατος ἡμῖν τῶν ποιητῶν καὶ ἀπεφήνατο, ὑπὲρ τοῦ Διὸς ἀγορεύων, ὡς—

777 ἥμισυ γάρ τε νόου, φησίν, ἀπαμείρεται εὐρύοπα Ζεὺς
ἀνδρῶν, οὓς ἂν δὴ κατὰ δούλιον ἦμαρ ἕλῃσι.

ταῦτα δὴ διαλαβόντες ἕκαστοι τοῖς διανοήμασιν οἱ μὲν πιστεύουσί τε οὐδὲν γένει οἰκετῶν, κατὰ δὲ θηρίων φύσιν κέντροις καὶ μάστιξιν οὐ τρὶς μόνον ἀλλὰ πολλάκις ἀπεργάζονται δούλας τὰς ψυχὰς τῶν οἰκετῶν· οἱ δ' αὖ τἀναντία τούτων δρῶσι πάντα.

ΜΕ. Τί μήν;

b ΚΛ. Τί οὖν δὴ χρὴ ποιεῖν, τούτων, ὦ ξένε, διαφερομένων οὕτω, περὶ τῆς ἡμετέρας αὖ χώρας ἡμᾶς, τῆς τε κτήσεως ἅμα καὶ κολάσεως τῶν δούλων πέρι;

ΑΘ. Τί δ', ὦ Κλεινία; δῆλον ὡς ἐπειδὴ δύσκολόν ἐστι τὸ θρέμμα ἄνθρωπος, καὶ πρὸς τὴν ἀναγκαίαν διόρισιν, τὸ δοῦλόν τε ἔργῳ διορίζεσθαι καὶ ἐλεύθερον καὶ δεσπότην, οὐδαμῶς εὔχρηστον ἐθέλειν εἶναί τε καὶ γίγνεσθαι φαίνεται, c χαλεπὸν δὴ τὸ κτῆμα· ἔργῳ γὰρ πολλάκις ἐπιδέδεικται περὶ τὰς Μεσσηνίων συχνὰς εἰωθυίας ἀποστάσεις γίγνεσθαι, καὶ περί γε τὰς τῶν ἐκ μιᾶς φωνῆς πολλοὺς οἰκέτας κτωμένων πόλεις, ὅσα κακὰ συμβαίνει, καὶ ἔτι τὰ τῶν λεγομένων περιδίνων τῶν περὶ τὴν Ἰταλίαν γιγνομένων παντοδαπὰ κλωπῶν ἔργα τε καὶ παθήματα. πρὸς ἅ τις ἂν πάντα βλέψας διαπορήσειε τί χρὴ δρᾶν περὶ ἁπάντων τῶν τοιούτων. δύο δὴ λείπεσθον μόνω μηχανά, μήτε πατριώτας ἀλλήλων εἶναι τοὺς d μέλλοντας ῥᾷον δουλεύσειν, ἀσυμφώνους τε εἰς δύναμιν ὅτι μάλιστα, τρέφειν δ' αὐτοὺς ὀρθῶς, μὴ μόνον ἐκείνων ἕνεκα, πλέον δὲ αὐτῶν προτιμῶντας· ἡ δὲ τροφὴ τῶν τοιούτων μήτε τινὰ ὕβριν ὑβρίζειν εἰς τοὺς οἰκέτας, ἧττον δέ, εἰ δυνατόν, ἀδικεῖν ἢ τοὺς ἐξ ἴσου. διάδηλος γὰρ ὁ φύσει καὶ μὴ πλαστῶς σέβων τὴν δίκην, μισῶν δὲ ὄντως τὸ ἄδικον, ἐν τούτοις τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἐν οἷς αὐτῷ ῥᾴδιον ἀδικεῖν· ὁ περὶ τὰ τῶν δούλων οὖν ἤθη καὶ πράξεις γιγνόμενός τις "ἀμίαντος" e τοῦ τε ἀνοσίου πέρι καὶ ἀδίκου, "σπείρειν εἰς ἀρετῆς ἔκφυσιν" ἱκανώτατος ἂν εἴη, ταὐτὸν δ' ἔστ' εἰπεῖν τοῦτο ὀρθῶς ἅμα

λέγοντα ἐπί τε δεσπότῃ καὶ τυράννῳ καὶ πᾶσαν δυναστείαν δυναστεύοντι πρὸς ἀσθενέστερον ἑαυτοῦ. κολάζειν γε μὴν ἐν δίκῃ δούλους δεῖ, καὶ μὴ νουθετοῦντας ὡς ἐλευθέρους θρύπτεσθαι ποιεῖν· τὴν δὲ οἰκέτου πρόσρησιν χρὴ σχεδὸν ἐπίταξιν πᾶσαν γίγνεσθαι, μὴ προσπαίζοντας μηδαμῇ μηδαμῶς οἰκέταις, μήτ' οὖν θηλείαις μήτε ἄρρεσιν, ἃ δὴ πρὸς δούλους φιλοῦσι πολλοὶ σφόδρα ἀνοήτως θρύπτοντες χαλεπώτερον ἀπεργάζεσθαι τὸν βίον ἐκείνοις τε ἄρχεσθαι καὶ ἑαυτοῖς ἄρχειν. 778

ΚΛ. Ὀρθῶς λέγεις.

ΑΘ. Οὐκοῦν ὅτε τις οἰκέταις κατεσκευασμένος εἰς δύναμιν εἴη πλήθει καὶ ἐπιτηδειότητι πρὸς ἑκάστας τὰς τῶν ἔργων παραβοηθείας, τὸ δὴ μετὰ τοῦτο οἰκήσεις χρὴ διαγράφειν τῷ λόγῳ;

ΚΛ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

ΑΘ. Καὶ συμπάσης γε ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν ἔοικεν τῆς οἰκοδομικῆς πέρι τήν γε δὴ νέαν καὶ ἀοίκητον ἐν τῷ πρόσθεν πόλιν ἐπιμελητέον εἶναι, τίνα τρόπον ἕκαστα ἕξει τούτων περί τε ἱερὰ καὶ τείχη. γάμων δ' ἦν ἔμπροσθεν ταῦτα, ὦ Κλεινία, νῦν δ' ἔπειπερ λόγῳ γίγνεται, καὶ μάλ' ἐγχωρεῖ ταύτῃ γίγνεσθαι τὰ νῦν· ἔργῳ μὴν ὅταν γίγνηται, ταῦτ' ἔμπροσθεν τῶν γάμων, ἐὰν θεὸς ἐθέλῃ, ποιήσαντες, ἐκεῖνα ἤδη τότε ἐπὶ πᾶσιν τοῖς τοιούτοις ἀποτελοῦμεν. νῦν δὲ μόνον ὅσον τινὰ τύπον αὐτῶν δι' ὀλίγων ἐπεξέλθωμεν.

ΚΛ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

ΑΘ. Τὰ μὲν τοίνυν ἱερὰ πᾶσαν περιξ τήν τε ἀγορὰν χρὴ κατασκευάζειν, καὶ τὴν πόλιν ὅλην ἐν κύκλῳ πρὸς τοῖς ὑψηλοῖς τῶν τόπων, εὐερκείας τε καὶ καθαρότητος χάριν· πρὸς δὲ αὐτοῖς οἰκήσεις τε ἀρχόντων καὶ δικαστήρια, ἐν οἷς τὰς δίκας ὡς ἱερωτάτοις οὖσιν λήψονταί τε καὶ δώσουσι, τὰ μὲν ὡς ὁσίων πέρι, τὰ δὲ καὶ τοιούτων θεῶν ἱδρύματα· καὶ ἐν τούτοις [δικαστήρια, ἐν οἷς] αἵ τε τῶν φόνων πρέπουσαι δίκαι γίγνοιντ' ἂν καὶ ὅσα θανάτων ἄξια ἀδικήματα. περὶ δὲ τειχῶν, ὦ Μέγιλλε, ἔγωγ' ἂν τῇ Σπάρτῃ συμφεροίμην τὸ καθεύδειν ἐᾶν ἐν τῇ γῇ κατακείμενα τὰ τείχη καὶ μὴ ἐπανιστάναι, τῶνδε εἵνεκα. καλῶς μὲν καὶ ὁ ποιητικὸς ὑπὲρ αὐτῶν λόγος ὑμνεῖται, τὸ χαλκᾶ καὶ σιδηρᾶ δεῖν εἶναι τὰ τείχη μᾶλλον ἢ γήινα· τὸ δ' ἡμέτερον ἔτι πρὸς τούτοις γέλωτ' ἂν δικαίως πάμπολυν ὄφλοι, τὸ κατ' ἐνιαυτὸν μὲν ἐκπέμπειν εἰς

τὴν χώραν τοὺς νέους, τὰ μὲν σκάψοντας, τὰ δὲ ταφρεύσοντας, τὰ δὲ καὶ διά τινων οἰκοδομήσεων εἴρξοντας τοὺς πολεμίους, ὡς δὴ τῶν ὅρων τῆς χώρας οὐκ ἐάσοντας ἐπιβαίνειν, τεῖχος δὲ περιβαλοίμεθα, ὃ πρῶτον μὲν πρὸς ὑγίειαν ταῖς πόλεσιν οὐδαμῶς συμφέρει, πρὸς δέ τινα μαλθακὴν ἕξιν ταῖς ψυχαῖς τῶν ἐνοικούντων εἰῶθε ποιεῖν, προκαλούμενον εἰς αὐτὸ καταφεύγοντας μὴ ἀμύνεσθαι τοὺς πολεμίους, μηδὲ τῷ φρουρεῖν ἀεί τινας ἐν αὐτῇ νύκτωρ καὶ μεθ' ἡμέραν, τούτῳ τῆς σωτηρίας τυγχάνειν, τείχεσι δὲ καὶ πύλαις διανοεῖσθαι φραχθέντας τε καὶ καθεύδοντας σωτηρίας ὄντως ἕξειν μηχανάς, ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ μὴ πονεῖν γεγονότας, ἀγνοοῦντας δ' αὖ τὴν ῥᾳστώνην ὡς ὄντως ἐστὶν ἐκ τῶν πόνων· ἐκ ῥᾳστώνης δέ γε, οἶμαι, τῆς αἰσχρᾶς οἱ πόνοι καὶ ῥᾳθυμίας πεφύκασι γίγνεσθαι πάλιν. ἀλλ' εἰ δὴ τεῖχός γέ τι χρεὼν ἀνθρώποις εἶναι, τὰς οἰκοδομίας χρὴ τὰς τῶν ἰδίων οἰκήσεων οὕτως ἐξ ἀρχῆς βάλλεσθαι, ὅπως ἂν ᾖ πᾶσα ἡ πόλις ἓν τεῖχος, ὁμαλότητί τε καὶ ὁμοιότησιν εἰς τὰς ὁδοὺς πασῶν τῶν οἰκήσεων ἐχουσῶν εὐέρκειαν, ἰδεῖν τε οὐκ ἀηδὲς μιᾶς οἰκίας σχῆμα ἐχούσης αὐτῆς, εἴς τε τὴν τῆς φυλακῆς ῥᾳστώνην ὅλῳ καὶ παντὶ πρὸς σωτηρίαν γίγνοιτ' ἂν διάφορος. τούτων δέ, **ὡς** ἂν **μένῃ** τὰ κατ' ἀρχὰς οἰκοδομηθέντα, μέλειν μὲν μάλιστα τοῖς ἐνοικοῦσι πρέπον ἂν εἴη, τοὺς δὲ ἀστυνόμους ἐπιμελεῖσθαι καὶ προσαναγκάζοντας τὸν ὀλιγωροῦντα ζημιοῦντας, καὶ πάντων δὴ τῶν κατὰ τὸ ἄστυ καθαρότητός τ' ἐπιμελεῖσθαι, καὶ ὅπως ἰδιώτης μηδεὶς μηδὲν τῶν τῆς πόλεως μήτε οἰκοδομήμασι μήτε οὖν ὀρύγμασιν ἐπιλήψεται. καὶ δὴ καὶ ὑδάτων τῶν ἐκ Διὸς εὑροίας τούτους ἐπιμελεῖσθαι χρεών, καὶ ὅσα ἐντὸς πόλεως ἢ ὁπόσα ἔξω πρέπον ἂν οἰκεῖν εἴη· ταῦτα δὲ πάντα συνιδόντες ταῖς χρείαις οἱ νομοφύλακες ἐπινομοθετούντων καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὁπόσα ἂν ὁ νόμος ἐκλείπῃ δι' ἀπορίαν. ὅτε δὲ ταῦτά τε καὶ τὰ περὶ ἀγορὰν οἰκοδομήματα καὶ τὰ περὶ τὰ γυμνάσια καὶ πάντα ὅσα διδασκαλεῖα κατεσκευασμένα περιμένει τοὺς φοιτητὰς καὶ θεατὰς θέατρα, πορευώμεθα ἐπὶ τὰ μετὰ τοὺς γάμους, τῆς νομοθεσίας ἑξῆς ἐχόμενοι.

ΚΛ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

ΑΘ. Γάμοι μὲν τοίνυν ἡμῖν ἔστωσαν γεγονότες, ὦ Κλεινία· δίαιτα δὲ πρὸ παιδογονίας οὐκ ἐλάττων ἐνιαυσίας γίγνοιτ' ἂν τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο, ἣν δὴ τίνα τρόπον χρὴ ζῆν νυμφίον

καὶ νύμφην ἐν πόλει διαφερούσῃ τῶν πολλῶν ἐσομένῃ—τὸ δὴ τῶν νῦν εἰρημένων ἐχόμενον—εἰπεῖν οὐ πάντων εὐκολώτατον, ἀλλὰ ὄντων οὐκ ὀλίγων τῶν ἔμπροσθεν τοιούτων, τοῦτο ἔτι ἐκείνων τῶν πολλῶν δυσχερέστερον ἀποδέχεσθαι τῷ πλήθει. τό γε μὴν δοκοῦν ὀρθὸν καὶ ἀληθὲς εἶναι πάντως ῥητέον, ὦ Κλεινία.

ΚΛ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

ΑΘ. Ὅστις δὴ διανοεῖται πόλεσιν ἀποφαίνεσθαι νόμους, 780
πῇ τὰ δημόσια καὶ κοινὰ αὐτοὺς χρὴ ζῆν πράττοντας, τῶν δὲ ἰδίων ὅσον ἀνάγκη μηδὲ οἴεται δεῖν, ἐξουσίαν δὲ ἑκάστοις εἶναι τὴν ἡμέραν ζῆν ὅπως ἂν ἐθέλῃ, καὶ μὴ πάντα διὰ τάξεως δεῖν γίγνεσθαι, προέμενος δὲ τὰ ἴδια ἀνομοθέτητα, 5
ἡγεῖται τά γε κοινὰ καὶ δημόσια ἐθελήσειν αὐτοὺς ζῆν διὰ νόμων, οὐκ ὀρθῶς διανοεῖται. τίνος δὴ χάριν ταῦτα εἴρηται; τοῦδε, ὅτι φήσομεν δεῖν ἡμῖν τοὺς νυμφίους μηδὲν διαφερόντως μηδὲ ἧττον ἐν συσσιτίοις τὴν δίαιταν ποιεῖσθαι b
τοῦ πρὸ τῶν γάμων χρόνου γενομένου. καὶ τοῦτο μὲν δὴ θαυμαστὸν ὄν, ὅτε κατ' ἀρχὰς πρῶτον ἐγένετο ἐν τοῖς παρ' ὑμῖν τόποις, πολέμου τινὸς αὐτό, ὥς γ' εἰκός, νομοθετήσαντος ἢ τινος ἑτέρου τὴν αὐτὴν δύναμιν ἔχοντος πράγματος 5
ἐν ὀλιγανθρωπίαις ὑπὸ πολλῆς ἀπορίας ἐχομένοις, γευσαμένοις δὲ καὶ ἀναγκασθεῖσι χρήσασθαι τοῖς συσσιτίοις ἔδοξεν c
μέγα διαφέρειν εἰς σωτηρίαν τὸ νόμιμον, καὶ κατέστη δὴ τρόπῳ τινὶ τοιούτῳ τὸ ἐπιτήδευμα ὑμῖν τὸ τῶν συσσιτίων.

ΚΛ. Ἔοικε γοῦν.

ΑΘ. Ὃ δὴ ἔλεγον, ὅτι θαυμαστὸν ὂν τοῦτό ποτε καὶ φοβερὸν ἐπιτάξαι τισίν, νῦν οὐχ ὁμοίως τῷ προστάττοντι 5
δυσχερὲς ἂν εἴη νομοθετεῖν αὐτό· τὸ δ' ἐξῆς τούτῳ, πεφυκός τε ὀρθῶς ἂν γίγνεσθαι γιγνόμενον, νῦν τε οὐδαμῇ γιγνόμενον ὀλίγου [τε] ποιοῦν τὸν νομοθέτην, τὸ τῶν παιζόντων, εἰς πῦρ ξαίνειν καὶ μυρία ἕτερα τοιαῦτα ἀνήνυτα πονοῦντα δρᾶν, οὐ ῥᾴδιον οὔτ' εἰπεῖν οὔτ' εἰπόντα ἀποτελεῖν. d

ΚΛ. Τί δὴ τοῦτο, ὦ ξένε, ἐπιχειρῶν λέγειν ἔοικας σφόδρα ἀποκνεῖν;

ΑΘ. Ἀκούοιτ' ἄν, ἵνα μὴ πολλὴ διατριβὴ γίγνηται περὶ τοῦτ' αὐτὸ μάτην. πᾶν μὲν γάρ, ὅτιπερ ἂν τάξεως καὶ νόμου 5
μετέχον ἐν πόλει γίγνηται, πάντα ἀγαθὰ ἀπεργάζεται, τῶν δὲ ἀτάκτων ἢ τῶν κακῶς ταχθέντων λύει τὰ πολλὰ τῶν εὖ τεταγμένων ἄλλα ἕτερα. οὗ δὴ καὶ νῦν ἐφέστηκεν πέρι

τὸ λεγόμενον. ὑμῖν γάρ, ὦ Κλεινία καὶ Μέγιλλε, τὰ μὲν περὶ
e τοὺς ἄνδρας συσσίτια καλῶς ἅμα καί, ὅπερ εἶπον, θαυμαστῶς
καθέστηκεν ἐκ θείας τινὸς ἀνάγκης, τὸ δὲ περὶ τὰς γυναῖκας
781 οὐδαμῶς ὀρθῶς ἀνομοθέτητον μεθεῖται καὶ οὐκ εἰς τὸ φῶς
ἥκται τὸ τῆς συσσιτίας αὐτῶν ἐπιτήδευμα, ἀλλ' ὃ καὶ ἄλλως
γένος ἡμῶν τῶν ἀνθρώπων λαθραιότερον μᾶλλον καὶ ἐπι-
κλοπώτερον ἔφυ, τὸ θῆλυ, διὰ τὸ ἀσθενές, οὐκ ὀρθῶς τοῦτο
5 εἴξαντος τοῦ νομοθέτου δύστακτον ὂν ἀφείθη. διὰ δὲ τούτου
μεθειμένου πολλὰ ὑμῖν παρέρρει, πολὺ ἄμεινον ἂν ἔχοντα, εἰ
νόμων ἔτυχεν, ἢ τὰ νῦν· οὐ γὰρ ἥμισυ μόνον ἐστίν, ὡς
b δόξειεν ἄν, τὸ περὶ τὰς γυναῖκας ἀκοσμήτως περιορώμενον,
ὅσῳ δὲ ἡ θήλεια ἡμῖν φύσις ἐστὶ πρὸς ἀρετὴν χείρων τῆς
τῶν ἀρρένων, τοσούτῳ διαφέρει πρὸς τὸ πλέον ἢ διπλάσιον
εἶναι. τοῦτ' οὖν ἐπαναλαβεῖν καὶ ἐπανορθώσασθαι καὶ πάντα
5 συντάξασθαι κοινῇ γυναιξί τε καὶ ἀνδράσιν ἐπιτηδεύματα
βέλτιον πρὸς πόλεως εὐδαιμονίαν· νῦν δὲ οὕτως ἥκται τὸ
τῶν ἀνθρώπων γένος οὐδαμῶς εἰς τοῦτο εὐτυχῶς, ὥστε οὐδὲ
μνησθῆναι περὶ αὐτοῦ ἐν ἄλλοις γ' ἐστὶν τόποις καὶ πόλεσιν
c νοῦν ἔχοντος, ὅπου μηδὲ συσσίτια ὑπάρχει τὸ παράπαν
δεδογμένα κατὰ πόλιν εἶναι. πόθεν δή τίς γε ἔργῳ μὴ κατα-
γελάστως ἐπιχειρήσει γυναῖκας προσβιάζεσθαι τὴν σίτων
καὶ ποτῶν ἀνάλωσιν φανερὰν θεωρεῖσθαι; τούτου γὰρ οὐκ
5 ἔστιν ὅτι χαλεπώτερον ἂν ὑπομείνειεν τοῦτο τὸ γένος·
εἰθισμένον γὰρ δεδυκὸς καὶ σκοτεινὸν ζῆν, ἀγόμενον δ' εἰς
φῶς βίᾳ πᾶσαν ἀντίτασιν ἀντιτεῖνον, πολὺ κρατήσει τοῦ
d νομοθέτου. τοῦτ' οὖν ἄλλοθι μέν, ὅπερ εἶπον, οὐδ' ἂν τὸν
λόγον ὑπομείνειε τὸν ὀρθὸν ῥηθέντα ἄνευ πάσης βοῆς, ἐνθάδε
δὲ ἴσως ἄν. εἰ δὴ δοκεῖ λόγου γ' ἕνεκα μὴ ἀτυχῆ τὸν περὶ
πάσης τῆς πολιτείας γενέσθαι λόγον, ἐθέλω λέγειν ὡς
5 ἀγαθόν ἐστι καὶ πρέπον, εἰ καὶ σφῷν συνδοκεῖ ἀκούειν, εἰ
δὲ μή, ἐᾶν.

ΚΛ. Ἀλλ', ὦ ξένε, θαυμαστῶς τό γε ἀκοῦσαι νῷν πάντως
που συνδοκεῖ.

ΑΘ. Ἀκούωμεν δή. θαυμάσητε δὲ μηδὲν ἐὰν ὑμῖν ἄνω-
e θέν ποθεν ἐπιχειρεῖν δόξω· σχολῆς γὰρ ἀπολαύομεν καὶ οὐδὲν
ἡμᾶς ἐστὶ τὸ κατεπεῖγον τὸ μὴ πάντῃ πάντως σκοπεῖν τὰ
περὶ τοὺς νόμους.

ΚΛ. Ὀρθῶς εἴρηκας.

5 ΑΘ. Πάλιν τοίνυν ἐπὶ τὰ πρῶτα ἐπαναχωρήσωμεν

λεχθέντα. εὖ γὰρ δὴ τό γε τοσοῦτον χρὴ πάντ' ἄνδρα συννοεῖν, ὡς ἡ τῶν ἀνθρώπων γένεσις ἢ τὸ παράπαν ἀρχὴν οὐδεμίαν εἴληχεν οὐδ' ἕξει ποτέ γε τελευτήν, ἀλλ' ἦν τε ἀεὶ 782 καὶ ἔσται πάντως, ἢ μῆκός τι τῆς ἀρχῆς ἀφ' οὗ γέγονεν ἀμήχανον ἂν χρόνον ὅσον γεγονὸς ἂν εἴη.

ΚΛ. Τί μήν;

ΑΘ. Τί οὖν; πόλεων συστάσεις καὶ φθοράς, καὶ ἐπι- 5 τηδεύματα παντοῖα τάξεώς τε καὶ ἀταξίας, καὶ βρώσεως, καὶ πωμάτων τε ἅμα καὶ βρωμάτων ἐπιθυμήματα παντοδαπά, πάντως καὶ περὶ πᾶσαν τὴν γῆν ἆρ' οὐκ οἰόμεθα γεγονέναι, καὶ στροφὰς ὡρῶν παντοίας, ἐν αἷς τὰ ζῷα μεταβάλλειν αὐτῶν παμπληθεῖς μεταβολὰς εἰκός; b

ΚΛ. Πῶς γὰρ οὔ;

ΑΘ. Τί οὖν; πιστεύομεν ἀμπέλους τε φανῆναί πού ποτε πρότερον οὐκ οὔσας; ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ ἐλάας καὶ τὰ Δήμητρός τε καὶ Κόρης δῶρα; Τριπτόλεμόν τέ τινα τῶν τοιούτων 5 γενέσθαι διάκονον; ἐν ᾧ δὲ μὴ ταῦτα ἦν πω χρόνῳ, μῶν οὐκ οἰόμεθα τὰ ζῷα, καθάπερ νῦν, ἐπὶ τὴν ἀλλήλων ἐδωδὴν τρέπεσθαι;

ΚΛ. Τί μήν;

ΑΘ. Τὸ δὲ μὴν θύειν ἀνθρώπους ἀλλήλους ἔτι καὶ νῦν c παραμένον ὁρῶμεν πολλοῖς· καὶ τοὐναντίον ἀκούομεν ἐν ἄλλοις, ὅτε οὐδὲ βοὸς ἐτόλμων μὲν γεύεσθαι, θύματά τε οὐκ ἦν τοῖς θεοῖσι ζῷα, πέλανοι δὲ καὶ μέλιτι καρποὶ δεδευμένοι καὶ τοιαῦτα ἄλλα ἁγνὰ θύματα, σαρκῶν δ' ἀπείχοντο ὡς οὐχ 5 ὅσιον ὂν ἐσθίειν οὐδὲ τοὺς τῶν θεῶν βωμοὺς αἵματι μιαίνειν, ἀλλὰ Ὀρφικοί τινες λεγόμενοι βίοι ἐγίγνοντο ἡμῶν τοῖς τότε, ἀψύχων μὲν ἐχόμενοι πάντων, ἐμψύχων δὲ τοὐναντίον πάντων ἀπεχόμενοι. d

ΚΛ. Καὶ σφόδρα λεγόμενά τ' εἴρηκας καὶ πιστεύεσθαι πιθανά.

ΑΘ. Πρὸς οὖν δὴ τί ταῦτα, εἴποι τις ἄν, ὑμῖν πάντ' ἐρρήθη τὰ νῦν; 5

ΚΛ. Ὀρθῶς ὑπέλαβες, ὦ ξένε.

ΑΘ. Καὶ τοίνυν, ἐὰν δύνωμαι, τὰ τούτοις ἑξῆς, ὦ Κλεινία, πειράσομαι φράζειν.

ΚΛ. Λέγοις ἄν.

ΑΘ. Ὁρῶ πάντα τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ἐκ τριττῆς χρείας καὶ 10 ἐπιθυμίας ἠρτημένα, δι' ὧν ἀρετή τε αὐτοῖς ἀγομένοις ὀρθῶς

e καὶ τοὐναντίον ἀποβαίνει κακῶς ἀχθεῖσιν. ταῦτα δ' ἐστὶν ἐδωδὴ μὲν καὶ πόσις εὐθὺς γενομένοις, ἣν πέρι ἅπασαν πᾶν ζῷον ἔμφυτον ἔρωτα ἔχον, μεστὸν οἴστρου τέ ἐστιν καὶ ἀνηκουστίας τοῦ λέγοντος ἄλλο τι δεῖν πράττειν πλὴν τὰς
5 ἡδονὰς καὶ ἐπιθυμίας τὰς περὶ ἅπαντα ταῦτα ἀποπληροῦντα, λύπης τῆς ἀπάσης ἀεὶ δεῖν σφᾶς ἀπαλλάττειν· τρίτη
783 δὲ ἡμῖν καὶ μεγίστη χρεία καὶ ἔρως ὀξύτατος ὕστατος μὲν ὁρμᾶται, διαπυρωτάτους δὲ τοὺς ἀνθρώπους μανίαις ἀπεργάζεται πάντως, ὁ περὶ τὴν τοῦ γένους σποράν ὕβρει πλείστῃ καόμενος. ἃ δὴ δεῖ τρία νοσήματα, τρέποντα εἰς
5 τὸ βέλτιστον παρὰ τὸ λεγόμενον ἥδιστον, τρισὶ μὲν τοῖς μεγίστοις πειρᾶσθαι κατέχειν, φόβῳ καὶ νόμῳ καὶ τῷ ἀληθεῖ λόγῳ, προσχρωμένους μέντοι Μούσαις τε καὶ ἀγωνίοισι
b θεοῖς, σβεννύναι τὴν αὖξην τε καὶ ἐπιρροήν.

Παίδων δὲ δὴ γένεσιν μετὰ τοὺς γάμους θῶμεν, καὶ μετὰ γένεσιν τροφὴν καὶ παιδείαν· καὶ τάχ' ἂν οὕτω προϊόντων τῶν λόγων ὅ τε νόμος ἡμῖν ἕκαστος περαίνοιτο
5 ὡς τοὔμπροσθεν ἐπὶ συσσίτια ἡνίκα ἀφικόμεθα—τὰς τοιαύτας κοινωνίας εἴτε ἄρα γυναικῶν εἴτε ἀνδρῶν δεῖ μόνων γίγνεσθαι, προσμείξαντες αὐτοῖς ἐγγύθεν ἴσως μᾶλλον κατοψόμεθα—τά τε ἐπίπροσθεν αὐτῶν, ἔτι νῦν ὄντα ἀνομο-
c θέτητα, τάξαντες αὐτὰ ἐπίπροσθεν ποιησόμεθα, καὶ ὅπερ ἐρρήθη νυνδή, κατοψόμεθά τε αὐτὰ ἀκριβέστερον, μᾶλλόν τε τοὺς προσήκοντας αὐτοῖς καὶ πρέποντας νόμους ἂν θείημεν.

5 ΚΛ. Ὀρθότατα λέγεις.

ΑΘ. Φυλάξωμεν τοίνυν τῇ μνήμῃ τὰ νυνδὴ λεχθέντα· ἴσως γὰρ χρείαν ποτ' αὐτῶν πάντων ἕξομεν.

ΚΛ. Τὰ ποῖα δὴ διακελεύῃ;

ΑΘ. Ἃ τοῖς τρισὶ διωριζόμεθα ῥήμασι· βρῶσιν μὲν
10 ἐλέγομέν που, καὶ δεύτερον πόσιν, καὶ ἀφροδισίων δέ τινα
d διαπτόησιν τρίτον.

ΚΛ. Πάντως, ὦ ξένε, μεμνησόμεθά που ‹ὧν› τὰ νῦν διακελεύῃ.

ΑΘ. Καλῶς. ἔλθωμεν δ' ἐπὶ τὰ νυμφικά, διδάξοντές τε
5 αὐτοὺς πῶς χρὴ καὶ τίνα τρόπον τοὺς παῖδας ποιεῖσθαι, καὶ ἐὰν ἄρα μὴ πείθωμεν, ἀπειλήσοντές τισιν νόμοις.

ΚΛ. Πῶς;

ΑΘ. Νύμφην χρὴ διανοεῖσθαι καὶ νυμφίον ὡς ὅτι καλ-

λίστους καὶ ἀρίστους εἰς δύναμιν ἀποδειξομένους παῖδας τῇ πόλει. πάντες δ' ἄνθρωποι κοινωνοὶ πάσης πράξεως, ἡνίκα e
μὲν ἂν προσέχωσιν αὐτοῖς τε καὶ τῇ πράξει τὸν νοῦν, πάντα καλὰ καὶ ἀγαθὰ ἀπεργάζονται, μὴ προσέχοντες δὲ ἢ μὴ ἔχοντες νοῦν, τἀναντία. προσεχέτω δὴ καὶ ὁ νυμφίος τῇ τε νύμφῃ καὶ τῇ παιδοποιίᾳ τὸν νοῦν, κατὰ ταὐτὰ δὲ καὶ ἡ 5
νύμφη, τοῦτον τὸν χρόνον διαφερόντως ὧν ἂν μήπω παῖδες αὐτοῖς ὦσιν γεγονότες. ἐπίσκοποι δ' ἔστωσαν τούτων ἂς 784
εἱλόμεθα γυναῖκες, πλείους εἴτ' ἐλάττους, τοῖς ἄρχουσιν ὁπόσας ἂν δοκῇ προστάττειν τε καὶ ὁπόταν, πρὸς τὸ τῆς Εἰλειθυίας ἱερὸν ἑκάστης ἡμέρας συλλεγόμεναι μέχρι τρίτου μέρους ὥρας, οἳ δὴ συλλεχθεῖσαι διαγγελλόντων ἀλλήλαις 5
εἴ τίς τινα ὁρᾷ πρὸς ἄλλ' ἄττα βλέποντα ἄνδρα ἢ καὶ γυναῖκα τῶν παιδοποιουμένων ἢ πρὸς τὰ τεταγμένα ὑπὸ τῶν ἐν τοῖς γάμοις θυσιῶν τε καὶ ἱερῶν γενομένων. ἡ δὲ παιδοποιία b
καὶ φυλακὴ τῶν παιδοποιουμένων δεκέτις ἔστω, μὴ πλείω δὲ χρόνον, ὅταν εὔροια ᾖ τῆς γενέσεως· ἂν δὲ ἄγονοί τινες εἰς τοῦτον γίγνωνται τὸν χρόνον, μετὰ τῶν οἰκείων καὶ ἀρχουσῶν γυναικῶν διαζεύγνυσθαι κοινῇ βουλευομένους εἰς 5
τὰ πρόσφορα ἑκατέροις. ἐὰν δ' ἀμφισβήτησίς τις γίγνηται περὶ τῶν ἑκατέροις πρεπόντων καὶ προσφόρων, δέκα τῶν νομοφυλάκων ἑλομένους, οἷς ἂν ἐπιτρέψωσιν **οἱ δὲ** τάξωσι, c
τούτοις ἐμμένειν. εἰσιοῦσαι δ' εἰς τὰς οἰκίας τῶν νέων αἱ γυναῖκες, τὰ μὲν νουθετοῦσαι, τὰ δὲ καὶ ἀπειλοῦσαι, παυόντων αὐτοὺς τῆς ἁμαρτίας καὶ ἀμαθίας· ἐὰν δ' ἀδυ- 5
νατῶσι, πρὸς τοὺς νομοφύλακας ἰοῦσαι φραζόντων, οἱ δ' εἰργόντων. ἂν δὲ καὶ ἐκεῖνοί πως ἀδυνατήσωσι, πρὸς τὸ δημόσιον ἀποφηνάντων, ἀναγράψαντές τε καὶ ὁμόσαντες ἢ μὴν ἀδυνατεῖν τὸν καὶ τὸν βελτίω ποιεῖν. ὁ δὲ ἀναγραφεὶς d
ἄτιμος ἔστω, μὴ ἐλὼν ἐν δικαστηρίῳ τοὺς ἐγγράψαντας, τῶνδε· μήτε γὰρ εἰς γάμους ἴτω μήτε εἰς τὰς τῶν παίδων ἐπιτελειώσεις, ἂν δὲ ἴῃ, πληγαῖς ὁ βουληθεὶς ἀθῷος αὐτὸν κολαζέτω. τὰ αὐτὰ δὲ καὶ περὶ γυναικὸς ἔστω νόμιμα· τῶν 5
ἐξόδων γὰρ τῶν γυναικείων καὶ τιμῶν καὶ τῶν εἰς τοὺς γάμους καὶ γενέθλια ‹τῶν› παίδων φοιτήσεων μὴ μετεχέτω, ἐὰν ἀκοσμοῦσα ὡσαύτως ἀναγραφῇ καὶ μὴ ἕληται τὴν δίκην. e
ὅταν δὲ δὴ παῖδας γεννήσωνται κατὰ νόμους, ἐὰν ἀλλοτρίᾳ τις περὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα κοινωνῇ γυναικὶ ἢ γυνὴ ἀνδρί, ἐὰν μὲν παιδοποιουμένοις ἔτι, τὰ αὐτὰ ἐπιζήμια αὐτοῖς ἔστω

καθάπερ τοῖς ἔτι γεννωμένοις εἴρηται· μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα ὁ μὲν σωφρονῶν καὶ σωφρονοῦσα εἰς τὰ τοιαῦτα ἔστω πάντα εὐδόκιμος, ὁ δὲ τοὐναντίον ἐναντίως τιμάσθω, μᾶλλον δὲ ἀτιμαζέσθω. καὶ μετριαζόντων μὲν περὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα τῶν πλειόνων ἀνομοθέτητα σιγῇ κείσθω, ἀκοσμούντων δὲ νομοθετηθέντα ταύτῃ πραττέσθω κατὰ τοὺς τότε τεθέντας νόμους. βίου μὲν ἀρχὴ τοῦ παντὸς ἑκάστοις ὁ πρῶτος ἐνιαυτός· ὃν γεγράφθαι χρεὼν ἐν ἱεροῖσι πατρῴοις ζωῆς ἀρχή. κόρῳ καὶ κόρῃ παραγεγράφθω δ' ἐν τοίχῳ λελευκωμένῳ ἐν πάσῃ φρατρίᾳ τὸν ἀριθμὸν τῶν ἀρχόντων τῶν ἐπὶ τοῖς ἔτεσιν ἀριθμουμένων· τῆς δὲ φρατρίας ἀεὶ τοὺς ζῶντας μὲν γεγράφθαι πλησίον, τοὺς δ' ὑπεκχωροῦντας τοῦ βίου ἐξαλείφειν. γάμου δὲ ὅρον εἶναι κόρῃ μὲν ἀπὸ ἑκκαίδεκα ἐτῶν εἰς εἴκοσι, τὸν μακρότατον χρόνον ἀφωρισμένον, κόρῳ δὲ ἀπὸ τριάκοντα μέχρι τῶν πέντε καὶ τριάκοντα· εἰς δὲ ἀρχὰς γυναικὶ μὲν τετταράκοντα, ἀνδρὶ δὲ τριάκοντα ἔτη· πρὸς πόλεμον δὲ ἀνδρὶ μὲν εἴκοσι μέχρι τῶν ἑξήκοντα ἐτῶν· γυναικὶ δέ, ἢν ἂν δοκῇ χρείαν δεῖν χρῆσθαι πρὸς τὰ πολεμικά, ἐπειδὰν παῖδας γεννήσῃ, τὸ δυνατὸν καὶ πρέπον ἑκάσταις προστάττειν μέχρι τῶν πεντήκοντα ἐτῶν.

NOTES

NOTES

BOOK I

The *Dramatis Personae.* Lacedæmon and Crete were famous for 624 a
their codes. Hence the appropriateness of the nationality of the two inferior members of the committee. The Athenian philosopher who propounds a new code must not be supposed to disregard what had already been done in that line. Besides, Doric institutions, having more of positive enactment, and greater interference with the liberty of the subject, present, to Plato's view, a better starting-point, for a consideration of the whole matter, than would those of his own country.

624 a 1. *εἴληφε τὴν αἰτίαν τῆς τῶν νόμων διαθέσεως*, "has the credit of your legal arrangements." Cp. *Rep.* 599 e *σὲ δὲ τίς αἰτιᾶται πόλις νομοθέτην ἀγαθὸν γεγονέναι;*

a 3. *ὥς γε τὸ δικαιότατον εἰπεῖν*, "most decidedly."

a 4. *παρὰ μὲν ἡμῖν Ζεύς, . . . Ἀπόλλωνα*: this sentence is typical of many in the *Laws.* A gentle anacoluthon is brought in to heighten the effect of variety. Two strands, so to speak, of the thread are intact, the third is broken. We shall often find a more violent rupture. For an excellent characterization of the style of the *Laws* cp. Apelt, "Zu Platos Gesetzen," Beigabe zur *Jahresb. ü. d. Gymn. C.–A. zu Jena*, 1907, pp. 1 ff.

a 7. *καθ' Ὅμηρον*: *τ* 179. Cp. *Minos* 319 c 5 ff.—For *ὡς* with an absolute construction after a *verbum declarandi* cp. below 626 e 4, 636 d 1, 644 b 6 and *Rep.* 470 e *καὶ διανοεῖσθαι ὡς διαλλαγησομένων καὶ οὐκ ἀεὶ πολεμησόντων.* Lobeck, on Soph. *Aj.* 281, traces the genesis of this not uncommon anacoluthon from such a construction as *Laws* 964 a *διανοοῦ ὡς ἐρῶν.*

b 2. *φήμη* is a solemn word (cp. 664 d 4)—properly used of the utterance of a god.

b 5. *ἀκούετε*: for the tense cp. *Gorg.* 503 c, and *γ* 193 *Ἀτρείδην*

δὲ καὶ αὐτοὶ ἀκούετε νόσφιν ἐόντες, ὥς τ' ἦλθ'. We use the (habitual) present tense of the verbs *read, to be told, learn, notice,* and *find* in the same way.

625 a 3. For the superfluous αὐτόν cp. *Gorg.* 482 d 2, *Tim.* 28 a 8. (Riddell, *Digest* § 223.)

a 5. ἐν τοιούτοις ἤθεσι νομικοῖς: τοιούτοις does not, of course, qualify νομικοῖς as our *such* in the sense of *so* might, nor is νομικοῖς, as Stallbaum says, epexegetic of τοιούτοις; but the two words ἤθεσι νομικοῖς go closely together, and τοιούτοις, which qualifies them both, gets from its context a complimentary shade of meaning — "among legal institutions (lit. "in law-bred habits") of so distinguished an origin" (or "character"). Cf. 751 c 9 τεθράφθαι ἐν ἤθεσι νόμων εὖ πεπαιδευμένους.

a 6. προσδοκῶ οὐκ ἂν ἀηδῶς . . . ποιήσασθαι, "I fancy you would not find law and government an unpleasant subject of consideration now, supposing we discoursed to each other about it as we walk." There is no need for the ἡμᾶς which L and O insert after ἀηδῶς. The only suggestion that the Athenian would bear a part in the discussion is made modestly by the word ἀκούοντας. The exceptional advantages enjoyed by the Cretan and the Spartan in the matter of law are urged as a reason why they would enjoy a talk about it: if ἡμᾶς stood as the subject of διατριβὴν ποιήσασθαι, it would be a suggestion that the Athenian too was an authority on the subject. This he does not make.

b 1. ποιήσεσθαι MSS., ποιήσασθαι Schanz. — πάντως δ', "there is no doubt that . . . " Cp. *Symp.* 173 b 6.

b 2. ὡς ἀκούομεν, "if my information is correct."

b 3. ὡς εἰκός, "we are sure to find."—πνίγους ὄντος τὰ νῦν, "*ut par est in hoc aestu*" Stallbaum.

b 6. οὕτω μετὰ ῥᾳστώνης: cp. ἁπλῶς οὕτως 633 c 9, οὕτω πίνοντας πρὸς ἡδονήν *Symp.* 176 e.

c 3. ὀρθῶς λέγεις, "a good suggestion!"

c 3–6. The division between the persons of the dialogue given here is that of the MSS. Schanz and others have made various alterations in it, for the worse, I think.

c 6. ταῦτ' εἴη, "be it so." Cp. *Rep.* 349 c 10 ἔστι ταῦτα.—κατὰ τί; cp. Aesch. *P.V.* 226 ὃ δ' οὖν ἐρωτᾷ', αἰτίαν καθ' ἥντινα αἰκίζεταί με, τοῦτο δὴ σαφηνιῶ, *Gorg.* 482 d καὶ ἔγωγε κατ' αὐτὸ τοῦτο οὐκ ἄγαμαι Πῶλον, ὅτι σοι συνεχώρησε τὸ ἀδικεῖν αἴσχιον εἶναι τοῦ ἀδικεῖσθαι.

c 7. τὴν τῶν ὅπλων ἕξιν: not "the practice of carrying arms," but, as the scholiast says, ἁπλῶς ὅπλισιν, "your accoutrement,"

"the sort of arms you usually have." The Cretan's answer explains, not why Cretans carry arms, but why their distinctive weapons are bows and arrows. For the periphrasis cp. *Tim.* 73 a *τῇ τοῦ περιγενησομένου πώματος ἐδέσματός τε ἕξει* for *τῷ περιγενησομένῳ πώματι καὶ ἐδέσματι*, and 74 a *τὴν δ' αὖ τῆς ὀστεΐνης φύσεως ἕξιν.*

c 10. *τὰ ἡμέτερα*, "our *institutions*," not "our *local conditions*."

d 3. *πρὸς τὴν τῶν πεζῇ δρόμων ἄσκησιν*: Cleinias answers the second of the Athenian's three questions first, then the third, then the first. — Running was the main exercise in the Cretan gymnasia, which, according to Suidas, were called *δρόμοι*. So Stallbaum, who is doubtless right in taking *ἔχοντα* to be masculine.

e 5. *ἄνοιαν κτλ.*: as we might say, "Minos's legislation is a witness to the folly of the nations who have no such institutions (and who thereby show that) they are blind to the fact that war is always at the door." I would put a full stop (instead of a colon) after *πόλεις*.

e 8. *καί τινας ἄρχοντας κτλ.*, "and that relays of men and officers should act as sentinels for them."

626 a 1. *διακεκοσμημένους εἶναι*: to be taken closely together as perf. infin. pass.

a 4. *ἀκήρυκτον*: not here = *ἄσπονδος*, but (as Stallbaum) merely "though it may not have been duly proclaimed (it is its natural state)." The scholiast says "needing no herald to prepare the people for it."

a 7. *κατὰ ταῦτα οὕτω*, "just with this view (he bade us *keep* them)." Cp. the *κατὰ τί* of 625 c 6, to which this is an answer.

b 1. *ὡς . . . κρατῇ τις*, "in the belief, i.e., that no peaceable possession or pursuit" (*ἄλλων* means other than the equipment and practice of war) "would do any good to men who did not manage to win their battles."

b 4. *γίγνεσθαι*: Stallbaum cps. the same inf. following *ὡς* with gen. abs. at *Charmides* 164 d *ὡς τούτου μὲν οὐκ ὀρθοῦ ὄντος τοῦ προσρήματος τοῦ χαίρειν, οὐδὲ δεῖν τοῦτο παρακελεύεσθαι.*

b 5. *γεγυμνάσθαι κτλ.*, "*your* training at all events has fitted *you* to discern the nature of the Cretan institution." The word *γεγυμνάσθαι* is used with a jocular reference to the above-mentioned gymnasia. It is a polite way of saying "you are very *ready* with your answer."

b 7. *ὃν γὰρ ὅρον ἔθου κτλ.*, i.e. "the criterion of the

excellence of a state's institutions is their suitability for ensuring victory in war over other states." Cp. *ὅρον θέμενος* 739 d.

c 4. The scholiast says this reply is quite *Laconic* in style. *θεῖος* is a favourite Spartan epithet of praise; only it should, in strict dialect, be *σεῖος*.

c 6–d 2. With this description of life as a *fight* we may compare H. G. Wells, *New Worlds for Old*, p. 218, "Human nature is against human nature. For human nature is in a perpetual conflict; it is the Ishmael of the universe, against everything, and with everything against it; and within, no more and no less than a perpetual battleground of passion, desire, cowardice, indolence and goodwill." It will be observed that Plato insists, as he develops this idea, that the *narrower* the field of conflict, the nobler the characteristics which are required to bring the fight to the right conclusion.

d 1. Ast takes *αὑτῷ πρὸς αὐτόν* as parallel to the two previous datives followed by *πρός c. acc.*, i.e. governed by *ταὐτὸν ὀρθόν ἐστι* understood; but it seems better, with Stallbaum, to take *αὑτῷ* as *dat. agentis* with *διανοητέον*. We are thus brought to the self-conscious standpoint.

d 2. ALO have *ἢ πῶς ἔτι λέγωμεν;* all modern editors substitute the *λέγομεν* of Eus. and A^2 and Vat. 1029 for *λέγωμεν*. Herm. joins *ἢ πῶς;* to the previous sentence, and proceeds *τί λέγομεν;*

d 4. *τῆς θεοῦ . . . ἐπονομάζεσθαι*: for this attraction of what, in a simpler form of expression, would be the object of the dependent infin. into the case governed by the word on which the infin. depends, St. quotes many parallels: e.g. *Gorg.* 513 e *ἐπιχειρητέον ἐστὶ τῇ πόλει θεραπεύειν*. Other cases are *Rep.* 416 a *ἐπιχειρῆσαι τοῖς προβάτοις κακουργεῖν*, *Laws* 700 c 1 *τὸ δὲ κῦρος τούτων γνῶναί τε καὶ ἅμα γόντα δικάσαι*: the infin. thus becomes epexegetical.

d 8. Ast and Schanz follow the "apographum Vossianum" in inserting *καὶ* before *ἑκάστους*, and Stallbaum approves, though he does not (in his 1859 edition) print the *καὶ*. Burnet does not accept the *καὶ* but puts a comma after *τε*. The reading with the *καὶ* is easier. The speaker simply re-enumerates the three contests mentioned above—between communities, between individuals, and between our two selves, so to speak. I would, however, follow Burnet, because I think that the author here intends to direct special attention to his following subject, i.e. the contest between the worse and the better self, and, to lead up to that, divides all

contests into *two* classes: (1) those fought in public (δημοσίᾳ) and (2) those fought in the privity of a man's own consciousness. It is hard to see how the καὶ before ἑκάστους could drop out, because, at first sight, it gives such a satisfactory sense. The same reason makes it easy to believe that somebody inserted it.

e 2. κἀνταῦθα, "and in that very war." Cl. has just said that life is a fight. (This is better, I think, than "and just that victory," i.e. "the victory over oneself.")

e 4. ταῦτα: i.e. this talking about victory and defeat.—For the construction cp. above on 624 a 7.

e 6. ἀναστρέψωμεν, i.e. "let us go backwards from the individual to the state."

627 a 9. τῇ τοιαύτῃ νίκῃ: cp. Dinarchus iii. 9 ὑμεῖς μὲν παρὰ πᾶσιν ἀνθρώποις ἐπαινεῖσθε ταῖς γεγενημέναις ζητήσεσιν.

b 1. The τὸ (before μὲν τοίνυν) goes with the εἰ clause.—The paradoxical nature of the idea of *self-conquest*, where both combatants are *self*—which Plato forbears to notice here (cp. also c 8)—he has pointed out at *Rep.* 430 e f. (cp. also *Gorg.* 489 c). He is more concerned here to hint at a more serious error in popular thought, i.e. that of supposing that the really *superior* could *ever* become in any sense *inferior*.

b 5. δουλούμενοι: conative.

c 1. ἄτοπον: the scholiast points out that the apparent absurdity springs from the twofold sense of the word κρεῖττον, which is a name not only for τὸ βέλτιον but also for τὸ ἐπικρατέστερον.

c 3. ἔχε δή: see on 639 d 2.

c 8. οὐ πρέπον (ἡμῖν), "not our business."

c 9. θηρεύειν: used in the same sense as διώκειν at *Rep.* 454 a κατ' αὐτὸ τὸ ὄνομα διώκειν τοῦ λεχθέντος τὴν ἐναντίωσιν. Cp. also the use of ἰχνεύειν at 654 e and *Parm.* 128 c,—"to hunt after a notion." At *Gorg.* 489 b Plato uses the fuller phrase ὀνόματα θηρεύειν (*aucupari verba*), and Boeckh (quite unnecessarily) proposed to read here ἐν τούτῳ ὀνόματα θηρεύειν. Badham proposes to take ὅτι as the neut. of ὅστις, i.e. ("it is not our business to inquire) *wherein* lies the victory or the defeat" (which would be said to put the worse above the better, or *vice versa*). But this is no criticism of the ordinary way of speaking, and deprecation of *verbal* criticism is what the context demands.

d 1 ff. "The object of our present examination of ordinary language is not to find what is proper or improper as an expression, but to find what is naturally right or wrong as law." I think

σκοπούμεθα πρός should be taken closely together, like σκοπεῖσθαι εἰς in Eur. *Med.* 1166, in the sense of *examine*. Cp. below, 645 d πρὸς τί δὲ σκοπούμενος αὐτὸ ἐπανερωτᾷς; and *Rep.* 589 c πρός τε γὰρ ἡδονὴν καὶ πρὸς εὐδοξίαν καὶ ὠφέλειαν σκοπουμένῳ . . .

d 4. φύσει may be translated by putting the adj. "essential" with the nouns "rightness and wrongness."

d 6. ὥς γε ἐμοὶ συνδοκεῖν: *Gorg.* 482 d ὥς γ' ἐμοὶ δοκεῖν, *Meno* 81 a ἐμοί γε δοκεῖν, *Euthyd.* 273 a ἐμοὶ δοκεῖν; St. cps. Ar. *Plut.* 736 ὥς γέ μοι δοκεῖ.

d 8. τόδε: the Athenian's next point is that the dissentients would not, in a civilized community, be left to themselves. There are tribunals which would set bounds to the fighting instinct. Thus he leads his audience round to the consideration that there are other things for laws to do besides getting men into fighting order. See 628 a 6. We must bear it in mind that the investigation of the Cretan and Spartan institutions here begun is not, as some have thought, meant to be the main business of the book, even at starting. From the first the author intended the deficiencies of the two systems to serve as an *introduction* to the *philosophy of law* and a *philosophical code*.

d 11 ff. There are two difficulties in this speech: (1) ἑκόντας in e 3, and (2) τρίτον πρὸς ἀρετήν. (Cp. 739 a f. τὴν ἀρίστην πολιτείαν καὶ δευτέραν καὶ τρίτην . . . εἰπόντες ἀρετῇ πρώτην πολιτείαν καὶ δευτέραν καὶ τρίτην.) The latter expression seems at first sight to mean the third in excellence, but it is evident that both speaker and hearers at once see that the third kind of judge would be far more useful than either of the others. Jowett translates "a third excellent judge," apparently taking πρὸς ἀρετήν as if it were a qualification of δικαστήν. The question may even be asked, could πρὸς ἀρετήν possibly mean *par excellence*? I think it is best to suppose that the speaker, taking it for granted that everyone would see that his second judge was better than his first, uses τρίτος in the sense of *third in an ascending scale*. *Three* was held by the Greeks to be a lucky number (cp. Soph. *O.C.* 8, *O.T.* 581, Aesch. *Eum.* 759, Soph. *fragm.* 389 with Nauck's note, Pind. *Isth.* vi. 10), and τρίτος had none of the associations of our *third-rate*. Hence τρίτος πρὸς ἀρετήν here means *more excellent than either of the other two*. (Cp. 717 c 2 ff.)

The former difficulty is a greater one. Wherein, if we read ἑκόντας, lies the superiority of the third judge? Ritter says no satisfactory answer can be found to this question, and reads

ἄκοντας. There is much to be said for this, but I think the MS. reading is correct. Judge number two secures that the majority should submit themselves voluntarily to the rule of the few (indeed it is hard to see how he could do it if *they* did *not* agree). The superior wisdom of No. 3 is shown in this, that for the personal rule of the minority he substitutes *a code of laws.* When both sides recognize the authority of this code they are more likely to remain friends than when it was a question of personal rule. There is something in the *form* of the description of the third judge that confirms this view. In this description there is a manifest reference to the shortcomings of the other two. —No. 3 does *not* (like No. 1) put anyone to death; he *does* reconcile them (like No. 2), but he does *more.* This reference to No. 2's action, which may be seen in the word διαλλάξας, will not be there if we read ἄκοντας, for then there will be no real reconciliation in the second case.—The friendly relation resulting in the third case implies that the majority see that it is their own interest to obey the laws.

628 a 1. I insert a comma after διαλλάξας δέ, to emphasize the connexion of εἰς τὸν ἐπίλοιπον χρόνον with παραφυλάττειν. Judge No. 3 not only brings about a reconciliation, but cements it by the laws he lays down to govern future action. As Cleinias says, he is not merely δικαστής, he is νομοθέτης as well. The three optatives ἀπολέσειεν in d 11 (with προστάξειεν), ἂν ποιήσειεν, and ἀπολέσειεν in e 5 (with δύναιτο) subtly vary the form of phrase, and deserve attention. ἀπολέσειεν in d 11 is like the assimilated opt. at Ar. *Nub.* 1251 οὐκ ἂν ἀποδοίην οὐδ' ἂν ὄβολον οὐδενὶ | ὅστις καλέσειε κάρδοπον τὴν καρδόπην, i.e. we should supply ἂν εἴη with ἀμείνων; ἂν ποιήσειεν has the form of the apodosis of a conditional sentence with which we may supply "if occasion offered." ἀπολέσειεν again in e 5 is opt. by assimilation to εἴη.—Other slight peculiarities of expression which give a special flavour to the passage are μήτε (e 5) followed by δέ (see 649 b 5), and the παραφυλάττειν, ὥστε εἶναι φίλους, "to secure that they should be friends," for the simple "to make them friends" (πρὸς ἀλλήλους goes with φίλους).—It is a question whether we ought not to put a ; after φίλους.

a 6. τοὐναντίον ἢ πρὸς πόλεμον: not only is the lawgiver in this case not looking towards *war* when making his laws, but he is looking exactly in the opposite direction: he is trying to make *peace.*

a 9. πρὸς πόλεμον αὐτῆς κτλ.: though we have seen that a

lawgiver sometimes looks towards peace, there is a sense in which he may be said to be looking towards a war in which his state may be involved: but it is civil, not foreign war, and it is with a view of *avoiding* it, not of making one side efficient fighters, that he makes his laws. For the distinction between στάσις and πόλεμος cp. *Rep.* 470 b ff. The phrases ὁ τὴν πόλιν συναρμόττων and τὸν βίον αὐτῆς κοσμεῖν throw light on Plato's views as to the function of the lawgiver. The former contains the same metaphor as is used by St. Paul at Col. 2. 19 of the Christian community: τὴν κεφαλήν, ἐξ οὗ πᾶν τὸ σῶμα διὰ τῶν ἁφῶν καὶ συνδέσμων ἐπιχορηγούμενον καὶ συμβιβαζόμενον αὔξει τὴν αὔξησιν τοῦ θεοῦ. For the latter cp. Eur. *Cycl.* 339 where the Cyclops, an enemy to law, speaks of lawgivers as ποικίλλοντες ἀνθρώπων βίον.

b 6. εἰρήνην στάσεως: Plato allows himself to use the same gen. with εἰρήνη at *Rep.* 329 c παντάπασι γὰρ τῶν γε τοιούτων ἐν τῷ γήρᾳ πολλὴ εἰρήνη γίγνεται καὶ ἐλευθερία. In our passage the expression is made less strained by the nearness of ἀπαλλάττεσθαι used of the same στάσις, and in the latter passage by the addition of ἐλευθερία to εἰρήνη. (Ast wants to read ἐκ τῆς στάσεως, and Stallbaum, reproving Ast, tells us that the gen. goes with δέξαιτο μᾶλλον, and is equal to ἢ στάσιν.) It seems strange to us that the definite ἑτέρων should precede the indefinite ποτέρων; the English form would be: "that, after the victory of one or the other party, the other should be put to death." All through the speech the gen. abs. clauses contain, as Stallbaum says, the *primaria notio*. For ποτέρων cp. 673 b 7, 914 d, *Charm.* 171 b, *Phil.* 20 e, *Rep.* 499 c, 509 a, *Theaet.* 145 a, *Soph.* 252 a.

b 9. Though long inclined with Schanz to bracket ἀνάγκην εἶναι —indeed I suspected the words before I knew that he did—I have now decided to follow Burnet in keeping them. It must be remembered that the infinitive depends on δέξαιτ' ἄν. The question resolves itself into: "under which of the two circumstances would you prefer to be *forced to turn your attention* to a foreign foe?" (ἀνάγκην εἶναι is therefore the equivalent of "when so compelled.")

c 6. τοῦ ἀρίστου ἕνεκα: here is slipped in, as if it were a commonplace, the root of Plato's philosophy of law; it is not, in his eyes, so much a means of repressing evil, as a means of *producing good*.

c 10. ἀπευκτὸν δὲ τὸ δεηθῆναι τούτων: parenthetical, "these are things which we should pray to be spared"; lit. "the needing them is to be deprecated."

d 1. οὐκ ἦν κτλ.: the past tense contains a reference to their

previous conversation on the subject: "the victory which we were talking about comes under the head of things necessary, not of things that are best:"—a variety of the so-called "philosophic imperfect."

d 2 ff. *ὅμοιον ὡς εἰ . . . ὡσαύτως δέ*: the simile is not drawn out in regular form, but the meaning all through is perfectly clear. It is implied, but not said, that it is a mistake to be so deeply interested in the cure of a malady as to forget that it is better not to have had a malady to cure. We shall meet the same medical metaphor in another connexion below at 646 c.

d 6. In *πολιτικὸς ὀρθῶς*, followed by *νομοθέτης ἀκριβής*, we see again the characteristic preference for *variety* of expression. The style of the *Laws* is loose, and at times almost dreamy, but the thought is definite and clear.—*ἀκριβής* is used of a *νομοθέτης* as at *Rep.* 342 d of an *ἴατρος*—*perfect (in his art)*.

d 7. *ἀποβλέπων* is epexegetic of *διανοούμενος οὕτω*.

e 1. *τῶν πολεμικῶν ἕνεκα τὰ τῆς εἰρήνης*: thus the Athenian has brought round the argument to a condemnation of Cleinias's interpretation of the root notion of the Dorian institutions. Cp. below 803 d 3 ff.

e 3. *θαυμάζω . . . εἰ . . . μή*, "I am much mistaken if (they have) not." For the same idiom in a past tense cp. Aristoph. *Pax* 1292 *ἦ γὰρ ἐγὼ 'θαύμαζον ἀκούων εἰ σὺ μὴ εἶης ἀνδρὸς βουλομάχου καὶ κλαυσιμάχου τινὸς υἱός*. For *θαυμάζω εἰ* in the sense of *I am surprised if* cp. *Prot.* 349 c *οὐ γὰρ ἂν θαυμάζοιμι εἰ τότε ἀποπειρώμενός μου ταῦτά πως ἔλεγες*.

629 a 1. *τάχ' ἂν ἴσως*, "that is quite likely."—Hermann, the Zürich edition, Schanz and Burnet adopt Bekker's emendation of the MS. *αὐτοὺς* to *αὐτοῖς*. Stallbaum stands by the MS. reading. "Sed libri omnes mordicus tenent accusativum. Atque is sane defensionem utcunque paratam habet. Pendet enim non ex verbo proximo, sed potius ex remotiore *ἀνερωτᾶν*." I do not agree with St.'s interpretation, but I think that the MS. reading does admit of a '*defensio*.' I take the connexion of ideas to be this: "You say *fighting* was the one thing the old legislation had in view: I am not surprised you should think so; but *we* on our part (*αὐτούς*) must not at any point (*οὐδέν*) be too keen *fighters*;" i.e. "do not let us insist on *our* view, but try by discussion to elicit the *true* view." (To those who still prefer *αὐτοῖς* I would suggest taking it as *neuter*, the following *ἐκείνων* being the first reference to the *authors* of the *νόμιμα*.)

a 2. *ὡς μάλιστα . . . σπουδαζόντων*, "in the name of our

common devotion to the subject"—"not forgetting that *they* cared about it just as much as *we* do." *ταῦτα* is "laws and government."

a 3. *καί μ. τ. λόγῳ συνακολουθήσατε*, "help me, please, to conduct the argument."

a 4. *προστησώμεθα γοῦν*, "I'm sure you won't mind if I appeal to Tyrtaeus." *προΐστασθαι* means "to put in a position of authority over us. Schol. "*τοῦτον οὖν ἐν τῷ λόγῳ παρέλαβεν ὁ Ἀθηναῖος ξένος, ὡς καὶ αὐτὸν πολέμου σύμβουλον γεγονότα.*"

a 6. *ταῦτα* here (like the *τούτων* seven lines higher up) refers to *war*, not to *law*.—*μάλιστα ἀνθρώπων*: "*ἀνθρώπων* enim superlativis ita apponitur ut eorum significationem augeat" Ast, who quotes *Theaet.* 148 b *ἄριστά γ' ἀνθρώπων*, *Hipp. Mai.* 285 c *ἀκριβέστατα ἀνθρώπων*, and many other examples from Plato and other authors. Cp. below 637 a 1 *κάλλιστ' ἀνθρώπων*.

b 1. *οὔτ'* . . . *οὔτ'* MSS., *οὐδ'* . . . *οὐδ'* Boeckh (following Tyrtaeus).

b 2. *εἰπὼν σχεδὸν ἅπαντα*, "and he goes pretty well through the list of (worldly) advantages." Cp. the fragment of Tyrtaeus, Bergk, *A.L.* 12.

b 4. *ὅδε μὲν γὰρ κτλ.*, "as to Megillus, *he* has them at his fingers' ends."

b 9. *δοκεῖς γ. δ. σοφὸς ἡ. εἶ. κ. ἀγαθός, ὅτι* . . . *ἐγκεκωμίακας*: at first sight it looks as if *διαφερόντως* (i.e. T.'s poetical skill) contained the whole ground for the bestowal of the epithets *σοφός* and *ἀγαθός*, but a consideration of the whole argument, and more particularly of the comparison in 630 c and e between the heaven-inspired legislator who aims at producing virtue (and whose code is pervaded by one principle), and the hand-to-mouth human legislator who meets special needs by special (repressive) enactments,—this consideration shows, I think, that the words here mean: "your insight and your right feeling are manifest from the high praises you bestow on high virtue in war"; i.e. it was not merely the excellence of T.'s poetry that makes the speaker call him *σοφός* and *ἀγαθός*, but the fact that he praises virtue, even though, as he shows in 630 b, he takes a narrow view of virtue.

d 2. *χαλεπώτατος*, "deadliest"; *πρᾳότερον*, "milder."

d 7 ff. Badham brackets *ἐπαινῶν* as being an impediment to the construction, while many emendations have been proposed of *πρὸς τοὺς ἐκτός* (of which the best seems to me the *πρὸς τὸν ἐκτός* of Baiter and Badham). I would in the text adopt a less extensive emendation than any of them, suggested to me by F.H.D.,—that of transposing *πότερον* and *ποτέρους*. The latter

word may well have been put first by a scribe who thought ὑπερεπῃνέσας ought to have more of an object than it has, or the transposition may have been made inadvertently. The construction of ἐπαινῶν is thus made easier, and πρὸς τοὺς ἐκτός needs no emendation. We must supply τοὺς μὲν from the τοὺς δὲ. Plato often lightens a sentence by such omission. Cp. *Laws* 648 c 1, *Phil.* 35 e, 36 e, and *Prot.* 330 a. πόλεμον in this case would be used loosely for the fighters in the war, as we speak of "the meeting" or "the cause" or "the trade," meaning the people engaged in one or the other.

e 2. τολμήσωσι: τολμήσουσι, which Stephanus and Stallbaum read, has no MS. authority. The same subjunctive without ἄν following a relative occurs at v. 34 of the same poem of Tyrtaeus: ὅντιν' ἀριστεύοντα μένοντά τε μαρνάμενόν τε | γῆς πέρι καὶ παίδων θοῦρος Ἄρης ὀλέσῃ. The exact words of T. at this passage are: οὐ γὰρ ἀνὴρ ἀγαθὸς γίγνεται ἐν πολέμῳ εἰ μὴ τετλαίη μὲν ὁρῶν φόνον αἱματόεντα καὶ δηΐων ὀρέγοιτ' ἐγγύθεν ἱστάμενος. Plato has reproduced the μὲν . . . καί while varying the other points.

630 a. The Athenian now proceeds to show that while the milder warfare brings out one sort of virtue, the deadlier warfare, wherein a man's foes are those of his own community, brings out more kinds. It is not only that the danger is nearer and greater. The difficulty at such times is to know whom to trust. The outward bonds of society, which keep men straight, are broken, and it is then seen who are good really, and who were only kept apparently good by the restraints of social observance. Both Plato and Theognis may be held to have assumed that in a στάσις the right was all on one side.

a 5. πιστός is best taken absolutely (not with ἐν χαλ. διχ.): "at a time of deadly civil strife a loyal man is worth his weight in gold." This way of taking πιστός is quite consistent with the following πιστὸς καὶ ὑγιὴς ἐν στάσεσιν, and πυστότης ἐν τοῖς δεινοῖς, inasmuch as it is *in* these trials that his loyalty is shown.

This passage prepares the way for treating σωφροσύνη (as he does later on) as a *fight*. The three kinds of fighting are: (1) against foreigners; in this the virtue is ἀνδρεία; (2) against fellow-citizens: in this the virtue of δικαιοσύνη is required most of all; (3) against oneself: in this fight the virtue displayed is σωφροσύνη.

b 1. ἐλθοῦσαι Eus., Proclus, ἐλθοῦσα MSS.

b 2. The words αὐτῆς μόνης ἀνδρείας, which are added in Eusebius's and Proclus's quotation of this passage, and are trans-

lated by Ficinus, are missing in all MSS. They are almost necessary for the sense, and the repetition of the word *ἀνδρείας* might well divert the transcriber's eye, and cause him to omit the words.—*ὑγιής* is used as in the passage of Simonides quoted at *Prot.* 346 c *ὑγιὴς ἀνήρ*: "*sound*" in a moral sense, "*honest.*" (See above on a and below on 639 a 7.) So in *Ep.* x. 358 c *τὸ γὰρ βέβαιον καὶ πιστὸν καὶ ὑγιές, τοῦτο ἐγώ φημι εἶναι τὴν ἀληθινὴν φιλοσοφίαν.*

b 3. *διαβάντες*: used in the sense of taking a firm stand (lit. straddle) as in the passage of Tyrtaeus from which the above quotation comes (11. 21).

b 4. Again Eusebius must be held to have preserved the correct reading *ἐν ᾧ πολέμῳ* (so Winckelmann conjectured), where the MSS. have *ἐν τῷ πολέμῳ*. Clemens, who reads *ἐν τῷ πολέμῳ*, in quoting the passage, saves the sense by omitting *φράζει* Τύρταιος.

b 7. *εὖ μάλα ὀλίγων* Eus., *μάλα ὀλίγων* MSS. A matter of rhythm. As Eus. seems often to have been right in this passage when differing from the MSS., I follow Burnet in choosing the former, especially as the addition of *εὖ* seems to improve the balance of the phrase.—The mention of mercenaries suggests a further difference between Tyrtaeus's ideal and that of Theognis. The mere fighter does not care which side he is on. Theognis's loyal man fights for what he thinks right.

b 8. Now that the *λόγος* we have followed has shown us a higher and a lower excellence—one four times as good as the other, we may say—can we imagine that any "decent" legislator, let alone a divinely-inspired one, would have only the lower in view in framing his laws? (Cp. above 628 e.)—We shall find Plato's common personification of the *λόγος* lower down at 644 e in the phrase *φησιν ὁ λόγος*.

c 2. *τῇδε*: i.e. in Crete.

c 3. For *ἄλλο* MSS. Heindorf conjectured *ἄλλοσε*, comparing *Theaet.* 202 e *ἢ οἴει ἄλλοσέ ποι βλέποντα ταῦτα εἰπεῖν.* In spite of Riddell's defence of *ἄλλο* (*Digest of Pl. Idioms* § 21) I adopt H.'s correction because I believe that in the idiom in which some part of *ποιεῖν* has to be understood with *ἄλλο*, there is always a *τι* with the *ἄλλο*, and the negative to it is not *οὐκ ἄλλο* (*ποιεῖν*) *ἤ*, but *οὐδὲν ἄλλο* (*ποιεῖν*) *ἤ*. So in a question at Xen. *Mem.* ii. 3. 17 *τί γὰρ ἄλλο, ἔφη ὁ Σωκράτης, ἢ κινδυνεύεις ἐπιδεῖξαι;* (cp. also *Euthyd.* 287 e). Perhaps the *ε* of *ἄλλοσε* was elided, and that may have facilitated the change to *ἄλλο*.

c 6. *δικαιοσύνην τελέαν*: for the whole of this passage it

is important to compare Aristotle, *Eth. Nic.* v. p. 1129 b 11 ff. especially (at l. 26) *αὕτη μὲν οὖν ἡ δικαιοσύνη ἀρετὴ μέν ἐστι, ἀλλ' οὐχ ἁπλῶς, ἀλλὰ πρὸς ἕτερον*, and l. 29 where he quotes Theognis 147: *ἐν δὲ δικαιοσύνῃ συλλήβδην πᾶσ' ἀρετὴ* [*ἔνι*] (Bergk *'στιν*). Aristotle's definition of *δικαιοσύνη* as the *ἀρετή* that shows itself in one's dealings with one's neighbour (*πρὸς ἕτερον*) explains and coincides with Plato's identification of *δικαιοσύνη* with *πιστότης*.

c 7. *κατὰ καιρόν*: as *κατὰ τρόπον* (below 635 d) means "in the right way," so *κατὰ καιρόν* means "opportunely." Cp. Pind. *Isth.* ii. 32 *χεῖρα . . . τὰν Νικόμαχος κατὰ καιρὸν νεῖμ' ἀπάσαις ἀνίαις*.

c 8. *δυνάμει τοῦ τιμία εἶναι*: a still more complicated verbal phrase depending on *δύναμις* is to be found at *Phaedo* 99 c *τὴν δὲ τοῦ ὡς οἷόν τε βέλτιστα αὐτὰ τεθῆναι δύναμιν οὕτω κεῖσθαι*. Cp. *Rep.* 433 d *ἡ τοῦ ἕκαστον ἐν αὐτῇ τὰ αὑτοῦ πράττειν δύναμις*. Varieties of verbal construction with *δύναμις* are (1) simpl. inf. *Phil.* 58 d *δύναμις ἐρᾶν τε τοῦ ἀληθοῦς καὶ πάντα ἕνεκα τούτου πράττειν*, *Rep.* 364 b *δύναμις . . . ἀκεῖσθαι*: (2) inf. with *τοῦ*: *Phil.* 57 e and *Rep.* 533 a and 532 d, *ἡ τοῦ διαλέγεσθαι δύναμις*, *Rep.* 328 c *ἐν δυνάμει τοῦ ῥᾳδίως πορεύεσθαι πρὸς τὸ ἄστυ*, *Rep.* 507 c *τὴν τοῦ ὁρᾶν τε καὶ ὁρᾶσθαι δύναμιν*: (3) *ὥστε* with inf.: *Rep.* 433 b *τὴν δύναμιν πάρεσχεν ὥστε ἐγγένεσθαι*: (4) *πρὸς τό c. inf.*: *Polit.* 272 b *παρούσης αὐτοῖς οὕτω πολλῆς σχολῆς καὶ δυνάμεως πρὸς τὸ μὴ μόνον ἀνθρώποις ἀλλὰ καὶ θηρίοις διὰ λόγων συγγίγνεσθαι*, *Laws* 657 b *δύναμιν ἔχει πρὸς τὸ διαφθεῖραι τὴν καθιερωθεῖσαν χορείαν*.

d 3. *τοὺς πόρρω νομοθέτας* MSS. Fault has been found with this expression (1) because of the occurrence of two cases of the word *νομοθέτης* in one sentence, and (2) because *πόρρω* was thought an inadequate expression: "Nam aperte fateor etiam istud *πόῤῥω* sic indefinite positum mihi displicere" (Stallbaum, who, like Ficinus, prints the sentence as a question). Ritter would read *νομοθεσίας* for *νομοθέτας*. At *Rep.* 620 c the soul of Thersites is discovered *πόρρω ἐν ὑστάτοις*. Perhaps here and there *πόρρω* has the sense of our "low down," "out of the way," "beyond the pale." (Ought *νομοθέτας* perhaps to be rejected?)—For the use of *ἀποβάλλομεν* cp. below 637 e, where *ἀποβάλλω* has even a stronger condemnatory force.

d 4. *οὐχ ἡμεῖς γε κτλ.*, "no, we don't: it is ourselves we are depreciating: we are quite at sea in imagining . . ."

d 8. *τὸ δέ*, "but," cp. Heindorf on *Theaet.* 157 b. (C. W. E. Miller

Am. Phil. Ass. Trans. vols. xxxix. and xl. denies Heindorf's statement —in vain, I think.) For τὸ δέ in a question cp. 886 b 3, 967 a 6 τὸ δὲ δὴ πῶς ἔχον ἂν εἴη; and see E. S. Thompson's note on *Meno* 97 c.

d 9. The substitution of τὸ ἀληθές for ἀληθές is like our putting "it is truth" in a similar sentence for "it is true." Cp. 659 b 3 ὅς γε τὸ δίκαιον.

e 1. Badham's guess that θείου ἀνδρός, written with contractions as θεΐἄρ, was first copied θειαρ and then changed to θείας gives us what, in view of the following ἐτίθει, is, both for grammar and sense, indispensable, i.e. a *person.* θείας cannot stand. There is no substantive, with which it would make sense, that could have been left out. Even if, with the scholiast, we supply πολιτείας (which Stephanus prints), or (better) with Gottleber, νομοθεσίας, and grant that it might have been omitted, ἐτίθει still has to go back to Cleinias's last speech but one for a subject. (Cp. also the ἐτίθει and the αὐτόν in 631 a.) Cousin was looking in the right direction when he suggested supplying κεφαλῆς with θείας. Cp. *Meno* 99 d καὶ οἱ Λάκωνες, ὅταν τινὰ ἐγκωμιάζωσιν ἀγαθὸν ἄνδρα, θεῖος ἀνήρ, φασίν, οὗτος, and Arist. *N. E.* 1145 a 28 ἐπεὶ δὲ σπάνιον καὶ τὸ θεῖον ἄνδρα εἶναι, καθάπερ οἱ Λάκωνες εἰώθασι προσαγορεύειν, ὅταν ἀγασθῶσι σφόδρα του (σεῖος ἀνήρ φασιν), οὕτω καὶ ὁ θηριώδης ἐν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις σπάνιος, below 642 d 5 Ἐπιμενίδης . . . ἀνὴρ θεῖος, and 666 d τίς ἂν οὖν πρέποι θείοις ἀνδράσιν;

e 3. καὶ κατ' εἴδη ζητεῖν αὐτῶν τοὺς νόμους οὐδ' ἅπερ οἱ τῶν νῦν εἴδη προτιθέμενοι ζητοῦσιν: this difficult passage has been variously interpreted as it stands, and variously emended. The first question to decide is whether the εἴδη are classes of *virtue,* or classes of *laws.* Stallbaum held the former view (as did Ast), and he took αὐτῶν as referring to the ἀρετῶν *implied* in πᾶσαν ἀρετήν. Though this seems impossible, Steinhart's emendation of αὐτῶν to αὐτῆς provides a good construction for this interpretation. And this interpretation would be satisfactory, if the sentence stopped at νόμους. But what have the modern, narrow-minded, hand-to-mouth legislators, who are referred to in the latter half of the sentence, to do with εἴδη ἀρετῆς? The point made against them is that they do not look to ἀρετή at all. In the latter half of the passage the εἴδη *must* be kinds or classes of *laws.* Inasmuch as αὐτῶν seems to be contrasted with τῶν νῦν, I do not adopt Ast's alteration of αὐτῶν to αὐτὸν. I would, with Schneider, take οὐδ' as οὐ δὲ (I would even suggest that we ought perhaps to read οὐχ

for οὐδ'), and would translate: "and (we ought to have said) that he tried to devise" (the χρῆν and the ὡς ἐτίθει empower us to translate ζητεῖν as referring to past time) "the laws of the men of that time in classes, but not the classes which the legislators of the present day have in mind when they devise laws." Seeing that a divinely-inspired legislator must always have in mind the production of virtue of all kinds in the members of his state, the classes or heads under which he would arrange his laws would correspond with classes and kinds of virtue and excellence—those e.g. which are enumerated at 631 b and c:—this is implied, but not directly expressed.—The meaning of ζητεῖν, which I have translated *try to devise*, is, as Ast says, illustrated by the τὸ περὶ νόμους ζήτημα occurring a few lines further down. It denotes the practical side of the inquiry into law—the trying to get, the *casting about* for laws, *excogitating* laws. Cp. Soph. *O.T.* 658 ἐμοὶ ζητῶν ὄλεθρον ἢ φυγὴν ἐκ τῆσδε γῆς, and especially *Politicus* 299 b 5 and e 7 κυβερνητικὴν . . . ζητῶν παρὰ τὰ γράμματα. (Fr. Doering, *De legum Platonicarum compositione*, Inaug. Diss. Leipzig 1907, takes αὐτῶν to refer to Minos and Lycurgus, and translates ζητεῖν τοὺς νόμους "*in leges inquirere*," and makes it depend on χρῆν; "*jubet socios* (*in leges eorum inquirere*)." This takes no account of ἐτίθει βλέπων, and though the following ζητοῦσιν *might* be taken in the same sense, ζητεῖ in the next line could *not*. Also he wants not χρῆν, but χρή for his interpretation.)

e 4. οὗ γὰρ κτλ.: I think εἴδους has to be supplied with οὗ: "whatever kind of law any law-maker finds to be needed, nowadays he devises, and adds it (παραθέμενος) to its class: one adds a law about division of property, or the treatment of sole-heiresses, another one about personal violence"; i.e. the modern legislator finds his code arranged under several headings (such as *inheritance*, or *assault*), and all he can do is to add something to one of the existing chapters, if he comes across a case that the existing law fails to meet. The philosopher, on the other hand, like the original divine lawgiver, imagines himself to be unfettered by existing codes. He begins all over again on philosophic principles —the principles which he says he can discern in the divine lawgiver's enactments. (Cf. *Rep.* 427 a where Socrates has just compared the details of the work of modern lawgivers—νομοθετοῦντές τε καὶ ἐπανορθοῦντες—to the cutting off of the ever reappearing Hydra's heads.) Cleinias, the Athenian says, is on the right track. He sees that you must ask what is the

educational value of law. In thus saying, it must be admitted that he rather reads his own views into the Cretan's statement that what Minos wanted was to make good soldiers, and Cleinias must have been rather surprised (after the manner of M. Jourdain), to find he had been a philosopher after all. The Athenian next asks if he shall show him how he ought to have gone on after such a promising beginning, and thus skilfully gets into the professor's chair without seeming to claim it for himself. This manœuvre is dramatically perfect.

631 a 1. *τῶν εὖ ζ.*: what is implied here is: "and this is the way Minos and Lycurgus must have sought for laws."

a 2. *σοῦ*: Ast is, I think, wrong in writing *σου*, and taking it as merely possessive with *ἐπιχείρησιν*: it is best taken as governed by *ἄγαμαι*. The two constructions that follow are marked off by *μέν* and *δέ*, as if *οὐκ ἄγαμαι* were to follow in the *δέ* clause: a parallel to the former may be found at Eur. *Iph. in Aul.* 28 *οὐκ ἄγαμαι ταῦτ' ἀνδρὸς ἀριστέως*, and possibly at *Prot.* 335 d *ἔγωγέ σου τὴν φιλοσοφίαν ἄγαμαι*. That (*οὐκ*) *ἄγαμαι might* have stood before a *ὅτι* clause may be seen by *Hipp. Mai.* 291 e *ἄγαμαί σου ὅτι μοι δοκεῖς . . .* Instead, however, of going on *οὐκ ἄγαμαι* he varies the phrase, and goes on as if the *μέν* had stood at the beginning of the *τὸ γὰρ ἀπ' ἀρετῆς ἄρχεσθαι* clause. The perfectly regular construction of the complex sentence would have been: *καὶ σοῦ τὴν μὲν ἐπ. ἄγαμαι . . ὀρθὸν γάρ· ὅτι δὲ . . . οὐκ ἄγαμαι, οὐ γὰρ ὀρθόν.*

a 8. *διελόμενον* means "expound," which goes closely with *λέγειν*.

b 4. *μάτην, sine causa*: cp. *Alc. I.* 113 c 4 *ἐμὲ δὲ αἰτίᾳ μάτην*, *Laws* 715 b *καὶ τὰ τούτων δίκαια, ἃ φασιν εἶναι, μάτην εἰρῆσθαι.*

b 8. *πόλις κτᾶται* MSS. and Eusebius, *κτᾶται* Theodoret, *παρίστασθαι* Stobaeus; *παρίσταται* Badham conjectured, *προσκτᾶται* Hug. *πόλις* is out of place here: (1) the point of view is that of the individual members of the community: *τοὺς αὐτοῖς χρωμένους* b 5; (2) it is moreover unnatural to speak of a state as possessing e.g. *ἰσχὺς εἰς δρόμον*; (3) if *πόλις* stood it seems more natural that it should not have a *τις* agreeing with it (Eusebius, in his quotation of the passage, leaves it out). *τις*, no doubt, was the only subject of *δέχηται*, and Stobaeus's *παρίστασθαι*—he fancied the sentence as reported, or dependent — points the way to Badham's *παρίσταται*, which is palaeographically not unlikely to have been corrupted to *πόλις κτᾶται*. (**IC** was read twice, the second time as **K**.) I would follow Schanz in adopting it. It may be noted that *δέχηται* is aptly used of gifts which come from

the gods.—For the sense cp. St. Matthew 6. 33 *ζητεῖτε δὲ πρῶτον τὴν βασιλείαν καὶ τὴν δικαιοσύνην αὐτοῦ, καὶ ταῦτα πάντα προστεθήσεται ὑμῖν.*—For *παρίστασθαι* thus used cp. *Laws* 707 a *κακὸν ἐν θαλάσσῃ τριήρεις ὁπλίταις παρεστῶσαι μαχομένοις.* —At 697 b *ἀγαθά* are divided into *three* classes: (1) *τὰ περὶ τὴν ψυχὴν ἀγαθά*, (2) *τὰ περὶ τὸ σῶμα καλὰ καὶ ἀγαθά*, and (3) *τὰ περὶ τὴν οὐσίαν καὶ χρήματα.* Of these divisions the second and third together correspond to *τὰ ἀνθρώπινα* here.

c 2. *τὰ μὲν ἐλάττονα*: the same four "worldly goods" are enumerated in Bk. II. 661 a: at *Gorg.* 451 e *ἰσχύς* is left out, while in the well-known *σκόλιον*, to which Socrates there refers, after health, beauty, and honestly-won wealth, comes (as fitting on a social occasion) *ἠβᾶν μετὰ τῶν φίλων* as a fourth. The addition, in the passage in Bk. II., of *μυρία δὲ ἄλλα ἀγαθὰ λέγεται* shows that we are not to lay stress on any particular three or four.

c 4. *κινήσεις τῷ σώματι*: a genitival dative of the instrument, going closely with the verbal noun; so below 633 b *ταῖς χερσὶ μάχαις.*—*οὐ τυφλός*: the proverbial blindness of wealth is here spoken of as a malady incident to its possessor.

c 6. *ἡ φρόνησις*: for this repetition cp. below 823 c 4 and Heindorf on *Gorg.* 501 a.—For the sense cp. 688 b 2, 963 a 8.

c 7. *μετὰ νοῦν* is the reading of the MSS. and of Stobaeus; Eusebius and Theodoret read *μετὰ νοῦ*, which I follow Schanz and Burnet in adopting. Badham, independently, suggested the latter reading, referring to the passage (710 a) where Plato speaks slightingly of *τὴν δημώδη σωφροσύνην* as contrasted with that which is accompanied by *φρόνησις*, or rather is *φρόνησις* as well. At 696 d also *σωφροσύνη ἄνευ πάσης τῆς ἄλλης ἀρετῆς μεμονωμένη* is spoken of as a very poor thing. The stress laid, all through this passage, and elsewhere in the *Laws*, on the importance of the *conjunction* of the virtues is in favour of Eusebius's reading. (We might almost say Plato holds that one virtue by itself, or at all events the natural tendency to it, needs to be *corrected* by another —e.g. above at 630 b, and below at 831 e, he talks of the danger that the mere *ἀνδρεῖος* may become a nuisance. In different passages in the *Laws* we are told that two things are necessary to perfection of character: (1) the natural disposition to a particular virtue must be trained in action (791 c *τὸ νικᾶν δείματα ἐπιτήδευμα ἀνδρείας*, 815 e *γεγυμνασμένος πρὸς ἀνδρείαν*, 816 a *ἀγύμναστος γεγονὼς πρὸς τὸ σωφρονεῖν*); (2) one virtue cannot stand alone; it must be helped by others. Above (630 a ff.) the Athenian speaks of *πιστότης* as involving *συμπᾶσα ἀρετή*, and he says we

might call this τελέα δικαιοσύνη—"perfect righteousness." In the present passage he uses δικαιοσύνη in the narrower sense. All this shows that our present discussion is *practical*, not speculative. The author wants us to have in mind the perfect character, and the way to produce it, rather than a classification of the virtues, or a scientifically exact nomenclature for a treatise on Moral Philosophy.)

631 d 1—632 b 1. ταῦτα δὲ πάντα κτλ., "nature has set all these above the other four, and the lawgiver must put them in the same rank. In the next place he must proclaim to the citizens that his other commands to them have these blessings in view: that of the blessings themselves the human wait upon the divine, and all the divine upon their leader wisdom. (As to the commands I spoke of) he must (δεῖ) so dispense honour and disgrace as to watch over (the whole life of the citizen): he must regulate the marriages they make, and his care must next extend to the production and rearing of both sexes, from youth to age. To do this he must carefully and closely observe them in all their intercourse with each other, and notice what gives pain, what gives pleasure, what excites desire and ardent affection. His laws must themselves be the instruments for rightly administering both blame and praise. Moreover, in anger, in fear, in all the troubles that misfortune brings, in the relief from trouble that comes with prosperity, in all the chances of disease or health, war or peace, poverty or wealth, what the lawgiver has to teach and to define is, in each of these various conditions, what is right, and what is wrong."

I have translated this difficult and somewhat loosely jointed passage in full, to show what I take to be the connexion of thought between its different parts. (d 3) βλέπουσας εἶναι is equivalent to βλέπειν (cp. 963 a 2 πρὸς γὰρ ἓν ἔφαμεν δεῖν ἀεὶ πάνθ' ἡμῖν τὰ τῶν νόμων **βλέποντ'** εἶναι), and προστάξεις is its subject: the dat. πολίταις is governed by προστάξεις: αὐτοῖς (i.e. the citizens) is best taken with διακελευστέον: τούτων refers (not to προστάξεις but) to ἀγαθά (from τούτων δέ to βλέπειν is a sort of parenthesis). If this explanation be adopted it will be seen that there is no force in Badham's contention that these words mean that the legislator is to charge *someone else* (e.g. the magistrate) to make the detailed enactments of which a summary is given from d 6 onwards, and which *the legislator himself is to make.* To obviate this supposed contradiction he reads πράξεις for προστάξεις. (He does not say how we are to construe εἶναι.) Fr. Doering (*ut supra*) makes this supposed contradiction the basis of his view that the

whole passage from 631 d 6 *περί τε γάμους* to 632 d 1 *φιλοτιμία* was written by Plato after he had changed his views about the task of the legislator. He began the *Laws*, D. says, with the view expressed at *Rep.* 425 c (and 427 a) that the legislator had only to make general arrangements for the outline of the state, and especially for the educative influences under which the citizens are to grow up: detailed enactments were to be left to the magistrates, or even to the good sense of individuals.

d 6 ff. *περί τε γάμους* and *ἐν ταῖς γεννήσεσιν* go with *ἐπιμελεῖσθαι*, which, I think, also governs the genitives *νέων ὄντων* and *ἰόντων*. (For *περί* with acc. after *ἐπιμελεῖσθαι* cp. *Menex.* 248 e *τῆς δὲ πόλεως ἴστε που καὶ αὐτοὶ τὴν ἐπιμέλειαν, ὅτι νόμους θεμένη περὶ τοὺς τῶν ἐν τῷ πολέμῳ τελευτησάντων παῖδάς τε καὶ γεννήτορας ἐπιμελεῖται.*) Ast says the genitive *νέων ὄντων* agrees with *παίδων*: but even though *τροφαί*, as he says, includes *educatio et institutio* as well as *nutriendi officium*, it could hardly be used of the care to be bestowed upon the aged. Stallbaum strangely takes *νέων ὄντων* as the *subjective* genitive to *τροφαῖς*—"the care of the children, whether exercised by young or old."

e 3. I would not follow Stallbaum in introducing *τε* after *ἐν πάσαις*, because the participial clause goes very well in a kind of subordination to *τιμῶντα καὶ ἀτιμάζοντα ἐπιμελεῖσθαι*, expressing the way in which the legislator can get the power of so doing.

632 a 2. With *ψέγειν* we must supply *δεῖ* from above.

a 2 ff. *ἐν ὀργαῖς τε αὖ . . . καλὸν καὶ μή*: Ritter remarks that whereas the previous words refer to the ordinary course of life and social intercourse, the key-word to this passage is *ταραχαί*. It deals with all the extraordinary occurrences that "upset" the mind, as we say. He is perhaps right in saying that even in *εὐτυχία* there is a disturbing influence, but few will follow him in his translation of (a 4) *τῶν τοιούτων ἀποφυγαί*. He says *τοιούτων* means the educative influences to which, in ordinary life, a man is subjected. No doubt Ast and Stallb. are right in saying that *τῶν τοιούτων* refers to *τῶν* (*διὰ δυστυχίαν*) *ταραχῶν τῆς ψυχῆς*.

a 6. *παθήματα may* mean *emotions* (so Stallb. apparently), but it is better to take it in the general sense of *occurrences*; cp. *Symp.* 189 d *δεῖ δὲ πρῶτον ὑμᾶς μαθεῖν τὴν ἀνθρωπίνην φύσιν καὶ τὰ παθήματα αὐτῆς*.

b 1. *τό τε καλὸν καὶ μή*, "h.e. *quatenus affectioni obsequi deceat necne*," Ast.

(There are two other notes of Ritter's on the passage above

translated which are helpful. He says, no doubt the place for the lawgiver's pronouncement (631 d 2) on the relative value of the spiritual and temporal excellences would be one of those *προοίμια* or prefaces to branches of enactments, of which the *Laws* contain many, and which Plato compares, at the end of the fourth book, to the prelude of a musician, or the conversation of a wise doctor with an educated patient on the subject of his disease and its treatment. The other note is the comparison of the outline of man's life (d 6 ff.), in which the salient points serve as hints for the classification of laws, to 958 c *ἀνδρὶ δή, τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο, γεννηθέντι καὶ ἐκτραφέντι καὶ γεννήσαντι καὶ ἐκτρέψαντι τέκνα, καὶ συμμείξαντι συμβόλαια μετρίως, διδόντι τε δίκας εἴ τινα ἠδικήκει καὶ παρ' ἑτέρου ἐκλαβόντι, σὺν τοῖς νόμοις ἐν μοίρᾳ γηράσαντι τελευτὴ γίγνοιτ' ἂν κατὰ φύσιν.*)

μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα . . . ἐλλείπει: in this passage both sense and construction have been obscured by the idea that it deals only with the way in which money is made and spent. Ast, for instance, says *κοινωνίας* and *διαλύσεις* are governed by *φυλάττειν*, and, as he naturally wants something to connect *φυλάττειν* with *ἐπισκοπεῖν*, he proposes to alter *καθ'* to *καὶ*: also, both he and Stallbaum understood *κοινωνίας* to refer to *business partnerships*. This involves them in further difficulties with *πᾶσιν τούτοις*, and with *ἑκοῦσίν τε καὶ ἄκουσιν*. The former they take to be neuter, and add *ἐν* before *πᾶσιν* (though St. does not print it). St. says that *ἐν πᾶσιν τούτοις* "*refertur ad τὰς κτήσεις καὶ τὰ ἀναλώματα civium.*" Many of the difficulties disappear when it is recognized that the passage deals with two distinct subjects, and falls into two divisions at the word *τρόπον*. The first subject is the regulation of money-making and money-spending; the second the supervision of *fellowships and associations*, a very different matter. The *καί* after *τρόπον* connects *φυλάττειν* with *ἐπισκοπεῖν*, the genitival dative *πᾶσιν τούτοις* is masc. (sc. *πολίταις*), and *ἑκοῦσιν* and *ἄκουσιν* agree with it: with *ὁποῖον* I think we must supply *τρόπον* from the preceding sentence. The word has occurred so recently, and would fall in so naturally with *καθ' ὁποῖον* that the omission is not extraordinary. It is not necessary to press the words *ἑκοῦσιν* and *ἄκουσιν* to the logical conclusion that they apply equally to both the *κοινωνίαι* and the *διαλύσεις*. Though it is conceivable that certain associations might claim adherents who did not wish to belong to them, it is naturally the *breaking up* of an association which may be against the will of some of its members. (So

at Soph. *Ant.* 1159 *τύχη γὰρ ὀρθοῖ καὶ τύχη καταρρέπει τὸν εὐτυχοῦντα τόν τε δυστυχοῦντ' ἀεί* we have to translate the *τε* by *or*, and not to assume the author to mean that Fortune, when raising a man, makes him *both* fortunate and unfortunate.)

b 6. Just as *κτήσεις* and *ἀναλώματα* are the direct objects of *φυλάττειν*, so, in the parallel clause, *ἐπισκοπεῖν* governs *κοινωνίας* and *διαλύσεις*; in both cases, however, the direct objects have explanatory adjuncts—in the first *ὅντιν' ἂν γίγνηται τρόπον*, and in the second *καθ' ὁποῖον ἂν ἕκ. πρ. τ. τ. πρὸς ἀλλήλους*.—*ἕκαστον* is emphatic like the *ἑκ.* in *τῆς ἑκάστων διαθέσεως* above.—I cannot help suspecting that *καὶ μὴ* after *δίκαιον* is the addition of a scribe who thought the expression ought to square with *τό τε καλὸν καὶ μή* in b 1: also that the same scribe added the *τε* after *ἔστιν*, which then became necessary. If I am right in wishing to reject these three words, *οἷς* is a true relative, to which *τῶν τοιούτων* is the antecedent; if not, *οἷς* must be used as a dependent interrogative. I would translate the whole: "and to keep an eye on the associations formed or broken by any of the citizens—may be willingly, may be on compulsion—(so as to observe) the manner in which all such mutual transactions take place, both the just ones and the unjust" (or, retaining the *καὶ μή* and the *τε*, and supposing the subject of the two verbs to be *τὸ δίκαιον*, "and to distinguish the just ones from the unjust"). It is impossible not to wish that Plato had lived to rewrite this whole passage.

For the *κοινωνίαι* of b 4 cp. *Rep.* 365 d *ἐπὶ γὰρ τὸ λανθάνειν συνωμοσίας τε καὶ ἑταιρίας συνάξομεν*, *Laws* 856 b *ὃς ἂν . . . ἑταιρίας τὴν πόλιν ὑπήκοον ποιῇ*, *Theaet.* 173 d *σπουδαὶ δὲ ἑταιριῶν ἐπ' ἀρχάς*, and *Ap.* 36 b *ἀρχῶν καὶ συνωμοσιῶν καὶ στάσεων*. It will be noticed that at 636 b it is stated that the *συσσίτια*, which were *κοινωνίαι* of the young men, led to *στάσεις*. This gives one reason for the state supervision of *κοινωνίαι*.

b 8. *τῶν νόμων*: Schanz, following a suggestion of Ast's, brackets these words. Stephanus changed them to *τῷ νόμῳ* (or *τοῖς νόμοις*). It seems far more likely that Plato should have allowed himself a genitive among so many datives, after the analogy of the genitive with *ἀκροᾶσθαι* (in the sense of *obey*, *Gorg.* 488 c), than that a scribe should have introduced it, or altered it from a dative. At p. 715 c *εὐπειθέστατος* has a dat. with it. An instance of the variety of construction which Plato allows himself may be seen at *Hipp. Mai.* 285 d, where, within a few lines, we read *ἃ (ἡδέως σου) ἀκροῶνται*, and *πάσης τῆς*

ἀρχαιολογίας ἥδιστα ἀκροῶνται. For other out-of-the-way uses of the genitive in Plato cp. *Rep.* 380 c σύμψηφός σοί εἰμι, ἔφη, τούτου τοῦ λόγου, *Tim.* 20 a οὐδενὸς ἰδιώτην ὄντα, *Euthyd.* 306 c συγγιγνώσκειν μὲν οὖν αὐτοῖς χρὴ τῆς ἐπιθυμίας (but *Symp.* 218 b συγγνώσεσθε γὰρ τοῖς τε τότε πραχθεῖσι καὶ τοῖς νῦν λεγομένοις).

c 1. πρὸς τέλος ἁπάσης πολιτείας ἐπεξελθών, "when he has come to the end of all his organizations;" ἁπάσης πολιτείας here corresponds to the πάντα πολιτεύματα of 945 d 5.

c 4. This is the first mention of the νομοφύλακες of whom we are to hear so much later.—κατιδὼν δέ: i.e. when the lawgiver has passed all the various classes of citizens in review. At 738 d e Plato speaks of the great importance of the electors' personal knowledge of those on whom honour or office is to be conferred: μεῖζον οὐδὲν πόλει ἀγαθόν, ἢ γνωρίμους αὐτοὺς αὑτοῖς εἶναι· ὅπου γὰρ μὴ φῶς ἀλλήλοις ἐστὶν ἀλλήλων ἐν τοῖς τρόποις ἀλλὰ σκότος, οὔτ' ἂν τιμῆς τῆς ἀξιᾶς, οὔτ' ἀρχῶν οὔτε δίκης ποτέ τις ἂν τῆς προσηκούσης ὀρθῶς τυγχάνοι.—ἅπασιν τούτοις: this is neuter, and, like the following πάντα ταῦτα, means the whole of the lawgiver's enactments and arrangements, which are in charge of the φύλακες.

c 5. διὰ φρονήσεως . . . ἰόντας: "cum verbb. eundi (διά c. gen.) est *versari in aliqua re, persequi, studere*," Ast, *Lex.* Cp. *Prot.* 323 a ἣν (πολιτικὴν ἀρετὴν) δεῖ διὰ δικαιοσύνης πᾶσαν ἰέναι καὶ σωφροσύνης and St. Paul's διὰ πίστεως γὰρ περιπατοῦμεν 2 Cor. 5. 7. For further particulars about the two *classes* of Guardians (those of *original*, and those of *imparted* wisdom) of the *Laws* cp. 961 ff. and 964 e ff. For δόξα ἀλ. cp. e.g. *Tim.* 51 d ff.

c 6. ὅπως πάντα ταῦτα . . . φιλοτιμίᾳ, "that Wisdom may give unity to the whole system, and make it subservient to Temperance and Justice, instead of to Wealth and Pride." There is a striking similarity between the leading idea of this passage and that of St. Paul's words at *Col.* 2. 19 . . . τὴν κεφαλήν, ἐξ οὗ πᾶν τὸ σῶμα διὰ τῶν ἁφῶν καὶ συνδέσμων ἐπιχορηγούμενον καὶ συμβιβαζόμενον αὔξει τὴν αὔξησιν τοῦ θεοῦ.—For ἀποφαίνειν in the sense of *make* cp. *Gorg.* 516 c ἀλλὰ μὴν ἀγριωτέρους γε αὐτοὺς ἀπέφηνεν ἢ οἵους παρέλαβε, Ar. *Eq.* 817 σὺ δ' Ἀθηναίους ἐζητήσας μικροπολίτας ἀποφῆναι: at p. 753 d below it is used of appointing magistrates, and at 780 a 1 of *making* laws; cp. the use of ἀποδείκνυσθαι at 783 d 9 in the sense of *produce*.—As to the form, which Ast, in deference to Dawes (*Misc. Crit.* 228) changed to ἀποφαίνῃ, possibly Dawes

would have said that it was only 1st aorists of which the 1st sing. subj. was identical with the fut. which cannot stand after ὅπως; at all events that is all that Dawes's instances could prove.

So ends what Stallbaum rightly calls (631 b 3–632 d 1) "designatio quaedam et adumbratio universi operis." It stands to the whole treatise in the same relation that the *προοίμια*, noticed above on 631 d 2, stand to its various divisions. Its leading idea is that of the *formative* or *educational* power and function of good laws. As the Hebrew lawgiver says at *Deut.* 32. 47: "This law is no vain thing for you, it is your life, and through this ye shall prolong your days upon the land whither ye go over Jordan to possess it."

d 2. ὑμᾶς is the subject of the διεξελθεῖν which goes with βούλομαι, as well as of that which has to be supplied with ἤθελον ἄν: διεξελθεῖν means *set forth, demonstrate, explain thoroughly.* The first thing he wishes his companions to demonstrate, if they are to make good the assertion that their laws are divine (624 a 3), and therefore perfect, is that the laws possess the advantages just enumerated; i.e. that they foster all the virtues. They find, on proceeding, that the Dorian system does foster courage, but when they come to temperance, all is not as it should be. The reader is left to draw the conclusion for himself that the system is *not* perfect after all; and the course of investigation proposed in the next paragraph *comes to an end as a natural consequence.*

d 4. καὶ ὅπῃ κτλ.: then follows an intimation that the subject must be studied *philosophically*: "I want you to show," the Ath. says, "that there is a *philosophy* of law, a *system* (τάξις), in the divinely ordered code, to be discerned by the philosopher, and even by those who have lived under a perfect code:—how it enables a man to judge of the relative importance and proper function" (both involved in τάξιν) "of various enactments."

d 5. τέχνῃ εἴτε καί τισιν ἔθεσιν: the two classes of intellect here referred to correspond to the two classes of φύλακες spoken of at c 5—τοὺς μὲν διὰ φρονήσεως, τοὺς δὲ δι' ἀληθοῦς δόξης ἰόντας.

d 6. There is a polite irony in ἡμῖν.

d 9. No subject of διεξελθεῖν is expressed; probably, if it had been, it would have been ὑμᾶς. The καθάπερ ἠρξάμεθα, which reminds his hearers that their first attempt has been a joint one, naturally leads to the suggestion in διέξιμεν ἐὰν βούλησθε that all three should share in the proposed investigation.

e 1. τὰ τῆς ἀνδρείας ἐπιτηδεύματα, "the means of cultivating courage" (cp. 791 b 5 ff.). Cp. *Rep.* 501 d τί δέ; τὴν τοιαύτην

(φύσιν) τυχοῦσαν τῶν προσηκόντων ἐπιτηδευμάτων οὐκ ἀγαθὴν τέλεως ἔσεσθαι;—The course recommended is this: first they are to consider the cultivation of all the separate virtues in turn, using the same method of investigation in each case; then they are to show, if they can, that particular laws or codes of law conduce to this object (ἐκεῖσε βλέπειν).

e 3. Of ὅπως ἄν with subj. in a temporal sense ("as soon as") we have possibly another instance at 755 a (if the text there is sound) ὅπως ἄν τις πλέον ὑπερβὰς ἑβδομήκοντα ζῇ. Kühner-Gerth ii. p. 445 says that *wie* is similarly used in old German and in modern Volkssprache instead of *als* (temporal).

e 5. ὕστερον δὲ ἀρετῆς πάσης: i.e. "after we have considered the methods whereby all virtue may be fostered." For ὕστερον followed by a gen. cp. *Soph.* 257 c περὶ ἅττ' ἂν κέηται τὰ ἐπιφθεγγόμενα ὕστερον τῆς ἀποφάσεως ὀνόματα.

e 6. Ritter supports Stallbaum's view that ἃ γε νυνδὴ διήλθομεν (for ἃ the early MSS. have τὰ, Ven. Ξ first corrected it, early edd. καὶ ἃ) refers exclusively to the outline of the division of law which was given in 631 d ff., and spoken of there as τὰς ἄλλας προστάξεις τοῖς πολίταις,—as to marriage, money-making, etc. The reference is, doubtless, to laws of some kind; but the phrase "the laws we examined just now" might well include a reference to the positive Cretan institutions with which the discussion began, as well as the imaginary ones summarized in 631 d ff. I say *imaginary*, because the Ath. is there saying what the panegyric of Cretan laws *ought* to be. The subsequent course of the argument (634 a ff.) seems to favour the assumption that the Dorian institutions *were* referred to here. It should be remembered that the "*imaginary*" ones were Dorian too. Doering (p. 27), of course, excludes all possibility of there being a reference in ἃ γε νυνδὴ διήλθομεν to 631 d 6 ff. He (following Tiemann, *Kr. Analyse v. Büch. I. und II. der pl. Gesetze*) holds that ἐκεῖσε βλέποντα goes with διήλθομεν—"which we showed (at 631 b–d) to be ἐκεῖσε βλέποντα," that ἃ διήλθομεν refers to *human* benefits (631 b 7), and that ἀποφανοῦμεν means "we will show them (i.e. the human benefits) to be supplied by the Dorian laws." This is special pleading, with a vengeance. ἐκεῖσε βλέποντα *must* go with ἀποφανοῦμεν; διήλθομεν does not want a secondary predicate, and ἀποφανοῦμεν does.—This discussion of Dorian institutions (which is not carried through very far) is a *dramatic* introduction to the subject of the *Laws*. Bruns and others err greatly, I think, in taking it to have been the original subject of the whole treatise.

e 7. *ἂν θεὸς ἐθέλῃ*: this pious aspiration was, as the speaker no doubt knew, not destined to be fulfilled (cp. on 778 b 7).

633 a 3. *καὶ σέ τε καὶ ἐμαυτόν*: Stallb. takes this to mean "it is not only Cretan institutions that are to be criticized; Spartan and Athenian must come in for their share of criticism as well"; and this explanation fits in well with the following *κοινὸς γὰρ ὁ λόγος*, i.e. "the discussion is on law in general, not on Cretan law only." Still, it is more likely that the Ath. means "the discussion will test the validity of your views and mine as well as of his"; *κοιν. γ. ὁ λόγος* will then mean "we are all three open to criticism." The (a 4) *λέγετε οὖν* is pointedly addressed to both the two, and the subsequent discussion deals in particular with Spartan rather than with Cretan institutions.

a 7. *καὶ τρίτον ἢ τέταρτον;* "And thirdly, or fourthly?" i.e. "What shall we mention next as *ἐπιτηδεύματα ἀνδρείας*?"—*ἴσως γὰρ ἂν κτλ.*: remembering that he had said that the investigation of *ἐπιτηδεύματα ἀνδρείας* is to serve as a type for that concerning the other branches of virtue, he is anxious to proceed formally.—Definite enumeration (*διαριθμήσασθαι*) makes for clearness (*δηλοῦντα*—masc.—in the next line); cp. below 894 a 8 *ὡς ἐν εἴδεσιν λαβεῖν μετ' ἀριθμοῦ*.

a 8. *εἴτε μερῶν εἴτε ἄττ' αὐτὰ καλεῖν χρεών ἐστι*: with these words Plato is perhaps waiving aside the ontological question. Stallb. thinks they refer to "litem et controversiam a Sophistis motam" and similar discussions in the *Protagoras*. Ritter is possibly right in thinking that he has in mind somebody's criticism of the term *μέρη ἀρετῆς*, but *not* the Sophists' contention (that virtues of different kinds can each exist separately from other virtues).—St. quotes several passages in which Plato uses *εἴτε . . . εἴτε* (or an equivalent) in a similar way: *Crito* 50 a, *Sympos.* 212 c, *Laws* 872 e 1, *Tim.* 28 b; Ritter adds *Laws* 863 b *ἓν ἐν αὐτῇ* (sc. *τῇ ψυχῇ*) *τῆς φύσεως εἴτε τι πάθος εἴτε τι μέρος ὂν ὁ θυμός*.

b 7. *ταῖς χερσί* is a genitival dative of the instrument; cp. 631 c *κινήσεις τῷ σώματι*. (Moeris's and Harpocration's "*χερσιμαχίας Πλάτων Νόμων ᾱ*" is now generally thought to be based on a mistaken reading of this passage, though Pierson—on Moeris 406—proposed, perhaps rightly, to read *χερσιμαχίαις* for *ταῖς χερσὶ μάχαις* here.)

b 8. I follow Hermann and Schanz in accepting Ast's *γιγνομέναις* for the MS. *γιγνομένων*.—The *τισιν* after *ἁρπαγαῖς* is slightly apologetic.

b 9. *κρυπτεία τις ὀνομάζεται*, "there is a service called *κρυπτεία*." Below, the passage 763 a 6 *πρὸς δὲ τούτοις . . . ἱκανῶς σῴζειν* (c 2),—in which occur the words *εἴτε τις κρυπτοὺς εἴτε ἀγρονόμους εἴθ' ὅ τι καλῶν χαίρει*,—throws some light upon this institution. The service was so called because those on it had to keep out of sight. They hid during the day, and did their work — usually killing prominent Helots — during the night. Plutarch says (*Lyc.* 28) so cruel an institution could not have been devised by Lycurgus; that it must have been of later origin. No doubt, he says, that is what gave Plato the idea that Spartan institutions were only good for bravery.—*θαυμαστῶς πολύπονος πρὸς τὰς καρτερήσεις*, "as full as could be of hardening toils."

c 1. *χειμώνων*, "in wintry weather," a variety of the common *χειμῶνος*.—As Ast says, both the privatives (*ἀνυπ.* and *ἀστρω.*) go with *χειμ.* At 942 d it is recommended that soldiers should get accustomed to lie on hard beds and go bare-headed and bare-footed. Cp. Xen. *De rep. Lac.* 2. 3.

c 4. The *γυμνοπαιδίαι*—the games of the naked—was a festival at Sparta at which choruses of men and of boys performed dances. Athenaeus (xiv. pp. 630 f.) mentions a "lyric" dance, called the *γυμνοπαιδική*, of a stately and elaborate character, resembling the tragic *ἐμμέλεια*. Ath. also says (xv. p. 678) that at the *γυμνοπαιδίαι* the leaders of the choruses wore garlands of palm-leaves, which were called *Θυρεατικοί· ὑπόμνημα τῆς ἐν Θυρέᾳ γενομένης νίκης*. The festival occurred in the middle of the summer in the month Hecatombaeon; hence *τῇ τοῦ πνίγους ῥώμῃ διαμαχομένων*. Probably the performance was a long and exacting one.

c 6. *ἑκάστοτε*, "in detail" (Jowett).

c 8. *τὴν ἀνδρείαν τί θῶμεν;* "How are we to define courage?" —lit. "As what are we to set down courage?" The fact that temptations, like privations, are spoken of as *endured* and *combated* (he echoes the *διαμαχομένων* in *διαμάχην*) enables the Ath. to slip imperceptibly from the subject of courage to that of temperance, which he thus presents at first as a branch of courage.

c 9. *ἁπλῶς οὕτως*: cp. the Homeric *μὰψ οὕτως*; so *Pol.* 286 e *εὐθὺς οὕτω*, *Pol.* 296 a, 303 d, *Phaedr.* 234 c *νῦν οὕτως*.

d 2. *καί τινας δεινὰς θωπείας κολακικάς*, "with all their powerful wheedling cajoleries." (Cp. *Romeo and Juliet* II. ii. 140 "a dream too flattering sweet to be substantial.") The *τινας* shows that the word *θωπείας* is used metaphorically, and that Pl. does not mean to add literal *flattery* as a third assailant of

virtue, in addition to *desire* and *pleasure*.—There is a poetical redundancy about this expression, a redundancy which is one of the marks of a hastily written and unrevised work. When an idea is first put into shape a number of almost synonymous words flock into the writer's mind, and he sets them all down without stopping to select. Apelt (*Jena Jahresbericht* 1907) well says that in the *Laws* we catch Plato at work; he has not had time to polish and arrange his material; his main anxiety is lest strength and life should fail him to get his rich harvest of thought, as it were, under cover; perfect order and precision are not to be expected under such circumstances. Badham rewrites the passage for him thus: ἢ καὶ πρὸς πόθου τε καὶ ἡδονῆς τινὰς δεινὰς θωπείας ("deleto inutili κολακικάς"). (Winckelmann and Schanz would also reject κολακικάς.)

d 3. οἰομένων, "who fancy themselves."—κηρίνους: this word —which some editors insert before ποιοῦσιν and some after—is preserved only in the margins of A and O and in Clem. Al. *Stro.* ii. 108. The early vulgate inserted μαλάττουσαι after θυμούς.

d 4. οἷμαι μὲν οὕτω is in an erasure in A and is omitted in O.—"Vocabulo οὕτω per epexegesin additur πρὸς ταῦτα ξύμπαντα, ad quod ex antegressis repetendum εἶναι αὐτὴν διαμάχην. Sic Sympos. 215 A: Σωκράτη δ' ἐγὼ ἐπαινεῖν οὕτως ἐπιχειρήσω, δι' εἰκόνων" Stallb. Burnet is doubtless right in putting a semicolon instead of a comma after οὕτω.

e 2. ἢ καί: we can hardly translate this καί otherwise than "*also*," "*as well*"; Schanz and Boeckh apparently do so; in that case we must make it do duty for the unexpressed μόνον (with τὸν τῶν λυπῶν ἥττω). Schanz accepts Boeckh's emendation of the MS. κακὸν to κακίον', which he says is supported by a small erasure before the ὸ of κακὸν. The καί in the following words is an objection to this. (Ficinus has *deteriorem*.)

e 3. The μᾶλλον, which Schanz placed at the beginning of Cleinias's speech, formerly stood, in MSS. and edd. alike, as the last word of the preceding speech of the Athenian.

e 5. τὸν ἐπονειδίστως ἥττονα ἑαυτοῦ: the τόν with the predicate has a deictic force; it conveys an invidious distinction: "it is specially this victim of pleasure, isn't it? (που), that we all call self-conquered in the invidious sense."

634 a 1. ὁ Διὸς οὖν κτλ.: the implication here foreshadowed is that, if there prove to be a grave defect in the legislation, it can be only partially of divine origin.

a 2. The metaphor in χωλήν is helped out by the βαίνειν

in *ἀντιβαίνειν*. In *δεξιά* we have a simple pun: its figurative meaning of "shrewd" serves to introduce the following adjectives. —Again we have a redundancy of ideas, like that at 633 d 2. (Schanz proposes to omit *κομψὰ καὶ*, partly because the *καὶ* was only added by the second hand in A.)

a 7. *ἀμφοτέραις ταῖς πόλεσιν*: not a local dative, but in loose explanatory apposition to *ὑμῖν*; cp. 638 e 6.—*γεύοντα τῶν ἡδονῶν*, "while teaching men how pleasure tastes."

a 9. *ἄγοντα εἰς μέσας*, "putting it (pain) in their way."—*μέσας* and *αὐτῶν* evidently refer to *λύπας*: otherwise we should have *ἀναγκάζει* and *πείθει*. *τιμαῖς* probably goes only with *ἔπειθεν*, though the thought of chivalry's "Noblesse oblige" might incline us to take it with *ἠνάγκαζε* as well.—The (dependent) question breaks off abruptly, and the speaker begins a fresh (independent) one at *ποῦ δή* to express the idea with which he started; then the question is repeated in other words. All this is very conversational in style. (St. and Jowett make *μέσας* and *αὐτῶν* refer to *ἡδονάς*, and translate the two verbs as if they were in the present tense.)

b 1. The punctuation here should be *αὐτῶν·*—(Prof. Burnet agrees).—*ποῦ δὴ κτλ.*, "Where, I say, has this same enactment been made in your laws with reference to pleasure?"

c 1. *ἴσως*: it is difficult to be sure whether this means *equally* or *perhaps* here—the former, I think. In the next line it is *perhaps*.—*κατὰ μεγάλα μέρη καὶ διαφανῆ*, "(instances) on a large and striking scale." *κατὰ μέρη* means "in detail," "in the several parts," as distinguished from *καθ' ὅλον* (*Tim.* 55 e *κατά τε μέρη καὶ καθ' ὅλον*). *κατὰ μεγάλα μέρη* (a phrase which occurs also at *Philebus* 30 b) means lit. *in large details*; the addition of *καὶ διαφανῆ* emphasizes the fact that the details, to show the design, must not be insignificant, but conspicuous.—*εὐπορoίην ἄν*, "I should not be at a loss."

c 4. *ὁμοίως*: i.e. as obvious as in the case of institutions intended to train men to disregard pain.

c 5. *καὶ οὐδέν γε θαυμαστόν κτλ.*: the connexion of thought here, down to 635 b 1, is this: "no actual system is perfect; not yours at Sparta and Crete, any more than ours at Athens. So, in our search for perfection, we must none of us feel hurt if deficiencies in his native institutions are exposed. We are too old for anything like pettishness. Well, it is natural that I should know, better than either of you, what fault the world finds, rightly or wrongly, with Dorian institutions. Now one of the best of them

—among many good ones—is that which regards any criticism of the laws, unless made privately by a magistrate or by an old man to a contemporary, as sacrilegious. There are no young men here, so we may proceed."

d 5. λόγος ἂν ἕτερος εἴη: Ast cps. Arist. *Pol.* iii. 3 εἰ δὲ δίκαιον διαλύειν ἢ μὴ διαλύειν, ὅταν εἰς ἑτέραν μεταβάλλῃ πολιτείαν ἡ πόλις, λόγος ἕτερος. Stallb. adds Plato, *Ap.* 34 e ἀλλ' εἰ μὲν θαρραλέως ἐγὼ ἔχω πρὸς θάνατον ἢ μή, ἄλλος λόγος, πρὸς δ' οὖν κτλ. Similarly *Rep.* 462 d καὶ περὶ ἄλλου ὁτουοῦν τῶν τοῦ ἀνθρώπου ὁ αὐτὸς λόγος, and *Tim.* 54 b διότι δέ, λόγος πλείων. These and other passages (Stallb. cites Dem. *Phil.* iii. 16 and *De cor.* § 44) support Eusebius's λόγος against the MS. ὁ λόγος here, and the δ' οὖν in the passage from the *Apology* gives some confirmation to Bekker's δ' οὖν, which Schanz and Burnet rightly adopt instead of the MS. γ' οὖν.

d 7. εἴπερ καί, "if (your laws are good) as in truth they are"; cp. *Soph.* 238 b εἴπερ γε καὶ ἄλλο τι θετέον ὡς ὄν.

e 1. With ἐξ ἑνὸς στόματος πάντας συμφωνεῖν Stallb. cps. *Rep.* 364 a πάντες γὰρ ἐξ ἑνὸς στόματος ὑμνοῦσιν.

e 4. With the suggestion of criticism in συννοεῖ (trans.) here cp. our similar use of *to reflect upon, to think twice about.*

e 6. With ποιεῖσθαι we may suppose ἐᾶν to be supplied from d 9.

635 a 1. ἀπὼν τῆς τότε διανοίας: I accept without hesitation Burnet's punctuation of this passage, which connects τῆς διανοίας with ἀπών. This word is part of the metaphor in ἐστοχάσθαι: "though far removed from the old legislator's mind—as far as τότε from νῦν—you have hit it. You must be a μάντις." There is a confusion between time and space which gives a certain haziness to the metaphor. (Schanz wants to bracket ἀπών.) For the gen. διανοίας cp. Soph. *Ant.* 1169 ἐὰν δ' ἀπῇ τούτων τὸ χαίρειν. . .

a 4. ἀφείμεθ' ὑπὸ τοῦ νομοθέτου διαλεγόμενοι . . . μηδὲν ἂν πλημμελεῖν, "the lawgiver leaves us free to discuss without offence." ἂν πλημμελεῖν for the simple πλημμελεῖν is an anacoluthon; perhaps the speaker meant us to feel that διαλεγόμενοι is equivalent to εἰ διαλεγοίμεθα.

a 6. "καὶ s.v. A" Burnet. I conjecture that what was originally written here was ἔστι ταῦτα οὕτως· καὶ μηδέν γε ἀνῇς—that the **CKAI**, owing to the faintness of the **I**, the bad formation of the **K** and of the **C** was read as **EICA**. It was seen afterwards that a καὶ was wanted before μηδέν and it was inserted in A above the line. (It is a slight confirmation of this that A has not οὕτως but οὕτω.) Schanz omits the καὶ. It certainly does not seem necessary if, as

Ast and Stallb. say, εἰς ἅ means *quapropter* in the sense of *wherefore, for which reason.* But can it? The nearest approach I can find to this use is Soph *Trach.* 403 ἐς τί; "*for what purpose?*" but "*with a view to which*" does not suit this passage. (εἰς τοῦτο, at 1 *Timothy* 4. 10, is translated in the A.V. "*therefore,*" but it is altered in the R.V. to "*to this end*").—As against Schanz it may be urged that γε is much more natural after καὶ than after εἰς ἅ.—F.H.D., omitting καὶ, proposes to read εἶτα for εἰς ἅ.

a 7. οὐ γὰρ τό γε γνῶναί τι κτλ., "it is no disgrace to a man to be told of something wrong; if he is grateful to his critic, instead of being indignant with him, it may result in his being able to set the wrong right."

b 2. For πω Stallb., Schneider, and Schanz accept πως, the reading of a Vienna MS. But the former stands very well here as an anticipation of πρίν.

b 3. βεβαίως: proleptic; so, *Rep.* 537 c, a method of μάθησις is said to be βέβαιος, and *Rep.* 585 e ἧττόν τε ἂν ἀληθῶς καὶ βεβαίως πληροῖτο. In all these cases it is the *result* that is fixed and definite, not the process by which the result is reached. (βέβαιος is a favourite word with Plato.) We must supply ἐρῶ from above with ἀπορῶν: "In what I say I shall not find fault; that can only be done after an exhaustive investigation: instead of that I will tell you the difficulty I feel about your system."

c 1. διὰ τέλους, "on every occasion."

c 2. φευξεῖσθαι: the paronomasia helps the formal statement of the analogy: it is not only pain and alarm that they will run away from; they will run away from those men who have had the training which they themselves have missed.

c 6—d 1. I would substitute a (,) for the (·) generally found after φόβων in d 1, because I take εἰ . . . γενήσονται, καὶ . . . πείσονται to be the protasis, and δουλεύσουσι to be apodosis. A parallelism thus comes out between the two cases: those untrained in fighting fear will (1) flee from the toils and troubles of life, and (2) fall before the better trained; so too those untrained in resisting pleasure will (1) be worsted by pleasure (ταὐτὸν πείσονται τοῖς ἡττ. τῶν φόβων), and (2) will be worsted and overcome by the better trained (δουλεύσουσι κτλ.). The καί before ἀμελέτητοι then connects γενήσονται with πείσονται, that before μηδέν is epexegetic, inasmuch as μηδὲν τῶν αἰσχρῶν ἀναγκάζεσθαι ποιεῖν explains wherein the firmness (καρτερεῖν) is shown. I do not take γιγνόμενοι with ἀμελέτητοι but with ἐν ταῖς ἡδοναῖς (this I think is certain, and would hold even though it were decided

that it is better to restore the colon at *φόβων*, to assume an asyndeton between *πείσονται* and *δουλεύσουσι*, and to make the *καί* before *ἀμελέτητοι* connect that word with *ἄπειροι*). *ἀμελέτητοι* = *ἀμελέτητοι ὄντες* or *οὐ μεμελετημένοι*, "not being trained, in the presence of pleasure, to show firmness." Cp. *Laws* 655 d *ἐν πράξεσί τε παντοδαπαῖς γιγνόμενα καὶ τύχαις.*—*ἕνεκα* in c 8 is used much as at *Theaet.* 148 d *προθυμίας μὲν ἕνεκα, ὦ Σώκρατες, φανεῖται*, and at *Polit.* 304 a *πείρας μὲν τοίνυν ἕνεκα φανερὸς ἔσται*: lit. here, "if they are left to their natural inclination to indulgence."

c 8. Ast was the first to remove the comma from after *ἡδονὰς* and put it after *ποιεῖν*: the sentence is more symmetrical so. *ἕνεκα . . . ἡδονάς* corresponds in idea with *γιγν. ἐν τ. ἡδοναῖς*, and *ἧττ. τῶν φόβων* with *μηδὲν τ. αἰσχ. ἀναγκ. ποιεῖν.*—The use of *γλυκυθυμία*—like that of *γλυκύθυμος* as an epithet of *ὕπνος* at Ar. *Nub.* 705, and of *Ἔρως* at Ar. *Lys.* 551—shows the same confusion of ideas as our expression "a sweet tooth."

d 2. *ἔτ' αἰσχίω*: the greater disgrace is partly due to the fact that men who in this case gain the mastery over them are sometimes *παντάπασι κακοί*. In the former case the victors are at all events brave men. Also it has been explained at 626 e that *τὸ ἡττᾶσθαι αὐτὸν ὑφ' ἑαυτοῦ πάντων αἴσχιστόν τε ἅμα καὶ κάκιστον.*—One thinks of Hannibal at Capua.

d 3. *καὶ τοῖς κεκτημένοις τὰ περὶ τὰς ἡδονάς*, "*nempe iis qui earum rerum domini sunt*," Ast. But there is more expressed in this idea of mastery than mere power of resistance: the men are masters of the whole art or science of pleasure (and are thus able to tempt others cleverly). *τὰ περὶ τὰς ἡδονάς* is "all that pleasure business." For *κεκτῆσθαι* in the sense of "be master of an art or science" cp. *Laws* 829 c *τῶν ὁπόσοι ποίησιν μὲν καὶ μοῦσαν ἱκανῶς κεκτημένοι ἐν αὐτοῖς εἰσιν.* (If the words are taken to mean simply "those who have had the advantage of the experience of pleasure," they come as a weak climax after or equivalent to *τοῖς δυν. καρτερεῖν ἐν τ. ἡδ.*)

d 5. *τῇ μέν* as regards pleasure: *τῇ δέ* as regards pain and fear. —*ἁπλῶς*, "*without qualification.*"

d 7. *κατὰ τρόπον*, "*recte*"; cp. 638 c, 766 d, *Phil.* 33 c, *Polit.* 310 c, *Crat.* 425 b, *Rep.* 581 b, *Tim.* 42 e. (The whole of this paragraph is a model of Platonic, i.e. superlatively beautiful and accurate, exposition.)

e 1. *περὶ τηλικούτων*, "about such weighty matters"; *Theaet.* 162 e *σκοπεῖ τε οὖν σύ τε καὶ Θεόδωρος εἰ ἀποδέξεσθε πιθανο-*

λογίᾳ τε καὶ εἰκόσι περὶ τηλικούτων λεγομένους λόγους.—πεπιστευκέναι ῥᾳδίως = "to be cocksure."

e 4. Ast and Stallb. insist on taking τὸ μετὰ ταῦτα as an adverbial phrase like τὸ ἀπὸ τούτου, and ὧν, or rather the antecedent to ὧν, as a partitive gen.; but (1) such a construction as that at *Phil.* 34 c λέγω μὲν τοίνυν, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἤδη τὸ μετὰ ταῦτα, where τό is the object of λέγωμεν, is much more common in Plato; (2) it is much more natural that the gen. which is the antecedent of ὧν should have something to depend on; and (3) the singular τό suits the context better, as being a direct reference to σωφροσύνη, whereas the antecedent gen. to ὧν might be either sing. or plur. The only strict parallel to such a partitive gen. as they here suppose, cited by Stallb., is at *Soph.* 232 b ἀλλ' ἀναλάβωμεν πρῶτον τῶν περὶ τὸν σοφιστὴν εἰρημένων, where Burnet accepts Heindorf's ἀναλάβωμεν <ἓν>.

e 6. λέγωμεν, "I would suggest that we should talk," or "we have got to talk." At 632 e the Ath. had proposed that they should take the ἐπιτηδεύματα of the different virtues one after another, and though, as Ritter, following Susemihl, says, they have really been discussing σωφροσύνη (disguised as a kind of ἀνδρεία) since 633 d, this is the first time the virtue is introduced by name (since the σώφρων ψυχῆς ἕξις in the enumeration at 631 c). This is a rhetorical artifice. Plato wants to show clearly how the arguments used about ἀνδρεία (and the training in it) apply equally to σωφροσύνη. No doubt also he wishes to bring out the *unity* of virtue. (The—as I take it—superficial inconsistency of calling the virtue by two names has been the ground of many attacks upon the treatise. The difficulty felt is a real one. Possibly the passage from 633 c 8 to 635 e 3 was put in as an afterthought as an alternative way of introducing the discussion about σωφροσύνη. I have only room here to refer to Doering (*ut supra*), pp. 28 ff.)—I have adopted Badham's μῶν τι for the τὶ (*ecquid?*) of the earliest editions—altered by Stephanus and Ast to τί. Seeing the preceding word ends in μεν, it is very possible that μῶν was omitted in error: anyhow it makes the sense clearer to an English reader. (F.H.D. suggests that Plato wrote λέγω· μῶν τι.) The Ath. here repeats the question already put at 634 b 1.

e 7. I do not follow Badham in rejecting ᾗ ταῖς—"En purum putum recensorem qui genitivos illos a διάφορον pendere non intellexit."—I think Plato adopted the unusual ᾗ instead of the gen. because his choice would lie between making πολιτευομένων agree with πολιτειῶν (understood)—and though he often uses πόλις

as subject to *πολιτεύεσθαι*, neither he, nor probably anyone else, ever said *ἡ πολιτεία πολιτεύεται*—and writing such an awkward phrase as *τῶν τῶν εἰκῇ πολιτευομένων*. Bdh., however, apparently, takes *πολιτευομένων* as agreeing with *πολιτειῶν* understood. He should at least have given an instance of the construction.—With *πολιτευομένων* we may supply either *πόλεων* or *ἀνθρώπων*, preferably the latter.—For *ἤ* after *διαφέρειν* cp. *Phaedr.* 228 d *οἷς ἔφη διαφέρειν τὰ τοῦ ἐρῶντος ἢ τὰ τοῦ μή*, and *Rep.* 455 c *πάντα ταῦτα τὸ τῶν ἀνδρῶν γένος διαφερόντως ἔχει ἢ τὸ τῶν γυναικῶν*. For the omission of the second *ἐν* cp. the similarly omitted *ὑπό* at *Laws* 683 e 4 *μῶν ὑπό τινων ἄλλων ἢ σφῶν αὐτῶν ;*—*εἰκῇ* : Sparta and Crete had "divinely planned" constitutions; other constitutions were made at random, not on any fixed principle—like the codes described at 630 e, made by the lawgivers of the day.

636 a 1. *ὥσπερ τὰ περὶ τὸν πόλεμον νυνδή* : i.e. "as (we did find some superiority) in the case of *ἀνδρεία* just now."

a 2. *οὐ ῥᾴδιον* : supply, not with Stallb. *εἰπεῖν* but, *ἀνευρίσκειν*.

a 3. *πρὸς ἀμφοτέρας* : "int. *τὴν ἀνδρείαν* et *τὴν σωφροσύνην*. Male interpretes ad civitates trahunt," Ast.

a 4. *ἔοικεν . . . γίγνεσθαι*, "it does seem difficult for such things as institutions to be as clearly beyond dispute in action as in their intention"—in other words, "it is hard to get institutions that are as satisfactory in action as they are in theory." Ast is doubtless right (*pace* Stallb.) in taking *ἀναμφισβητήτως* as equivalent to the adjective—so *Laws* 968 b *τίς δὲ ὁ τρόπος ἡμῖν γιγνόμενος ὀρθῶς γίγνοιτ' ἄν*, *Rep.* 504 c *μέτρον τῶν τοιούτων ἀπολεῖπον καὶ ὁτιοῦν τοῦ ὄντος οὐ πάνυ μετρίως γίγνεται*—though I do not think he is right in taking *τὸ περὶ τὰς πολιτείας* as an adverbial phrase—"*circa civitates.*"—Rather it is the subject of *γίγνεσθαι*. (This is better, I think, than taking *τό* with *γίγνεσθαι*.) With Ast's construction "a man," or "a lawgiver" would presumably have to be supplied as the subject of *γίγνεσθαι*. His translation of the whole is: "circa civitates s. leges ita certum esse, h.e. tam certas leges (quae nihil controversiae vel dubitationis habeant) statuere, ut res ipsa, s. eventus respondeat legislatoris consilio."

a 6. *κινδυνεύει γάρ κτλ.* : the parallel is adequately suggested, but the expression of it is not complete,—not even logical—the *καθάπερ ἐν τοῖς σώμασιν* has no right to be where it is.—This informality may be intentional (i.e. a dramatic representation of a hasty conversational style), or it may be due to hasty writing

(the informal ἐν ᾧ and the τὰ ἡμῶν σώματα coming after the ἓν σῶμα point to the latter cause).—Schanz brackets καθάπερ ἐν τοῖς σώμασιν, Ast reads ὃ for ἐν ᾧ.

a 7. τι πρὸς ἓν σῶμα: a variety for πρὸς ἔν τι σῶμα.—ἐπιτήδευμα, "treatment."—ἐν ᾧ οὐκ ἄν φανείη we might translate, "without finding that . . ."

b 1. ἐπεί, "for instance"; *Prot.* 319 e ἐπεὶ Περικλῆς, "P. for instance."

b 3. χαλεπά, "are a danger." (Cp. *Polit.* 274 b θηρίων ὅσα χαλεπὰ τὰς φύσεις ἦν).—πρός: lit. "*in the direction of*"—"are dangerously liable to produce." The young men of the cities named were "spoiling for a fight," because they were so highly trained. Arist. *Pol.* v. 7, in speaking of a στάσις at Thurii, sets it to the account of γενόμενοί τινες πολεμικοὶ τῶν νεωτέρων. Cp. Alcidamas, *Odysseus* p. 184, l. 19 οὐδ' ἐν παλαίστρᾳ οὐδ' ἐν συμποσίῳ, ἔνθα φιλεῖ ἔριδας πλείστας καὶ λοιδορίας γενέσθαι. Grote chap. lxv. gives reason for thinking that the revolution at Miletus, described by Plut. *Lys.* 8, was not due to political differences. The Boeotians are well known to have regarded bodily training as a more important part of education than the training of the mind.

b 4. καὶ δὴ καί introduces the next, and more weighty, charge against the γυμνάσια—a charge often brought by ancient writers.—This whole passage, down to διεφθαρκέναι, presents great difficulties. According to Burnet the original reading of A (and O) was παλαιὸν νόμον, corrected by the writer—(I examined the passage in A and thought it was by a later hand)—to παλαιῶν νόμων: a later hand altered the ω's back to o and wrote νόμιμον as a variant for νόμον in the margin. After ἐπιτήδευμα follow the words καὶ κατὰ φύσιν τὰς π. τ. ἀφ. ἡδονὰς. Two minor MSS. omit the καὶ, which seems to me likely to have been introduced by some scribe who took κατὰ φύσιν as going, along with παλαιὸν, to qualify νόμον, and took νόμον as in appositiou to τὰς περὶ τὰ ἀφροδίσια ἡδονάς. This last view I think a mistake. The ἡδοναί are φύσει as opposed to νόμῳ, and the force of the passage seems weakened if they are spoken of as a νόμος. I have therefore accepted Boeckh's πάλαι ὂν νόμιμον, and Ast's τὰς κατὰ φύσιν περὶ τὰ ἀφρ. ἡδονάς. Most decidedly οὐ μόνον ἀνθρώπων ἀλλὰ καὶ θηρίων goes with φύσιν. Stallb. oddly says it is a "hyperbolical" strengthening of the charge against the γυμνάσια, that the mischief they wrought extended to animals, quoting *Laws* 942 d, where ἀναρχία is spoken of as extending to the brutes.

The position of the genitives is a little awkward, but any other position in the sentence would be more awkward.—"Then again this usage, where it is an institution of long standing, is thought to have corrupted the sense of pleasure, attendant on *τὰ ἀφροδίσια*, which is natural to the whole animal creation." With the *παλαιὸν νόμιμον* of L and A^3 cp. Athen. xiv. p. 633 b *καταγηρασάντων σχεδὸν ἁπάντων τῶν ἀρχαίων νομίμων*.

b 7. *τις*, "public opinion."

c 1. *εἴτε παίζοντα εἴτε σπουδάζοντα ἐννοεῖν δεῖ τὰ τοιαῦτα*: the effect of this parenthesis is somewhat as follows: "the comic poet, if you will let him, will tell you as readily as the philosopher."

c 4. *ἀποδεδόσθαι*, "to be yielded" or "produced."

c 6. *καὶ τῶν πρώτων τὸ τόλμημ' εἶναι δι' ἀκράτειαν ἡδονῆς*: at first sight this seems to mean: "and that the audacity of the original perpetrators is due to intemperance in pleasure." But it is hard to see why this self-evident remark should be made only about the first perpetrators of the enormity, and still harder to understand the present *εἶναι*, especially after *ἀποδεδόσθαι*. Besides, *δι' ἀκρ. ἡδ.* makes an awkward predicate to *εἶναι*. I cannot help thinking that *τῶν πρώτων* has a kind of adverbial force—"prominently"—and that the sentence meant "and that the audacity is in an especial degree due to unbridled lust." Just such a use of *πρῶτος* may be seen at *Phil.* 44 e *πρὸς τὰ πρῶτα μεγέθει*. — *ἀκρατείᾳ ἡδονῶν τε καὶ ἐπιθυμιῶν* occurs at *Laws* 886 a, *ἀκρατεῖαι ἡδονῶν καὶ λυπῶν* at 908 c, *δι' ἀκράτειαν ἡδονῶν καὶ λυπῶν* at 934 a, and *ἡδονῶν ἀκράτεια* at *Tim.* 86 d.

d 1. *ὡς λογοποιησάντων τούτων*: cp. above on 624 a 7. This variant for the *acc. c. inf.* construction expresses the charge made against the Cretans: *τούτων* is emphatic—"that it was *they* who invented the story." After a conversational break—the asyndeton is well marked by Burnet's colon after *τούτων*—follows, as an amplification of the charge, what all the world supposed to be the reason of the invention: *προστεθηκέναι* thus depends on a verb of saying or thinking supplied from *κατηγοροῦμεν*.

d 3. *προστεθηκέναι*: i.e. *τοῖς νόμοις*.—*κατά*, "to the disadvantage of," as at *Ap.* 37 b *κατ' ἐμαυτοῦ ἐρεῖν αὐτός*. — *δή* "as they would have us believe."—The *καί* in d 4 points the same way as the *προσ-*: they followed Zeus's injunctions in the laws; they followed (they said) his example in the vice.

d 4–e 3. "Be that as it may, our topic suggests to us two con-

siderations which go to the foundations of the philosophy of law: (1) What pleasures ought not to be sought? (2) What pains ought not to be avoided?" These weighty words illuminate the whole treatise on laws which follows. Whether the lawgiver is enjoining or prohibiting, giving honour or fixing a penalty, his ἐπιστήμη is shown in his power to answer these two questions. Nature provides the raw material in the form of the emotions of pleasure and pain; the educator of states and individuals moulds it by the habits which his laws and institutions induce. (See below 727 c 1–5 for an instance of the legislator's application of this principle.)

d 5. ἀνθρώπων is emphatic; the myth dealt with superhuman beings.

d 7. ἔν τε πόλεσιν καὶ ἐν ἰδίοις ἤθεσιν: Stephanus was the first of modern interpreters to write ἤθεσιν (A L O) for the ἔθεσιν of the inferior MSS. and the received text,—apparently as a conjecture of his own, and Stallb. follows him in interpreting the word to mean "*abodes*," acc. to its old poetical use. It is certainly so used at 865 e, which Stallb. quotes, but it there stands in the vague sense of "*haunts*," not in that of *houses*, which he gives it here. Besides it is not *cities*, or *houses* or *families*, but the *institutions* and *constitution* of the πόλις on the one hand, and the *habits* and *character* of the ἰδιώτης on the other, that are here in question, and it is best to take "*cities* and *men's characters*" here as short for that. One half of the compound notion is mentioned in the first member of the comparison, and the other half in the second.

e 2. ζῷον ἅπαν: very possibly under these words he included not only individual animals, but the universe; an organism, which, like human communities, had its laws—the ζῷον ἓν ὁρατόν of *Timaeus* 30 d.

e 4—637 b 6. To the height of this philosophical argument Megillus cannot rise, though he expresses polite admiration. He takes refuge in the practical consideration that you don't see the drunkards about Sparta that you see at Athens and elsewhere.

e 6. δοκεῖ μοι used impersonally, followed by *acc. c. inf.* is rare. —The τό added to ἡδονὰς φεύγειν expresses the fact that the injunction to avoid indulgence had been under consideration before (i.e. at 635 b 6).

e 7. διακελεύεσθαι is a sort of historic present. "(I'm no philosopher) but it is clear to me that the Lacedaemonian lawgiver is right in that injunction of his to shun pleasure."

e 8. *βοηθήσει*, "will take the field." (It is a pity that the dictionaries do not give this as the primary meaning instead of "assist.")

637 a 1. *κάλλιστ' ἀνθρώπων*: see above on 629 a 6.

a 2. For *οὗ* (which depends on *ἡδοναῖς*) Ast suggested *ὑφ' οὗ*, and Schanz actually prints *δι' οὗ*; but *οὗ* suits the vagueness of the antecedent better than *δι' οὗ*. *τοῦτο* is explained a little further down to be *συμπόσια* and (*τὰ*) *τούτοις συνεπόμενα*—the licence and exhilaration attendant on set occasions for drinking.

a 3. *ἀνοίᾳ*: the schol. on Arist. *Nub.* 418 throws light on the associations of this word: *ἀνοήτων τῶν ἀφροδισίων, τῆς τοιαύτης λαγνείας. τὸ γὰρ ἀνοηταίνειν τὸ διὰ μωραίνειν τὸ ἀφροδισιάζειν ἔλεγον.* Cp. Eur. *Androm.* 674 *γυναῖκα μωραίνουσαν.*

a 5. *ὅσων Σπαρτιάταις μέλει*, "with which Spartans are concerned," i.e. for which they are responsible.

b 1 f. *καὶ οὔτ'* MSS.; *καὶ οὐδ'* Schweighäuser on Athenaeus iv. p. 43, where this passage is quoted, and where for *λύσαιτο* we find *ῥύσαιτο*, which I have adopted. Those who read *ῥύσαιτο* evidently took *Διονύσια* as its subject, and made *ἔχοντ'* nom. in agreement with it (so Stallb.). Those who read *λύσαιτο* probably took *ὅστις* as its subject, and *ἔχοντ'* as acc. masc. sing. (so Ast in his edition, though apparently in his *Lexicon* he takes *ἔχοντ'* to be nom. neut. pl.). The former view is supported by the only other instance of *πρόφασιν ἔχειν* in Plato (*Rep.* 469 c) where it means *to provide an excuse.*

b 2. *ὥσπερ ἐν ἁμάξαις εἶδον*: the object of *εἶδον* in the mind of the speaker would probably be *κωμάζοντάς τινας μετὰ μέθης* (so Ast). For *ἐν ἁμάξαις* Ast quotes schol. on Lucian, *Ad Iov. Tragoed.* § 44 *ἐν τῇ ἑορτῇ τῶν Διονυσίων παρὰ τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις ἐπὶ ἁμαξῶν καθήμενοι ἔσκωπτον ἀλλήλους καὶ ἐλοιδοροῦντο πολλά. παροιμία οὖν ἐκράτησεν ἐπὶ τῶν ὑβριστικῶς χρωμένων τὸ ἐξ ἁμάξης.*

b 3. *καὶ ἐν Τάραντι δὲ παρὰ τοῖς ἡμετέροις ἀποίκοις*: is Plato here slyly putting an argument for the Athenians into Megillus's mouth? The Dorian, like a too strictly brought up child, when released from the rigid Spartan discipline, runs to excess in indulgence.—Juvenal calls Tarentum "*madidum.*"

b 7. *ἐπαινετὰ μὲν . . . βλακικωτέρα*, "all indulgence in pleasure is good where there goes with it a power of saying 'no'; where that power is weakened the man is a fool."

c 1. *γάρ*, "no doubt."—*σου λάβοιτ' ἄν*: *λαβέσθαι τινὸς* is "to lay hands on a man"—cp. *Gorg.* 486 a *εἴ τις σοῦ λαβόμενος . . .*

εἰς τὸ δεσμωτήριον ἀπαγάγοι—the Latin *prehendere*. Here it is used in the figurative sense of the Latin *reprehendere*.—τῶν παρ' ἡμῶν ἀμυνόμενος: this Stallb. translates "*nostra instituta defendens*." This would no doubt be right if, with Schanz, we adopted the Aldine alteration of the MS. ἡμῶν to ἡμῖν. At *Symp.* 219 a τὰ παρ' ἐμοῦ means "what I have to say," i.e. "what comes from me." At *Soph.* 265 d we have ἄνευ τῶν παρ' ἡμῶν λόγων, and at 251 d ἐν τοῖς παρ' ἡμῖν λόγοις with the same slight difference.—It will be seen that in our passage it is much more likely that τῶν is *masc.*, and that ἀμυνόμενος is used (as it often is) absolutely ("in self-defence") as at *Laws* 731 b, where also it is subordinate to another participle νικῶντα (as δεικνύς is here to it). τις τῶν παρ' ἡμῶν then is "a man from (or 'on') our side"—an Athenian.

(**b 7–d 5.**) The connexion of ideas in this passage is this: "Liberty to indulge is good, but not licence. Foreigners, though, are not good judges in the matter. What they take to be licence is often only a liberty to which they are not accustomed. But let us not waste time in condemning or justifying each other; the only man who is before our tribunal is the lawgiver; and it will help us in our judgement of what is good or bad in *law* if we review carefully the whole question of *the effect of wine and the regulation of indulgence in it*." We are thus launched on a subject which occupies the rest of Book I., and is not finally dismissed till the end of Book II. In the course of its investigation we are introduced to the relation of νόμος and the νομοθέτης to παιδεία.

c 4. ἀπολύεσθαι, "absolve" (sc. τοιαῦτα ἐπιτηδεύματα). The μή which follows it is the same μή that we had at 635 a 5 after ἀφείμεθα (cp. Thuc. i. 128. 3 ἀπελύθη μὴ ἀδικεῖν): the addition of the τοῦ (cp. Xen. *Hel.* iv. 8. 5 τούτους αὖ τοιαῦτα λέγων ἔσχε τοῦ μὴ ἐκπεπλῆχθαι) and of the ἀλλ' ὀρθῶς make it seem stranger than usual to us.

d 3. ἔτι γὰρ οὖν εἴπωμεν πλείω, "I really should like to say more still." For γὰρ οὖν used in this way cp. *Phaedr.* 247 c τολμητέον γὰρ οὖν τό γε ἀληθὲς εἰπεῖν.

d 4. περὶ ἁπάσης μέθης: the explanation that follows (λέγω δ' κτλ.) shows that μέθη is not used here in the sense of *strong drink*, but in that of *ebriety*. We must remember that the Greeks drank nothing stronger than wine, and nearly always drank that mixed with water, and hence that the word μέθη had not the disgusting connotation that its equivalent has among us. The effect of drinking wine—especially that of drinking more wine

than was necessary to quench the thirst—was noticeable—it is described below, 645 d and e—but the degree of mental and physical incapacity that was associated with the word *μέθη* and its cognates *μεθεύειν* and *μεθυστικός* was not so great as that associated with our words *drunk* and *intoxication*.—*σμικρόν*, "*insignificant, immaterial*." The meaning of *οὐ σμ.* is helped by the following statement that it takes a wise lawgiver to decide how the practice is to be regarded.

d 6. *τὸ παράπαν* ("at all") and *ἢ μή* are both used with the verbal noun just as they would be used with a verb.

e 3. *παντάπασι* qualifies *ἀκράτῳ*.—*γυναῖκές τε καὶ αὐτοί*: the emphatic position of the word *γυναῖκες* suggests that Greek women drank less wine than men. Xen. *De rep. Lac.* i. 3 says that at Sparta the young women were allowed either no wine or only wine mixed with much water.

638 a 1. In A and all other MSS. the words *ὦ λῷστε* form the last words of the Athenian's previous speech. According to O. Immisch (*Phil. Stud. zu Plato* ii. p. 51) there is in the margin of L (Stallb.'s Flor. δ) a note which says that a certain *πατριάρχου βιβλίον* contained a correction which made these words begin Megillus's speech. Ast made the same correction independently. Who the *πατριάρχης* was, whose copy of Plato contained this and several other corrections of the text of the *Laws* (see Immisch *ut supra*), is not known.—For the *δέ γε* cp. Porson's notes on *Orestes* 1234 and *Medea* 814. In the former he says, "Ubi persona secunda prioris sententiam *auget aut corrigit*, post *δὲ* modo interposito, modo non interposito alio verbo, sequitur particula *γε*." Burnet remarks, at the end of the preface to vol. v., that many alterations in the text of the *Laws* are due to a corrector who imagined that *μέν*, *δέ* or *οὖν* could not stand anywhere in a sentence except in the *second* place. Hence, probably, the dislocation of the *ὦ λῷστε* here.

a 4. *ἀτέκμαρτοι*, "*inexplicable, mysterious, of obscure origin*." Ast puts too much into the word in explaining it to mean "*in quibus nullum indicium inest virtutis vel pravitatis*." This notion is added in the following words.

a 5. *ὅρον*, "*criterion*," as above at 626 b 7.

a 6. *νίκην τε καὶ ἧτταν λέγοντες μάχης*, "if we declare it to be victory or defeat in battle."—For the epexegetic participial clause cp. *Rep.* 331 e *τί φῂς τὸν Σιμωνίδην λέγοντα ὀρθῶς λέγειν περὶ δικαιοσύνης;* It was felt to be rather strange here because of the antecedent *τοῦτον*. Hence *λέγοντες* was altered by some

to βλέποντες. Stephanus mentions this reading: it is reported to have been in the margin of Voss's MS., and Ficinus translates "*si ad victoriam belli fugamque respexerimus.*" This unnecessary alteration is sufficiently condemned by the fact that βλέπειν, in the sense of *respicere* (*ad*), is always intransitive in Plato (i.e. followed by a prep.). (At *Tim.* 51 c it is trans. in the sense of *to see with the bodily eyes*, and at *Charm.* 172 c in the sense of *look for, seek*; cp. Heindorf *ad loc.*)

a 7. The ἐπειδή clause goes closely with the previous words.—I have put a colon after μάχης (as Schanz), also a comma after μαχόμεναι, removing the one usually put after καταδουλοῦνται (which is a "historic" present). (? ἐπεὶ δὴ γὰρ.) This arrangement assumes for γάρ almost the force of "for instance."

b 2. Λοκρούς: for the early history of lawless Locri and its wonderful conversion by Zaleucus cp. e.g. Grote ch. xxii. As to its later εὐνομία cp. Pind. *Ol.* ix. 17, and x. 15, Plato, *Tim.* 20: for its conservatism cp. Dem. *C. Timocr.* 744.—The defeat of the Locrians by a Syracusan force, here referred to, is probably that inflicted on them by Dionysius the younger in 456 B.C., when he had to flee from Syracuse. He had to fight with the Locrians for the possession of the citadel. If this is so we have a *terminus a quo* for the composition of the *Laws* (see below on 711 e 5).—Cean laws and Cean morals were proverbially excellent. Nothing seems to be known of the circumstances of Ceos's subjection to Athens.

b 4. αὐτοῦ ἑκάστου: i.e. taking them in fullest detail, and examining them minutely.

b 7. πρῶτον δ' κτλ.: having dismissed the notion that the most powerful nations must needs have the best laws, the Ath. warns his hearers that no custom or practice ought to be praised or blamed without a careful consideration of the circumstances of the case.

c 2. λόγῳ λαβόντες: I think Stallb. is right, as against Ast, in taking this to mean *discuss* (verbally), rather than *reflect upon* (mentally). The word ῥηθέν and the ἐν τοῖς λόγοις of d 1 make somewhat for this view.

c 3. προθέμενοι: rather more than *propose* here; it is "*who set out to, make up their minds to.*"—εὐθὺς ῥηθέν: cp. *Theaet.* 186 b εὐθὺς γενομένοις.

c 4. For κατὰ τρόπον cp. on 635 d 7.

c 5. I have followed Ast and Schanz in adopting Cornarius's correction of the MS. πυρὸς to τυρὸς. C. quotes from

Hippocrates καὶ μὴ ἁπλῶς οὕτω δοκέειν ὅτι πονηρὸν βρῶμα τυρός. For those who retain the reading πυροὺς, the ἔχοντα in c 8 presents a special difficulty. τυρός might be used in either the sing. or the plur., but the singular πυρόν, which would have to be supplied with ἔχοντα, would not be natural Greek. As an article of food they always spoke of πυροί or κριθαί.

c 6. αὐτοῦ : i.e. τοῦ βρώματος.—ἐργασία is the *operation, effect.* Stallb. cps. *Prot.* 353 d κατὰ τὴν αὐτῆς τῆς ἡδονῆς τῆς παραχρῆμα ἐργασίαν.

c 7. προσφορά, "*the application.*" — The following relative clauses explain the word προσφοράν—more particularly is the inf. προσφέρειν epexegetic of προσφοράν :—I have not followed Schanz in adopting Madvig's athetesis of this inf. Such an epexegetic inf. is just possible in the *Laws.* If an emending copier had inserted anything, he would, I think, have inserted προσφέρειν δεῖ, which is the reading of two inferior MSS. according to Stallb. —The points to be observed about the application of the diet are the manner of the application, the choice of recipients, the concomitant treatment, the state of the food, and the state of the recipients.

d 2. τοσοῦτον μόνον : i.e. only the bare word μέθη.

d 4. A has ἐπαινοῦμεν alone, L and O have χρώμενοι ἐπαινοῦμεν. Boeckh ejected ἐπαινοῦμεν, Schanz, rejecting χρώμενοι, writes ἐπακολουθοῦμεν for ἐπαινοῦμεν. I follow Boeckh, and also bracket καὶ after ἑκ. I can hardly believe that ἐπαινεῖν in these circumstances, in two consecutive lines, could have been used first in the sense of *praise* as opposed to *blame*, and then in the sense of *back an opinion*, whether favourable or unfavourable. I conjecture the original text to have been : μάρτυσιν γὰρ καὶ ἐπαινέταις χρώμενοι ἑκάτεροι, οἱ μέν, ὅτι κτλ., and that ἐπαινοῦμεν was written in the margin of some copy, by a scribe who thought a verb ought to be supplied : when ἐπ. got into the text, it became necessary to add a καὶ after ἑκάτεροι. In any case the meaning is clear. The philosopher must not be content with the verdict of *numbers*, or with that of *experience* : he must go behind both, like the scientific doctor in the case of diet mentioned above. Both of us, says the Ath., are on the wrong tack : *I*, in appealing to *numbers*, *you*, in appealing to the witness of *results.*

d 5. κύριον : *decisive*—something that will settle the matter.

d 6. αὐτῷ : i.e. οἴνῳ ; "*vino abstinentes*" Ficinus.

d 7. τοῦτο : the last-mentioned argument from experience. ἡμῖν is probably the Ath., but it may be the whole company.

According as we decide this point, we shall decide between ὑμῖν and ἡμῖν in e 5.

e 3. περὶ αὐτοῦ τούτου, τῆς μέθης: a bold and emphatic variant for περὶ αὐτῆς τῆς μέθης.—πειρώμενος ἂν ἄρα δύνωμαι: we should begin a fresh sentence here, "And I hope that in so doing I may be able to show" etc.

e 4. ὀρθὴν μέθοδον: i.e. the discussion is to be a lesson in logic.

e 5. ἡμῖν A, ὑμῖν Hug; see above on d 7.—περὶ αὐτῶν: i.e. περὶ ἁπάντων τῶν τοιούτων, about *all* customs and institutions, not about μέθη alone. It is not only on one subject that you will find yourselves (you, Spartans and Cretans) in the minority, and it will be as well for you to know how to answer attacks.

e 6. Some editions read ἡμῖν here, on no MS. authority.

639 a 2. For δή L has δέ, and for πῃ τῇδε Ast would read the more usual τῇδέ πῃ, an unwarrantable alteration.

a 5. καί where we should say *or*.

a 6. τῶν κακῶν MSS.; Eusebius and Theodoret, in quoting this passage, omit the article. Cp. below c 4. τινων κακῶν Herm.

a 7. ὑγιὲς καὶ ὁτιοῦν: an interrogative form of the very common οὐδὲν ὑγιές, used much as we use the (conversational) *rotten* and *rot*, sometimes of the morally unsound, sometimes of the *nonsensical*. The neuter is used adverbially here as acc. of the inner object; so χρηστόν τι ψέξειν c 6. ὁ τοιούτου ψόγος οὐδὲν ὑγιὲς ψέγει would be "such a man's blame sounds ridiculous." —ἡγώμεθα MSS., ἡγούμεθα Eusebius. Ast notes that the MSS. not infrequently change a pres. to a deliberative subj.; cp. c 5 below.

a 9. The mention of κακοὶ ἄρχοντες leads naturally to the consideration of the χρηστὸς ἄρχων, itself a step towards that of the due ordering of συμπόσια.

b 1. οὖν, a mere ghost here, as far as its illative force goes, serves the euphony of the sentence, by obviating the jingling ἄν τε ναυτιᾷ ἄν τε μή.

b 6. κἂν Stephanus, καὶ MSS.

b 7. Schanz agrees with Cobet in thinking that ὡς has dropped out before ὑπὸ μέθης; but, as Ritter says, though this is palaeographically possible, the comparison of 649 d 6 πάνθ' ὅσα δι' ἡδονῆς αὖ μεθύσκοντα παράφρονας ποιεῖ shows that the metaphor could be used without such an introduction. Besides, would not Plato in that case have said ὡς ὑπὸ μέθης ὑπὸ τοῦ φόβου? Ast cps. *Critias* 121 a μεθύοντες ὑπὸ τρυφῆς.

b 10. To clear our ideas the Ath. introduces us to a "right-

down bad" ruler as well as to a good, and to a moderately bad one.

b 11. *σφόδρα γυναικῶν*: so we find an adverb without an article qualifying a noun in *Theaet.* 183 e *πάνυ πρεσβύτης*, Dem. *De f. leg.* 385 *ἄρδην ὄλεθρος*, Thuc. i. 122 *ἄντικρυς δουλείαν*, ii. 47 *φθορά οὕτως*, Aesch. *Cho.* 929 *κάρτα μάντις*, Xen. *Hell.* vi. 2. 39 *μάλα στρατηγόν*, Ar. *Nub.* 1120 *ἄγαν ἐπομβρία*. These are all adverbs of *measure*; but we also find *μάτην κόμπος* (Hdt. vii. 103), *λογάδην λίθους* (Thuc. iv. 4), *ξυσταδὸν μάχαις* (Thuc. vii. 81), *μάτην λόγος* (Eur. *Ion* 275).

c 1. *τί δ' ἐπαινέτην ἢ ψέκτην;* the *οἰόμεθα* in c 5, which picks up the broken thread of the construction, shows us what verb we have to supply here. So at *Soph.* 266 c *τί δὲ τὴν ἡμετέραν τέχνην;* the following *φήσομεν* shows that *λέγομεν* has to be understood: so at *Phaedr.* 264 b *τί δὲ τἆλλα;* where *τἆλλα* is nom. with *δοκεῖ* (which soon follows) understood.—From *ἢ* we must supply mentally a *ἢ* to be the subject of *ὠφέλιμός ἐστιν*, while the *ὁ δὲ μ. ἑορ. εἴη* goes on as if *εἴ τις ἐπαινοίη* had gone before. The style all through this passage is conversational, but the sense is clear. As another person (the *ἄρχων*) has been mentioned since the *ἐπαινέτης*, the demonstrative use of the *ὁ δέ* is quite idiomatic. It is difficult to see why Stallb. thought the passage "*turpiter corrupta*," or how he mends it by writing *ὃς δὴ* for *ὁ δὲ*.—The introduction of the word *κοινωνία*, which is quite legitimate as a general term including such communities as a flock of goats, or an army, leads up to the consideration of the *συμπόσια* which follows.—*κοινωνίαν αὐτὴν αὐτῇ κοινωνοῦσαν* is, as Stallb. says, "*eleganti quodam lusu dictum.*"

c 3. The *μήτε . . . δέ* is again "free," but perfectly idiomatic. Cp. H 433 *ἦμος δ' οὔτ' ἄρ πω ἠώς, ἔτι δ' ἀμφιλύκη νύξ*, Soph. *Phil.* 1312 *ὃς μετὰ ζώντων θ' ὅτ' ἦν ἤκουˊ ἄριστα, νῦν δὲ τῶν τεθνηκότων*, Eur. *Suppl.* 223 *χρὴν γὰρ οὔτε σώματα ἄδικα δικαίοις τὸν σοφὸν συμμιγνύναι, εὐδαιμονοῦντας δ' εἰς δόμους κτᾶσθαι φίλους.*

c 4. There is a good example here in A of the way in which a writer's eye and hand may play him false. The first hand of A wrote *ἀναρχόντων* in the place of *ἄναρχον ἢ μετὰ κακῶν ἀρχόντων*: A^2 supplied in the margin the missing *-χον ἢ μετὰ κακῶν ἀρ-* which his eye had skipped the first time. After writing the letters *ἀναρ-* his eyes, on returning to his exemplar, went to the *ἀρ-* in *ἀρχόντων*.

c 5. *οἰόμεθα* is the reading of Eusebius and of A^2, elsewhere it

is *οἰώμεθα*; cp. above on a 7.—For the *δή* of A and Eus., O has *ἄν*: A^2 has *ἄν*, and O^2 *δή*.—In the change from the sing. (*ὁ δέ*) to the plural in *θεωρούς* we have the last of the conversational irregularities spoken of above.—For *ἐπαινέσεσθαι* Eus. has *ἐπαινεῖσθαι*.

c 7. *πῶς δ' ἄν* (i.e. *οἰοίμεθα*): this *ἄν* may have given rise to the *ἄν* suggested as a variant for *δή* in c 5.

d 2. *ἔχε δή* (cp. 627 c 3): Heindorf on *Gorg.* 460 a says, "mihi vox *ἔχειν* in hac quoque formula, ut saepe alias, *inhibendi* et *subsistendi* vi accipienda videtur"—somewhat, i.e., like our familiar "wait a bit." At *Ion* 535 b *ἔχε δή μοι τόδε εἰπέ*, however, and possibly here, *ἔχε δή* seems to be used just with the force of *ἄγε δή*. A phrase so commonly used in conversation must have lost some of its original significance.

d 6. *οὐδεπώποτε*: as Stallb. says, *ἐθεάσασθε* (not *ἐθεάσατό τις*) must be supplied here.

d 9. *διηρώτηκα*: this word is always used elsewhere in Plato with a personal object (though at *Phil.* 57 c it is not expressed) in the sense of *to question, put to the question*; here it means "inquire into," "examine."—*ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν* qualifies *πάσας*; cp. Adam on *Ap.* 17 a and *Rep.* 341 b.—*ὅλην μὲν . . . μόρια δ' εἴ που . . . τὰ πολλὰ δέ*, "I have never seen or heard of *one* that was as it should be throughout, and though I may have seen insignificant parts that were proper here and there, still I may say I found the majority of them altogether at fault." In *τὰ πολλά* and *σύμπαντα* we have the same change to the neut. as that noticed on 638 e 3.

e 5. *ἡμεῖς μὲν γάρ κτλ.*: a polite way of hinting disbelief in the existence of such a thing as a "proper" *συμπόσιον*.—*εὐθύς*, "at first sight."

640 a 4. *τὸ μέν*: demonstrative, "*this much* you *do* know, don't you?"—*ἐν . . . κοινωνίαις πράξεων ὁντινωνοῦν*, "in any kind of concerted action."

a 5. *ἑκάστοις* agrees in sense with the individual members of which the companies spoken of are composed; we should translate "for each set of people." *παντα χοῦ* is "*in all cases*," i.e. in every sort of company.

a 11. *τῶν δειλῶν*: "frequentissime Graeci a singulari collective vel infinite posito ad pluralem transeunt" Ast, who cps. 853 d *μή τις ἐγγίγνηται . . ὃς . . . οὗτοι . . . γίγνωνται*.

b 4. *παντὶ τρόπῳ* as at *Theaet.* 148 d, "at all costs."

b 6. *νῦν δέ γε . . φιλοφροσύνης*: the connexion between *στρατοπέδου* and *ἄρξοντος* is so close that the fact that *στρατοπέδου*

has come before *περί* makes it easy to interpose *λέγομεν* between *περί* and *ἄρξοντος*. The nearest approach to this arrangement among the parallels cited by Ast is 697 c *ἡ Περσῶν περὶ διάσκεψις τῆς πολιτείας*; he also cps. 676 c 6, 691 b 2, 834 d 3. It is difficult to know whether *στρατοπέδου* was felt as a gen. dependent on a *noun* (*ἄρξοντος* being a slight, though significant, modification of *ἄρχοντος*) or as governed by a part. of the verb *ἄρχειν*.—*ἐχθροῖς* is governed by the verbal noun *ὁμιλίαις* (cp. 631 d 3). —*ὁμιλίαις* is plural, I suppose, because it takes *two* armies to make a battle.—(Against Badham's rewriting of this sentence —*στρατηγοῦ πέρι λέγομεν ἄρξοντος ἀνδρῶν ὁμιλίας*—there are at least two strong objections: (1) what can have been the motive for changing so simple a construction into a very complex one? (2) whereas, in the version in the text, *ἄρξοντος* goes equally well with *ἐχθρῶν* and with *φίλων*, *στρατηγοῦ* will not go with both. The sentence as we have it seems to me quite in the style of the *Laws*.—Ficinus translates "*non de exercitu nec imperaturo.*" Hence Schanz reads *οὐδ' ἄρξοντος*.—Burnet says A does read *ἄρξοντος*, not, as Sch. says, *ἄρξοντες*.)

b 8. *εἰρήνη* and *φιλοφροσύνη* (peace and goodwill) have already been mentioned together at 628 c 10.

c 2. *οὐκ ἀθόρυβος*: i.e. somewhat of a chaos, and therefore needing, more than anything, an *ἄρχων*.

c 3. Cleinias's very ready assent, here and in his next four answers, to any suggestion of a fault that may be found with a *συμπόσιον*, shows him still incredulous.

c 4. *καὶ τούτοις*: *this* company, as well as the other company (of soldiers) spoken of above.

c 6. *ἀθόρυβον*, "orderly."

c 9. *περὶ συνουσίας* (acc. pl.) *φρόνιμος*: this corresponds to the *σοφός* in d 4. The particular wisdom here denoted is largely covered by Dr. Johnson's (grammatically indefensible) word "clubbable." The instinct and tact implied in the English word is at all events indispensable for the office in question.

c 10. The position of the *τε* is not logical: grammatically the two main items to be connected are (1) the *guardian* of what is present, and (2) the *producer* of the hoped-for addition; whereas the position of the *τε* forces us to think of the two items as (1) *the present*, and (2) the *future* (augmented) good-fellowship.—There is a further structural irregularity in *πλείονος*, which does not depend on *ἐπιμελητής* (*one who takes care*) alone, as in grammar it

should, but on a sort of compound noun ἐπιμελητὴς ὅπως ἔσται which is equivalent to *one who produces*. (Possibly Plato did not like the sound of φύλαξ τε τῆς, or perhaps he began with the continuatiou καὶ τῆς ἐσομένης in his mind, and thought, as he went on, that it did not express all that he had to say, and so chose the fuller phrase,—all that remained of the former being the case of πλείονος.)

d 4. νήφοντά τε καὶ σοφόν : though σοφόν is the equivalent of φρόνιμον περὶ συνουσίας in c 9, νήφοντα (in the literal sense) introduces only one, though the most essential, of the conditions on which the character of the ἀθόρυβος of c 6 depends. Cp. Aristotle, *Pol.* 2. 12 (1274 b 11) Πλάτωνος δ' . . . (ἴδιος) ὁ περὶ τὴν μέθην νόμος, τὸ τοὺς νήφοντας συμποσιαρχεῖν.

d 6. καί is here *or*.—νέος introduces a new condition, in such a way as to imply that it would, of course, have been taken for granted : "young and inexperienced" is almost the same as "inexperienced" alone. (There is something attractive about Badham's νέων for νέος, but, on the whole, I think that, if νέων and νέος had equal MS. authority, the latter is preferable.—"If, with a drunken or a young inexperienced chief, an assembly of drunkards does not signally come to grief, it will be far more by luck than good guiding.")

d 9–e 5. In other words, the critic of συμπόσια must be quite sure that what he is blaming is not some accidental accompaniment. He cannot be sure of this until he has seen a συμπόσιον properly conducted under favourable conditions. If *then* he condemns it—and he *may*—we must listen to him (e.g. you mustn't select a *rotten* apple, when you want to condemn *apples* as such—αὐτὸ τὸ πρᾶγμα).

e 4. πᾶν, "*any* proceeding" (without sober guidance).

641 a 3. The next question the Cretan puts is : "supposing that we are wrong in blaming συμπόσια, what *good* do they do?"

a 4. τοῦτο τὸ περὶ τὰς πόσεις νόμιμον, "this drinking institution." I have followed Schanz in reading ὀρθῶς for the MSS. ὀρθὸν. Since 639 d 1 we have had ὀρθῶς γενομένῳ, ὀρθῶς γιγνομένην (twice), γιγνομένων ὀρθότατα, and γιγνόμενον ὀρθῶς. It is more likely that a scribe mistook the termination than that Plato shonld have varied the phrase here.

a 5. The antecedent to ὅ is στράτευμα, not the statement about it.

a 7. νίκη πολέμου : so above 638 a 7 νίκην μάχης (at 647 d τὴν ἐν τῷ πολέμῳ νίκην, at c 4 below πολέμων νίκας).

b 1. For *παιδαγωγεῖν* as a variant for *ἄρχειν*, "lead," St. cps. *Laws* 897 b, *Tim.* 89 d (cp. our "ruler and guide"). The word is cunningly chosen (and as cunningly repeated in b 3), to lead our minds to the great subject of *παιδεία.—τί μέγα ;* i.e. what result corresponding to the *οὐ σμικρὸν ἀγαθόν* produced by an army ?

b 3. *τί δέ ;* this is not a repetition of Cleinias's question, which would be *ὅτι* (cp. *Euthyphro* 2 c, *Laws* 662 b 1), but is "to take another point," or "again."—The indirect way in which the Ath. suggests that symposia may have a moral, educative action heightens the dramatic effect : at the same time it is polite. This is the second time he has turned the tables on the two Dorians. First he proved that *συσσίτια*, which they cited as *ἐπιτηδεύματα ἀρετῆς*, were bad for morals ; and now he is evidently going to show how *συμπόσια*, which they prided themselves on *not* having, may help to form the perfect character.

With this transition to the subject of *παιδεία* at b 6 we pass from the *Introduction* to the main subject of the treatise, with which, as has already been hinted once or twice, the consideration of the *educative value* of constitutions, customs, and laws must be inseparably connected. We see that the proposal to investigate Dorian institutions was only a dramatic introduction to the consideration of laws and customs from an independent philosophical stand-point. Cleinias and Megillus, we are to suppose, began by thinking that the main purpose of the conversation was to investigate their own institutions, but I cannot understand how a modern reader should think that Plato, at any period of the composition of the *Laws*, had this in his mind as his main object.

b 4. *κατὰ τρόπον* : see above on 635 d 7.—All the texts, apparently, have *ἢ τοῦτο*, as if it were a question : surely it should be *ἢ τοῦτο*.

b 5. *οὕτως* : opposed to the *ὅλως* that follows.—"*βραχύ τῇ* A L, *βραχύ τι* O" Burnet. *βραχύ τι τῇ* Bekker.—"Sic sexcenties *βραχύ τι, βραχέα ἅττα, σμικρόν τι* et *σμίκρ' ἅττα* usurpatur. Ejectum videtur *τι* ob sequens *τῇ*" Stallb.—What the Ath. says here is : "any *educational* influence, even though it only affects a few, deserves respect, as part of a great and important system."

b 6. *ὅλως* : i.e. not about individual cases, but in general.

c 1. *πράττοιεν* : intransitive.

c 2. *παιδεία μὲν οὖν . . . ἀπαιδευσίαν* : Cleinias had instanced *νίκη πολέμου* as an important result (*μέγα*) : the Ath. says it is merely *one* among the advantageous results of *παιδεία*, and, far

from being so indisputably *μέγα*, as Cl. thinks it, it sometimes undoes some of the advantages to which it is incidental—as indeed is implied in the proverbial qualification *Καδμεία*, which nobody ever heard applied to *παιδεία*.—The argument does not seem quite on all fours here, unless we admit an extension of the phrase to cover remoter consequences. What was generally called a *Καδμεία νίκη* would be less likely to produce *ὕβρις* in the victor than one which had cost him less.—For *Καδμεία* Ast quotes from Erasmus's *Adagia*; "undecunque natum est adagium, Cadmeam victoriam appellabant infelicem etiam ipsis victoribus."

c 8. *δοκεῖς ἡμῖν*, "we are to conclude then!"—Cleinias can hardly believe his ears; still less, doubtless, when he hears the Ath.'s confident assent (d 3).—*τὴν ἐν τοῖς οἴνοις κοινὴν διατριβήν*: lit. "the occupation of drinking in company," a blunt phrase adopted by the Ath. himself at 645 c 3.

d 1. *ὡς εἰς παιδείας μεγάλην μοῖραν τείνουσαν* (the construction—after *λέγεις*—is a variety of that noticed on 624 a 7), "has an important educational tendency."

d 6. *τὸ μὲν ἀληθές*: used adverbially, as at Thuc. vi. 33. 2 *πρόφασιν μὲν Ἐγεσταίων ξυμμαχίᾳ . . . τὸ δὲ ἀληθὲς Σικελίας ἐπιθυμίᾳ*.—"To be quite sure that this is so in very truth" (*διισχυρίζεσθαι* here, I think, as at *Theaet.* 158 d, *Crat.* 440 c, means "to maintain," or "insist upon a thing *to oneself*," and so "to feel sure of"). Cp. *Tim.* 72 d *τὸ μὲν ἀληθές, ὡς εἴρηται, θεοῦ συμφήσαντος τότ' ἂν οὕτω μόνως διισχυριζοίμεθα*.

d 7. "As we have embarked on the subject," he goes on, "you are welcome to my opinion."

d 10. *πειρώμεθα*: indicative, I think.

e 2 f. Before Burnet, all interpreters took *συντεῖναι* as governing *τὸν λόγον*. He, however, puts a comma after, as well as before, *συντεῖναι*, i.e. he takes it absolutely, with *ἐπί*, in the sense of "do your (and my) best to," and governs *τὸν λόγον* by *δηλῶσαι*. This makes the arrangement of the latter part of the sentence seem awkward. But the apparent awkwardness is not foreign to the style of the *Laws*; and it was perhaps intended to give special emphasis to *τὸν λόγον*. On the other hand it clears up the construction of the earlier part of the sentence. How obscure this was we may see from the fact that, while Ast says we must supply in sense *συντεῖναι τὸν νοῦν* with *ὑμᾶς* (getting it out of the *συντεῖναι τὸν λόγον*), Stallb. explains the "zeugma" by supplying *ἀναφέρειν τὸν λόγον πειρωμένους* with *ὑμᾶς*. Plato's usage too is more in favour of *strive*, as a meaning for *συντεῖναι*, than *direct*.

πειρώμενον agrees with the subj. of δηλῶσαι, and, with ἁμῶς γέ πως, means "to the best of my powers."

e 5. ἡμῶν: the order here is of the same involved kind noticed in the συντεῖναι sentence.—ὑπολαμβάνουσιν is used here, as at *Apol.* 28 e ὡς ἐγὼ ᾠήθην τε καὶ ὑπέλαβον, in the sense of *believe, be under the impression.*

e 7. "I think of as many matters as he; but I give heaven thanks, and make no boast of them" (Jaques, in *As You Like It*).

642 a 1. σκοπῶ δὴ μὴ δόξαν ὑμῖν παράσχωμαι, "I am anxious *not* to give you the notion."—In περὶ σμικροῦ L has undoubtedly here preserved for us the right reading (and so O^2): A and O^1 had περὶ σμικρὰ.

a 3. ἀνακαθαιρόμενος, "*developing, expounding*" (a long argument). In a passage of Porphyrius's *Life of Plotinus* (quoted by Ritter and Preller, p. 517) the word occurs in this sense: P. says that Plotinus, and two other pupils of the philosopher Ammonius, bound themselves μηδὲν ἐκκαλύπτειν τῶν Ἀμμωνίου δογμάτων, ἃ δὴ ἐν ταῖς ἀκροάσεσιν αὐτοῖς ἀνεκεκάθαρτο "which he had expounded to them in his lectures." Plato probably uses it consciously as a metaphor—from the extracting the metal from the ore (*Laws* 678 d). Ast takes the word to mean *elaborate* (a long speech), a slightly different view. Stallb. thinks it can mean "to make by way of explanation" (a long speech). (Badham rewrites it ἀνεκὰς αἰρόμενος!)—τὸ δέ, "*at vero*" Stallb., who cps. *Apol.* 23 a; see above on 630 d.—ἡ κατὰ φύσιν . . . ἀπολαβεῖν, "its scientifically correct treatment can never get clear and adequate expression in (philosophical) argument without (the help of) a correct theory of μουσική"; and this last, he says, cannot be discussed without an exposition of what is meant by *education* in general, of which it is a branch.—That διόρθωσις means "*correct treatment*" we are helped to see by the ἐν τοῖς λόγοις that follows. —For οὐκ . . . σαφές for οὐδὲν σαφές cp. *Rep.* 368 a πάνυ γὰρ θεῖον πεπόνθατε, *Crat.* 425 d and *Soph.* 247 e βέλτιον for βέλτιόν τι.—For σαφὲς ἀπολαβεῖν cp. *Polit.* 277 c ἔοικεν . . . τὴν . . . ἐνάργειαν οὐκ ἀπειληφέναι πω.

a 7. ὁρᾶτε . . . λόγον: the first four words cannot be any sort of apodosis to the εἰ clauses that follow. They mean: "Consider (both of you) what we had better do." The following construction seems rather slovenly, and it is not surprising that Hermann (followed by Schanz) wants to delete from εἰ to λόγον. The nearest approach to this is such a construction as the first εἰ clause at Xen. *Cyrop.* iii. 3. 49 τί δ', ἔφη, ὦ Κῦρε, εἰ καὶ σὺ συγκαλέσας,

ἕως ἔτι ἔξεστι, παρακελεύσαιο, εἰ ἄρα τι καὶ σὺ ἀμείνους ποιήσαις τοὺς στρατιώτας; Here the τί; ("how would it be?") has to be supplied out of the previous ὁρᾶτε τί ποιῶμεν. Another εἰ clause depending on something not expressed is that at *Laws* 744 a εἴ μοι συμβαίνει τοῦτο ἢ καὶ ἀποτυγχάνω τοῦ σκοποῦ; The conversational anacoluthon is best marked by a —.

b 3. πρόξενος apparently used as an adjective here: so ξένος at Soph. *O.T.* 219 (also *c. gen.*) ἀγὼ ξένος μὲν τοῦ λόγου τοῦδ' ἐξερῶ.

b 4. πᾶσιν τοῖς παισίν, . . . ἐνδύεται ἕκαστον ἡμῶν: the peculiarity of the anacoluthon is that there seems to be a tardy attempt to mend it; ἐγγέγονεν, which comes as if after a parenthesis, is a sufficient explanation of the dative παισίν; again quite conversational.

b 5. Ast unaccountably takes ταύτῃ as adverbial ("*propterea*"). Its separation from τῇ πόλει gives it special emphasis. ταύτῃ τῇ πόλει depends grammatically on εὔνοια rather than on προξένων, though the proximity of προξένων to τῇ πόλει is significant. It shows whose πρόξενοι are being talked of.—Badham rejects ἡμῶν . . . πόλει as a "*miseri magistelli interpretatio*," and Schanz follows him. The omission certainly seems to improve the sentence.

b 8. τῶν παίδων εὐθύς: the gen. depends on ἀκούων; the qualifying εὐθύς has very little definite meaning. We might say: "If I heard the mere children talking, and they, being Lacedaemonians, had some fault to find with, or some praise to bestow upon, the Athenians."—In the margin of Cod. Voss. was written ἐκ τῶν παίδων εὐθύς: Schanz adopts this, but such a phrase would come too soon after ἐκ νέων εὐθύς, and the loss of the ἐκ, if it was there, is hard to account for. As it is, the preceding ἐκ νέων εὐθύς helps to show that εὐθύς goes with παίδων here.—The plur. ὑμῶν applies to the whole body of πρόξενοι of Athens, of whom Meg. was one—the ἡμῶν τῶν προξένων of b 6.

c 2. Acc. to Boeckh κακῶς ῥέξειν τινά is a Laconism. It is certainly not ordinary Attic.

c 5. πᾶσαν, "thorough, hearty."

c 7. διαφερόντως τοιοῦτοι: Ritter quotes *Ep.* vii. 336 d φοβεῖσθαι δὲ μηδὲ Ἀθήνας· εἰσὶ γὰρ καὶ ἐκεῖ πάντων ἀνθρώπων διαφέροντες πρὸς ἀρετήν.

c 8. The two points about the goodness of the good Athenian are: (1) that it is spontaneous (αὐτοφυῶς); it is open to him, as it is *not* open to the Spartan, to be bad in all sorts of ways, if he likes; (2) it is *genuine*, and the mark and warrant of its genuineness is that it is (as we should say) *perfectly natural*—the gift of

the divine author of the whole scheme of things—*θείᾳ μοίρᾳ*: at *Laws* 875 c, a natural endowment (*φύσει*) is spoken of at the same time as a *divine gift* (*θείᾳ μοίρᾳ*); at *Phaedr.* 230 a, a "divine disposition," *θεία τις καὶ ἄτυφος μοῖρα*, is spoken of as the gift of nature (*φύσει*); at *Apol.* 22 c, a poet's "enthusiasm" is spoken of as *φύσει*, at *Ion* 534 c it is spoken of as bestowed *θείᾳ μοίρᾳ* (see E. S. Thompson on *Meno* 89 a). Of course *all* that is *φύσει* is not *θείᾳ μοίρᾳ*—cp. *Critias* 121 a where *ἡ τοῦ θεοῦ μοῖρα* is spoken of as disappearing from a man, and being replaced by the purely human—*τὸ ἀνθρώπινον ἦθος*—and many gifts of providence are adventitious, and not *natural*, but where the nature *is* of divine origin, it is of the right sort—*no sham.*—For *ἀληθῶς καὶ οὔτι πλαστῶς* St. cps. *Soph.* 216 c *μὴ πλαστῶς ἀλλ' ὄντως φιλόσοφοι*, and *Rep.* 485 d *μὴ πεπλασμένως ἀλλ' ἀληθῶς φιλόσοφος*. (Valckenaer rejected *θείᾳ μοίρᾳ . . . πλαστῶς* as an explanation of *αὐτοφυῶς*; Cobet rejected *ἀληθῶς . . . πλαστῶς*; Schanz rejects *θείᾳ μοίρᾳ*.—Thompson on *Gorg.* 506 d takes *θείᾳ μοίρᾳ* in this passage closely with *αὐτοφυῶς*.)

d 2. *ὁπόσα*: so at d 4. Both men answer in the same strain; they are content to have the present topic thrashed out however long it may take.

d 4. *τῇδε*, "here," i.e. at Cnossus. It is best to give *τῇδε* the local sense, as at 630 c 2 and d 5. (Ast takes it as *οὕτως*, and suggests altering it to *ἤδη*.) If this is right *οἰκεῖος* in d 6 will not mean, as Bergk thinks, "our fellow-townsman," but "a connexion of mine." There is a dramatic propriety in the fact that, as Stallb. points out, Cleinias should bear to Epimenides the same relationship that Plato himself (i.e. the Ath. stranger) did to Solon.

d 6. It is best, with Grote (vol. iii. p. 88), to acknowledge that we have here "a remarkable example of carelessness as to chronology," but we need not lay it at Plato's door; nor are we driven to convict the Cretan, who makes the statement, of what St. Paul's quotation at *Titus* i. 12 asserts to be the national vice of his countrymen. As below at 677 d 8, where the Ath. refers to Epimenides as "your friend of quite recent times," *τὸν ἀτεχνῶς χθὲς γενόμενον*, and alludes to another wonderful story about him—so here Plato (dramatically) ascribes to the Cretan an amusing ignorance of Athenian history, as well as a natural disposition to make Epimenides play a prominent part in a time of national crisis. (Meursius, *In Solon.* ch. 9 conjectured *ρκα*, i.e. 121, for *δέκα*.)

e 1. *φοβουμένων τὸν Περσικὸν Ἀθηναίων στόλον*: a similar

dislocation of what seems the natural order where genitives are concerned is not uncommon in the *Laws*. St. quotes 648 e *τὴν πάντων ἧτταν φοβούμενος ἀνθρώπων τοῦ πώματος*, 688 b *πρὸς πρώτην τὴν τῆς συμπάσης ἡγέμονα ἀρετῆς*, 730 a *μεθ' οὗ γὰρ ἱκετεύσας μάρτυρος ὁ ἱκέτης θεοῦ ‹ἀπ›έτυχεν ὁμολογιῶν*, 858 c *τοῖς μὲν τῶν ἄλλων συγγράμμασιν ποιητῶν*, 873 d *ἐν τοῖς τῶν δώδεκα ὁρίοισι μερῶν*.

e 4. *ἐξενώθησαν ὑμῖν*, "formed a friendship with you."

e 5. *οἱ πρόγονοι ἡμῶν* : i.e. our family (at that time), in the person of Epimenides.—*ἐκ τόσου*, "from that day to this." The *ἔγωγε* that follows shows that Cleinias speaks of his own family, and not of the Cnossian state (see on d 4). Ast quotes Diog. Laert. i. 111 *Ἀθηναῖοι δὲ τάλαντον ἐψηφίσαντο δοῦναι αὐτῷ . . . ὁ δὲ τὸ μὲν ἀργύριον οὐ προσήκατο, φιλίαν δὲ καὶ συμμαχίαν ἐποιήσατο Κνωσσίων καὶ Ἀθηναίων*.

643 a 3. *τὰ δ' ἐμὰ . . . δύνασθαι . . . οὐ πάνυ ῥᾴδια*, "when it comes to being able to do it, my task is none too easy." The vagueness of *τὰ ἐμά* (probably even more vague than *τὸ ἐμόν*, for which see Heindorf's note on *Theaet.* 161 e) allows of its being used, by a slight zeugma, in a slightly different sense with *ῥᾴδια*. As the subject of *ἕτοιμα* it was equal to *ἐγώ*.—For the connexion of the notions of *βούλησις* and *δύναμις* cp. *Gorg.* 509 d *πότερα δύναμιν ἢ βούλησιν ; κτλ.*

a 4. *πρὸς τὸν λόγον*, "for the purposes of the argument." Cp. *Phaedr.* 257 b *ἵνα . . . ἁπλῶς πρὸς Ἔρωτα μετὰ φιλοσόφων λόγων τὸν βίον ποίηται*.

a 5. *τί ποτ' ἐστὶν καὶ τίνα δύναμιν ἔχει* : cp. *Laws* 892 a *ψυχὴν . . . ἠγνοηκέναι κινδυνεύουσι . . . οἷόν τε ὂν τυγχάνει καὶ δύναμιν ἣν ἔχει*, and 964 c 2 *ἣν δύναμιν ἔχει κακία τε καὶ ἀρετή*, *Phaedr.* 237 c *περὶ ἔρωτος οἷόν τε ἔστι καὶ ἣν ἔχει δύναμιν* and 265 d *εἰ αὐτοῖν τὴν δύναμιν τέχνῃ λαβεῖν δύναιτό τις, οὐχ ἅχαρι*. As *δύνασθαι* sometimes means *significare*, so *δύναμις* often means *significatio*. (Ast in *Lex.* gives eight instances.) In these three passages, as at *Gorg.* 455 d—where Cope translates *τὴν τῆς ῥητορικῆς δύναμιν ἅπασαν* "the entire force and meaning of rhetoric"—I think the notion in the writer's mind is rather "*what the term implies*," than "*what the thing can do*." Ritter in a valuable note (p. 11 f.) says that in these passages it means "what the thing *is*." Referring to Peipers, *Ontologia Plat.* 250 ff. he says that with Plato *εἶναι* is nothing but the *δύναμις τοῦ ποιεῖν καὶ πάσχειν*. If that is so, we have in all these passages a simple tautology. Cp. *Soph.* 247 e 3.

a 6. *ἰτέον εἶναι τὸν . . . λόγον* : "*accusativus, in hac structura Atticis usitatus, Platoni imprimis frequentatur,*" Heindorf on *Phaedr.* 272 e. Among other passages he quotes *Laws* 688 e *τόν γε νομοθέτην . . . πειρατέον ταῖς πόλεσι φρόνησιν . . . ἐμποιεῖν.*

a 7. *τὸν θεόν* : i.e. *τὸν Διόννσον*, an ennobling periphrasis for *οἶνος*. Cp. 773 d where *οἶνος* is spoken of as chastened *ὑπὸ νήφοντος ἑτέρου θεοῦ*. These words may also contain a reference to the part to be taken in education by the god as the inspirer of the Dionysiac Choir.

b 3. *λέγοις ἄν* : so below 782 d 9, *Parm.* 126 a, *Phaedr.* 227 c.

b 5. *τοῦτο αὐτό*: antecedent to *ὅτιοὖν* (not, as Stallb., to *τὸ ἀγαθὸν εἶναι ὅτιοὖν*).—*ἐκ παίδων εὐθύς* : see above 642 b 5 *ἐκ νέων εὐθύς.*

b 6. *ἑκάστοις* : neut. (so Ast—not, as St., masc.). We should understand it better if Plato had written *ἐν ἑκάστοις τοῖς τοῦ πράγματος προσήκουσιν.* Probably he did not like the sound of two consecutive words beginning with *πρ*, and for some reason preferred not to say *τοῖς προσήκουσι τοῦ πράγματος.*—The masc. *οἱ προσήκοντες* is used as a subst. with a possessive gen. depending on it at *Apol.* 34 b ; the neut. *προσήκοντα* is equally substantival here.

b 8. *ἤ τινα οἰκοδόμον* : "*τις est forte (etwa) qua significatione praesertim cum ἤ conjunctum gaudet.* Sic infra 644 a *ἤ τινα πρὸς ἰσχύν*, 740 c *ἤ τινες ἄρρενες*, 838 c *ἤ τινας Οἰδίποδας*, [867 b *ἤ τινας ὡς ἀκουσίους*], 898 e *ἤ τινος ἀέρος*, 933 d *ἤ τισιν ἐπῳδαῖς*, 934 a *ἤ τισιν ἐπιθυμίαις*" Ast. So *Rep.* 431 a 7 *ὅταν δὲ ὑπὸ τροφῆς κακῆς ἤ τινος ὁμιλίας κρατήθῃ*, *Laws* 757 d 3 *ἤ καὶ κράτος δήμου τι*, 950 d 8.—With regard to this early specialization in the education of the craftsmen, if it had been objected to Plato that this sort of training would make a man into a *tool*, he would probably have answered that he meant his *οἰκοδόμοι* and *γεωργοί* to be tools. Possibly too, if it were urged that you cannot tell at the beginning of a child's education what calling he will be best fitted for, he would have said that it is for the good of the community that crafts should be hereditary. Cp. *Rep.* 415 a *ἅτε οὖν συγγενεῖς ὄντες πάντες τὸ μὲν πολὺ ὁμοίους ἂν ὑμῖν αὐτοῖς γεννῷτε.*

c 4. For *ἀναγκαῖα* followed by an act. infin. St. cps. *Soph.* 242 b, *Gorg.* 449 b *εἰσὶ μέν, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἔνιαι τῶν ἀποκρίσεων ἀναγκαῖαι διὰ μακρῶν τοὺς λόγους ποιεῖσθαι.*

c 5. *ἱππεύειν παίζοντα* : this suggests to us a rocking horse, or the *παιδαγωγός* on all fours with a child astride on his back.

It should be remembered, however, that *παίζειν* is a cognate of *παιδεία* as well as of *παιδία*, and that the line between the two was not nearly so sharply drawn with the Greeks as it is with us. Only the two richest classes at Athens had to serve as cavalry. As *ἔφηβοι* they had to learn to ride in earnest, but it was probably not this stage that Plato was thinking of here.

c 6. *ποιοῦντα*, the reading of the MSS., whether due to the original author or to a copying scribe, must be a slip for *ποιεῖν*, due to the attraction of the neighbouring *παίζοντα*. In the margin of the MS. of Eusebius, who quotes this passage, the correction to *ποιεῖν* is made, and Boeckh and Ast made it separately.

c 7. *παιδίων*, the reading of Eusebius and Aristides, is now generally adopted for the *παιδείων* of the MSS.—*ἐκεῖσε . . . οἷ ἀφικομένους αὐτοὺς δεῖ τέλος ἔχειν*, "towards the pursuits (or employments) in which they themselves (will) have to be engaged when they grow up," i.e. I take the *ἀφ. τέλ. ἔχειν* to be equal to *ἀφικέσθαι τέλος ἔχοντας*. For *τέλος* in the sense of *maturity* cp. *Phaedr.* 276 b *ἀγαπῴη ἂν ἐν ὀγδόῳ μηνὶ ὅσα ἔσπειρε τέλος λαβόντα*, and *Laws* 834 c, where *τοῖς τέλος ἔχουσι* is "i.q. *τελείοις, adultis*" (Ast); so at 899 e *πρὸς τέλος . . . ὁρῶν ἐλθόντας*, *Menex.* 249 a *ἐπειδὰν εἰς ἀνδρὸς τέλος ἵωσιν*. *τέλος ἔχειν* is often used in the *Laws* without *βίου* (once, 801 e, with *βίου*) for "*to die*." At *Tim.* 90 d it means *to find its fulfilment*, and this is apparently the sense which Jowett gives it here. He translates "(to direct the children's inclinations . . .) *to their final aim in life*." This neglects the emphatic *αὐτούς*.—Another possibility is that *τέλος ἔχειν* here means "*to reach perfection*"—the same as the *τέλειον εἶναι* four lines lower down—"to the point to which they themselves must come if they are to reach perfection." But the meaning wanted is not that the teacher must set the highest possible ideal before the child, but that he must direct his thoughts, and more particularly his inclinations, to a particular employment.—With this explanation too the emphatic *αὐτούς* seems out of place, whereas it goes admirably with the *ἀφικομένους* if that is taken to be the most significant word in the phrase. (F.H.D. suggests that *τέλος ἔχειν* means "to take up their position in the world.")—The main point in this paragraph, as the next words clearly show, is, not that children should specialize early but, that the first object of education is to make children *like* doing what will be their life-work.

d 1. *τροφήν* is *disciplinam*, a common Platonic use; cp. *Tim.* 44 b *ἂν μὲν οὖν δὴ καὶ συνεπιλαμβάνηταί τις ὀρθὴ*

τροφὴ παιδεύσεως.—τοῦ παίζοντος: almost the same as τοῦ παιδευομένου.

d 2. εἰς ἔρωτα . . . ἀρετῆς: I feel less difficulty in retaining the MS. reading in this much discussed passage than in adopting any of the proposed alterations of it. τῆς τοῦ πράγματος ἀρετῆς must be taken as a genitive defining the scope of τέλειον, while ὅ, like the ὁτιοῦν with ἀγαθόν at b 4, denotes the thing in which perfection is to be shown. The αὐτόν here I do not take to be emphatic. The gen. ἀρετῆς is like the gen. with ἐπιστήμων and ἔμπειρος (of which many exx. occur in P.). ἀρετή is cognate in meaning to τέλειος, and this makes the connexion more natural. We may translate: "In which, when he becomes a man, he will have to gain as great perfection as the subject admits of"—lit. "to be fully equipped with the perfection of the subject."—Of the proposed changes the simplest is the second proposed by Ritter, i.e. to put the τῆς before ἀρετῆς: in that case ἀρετῆς will depend on ἔρωτα and τούτου τοῦ πράγματος on ἀρετῆς. The change R. prefers is to put a comma after εἶναι and a καὶ before τῆς.—Schanz brackets τῆς . . . ἀρετῆς. Badham rearranges the words, reading τῆς τούτου τοῦ πράγματος ἀρετῆς, ὃ . . . τέλειον εἶναι. Ast reads οὗ (*ubi*) for ὃ, taking it with γενόμενον, and making τοῦ πράγματος an objective gen., depending on ἀρετῆς ("excellence at the subject"), which itself depends on τέλειον.

d 4. The MS. authority is strongly in favour of ἡμῖν here. The change of one for the other is so common that modern editors are doubtless right in following L ("ut videtur" Burnet) in reading ὑμῖν.—The preceding ὅπερ εἶπον refers to b 2.

d 6. ὃ λέγομεν εἶναι παιδείαν, "what we mean by παιδεία." In the previous paragraph we have been told the right *method* of education: in this we have its *aim*. Though there are difficulties about the language of particular passages (e.g. d 8 ff.), the meaning of the whole is clear. The author distinguishes between a *liberal education* and a *technical training*. The method (see above) is the same for the two, but the object very different. It is with the former only that the lawgiver is concerned.

d 7. θ' is "*or*."

d 8. τροφάς, "bringing up"—as above at d 1, and below at a 1.—ὡς with an acc. part. following λέγομεν is an absolute construction like that commented on above at 624 a 7. St. cps. *Phaedo* 109 d. Cp. Eur. *Phoen.* 1460 f. ἀνῆξε δ' ὀρθὸς λαὸς εἰς ἔριν λόγων, ἡμεῖς μὲν ὡς νικῶντα δεσπότην ἐμόν. . . .

d 8–e 2. In this difficult passage the MSS. and Eusebius have

μάλα πεπαιδευμένων σφόδρα ἀνθρώπων. Ficinus and Cornarius translate as if they had πεπαιδευμένον ἄνθρωπον, treat σφόδρα as redundant, and supply τέχνην with the gen. ἄλλων τοιούτων. (R. G. Bury would read εἰς ⟨τά⟩ τε, taking καπ. and ναυκλ. to be genitives.) Ast saw that ἄλλων τοιούτων must have a noun to depend on, and conjectured that μάλα was an early mistake for πράγματα; Winckelmann preferred ἐπιτηδεύματα, referring to 918 a 1 where we have καπηλείας ἐπιτηδεύματα. With this and the change to the acc. sing. (πεπαιδευμένον ἄνθρωπον) Schanz is content, and Ritter approves. As a smaller alteration I proposed formerly to read ἄττα for μάλα and to keep the following genitives, taking καπηλείας and ναυκληρίας as acc. plur., and translating πεπ. σφ. ἀνθρ. "in the case of men who have been highly trained." But I now prefer with F.H.D. to see the source of error in σφόδρα. He for this word would read σοφίαν, taking καπηλείας and ναυκληρίας as objective genitives depending on it. It will be noticed that σοφίαν in the same connexion recurs eight lines further down. The gen. ἀνθρώπων is on all fours with the ἡμῶν in the earlier half of the sentence. We might then translate the whole passage from νῦν γάρ: "As it is (cp. νῦν δέ at *Phaedr.* 244 a) we blame or praise the bringing up of individual men, speaking of that one among us as an educated man, another as uneducated (and we say this) sometimes in the case of those who have been highly trained for hucksterage or for seamanship, or for any other such business."

e 3. ταῦτα refers to the business trainings spoken of above.

e 4. There is something attractive in Ritter's suggestion that perhaps for παιδείαν here we ought to read παιδαγωγίαν. He refers to 659 d where we read ὡς ἄρα παιδεία μέν ἐσθ' ἡ παίδων ὁλκή τε καὶ ἀγωγὴ πρὸς τὸν ὑπὸ τοῦ νόμου λόγον ὀρθὸν εἰρημένον.

e 6. ἐπιστάμενον is not connected with τέλεον by τε, but it is subordinate to and explanatory of τέλεον. For ἄρχειν τε καὶ ἄρχεσθαι St. cps. Solon ap. Stob. *Serm.* xlvi. 22 ἄρχε πρῶτον μαθὼν ἄρχεσθαι, ἄρχεσθαι γὰρ μαθὼν ἄρχειν ἐπιστήσει, and Arist. *Pol.* 1333 a 2 and Cic. *De legg.* iii. 2.

644 a 1. ἀφορισάμενος (the technical term for "isolating" a phenomenon) refers to the μὴ ἀόριστον γένηται in 643 d 6.—For ὡς ἐμοὶ L^1 and O^1 apparently have ἐξ ὧν (cp. *Prot.* 313 c ἐξ ὧν σὺ λέγεις, *Phaedo* 61 c ἐξ ὧν ἐγὼ ᾔσθημαι). This looks like a very early variant.

a 3. τινα: cp. above on 643 b 8.—I see no force in Badham's

objection that it is ridiculous to talk of *ἰσχύς* as if it were a *σοφία*. To say nothing of the difference between *ἄλλος* and the English *other* in such sentences, "the training which aims at money, or, say, some particular bodily strength" implies the acquirement of *skill*, and *σοφία* includes all sorts of skill (cp. *Prot.* 321 d Ἡφαίστου καὶ Ἀθηνᾶς τὴν ἔντεχνον σοφίαν), and a man may be, in a literal, as well as in a metaphorical sense, a *σοφὸς παλαιστής* (Soph. *Phil.* 431). For the whole passage cp. *Epist.* 358 c 3 τὸ γὰρ βέβαιον καὶ πιστὸν καὶ ὑγιές, τοῦτο ἐγώ φημι εἶναι τὴν ἀληθινὴν φιλοσοφίαν, τὰς δὲ ἄλλας τε καὶ εἰς ἄλλα τεινούσας σοφίας τε καὶ δεινότητας κομψότητας οἶμαι προσαγορεύων ὀρθῶς ὀνομάζειν.

a 4. *ἄνευ νοῦ καὶ δίκης*: a negative definition of the aim of education; i.e. it must produce *φρόνησις* and *δικαιοσύνη*. The former was partly implied in the *ἄρχειν ἐπιστάμενον*, and the latter in the *ἄρχεσθαι ἐπιστάμενον* above. That *σωφροσύνη* and *ἀνδρεία*, the other two of the *θεῖα ἀγαθά* mentioned at 631 c, are not specified here we have no right to complain. The Athenian selects the two most indispensable products of education. That he is speaking generally, and not philosophically classifying, is shown by his resumption of his whole contention, three lines lower down, in the form: "true education has got to make us *good*," prefaced as it is by a deprecation of criticism of his previous terms—*μηδὲν ὀνόματι διαφερώμεθ' αὐτοῖς* (i.e. *ἀλλήλοις*).

a 6. For *ὀνόματι διαφέρεσθαι* St. cps. *Euthydem.* 285 a *καὶ μὴ ὀνόματι διαφέρεσθαι.*

a 8. *σχεδόν*: merely a sort of apology for the general term *ἀγαθοί*; i.e. it does not mean that in *nearly all cases* well educated men are good (so Ast and Jowett), but that the nearest approach to a general term in the case is the word *good*: "what you may call *good*."

b 1. *μηδαμοῦ ἀτιμάζειν*: this he says in view of the disparagement of the *συμπόσια*, which he is going to show may be educational implements for training men in *σωφροσύνη*.—*πρῶτον τῶν καλλίστων τοῖς ἀρίστοις ἀνδράσιν παραγιγνόμενον*, "the greatest blessing man can receive, and the better the man, the greater the blessing." The *παρα-* in the verb shows that he is speaking not of what a man has *φύσει*, but of additions to it.

b 2. *ἐξέρχεται*: the connexion with *ἐπανορθοῦσθαι* shows that the word is used for "*goes wrong*"—"outsteps bounds"—a rare use. Cp. *Phil.* 13 d 6 *καὶ ὁ λόγος ἡμῖν ἐκπεσὼν οἰχήσεται.*—The statement that it is every man's duty to do what he can to help

education into the right lines is noteworthy.—L and O have *παντὸς* but A has *παντὶ*, and so O_2.

b 6. Cp. above on 624 a 7. The *πάλαι* refers to 626 e 2 ff.; though the precise statement that the *man* who conquers himself is *good* is not made there, at 627 b 6 f. that statement is made about a city.

b 9. *ἀναλάβωμεν*, "let us consider again"—the object, most likely, being, not *τοῦτ' αὐτό*, but the sentence—"what we mean by that same"; so at *Apol.* 19 a *ἀναλάβωμεν οὖν ἐξ ἀρχῆς τίς ἡ κατηγορία ἐστίν*, and at *Hipp. Mai.* 288 a *ἀναλάβω ὃ λέγεις*, *Phil.* 33 c *μνήμην, ὡς ἔοικεν, ὅτι ποτ' ἔστιν πρότερον ἀναληπτέον*.

c 1. *μοι*: this ethic dative turns what looked like a command into a request. It is almost "if you please." I don't think Schanz can be right in altering it to *μου*. Cp. Dem. 18. 178 *τούτῳ πάνυ μοι προσέχετε τὸν νοῦν.—ἀποδέξασθε ἐάν πως δυνατὸς γένωμαι*: so *Rep.* 525 d *οὐδαμῇ ἀποδεχόμενον ἐάν τις . . . διαλέγηται*—"allow me to . . . if I can."—The *δι' εἰκόνος*, of course, goes with *δηλῶσαι*.—"Let me, please, try and show you, by the help of a figure, how the case stands."

c 4. *ἕκαστον αὐτόν*: a variety of the common *αὐτὸς ἕκαστος* ("*pro se quisque*" Ast), "each separate individual," or "each separate self."—*ἕνα* is of course *predicate*. (St. takes *αὐτόν* closely with *ἕνα*.)

c 9. *μελλόντων*: Stephanus was for reading *μελλόντοιν*, in which case, I suppose, *πρὸς δέ* would be adverbial: "*non male*" Ast says, though he keeps *μελλόντων*, supplying *αὐτῶν* (i.e. the two *συμβούλω*, *ἡδονή* and *λύπη*) with it. But certainly, if *μελλόντων* be kept—and I think it should—it is best, with Stallb., to take it as a neuter.—For the adjective used substantively without the article cp. *Laws* 816 d *ἄνευ γὰρ γελοίων τὰ σπουδαῖα . . . μαθεῖν . . . οὐ δυνατόν.—οἷν*, which refers of course to *δόξας*, was altered in the margin of Eusebius to the un-Attic *αἷν* (cp. Wecklein, *Curae Epigraphicae*, p. 14).

c 10. A good instance of the neutral use of *ἐλπίς*.

d 1. *θάρρος*, "confidence," "a cheerful expectation." As he has deliberately given the neutral sense to *ἐλπίς* he has to find another word for it here; besides, *θάρρος* is more decidedly the opposite of *φόβος* than *ἐλπίς* is. Cp. 671 c *τὸν εὔελπιν καὶ θαρραλέον*. For this use, and for the whole passage, cp. *Tim.* 69 c f. *ἄλλο τε εἶδος ἐν αὐτῷ ψυχῆς προσῳκοδόμουν τὸ θνητόν, δεινὰ καὶ ἀναγκαῖα ἐν ἑαυτῷ παθήματα ἔχον, πρῶτον μὲν ἡδονήν, μέγιστον κακοῦ δέλεαρ, ἔπειτα λύπας, ἀγαθῶν φυγάς, ἔτι δ' αὖ*

θάρρος καὶ φόβον, ἄφρονε συμβούλω, θυμὸν δὲ δυσπαραμύθητον, ἐλπίδα δ' εὐπαράγωγον. (ἐλπίς seems here used in the sense of *fancy.*)—ἐπὶ πᾶσι τούτοις, "about all these (instances of hopes and fears)."

d 2. λογισμός (sc. ἐστι): the construction changes here.—ὃς . . . ἐπωνόμασται is rejected by Schanz. He apparently considers it manufactured by a commentator out of 645 a 2. But if these words were absent there is nothing to which the following remarks of Cl. and Meg. could refer. It is a sudden revelation of the way the Ath.'s mind is working, and his hearers are not unnaturally bewildered. What follows at 645 a is an explanation. He means that what this calculation (about the advisability of encouraging hopes or fears) is to the individual man, that, in the case of the state, is the debate which results, by public agreement, in a *law.*

d 7. θαῦμα: cp. 803 c ἄνθρωπον δέ, ὅπερ εἴπομεν ἔμπροσθεν, θεοῦ τι παίγνιον εἶναι μεμηχανημένον; and 804 b θαύματα ὄντες τὸ πολύ, σμικρὰ δὲ ἀληθείας ἄττα μετέχοντες. Cp. the hymn in Browning's "Pippa Passes": "God's puppets, best and worst, are we."

d 8. Rabe (*Rh. Mus.* lxiii. 2, p. 236) says O^3 gives ἡγησόμεθα as read by τοῦ πατριάρχου τὸ βιβλίον.—τῶν ζῴων θεῖον: the MS. text is quite sound here, I think. τῶν ζῴων is "living creatures though we are"; we are not lifeless—put together (cp. συνεστηκός below) out of wood, but we *are* puppets, all the same. If the apparently simple reading τῶν θεῶν—suggested by Muretus and adopted by Schanz—had stood here, I think we should have had αὐτῶν instead of the emphatic ἐκείνων in the next line: be that as it may, who can say that Plato ought to have said θαῦμα θεῶν here rather than θαῦμα θεῖον?—For the consciousness that the cognate word implies the noun θεοί, and that the noun can, in the afterpart of the sentence, be referred to as so implied, Heindorf on *Theaet.* 168 a refers to this passage and to *Laws* 864 d παιδίᾳ χρώμενος, οὐδέν πω τῶν τοιούτων (sc. παίδων) διαφέρειν. Cp. Porson on *Hec.* 22, where he quotes Soph. *Trach.* 259 ἔρχεται πόλιν Τὴν Εὐρυτείαν· τόνδε (sc. Εὔρυτον) γὰρ μεταίτιον Μόνον βροτῶν ἔφασκε τοῦδ' εἶναι πάθους.—Because, in mystical language, in the *Timaeus* (39 e ff.) Plato talks of the οὐράνιον θεῶν γένος (the stars) as ζῷα θεῖα καὶ ἀίδια, many editors of this passage have adopted the belief that the true reading should be θείων, and that τῶν ζῴων θείων (a strange order) means "*gods.*"—εἴτε ὡς παίγνιον . . . συνεστηκός: another difference from

ordinary puppets: it is possible that we are not meant for the *amusement* of the heavenly spectators; they may have been made "for some serious purpose."—We need not follow up the metaphor by asking, "who pulls the wires and with what motive?" The following words (*τόδε δὲ ἴσμεν*) confine its application. We answer to the tug of passion or other motives just in the way that the marionettes answer to the pull of the wires. (Cf. *King Lear* IV. i. 38 "As flies to wanton boys, are we to the Gods: They kill us for their sport.") Cp. *Pol.* 268 a 5 *καὶ τοῦτο μὲν ἐπισκεψόμεθα τόδε δὲ ἴσμεν*, and below, 672 b 8.

e 1. *γιγνώσκομεν*: the pres. means we are (not) inquiring (into this—i.e. the motive of the pulling).

e 3. *ἀνθέλκουσιν* Eusebius, *ἀνθέλκουσαι* MSS.—"*errore aperto, cujus fons in vicino ἐναντίαι οὖσαι cernitur*" Stallb.

e 4. *οὗ δὴ διωρισμένη ἀρετὴ καὶ κακία κεῖται*: lit. "in the very region where vice 'marches with' virtue." We might say, "on the border line between vice and virtue."—*μιᾷ γάρ . . . δεῖν . . . συνεπόμενον . . . ἀνθέλκειν τ. ἄλλ. νεύ. ἕκαστον*: still less of the original metaphor is left here—nothing but the wires: we are no longer a *spectacle*: *we can pull our own wires.*—*ὁ λόγος*: as before, the personified argument—"*Philosophy.*"

645 a 1. *τὴν τοῦ λογισμοῦ ἀγωγὴν χρυσῆν καὶ ἱεράν*: Homer's picture of Zeus at one end of the golden rope, successfully resisting the pull of all the other gods and goddesses at the other, was no doubt present to Plato's mind here,—as at *Theaet.* 153 c, where he suggests that the golden rope is an allegorical representation of the sun—but I do not think that *ἀγωγή* is an abstract used for the concrete; i.e. it does not mean *rope*, but *drawing.* It is *χρυσῆ* that is used in the non-natural, i.e. the metaphorical sense:—"the golden and blessed drawing of reason." (Cp. *Twelfth Night* I. i. 35 "How will she love, when the rich golden shaft Hath killed the flock of all affections else That live in her.") *ἀγωγή* will thus have here much the same sense it has at 659 d *ἡ παίδων ὁλκή τε καὶ ἀγωγή*—and at 819 a, where it almost equals *τροφή* or *παιδεία.* By this time the metaphor has almost disappeared: it survives only in the *suggestion* of Homer's golden rope.—*τῆς πόλεως κοινὸν νόμον ἐπικαλουμένην*, "which gets the name, when it affects (not a man, but) the state, of a generally binding law." (See above on 644 d 2.) The main idea which emerges here is one which has been presented to us before, and which the author means us to have in mind all through; i.e. that of the educational influence of law. Behind all education too,

whether of the man or of the community, we are shown the force of *reason* which guides it. Cp. Rit. and Prell. 523 d.

a 2. ἄλλας δὲ σκληρὰς . . . ὁμοίας: an embarrassing wealth of thought is here hinted at rather than adequately expressed. A revision by the author's hand would doubtless have added clearness. The codex Ricardianus adds καὶ μονοειδῆ after οὖσαν, and Ficinus translates the words. Schanz marks a lacuna after οὖσαν. Even with the added words the antitheses are not all clearly expressed. The παντοδαποῖς εἴδεσιν ὁμοίας has, I would suggest, already in the ordinary text the ideas to which it is the antithesis, though they are not clearly expressed as such. The drawing of virtue is *single* (μιᾷ—in an emphatic position): along with this, and with the epithets χρυσῆ and ἱερά, go naturally those of *immutability* and *harmony*, and these are further suggested by the contrasted dissimilarity of the opposing forces.

a 5. The ἀεί here reminds us of the διὰ βίου and the παντί in a somewhat similar exhortation to the good citizen at 644 b 3. —In the whole of the present passage down to τὰ ἄλλα γένη the language admits of reference to the struggle between the good and the bad elements either in the *man* or in the *state*.

a 6. πρᾴου καὶ οὐ βιαίου: cp. the quotation from *Isaiah* in *St. Matthew* 12. 19 οὐκ ἐρίσει οὐδὲ κραυγάσει, οὐδὲ ἀκούσει τις ἐν ταῖς πλατείαις τὴν φωνὴν αὐτοῦ. κάλαμον συντετριμμένον οὐ κατεάξει καὶ λίνον τυφόμενον οὐ σβέσει, ἕως ἂν ἐκβάλῃ εἰς νῖκος τὴν κρίσιν. The only point in the metaphor here preserved is the *gold* as contrasted with the other metals—physically, in bulk, hardness and roughness their inferior, but in worth and (so to speak) moral power, their superior. Cp. the language used at *Rep.* 415 a, and often elsewhere in the *Republic*, of the *golden* element in the state.—δεῖσθαι ὑπηρετῶν αὐτοῦ τὴν ἀγωγήν: cp. *Rep.* 441 c οὐκοῦν τῷ μὲν λογιστικῷ ἄρχειν προσήκει, σοφῷ ὄντι καὶ ἔχοντι τὴν ὑπὲρ ἁπάσης τῆς ψυχῆς προμήθειαν, τῷ δὲ θυμοειδεῖ ὑπηκόῳ εἶναι καὶ συμμάχῳ τούτου; In the *state*, it is the duty of the good citizen to support the law, and what Plato in the *Republic* calls the *golden* element among the citizens.

a 7. The ἐν occurs in no MS. Eusebius has it, and Ficinus has *in nobis* in his translation. The palaeographical argument cuts both ways; the ἄν is as likely to have been the cause of the introduction of an ἐν, as of its loss, and Ficinus's *in nobis* may have been a translation of ἡμῖν. There is a slight gain of definiteness of expression in the ἐν ἡμῖν, and I have doubtfully

left it in the text out of deference to the views of most modern editors.

b 1. *καὶ οὕτω . . . σεσωμένος ἂν εἴη*: a hard passage. Ritter (p. 13) has a useful note on it, more particularly on the uses of *μῦθος* and *λόγος*. "Though occasionally interchangeable they are generally distinct; *μῦθος* persuades, is rhetorical, aims at producing a certain mental atmosphere: *λόγος* convinces and lays down the law; the *προοίμια* of the *Laws* are *μῦθοι*." But I do not find it easy to agree with R. that *ὁ μῦθος ἀρετῆς* here means "*the recommendation of virtue*":—as we might say in quasi-parliamentary language, "*the speech for virtue*." I think *ἀρετῆς* is a subjective gen., and that the whole passage means "If this help is given, and the golden element prevails, virtue's persuasive representation, which likened us to puppets, will not fail of its effect (and after all the cord I speak of is a golden one)." A *λόγος* is said *σῴζεσθαι* (*Theaet.* 164 a and 167 d) when it is still maintained,—when it has not to be abandoned; a *μῦθος σῴζεται* when it holds its own as a persuasive force. For the form of the phrase cp. *Rep.* 621 b 8 *καὶ οὕτως, ὦ Γλαύκων, μῦθος ἐσώθη καὶ οὐκ ἀπώλετο*. (Here, though the lit. meaning is "the *μῦθος* was preserved to us," I think there underlies the literal meaning the suggestion that the *μῦθος gained its point*: this is borne out by the following *καὶ ἡμᾶς ἂν σώσειεν, ἂν πειθώμεθα αὐτῷ*, which also illustrates the persuasive, instructive character of the *μῦθος*.) Cp. *Theaet.* 167 d *σῴζεται . . . ὁ λόγος οὗτος*, 164 a, *Rep.* 395 b. St. cps. *Phil.* 14 a (where see Badham's note). —For the order of the *ὡς* and the *θαυμάτων* St. cps. *Soph.* 242 c, *Phil.* 18 d, and *Polit.* 260 c.—Ast and Stallb. take *ὁ μῦθος ἀρετῆς* as "*the story about virtue*"; sooner than agree to this Badham would (very ingeniously) read *ἆρ' ἔτι* for *ἀρετῆς*. The difficulty of deciding the meaning of the gen. *ἀρετῆς* is so great, that Badham's suggestion is very attractive.

b 2. This result of the use of an *εἰκών* was that hoped for when it was first promised at 644 c 1: it gives something of an explanation (*τρόπον τινά*) of what was meant by saying that self-mastery is essential to virtue (cp. 633 d and e); it means that the better elements must be victorious over the worse.

b 3. *καὶ ὅτι πόλιν καὶ ἰδιώτην κτλ.*: the next result that follows, if the *μῦθος* makes its way, is that every man for himself can form a right judgement about the various motives and inducements to action of different kinds, and guide his life by it, and that a state, when it gets its right judgement either directly

from heaven or from the rightly judging man just spoken of (*τούτου τοῦ γνόντος ταῦτα*), can make of it a law to guide its internal and its foreign policy alike.

b 6. Eus. inserts *αὐτοῦ* before *τούτου*: perhaps we ought to read *αὐτοῦ* instead of *τούτου*.

c 1. *διηρθρωμένον*: a synonym for *διωρισμένον*, as at 963 b.

c 2. *αὐτοῦ*: rather loosely used for the *distinction* between the two things that have just been said to have been more clearly distinguished from each other.—Lastly, light will be thrown, by the realization of the nature of virtue and vice, on the great subject of *παιδεία*, and we may be able to see that the time spent at a drinking-party has so important a bearing on this subject as to merit the closer consideration which we are invited to give to it.

c 3 ff. With *τὸ περὶ τῆς ἐν τοῖς οἴνοις διατριβῆς* we must supply *ἔσται μᾶλλον καταφανές* from the previous sentence.—Confusion was caused here in the earlier editions by the wrong attribution of *φανείη . . .* to *λέγε δή*. Hermann was the first of the moderns to restore the various speeches to their right authors, but Stephanus had already shown the right way.

c 7. *τῆς γε νῦν διατριβῆς*: with a manifest reference to the *τὸ περὶ τῆς ἐν τ. οἱ. διατριβῆς* of the last speaker.—*ὅτιπερ ἂν ἄξ. γίγν.*, like the *ὁπόσα σοι φίλον* of 642 d 2 and the *ὁπόσα βούλει* of 642 d 4, give the Ath. *carte blanche* as to length.

d 1. *λέγε δή*: before a question, like *καί μοι λέγε* at 646 e 4.—The Ath. certainly seems to want to startle his hearers. He has taken their breath away once by suggesting that getting drunk is a branch of a liberal education, and now we have what sounds like a farcical suggestion of making a puppet drunk.

d 2. *ἀπεργαζόμεθα*: the pres. is, as St. says, supported by the similar tense at 647 c 5 (Steph. wanted to alter it to the fut.).

d 4. *πρὸς ὅτι*: the regular *repeated* form of the question *πρὸς τί;*—in other words "I can't answer your question, *why*? till I get the first question answered."—*τοῦτο* is the *θαῦμα*, and *ὅλως* (cp. 641 b 6) goes with the whole question: "What," he asks, "is the general result to the *θαῦμα* when it has come into connexion with wine?" (*τούτῳ may*, as St. says, be neut., referring to *μέθη*, as *τούτου* at 672 e 5 refers to *παίδευσις* or *χορεία*.—I think St. is certainly wrong in supplying *ἐρωτῶ* with *τοῦτο ὅλως*—"*sed hoc in universum quaero.*")—For the two cases of *οὗτος* in conjunction cp. 646 d 6 (*τοῦτο ἐν τούτοις*).

d 6. *ἐρωτῶ γάρ*, "what my question amounts to is . . ."—

For the proleptic σφοδροτέρας with ἐπιτείνει St. cps. *Prot.* 327 c οὗτος ἂν ἐλλόγιμος ηὐξήθη.

e 5. There is a conversational looseness about the acc. τὴν ἕξιν (as there is in the use of αὐτόν two lines above, when the τις to which it refers comes after it), and there are several other, more regular moulds in which the sentence might have been cast, but the meaning is quite clear. The acc. with εἰς ταὐτὸν ἀφικνεῖσθαι is of the same kind as the acc. with ὅμοιος of the thing in which the likeness is seen: Soph. *Aj.* 1153 ὀργὴν ὅμοιος, *Il.* v. 778 ἴθμαθ' ὁμοῖοι. There is no need, with Schanz, to suspect a corruption of the text.

646 a 2. πονηρότατος: at 644 b 7 the admission was referred to that a man who could not rule himself was a *bad* man; so again here.

a 4. I.e. by the side of the proverbial (Ar. *Nub.* 1417) childishness of the old man, we may now set the childishness of the man who is overcome by wine. The comparison adds dignity to the state of mind of the latter, but it does not make that state any clearer; the childishness is hardly of the same kind. What is common to the two is that both come in later life.

b 5. The εἰ is the usual εἰ after θαυμάζω.

b 6. ἅπασαν φαυλότητα, "utter degradation," Jowett.

b 7. ψυχῆς λέγεις: with ψυχῆς we must supply φαυλότητα from the preceding sentence.

c 1. ἐπὶ τὸ τοιοῦτον: again a conversational looseness of expression. It is possible that we ought to put a (;) after ἀδυναμίαν, and supply δεῖ ἑαυτὸν ἐμβάλλειν from what precedes.

c 3. αὐτοὺς βαδίζοντας: the αὐτούς implies that nobody forces them to it (referring to the ἑκών above); βαδ. that at the time of seeking the doctor's services they are in fair health.—ἐπί with dat., "*with a view to*"; so *Prot.* 312 b τούτων γὰρ σὺ ἑκάστην (sc. μάθησιν) οὐκ ἐπὶ τέχνῃ ἔμαθες, ὡς δημιουργὸς ἐσόμενος, ἀλλ' ἐπὶ παιδείᾳ, ὡς τὸν ἰδιώτην καὶ τὸν ἐλεύθερον πρέπει.—There is more in this analogy of medical treatment than at first appears. When we come to the Athenian's complete scheme for the regulation of the use of wine (see 674 a, b, c) we see that its use is to be, morally speaking, a *medical* one; no city would need, he says, many vineyards; the scheme would not be good for what in England is called "the trade."

c 4. μετ' ὀλίγον ὕστερον: apparently an adaptation of the poetical μεθύστερον; the usual Platonic phrase is ὀλίγον (or ὀλίγῳ) ὕστερον.

c 7. *γυμνάσια καὶ πόνους* : a hendiadys, "the labours of the gymnasia."—*ἀσθενεῖς* probably refers to the temporary fatigue after great exertion.

d 2. *τῶν ἄλλων ἐπιτηδευμάτων πέρι* : about other practices, that is, *besides those which are concerned with the body*, we should expect people to be able to submit to a temporary loss or inconvenience, if it was the price of greater future gain.

d 5. I think we have here again a conversational laxity of expression, and that the presence of *περί* with *τὸν οἶνον* is made to cover the absence of *περί* or *πέρι* with *διατριβῆς*. If we cancel *ὡσαύτως διανοητέον* (with Hermann) or *διανοητέον* (with Schanz) and supply *διανοεῖσθαι χρή* and *περί* from the preceding sentence, it will be awkward if we do not make this sentence too a *question*, and that will not suit the *εἴπερ* clause which follows.

d 6. *εἴπερ ἔνι . . . διανοηθῆναι*, "if it is possible to reckon this (practice) as really belonging to these (practices)"—i.e. as being one of the practices in which a temporary loss will produce a future gain. (I think that is better than, with Stallb., to take *τοῦτο* to be "this state of things" and *τούτοις* to be "*istis quae ad compotationem pertinent*," i.e. *ἡ περὶ τὸν οἶνον διατριβή*.)—The following sentence incidentally explains more clearly what he means by *τοῦτο ἐν τούτοις*.

d 8. *ἔχουσα φαίνηται* : the subject to be supplied is *ἡ π. τ. οἷ. διατριβή*.

d 9. *τῆς περὶ τὸ σῶμα*, "than that which accrues to the body" (in the instances, i.e., given at c 3 ff.).—*τῇ γε ἀρχῇ* : is this a metaphor from the stadium—"at the start"? (cp. 648 e 1). Ast takes *τῇ ἀρχῇ* to be equivalent to *ἀρχήν* or *τὴν ἀρχήν*, *omnino*. Anyhow the point is that, whereas the *ὠφελία* spoken of just above has to be waited for, *this* advantage is enjoyed at once.

e 2. *τοιοῦτον* : this does not refer to the word *ἀλγηδόνων* but to the possession of an advantage *μηδὲν τῆς περὶ τὸ σῶμα ἐλάττω*. —*αὐτῷ* refers to *διατριβή* ; cp. on 645 d 4.

e 4. *καί μοι λέγε* : cp. 645 d 1.—*δύο φόβων εἴδη* : just as above the Ath. introduced *temperance* under the guise of a kind of *courage*, so here he introduces the sense of *shame* as a kind of *fear*.

e 11. *πράττοντες ἢ λέγοντες* : subordinate to *δοξάζεσθαι*—"*if* we do or say."

647 a 4. *ἐναντίος* : here and in the following line not used as at a 10 and 646 e 4. There it means *opposite* in a logical sense ; here it means *opponent* in a military sense. We may, I think, translate *ἐναντίος ἐστί* by "is a foe to," or perhaps "challenges."

a 5. *ἀλγηδόσιν καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις φόβοις*, "pains, and the other things men fear"; so at 635 b we have *λῦπαι* and *φόβοι*, with *ἡδοναί* and *παιδίαι* next door to them.

a 8. Ast was no doubt right in altering the *οὐκ ἄν* of the MSS. to *οὐ καὶ*. (So too Badham: Ast's other alterations in this paragraph—*σέβεται καλῶν* or *σέβει καὶ καλεῖ . . . τό<δε>*—are unnecessary.)—*καὶ νομοθέτης καὶ πᾶς οὗ καὶ σμικρὸν ὄφελος*: *καὶ . . . καί* here is rather "whether . . . or" than "both . . . and," and the whole is equivalent to: "anybody who is worth anything, whether he be lawgiver or not."

a 9 f. *καλῶν* is subordinated to *προσαγορεύει* in order to bring out the linguistic connexion between the honourable *αἰδώς* and its execrable opposite. (Schanz rejects the words *καλῶν αἰδῶ*, but cp. 699 c 4 *ἣν αἰδῶ πολλάκις ἐν τοῖς ἄνω λόγοις εἴπομεν.*)—Every *φόβος* has naturally an opposite *θάρρος* (see above 644 c 10 f.).—It is interesting to note that, before it was known that A confirmed the reading *τούτῳ*, Heindorf so corrected the vulgate *τούτων*. The correct reading also occurred in the margin of O.

b 1. *μέγιστον κακὸν ἰδίᾳ τε καὶ δημοσίᾳ*, "a curse, whether to the individual man or to the state." In saying *δημοσίᾳ* he is probably thinking, not so much of a state's action towards other states, as of the character of its laws and institutions. So at *Phaedr.* 277 d *δημοσίᾳ* is explained as e.g. implying *νόμους τιθείς*. The adverb would also apply to the action of an individual man in a public capacity, as a *δικαστής* for instance, or a speaker before a *δικαστήριον*; cp. *Theaet.* 174 b c *καὶ δημοσίᾳ . . . ὅταν ἐν δικαστηρίῳ ἤ που ἄλλοθι ἀναγκασθῇ περὶ τῶν παρὰ πόδας καὶ τῶν ἐν ὀφθαλμοῖς διαλέγεσθαι.* If this latter sense was prominent in this passage, it would mean "a curse to either an *ἰδιώτης* or a *πολιτικός*"; probably the words would cover both meanings, and so be untranslatable in English.

b 4. *ἓν πρὸς ἕν* recurs at 738 e, 705 b *ἀνθ' ἑνὸς ἕν*, and *Epinomis* 976 e *μία γὰρ ὡς εἰπεῖν πρὸς μίαν*: the phrase corresponds to our "man for man" (cp. Kipling's "Man for man, the Fuzzy licked us 'oller"), and "one thing with another."

b 7. Probably *θάρρος* would not have had a gen. depending on it of the thing of which fear is not felt, if it had not been for the contrasted words *φόβος φίλων.—αἰσχύνης πέρι κακῆς*: "addit *κακῆς*, quia de pudore dictum est antea, qui etiam honestus potest esse" Stallb.—The *πέρι* with gen. explains what it is in friends we are afraid of—i.e. their pouring shame upon us; cp. 648 b 2 *ἀνδρείας τε πέρι καὶ δειλίας* of the *matter* with which the test is concerned.

c 3. *ἄφοβον . . . φόβων πολλῶν τινῶν*, "free from all sorts of fear." Zeller was apparently the first to put a comma after *τινῶν* : previous commentators had made *φόβων π. τ.* depend on *φόβον*. Besides being an extraordinary expression, this last arrangement of the words did not give a satisfactory sense, and this it was that led to emendation ; e.g. Ast's *θόρυβον* for *φόβον* (relinquished later), and Heindorf's *φοβερῶν* for *φόβων*. Other arrangements of the words as they stand in the MSS. are Stallb.'s, who puts a comma after *φόβων* ; Vermehren's, who puts a comma after *πολλῶν* ; while Schanz rejects *φόβων*. I have followed Burnet in accepting Zeller's punctuation.

c 4. *μετὰ νόμου* : this difficult expression must be interpreted in view of the *μετὰ δίκης* in c 7, and also of the *μετὰ λόγου κτλ.* in d 6. I think it means "with the help of the law" :—not only that the laws ordain the discipline in courage, but that the spirit of the laws helps and directs the process of discipline. It is, i.e., a *state* institution. So in the corresponding sentence that follows, to preserve the parallelism, instead of saying *duly*, or *rightly* (fearful), he says "*under the inspiration of justice*," or "*a correct judgement*." I have followed Schanz and Burnet in putting a comma after *νόμου*, to show that it goes, not (as Ast) with the succeeding, but with the previous words ; otherwise, as *ἄγοντες* goes closely with *ἀπεργαζόμεθα*, it is hardly in place.

c 7–d 7. This paragraph should be carefully compared with 634 a 6–b 6. There, after the "dichotomy" of *ἀνδρεία* into (1) the power of resisting fear and pain, and (2) the power of resisting the seductions of pleasure, the necessity was insisted on of a *training* in *both* kinds of courage. Here it is *fear* that has been "dichotomized" into (1) fear of pain, and (2) fear of disgrace ; and here too the necessity of a double kind of training is insisted on. Only this time the training has not, as before, to *encourage* both sorts ; the first kind of fear has to be discouraged, and the second to be encouraged. As we read on the present paragraph it is as if we were looking at a dissolving view : gradually the familiar figures of *ἀνδρεία* and *σωφροσύνη* emerge, and we see that we have been investigating the same question all the time. (Incidentally we may notice that the dramatic machinery which (at 634) gave to the question the form of a suggestion that we should look for some such training in the laws of the Cretans and Spartans, has now been dropped. I altogether disagree with those critics who see in this a *change of subject* of the dialogue.)

c 8 f. *προσγυμνάζοντας*, "training him to *meet*" (*ἀναισχυντίᾳ*

in combat). The προ- of the προγυμνάζοντας proposed by Stephanus would be in place only if followed by "we must make him *able* to conquer"; but what we have is νικᾶν δεῖ ποιεῖν διαμαχόμενον—"make him fight successfully against (his temptation to indulgence)."—For ποιεῖν with an inf. in the sense of *compel* cp. *Rep.* 407 c κάμνειν γὰρ οἴεσθαι ποιεῖ ἀεὶ καὶ ὠδίνοντα μήποτε λήγειν περὶ τοῦ σώματος.

c 9. αὐτοῦ MSS.; Ast corrected this to αὑτοῦ. Schanz retains the MS. reading.

c 10. Rabe (*ut supra*) says O gives a variant ᾗ, for ἤ.

c 10—d 7. "Or are we to imagine that though a successful fight against timidity is the necessary preliminary to perfect courage, and though the most gifted nature (ὁστισοῦν) will never reach half the excellence of which it is capable if it has not had experience and training in such fights; temperance forsooth can be acquired in perfection by a man who has never gone through a successful struggle against a host of delightful seductions that beckon him towards impudence and crime—a struggle in which he is to be helped by reason, by active exertion, and by skill, whether at play or at work? Surely he is not to lack all such experiences as these?"

c 10. δειλίᾳ: this word, followed by ἀνδρείαν, and the σώφρων in d 3 reveal to us that we are really discussing the ἐπιτηδεύματα for the production of ἀνδρεία and σωφροσύνη (cp. 632 e 1 f.).—A had apparently altered δειλίᾳ to διαίτῃ; but in the margin is γρ. δειλίᾳ: in O the text has διαίτῃ and the margin the correction δειλίᾳ (ἀπ' ὀρθώσεως· οὐκ εὖ): Steinhart's suggested ἀναιδείᾳ does not fit the passage at all.

d 6. ἔργου is difficult; I think it means the active exertion *of his trainers*, but it is conceivable that it means the habit which comes of repeated action on the part of the trained.

d 8. τόν γ' εἰκότα λόγον: for the article cp. 649 c 7 τό γ' οὖν εἰκός, and 630 d 9 τό τε ἀληθὲς καὶ τὸ δίκαιον, where Ast has collected a number of similar instances of the use of the neuter art. from later books of the *Laws*.

e 1. φόβου φάρμακον, "a drug *to produce* fear." (See Dindorf on Steph. *Thes.* s.v. φάρμακον.) Gomperz, *G. D.* p. 500, suggests *bromine*.—θεός: in order to make the fictitious parallel as exact as possible, Plato postulates a divine origin answering to that of wine: the object of the fiction is to bring out clearly the main points in the nature and action of wine; hence the exactness of the parallel. One important fact that comes out clearly is that

there are different stages of *μέθη* (*μᾶλλον . . . καθ' ἑκάστην πόσιν*).

e 2. "*ἐθέλῃ* L O et in marg. *γρ.* a³ : *ἕλῃ* A" Burnet.—*ὥστε* with *νομίζειν* is a somewhat loose (but still more convenient) variant of the more regular *τοιοῦτον . . . οἷος ἂν ποιοίη νομίζειν.* —Notice also the change from plur. in *ἀνθρώποις* to sing. in *αὐτόν* in e 3.

e 4. *μέλλοντα* could hardly have taken a dat. (*αὐτῷ*) if it had not been joined with *παρόντα.*

648 a 2. *ἐκκοιμηθέντα* : possibly the word is a new creation : it implies a previous state in which many, if not all, of the mental powers were in abeyance. *κοιμάω* is used in a metaphorical sense at *Rep.* 571 d e *τὸ λογιστικὸν μὲν ἐγείρας . . . τὸ ἐπιθυμητικὸν δὲ μήτε ἐνδείᾳ δοὺς μήτε πλησμονῇ ὅπως ἂν κοιμήθῃ.*

a 6. *ἔσθ' ὅτι κτλ.* : not "could the lawgiver have made *any use* of it?" but "could the lawgiver have used it *at all* (for producing courage)?" We may notice the parallel form of the two questions :—*ἔσθ' ὅστις* at 647 e 1 and *ἔσθ' ὅτι* here.

a 7 f. *οἷον . . . διαλέγεσθαι*, "for instance, what easier than to have put this question to him?"

a 9. *πρῶτον μέν* : this implies that it is not *only* as a test that the drug may be useful—the state to which it reduces a man will serve for his *training* in courage as well. Cp. 649 d 8 *πρῶτον μὲν πρὸς τὸ λαμβάνειν πεῖραν, εἶτα εἰς τὸ μελετᾶν.* (This is better than to take *τί δέ ;* in b 4 as if it were equivalent to *ἔπειτα δέ.*)

b 1. For *βάσανον λαμβάνειν* cp. *Tim.* 68 d *εἰ δέ τις τούτων ἔργῳ σκοπούμενος βάσανον λαμβάνοι . . .*

b 2. For *πέρι* cp. above on 647 b 7.

b 6. *καὶ τοῦτο* : he begins as if he were going to say : "He will say yes to that too" ; then he remembers that in this question there were two alternatives, and puts in *μετὰ τῆς ἀσφαλείας* as explanatory of the *τοῦτο*, slightly varying the phrase by the insertion of the article ("the safety you speak of"). (Is it possible that a *τό* has fallen out after the *τοῦτο* ? It would thus be more regular in form as an explanatory addition to the *τοῦτο.*)

b 8. *χρῷο δ' ἄν ;* (sc. *τῷ φαρμάκῳ*) : these words introduce the second purpose of the drug : in the course of the testing process (*εἰς τοὺς φόβους ἄγων καὶ ἐλέγχων ἐ. τ. π.*) help would be given towards the formation of a courageous habit of mind.

b 9. *ἐν τοῖς παθήμασιν*, "while the patient's mind was disturbed."

c 1. *τὸν δὲ ἀτιμάζων*: Stallb. says that if the *τὸν μέν* had been put in, it would have come before *παρακελευόμενος*; I think it would have come before *τιμῶν*: the *παρακελευόμενος*, like the *τιμῶν*, describes the treatment of a hopeful case, the *νουθετῶν* and the *ἀτιμάζων* that of an unhopeful one; the following *μέν* and *δέ* clauses mark the same distinction between the two cases.

c 3. *γυμνασάμενον*: the middle (instead of the passive) to show that the "patient" is supposed to take an active part in his own training.

c 4. *ζημίαν ἐπιτιθείς*: subordinate to *ἀπαλλάττοις ἄν*. The only reason for calling attention to this is that Stallb. calls *ἐπιτιθείς* an anacoluthon, and mentions the suggestion to emend it to *ἐπιτιθείης*, as if it in its clause held the same position as *ἀπαλλάττοις ἄν* in the previous one.

c 5. *μηδὲν ἄλλο ἐγκαλῶν τῷ πώματι*, "although on further consideration (*ἄλλο*) you found no fault with the drink."

c 7. *τὰ νῦν*, "our present arrangements."—It is not necessary with Ast to suppose *γυμνάσια* supplied in thought from the previous *γυμνασία* of kindred meaning.—*θαυμαστὴ ῥᾳστώνης*: the gen. is the same as that used with verbs of wondering (or other emotions) to denote the source of the emotion. *Rep.* 426 d *τί δ' αὖ τοὺς ἐθέλοντας θεραπεύειν τὰς τοιαύτας πόλεις καὶ προθυμουμένους; οὐκ ἄγασαι τῆς ἀνδρείας τε καὶ εὐχερείας;*—*καθ' ὁπόσους*: the practical schoolmaster would object that the numbers in a "drinking" class should be strictly limited.

d 1 ff. The main outline of this long and complicated sentence seems to be this: *εἴτε τις μόνος γυμνάζοιτο ὀρθῶς ἄν τι πράττοι, εἴτε τις μηδὲν ὀκνοῖ μετὰ συμποτῶν πλειόνων ἐπιδείκνυσθαι κτλ. (ὀρθῶς ἄν τι πράττοι).*

d 1. *τὸ τῆς αἰσχύνης ἐπίπροσθεν ποιούμενος*: *ἐπίπροσθεν εἶναι* (or *γίγνεσθαι*) means *to intervene*, often with the notion of obstructing the view (see *ἐπιπρόσθησις* of eclipses): *ἐπ. ποιεῖσθαι* is *to interpose*, generally with the same added notion; so that it means, as here, *to screen*, lit. "*putting his feelings of shame in between himself and other people.*" Cp. 732 b 4 *μηδεμίαν αἰσχύνην πρόσθεν ποιούμενον*. The following clause (*ἡγούμενος* is subordinate to *ποιούμενος*) at once gives the reason of the action, and explains the metaphor of the previous phrase: his shame is not an *actual* obstacle, but it acts like one; it prevents others from seeing what is going on. So Ast. (For other views see Wyttenbach's note on Plutarch, *Cons. ad Ap.* 36. Thompson on *Gorg.* 523 d thinks

that there and here *ἐπίπροσθεν* has a slightly wider meaning: he says it has nearly the force of *ἐμποδών*.)

d 2. *πρὶν εὖ σχεῖν*, "until he attains to perfection," or, metaphorically, "before he has got his lesson."

d 3 f. *πῶμα μόνον ἀντὶ μυρίων πραγμάτων παρασκευαζόμενος*: it is difficult to be sure, but I think that this clause is subordinate, not to *γυμνάζοιτο* but, to *ὀρθῶς ἄν τι πράττοι*, i.e. neither the solitary practiser nor the member of the *συμπόσιον* "would be far wrong" (*τι*, "in a measure," which Badham discards, is due to *μείωσις*, cp. *οὐδεὶς πάνυ τι*, *Phaedo* 57 a), "if he avoided endless trouble by providing himself with the drug." I have therefore taken away the comma which generally stands after *παρασκευαζόμενος*.—O has *ὀρθὸν* corrected by a later hand to *ὀρθῶς*.

d 5. *ἑαυτῷ* is better taken with *πιστεύων* than with *παρεσκευάσθαι*, which last is epexegetic of *πιστεύων*.

d 7. *ἐπιδείκνυσθαι* is, I think, here used absolutely, as at *Gorg.* 447 b, in the sense of *ἐπίδειξιν ποιεῖσθαι*. In that case *δύναμιν* is only governed by *ὑπερθέων* and *κρατῶν*, which are subordinate to *ἐπιδείκνυσθαι*.—*τῇ τοῦ πώματος ἀναγκαίᾳ διαφορᾷ* (difficult), "the inevitable change wrought by the potion," the gen. being subjective as at e 5, *τὴν ἧτταν τοῦ πώματος*. The conjecture *διαφθορᾷ* first appeared in the Louvain ed. of 1531 (not "in the 1st Basle ed."), and was adopted by Bekker; "degeneration" would fit the passage well enough; the *ἀλλοιοῦσθαι* however, which is coupled with the *σφάλλεσθαι* at e 2, is in favour of the MS. reading. On the other hand the meaning "*change*" is strange for *διαφορά*. (Schanz adopts Hercher's *φορᾷ*, which is palaeographically possible, and also gives a fair sense: "the power residing in the irresistible course of the potion"—or would *φορά* be *impulse, force*?—anyhow there is some tautology involved in this reading.)

e 1. *ὑπερθέων*: a metaphor from the stadium (cp. 646 d 9).—*ὥστε*: another "pregnant" *ὥστε* (cp. 647 e 2)—"with the result that."

e 2. *δι' ἀρετήν*, "*virtutis beneficio s. ope*," Ast. (Schanz again sees dittography here, and suggests that *δι'* should be removed; but then *ἀρετήν* would want a *τήν* before it.)

e 3. *τὴν ἐσχάτην πόσιν*: i.e. that cup after which it would be physically impossible for the drinker to proceed.

e 4. The double genitives are different to those commented on by Heindorf on *Crat.* 400 d, in that here the first is objective and

the second subjective; but they are well illustrated by Stallb.'s comparison of *Rep.* 329 b *τὰς τῶν οἰκείων προπηλακίσεις τοῦ γήρως.*

e 6. I have followed Schanz and Burnet in adopting Stallb.'s insertion of *ἄν* after *γὰρ*, though I think it worth considering whether *γ' ἄν* was not what Plato wrote; the loss of the *ἄν* is hard to explain, but *γ' ἄν* might without difficulty have become *γάρ*: *γε* very often follows within a few words of *ναί*.—Another alteration of the text which is worth considering is that made in the Aldine ed., which reads *σωφρονεῖ*.—*καὶ ὁ τοιοῦτος*: even the man who is confident in his powers of resistance to temptation (would be wise to stop before the last glass).

649 a 2. *σχεδόν*, as at 644 a 8, modifies the general assertion—not that the speaker doubts the truth of what he says, but he prefers the more modest form of assertion.

a 4. *τοὺς γὰρ γόητας οὐκ ἐν θοίνῃ λέγω*: i.e. "quacks, who do profess to concoct such potions, are not fit to sit down with philosophers." For Plato's metaphorical use of the word *θοίνη* cp. (among others) that at *Symp.* 174 c *φαῦλος ὢν ἐπὶ σοφοῦ ἀνδρὸς ἰέναι θοίνην ἄκλητος.*

a 5. I have ventured to insert a *καὶ* before *ἃ μὴ χρή*. (An abbreviation of the same shape as that used for *ὡς*, when written vertically and accented, was used for *καὶ*: this *may* account for the dropping out of *καὶ* after *-ως*.) It seems very strange that Plato should confine *excessive* and *inopportune* confidence to things *ἃ μὴ χρὴ θαρρεῖν*—things about which confidence ought not to be felt *at all*. If we have the *καί* we get three distinct classes of improper confidence: (1) excessive, (2) inopportune, and (3) (totally) misplaced. (Schanz puts a comma before *ἃ μὴ χρή*, as if he took it for *ἃ οὐ χρή*—"which things ought not to be done.")—As the word *πῶμα* goes closely with the gens. *ἀφ.* and *τοῦ λ. θαρρεῖν*, no *τι* (as Heind. suggested) is needed before it.

a 6. *ἦ πῶς λέγομεν;* so at 639 b 1 *ἦ πῶς ἂν λέγοιμεν;* where an affirmative answer is evidently expected. O says that *πατρ. βιβλ.* has *λέγωμεν* and so Ed. Lov.

a 7. *τὸν οἶνον φράζων*, "and he will name wine."

a 8. *τοῦτο*: (nom.) either neut. for masc., referring to *οἶνος* (cp. Heind. on *Gorg.* 460 e, where he cites *Gorg.* 463 b and *Laws* 937 d *καὶ δὴ καὶ δίκη ἐν ἀνθρώποις πῶς οὐ καλόν, ὃ πάντα ἡμέρωκε τὰ ἀνθρώπινα*), or, better, with *πῶμα* understood. ("Is this just the opposite of the last potion we spoke of?")

a 9. A has *τονθρωπον* corr. by A^2 to *τὸν ἄνθρωπον* (cp. 653 d 1); O^3 mentions a reading *πιόντα ἄνθρωπον*.

b 1. With the somewhat otiose addition *ἢ πρότερον* (after *αὐτὸν αὐτοῦ*), and indeed with the whole passage, Stallb. well compares *Prot.* 350 a *οἱ ἐπιστήμονες τῶν μὴ ἐπισταμένων θαρραλεώτεροί εἰσι, καὶ αὐτοὶ ἑαυτῶν, ἐπειδὰν μάθωσιν, ἢ πρὶν μαθεῖν.* His collection of passages on the effect of wine is also interesting.—(*ἢ* was omitted at first in A and added above the line; Schanz discards both it and *πρότερον*.)

b 2. With *πληροῦσθαι* we must supply *ποιεῖ*. (H. Steph. would have altered it to *πληροῦται*, so as to bring it into line with *μεστοῦται*.)

b 3. *εἰς δόξαν*, "in imagination"; so *Philebus* 57 c *εἰς σαφήνειαν*, *Symp.* 196 c *εἰς γ' ἀνδρείαν Ἔρωτι οὐδ' Ἄρης ἀνθίσταται*, *Tim.* 46 e *εἰς ὠφέλειαν* "in the way of advantage."

b 4. *ὡς σοφὸς ὤν*: cp. *Crat.* 406 c *οἶνος δ', ὅτι οἴεσθαι νοῦν ἔχειν ποιεῖ τῶν πινόντων τοὺς πολλοὺς οὐχ ἔχοντας . . .*, on which passage Heindorf has a note on *δέ* following *τε*, as it does here at b 5 (cp. 628 a 1).

c 2. *ἃ τῆς αἰδοῦς ἔλεγες, ὡς οἰόμεθα*, "what you called shame's part, I suppose?"

c 3. *καλῶς μνημονεύετε*: it is simpler to take this (as Ast in *Lex.*) to mean "your memory is correct," than with Jowett "thank you for reminding me." To *remind* is generally *ἀναμιμνήσκω*. At 646 b 1 *μνημονεύεις* means little more than *λέγεις*.

c 4. *ἐν τοῖς φόβοις*: the test and discipline of courage are real fears and real hardships. The fictitious potion would have produced imaginary fears and hardships. The description of its effects has made admirably clear the way in which it is suggested that wine should be used, and for what purpose.

c 5. The *ἄρα* of the MSS. is altered by a very late hand in A to *ἆρα*. This correction is manifestly better than Ast's introduction of *εἰ* after *ἄρα*.—*τὸ ἐναντίον*: i.e. the right sort of fear (that of disgrace): *ἐν τοῖς ἐναντίοις*: i.e. in a state of over-confidence and exhilaration.

c 7. For the *τό* cp. 647 d 8.

c 8 f. *ἐν τούτοις . . . ἃ παθόντες . . . πεφύκαμεν . . . εἶναι*, "in such states of mind as would naturally incline us to be . . ."

d 1 f. *αἰσχρόν* goes with *τι* as well as with *ὁτιοῦν*, which is added as a sort of after-thought, to make the *τι*, when it got to be used with *δρᾶν*, more general. *τι* was omitted in the old editions

and by the first hand in O, but occurs in A and L, and was added by O^2.

d 4. *οὐκοῦν κτλ.*, "are not all these (that I am going to mention) states (of mind, or condition) in which we are so affected?"

d 5. *δειλία*, as Ast says, is quite out of place in this enumeration. Is it possible that *ἀδειλία* is what Plato wrote? (Steinhart's suggestion *ἀναιδεία* is palaeographically likely, but the word is descriptive of the whole state, not of a separate manifestation of it, as all the other words are.)

d 7. *εὐτελῆ τε καὶ ἀσινεστέραν* (which agree with *πεῖραν*) are put in this strange order to emphasize the importance of the point that the training he offers to temperance has none of the *μυρία πράγματα* and the dangers of the only practical training that courage can have.—*τούτων* depends on *πεῖραν*.

d 9. *βασάνου καὶ παιδιᾶς*: a hendiadys; "sportive test." Cp. *Polit.* 308 d *ἡ πολιτικὴ . . . παιδιᾷ πρῶτον βασανιεῖ*.—For the pleonastic *πλήν* after *μᾶλλον ἔμμετρον* cp. *Minos* 318 e 7 *οὐ γὰρ ἔσθ' ὅτι τούτου ἀσεβέστερόν ἐστιν οὐδ' ὅτι χρὴ μᾶλλον εὐλαβεῖσθαι πλὴν εἰς θεοὺς καὶ λόγῳ καὶ ἔργῳ ἐξαμαρτάνειν*; it is very like the *πλήν* after *ἄλλο* at *Tim.* 30 a.

e 1. *ἔμμετρὸν μᾶλλον*, "less objectionable."—*ἂν καὶ ὁπωστιοῦν μετ' εὐλαβείας γίγνηται*, "provided a little care attend its application."

e 3. *ἰόντα* agrees with the imagined subject of *λαμβάνειν*.—"Do you recommend a man (instead of using the test I offer) to run the risk of making a compact or legal agreement with him?" (If he breaks it you will *know* that he is not a just man, but is not the experiment a dangerous one?)

650 a 1. *αὐτῶν* refers to *τὰ συμβόλαια* (so Ast.—Bekker prefers to read *αὐτῷ*. Stallb. understands by *αὐτῶν* the things themselves about which the agreement was made).—*συγγενόμενον μετὰ τῆς τοῦ Διονύσου θεωρίας*, "by watching him (lit. getting into his company) with the help of a Bacchic festal indulgence?"

a 2 ff. *ἢ πρὸς κτλ.*: a good deal has to be supplied from the previous description of the parallel case, but the meaning is quite clear, if the parallel be kept in mind. I have followed Stallb. and Schanz in adopting Bekker's correction of the MS. *κινδυνεύσαντες* to *κινδυνεύσαντα*, and adopted Burnet's punctuation, with a comma before and after *οὕτως*, which *resumes* (cp. 625 b 6).—Ast shrewdly remarks that this second kind of depravity would be readily betrayed under the influence of wine.

a 6. *τὴν ἄλλως* (sc. *ὁδον*) means lit. "along the road that does not lead to anywhere in particular," i.e. where there are no special consequences to be apprehended, and the following words furnish a definite explanation of what is meant. We might almost translate then "at large." Cp. *Theaet.* 172 e *καὶ οἱ ἀγῶνες οὐδέποτε τὴν ἄλλως ἀλλ' ἀεὶ τὴν περὶ αὐτοῦ.*

b 2. *ἀλλήλων*: this word introduces the idea that it is the duty of every citizen to take stock of his neighbour's disposition.

b 3. *τό τε τῆς εὐτελείας*, "and in the matter of economy." (St. takes *τὸ τῆς εὐτελείας κτλ.* as the subject of *διαφέρειν.*) As at 635 b 6 (*τὸ τῶν λυπῶν καὶ φόβων*) it is a periphrasis for the simple article with the same case of the subs. He might have said *πρὸς εὐτελείαν* (cp. *Phil.* 55 c *διαφέρειν πρὸς ἀρετήν, Critias* 117 d *τοῖς πάντων διαφέρουσιν πρὸς πίστιν*), but he uses *πρός* in a different sense with *βασάνους* later in the sentence ("in comparison with"). For the simple acc. in this sense with *διαφέρω* cp. Arist. *Clouds* 503 *οὐδὲν διοίσεις Χαιρεφῶντος τὴν φύσιν.*

b 6. *τῶν χρησιμωτάτων ἕν*, "outstanding among things of greatest use"—"of unique benefit" (to the statesman's art).—*τὸ γνῶναι* is epexegetic to *τοῦτο.*

b 9. *πολιτικῆς* continues the construction of *ἧς* ("whose business it is—and it is, I imagine, the business of *πολιτική*"). Cp. the quotation from the *Politicus* given above on 649 d 9.

BOOK II

652 a 2. *αὐτῶν*, "the subject," i.e. *ἡ ἐν οἴνῳ διατριβή, συμπόσια*, referred to at 650 b 1 as *τούτων*: *αὐτά* then (supplied) is the subject of the following *ἔχει.*

a 3. *τι μέγεθος ὠφελίας*: so *ὕψη καὶ κάλλη κυπαρίττων* at 625 b 8, *αἰθέρος βάθος* Eur. *Med.* 1297, *τὸ χρῆμα τῶν νυκτῶν* Ar. *Nub.* 1, *χρυσὸν ἐπῶν Plut.* 268, *ποντίων τε κυμάτων ἀνήριθμον γέλασμα P.V.* 89.

a 6. *ὅπῃ δὲ καὶ ὅπως*: with this we must supply, not *σημαίνειν βούλεται* but, *ἔνεστι.*

b 1. *μή πῃ παραποδισθῶμεν ὑπ' αὐτοῦ*: the *λόγος*, which has just been spoken of as "hinting" a certain conclusion, is here credited with the power, if not the inclination, of "ensnaring," i.e. misleading its followers, if they are not wide awake. The word

is only found (in Plato) here and at *Ep.* 330 b, where it means "catch," "entangle," much as it does here.

b 3. *τί ποτε λέγομεν*: so the MSS.; Madvig conjectured *τί ποτ' ἐλέγομεν*. The imperfect is more usual in such a clause depending on *ἀναμνησθῆναι*, but the pres. will stand perfectly well. The *ἡμῖν* favours the present: the definition given at 643 d 6 ff. is to stand for them still.

653 a 1. *τούτου γάρ, . . . σωτηρία* (see below 654 d 8, where what is here called *σωτηρία* is called *φυλακή*), "if I am not mistaken, this institution (of *συμπόσια*), if properly conducted, is a safe-guard of education"—i.e. is a means of preserving the effect of education. *σωτηρία* (without the article) *ἐστὶ τούτου ἐν . . .* does not mean as much as "education depends on" (Jowett). For this use of *σωτηρία* cp. *Rep.* 425 e *ἐάν γε θεὸς αὐτοῖς διδῷ σωτηρίαν τῶν νόμων ὧν ἔμπροσθεν διήλθομεν.*—L and O have *τοῦτο* for *τούτου*.

a 4. *μέγα λέγεις*, "that is a strong thing to say," "that *is* taking high ground."

a 5. *λέγω τοίνυν . . .*, "this is what I say: a child's first infantile sensations are those of pleasure and pain; and these sensations are the sphere in which the soul first acquires goodness or badness. Wisdom and fixed right opinion come to specially favoured men as they are getting old, and certainly a man who gets them, and all the blessings in their train, is a perfect man. The first acquisition of goodness by a child is, I say, a matter of education. Clearly, if pleasure and liking, and pain and dislike, for the right things, are implanted in the soul of one who cannot yet reason about them, and if, when he does arrive at a reasoning age, these sensations concur with his reason to pronounce that his character has been properly formed by his relatives, this harmonious combination, in its entirety, is Virtue, while the part of it which consists of the rightly trained sensations of pain and pleasure, whereby the man hates what he ought to hate, from his childhood up, and likes what he ought to like—it is just that element which, if I am right, is Education, and so for purposes of our discussion I would distinguish and define it."

a 7. *φρόνησιν δὲ καὶ κτλ.*: lit. "about wisdom—and fixed right opinions—I say that it is lucky for a man if he acquires it as he is getting old." The accusatives are not exactly absolute: the construction is a conversational extension of such a sentence as *τὴν φρόνησιν λέγω ὅτι παραγίγνεται.*—The number of *παρεγένετο* (a gnomic aorist) emphasizes the fact that *φρόνησιν* is the

prominent word among the preceding accusatives. Cp. Cic. *De fin.* v. 21 "praeclare enim Plato: beatum cui etiam in senectute contigerit ut sapientiam verasque opiniones assequi posset."—For βέβαιος in this connexion cp. *Tim.* 37 b δόξαι καὶ πίστεις γίγνονται βέβαιοι καὶ ἀληθεῖς.

b 1. I think, with some hesitation, that it is better to take παιδείαν as the *predicate*. The definition of *what education is* comes at the end of the speech (b 6–c 4).

b 4. λόγῳ λαμβάνειν, "to treat (the matter) philosophically,—to reason about it." λόγῳ λαβεῖν τι is a variety for λόγον λαβεῖν τινος; cp. above 638 c πάντες οἱ λόγῳ τι λαβόντες ἐπιτήδευμα and *Parm.* 135 e περὶ ἐκεῖνα ἃ μάλιστά τις ἂν λόγῳ λάβοι.—δυναμένων depends on ψυχαῖς; λαβόντων is a gen. abs., which perhaps would not have been used thus without its subject, if it had not been for the preceding gen. δυναμένων.—συμφωνήσωσι: the subject to this must be ἡδονὴ καὶ φιλία κτλ. So, I find, Apelt, ut sup. p. 5. He says: "Das ἐπιθυμητικόν, ohne Unterstützung von Seiten des eigenen λόγος, bisher von anderen zum Guten erzogen, wird nunmehr, da der eigene Verstand ausgebildet ist, zu seiner Freude gewahr, wie richtig es erzogen worden ist." For another way of describing the union between pleasure or appetite and reason or wisdom cp. 688 b καὶ πρὸς πρώτην τὴν τῆς συμπάσης ἡγεμόνα ἀρετῆς, φρόνησις δ' εἴη τοῦτο καὶ νοῦς καὶ δόξα μετ' ἔρωτός τε καὶ ἐπιθυμίας τούτοις ἑπομένης.

b 6. I am strongly inclined to agree with F.H.D. who would bracket ἐθῶν, and take προσηκόντων as masc. This gives ὑπό a more natural sense; but it is difficult to see how ἐθῶν came in: perhaps it was a marginal additional to συμφωνία.—σύμπασα: lit. "in its entirety," i.e. the two elements of correctly formed habit and moral insight *taken together*.

b 7. τὸ τεθραμμένον is lit. "the part of it trained rightly." We should find it more natural in English to say "the *training* (in feeling pleasure or pain) is education"; what Plato says is rather: "the *result* of the training is education," as above at b 1 and 2, i.e. "a child so trained is a child educated." (Cp. Steele's "To have loved her was a liberal education.")

c 2. ἀποτεμὼν τῷ λόγῳ: it is difficult to be sure whether τῷ λόγῳ denotes the instrument by which the distinction is made, or the (quasi) person in whose interest the distinction is made: I think, the latter.

c 3. κατά γε τὴν ἐμὴν (sc. δόξαν): St. cps. *Phil.* 41 b 4 ἀλλ', ὦ Πρώταρχε, εἰσὶν κατά γε τὴν ἐμήν, *Rep.* 397 d ἐὰν ἡ ἐμή, ἔφη, νικᾷ.

This whole paragraph should be carefully compared with *Rep.* 401 b ff., more especially with the following passages: d 1 *καὶ εὐθὺς ἐκ παίδων λανθάνῃ εἰς ὁμοιότητά τε καὶ φιλίαν καὶ συμφωνίαν τῷ καλῷ λόγῳ ἄγουσα*, and e 3 *καὶ καταδεχόμενος εἰς τὴν ψυχὴν τρέφοιτ' ἂν ἀπ' αὐτῶν καὶ γίγνοιτο καλός τε κἀγαθός, τὰ δ' αἰσχρὰ ψέγοι τ' ἂν ὀρθῶς καὶ μισοῖ ἔτι νέος ὤν, πρὶν λόγον δυνατὸς εἶναι λαβεῖν, ἐλθόντος δὲ τοῦ λόγου ἀσπάζοιτ' ἂν αὐτὸν γνωρίζων δι' οἰκειότητα μάλιστα ὁ οὕτω τραφείς.* Cp. also Ar. *Pol.* 1340 a 15 *τὴν δ' ἀρετὴν (εἶναι) περὶ τὸ χαίρειν ὀρθῶς καὶ φιλεῖν καὶ μισεῖν.* (Scholars have been in too great a hurry to correct this passage. At least seven alterations of the text have been proposed, of which Schanz adopts Stephanus's *βεβαιοῦν* for *βεβαίους* in a 8, and Eusebius's *λόγον* for *λόγῳ*, while he pronounces *ὀρθῶς . . . ἐθῶν* to be corrupt. I have followed Burnet in leaving the text as the chief MSS. have it, merely writing, with him and Schanz, *αὕτη 'σθ'* for the MS. *αὐτῆς θ'*, where Eusebius has *αὕτη ἔσθ'*, and suggesting the athetesis of *ἐθῶν.*)

c 5. *τὰ πρότερον*: two things were said above about *παιδεία* at 643 b ff.: (1) "As the twig is bent the tree inclines,"—i.e. "if you let a child *play* at a thing, when he grows up he will *like* that thing," and (2) What he means by education is that of *character and disposition*, not that of special faculties; i.e. he wants to make a good *citizen*, not a good *carpenter*, etc.

c 8. *παιδειῶν οὐσῶν*: here again he does not say the *training* is education, but the rightly trained or schooled delight and its opposite are education: I think here again we may translate "are matters of education."

c 9. *κατὰ πολλά*: this is the reading of the MSS. The Aldine edition read *τὰ πολλά*, and was followed by all the early editions including that of Ast. Even after the discovery that the MSS. read *κατὰ πολλά*, Stallbaum in his one vol. ed., the Zürich editors, and Schanz prefer to read *τὰ πολλά*, evidently holding that Aldus, by accident or design, had got back to what Plato wrote. It does not seem to have been sufficiently noticed that, though the *syntax* gains greatly by the reading *τὰ πολλά*, the sense is materially altered. Did Plato mean to say that *most* of the effect of education, as he interprets the word, wears off in ordinary life?—or only that a *good deal* wears off? Ast, though he had no reading but *τὰ πολλά* before him, does not take it as the subj. of *χαλ.* and *διαφθ.*, but translates it *plerumque.* The more moderate statement seems to me more natural here, so I have followed Burnet in printing *κατὰ πολλά*. *παιδεία*, the word

most in our thoughts all through this passage, must be supplied as the subject of *χαλᾶται* and *διαφθείρεται*. We are now going to see exactly what the Ath. meant at a 3 by saying that *ἡ ἐν οἴνῳ συνουσία* was a *preservative* of education. *κατὰ πολλά* then is "to a great extent."

d 2. *ἀναπαύλας τε . . . ἐτάξαντο τὰς τῶν ἑορτῶν ἀμοιβάς, καὶ Μούσας . . . ἔδοσαν, ἵν' ἐπανορθῶνται, τάς τε τροφὰς γενομένας ἐν ταῖς ἑορταῖς μετὰ θεῶν*: Burnet has, I think, shown the right way to read this passage by putting a comma after *ἐπανορθῶνται*.—The gods, says the Ath., not only provided festivals, by way of variety, to rest men from their labours, but gave them the Muses, Apollo, and Dionysus to show them how to celebrate them rightly, and (in so doing) gave men a refreshment to their souls (as we should say)—lit. "and gave them the spiritual nourishment (*τὰς τροφάς*, see on 643 d 1) which, thanks to the gods (*μετὰ θεῶν*), is furnished by the festivals."—*τὰς τῶν ἑορτῶν ἀμοιβὰς* [*τοῖς θεοῖς*]: Clemens Alex., in quoting this passage, leaves out *τοῖς θεοῖς* (which is in all MSS.). Ast was, I think, right in holding the addition to have been made by some scribe who only knew *ἀμοιβαί* in the sense of *requital*. Here it means "change" or "variety," and the gen. *ἑορτῶν* is a gen. of *definition* (not, I think, "the round of feasts"—we should say: "gave them festivals *as a relief*"). (Zeller, *Plat. Stud.* p. 95 defends *τοῖς θεοῖς*, making it depend on *ἑορτῶν*.)

d 4. *ἵν' ἐπανορθῶνται*: before Burnet all interpreters took *ἐπ.* as governing *τὰς τροφάς*, and either ejected or altered the *τε* which all MSS. place between these two words. (Schanz and Ritter further approve of Wagner's alteration of *γενομένας* to *γενόμενοι*.) *ἐπανορθῶνται* is middle: its subj. is the Muses, Apollo, and Dionysus, and its object *τὰς ἑορτάς* understood.

d 5. *μετὰ θεῶν* is difficult: the gods seem to be those just mentioned.—*ὁρᾶν ἃ χρὴ πότερον κτλ.*, "about this we must see whether, etc." Then, instead of going on "whether *it* is true or not," he goes on: "whether the now prevailing *λόγος* is true to nature, or how it is"—lit. "whether our *λόγος* is dinned into our ears *true*." (A Florentine MS., L 85. 9, has *οὖν* in the margin as a variant for *ἃ*; this makes the construction easier; all the earlier editions read *οὖν*: Schanz prefers *δὴ*.) A somewhat similarly framed sentence occurs at *Rep.* 399 e *βίου ῥυθμοὺς ἰδεῖν κοσμίου τε καὶ ἀνδρείου τίνες εἰσίν*.

d 6. *ὑμνεῖται ἡμῖν*: the metaphor is possibly due to the recent mention of Apollo and the Muses. The word is used of an oft

repeated statement or argument; cf. *Rep.* 549 d *καὶ ἄλλα δὴ ὅσα καὶ οἷα φιλοῦσιν αἱ γυναῖκες περὶ τῶν τοιούτων ὑμνεῖν.*

e 2. *οἷον*, "you might almost say."—*μεθ' ἡδονῆς*: see below on 654 a 3.—*προσπαίζοντα*: though there is no dative with the verb, the *προσ-* is not "otiose"; it denotes the joining others in playing, "joining in a game." So at *Euthyd.* 283 b *ᾠηθήτην . . . ἡμᾶς . . . παίζειν . . . καὶ διὰ ταῦτα προσεπαισάτην.*

e 4 f. *τάξεων*: *τάξις*, order, system the Greeks naturally held to be the foundation of all science.—*οἷς* shows a sturdy disregard of logic, to say nothing of grammar: it is only the *τάξεις*, not the *ἀταξίας* to which *οἷς* refers: the *perception* of *τάξεις* involves the perception of their opposites, and Plato will not omit this fact; at the same time he finds the illogical relative *οἷς* a convenient sentence-link. As we have seen before, he often prefers the neuter pronoun when talking of things with feminine names.

e 5. *ῥυθμὸς καὶ ἁρμονία*: the fact that these and many other Greek scientific terms still live in modern languages is a witness to the creative power of the Greek intellect; but it must not be forgotten (1) that in the course of centuries the words have taken on new associations and connotations, and (2) that when the Greeks were making the sciences, they were also making scientific nomenclature. The words they chose as technical expressions were mostly words in common use, such as *shape*, *measure*, *row*, *form*, *flow* and the like, and we must not expect them to have acquired at once a strictly limited technical application. In the discussion of *μουσική* which follows we shall find, e.g., the words *ῥυθμός* and *σχῆμα*, *μέλος* and *ἁρμονία*, whether used separately, or contrasted one with another, so variously applied that we cannot always translate them in the same way.

The Greeks seem to have been about as sensitive to order and system in *bodily motion* as in *sound*. Our muffled perceptions make it hard for us even to guess what *ὄρχησις* meant to Plato. It is to some extent the same with the *formal* element in language: we cannot hope to understand the Greeks thoroughly when they criticize the rhythm of poetry or prose. Their sensibilities in such matters were keener than ours.

ῥυθμός, as Plato tells us below (664 e 8), is the name given to systematized movement (*τῇ τῆς κινήσεως τάξει*). The material of this systematized movement may be bodily movement, speech, or musical sounds. The word is from the same root as *ῥέω*, though we have no trace of its use in the sense of *a flowing*. It is possible that it gained its special sense of *measure* and *regular recurrence*

from the sense of the evenness of the motion of fluids, as compared with that of most solids, but, in its special use, it is more probably an echo, so to speak, of the sound of the recurring waves on the sea-shore as heard by the Greeks. Ἁρμονία, as we learn from the same passage below (665 a 1), is the name given to the effect produced by the juxtaposition of musical notes of different pitch. Sometimes "pitch" will translate the word, sometimes even "tune." Sometimes it is used with a reference to the arithmetical relations of the different notes of the scale, while sometimes it means *scale*, or *style of music*.

654 a 1. The τούς before θεούς, which H. Stephanus wanted to eject, adds to the demonstrative force of the following τούτους.

a 2. τὴν ἔνρυθμόν τε καὶ ἐναρμόνιον αἴσθησιν, "the sense of rhythm and pitch," whereas εὔρυθμον, as suggested by a marginal variant in L (which does not also suggest εὐάρμοστον for ἐναρμόνιον), introduces the further notion of the adaptability or the careful preservation of ῥυθμός.

a 3. μεθ' ἡδονῆς: these words (repeated from 653 e 2) are of great importance to the Athenian's theory. The gods whom he called men's συνεορτασταί gave them not only artistic sensibilities, but the power of enjoying them as well. As the author of *Ecce Homo* says (chap. x.) "The highest perfection of pleasure is not among the prizes of exertion, the rewards of industry or ingenuity, but a bounty of nature, a grace of God."—For ᾗ δὴ all the MSS. have ἤδη: it was first corrected by Aldus.—ᾗ is an instrumental dative and αἴσθησιν μεθ' ἡδονῆς is its antecedent.—χορηγεῖν and συνείροντας go closely together, the participle being the more significant of the two.—ἡμῶν: for the gen. with χορηγεῖν cp. *Theaet.* 179 d 8: the vulgate ἡμῖν has no MS. authority.

a 4. ἀλλήλους, the reading of O and the early editions, involves a construction foreign to the habits of the word. It is easy to supply ἡμᾶς, as obj. to συνείροντας, from the preceding ἡμᾶς and ἡμῶν.

a 5. A has (over the line) τὸ before παρὰ and space for two letters after παρὰ. Schanz justly conjectured that a scribe had (wrongly) altered παρὰ τὸ into τὸ παρὰ (which is also the reading of O). For the causal meaning of παρά *c. acc.* cp. the orator Lycurgus 64 ἡγοῦμαι δ' ἔγωγε, ὦ ἄνδρες, τοὐναντίον τούτοις, παρὰ τοῦτον εἶναι τῇ πόλει τὴν σωτηρίαν (cp. also Thuc. i. 141. 7). We may translate here: "because of the name joy which comes natural to them." The vulgate followed O and the corrector of A (though Bekker and the Zürich editors left the τὸ out alto-

gether): τὸ ὄνομα was taken closely with ὠνομακέναι, and παρὰ τῆς χαρᾶς was taken to mean "*ductum a laetitia*" (St.). But παρά *c. gen.* in Attic is always used with a *person* (to say nothing of the difficulty then of translating ἔμφυτον).

a 9. Since the first stage of education is due to the institutors of the χορός, "ἀπαίδευτος will (at that stage) mean ἀχόρευτος, and the educated pupil will be the one who has been thoroughly drilled in a χορός."

b 3. τὸ σύνολόν ἐστιν, "is a generic name for." So below (665 a) χορεία is said to be a generic name for both (τὸ συναμφότερον) ῥυθμός and ἁρμονία. In these two passages the τό and the adj. are used adverbially: at *Soph.* 220 b (τοῦ δὲ ἐνύδρου σχεδὸν τὸ σύνολον ἁλιευτική) τὸ σύνολον is the subject.

b 9. "What we mean when we say καλῶς"—i.e., as he goes on to explain, "can singing and dancing be said to be *well* done, if the words or gestures are not themselves *right and good*?"

c 3–d 3. A free translation will show how I take this difficult paragraph.—"Supposing then a man has correct taste in matters of art, and acts up to it" (as far as he can); "shall we hold such a man better educated in χορεία and μουσική if he is number one or number two of those I am going to describe? *Number one* is able on every occasion adequately to express, by bodily movement and voice, what he has considered in his mind to be the right thing, while taking no pleasure in rightness, and not feeling any dislike to wrongness. *Number two*, while quite unable to reach perfection in vocal or bodily expression of what is in his mind (ᾗ διανοεῖται), feels, to the full, a delight in what is right and good, and a disgust at all that is wrong and bad."

ὁ τοιοῦτος refers *back*—"such a man as I have just described." —The unusual ᾗ (=πότερον), which nearly all modern editors have followed Ast in rejecting, is put in to show that ὁ τοιοῦτος is not antecedent to ὃς ἄν alone, but to κεῖνος ὃς ἄν as well. The same motive perhaps led to the slightly irregular substitution of ὃς ἄν for ἐάν. Burnet retains the ᾗ before ὃς ἄν, but I cannot follow him in putting a (;) after μουσικήν: I think there should be no stop at all there.—The next important difficulty in the paragraph is the phrase ᾗ διανοεῖσθαι. There seem to me two objections to this: (1) *Ex hypothesi* (see c 3) *both* the characters described have a *right judgement* as to what is καλόν or not, and (2) if Plato had wanted to say that the second one had not the power of bodily representation, *or* that of correct judgement, would he not have said μηδὲ τῷ νῷ διανοεῖσθαι? For not only is ᾗ

irregular here for *μηδέ* (at *Euthyphro* 5 b 6 *ἤ* is "or else"), but, in the absence of some such words as *τῷ νῷ* with *διανοεῖσθαι*, it would have to be taken with *τῇ φωνῇ καὶ τῷ σώματι*. Burnet's comma after *κατορθοῦν* is not enough to save the situation. I have therefore adopted Badham's correction of *ἢ διανοεῖσθαι* to *ᾗ διανοεῖται*.

c 4. *οὕτως αὐτοῖς χρῆται* : i.e. "shows by his dealing with them that he thus thinks." For *οὕτως* "in accordance with this" cp. 670 d 6.

c 6. *σώματι* and *φωνῇ* are datives of the instrument : *τὸ διανοηθὲν εἶναι καλόν* is an acc. of the inner object—*the service performed* ; cp. *Rep.* 467 a *διακονεῖν καὶ ὑπηρετεῖν πάντα τὰ περὶ τὸν πόλεμον*, where, as here, the person to whom the service is performed is left to be understood.

d 1. It is best to take *κατορθοῦν* as intransitive here as well as in the next line, and not, with St., to supply *τὸ διανοηθὲν (εἶναι) καλόν* as its object.

d 4. "The advantage of the education you describe is great," i.e. of the education of No. 2.

d 5. *οὐκοῦν κτλ.*, "if then we three (being agreed, as we are, about the necessity of properly felt *ἡδονή* and *λύπη*) know what is right and good in *ᾠδή* and *ὄρχησις* . . ."

d 7. *ὀρθῶς* goes with *πεπαιδευμένον* and (in a way) with *ἀπαίδευτον*—"the man who *is* and who is *not* correctly educated."

d 8. *παιδείας φυλακή* : a reference to the *σωτηρία (παιδείας)* spoken of at 653 a.—*καὶ ὅπου*, "and where it is to be found." That is, in order to decide the question with which we started about *ἡ ἐν οἴνῳ συνουσία*, we must first make sure that we have correct canons of taste in both departments of *μουσική*.

e 3. *ἰχνευούσαις* : see above on *θηρεύειν* at 627 c 9.

e 4. I have adopted C. Ritter's *κατ'* for the MS. *καὶ* before *ᾠδήν*. It is clear from what follows that what we are now to decide is, what is a right and good *σχῆμα*? and what is a right and good *μέλος*? and that the word *σχῆμα* is used of the performance of the "dancer," and *μέλος* of that of the singer. Hence, even if we keep *καὶ* we should have to give it a loose translation, such as "that is to say we are discussing." But this would be "flabby" in Greek, and *κατ'* is neat and precise, besides being palaeographically probable. For this use of *κατά* cp. *Gorg.* 474 e *τὰ κατὰ τὴν μουσικὴν πάντα*, and *Rep.* 382 e *οὔτε ἄλλους ἐξαπατᾷ οὔτε κατὰ φαντασίας οὔτε κατὰ λόγους, οὔτε κατὰ σημείων πομπάς*. The chiasmus is no objection to this view.—For *σχῆμα* it is hard to find an English word : perhaps *posture* is the best ; but

it does not convey to us the notion of *movement* of the limbs and body as well as that of *shape* and *mien*, which are all conveyed by σχῆμα here.

e 5. "Pariter in verbis διαφυγόντα οἰχήσεται imago a venatione sumta est," Ast.

e 6. εἴθ' Ἑλληνικῆς εἴτε βαρβαρικῆς: possibly this is only another way of saying "*any* education at all"; but it seems to convey a hint that Greeks may have something to learn from foreigners. Above, at 637 d and e, Plato had appealed to foreign customs in discussing μέθη, and below, at 656 f., he finds much to learn from Egypt. Cp. Archer-Hind's note on *Phaedo* 78 a, where he also compares *Rep.* 499 c, and *Symp.* 209 e. Is it possible that the words contain a reference to Xenophon's *Cyropaedia*? Cp. 694 c, Athenaeus xi. 504 and 505, Aul. Gell. *N.A.* xix. 3.

e 10. ποτε in this question corresponds to the Scotch "again" in a similar position.—ἐχομένης is Stephanus's manifestly correct emendation of the MS. ἐρχομένης. Cp. *Rep.* 395 e, *Gorg.* 522 a, *Phil.* 45 b, *Theaet.* 191 c.—The Athenian now proceeds to show that the question of the good or bad in art is a *moral* one. He is content—to avoid μακρολογία—to take only one virtue, with its opposite vice, in illustration of his view. He takes courage and cowardice, both of which are particularly manifest in the look and mien.

655 a 3. τὰ χρώματα: this reference to the pallor of the coward seems hardly to call for the amusing protest which follows against a bit of virtuoso's slang—the transference to music of a term properly belonging to painting. The protest is all the more remarkable because Plato himself, at *Rep.* 601 a and b, twice uses χρώματα in a metaphorical sense, first of highly coloured poetical diction, and next of the brilliance and attractiveness conferred on language by μέτρον, ῥυθμός, and ἁρμονία: this attractiveness he speaks of as τὰ τῆς μουσικῆς χρώματα.—Boeckh, convinced that the mention of χρώματα at a 3 was not enough to account for the criticism of the word εὔχρων at a 7, interpolated, after ἔνεστι in a 5, the words <χρώματα δὲ οὐκ ἔνεστι>, and Schanz follows him.

a 6. We must supply ἔστιν after εὐάρμοστον from the οὐκ ἔστιν that follows.

a 7. μέλος ἢ σχῆμα: we have the same chiasmus here as at 654 e 4. The words ἁρμονία and εὐάρμοστον apply here to the μέλος, and ῥυθμός and εὔρυθμον to the σχῆμα.

b 2. ἵνα δὴ μὴ μακρολογία πολλή τις γίγνηται: at 632 d e the Athenian proposed, "if his audience liked," to go through the

virtues, beginning with *ἀνδρεία*, for the purpose then before them : *in fact* he only got through *ἀνδρεία* and *σωφροσύνη*. So here, in a different argument, he finds it enough to take one virtue, and to treat it as typical of all the rest, leaving it to his audience to think out the way in which other virtues can be expressed in *σχῆμα* and *μέλος*. It would no doubt have been a congenial task to Plato to do this himself, but, at his age, *he had not time for it.*

b 3. These words have been variously punctuated: *ἡμῖν, ἅπαντα ἁπλῶς ἔστω· τὰ μὲν . . .*; *ἡμῖν, ἅπαντα ἁπλῶς ἔστω τὰ μὲν . . .* (Ast). The punctuation in the text—now generally adopted—was suggested by St. in a note (1859 ed.) but not printed in his text.—*ἁπλῶς* is "once for all."

b 4. *εἴτε αὐτῆς, εἴτε τινὸς εἰκόνος*, "whether they consist in an expression of the virtue itself, or are concerned with an image of it" ; i.e. whether the *gesture* or the *exclamation* is the outcome of *actual* virtue of the mind or excellence of the body (as is described at 654 e 10 ff. in the case of courage), or whether (as in the case of an actor) the virtue or excellence only exists in the artist's *imagination* (as we should say). The gens. *αὐτῆς* and *εἰκόνος* are in apposition to *ἀρετῆς*, and governed, like it, by *ἐχόμενα*. (Ritter's discussion of the passage is helpful, but it is surely perverse of him to take *ψυχῆς* and *σώματος* as dependent on *σχήματα καὶ μέλη*. *αὐτῆς* with him (as with St.) refers to *ψυχῆς*. He takes *αὐτὴ ἡ (ἀνδρεία) ψυχή* as the real (brave) man, and *εἰκὼν (τῆς ἀνδρείας ψυχῆς)* as an artist's or poet's *conception* of him.)

b 7. *ὀρθῶς προκαλῇ*, "a good proposal!" Cp. *Rep.* 576 e *ἀλλ' ὀρθῶς, ἔφη, προκαλῇ . . . καὶ περὶ τῶν ἀνδρῶν τὰ αὐτὰ ταῦτα προκαλούμενος ὀρθῶς ἂν προκαλοίμην.*

b 9. *ἔτι δὴ τόδε* : from this point down to d 3 we are concerned with a difficulty ; it is this : It is a general opinion that the function of art is *to please* ; different people are pleased by different artistic representations (*χορεύματα*). We have just laid it down that good art means *virtue* and bad art *vice* : do those who make the mistake of liking best something which is not really best, do so because they like vice? No one will confess to that, at any rate ; it is almost blasphemous to suppose it. The solution of the difficulty, given in the following paragraph (d 5–656 a 5), is that tastes are not formed without a process of *habituation* : we cannot see the significance of anything so complicated as a *χόρευμα*,—which itself depends for its significant representation on trained habits of imitation—any more than we can *be* good without having gone through the process of forming our character and

tastes by long habit. (That is where education comes in, and where a bad education does harm.) The same question with regard to pleasure in general is propounded at *Rep.* 581 e ff., and answered in much the same way as it is here.

c 3. The MSS. had λέγωμεν corrected in A to λέγομεν. The ἄν, which is rather awkward, must go with εἶναι. Hermann and Schanz read λέγοιμεν, but this does not mend matters: ἂν εἶναι is *oratio obliqua* construction for ἄν εἴη in a direct form of question; cp. 658 b 4 τί ποτ' ἂν ἡγούμεθα . . . συμβαίνειν;—τὸ πεπλανηκὸς ἡμᾶς: it is implied that, if we like different things, some of us must make the mistake (πλάνη) of thinking that best which is not best. Either, then, *best* has different meanings for different people according to their nature, or some of us do not see clearly.—As I read the passage, the latter suggestion opens the way for the explanation at d 5 ff.

c 4. τὰ μὲν αὐτά: an unusual severance of the ταὐτά by the introduction of the particle μέν. (Stallbaum would read ταὐτὰ μὲν αὐτά, Schanz ταὐτὰ μέν.)

c 5. οὐ γάρ που ἐρεῖ γέ τις: the argument of this sentence depends on the consideration introduced by the following καίτοι λέγουσίν γε; therefore it is wrong to put a full stop after μούσῃ τινί. "Men always say that what they *like* is the right sort of μουσική: you will never find a man confessing that he *likes* the vicious and degraded:—in other words, that the degraded and vicious μουσική is *better* than that which is morally of the opposite kind." (And yet it is said that a theatrical manager once secured a large audience for a piece by advertising it as "the worst play in London.")

d 5 ff. "Seeing that choric performances are representations of ways and manners, and deal with most varied kinds of actions and situations, and that the individual performers depend for their rendering on a mixture of trained habit and imitative power (ἤθεσι καὶ μιμήσεσι), it is necessary that those (performers) who find word, tune or gesture after their own fashion, whether this is due to their natural disposition or their previous familiarity with them, or to both, should not only like and praise such representations, but also should pronounce them to be right and good; while they cannot possibly like, or approve of, or help calling bad, representations which are repugnant either to their natural disposition, or to the way of thinking with which they are familiar." The *performers* here spoken of are not professional actors, but every reader or reciter of a poem with all its accompaniments; cp. 656 a 2.

—γιγνόμενα agrees with μιμήματα and τὰ περὶ τὰς χορείας (so Ast), and may be compared to the similarly used ἐνοῦσαν (which I conjecture ought to be read ἐνοῦσαι) at *Polit.* 258 d 9—he is there speaking of τέχναι—αἱ δέ γε περὶ τεκτονικὴν αὖ καὶ σύμπασαν χειρουργίαν ὥσπερ ἐν ταῖς πράξεσιν ἐνοῦσαν σύμφυτον τὴν ἐπιστήμην κέκτηνται.—Many editors take γιγνόμενα as the object of διεξιόντων; Orelli would omit the καί after ἤθεσι—Badham also, reading μιμήσει for the vulgate μιμήμασι.—But ἤθεσι, added to πράξεσι and τύχαις, would, after μιμήματα **τρόπων**, be tautological, but, when taken instrumentally with διεξιόντων, it has a due significance.—ἤθεσι καὶ μιμήσεσι (so L and O for the μιμήμασι of A) I take to be a sort of hendiadys, and to have been foreshadowed by the τρόποι and πράξεις καὶ τύχαι of real life. (It has been—quite unnecessarily—suggested that we ought to alter μιμήσεσι (or rather μιμήμασι) to σχήμασι, or again to παθήμασι.)—For the idea cp. *Rep.* 395 d αἱ μιμήσεις, ἐὰν ἐκ νεῶν πόρρω διατελέσωσιν, εἰς ἔθη τε καὶ φύσιν καθίστανται καὶ κατὰ σῶμα καὶ φωνὰς καὶ κατὰ τὴν διάνοιαν.

d 7. There is a connexion of ideas between πρὸς **τρόπου** and the μιμήματα **τρόπων** two lines above.

e 1. κατὰ φύσιν: Plato does not leave out of sight the possibility that some people may like bad things because they are bad by nature.

e 4. With αἰσχρά τε προσαγορεύειν we must supply ἀναγκαῖόν ἐστι from the preceding clause.

e 5. οἷς δ' ἄν κτλ.: Plato does not find it necessary for the argument to consider the case of the man whose nature and training are *both* bad. He has first explained how it comes about that different people enjoy different χορεύματα; now he explains how it is that sometimes the actions and professions of the same person are inconsistent.

e 7. οὗτοι δέ: the resuming, repeated δέ; cp. *Symp.* 220 b 4 οὗτος δ', *Phaedo* 78 c ἃ δέ . . . ταῦτα δέ, 113 e οἳ δ' ἄν . . . τούτους δέ.

656 a 3. κινεῖσθαι τῷ σώματι: these words, and the following ᾄδειν, show that the Athenian, for the last ten lines, has had in mind, not spectators, but χορευταί themselves.

a 4. ὡς ἀποφαινόμενοι καλὰ μετὰ σπουδῆς, "as they would thereby deliberately declare their approval."

a 6. A and O_2 have λέγοις, L and O have λέγεις: Hermann adopts Schmidt's ὀρθότατ' ἂν λέγοις (like the κάλλιστ ἄν at 897 e 7, but the cases are not similar), Schanz ὀρθότατα λέγοις ἄν. So at *Rep.* 610 a 4, where the MSS. have ὀρθότατ' ἂν λέγεις, Hermann

reads *ὀρθόταθ' ἂν λέγοις*. Probably, both here, and at *Rep.* 610 a, the correct reading is *ὀρθότατα λέγεις*.

a 7. *μῶν οὖν τι* : we had *μῶν οὖν* at 624 a 7 and we find *μῶν τι ;* ("*an forte?*") at *Prot.* 310 d 4. The *ἔσθ' ἥντινα* is used like the *ἔστιν ὅτι* at 663 d 9. In A the *μ* is "*in rasura*," and the *ὧν οὖν τι* is "*extra versum*" (Burnet and Schanz). Schanz cuts out these three words. His *ἄν* after *λέγοις* ("*s in rasura*") fills the gap left by the *μ* of *μῶν*.—The Athenian asks, "Do you think then that the man who takes pleasure in gestures or songs of an evil character suffers at all (from so doing)? or that men who find pleasure in the opposite direction (i.e. in good songs) get any advantage from it?" The whole question is in loose conversational style.

a 8. *πονηρίας* : for the gen. used in place of an adj. cp. Arist. *Poet.* 1454 a 28 *πονηρίας ἤθους*, and below 660 a 2 *τὴν δὲ τῶν πονηρῶν (τροφήν)*.

a 10. *εἰκός γε . . . τὴν μοχθηρίαν ;* Cl. "I expect they do." Ath. "Won't you go further than that, and say that they *can't help* being in the same plight as the man who sees bad men's evil ways not with dislike but with enjoyment, notwithstanding the perfunctory disapproval which a dim notion of his own depravity may make him express?"

b 1. With *ὅπερ* we must supply *ἔστιν* : it is almost equivalent to *ὥσπερ* : by a contrary process the English *as* is used as a relative pronoun after *such*.

b 3. *ὡς ἐν παιδιᾶς μοίρᾳ* : not, I think, "playfully" (Jowett), but "perfunctorily," "not seriously" ; *παιδιά* is constantly contrasted with *σπουδή*, and in this connexion it gets the notion of "child's-play," and "make-believe" ; cp. *Laws* 889 d *παιδιάς τινας, ἀληθείας οὐ σφόδρα μετεχούσας, ἀλλ' εἴδωλ' ἄττα συγγενῆ ἑαυτῶν*. So here, the man is said to treat his own evil propensities as if they were *a dream*.

b 4. *αὐτοῦ* A, and so Burnet : *αὐτοῦ*, (apparently) the reading of the other MSS., seems to me to give the right sense. Ficinus seems to have read *αὐτῶν* (? masc.). *αὐτοῦ* (neut.) is, I suppose, to be translated "of such conduct."—*τότε*, "on such an occasion" (i.e. in the very moment when he forbears to praise).—For *ὁμοιοῦσθαι* cp. *Theaet.* 177 a 1 *λανθάνουσι τῷ μὲν ὁμοιούμενοι διὰ τὰς ἀδίκους πράξεις*.

b 7. *ἐκ πάσης ἀνάγκης* : a reference to the *ἀναγκαῖον* in b 1. This is a *clear* case of necessity.

c 2. I have adopted "*ἐκ πάσης ἀνάγκης*" Schanz's introduction

of *περὶ* before *τήν*. (Stallbaum takes *τὴν . . . παιδείαν τε καὶ παιδιάν* as an absolute acc. with *ἐξέσεσθαι*; they are much more needed by *καλῶς κείμενοι*.)—*παιδείαν τε καὶ παιδιάν*: this jingle —the *Laws* shows a weakness for verbal jingles, which some may think senile—is a sort of summary and reminder of the previous argument that dance and song are the subject matter of education: "about the Muses' work, which is at once education and amusement."

c 4. *ῥυθμοῦ ἐχόμενον*: a vague phrase; "anything in the way of *ῥυθμός*."

c 5–6. *ἐν τοῖς χοροῖς* certainly goes with *διδάσκοντα*, not with *ἀπεργάζεσθαι*; therefore Burnet is right in putting a comma after *χοροῖς*.—*ὅτι ἂν τύχῃ . . . μοχθηρίαν*, "turn them (the children) out just what *he* happens to be in the way of goodness or badness." *ὁ ποιητής* is, I think, the subject of *τύχῃ*.—*ἀπεργάζεσθαι ὅτι* is not "produce whatever result," *τοὺς παῖδας* (supplied in thought) is the object of *ἀπεργάζεσθαι*, and *ὅτι* is the secondary predicate; lit. "render them whatever he happens to be."—The *καί* before *τοὺς τῶν εὐ. π.* emphasizes these words; the poet is imagined as teaching the *children* what he likes *himself*. (If *ὅτι* is the subject of *τύχῃ*, the words should be translated, "turn them out whatever chance determines in the way of goodness or badness,"—the "chance" ultimately being the disposition which the poet happens to have.)—Ast also put a comma after *χοροῖς*, but then he put another comma after *τύχῃ*, taking *ἀπεργάζεσθαι* absolutely, in the sense of *informare*—governing *παῖδας* understood—and taking *ὅτι ἂν τύχῃ* in apposition to *τοῦτο*. —*τοὺς . . . παῖδας καὶ νέους* is a sort of hendiadys, chosen, probably, instead of *νέους παῖδας*, because, to the author's ear, it improved the balance of the sentence.

d 5. *θαῦμα καὶ ἀκοῦσαι*, "the report of it will be enough to surprise you."

d 6. *ἐγνώσθη . . . οὗτος ὁ λόγος*, "this principle was settled."

d 7. *μεταχειρίζεσθαι ταῖς συνηθείαις*, "to practise habitually," lit. "to deal with by their habituations." In A the letters **ηθει** in *συνηθείαις* are a correction made by A^2. Schanz reads *συνουσίαις*, which, I think, is very likely what A^1, but not what Plato, wrote. For (1) *μεταχειρίζεσθαι* (with *μέλη* for object) would not by itself mean *practise* (songs), in the sense of repeat them until they were familiar (which is the one meaning which suits the passage), but with the addition of *ταῖς συνηθείαις* we get that meaning; and (2) *ταῖς συνουσίαις* must have *ἐν* with it if

it is to mean "in their classes," which is simplest here—though it might mean "by means of their classes." It must be admitted that *ταῖς συνηθείαις* is an unusual expression, but that makes it less likely to have been either the mistake of a scribe, or the idea of a corrector. (It is perhaps worth considering whether *μεταχειρίζεσθαι* may not be *passive*, and *σχήματα* and *μέλη* acc., on the analogy of the acc. of *the thing taught* with verbs of teaching.)

e 2. *καὶ ὁμοιώματα*: for this the MSS. have *καὶ ὁποῖ' ἄττα*; which words were rejected by Schanz. Apelt, *Jen. Prog.* 1905, preferably suggests that they should be replaced by the reading of the text.—*καινοτομεῖν* applies to a modification of existing forms, *ἐπινοεῖν* to the devising of new ones.

e 3. For *ἄλλ' ἄττα ἤ* A and O wrongly read *ἀλλ' ἄττα ᾗ*.—*οὔτε ἐν τούτοις οὔτε ἐν μουσικῇ συμπάσῃ*: *τούτοις* is neuter and refers to *σχήματα*. Though the patterns in the temples mentioned above were drawn, painted, or sculptured forms, the addition of *ἐν μουσικῇ συμπάσῃ* shows that there were in Egypt stereotyped forms of song and dance as well, and so we are distinctly told at 657 a and 799 a.

e 5. *οὐχ ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν . . . ἀλλ' ὄντως*: cp. *Rep.* 341 b *ποτέρως λέγεις . . . τὸν ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν ἢ τὸν ἀκριβεῖ λόγῳ;*—At *Epinomis* 987 a the author speaks of the astronomical science of Egypt (and Syria) as *βεβασανισμένα χρόνῳ μυριετεῖ τε καὶ ἀπείρῳ*.

657 a 1. For the remarkable acc. H. Richards suggests *τῇ αὐτῇ δὲ τέχνῃ*. I think it is not impossible that a *κατὰ* has dropped out before *τὴν*. Cp. Burnet, pref. to vol. v., end of last paragraph but one. Perhaps this idea gets some slight support from the *κατὰ ταὐτά* in 660 b 7.

a 7. *περὶ τῶν τοιούτων νομοθετεῖσθαι βεβαίως θαρροῦντα . . . παρεχόμενα*: so MSS.; this can hardly stand. (1) The middle *νομοθετεῖσθαι* is used (of a single legislator—*θαρροῦντα*) in the sense of *νομοθετεῖν*; (2) as *νομοθετεῖσθαι* already has *περὶ τῶν τοιούτων* to complete its sense, and give the subject matter of the legislation, the object *μέλη* is superfluous; (3) *θαρροῦντα* is quite out of place. The "confidence" spoken of at b 3 is supposed to spring from the consideration that the thing had been done before, and *θαρροῦντα* there is quite naturally introduced, but there is no sense in saying that the first person who made such a law did it with confidence, especially when the sentence begins *δυνατὸν ἄρ' ἦν*. Only one of these difficulties is removed by Madvig's rejection of *θαρροῦντα*, which

Schanz accepts. I propose to read *νομοθετεῖσθαι <καὶ> βεβαίως <καθιε>ροῦν τὰ μέλη τὰ τὴν ὀρθότητα φύσει παρεχόμενα.* (I should even like to go further and read the sentence (*ὅτι δυνατὸν ἄρ' ἦν περὶ τῶν τοιούτων*) *νομοθετοῦντα βεβαίως καθιεροῦν τὰ τὴν (ὀρθότητα φύσει παρεχόμενα).*) The introduction of *μέλη* is premature. He is dealing here with *μουσική* in general. In view of the general corruption of the passage I think it is very likely that *τὰ μέλη* was introduced from below; also that, when *καθιεροῦν τὰ* became *θαρροῦντα*, the need of an infinitive led to the alteration of *νομοθετοῦντα* to *νομοθετεῖσθαι*. The whole passage (from *τοῦτο δ' οὖν*) would mean: "At all events it is an undoubted and a noteworthy fact in the history of *μουσική* that it was found possible for a man who was legislating about such things to give the effective sanction of religion to that which is fundamentally right." *καθιεροῦν* gets important support from *τὴν καθιερωθεῖσαν χορείαν* at 657 b 6, and from 813 a 1 *ἃ δὴ* (sc. *μέλη*) *καθιερωθέντα ἔφαμεν δεῖν κτλ.*

a 8. *τοῦτο*: i.e. an unerring judgement—the power of conceiving what is absolutely *φύσει ὀρθόν*—in matters of art.

a 9. *θείου τινὸς ἀνδρός*: Eusebius preserves *ἀνδρὸς*, the MSS. omit it, probably by an error due to the following *ἄν*.—*ἐκεῖ*: i.e. in Egypt, where the same divine origin was apparently claimed for the Law as in Sparta and Crete.

b 2. *ὅπερ ἔλεγον*: this refers probably to 656 b and c, where Plato had said, first, that bad "music" was as bad for the young as bad company, and, secondly, that laws ought to be made to regulate composers of music and poetry. — *ἑλεῖν* is "catch," "conceive" (cp. Browning's "*recapture* that first fine careless rapture").—*εἰ δύναιτό τις . . . τὴν ὀρθότητα*: the Ath. has just said that fundamental correctness (*τὴν φύσει ὀρθότητα*) in *μουσική* cannot be obtained without divine inspiration; still, even though the *ὀρθότης* to which a man can attain in *μουσική* is not perfect, *such as it is* he ought—and that confidently—to prescribe it by law.—Though *ὁπωσοῦν* "in whatever degree" goes, strictly speaking, with the verb, its position makes it seem to qualify the noun; cp. *Phil.* 64 d *μέτρου καὶ τῆς συμμέτρου φύσεως μὴ τυχοῦσα ἡτισοῦν καὶ ὁπωσοῦν σύγκρασις*. This is better than, with Jowett, to translate "if a person can only find *in any way*").

b 4. *ὡς*: the sentence thus introduced gives one ground for the confidence just spoken of. The legislator need not be afraid of the term "old-fashioned." (There is thus no reason to reject, with Winckelmann, the *οὐ* before *μεγάλην*.)—*ἡ τῆς ἡδονῆς καὶ λύπης*

ζήτησις: an imperfect phrase for "the search for pleasure and the avoidance of its opposite." Badham suggested that for ζήτησις we ought to read ὑφήγησις—i.e. "the tendency of our likes and dislikes to make us crave novelty in μουσική"—an attractive suggestion. F.H.D. would bracket ζητεῖν, taking ἡδονῆς καὶ λύπης as subjective genitives. If we are to be content with the vulgate, we must doubtless follow Stallbaum in taking τοῦ ζητεῖν (the MS. που has been universally corrected since Aldus to τοῦ) as a gen. of definition, explanatory of ζήτησις, after the same pattern as δουλείᾳ . . . τῆς δουλώσεως at 776 d and διατριβὴν . . . τῆς μελλήσεως at 723 d. Ast on 647 c collects many instances of a similar "perissologia," to which St. adds, among others, *Euthyd.* 305 d ἐὰν τούτους εἰς δόξαν καταστήσωσιν μηδενὸς δοκεῖν ἀξίους εἶναι, where there is no τοῦ, and where Badham ejects δοκεῖν and Naber εἰς δόξαν. Lobeck, *Paralip.* p. 534, cps. Dem. *De Symm.* 178. 6 τοῦ δοκεῖν εὖ λέγειν δόξαν ἐκφέρονται.—We may translate: "For the craving of our likes and dislikes manifested in the search after novelty in μουσική. . . ."

b 6. (πρὸς τὸ) διαφθεῖραι . . . ἐπικαλοῦσα ἀρχαιότητα, "to damage . . . by branding it as old-fashioned." The Aldine ed. was again undoubtedly right in altering the MS. ἐπικαλοῦσαν to the nom.—The ζήτησις is spoken of as if it were a person actuated by the desire described.

c 3. λέγομεν A^2 and Vat. 1029 (cp. on d 8), λέγωμεν ALO.—For the datives governed by χρείαν cp. 670 a where ψιλῷ ἑκατέρῳ is governed by χρήσεως. Greek uses the dative in a more varied way than other languages do. The whole sentence may be translated: "Well then, we may say then—may we not?—without fear of contradiction, that the right way to use μουσική and the relaxation of choric performances is as follows."

c 5. "We feel delight when we think that things are right with us, and we think that things are right with us when we feel delight." The latter half of the statement means, as Ritter says (*Analysis* p. 11), "we do well to be glad"—"the gladness does us good." Herein, he seems to say, is the great *sanction* of all merry-making.

c 8. I think Burnet is right in putting a comma after τοιούτῳ, making χαίροντες an explanation of the three preceding words.

d 1. αὐτοί points the contrast between young and old: the former express their joy in dance and song; their elders feel the joy (χαίροντες), but it is second-hand, they are spectators only (θεωροῦντες).

d 2. *τὸ δὲ τῶν πρεσβυτέρων ἡμῶν κτλ.*, "as to us elders, we think that the proper way for us to proceed is to look on." There seems to be a reminiscence in the *πρεπόντως* of the *ὀρθήν* in c 4.

d 3. *παιδείᾳ* A, *παιδιᾷ* O, and so A_2 (Burnet).

d 4. *ὃ ποθοῦντες καὶ ἀσπαζόμενοι κτλ.* (*καί* emphasizes *ἀσπαζόμενοι*) : i.e., while regretting our own lack of activity, we can take delight in that of others—in fact we encourage it, because it can rouse us (*ἐπεγείρειν*) from our torpor to an imaginary (*μνήμῃ*) youth. It is a delightful fancy that represents the sight of another's joy as awakening the onlooker from the sleep of age, by the help of memory—or, as we should say, by the help of imagination.—The words *τίθεμεν ἀγῶνας* at once take us in thought to a Greek festival, with its attendant contests in all kinds of artistic and other exercise, and prepare us for the *ἑορταζόντων* in e 1.

d 8. *μῶν οὖν κτλ.*, "we think,—don't we?—that there is something in the generally expressed opinion about festal performances. Most people say that etc."—It is clear here again (as in c 3) that A^2 and Y were right in reading the indicative.

e 4. *δεῖ γὰρ δὴ . . . τιμᾶσθαι*, "without doubt, as it is recognized that merry-making on such occasions is right, the man who gives pleasure to most people, and who gives the greatest pleasure ought to be most highly honoured."

658 a 1. "Not only are we right in saying so, but we should be right in doing so."

a 4. *ταχύ* : "nota paronomasiam," Ast.

a 5. *διαιροῦντες αὐτὸ κατὰ μέρη* : he has here in mind the distinction between the different kinds of *ἀγών*. The imaginary proclamation of a contest which follows is peculiar in *not* making this discrimination.

a 6. *οὕτως ἁπλῶς* : so at *Rep.* 351 a and *Phil.* 12 c ; *ἁπλῶς οὕτως* (*ῥᾳδίως οὕτως κτλ.*) is the common order, "without qualification."—*ὁντινοῦν* seems used in the sense of "any you like."

a 8. *προείποι* : the idea is "resumed" by the noun *προρρήσεως* in b 4.—For *ἥκειν* after *προείποι* St. cps. *Menex.* 240 a *εἶπεν ἥκειν*.

b 1. *ὃς [δ'] ἂν κτλ.* : Ficinus translates : "praemiaque ei proponit, qui spectatores maxime delectaverit." From this Winckelmann naturally concludes that Ficinus read *ὃς ἄν*, and Usener, who (followed by Schanz) reads *δ' ἄν* (for *δὴ ἄν*), suggests that possibly *θεὶς νικητήρια* ought to stand immediately before *ὃς*. 'Whether the words are transposed or not, it is perhaps better (with Ficinus) to

take ὃς ἄν as "the prize to be for the man who," than as merely depending on ἀγωνιούμενον ("to find out" or "to see, who"). The insertion of Δ before Α is a natural copyist's error; or the δ' may have been introduced intentionally by a scribe who had not seen to the end of the sentence.—ἐπιταττόμενος I take to be *passive* (Ast in his *Lex.* gives only this passage as an example of its *middle* use). Not only does this agree with the habit of the verb, but a participle agreeing with the subj. of προείποι would very awkwardly disturb the course of the sentence.

b 2. νικήσῃ δέ: the δέ is due to the suggestion in the previous clause that there *might* have been some restriction laid down as to the nature of the contest.

b 3. The καί before κριθῇ is *explanatory*. It seems strange, as Ast says, that νικήσῃ should come before κριθῇ, but the καί implies that the two verbs refer to the same event.—We may translate (προείποι . . . γεγονέναι): "were by proclamation to offer prizes, and invite all and sundry to compete for them, in a contest of mere pleasure-giving—the prize to go to the man who gives most pleasure to the spectators, without being restricted in the means he employs,—all that is necessary is that he should surpass all rivals in producing just precisely (ὅτι μάλιστα) this very result, and be pronounced to have been the most delightful among the competitors." The sentence is a rough one, in conversational style. Ast rewrites it elegantly. Stallbaum, while rebuking Ast for his boldness, adopts, in his translation, but not in his text, the boldest of Ast's alterations—that of νικήσῃ to νικήσειν ("*eum victoriam esse reportaturum siquidem . . .*").

b 6. τοῦ πέρι λέγεις; "In what respect do you mean?"

b 9. οὐ θαυμαστόν κτλ., "I shouldn't wonder if one of them thought that by a *puppet-show* he would have the best chance of the prize."

c 3. δικαίως: the gist of the question is in this word. The point is not which performers would get most votes, but which performer *ought* to get most votes. So ὀρθῶς at d 8.

c 4. ὡς γνοὺς ἄν, "as if he could decide!"

c 5. Schanz brackets the words ἀκοῦσαί τε, which, he says, have been altered in A from ἀκούσας τε. If the words are genuine (which I doubt), they must mean, not "hear the competitors"—which would be unbearably tautological when followed by αὐτήκοος αὐτὸς γενέσθαι—but, "hear what the verdict is."

c 10. The Athenian's answer is a further exemplification of the principle enunciated in the words διαιροῦντες αὐτὸ κατὰ μέρη

in a 5. For the suggestion of a juvenile tribunal cp. *Gorg.* 464 d and 521 e.

d 3. *αἵ τε πεπαιδευμέναι τῶν γυναικῶν*: this passsage and 817 c 4, and *Gorg.* 502 d, have been cited as evidence that women were in Athens admitted to the theatre in Plato's time, at all events to tragedies.

d 4. *τὸ πλῆθος πάντων*: St. cps. *Minos* 321 a *ἔστιν δὲ τῆς ποιήσεως δημοτερπέστατόν τε καὶ ψυχαγωγικώτατον ἡ τραγῳδία.*

d 7. For *διατιθέναι* in the sense of *recite* St. cps. *Charm.* 162 d.

d 9. I prefer, with Schanz, and most editors, to put a (,) rather than with Bekker and Burnet a (;) after *εἴη*.

e 3. Apelt (ut sup. p. 5) claims that all difficulty vanishes if we accept his alteration of *ἔθος* to *ἔπος*. But does it? What we want here is a proof that "we old men," who give our verdict for epic poetry, *are the best judges*. Does it not sound puerile to say, "of course we are, because Epic poetry *is* the best"? And though Apelt says that is what is said here, the words even fall short of that, for they are **δοκεῖ ἡμῖν** . . . *βέλτιστον γίγνεσθαι*. It must be admitted, though, that *ἔθος* is difficult. H. Stephanus altered it to *ἦθος*, and the early editions followed him. But the *ἦθος* (of a man) would rather be used of qualities which do not change with age. It is more akin to *φύσις*, with which we find *ἔθος* contrasted. We are told, six lines below, that the best judges must not only be *βέλτιστοι*, but *πεπαιδευμένοι*, and that the superlatively good judge must be *διαφέρων παιδείᾳ* as well as *ἀρετῇ*. Some light may be thrown on *ἔθος* here by the words *τέχνῃ εἴτε καί τισιν ἔθεσιν* of 632 d 5, and *κατὰ ἔθος* at 655 e 1, and the *συνήθεια* of the same passage. Evidently here the advantage possessed by the old men is due to something in their circumstances and training. Ficinus takes *ἔθος* to mean *experience* (*usus rerum quem ab aetate habemus*), Cornarius to mean *taste* (*affectus* pl.), but he may be translating *ἦθος*. Jowett translates *ἔθος* by "way of thinking," Schneider (who takes *νῦν δή* to be *νυνδή*) by *consuetudo*, Ritter by "Lebenserfahrung." Whatever *ἔθος* is, it is here pronounced to be "far the best at the present time of all that are to be found in any city in any part of the world." I would suggest that the above-quoted applications of *ἔθος* to *training* and the subsequent mention of *παιδεία* here point to the word's being used in the sense of "*force, or influence, of habit*," i.e. *training*. *ἡμῖν* goes with it as a possessive dative, "in our case." So, in English we might say *our "way."*—The words *τῶν νῦν*, as Ritter says, suggest that possibly some day a special training in aesthetics may

turn out a judge better than that produced by the ordinary experience of life. The reason why this experience tells more with the old than with the young is simply that they have had more of it. At the present time, in default of *quality* of training, they must rely on quantity alone.—The *πρεσβυτάτοις* and *δι' ἐμπειρίαν* of 659 d 3 point in the same direction as the present passage. (H. Stephanus altered *νῦν* to *νεῶν*, which is most unwarrantably translated by Ast: "(*longe melius est*) *quam juvenum*"). For the connexion of *ἔθος* with *παιδεία* cp. *Rep.* 518 e (virtue is implanted) *ἔθεσι καὶ ἀσκήσεσι*, and 522 a *ἔθεσι παιδεύουσα τοὺς φύλακας*.

e 6. These words remind us of 655 c 8 *καίτοι λέγουσίν γε κτλ.* We shall have to recur to both these passages at 668 a 9.

659 a 1. *τὸν διαφέροντα*: whereas those who were endowed and trained *ἱκανῶς* were spoken of in the plural, as a class, the man with the special endowment and training is spoken of in the singular, as being rarer. There is no need to suppose that the author has here a special functionary in mind.—*διὰ ταῦτα . . . ὅτι*, "the reason why (I say this) is that . . ."

a 4. The early vulgate *θατέρου* for *θεάτρου* is a typical misreading: Ficinus translates it "ab alio discere."

a 5. Burnet was the first to put a comma after *μανθάνοντα*. The *καί* before *ἐκπληττόμενον* does not connect this word with *μανθάνοντα*—for this we should want *οὔτε*—but means *both*, though, strictly, either it ought to go before *ὑπὸ θορύβου*, or there ought to be another participle with *τῆς αὐτοῦ ἀπαιδευσίας*, in which case the *ὑπό* would have to be repeated. We may translate, "misled, as much by his own ignorance as by the noise made by the mob." The first *οὔτε* clause describes the case of the judge without *φρόνησις*, the second (*οὔτ' αὖ γιγνώσκοντα κτλ.*) that of the judge who, "though he has insight" (*γιγνώσκοντα*), gives the lie to his convictions, and his (sacred) profession, through cowardice. —For the *θόρυβος* cp. *Rep.* 492 b.

a 7. For the omission of *ἐξ* with *οὗπερ* cp. 770 b 5 *περὶ ἑκάστων ὧν τίθεμεν τοὺς νόμους*. Adam on *Rep.* 373 e calls it "the usual Greek idiom."

b 1. *ψευδόμενον κτλ.*, "be so irresolute as to give a vote which he knows to be false."

b 4. Ficinus took *τοῖς* with *θεαταῖς*; but, even though it is just conceivable that *ἀποδιδοῦσι* might be used in the sense of "manifest, express by way of response" (to the poet's efforts), clearly here the people whom it is the judge's duty to *oppose*

(ἐναντιωσόμενος) are the dramatic authors, who are spoken of as *providing* (τοῖς ἀποδιδοῦσι) the public with amusement. That θεαταῖς has no article is no more surprising than that θεατῶν has none, two lines above.

b 5. Unfortunately Eusebius, who quotes this passage, stops at θεαταῖς. What follows in the MSS. cannot be right. Hermann, Schanz, and Burnet adopt Winckelmann's insertion of οὐ before καθάπερ. Ritter will have none of the οὐ; but then he has to translate καθάπερ by "*wie umgekehrt.*" This is only putting in the negative in German, without putting it in in Greek. Even with the Greek negative the sentence is far from smooth; we must make the negative mean, "the old Greek procedure did not admit of acting as the Sicilian and Italian does now, which" (does so and so). Badham would have us mark a considerable lacuna after the word νόμος. I would suggest another way out of the difficulty, which is, to eject the words ἐξῆν γὰρ δὴ τῷ παλαιῷ τε καὶ Ἑλληνικῷ νόμῳ, as being a marginal scholium, which has been wrongly incorporated with the text. The sentence καθάπερ κτλ. follows naturally after τοῖς . . . μὴ . . . ὀρθῶς ἀποδιδοῦσι: it is a concrete instance of what these words describe. I have therefore ventured to bracket these words and put a colon after θεαταῖς.

b 7. ἐπιτρέπων used absolutely — without a direct object — almost in the sense of "give way to"; cp. 802 c 1 ταῖς δὲ ἡδοναῖς καὶ ἐπιθυμίαις μὴ ἐπιτρέποντας.

c 1 f. τῶν κριτῶν: it should be remembered that these κριταί are the *mob*: παιδεύουσιν in the next line is ironical, and Burnet is doubtless right in reading αὐτοὺς with A — the *spectators* actually *educate* (!) the poets. (As Schanz reads αὖτοὺς without comment, I conclude he thought the breathing in A was a rough one.)

c 5. αὐτοῖς δρῶσι, "through their own action" — as we should put it, "and they have themselves to thank for it." A and O read αὖ τοῖς. Modern editors rightly follow Vat. 1029 in reading αὐτοῖς. Cornarius sees too much in αὐτοῖς δρῶσι when he translates, "*quum ipsi poemata faciant.*" Ficinus has *nunc iis ex theatro contrarium accidit.* This looks as if he read τοῖς δρῶσιν, and took it to mean "owing to the actors." The ordinary contrast between δρᾶν and πάσχειν gives a flavour of antithesis to the sentence; it is almost equal to αὐτοὶ δρῶντες πάσχουσι. (Badham's αὖ οἷς δρῶσι is less pointed.) — πᾶν τοὐναντίον: i.e. they see plays with morals *worse* than their own, and come to take pleasure increasingly in what is wrong and bad, and their taste, instead of being elevated, is corrupted.

c 9. *τρίτον ἢ τέταρτον*: the most explicit previous statement of this doctrine was that at 653 b. It was almost as clearly laid down in 645 a—*τὴν τοῦ λογισμοῦ ἀγωγὴν χρυσῆν καὶ ἱεράν, τῆς πόλεως κοινὸν νόμον ἐπικαλουμένην*—and it was no doubt in the author's mind when he wrote 643 e and 656 b. If then education is the process of drawing and leading the youthful mind in the direction in which the Law says it ought to go, we see, incidentally, what sort of claim the subject of Education has to fill a large place in a treatise on Laws. The framer of laws, that is, must consider the *possibilities* of education—must know the *nature* of the process, and the capacities of its subject matter; and further, the most important branch of Law itself will be that which provides for, and regulates the educating process. See note on 671 a 4–672 d.

d 3. *ἐπιεικεστάτοις καὶ πρεσβυτάτοις*: in these words we have over again the insistence on both (1) *φύσις*, *natural endowment*, and (2) *experience*, as a necessity for right opinion. The second point is further reinforced by the addition of the words *δι' ἐμπειρίαν*. The same two influences were referred to in 655 d 8 in the words *ἢ κατὰ φύσιν ἢ κατὰ ἔθος*.

d 5. *ἐθίζηται*: we are reminded by this word of the *ὀρθῶς εἰθίσθαι ὑπὸ τῶν προσηκόντων* of 653 b 5.

d 6. *τοῖς ὑπὸ τοῦ νόμου πεπεισμένοις* (masc.) would apply not merely to the "second class" of *φύλακες νόμων* spoken of at 632 c, but to all rightly educated adults with whom the young came in contact. It is, however, only *ὁ γέρων* (d 7) who is referred to as an *authority* on the question of what is right and wrong. Eusebius, in quoting this passage, has *τεθειμένοις* (neut.) for *πεπεισμένοις*, a disquieting variant—due perhaps to an imperfect memory.

e 1. The *τούτων ἕνεκα* resumes the *ἵνα* of d 4, and introduces the main sentence *αὗται* (*αἱ ᾠδαὶ*) *δοκοῦσι* (supplied from *δοκεῖ* in c 9) *ἐπῳδαὶ γεγονέναι*, a sentence which is inordinately long, and almost smothered in relative and other clauses.—*ὄντως μὲν ἐπῳδαί*: Plato never scorns to point his argument by a pun; he seems to think the spirit of the language inspires the *λόγος* on such an occasion.—For this application of the notion cf. *ἐπᾴδειν* at *Phaedo* 114 d.

e 2. *νῦν*: if this is right, it must mean "under our present system." Stallbaum thought it might be an error for *ἡμῖν*.

e 3. *συμφωνίαν*: cp. above 653 b 6 *αὕτη 'σθ' ἡ συμφωνία κτλ.*—*σπουδήν*: this again is partly a quibble. The *σπουδή* which

the young eschew is not exactly the *σπουδή* which the *ἐπῳδαί* are supposed to feel (*ἐσπουδασμέναι*). The latter is a *serious intention*, the former merely work, as opposed to play.

e 5. *καλεῖσθαι καὶ πράττεσθαι*: I think *πράττεσθαι* means that the performance is regarded by the children themselves as a *παιδιά*, not merely that it is so treated by their teachers; i.e. "not only do people *call* it playing and singing, but the children *do* it as if they thought it such"—they know nothing of its having a magical or medicinal effect upon them. This last idea—for charms and incantations were used against disease as well as against disinclination (cp. *Euthyd.* 290 a)—suggests the following analogy from nursery therapeutics.—*τοῖς κάμνουσίν τε καὶ ἀσθενῶς ἴσχουσιν*: the *παίδων* of d 1, the *τῶν νέων* of e 4, and the *παιδός* of d 5 justify us in supposing that he is still talking only of children here. Besides, the nature, especially of the second process, is that of one more often applied to children than to adults.

660 a 1. *οἷς μέλει τούτων*: i.e. doctors, or nurses. *τούτων* is best taken as neuter, "these matters"; if it is masc. it would not mean "the children"—that would be *αὐτῶν*—but *τοῖς κάμνουσιν*, which would then be "sick people" generally.

a 2. *τῶν πονηρῶν*: for the gen. where we expect the adj. *πονηράν* cp. *πονηρίας σχήμασιν* at 656 a 8.—*ἐν ἀηδέσιν*: one would imagine this to be a vague reminiscence of the practice of putting mustard on a child's thumb to prevent its being sucked. If Greek mothers went so far as to try to make all un-nourishing food unpalatable, there was more educational science in a Greek nursery than in a modern one.

a 3. *ταὐτόν* is adverbial; cp. *Polit.* 308 e *ταὐτὸν δή μοι τοῦθ' ἡ βασιλικὴ φαίνεται . . . οὐκ ἐπιτρέψειν.*

a 4. *ἐν τοῖς καλοῖς ῥήμασι καὶ ἐπαινετοῖς*: these words are difficult; I think they mean, "with the help of that beautiful and choice language of his." The poet is compared to the doctor or nurse in the preceding simile, the poet's "beautiful language" to the appetizing medium, and the *χρηστὴ τροφή* is here represented by *σχήματα* and *μέλη* which harmonize with and suggest *σωφροσύνη*, *ἀνδρεία* and all kinds of virtue. The preposition *ἐν* is doubtless chosen to preserve the idea suggested by *ἐν ἡδέσι τισὶν σιτίοις*, but it here has what we may call its *instrumental* use, cp. below 680 d 8, 928 d 6, *Phaedo* 95 d 4, *Theaet.* 206 a 6. His *fine language* is to be a *recommendation* of the "virtuous" *σχήματα καὶ μέλη* which he is bound to "produce." (Hug wanted to reject

ἐν . . . ἐπαινετοῖς. Though this would get rid of a difficulty, it would rob the comparison of an important feature.)

a 5. τὰ τῶν σωφρόνων : cp. above 655 b. Here we have the same definition of what is καλόν in art.

b 1. πρὸς Διός, "Bless you!"—νῦν, "at the present time."

b 2. ποιεῖν is doubtless here used in the special sense in which it was used in a 7 and 8.

b 7. καὶ κατὰ ταὐτά : these words, which Plato often uses before ὡσαύτως, merely round off the phrase, and reinforce τῶν αὐτῶν :—"the same, and of the same nature."

c 3. I think Burnet is right in omitting the comma after θαυμάζοιμι (most editors have it). Thus read, the sentence οὐκ ἂν θαυμ. κτλ. will mean, "I expect it was through my not expressing my meaning clearly that—to my cost (ἔπαθον)—I did so"; i.e. "that I created, and suffered from, a false impression" (so Ficinus).

c 4. ἀλλ' ἃ βούλομαι κτλ. : i.e. "instead of speaking clearly (and abusing things as they are), I gave you a general sketch of what I *wish* to be, in the matter of μουσική, in such a way, perhaps, as to make you think that *that* (ταῦτα) was what I meant"; then (as a reason why he did not find fault with the actual state of things) "because, though it is sometimes necessary to rail at hopeless and hardened sinners, such railing is not at all a pleasant task"—lit. "things past cure, and far advanced on the wrong road."—The emphatic ἐμέ in c 6 seems to be merely due to the fact that ἃ σὺ λέγεις had come before. The ταῦτα is, by its position, also emphatic.

d 1 and **3.** ταῦτα and τοιαῦτα are ἃ διανοοῦμαι and ἃ βούλομαι γίγνεσθαι περὶ μουσικήν respectively.

d 6. Both οὕτως and καθάπερ νῦν γίγνεται go with γιγνόμενα, just as both the καθάπερ clauses in the next three lines go with γίγνοιτο.

d 8. πολύ που τὸ διαφέρον : cp. above 654 d 4. Here the verb to be applied is ἂν εἴη.

d 9. ἔτι, "furthermore."

d 11. φέρε δή, συνομολογησώμεθα τὰ νῦν, "now then for a settlement of the question."—Cleinias's remarks at b 1 ff. showed that he was thinking of the form and style of μουσική : here the Ath. rather suddenly directs our sole attention to the *subject matter* of the poet's work, τὰ λεγόμενα. He was entitled to do so by the admission by his hearers of the principle enunciated at 655 b, that καλόν in μουσική means ἀρετῆς ἐχόμενον, but no

doubt his hearers were somewhat bewildered, as Cleinias's answer (on 661 d) shows. The Athenian is here pursuing, in a concrete instance, the same inquiry which he makes in general in Bk. I.: i.e. are the Cretan and Spartan institutions, though they may teach us much, as satisfactory as they claim to be?

e 1. *παιδείᾳ καὶ μουσικῇ* is a hendiadys. This identification is also based on a previous admission (654 a 5 ff.).

e 5. *Κινύρα τε καὶ Μίδα*: Tyrtaeus (12. 6) has the Ionic forms of the gen.—*πλουτοίη δὲ Μίδεω καὶ Κινύρεω μάλιον.*

e 6. *ἀνιαρῶς ζῇ*, "lives a life of misery." *ἀνιαρός* is the natural opposite of *ἡδύς*, *Prot.* 351 c, 355 e.

e 7. *εἴπερ ὀρθῶς λέγει*: the Athenian has asserted, with his hearer's assent, the legislator's right to dictate to the poet, and is thus enabled a second time to turn the tables on the Spartan national poet. Whereas Tyrtaeus says: No amount of physical or temporal advantage counts for anything in a man who is not brave, the Ath. here lays it down that even bravery itself is just as worthless, if the possessor is *ἄδικος*. He even goes further, and says that it, like all other advantages, is a curse and not a blessing to a man if he is not virtuous. (Cp. 630 b 3 ff., and *Gorg.* 511 ff.)

661 a 2 ff. The optatives *τολμῷ*, *νικῷ*, and *γίγνοιτο* are, in form, the direct expression of the speaker's wish, but, as *ἄδικος δὲ ὤν* is directly contrasted with *τοιοῦτος ὤν*, and the quotations from Tyrtaeus run on, we may suppose them to be, in effect, the *reported* expression of a wish; i.e. "he must say, I would not have him steel his mind to face slaughter," etc. For a similar change from oblique to direct narration cp. *Tim.* 18 c *μηχανώμενοι ὅπως μηδείς ποτε τὸ γεγενημένον αὐτῷ ἰδίᾳ γνώσοιτο, νομιοῦσι δὲ πάντες πάντας αὐτοὺς ὁμογενεῖς*, and *Gorg.* 512 a *λογίζεται . . . ὅτι οὐκ, εἰ μέν τις . . . μὴ ἀπεπνίγη, οὗτος μὲν ἄθλιός ἐστιν.*

b 1. For *ἔχεσθαι c. gen.* in the sense of "depend on" cp. *Prot.* 319 e 4 *ἃ μὲν διδασκάλων εἴχετο*, *Meno* 94 b 6 *ὅσα τέχνης ἔχεται.*

b 2. *τὸ τέλος*, "the crown."

b 5. All this is an emphatic restatement of what was said at 631 b 7 ff.

c 1. *τὸ παράπαν*, "in general," because "life" is the most general expression of all physical activity—of which the particular senses just mentioned are kinds.

c 1 ff. *τὸν . . . ὄντα* is the subject to *ζῆν.—μέγιστον μὲν κακὸν . . . ἔλαττον δέ*: i.e. the possession of immortality would only prolong—and so multiply—the misery infinitely; while a speedy death would shorten, and so lessen it.

c 5. ἐπιζώιη A (*ι in ras.*), ἐπιζώσῃ Eus. (acc. to Burnet). Ast boldly emends to ἐπιζῇ; Stallb. and the Zürich edd. retain the impossible vulgate ἐπιζώῃ; Schanz writes ἐπιζῶν ᾖ, and Burnet ἐπιζώῃ (which L. & S.[7] s.v. ἐπιζάω—presumably as a misprint—gives as the vulgate here). I have, with some hesitation, preferred Schanz's emendation to Burnet's. The poetical form seems less likely to have been written by Plato here than the participial periphrasis (cp. e.g. εἶναι γιγνόμενον in e 2); also the *rasura* in A is not so easily accounted for on Burnet's hypothesis. At the same time, the *rasura* apart, ἐπιζώῃ, written originally with no ι in the last syllable, would be naturally written ἐπιζῴῃ by a careless scribe.

c 6. ποιήσετε MSS., πείσετε Eus.

c 7. ἀποδιδόντας, "furnish," as at 659 b 5.

c 8. I have followed Schanz in putting only a colon after ὁρᾶτε.

d 1. καλὰ A, κακὰ O, Eus., Iambl., and a late hand in the margin of A.—This emphatic (σαφῶς) restatement of the main point—and explanation of ταῦτα ἅπερ ἐγώ—is made by the Athenian because it is just of this that he expects it will be hardest to convince his hearers.

d 3. ὅπερ οὖν ἠρόμην: these words refer directly to the question ἦ γάρ; in c 8, and indirectly to the συνομολογησώμεθα at the beginning of the paragraph; but they do not compel us to take ταῦτα . . . ἡμῶν as a question, as the first printed editions did—reading the fut.

d 7. διὰ τέλους: i.e. all three advantages are to be supposed to be *lasting*.—ὑμῖν: ethic dat., "if you like." Iamblichus, in his quotation of the passage, omits it.

d 7 ff. καὶ ἔτι προστίθημι κτλ.: I think προστίθημι does not govern the following accusatives, and that εἶναι is not predicative to λεγομένων, but that the accusatives are the subjects to γιγνόμενον εἶναι, which stands for γίγνεσθαι—γιγνόμενον agreeing naturally with the last acc.—μηδὲν ἄλλο: μηδέν (not οὐδέν) because the sentence is, in effect, conditional—perhaps too the fact that it is the subject to an infin. (εἶναι) had something to do with the choice of μηδέν.—To those who prefer to take εἶναι with τῶν λεγομένων I would still urge that it is best to take γιγνόμενον with *all* the accusatives: "I don't mind adding, if you like, that he has pre-eminent strength and courage, with immortality to boot, and moreover none of the so-called evils." Then the construction is changed, and we go back to the acc. ἔχοντα, which is parallel to κεκτημένον

in d 6. The resuming *τὸν οὕτω ζῶντα* seems to admit a previous conversational irregularity. At the same time the *μηδὲν ἄλλο* and the *μόνον* support each other so closely that I do not think we ought, with Burnet, to mark off *καὶ ἔτι . . . γιγνόμενον* with dashes as a parenthesis. Still less do I see any reason for following Schanz in rejecting *καὶ μηδὲν . . . γιγνόμενον*.

e 4. Stallbaum is not right in saying "*pertinet οὐκ ad solum εὐδαίμονα*." If we had, e.g., *πέπεισμαι*, instead of *οὐ πείθω ὑμᾶς*, as the main verb, it would be followed by *μὴ εὐδαίμονα ἀλλ' ἄθλιον γίγνεσθαι*. The *οὐκ* is added to the *μή* in the sentence as we have it, because the main verb *πείθω* has a neg. with it. Hence it is the *μή*, not the *οὐκ*, which negatives *εὐδαίμονα*.

e 6. *τί οὖν . . . χρεών;* "what must be our next step?"

662 a 3. *αἰσχρῶς*: the words previously used are *ἄθλιος* and *ἀνιαρῶς*; from Cleinias's present point of view a *βίος* may be *αἰσχρός*, and yet not *ἄθλιος* (*κακός* has something of both). We are thus introduced to the subject discussed at *Gorg.* 474 e ff. and mentioned at *Rep.* 392 b.

a 5. *τὸ καὶ κακῶς;* i.e. "and will you agree to the words 'and evilly'?"

b 1. *ὅπως;* "how, ask you?"—The *ὡς ἔοικεν* shows that *εἰ δοίη* is not a *wish*, but the protasis to a suppressed apodosis *συγχωροῖμεν ἄν*.

b 2. *ὡς νῦν γε κτλ.* "(an agreement as complete) as our present discord appears to be"—a pregnant use of *ὡς*. (I think this is better than to take *ὡς* as simply = *γάρ*.)

b 3. *οὕτως ἀναγκαῖα, ὡς οὐδέ, . . . Κρήτη νῆσος σαφῶς*, "a conclusion so irrefutable that it is not so clear that Crete is an island"—another pregnant use of *ὡς*, similar to that at Eur. *I.T.* 1180 *σοφήν σ' ἔθρεψεν Ἑλλάς, ὡς ᾔσθου καλῶς*. In the latter passage *ὡς* = *ὅτι οὕτως*: here it is equal to *ὥστε οὕτως*. Cp. also Soph. *O.T.* 345. I think that *ἐστί*, rather than (as St.) *φαίνεται*, is to be supplied with *Κρήτη νῆσος*.

b 7. *ὡς*: this conjunction does duty for two sentences, which are connected by *ἤ*.

c 3. *παρά* depends on *διάφορα*; cf. *Phaedo* 74 a *παρὰ ταῦτα πάντα ἕτερόν τι*. St. cps. the *παρά* with *ἄλλα* (*ἢ παρὰ ταῦτα ἔχομεν ἄλλα διανοηθῆναι; Phil.* 21 d). I can find no other example of *διάφορος* with *παρά*, though it seems a natural construction. At *Tim.* 63 e we have *διάφορα πρὸς ἄλληλα*, and *διαφέρειν* and the noun *διαφορά* are also found with *πρός* (*Phil.* 47 d *ψυχῆς πρὸς σῶμα διαφερομένης*, *Laws* 928 d 5 *διαφοραὶ*

πατέρων τε πρὸς αὐτῶν παῖδας, *Phaedr.* 231 b τὰς πρὸς τοὺς προσήκοντας διαφοράς). Probably διάφορος (κτλ.) πρός τινα corresponds to διάφορός τινι, and διάφορος παρά τινα to διάφορός τινος.

c 7. For νομοθετήσαντας cp. above 624 a 4 and 5.

d 2. εἰ δή, "suppose, for the sake of argument," like the εἰ μὲν δή at d 6, implying that the Ath. does not think for a moment that Zeus and Apollo *would* give such an answer.

d 3. εἴπερ ὀρθῶς ἐπανερωτῷμεν : there is a suspicion of ostentation in these words—it is almost as if the Ath. flourished a piece of logic in the face of his unsophisticated audience. (So Touchstone discourses of "philosophy," and a "figure of rhetoric" to Corin or William.) Anyhow it is not easy to see why the next question is the "correct" sequel to the last.

d 4. The word εὐδαίμων brings in a fresh notion. It means not simply *happy*—which would be much the same as ἡδύς—but *blessed of heaven.* Cp. *Rep.* 354 a ἀλλὰ μὴν ὅ γε εὖ ζῶν μακάριός τε καὶ εὐδαίμων, where Adam quotes Aristotle's elegy on Plato : ἱδρύσατο βωμὸν ἀνδρός, ὃν οὐδ' αἰνεῖν τοῖσι κακοῖσι θέμις· ὃς μόνος ἢ πρῶτος θνητῶν κατέδειξεν ἐναργῶς οἰκείῳ τε βίῳ καὶ μεθόδοισι λόγων, ὡς ἀγαθός τε καὶ εὐδαίμων ἅμα γίνεται ἀνήρ. At *Meno* 78 a Socrates adds κακοδαίμων (a word of colloquial abuse—"God-forsaken" as E. S. Thompson says) to ἄθλιος, as if the one notion involved the other. It would therefore be more than ἄτοπον if the Gods made the answer supposed at d 6. As the two Gods are the original lawgivers for Sparta and Crete, the Ath.'s hearers are bound to agree here.

d 6. ἄτοπος αὐτῶν ὁ λόγος ἂν γίγνοιτο, "their reasoning would become absurd."

d 7. βούλομαι δέ μοι μὴ ἐπὶ θεῶν λέγεσθαι τὸ τοιοῦτον, "I should not like to see such a saying put into the mouth of a God"; lit. "to be said *in the case of* a God." For this use of ἐπί *c. gen.* with λέγειν cp. *Rep.* 475 a ἐπ' ἐμοῦ λέγειν, 524 e ὥσπερ ἐπὶ τοῦ δακτύλου ἐλέγομεν, *Gorg.* 453 e εἰ ἐπὶ τῶν αὐτῶν τεχνῶν λέγομεν ὥνπερ νυνδή, *Laws* 793 e ὅπερ ἐπὶ τῶν δούλων ἐλέγομεν, *Charm.* 155 d ἐπὶ καλοῦ λέγων παιδός.

e 2 ff. ἠρωτήσθω, "let (the question) be supposed to have been put to"; and perhaps too ὁ δ' εἰπέτω is, "and let him be supposed to answer."—μακάριος is here used as synonymous with εὐδαίμων. We have the same μοι with ἠρ. that we had with λέγεσθαι, and that is one reason why I think Schanz is wrong in altering ἠρωτήσθω into ἠρωτῆσθαι : there would then be too great

uniformity between the two clauses. For a similar pair of accusatives, coupled with the *figura etymologica*, cp. *Laws* 705 c *μιμήσεις πονηρὰς μιμεῖσθαι τοὺς πολεμίους*; the only difference here is that the verb is passive. (The Cod. Voss.—*in marg.*—put in *πρὸς* before *πατέρα*, and Ast actually prints *πατήρ τε καὶ νομοθέτης* with no MS. authority, and St. approves.)—The pregnant use of the perf. imperat.—not merely "let the question have been put," but "grant," or "suppose that the question has been put"—is quite idiomatic; cp. Θ 524 *μῦθος δ' ὃς μὲν νῦν ὑγιής, εἰρημένος ἔστω*, *Crat.* 401 d *καὶ ταῦτα μὲν δὴ ταύτῃ ὡς παρὰ μηδὲν εἰδότων εἰρήσθω*.

e 5. *ἀλλ'*, "and yet."

e 6—663 a 7. *ταύτῃ μὲν οὖν κτλ.* "well, the lawgiver—or father—who decides this way" (i.e. that the *ἥδιστος βίος* is *μακαριώτατος*) "would, I think, appear absurdly at a loss to give a consistent answer. If, on the other hand, he declared the perfectly *just* life to be perfectly blessed, anyone who heard him would, I think, inquire 'what was the advantage and merit in it, superior to pleasure, which the law found to recommend?' Why, what advantage *can* the just man find which has *no* pleasure in it? I ask you, is fair fame, and the praise of men and gods, an advantage and an honour which is *un*pleasant, and an ill name the reverse? My good lawgiver, we shall never admit that. Pray, is wronging nobody, and being wronged by nobody, *un*pleasant, though good and right, and is the other behaviour pleasant, though disgraceful and bad?"—*ταύτῃ*: I think, after much hesitation, that we ought to take this word with *τιθέμενος* rather than with *φαίνοιτο*: (1) because *τιθέμενος* with a qualifying word is more naturally used than if taken absolutely; i.e. "he who decides this way," rather than "the decider, the authority," or even "the deciding lawgiver," and (2) because there seems to be a decided antithesis between *ταύτῃ μὲν οὖν* (*ὁ τ.*) and *εἰ δ' αὖ* in e 8. (I am not influenced by e.g. *Crat.* 398 c *ταύτῃ δ' οὖν τίθεμαι κτλ.* because I think that there, as at *Crat.* 418 d 2, *ταύτῃ* means "that is why.")

e 7. *ἄτοπος* goes, I think, closely with *ἄπορος*; not "would look foolish and . . . ," but "would appear strangely at a loss to . . ." Cp. *Ep.* **333** c 6 *καὶ μάλα ἀτόπῳ καὶ αἰσχρᾷ νίκῃ*, "and that by a remarkably disgraceful victory"—(cp. our "nice and warm").—The gen. *τοῦ συμφ. ἑαυτῷ λέγειν* depends on the *ἀ*-privative in *ἄπορος*.

663 a 1. *ὁ νόμος*: this personification of *νόμος* is peculiar, but

intelligible; ὁ νόμος represents the same point of view as ὁ νομοθέτης. τὸ δίκαιον is what the law enjoys, and consequently the law is held responsible for the effects of just action. Schanz adopts Badham's substitution of νομοθέτης for νόμος here, and I am strongly disposed to follow his example. If νόμος be retained, it must anyhow be regarded as a conscious substitution for νομοθέτης, denoting the same "party" in the argument.

a 2. τί γὰρ δὴ δικαίῳ χωριζόμενον ἡδονῆς ἀγαθόν: the argument is: For the just man to be εὐδαίμων must be an ἀγαθόν; there is no ἀγαθόν the just man can experience, which is χωριζόμενον ἡδονῆς: therefore it must be wrong to think that τὸ δίκαιον and τὸ ἡδύ can be separated, or that the lives spoken of at 662 d 1 are *two*.

a 6. μήτε ὑπό τινος ἀδικεῖσθαι: to complete the picture, from the point of view of law and lawgiver—i.e. of the community—the recipient of the wrong must be mentioned as well as the wrongdoer; one involves the other.

a 7. ἤ for καί, possibly to show that no special distinction is here intended between ἀγαθόν and καλόν; possibly, only for variety's sake.—τὰ δ' ἕτερα, "the *different* state of things," where we should expect "the *opposite* state of things"; possibly, because τἀναντία had just before been used adverbially. The context shows that it *is* the opposite state of things, which he here denotes by the milder expression. (Ast rejected ἥκιστα . . . κακά. A Venetian MS. — Bekker's Ξ—and the four earliest printed editions omitted ἥκιστα . . . ἀδικεῖσθαι. Ficinus translates the whole passage—giving it all, even καί πως, to the Ath.; Cod. Voss. attributed ἥκιστα . . . ἀδικεῖσθαι (acc. to Ast and Stallb.) to Cleinias. (More probably Cod. Voss. gave him down to κακά.)

b 1. καὶ ἀγαθόν τε καὶ καλόν: I cannot help suspecting these words to be spurious. The identification of ἀγαθόν and καλόν is kindred to that of ἡδύ and δίκαιον—is perhaps the identification of the *generals* of which the latter pair are *particulars*—but it is a separate point. It would need different arguments, and it is not used in the rest of the paragraph. The only defence the words seem to admit of is, that the whole of the paragraph appears to have been written in a less careful style than the preceding part of the argument.—εἰ μηδὲν ἕτερον: Ast is, I think, right in supplying πρός in sense (before μηδέν) from the following clause; i.e. not "will persuade, if nothing else can," but "will persuade to (this), if to nothing else."

b 2. νομοθέτῃ κτλ., "in the lawgiver's eyes that reasoning is most wicked and dangerous, which denies that this is the case"—

i.e. which denies that τὸ ἡδὺ καὶ τὸ δίκαιον are identical.—ἐναντιώτατος is lit. "most hostile" (to the lawgiver)—"his most deadly opponent."

b 5. πλέον, "in larger amount."

b 6. I have ventured to alter σκοτοδινιᾶν into σκοτοδινίαν. The noun is used in a figurative sense, at 892 c and *Soph.* 264 c, for *uncertainty, perplexity*; here we are told that "distance"—for so we may translate what literally means "what is seen at a distance"—"produces indistinctness of vision (in all, and especially in the inexperienced)." This indistinctness is directly afterwards denoted by the more general σκότος (cp. *Rep.* 516 e, where the man, who is imagined as returning from sunlight to the cave, σκότους ἂν ἀνάπλεως σχοίη τοὺς ὀφθαλμούς).

b 7. The reading of A and O is (νομοθέτης) δ' εἰ μὴ. The δ' turns all the rest of the paragraph into a protasis with no apodosis. L has εἰ μὴ (L 59. I. has δὲ τὴν in the margin). This εἰ μὴ, which Burnet adopts, makes all the rest of the paragraph the protasis to σκοτοδινίαν παρέχει. This satisfies grammar, but not sense and logic. The νομοθέτης can doubtless remove the σκοτοδινία by treatment, but who could say "distance produces indistinctness *unless the νομοθέτης removes it by treatment*"? If he removes it, it must have been there, and consequently must have been produced. With this reading we should have to supply, in sense, "and will continue to do so," after παρέχει. Ald., and all editions up to Stallb. and the Zürich editors, read δ' ἡμῖν. Hermann (whom Schanz and Apelt p. 5 follow) corrects δ' εἰ μὴ to δ' οἶμαι. This last correction seems more natural here, and to be palaeographically at least as likely as δ' ἡμῖν. εἰ μὴ looks like a correction of δ' εἰ μὴ; i.e. the δ' was more likely to be omitted on purpose than put in.

b 8. εἰς τοὐναντίον τούτου: another slipshod phrase, like οὕτως ἔχειν at b 4; apparently it means "into the opposite of what it was at first."

c 1. καὶ πείσει κτλ.: what follows is either still more slipshod in expression than the former part of the paragraph, or corrupt. If the latter, the corruption is so far uncured, if not incurable. If the former is the true account, we may perhaps adopt St.'s explanation that τῷ τοῦ δικαίου is the dat. of τὸ τοῦ δικαίου, a paraphrase for τὸ δίκαιον. Apparently the νομοθέτης is, by his course of training—in which he relies on the formation of habit (ἔθεσι), fortified by praise (ἐπαίνοις), and reasoning (λόγοις)—to make his charges believe (1) that it is an artificial picture

(*σκιαγράφημα*) of right and wrong that they have been looking at, and (2) that, like other pictures, it only produces the illusion intended, if seen from a certain point. Here the illustration would join up with the *τὸ πόρρωθεν ὁρώμενον* one. The man who has had a training in just action would have been brought *near* to justice, and would therefore discern the faults of the picture which looked all right when he was far off from it.

c 2. Naber's *ψόγοις* for *λόγοις* (adopted by Schanz) seems wrong; the following representation of the case (*ὡς ἐσκιαγρ. κτλ.*) would need *λόγοι* to explain it.

c 3 ff. I have removed the comma from after *φαινόμενα*, put commas before and after *τῷ τοῦ δικαίου ἐναντίως*, and after *θεωρούμενα*, and would translate *ὡς ἐσκιαγρ. . . . ἀμφότερα*, "That the right and wrong he sees is like a rough picture—the wrong, which behaves in the opposite way to the right, appearing, when seen by him when he is in a wrong and bad state, pleasant, and the right most unpleasant; while, when they are seen by him when he is in a state of righteousness, every man sees both sides altogether in the opposite light." If the *ἑαυτοῦ* of the MSS. is right, we must suppose an imaginary pupil of the lawgiver to be spoken of. In that case *παντί* in c 5 is irregular, and *πάντῃ* recorded (or suggested) by a late hand in the margin of A is preferable; but if Ast (applauded by St., and followed by Schanz) is right in reading *αὐτοῦ* for *ἑαυτοῦ*, *παντί* is quite in order.—Badham proposed *καὶ τἄδικα* for *καὶ ἄδικα* (the omission to repeat the article is hardly noticeable among so many irregularities of expression)—and to eject the words *τὰ μὲν ἄδικα τῷ τοῦ δικαίου*, inserting *τὰ μὲν ἄδικα* after *θεωρούμενα*, and rejecting *πρός* in c 5.—F.H.D. would reject *τῷ τοῦ δικαίου*. Schanz marks a lacuna before *ἐναντίως*. Stephanus (and C. Ritter) recommend the rejection of the *τῷ* before *τοῦ δικαίου*—governing the gen. by *ἐναντίως*.—For the use of *ἐκ* in c 3 and 4 St. well cps. *Soph.* 236 b *τὸ φαινόμενον μὲν διὰ τὴν οὐκ ἐκ καλοῦ θέαν ἐοικέναι τῷ καλῷ*, where the effect is the opposite of that described in the present case.—The *μέν* before *ἄδικα* corresponds in logic to the *δέ* in *τὰ δὲ δίκαια*, and the *μέν* before *ἀδίκου* to the *δέ* in *ἐκ δὲ δικαίου*.—*ἡδέα* is predicate to *φαινόμενα*, not to *θεωρούμενα*. Among the suggested alterations of the passage that of Madvig seems to me the best; he supposes *ἐναντίῳ* to have fallen out before *ἐναντίως*. We thus get a clumsy chain of participles, but greater clearness. I should still, if this were adopted, put a comma after *θεωρούμενα*.—A somewhat similar

philosophizing is to be seen in Euripides, *Iph. in Aul.* 387 *πονηροῦ φωτὸς ἡδοναὶ κακαί.*

c 7 f. The question arises: with what do *τήν*, *ποτέραν* and *τήν* in the next line agree? In grammar it is *ἀλήθειαν*, but the meaning of this word coalesces with that of its dependent gen. *κρίσεως* to mean "true judgement," or rather "claim to truth." What the sentence means is, "which claim to be true has the higher authority?"

d 5–e 2. As Cleinias's form of assent shows a disposition to go behind the argument, the Ath. reinforces it by considerations of expediency. He is careful, by the extremely hypothetical form of the question, to guard against the idea that he himself for a moment doubts the reality of his previous conclusion. He does not say, "if it were otherwise, what better opportunity for a useful lie could a legislator *have*?" but, "if it *had* been otherwise," and "*have had.*" (Voltaire's "il faudrait l'inventer" is in a less hypothetical form.) It is almost as if Plato argued: "Does it not look as if it *must* be true, because it is such a useful thing to be able to say?"—*οὗ τι καὶ σμικρὸν ὄφελος*: we have already met this phrase at 630 c and 647 a in connexion with the *νομοθέτης*; cp. also 890 d *τόν γε ἄξιον καὶ σμικροῦ νομοθέτην.*

d 7. *ὡς καὶ νῦν αὐτὸ ᾔρηχ' ὁ λόγος ἔχειν*: cf. *Parm.* 141 d *ὥς γε ὁ λόγος αἱρεῖ*, *Phil.* 35 d *οὐδαμῇ ὁ λόγος αἱρεῖ*, *Rep.* 604 c *ὅπῃ ὁ λόγος αἱρεῖ βέλτιστ' ἂν ἔχειν. αἱρεῖν* seems in this phrase to be used much as we say, in an argument, "there you have me."

e 1. Schanz adopts H. Stephanus's insertion of *πείθειν* before *ποιεῖν*: this insertion was independently suggested by Badham. At 671 c 4 *δυναμένους* has just as much need of a supplied inf. The difference is that there the sentence is long, and a *ποιεῖν* which occurs near the end *sounds* as if it might be the missing inf., though it is not. I am inclined to believe in a *pregnant* use of *δύνασθαι* in the sense of "to be equal to bringing it about that" (cp. Ast, *Lex.*), akin to its meaning of "to signify," "to be equal to"; *πείθειν ποιεῖν* would sound very awkward.

e 2. *πάντας*, which is in no MS., has been, by most editors, added to the text from Eusebius's quotation of the passage.

e 3 ff. The most various interpretations have been proposed of Cleinias's remark, and the Athenian's answer. The difference arises from the various *subaudienda* imagined before or after Cleinias's remark; e.g. (before it) "it would certainly be better if we could do without a lie" (C. Ritter); (after) "id quod verum esse putamus difficile est (*nobis*) persuadere (*non ita esse*)" Ast.

Both these cannot be right; I think no *subaudienda* are needed. The author is directly calling attention to the plastic nature of the youthful mind, and incidentally suggesting a correct appreciation of *myths* and their position in education. In the previous paragraph the Athenian's language, in referring to the possible use of a lie, is carefully chosen—ἐπ' ἀγαθῷ ψεύδεσθαι πρὸς τοὺς νέους—he calls it λυσιτελές, and an efficient prompter of a good disposition. This is because he wants to point out the use of *stories* in forming the mind. Cleinias does not see what he is driving at, and takes refuge in the following safe and somewhat trite remark: "truth" (i.e. philosophical truth) "is a treasure, and an abiding one; but the process of getting it into people's minds is evidently a hard one." In the Athenian's answer I have ventured to read τὸ μέντοι Σιδώνιον for τὸ μὲν τοῦ Σιδωνίου. It is not likely that Plato should have spoken of the story as *told* by a Sidonian (and that is the most natural translation of the gen.), and a comparison of *Rep.* 414 c suggests that τὸ Σιδώνιον μυθολόγημα is only a variety for the proverbial ψεῦδος or ψεῦσμα Φοινικικόν (see Photius s.v. Φοινικικόν). For τὸ μέντοι = τὸ δέ cp. *Phaedrus* 228 d τὴν μέντοι διάνοιαν. What the Athenian says there is: "I grant you; but it is *not* hard to get a cock-and-bull story like the Sidonian one into people's minds." (I think Burnet is wrong in reading the words as a question. A question should have had οὐ ῥᾴδιον, and if it had been a question, it would naturally have been repeated after Cleinias's ποῖα;)—The Ath. seizes on the word πείθειν as opening up the general subject of the way in which the young mind can and ought to be furnished with ideas and feelings. Of course the Cretan goes off mentally in the direction suggested, and asks ποῖα; He has been in a fog, and he sees a chance of getting into clearer air.

e 6. ἐγένετο may fairly be taken as a gnomic aorist; the addition of καὶ ἄλλα μυρία looks as if no definite accrediting of a particular story was referred to.

e 9. παράδειγμα τοῦ πείσειν, "proof that a man will (be able to) persuade." For παράδειγμα in the sense of "proof" or "confirmation" cp. *Laws* 801 b 9, Thuc. i. 2. 6.

664 a 2. αὐτόν is the νομοθέτης, not the imaginary τις.—The substance of this paragraph is as follows: "the minds of the young are plastic. It is of the utmost importance that they should be moulded aright. They *must* be led to think that doing right is pleasanter than doing wrong. The songs they sing and hear, the stories that are told to them, the admonition of their elders, and

the public opinion of the whole community *must* all point in this direction, and tend to induce this belief." His two hearers agree unconditionally that the λόγος is leading them aright. Cleinias's answer at 663 d 5, and his next remark, and the turn now taken by the Athenian's disquisition reveal to us that Plato in this dialogue is mainly writing, not for men who are able to follow διαλεκτικοὶ λόγοι but, for practical men, whose experience enables them to criticize from a practical standpoint, and, if necessary, to amend, the work of a νομοθέτης. From time to time, however, through the Νόμοι, the author goes back, as one should say, to first principles,—and in a tone that shows us that it is in no sceptical spirit that he abandons the higher ground.

a 4. ἡ τοιαύτη συνοικία πᾶσα (φθέγγοιτ' ἀεί) : this paraphrase for πόλις, in this connexion—the universal voice of the community—is what we should call "public opinion." (I. Bruns p. 70 says the word τοιαύτη proves that this passage, as first arranged, came after the proposal at the end of Bk. III. to legislate for a special colony.)—Schanz reads ὅντιν' ἄν for the MS. ὄντινά. Burnet, at *Gorg.* 492 b (where no MS. has ἄν, and only a late hand in the margin of B has τι), adopts Woolsey's τί ἄν (after δυναστείαν), but here, and at *Euthyd.* 296 e, he leaves the optative without ἄν. It is probable that the ἄν has fallen out here—*possible* that Plato left the ἄν out in his written text—either thinking that he had put it in, or with a vague notion that the ἄν with ἐργάσαιτο was enough. In either case I do not believe that he would have been other than grateful to any editor who put it in,—though he might have wished to have a say as to where it was to stand.

a 6. The διὰ βίου παντός, which reinforces the ἀεί, foreshadows the arrangement, described in the two following speeches of the Athenian, for securing the aid of men of all ages.

b 3. ἐμὸν ἂν εἴη λέγειν : not merely "my (next) task must be to describe," but "I will take upon myself to describe"; ἐμόν is emphatic. So, more circumstantially, at 892 d ff., as already at 631 a, and 641 e, the Athenian claims to lecture his audience sometimes, instead of discussing matters on an equality with them.

b 4. ἐπᾴδειν : cp. 659 e 1 ὄντως μὲν ἐπῳδαὶ ταῖς ψυχαῖς, and 666 c 6.—τρεῖς ὄντας : this is the first time *three* choruses are spoken of. We learn from Plut. *Lycurg.* ch. 21 that there were at Spartan festivals three choruses : κατὰ τὰς τρεῖς ἡλικίας συνιστάμενοι . . . ὁ μὲν τῶν γερόντων . . . ὁ δὲ τῶν ἀκμαζόντων . . . ὁ δὲ τρίτος, ὁ τῶν παίδων. That is, doubtless, why the Ath. refers

to the arrangement as already known.—Up to 666 d ff. Plato uses language about the class of citizens between thirty and sixty years of age which conceals from his interlocutors the fact that it is only *in a figure* that he describes them as a χορός; from 666 d onwards he unfolds to them that the μοῦσα to which the mature minds among the citizens are to be devoted is "καλλίων τῆς τῶν χορῶν καὶ τῆς ἐν τοῖς κοινοῖς θεάτροις" (667 a).

b 7. τὸ δὲ κεφάλαιον αὐτῶν τοῦτο ἔστω: so the MSS. αὐτῶν seems not to refer to τὰ καλὰ πάντα which are to be the subject matter of the songs. If it does, the following clause is very irregularly expressed. Stallbaum would like to put a comma after λέγεσθαι, and insert the words καὶ τοῦτο before φάσκοντες. The only way in which we can bring the passage into order as it stands is to suppose αὐτῶν to refer to the general arrangements about the choruses: "The main point to be kept before us in our proceedings in this."—I have ventured to read αὖ for αὐτῶν.

b 8. ὑπὸ θεῶν λέγεσθαι: just as the citizens in general are to be told that the laws of the state were given by a god, or by a divinely inspired man, so, to the young, the truths which only the experienced philosopher can discover are to be presented with the sanction of religion.

c 1. It is, I think, admissible to suppose that ἀληθέστατα refers to the statement that the right and good life is the pleasantest, not to the statement that the gods say so; whereas the μᾶλλον πείσομεν . . . ἢ ἐὰν ἄλλως πως φθεγγώμεθα λέγοντες refers merely to the appeal to the religious sanction.

c 5. εἰσίοι: previous references to ἑορταί at 652 d and 657 d and the words ἐν θεάτρῳ at 665 e 5 make it clear that this word is here used in the technical sense of "coming on" to the stage at a public festal performance.

c 6. ἁπάσῃ σπουδῇ: i.e. it is to be no amateurish performance; the choir must do its very best; as indeed is to be expected, when all the city assembles to hear it. It is the choir of the Muses, who preside over *education*. (The occasion has some of the elements of the modern school speech-day.)—ὁ μέχρι τριάκοντα ἐτῶν: Plato does not here specify a date which is to divide παῖδες from ἀκμάζοντες; probably because, for different purposes, and in different states, the date varied; also, in some states the ἔφηβοι formed an intermediate class.

c 7. Cp. *Critias* 108 c καὶ τὸν Παίωνά τε καὶ Μούσας ἐπικαλούμενον, though there the divinity is only appealed to for

inspiration, and not, as here, implored to produce conviction as well. The second chorus is evidently that of Apollo.

c 8. *τοῖς νέοις*: either all below the class of the *ἀκμάζοντες*—those, i.e., still undergoing the process of education—or perhaps *οἱ νέοι* includes the *ἀκμάζοντες* as well—as being still impressionable. The words *ἵλεων μετὰ πειθοῦς*, "graciously pleased to convince," look more like a prayer for others than for the suppliants themselves.

d 1. As I think that the *δέ* in *τοὺς δὲ μετὰ ταῦτα*, and not the *δέ* after *δεῖ*, marks the chief contrast to the *μέν* clause in c 4, I have put a colon, and not a full stop (as St. and Burnet) after *ἐπευχόμενος*—Schanz puts a comma there. The grammatical construction, it is true, indicates a greater break at *ἐπευχόμενος*, as both *ᾄδειν* and *καταλελεῖφθαι* depend on *δεῖ*, but logically the three choruses on the one hand, and the old men past "singing" on the other, are more opposed than the two first choruses and the rest of the population.

d 2. *τοὺς μετὰ ταῦτα*: this can mean nothing but "those who are beyond that age"; but it is an unusual expression, as also is *φέρειν*, in the next line, which a comparison of 665 d 9—*πᾶς που γιγνόμενος πρεσβύτερος ὄκνου πρὸς τὰς ᾠδὰς μεστός*—would persuade us to translate "to support the toil of," an unusual extension of the sense of *to endure* (something evil). Is it possible that the word here means *to contribute*?) cp. *Polit.* 298 a *προστάττοντες ἀναλώματα φέρειν*)—or even *to produce*?

d 3. *μυθολόγους περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν ἠθῶν*, "to tell stories about the same characters"; i.e. about men who display virtuous dispositions.

d 4. *διὰ θείας φήμης*: i.e. of an inspired character, cp. 624 b 2.

d 8. That is, we are now going to see what is the second and chief use of *μέθη*—that referred to beforehand at 653 a as *a means of safe-guarding education.* Its first use—that of enabling the educators to judge character—*τὸ κατιδεῖν πῶς ἔχομεν τὰς φύσεις* —(*τὸ*) *ψυχῆς βάσανον λαμβάνειν*—and to train the young in *αἰδώς* and *αἰσχύνη*—had been explained already at the end of Bk. I. The forgetfulness of his hearers provides the Ath. with the occasion for a useful repetition.

Inasmuch as the explanations which follow all apply to the participation of mature and elderly men in the chorus of Dionysus, Orelli's *τρίττους* for *τρίτους* (in d 6) is inadmissible—besides, there could have been nothing about the first two choruses which would seem strange to his hearers; it was only

about the third that they needed further information. Possibly it was the recent occurrence of the word τρίτους in d 1 which made him choose the plural here. We get the sing. again at 665 b 1.

e 3. κατ' ἀρχὰς τῶν λόγων: i.e. at 653 d f. Here οἱ λόγοι means the discussion begun *in this book*; and so probably above, at d 9.

e 7. τούτων ἀμφοτέρων: i.e. of bodily movement, and of voice; this gen. depends on τάξεως, and that on αἴσθησιν. This acc. should itself have been in the gen., as governed by the nearer verb ἐφάπτοιτο, but, to avoid *three* genitives, one on the back of another, it is made to be governed by ἔχοι, even though it is duplicated by the following τοῦτο:—an instructive instance of Plato's sentence-construction, and treatment of cases. (Burnet has made this construction much clearer by putting a comma after ἀμφοτέρων. Stallb. commends, and Schanz adopts Winckelmann's αἰσθήσει for αἴσθησιν (cp. *Phaedo* 65 d, and *Phil.* 35 a). Badham suggests the same change (comparing τῷ νῷ ἐφάπτεσθαι τῶν ὄντων), and places the word after οὐδὲν. But a comparison of 653 e 3—τὰ μὲν οὖν ἄλλα ζῷα οὐκ ἔχειν αἴσθησιν τῶν ἐν ταῖς κινήσεσιν τάξεων οὐδὲ ἀταξιῶν—makes it very hard to explain ἔχοι τοῦτο here as meaning anything but ἔχοι τάξεως αἴσθησιν, and if the ἔχοι clause was in the writer's mind at the beginning of the sentence, the slight anacoluthon involved in αἴσθησιν . . . ἐφάπτοιτο is easily explained—especially when there were so many genitives about.)—For the whole subject of the passage cp. *Phil.* 17 c ff. and above on 653 e 4.

665 a 2. A has ἁρμονίας, and so a second hand in O; i.e. the writer of A cannot be trusted as perfect in grammar. Cp. Hdt. vi. 53 οὐκ ἔπεστι ἐπωνυμίη Περσέϊ οὐδεμία πατρὸς θνητοῦ, ὥσπερ Ἡρακλέϊ Ἀμφιτρύων; if ever a Greek would have thought it right to say ὄνομα Ἀμφιτρύονος, he would have done it in this sentence, one would think.

a 8. It would have been more regular to repeat the ὁ before τῶν Μουσῶν, but the pl. εἴρηνται makes it clear that *two* choruses are spoken of, and so the repetition—which would rather spoil the rhythm—is unnecessary.

b 2. λέγεσθαι, not "(has) to be spoken of," but "(must) be called (that of Dionysus)."

b 3. μάλα γὰρ ἄτοπος . . . Διονύσου πρεσβυτῶν χορός: the licence which Cleinias associates with the name of Dionysus seems to accord ill with old age. In spite of the Spartan institution of

the *χορὸς γερόντων* Cleinias is perhaps surprised at the inclusion, in any chorus, of old men of between 50 and 60, but that that chorus should be, so to speak, a "drunken" one, scandalizes him as much as did the first suggestion (cp. 641 c 8) that *μέθη* had an educational use.—In the mention of men "above fifty" we have a hint that the third "chorus" is a heterogeneous collection, and may perhaps fall into several classes.

b 6. *αὐτῷ* : i.e. *Διονύσῳ*.

b 7. *ἀληθέστατα μέντοι λέγεις* : i.e. "you are quite right in thinking it extraordinary."—*λόγου δὴ δεῖ* : Schanz follows A in writing *λ. δὲ δεῖ*. *δή* ("the fact is") is more in place here—what follows is corroborative, not adversative—and the first hand in O gives it some support by reading *λόγου δεῖ δὴ*.

b 8. *ὅπῃ τοῦτο κτλ.*, "(in fact it will, I expect, need a train of argument) to turn this arrangement, if made, into a defensible one." A comparison of the construction at 660 d 5 f., and, e.g., 968 c 1, would lead us to expect *εὐλόγως*, and so Schanz corrects. It is surely rash to say that Plato had not the choice of the adjective here.

c 2. *πάντα* goes in sense with all the accusatives that follow.

c 3. *καί* (before *ὅλῃ*) leads to a climax—"in fact"; cp. 667 b 8 and *Phaedo* 58 d *ἀλλὰ παρῆσάν τινες, καὶ πολλοί γε*; it is the same *καί* which we have in *καὶ γάρ, καὶ μήν*.

c 4. *ἐπᾴδουσαν* : *ἐπῳδή* and *ἐπᾴδειν* are with Plato stock terms (cp. 666 c 6 *ὃ πολλάκις εἰρήκαμεν, ἐπᾴδειν*) of "soul-therapeutics" (Eusebius, *H.E.* iii. 4. 6, speaking of St. Luke, uses the term *ψυχῶν θεραπευτική*). The addition of *ἐπᾴδειν* to *ᾄδειν*, or its substitution for it, makes it easier for us to recognize that the *χορεία* here spoken of is often a mental process, not a bodily performance.

c 2–7. Every educated man, woman, and child—slaves included—is capable of taking part in a *χορός* (*ὁ μὲν ἀπαίδευτος ἀχόρευτος ἡμῖν ἔσται* 654 a), and they are to use these "spells" (i.e. those described in brief at 664 b 6 ff.) *all their lives* (*μὴ παύεσθαί ποτε*); and, that their fascination for the performers themselves may never cloy, we are, "by hook or by crook" (*ἀμῶς γέ πως*), to avoid uniformity, and without fail (*πάντως*) to impart to them a subtle intricacy (of words, tune, and bodily movement); cp. Pind. *Ol.* vi. 146 *ἀνδράσιν αἰχμηταῖσι πλέκων ποικίλον ὕμνον.—ὥστε . . . ἡδονήν* : lit. "so that the singers may have an unquenchable thirst for their songs, and pleasure (in its satisfaction)"; cp. Eur. *I.T.* 954 *εἶχον ἡδονήν*, "enjoyed themselves." The *ἀπληστία* is, apparently, to be secured by the absence of uniformity—which, as Ritter

says, is partly due to the different natures etc. of the different classes of singers—and the ἡδονή by the ποικιλία.—Eusebius, Stallb. says, has περὶ τοῦ δεῖν in c 2 for the MS. τὸ δεῖν. It was, of course, open to the speaker to continue on the model of his own words ἆρα . . . ὁμολογεῖται; or on that of his questioner —τοῦ πέρι; But that is no reason why, with Ast, we should read τοῦ δεῖν.

d 1. τοῦτο τὸ ἄριστον τῆς πόλεως: cp. 658 e, where it is claimed that old men are the best judges. (Ritter would read ταῦθ' for τοῦθ', a good suggestion.)

d 3. ᾄδον: the participle is the principal verb in sense; the question is, in effect, "Where would the old men sing—the old men, whose songs (in subject matter) would be the best, and would therefore do most good?"

d 4. ἀνοήτως οὕτως, "in mere folly"; so ἁπλῶς οὕτως, ῥᾳδίως οὕτω, οὐτωσὶν ἀτρέμα (*Gorg.* 503 d).—κυριώτατον, "perfect masters of"; it includes, I think, the idea of "the best authority about"; cp. *Ep.* 345 b οἳ περὶ τῶν τοιούτων πάμπολυ Διονυσίου κυριώτεροι ἂν εἶεν κριταί, *Ep.* 311 d κυριώτερα δὲ τὰ τῶν θείων ἀνδρῶν μαντεύματα ἢ τὰ τῶν μή.

e 1. χαίρει ἧττον πράττων τοῦτο: litotes for "does not like doing it," as is shown by the following "if obliged to do it."

e 2. ὅσῳ . . . τόσῳ μᾶλλον: added, with conversational asyndeton, in amplification of the comparatives ἧττον and μᾶλλον —"and the older and wiser he grows, the more he feels it."

e 5. παντοίοις ἀνθρώποις ᾄδειν ἑστὼς ὀρθός: cp. Shakespeare's "(Nature might) stand up and say to all the world."

e 6. ἔτι μᾶλλον: he does not like doing it at all; the being obliged makes it worse, the publicity of a theatrical performance is a "still further" aggravation.—καὶ ταῦτά γ' εἰ suggests yet another grievance—the φωνασκός, with blind pedantry, might put the old man on meagre diet—just the opposite treatment, as the sequel shows, to what the case needs.

e 8. παντάπασίν που: these words gather up, as it were, the force of the climax; he asks, in effect, "can you imagine a more distressingly humiliating situation? Every spark of προθυμία would be stifled by it."—This comic picture helps to unsettle the notion that the χορεία of the mature and elderly is to be a *literal* one.

666 a 2. αὐτούς possibly refers to all the "singers," not the third chorus alone.

a 5. "πῦρ ἐπὶ πυρί· παροιμία ἣν μέμνηται καὶ Πλάτων· κακὸν

ἐπὶ κακῷ," Photius.—ὀχετεύειν, a metaphor from *irrigation*, is appropriate to the "liquid fire" of "drink"; cp. *As You Like It* II. iii. 48 "For in my youth I never did apply Hot and rebellious liquors in my blood."

a 6. πρὶν ἐπὶ τοὺς πόνους ἐγχειρεῖν πορεύεσθαι, "before they address themselves to the work of life." Cp. Eur. *Orestes* 1068 ἐπ' ἔργον δ', ὡς ὁρᾷς, πορεύομαι. [F.H.D. prefers "before they *attack* their task."]

a 7. εὐλαβουμένους (by way of varying the construction) agrees with the (imaginary) object of διδάσκοντες and subject of ὀχετεύειν; the Aldine ed. emended it to εὐλαβούμενοι, which would agree with the subject of νομοθετήσομεν.—ἐμμανής, "passionate, violent," is a less derogatory epithet than μανιώδης "crazy."

a 8. γεύεσθαι, and the following infs. ἀπέχεσθαι, καλεῖν, and παρακαλεῖν, are best taken as dependent on νομοθετήσομεν, not as on χρή (supplied from οὐ χρή).

b 1. τὸν νέον: not a precise term; sometimes it is used of mere children; sometimes, as here, used as the opposite of γέρων.—A has τῶν νέων corr. by A^2 to τὸν νέον, which is the reading in Athenaeus x. 55, and Stobaeus, *Flor.* 44. 44.

b 2. τετταράκοντα ἐπιβαίνοντα ἐτῶν, "when a man is rising forty," as we say—i.e. enters the fourth decade. This meaning is sufficiently defined by the previous μέχρι τριάκοντα ἐτῶν.—ἐν τοῖς συσσιτίοις εὐωχηθέντα κτλ.: the situation suggests an old-fashioned College Common-Room at Oxford or Cambridge.

b 3. καλεῖν seems used of the general invocation of the gods before the drinking began, and παρακαλεῖν is a slight variation of the general word to mark a special appeal. (Badham would reject καλεῖν, thus making the position of the τε more regular; but it is difficult to see why anyone should have put it in, if it was not there.)

b 4. A has πρεσβυτάτων, O and Athenaeus πρεσβυτῶν, Stob. and Galen πρεσβυτέρων (so Schanz and Burnet).—τελετὴν ἅμα καὶ παιδιάν, "(to) what is at once the recreation, and the special religious privilege of the older men." The word τελετήν is specially appropriate, as it was used of a festival ceremony in particular; at Eur. *I.T.* 959 the word is applied to the feast of the Χόες. Athenaeus ii. 40 d can hardly be right in saying that τὰς ἔτι μείζους καὶ μετά τινος μυστικῆς παραδόσεως ἑορτάς were called τελετάς because of the large sums *spent* upon them—"τελεῖν γὰρ τὸ δαπανᾶν"—a feast was itself, as it always has been, a ceremony, involving initiation.

b 5. *ἐπίκουρον* is here an adjective, qualifying *φάρμακον*; cp. Eur. *I.A.* 1027 *χέρ' ἐπίκουρον κακῶν*, *Or.* 211 *ὦ φίλον ὕπνου θέλγητρον ἐπίκουρον νόσου.*

b 6. I have ventured to bracket the words *τὸν οἶνον.* It was a natural marginal explanation of *φάρμακον*, and it is very hard to fit it in as well as *ἦν* and *φάρμακον* in the text. I would translate *τήν . . . φάρμακον* "the mystery and delight of the older men, which he has given to mankind as a charm against the austerity of age." (So, too, Peipers, *Qu. Cr. de Pl. Legibus*, p. 95. H. Richards suggests reading *ἧς* for *ἦν*.)

b 7. I feel sure that Burnet is right in reading *λήθῃ* for the MS. *λήθην.* The only way by which editors have made sense of the passage is to adopt the suggestion, made in the margin of Cod. Voss., to insert *τε* after *μαλακώτερον*, but the sentence runs much better in Burnet's form.

c 1. *καθάπερ εἰς πῦρ σίδηρον ἐντεθέντα γιγνόμενον*: so the MSS. I doubt the correctness of the construction *τὸ ἦθος γίγνεται καθάπερ σίδηρος εἰς πῦρ ἐντεθείς* in the sense "the nature of the soul becomes like iron put into the fire." *γίγνεσθαι*, like *εἶναι*, can have an *adverb* as predicate, but I think such a sentence as the above would be hard to find. I suggest that what was written was *καθαπερεὶ εἰς*, or possibly *καθαπερεὶ 's*. The sentence would then mean "becoming, so to speak, iron put in the furnace." (Ast, who reads *μαλακώτερόν τε*, says we must supply *μαλακώτερον* in sense with *γιγνόμενον*, "becoming *softer* like iron in the furnace.") [F.H.D. would bracket *γιγνόμενον*.]

c 2. *καὶ οὕτως εὐπλαστότερον εἶναι*: cp. 671 c *παιδεύειν τε καὶ πλάττειν . . . τοῦτον δ' εἶναι τὸν πλάστην* (see note on 671 a 4—672 d 9). Ast's note on this passage is: "Frequens vero est comparatio animi ferocis cum ferro aqua tincto, molliti vero cum ferro igne cocto. Plutarchus de discrim. adul. p. 73 c [chap. xxxvi] *ὥσπερ ὁ σίδηρος πυκνοῦται τῇ περιψύξει καὶ δέχεται τὴν στόμωσιν ἀνεθεὶς πρῶτον ὑπὸ θερμότητος καὶ μαλακὸς γενόμενος.*"

c 8. *μετέχειν ἡμῖν ᾠδῆς*: it may naturally be asked here, "if this third chorus is to sing in private, where is the public benefit? —who are to be 'charmed' by it?" This question is answered implicitly in the sequel, thus: "Their superior insight and training makes them the repository of correct taste. It is to them that the *νομοθέτης* must go when he wants to find what style of *χορεία* is to be enjoined by law for the two other choruses; and it is they who must supervise the poets and musicians." In other words, they are not primarily a performing chorus, like the other

two. Their function is to be the *mind* of the state in the matter of χορεία ; and in the exercise of their faculties the suppleness of intellect which is necessary in addition to the wisdom of experience is to be artificially supplied by wine.

d 3. The MSS. have *ποίαν δὲ ἄισσουσιν οἱ ἄνδρες φωνὴν ἢ μοῦσαν ; ἢ δῆλον κτλ.* It is clear that *ἄισσουσιν* (of which the *ἄι* is *in rasura* in A) is a *vox nihili*, and so Ast, Stallb., and the Zür. editors alter it to *ᾄσουσιν*. Porson (in a note on Markland's note on Eur. *Supplices* 932), seeing that the act. fut. of *ᾄδω* was almost as bad a solecism, corrected it to *ᾄσουσιν*, so too Cobet, independently. Stallb. does not accept this manifestly correct emendation, because, he says, though *φωνὴν ἰέναι* is idiomatic, *ἰέναι μοῦσαν* is unheard of. This valid objection is admirably met by Burnet's further emendation which greatly improves the rest of the sentence as well. He puts the mark of interrogation after *φωνήν*, and ejects the second *ἤ*. The zeugma is far less harsh when *μοῦσαν* is no longer in the same sentence as *φωνήν* ; also, not only does *ᾄσουσιν* go better with *φωνήν* alone, but *πρέπουσαν* goes better with *μοῦσαν* alone. I would further write *ᾗ* for the first *ἤ*, and change the (;) after *τινα* to a full stop.

d 4. For the MS. *δεῖ* Steph. suggested *δή*, Ast *εἴ*, Schanz *ἀεί*. —We may translate, "But what sort of a note will theirs be? Clearly their 'music' must be in keeping with their age and character."—The following passage from *Phaedr.* 259 d illustrates more than one point in the text: *τῇ δὲ πρεσβυτάτῃ Καλλιόπῃ καὶ τῇ μετ' αὐτὴν Οὐρανίᾳ τοὺς ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ διάγοντάς τε καὶ τιμῶντας τὴν ἐκείνων μουσικὴν ἀγγέλλουσιν, αἵ δὴ μάλιστα τῶν Μουσῶν περί τε οὐρανὸν καὶ λόγους οὖσαι θείους τε καὶ ἀνθρωπίνους ἱᾶσι καλλίστην φωνήν.*—(For the rejection of the *ἤ* after *μοῦσαν* cp. 954 a, where Hermann successfully challenges another *ἤ*.)

d 6. *θείοις ἀνδράσιν* : i.e. men of renown and distinction ; great men. If the Ath. had here been asked : "Are all the members of the third chorus, then, great men?" we should have been enlightened as to much that is obscure in Plato's idea about the Dionysiac Chorus. But the question was not asked, i.e. Plato does not mean to give us the details.

d 8. *ἡμεῖς γοῦν . . . καὶ οἵδε* : i.e. "we Cretans, and the Spartans."

d 9. With *δυναίμεθα* it is easy to supply *ᾄδειν* from the relative sentence ; but cp. on 663 e 1 and *Phil.* 23 d 9 *διάκρισίν*

τινος δυναμένου. — ἦν . . . γενόμενοι, "which we were taught when we learnt to sing in chorus."

e 2. ἐν ἄστεσι κατῳκηκότων: the use of the adj. ἀστεῖος shows what these words imply. — οἷον . . . κέκτησθε: if φορβάδας is sound—it looks very much like a marginal synonym for ἐν ἀγέλῃ νεμομένους—it must be the main predicate to κέκτησθε, "you keep your young men in flocks, like so many colts at grass in one big herd."—ἀγέλη in Crete, and βουά in Sparta, were technical terms for the bands or classes in which the youths were trained.

e 5. ἀγριαίνοντα: as at *Rep.* 493 b, Plato uses this verb in its original sense of "to be ἄγριος, wild," the opposite of ἀστεῖος in derivation, as in sense.—ἐπέστησεν: gnomic aor. used side by side with pres.—the education being a lengthy process.—ἱπποκόμον . . . ψήχων: the metaphorical language of this passage, which is even playfully extravagant, indirectly prepares his hearers for his main metaphor as to the ᾠδή and μοῦσα.

e 6. πάντα προσήκοντα ἀποδιδοὺς τῇ παιδοτροφίᾳ, "paying all due attention to his rearing"; the absence of the art. with προσήκοντα gives additional emphasis to πάντα—"in all points"; I take παιδοτροφίᾳ (and not προσήκοντα) to be the antecedent to ὅθεν—"such a rearing as will secure that . . ." For ὅθεν . . . ἂν εἴη cp. *Prot.* 318 e (quoted in the note on the next line) ὅπως . . . ἂν εἴη.

667 a 1. Ast has collected many instances where δέ, instead of ἀλλὰ καί, follows οὐ (or μὴ) μόνον, e.g. 747 e 1, 965 b 9.—πόλιν the *political*, ἄστη the *civic* or rather *civil* communities. There might be several ἄστη in a πόλις.—διοικεῖν: not so much as "be a governor of" (Jowett); the word would apply to the part taken in the state by any member of a self-governing community. Cp. *Prot.* 318 e ὅπως ἂν ἄριστα τὴν αὑτοῦ οἰκίαν διοκοῖ, καὶ περὶ τῶν τῆς πόλεως ὅπως τὰ τῆς πόλεως δυνατώτατος ἂν εἴη καὶ πράττειν καὶ λέγειν, *Meno* 91 a ταύτης τῆς σοφίας καὶ ἀρετῆς, ᾗ οἱ ἄνθρωποι τάς τε οἰκίας καὶ τὰς πόλεις καλῶς διοικοῦσι, and *Rep.* 600 d ὡς οὔτε οἰκίαν οὔτε πόλιν τὴν αὑτῶν διοικεῖν οἷοί τ' ἔσονται ἐὰν μὴ σφεῖς αὐτῶν ἐπιστατήσωσιν τῆς παιδείας.

a 2. ὃν δή: i.e. the typical unregenerate member of the ἀγέλη described above; "that's just the sort of yokel that . . ."—κατ' ἀρχάς)(κατ' ἀρχὰς τῶν λόγων at 664 e, here used manifestly of the beginning of the whole treatise (see below on 671 a 4 ff.).—τῶν Τυρταίου πολεμικῶν πολεμικώτερον κτλ, "a more capable fighter than Tyrtaeus's warriors, for he everywhere and always accounts

bravery not as the first, but as the fourth of virtue's possessions, whether for state or for individual." Cf. above 630 a 7 ff., where *στάσις* is contrasted with foreign warfare.

a 4. Burnet has made the connexion of the different parts of the sentence clearer by putting a comma after the words *ἀεὶ καὶ πανταχοῦ*, which go closely with *τιμῶντα*.—The datives *ἰδιώταις* and *συμπάσῃ πόλει* go with *τέταρτον ἀλλ' οὐ πρῶτον κτῆμα*; the value of this particular one of virtue's possessions is low, both for the state and for the individual. Cp. 661 b 5 *ταῦτά ἐστι σύμπαντα δικαίοις μὲν καὶ ὁσίοις ἀνδράσιν ἄριστα κτήματα*. Cf. also *Phil.* 66 a *ὡς ἡδονὴ κτῆμα οὐκ ἔστι πρῶτον οὐδ' αὖ δεύτερον*. Ast is wrong in putting in *ὡς*, by way of explanation, before *τέταρτον*; the *ἀγαθὸς στρατιώτης* does not so regard courage.

a 6. *οὐκ οἶδα ὅπῃ* or *οὐκ οἶδα ὅντινα τρόπον*—"somehow or other"—are frequently used with the sort of implication that the last speaker is "a little too clever." Cp. *Gorgias* 513 c, *Phil.* 19 a, *Phaedr.* 265 b.—*πάλιν αὖ*: the reference is to 630 d 2.

a 9. *εἴπερ*: Heindorf on *Parm.* 150 b has collected many instances of this elliptical use; cp. e.g. 900 e, Ar. *Nub.* 226.—*πορευώμεθα, εἰ βούλεσθε*, "please let us go." Ast cps. *Rep.* 394 d *ἀλλ' ὅπῃ ἂν ὁ λόγος ὥσπερ πνεῦμα φέρῃ, ταύτῃ ἰτέον*.

a 10 ff. *εἰ γὰρ ἔχομεν μοῦσαν κτλ.*: this is the first unequivocal declaration that the mature citizens of from thirty to sixty are not to form a *χορός* in the literal sense. We have now to find out what is the *μοῦσα*—what is the *accomplishment* or *spiritual contribution*, proper to the Dionysiac "choir." The keynote of the paragraph is given us in the words *καλλίω* and *καλλίστη*.

b 2. *αἰσχύνεσθαι, ζητεῖν δέ*: the feeling of shame which, for these men, bars the way to public musical performances like those of the other choirs, has been fully described, but not their desire for the highest kind of activity. This desire is perhaps implied when they are called *θεῖοι ἄνδρες* (666 d 6), and it is consistent with their being *κυριώτατοι τῶν καλλίστων καὶ ὠφελιμωτάτων ᾠδῶν* (665 d 4), and *πρόθυμοι πρὸς τὰς ᾠδάς* (666 a 2, and c 4); so that *φαμεν* is here simply "we assert," not "we have asserted."

b 5–c 3. "Is it not necessarily the case with all things that have any attendant charm, either, in the first place, that the very fact that it is charming is by itself the important point about the thing, or that what matters most is its correctness, or further,

the advantage of it? What I mean is this: take food and drink —any kind of nourishment; a charm attends it which we should call pleasure. But as for what we should call correctness and advantage, just that out of any (ἑκάστοτε) of our victuals which we call wholesome is in itself what is most correct" (i.e. in the case of food advantage and correctness coincide).—Cp. *Gorg.* 474 d, and 506 c d.—The main difficulty in the passage lies in the ἣν δὲ ὀρθότητά τε καὶ ὠφελίαν. If, with Badham, we take these words to be the subject to εἶναι τὸ ὀρθότατον, we get, as he says, a *misere turbata sententia.* But it is clear that the subject of εἶναι τὸ ὀρθότατον is αὐτὸ τοῦτο ὅπερ ὑγιεινὸν λέγομεν. Therefore ἣν κτλ., to which the antecedent would, if the sentence went on regularly, be, like χάριν, in the acc., is left *suspended*, and the sentence suddenly takes another path. Cf. *Phaedr.* 233 b εὐτυχοῦντας δέ, καὶ τὰ μὴ ἡδονῆς ἄξια παρ' ἐκείνων ἐπαίνου ἀναγκάζει τυγχάνειν. A nominative similarly suspended occurs at *Rep.* 565 d ὡς ἄρα ὁ γευσάμενος τοῦ ἀνθρωπίνου σπλάγχνου, ἐν ἄλλοις ἄλλων ἱερείων ἑνὸς ἐγκατατετμημένου, ἀνάγκη δὴ τούτῳ λύκῳ γενέσθαι. (Bdh. reads τὴν for ἣν and says that for ὀρθότατον we want something like παρεχόμενον; Schanz agrees so far as to obelize ὀρθότατον.)

b 6. The μόνον is important, and is repeated at d 9.

b 8. For the second καί cp. 665 c 3.

c 5. The two examples, drawn (1) from practical *physical* life, and (2) from the life of the *intellect*, are only preliminary to the consideration of the importance of clear notions about the distinct spheres of *pleasure*, *correctness*, and *moral effect* in the domain of (3) *art*. Above (657 e – 658 e) we have been told that the common idea that pleasure is *the* criterion in art is only true of the pleasure felt by certain trained and experienced judges. Again, at 663 c, the question was raised as to the *value* of different judgements. The present passage—667 b 5–671 a 4—is a development of the author's views on the subject. It falls into two parts:

(1) 667 b 5–669 b 4 deals with the requisites of a competent judge. We here are told that what the true judge learns from experience and from training is, that there are further considerations besides pleasure which must be taken into account; and indeed that it is doubtful whether a case would ever present itself in which pleasure could be severed from these. If, these requirements are not satisfied, the right-minded judge will feel no pleasure; and thus we are able, after all, to accept the doctrine

that pleasure is the criterion in matters of art, provided that it is felt by the right persons.

(2) The second passage (669 b 5–671 a 1) warns us of the special dangers and errors to which these judges of art are liable in their attempt to form a correct public taste.

c 7. *καὶ τὸ εὖ καὶ τὸ καλῶς*: not used here (as *εὖ* is at 669 b 1) specially of the *moral* effect, but of the general praiseworthiness of the act of learning. Plato only lightly touches the subject of *μάθησις* here; all he has to show is that the pleasure of learning is something distinct from the correctness of the thing learnt; though he does not say, or mean to imply, that it is independent of it.

c 9 ff. *τί δὲ . . . προσαγορεύειν;* "and how about all the imitative arts which produce likenesses? Is not charm a proper name for any pleasure that may attend successful accomplishment of this?"—I think Stallbaum is right in holding that the prominent position of the words *τῇ τῶν ὁμοίων ἐργασίᾳ* is due to the contrast with the recently mentioned *ἀλήθεια*:—this time it is not *real* things we are talking about, but *copies* of real things. The dative gives the *grounds* for the epithet *εἰκαστικαί*—"such as are *εἰκαστικαί in virtue of* their production of likenesses"; similar *adverbial* datives occur at *Meno* 89 a *καὶ τούτῳ τῷ λόγῳ φρόνησις ἂν εἴη τὸ ὠφέλιμον*, *Theaet.* 162 e *πιθανολογίᾳ τε καὶ εἰκόσι λεγομένους λόγους*, *Gorg.* 513 c *τῷ αὐτῶν ἤθει λεγομένων τῶν λόγων*.—Schanz rearranges and emends as follows: *τί δὲ τῆς τῶν ὁμοίων ἐργασίας;* beginning a fresh question with *ὅσαι κτλ.*—cp. *Gorg.* 509 d *τί δὲ δὴ τοῦ ἀδικεῖν;* where Heindorf's note is: "solet igitur triplex in hac loquendi forma casus adhiberi, nominativus, genetivus, accusativus." To the instances of the nom. following *τί δέ* given by him on *Gorg.* 502 a our present passage may be added. In many of them, as here in A, the variant *δαί* occurs for *δέ*.—The old vulgate read *τί δαί;* or *τί δέ;* The punctuation I have adopted is Burnet's.

d 1. *τὸ μὲν ἡδονὴν ἐν αὐτοῖς γίγνεσθαι παρεπόμενον*, "that pleasure should be produced as a by-product." (All editors but Burnet put the comma *before* *παρεπόμενον*.)

d 5–7. *τὴν δέ . . . ἡδονή*, "but the *correctness* of such productions we may, speaking generally, pronounce to be effected by exact correspondence both in quantity and quality, rather than by pleasure."

e 1. *παρέχεται* is most likely passive. For the change of mood Ast cps. Isoc. *De pace* 177 e, where *εἴ τις . . . ἐστι* is followed (in

the MSS.) by *φροντίζοι*—Müller reads *φροντίζει*.—*μηδ' αὖ γε βλάβην*, "and of course, on the other hand, does no harm."

e 2. *τοῖς ἄλλοις* refers to the same things as *τούτων* at e 4, i.e. *ὠφελία*, *ἀλήθεια* or *ὁμοιότης*. (Stallbaum takes *τούτων* to refer to *βλάβη*, and to stand for *τῶν βλαβερῶν*.)

e 3. *ἦν δὴ . . . ἐπακολουθῇ*: cp. *Philebus* 52 e ff. where Socrates explains that it is not the extent, or even the intensity, of a quality which shows it in its truest and best light, but its *pureness*; there must be no admixture of anything else with it.

e 5 f. Cleinias's remark is merely an echo of the Athenian's *μηδ' αὖ γε βλάβην*, "You would exclude, of course, any pleasure that had an admixture of pain." The remark serves to introduce the following statement of the Athenian, that in the case just imagined we should have *παιδιά* pure and simple—not *παιδεία*. At 668 b 1 he expresses a doubt whether this pure and simple *παιδιά* is ever to be found.

e 10 ff. *ἆρ' οὖν . . . ὁτῳοῦν ἄλλῳ;* "may we not, in consequence of all this, assert, that a representation or imitation ought on no account to be estimated by the pleasure of it, or by somebody's empty opinion? This applies to any instance of equality; the equal is not equal, nor the symmetrical symmetrical, in any case, because somebody thinks it so, or because a thing takes somebody's fancy.—No, it must be estimated by no other thing in the world than by exactness of correspondence." I have followed Burnet in adopting Stallbaum's punctuation of this paragraph, i.e. in marking *καὶ δὴ . . . ὅλως* as a parenthesis.

668 a 1. Almost every editor has his own way of emending the MS. *ἢ μή τις (χαίρει τῳ)*. I follow St. and Ast in reading *ἢ εἴ τις (χαίρει τῳ)*. There is, as St. says, a "vestige" of this reading in the marginal note reported from Cod. Voss., *ἢ εἴ τις τό γε ἴσον ἴσον*. I conjecture that the course of the corruption was, that some scribe put in—perhaps inadvertently—*ἢ μή* after *δοκεῖ*—that then *ἢ εἴ* was inadvertently dropped out. (It is just possible that the original reading was *ἢ μή, ἢ εἴτις*.)

a 9. *ἥκιστ' ἄρα κτλ.*: Plato has not taken the trouble to reconcile this statement with that at 658 e 6. Verbally one contradicts the other. Really the second statement sets aside the first by going a step further back in the explanation. At 658 e he allows that the *ἡδονή* of the perfect judge is a criterion; here he says that, because that *ἡδονή* turns out to be dependent on *something else*, that *other thing* is the real criterion.—We may

translate, "then, if a man says that the value of *μουσική* depends on the pleasure it gives, this account will not do. You must by no means make a merely pleasure-giving *μουσικήν*—if such there be —your serious object; you must aim at that kind which is a life-like representation of what is right and good"—lit. "which preserves its life-likeness to the representation of the right and good." The last few words are very difficult. I take *τῷ μιμήματι* as a genitival dative; it *would* have been in the gen. but for the fact that *τοῦ καλοῦ* depends on *it*. [F.H.D. appeals to the phrase *ὅτῳ ἔοικε τῶν ἀξιολόγων μιμημάτων* at 669 e 4. "Evidently," he says, "we might say *ὁμοιότητα ἔχει ἀξιολόγῳ μιμήματι*," and he holds that *τῷ τοῦ καλοῦ μιμήματι* means much the same as *ἀξιόλογον μίμημα*, i.e. that no *μίμημα* is "worth considering," in Plato's opinion, which is not a representation of *τὸ καλόν*. My note on the latter passage will show that I think that in neither passage is Plato really talking of the *likeness* of one representation to another *representation*, but of the likeness to a *thing represented*, i.e. of the *correctness* of the representation. Both *ὀρθότης* (b 6) and *τὸ καλόν* are to be considered. Also the *τὴν* before *ὁμ.* seems to me to be in favour of my view.] Ritter boldly says that *μίμημα* both here and at 669 e 4 means *the thing imitated*. But that would only help us here if we had *τῷ καλῷ μ.* instead of *τῷ τοῦ καλοῦ μ.* He allows us the alternative of taking *τῷ τ. κ. μ.* as a "*dativus caussae*," "which gets its likeness by," or "from its imitation of *τὸ καλόν*." (? Ought we here and at 669 e 4 to give to *μίμημα* the meaning *pattern* which it seems to bear at *Politicus* 274 a 2 ?)

b 4. *τούτοις*: the members of the Dionysiac Choir.

b 6. *γάρ*, "you will remember."—*ἦν, ὥς φαμεν*, "was, according to us." The *ἦν* sufficiently shows the reference to be to what was said a little time back, so that *φαμεν* is a *historic* present. O reads *ἔφαμεν*, unnecessarily. The reference is to 667 d 5 f.

b 7. *ἀποτελεῖν* seems here to be used in the sense of "to reproduce" or "represent"; cp. below 817 b 8.

b 10. For *περί c. acc.* in place of a simple gen. cp. below on 685 c 2.

c 1. *καὶ τοῦτό γε μῶν οὐκ . . .*; this question does not merely put the previous statement in an interrogative form. The *πᾶς* of the *πᾶς ἄν ὁμολογοῖ* means "*anyone who considers the question*," whereas the subject of *μῶν οὐκ ὁμολογοῖεν* is "*all who are concerned in the production of the ποιήματα*"; for in a sense the audience is helping to create the illusion. Cp. Arist. *Poetics* 1447 a 13.

(Badham says the καί before τοῦτο is quite out of place, and must be a mistake for ἐπεί.)

c 4–8. The difficulty of this passage, and the difficulty of reconciling it with what follows is due, I think, mainly to the want of a perfect analogy between the natures of the two arts of μουσική and painting. Here we are dealing with the productions of μουσική. The terms ὅτι ποτ' ἐστίν and οὐσία are not used as "esoteric" terms of διαλεκτική, but in the general sense of *nature*: this is made clear by the following τί ποτε βούλεται and ὅτου ποτ' ἐστὶν εἰκὼν ὄντως (cp. also 669 e 3 f.). They refer to the *representation*, not to the *thing represented*; i.e. the words mean not "what is the essence of the thing which the poet intends to represent?" but "what is the representation really intended to be a representation of?" On the other hand the paragraph d 7–e 5 deals with τὰ μεμιμημένα [σώματα], and there the ὅτι ποτ' ἐστίν means the nature of the thing that is copied by the painter—not its "absolute essence" in a dialectic sense, for art represents the outward characteristics (φαινόμενα, cp. *Rep.* 596 e) of the individual, not the character of the type. The sphere of ὀρθότης, both in μουσική and γραφική, is the artist's technique. The ordinary spectator has experience enough of the world of feeling, and of the external world to enable him to feel the sensation the artist designs to produce, but he does not know how it is done, and could not correct the mistakes of an unskilful performer. Again, a man may have enough technical knowledge to criticize the artist (or even to produce the work of art), without being able to say whether the moral effect of the ποίημα was good or bad. Thus we get the three classes, of (1) ὁ πολὺς ὄχλος, (2) the capable art-critic (and the ποιητής?), and (3) the capable νομοθέτης, whose respective achievements are here described.—We may translate: "Then it seems that if a man wants to make no mistake about any particular production, he must know what it is. For if he does not know its nature—does not know, that is, what it means to represent, and of what it really is the image, he will hardly discern whether the intention is correctly carried out or not."—Badham may be right in reading μιμήσεως for βουλήσεως at c 8. It is difficult to see how τὴν ὀρθότητα τῆς βουλήσεως can mean *the correct carrying out, or right realization, of the intention* (cp. 682 a 9), and yet that is the meaning we *must* have here. On the other hand αὐτοῦ, which stands for τοῦ ποιήματος—the constr. being τὴν ὀρθ. ἢ καὶ ἁμ. τῆς βουλήσεως—goes better with it than it would with τῆς μιμήσεως.—Badham meets this

objection by reading *αὖ* for *αὐτοῦ*; but this again seems too *circumstantial*.

c 7. *ὄντως*, as Ritter observes (*Unters. üb. Pl.* p. 59), is one of the words distinctive of Plato's later language; it occurs 50 times in the *Laws*, and only 9 times in the *Republic* (21 times in the *Sophist*, 15 times in the *Philebus*, 11 in the *Politicus* and 8 in *Tim.*).

d 1 f. *τό γε εὖ καὶ τὸ κακῶς*: for *εὖ* and *κακῶς* in this connexion cp. *Rep.* 377 d and e *ἐάν τις μὴ καλῶς ψεύδηται*, and *ὅταν εἰκάζῃ τις κακῶς*, where Pl. is speaking of the *moral* effect of poetry.—The modern reader can hardly help asking here "why should not the plain man, who has no technical skill or knowledge, be able (in some cases at least) to pronounce on the moral character of a production of *μουσική*?" Possibly Plato holds that, the moral judgement being of a higher kind, it can only be satisfactorily performed by a mind which has had practice in the lower kind, i.e. the aesthetic.—Or is it a knowledge of psychology that is necessary?—Or again, is it merely that the recognized connoisseur can speak with more *authority*?

d 5. *κατὰ τὴν ὄψιν ἡμῖν*, "which make their appeal to our sense of *sight*."

d 7. *ἐν τούτοις*: cp. 645 d 4 and 646 e 2 for neuter pronouns referring to feminine nouns.

d 8. *τῶν σωμάτων*: I think Badham is right in rejecting these words. They make the sentence awkward, and are unnecessary. It is not till the next sentence but one that he takes a human or animal body as an example. [F.H.D. says "No: because *sight* is concerned with *bodies*."]

d 9. *τό γε ὀρθῶς αὐτῶν εἰργασμένον*, "what was correct in their execution."

d 10. *τοὺς ἀριθμούς* is, I think, to be taken, as well as *τὰς θέσεις*, in sense with *ἑκάστων τῶν μερῶν*; *τοῦ σώματος* is put early in the sentence, instead of after *τῶν μερῶν*, for rhythm's sake. (Heindorf suggested that for *ἀριθμούς* we ought to read *ῥυθμούς*, and Badham *ἁρμούς*; but neither goes well with *ὅσοι τέ εἰσιν*. As the *μέρη* of the *σῶμα* are mentioned, we need no further particularization of parts such as *ἁρμοί*. The two points are: (1) how large are the numbers of the different parts? and (2) which ought to come next to which?—Ast, who refers to Xen. *Anab.* ii. 2. 6 *ἀριθμὸς δὲ τῆς ὁδοῦ . . . σταθμοὶ τρεῖς καὶ ἐνενήκοντα*, translates *ἀριθμός* here by *measure*; Stallb. by *die Grossenverhältnisse*, Jowett by "*proportions*"; L. & S. say it stands for "*the whole*" of

the body.—The reason why *ἀριθμούς* is plural is that the human body has sets of members, the sets being of different "*numbers.*"

e 1. The subject of *ἔχει* is easily assumed, from the previous *εἰργασμένον* and the following *εἴργασται*, to be *τὸ εἰργασμένον*, i.e. *the picture.*

e 2. With *χρώματα* and *σχήματα* we can easily supply *προσήκοντα* from the previous *προσήκουσαν.*

e 8. *τὰ ἑαυτοῦ* : i.e. *τὰ προσήκοντα.*

669 a 2–6. *ἆρά γε . . . ἐγιγνώσκομεν,* "Does it follow, without more ado (*ἤδη*), that the man who has been equal to this judgement must be able easily to decide this further point—whether the work of art is beautiful, or, if not, where it may be thought to be deficient in 'beauty'?" Cl. "Why, in that case, I should say that pretty well all of us" (i.e. all the world) "would (equally) be judges of the beauty" (we should say *the points*) "of animals." (So Ast.)

There are difficulties about this interpretation, but I think it follows the line of least resistance. For *τῷ γνόντι* we should have expected *τὸν γνόντα*—but cp. *Rep.* 353 e *ἀνάγκη ἄρα κακῇ ψυχῇ κακῶς ἄρχειν καὶ ἐπιμελεῖσθαι* ; also it is rather surprising to find the Cretan so ready to admit the difficulty of deciding whether an animal was beautiful or not. Perhaps he speaks as a farmer, thinking of the *points* of stock. (Jowett translates, "Must we not also know whether the work is beautiful, or in any respect deficient in beauty?" Cl. "If this were not required, stranger, we should all of us be judges of beauty." Ritter takes Cleinias's remark to mean that the decision about beauty *is* one for which any man is competent.) It follows that, if Cleinias is right, "all the world" would be in the position of *τῷ ταῦτα γνόντι*, i.e. would be competent to pronounce upon the *ὀρθότης* of the picture of an animal. The analogy, however, from painting (or sculpture) does not serve to explain the *processes* of the appreciation of *μουσική*—which, we are soon to be told, are difficult to follow—it only makes clear what are the three stages of acquirement to which attention is to be drawn.

a 8. Badham, for *καὶ πάντῃ*, would read *πάντα*—unnecessarily ; *πάντῃ* generalizes the statement.

a 9. Boeckh proposed to read *ὅ, τι* for *ὅ τε* : either is possible ; cp. *Prot.* 352 e *διδάσκειν ὅ ἐστιν αὐτοῖς τοῦτο τὸ πάθος*, *Phaedo* 65 e 1 *τῆς οὐσίας, ὃ τυγχάνοι ἕκαστον ὄν*, and *Meno* 92 c with E. S. Thompson's note.

b 1. *ὡς εὖ* : not, as Jowett, "that it has been well executed" ;

the εὖ, as at 668 d 2, refers to the *higher aesthetic* or *moral* judgement on the performance.

b 2. *ῥήμασί τε καὶ μέλεσι καὶ τοῖς ῥυθμοῖς* : these words make the paragraph hopelessly illogical. Even if Badham's objection to *πάντῃ* be upheld, the *ἥτισοῦν* emphasizes the fact that the question considered is a general one, applying equally to *different kinds* of artistic production. With this it is impossible to fit in words specifically describing a production of *one* kind only. It is not till the next paragraph that we return to the special consideration of the branch *μουσική*. I have therefore ventured to bracket these words.

b 5. *μὴ τοίνυν ἀπείπωμεν λέγοντες κτλ.* : cp. 769 e *οὐκ ἄν ποτε λέγων ἀπείποι τὸ τοιοῦτον πρὶν ἐπὶ τέλος ἐλθεῖν.* "Now we must not fail to point out how it is that *μουσική* is such a difficult subject."

b 6. *ἐπειδὴ γὰρ ὑμνεῖται . . . εἰκόνων*, "the fact is that, while it is more discussed than other sorts of images, it needs quite the most careful treatment of any." *ἐπειδή* introduces rather *attendant circumstances* here, than *cause*. The two *reasons why* the subject is difficult are given afterwards (*ἁμαρτών τε γάρ κτλ.*). For *ἐπειδή*, "at the same time that" or "although," cp. *Rep.* 348 c *ἐπειδὴ καί*, *Phaedo* 87 a 8, *Apol.* 27 c 10 ; for *ἐπεί* "although" (Ast on 686 b 2 says "*ἐπεί, quanquam, alioqui*") cf. *Symp.* 187 a, *Prot.* 353 a, *Apol.* 19 e ("and yet") and below 794 d 7, 875 c 3.—Stallbaum thinks the *τὸ* which the Aldine ed. put in before *περὶ αὐτήν* indispensable : I think we do better without it. *ὑμνεῖται* is impersonal like *λελέχθω* at *Tim.* 89 d (*περὶ μὲν τοῦ κοινοῦ ζῴου . . . ταύτῃ λελέχθω*).—For the omission of the *περί* before *τὰς ἄλλας* Ast cps. 685 b and *Soph.* 227 b.

b 8. *ἁμαρτών τε γάρ . . . Μουσῶν*, "not only is a mistake most injurious" (cp. above 656 b 4) "by which you are led to entertain bad dispositions, but it is very hard to discover, because our poets are not exactly as gifted as the Muses themselves."—Stallb. reminds us of the celebrated passage in the *Republic* (401 d) on the far-reaching effects of good and bad Music : *κυριωτάτη ἐν μουσικῇ τροφή, ὅτι μάλιστα καταδύεται εἰς τὸ ἐντὸς τῆς ψυχῆς ὅ τε ῥυθμὸς καὶ ἁρμονία, καὶ ἐρρωμενέστατα ἅπτεται αὐτῆς, φέροντα τὴν εὐσχημοσύνην, καὶ ποιεῖ εὐσχήμονα, ἐάν τις ὀρθῶς τραφῇ, εἰ δὲ μὴ τοὐναντίον κτλ.*—The ironic litotes of the indictment of the poets and musicians of Plato's day strikes the key-note of the bitter invective which follows.

c 4. The MSS. have *χρῶμα γυναικῶν* : I have adopted the

Aldine correction of *χρῶμα* to *σχῆμα*. It is not likely that, after protesting against the "slang" term *εὔχρων μέλος* at 655 a 7, Plato should here use *χρῶμα* in the sense of "complexion" or "style" of music; besides, the corresponding instances which follow show that we want the mention of *σχῆμα* here. (It is hard to see how, from the fact that, at 668 e, we have *χρώματά τε καὶ σχήματα* in the sense of the colours and outlines of a *picture*, Stallbaum concludes that we ought to read *χρῶμα καὶ σχῆμα* here.)—For the general sense of these terms of *μουσική* cp. above on 653 e 5 and 654 e 4. Here (as at 654 e 4) *σχῆμα* doubtless denotes bodily posture or gesture—possibly the grouping of a chorus.

c 7. The *ὑπο-* in *ὑποθεῖσαι* has doubtless the meaning *as an accompaniment*; the preposition is used in this sense, apparently with all three cases.

c 8. *ἔτι δὲ κτλ.*: a description of what would now be called "musical fireworks," or "programme music." One is reminded of Dr. Johnson's "I would it were impossible" of the difficult piece of music.

d 2. *ὡς ἕν τι μιμούμεναι*, "when professing to represent some *one* thing."

d 3. Badham thinks *ἐμπλέκοντες* a mistake for *συμπλέκοντες*.

d 4. *γέλωτ' ἂν . . . τέρψιος*: a rather curious use of *παρασκευάζω*. I do not think it means "call forth laughter from the men," but "furnish an object of mockery for all the men whom etc." Cp. *γέλωτα παρεῖχον Gorg.* 474 a, *γέλωτα δὴ τὸν ἐμὲ ἐν τοῖς λόγοις ἀπέδειξεν Theaet.* 166 a. I.e. I think we ought to supply *τούτοις* as the antecedent to *ὅσους*, and to take *τῶν ἀνθρώπων* as a partitive gen. dependent on *ὅσους*. Lobeck's comment on these words (*Aglaoph.* ii. p. 948) is, "Orphei sententia huiusmodi fuisse videtur: *ὅσσοι Ἥβης μέτρον ἵκοντο, λάχον δέ τε τέρψιος ὥρην*, i.e. 'quicunque ad pubertatis annos et ad eam aetatem adoleverunt, quae Veneri matura habetur.' Hinc Plato transfert ad judicii maturitatem, illudque musicae genus, de quo loquitur, omnibus, qui in his rebus aliquem sensum habeant veraeque voluptatis capaces sint, taedio fore dicit." We may translate "(are greatly given to such jumbles and confusions) as would furnish matter for the scorn of all whose 'power of delight,' as Orpheus says, 'is in its happy prime.'"—(H. Richards would read *ὅσοις* for *ὅσους*.) As Hamlet told the players, "this overdone . . . though it make the unskilful laugh, cannot but make the judicious grieve."

d 6. The subject of ὁρῶσι is, as Stallb. says, "non poetae, sed homines maturioris judicii"; the same people are the subj. of γιγνώσκειν at e 3, and (perhaps) ὑπολαβεῖν at e 5. (Badham does away with the need of supposing this change of subject by inserting τοῖς before τῶν ἀνθρώπων, removing the full stop after τέρψιος, and substituting θ' for τε γὰρ—taking ὁρῶσι as a participle. He also reads εἴ τι for ἔτι (ἔ*τι A). By itself this last change obviates one of the changes of subject, and Schanz adopts it. But what follows seems too large and emphatic a statement to be introduced in a subordinate εἴ τι clause.

d 7. ψιλούς: not *prose, without metre* as Ast and L. & S. here, and *Menex.* 239 c (λόγῳ ψιλῷ), but, as Stallbaum, *without music* (or *tune*).—It is difficult to be sure of the meaning of σχήματα here. It seems safest to understand it, as before, of the bodily postures of the reciter. (Ritter thinks this sense inadmissible here, and suggests (p. 33) for it *die Form des Ausdrucks*, and assigns the same meaning to σχήματα at 655 a 1. I think R. is wrong in holding, as his chief ground for this decision, that, in all these cases, we are bound to suppose that the element—whether words, or tune, or rhythmic motion or posture—which Plato mentions *first*, must be thought of as "*gefunden und festgestellt*" *before* the other elements are provided. When Plato speaks of one set of elements as *accompanying* another set, he does not necessarily imply that the two sets were composed in the order in which they are mentioned.)

e 1. With μέλος we are intended to supply some such verb as ποιοῦσιν—or perhaps ποιοῦντες.—All through this passage ῥυθμός seems to apply to *rhythmic bodily motion*, not to any metrical arrangement of the words, though in the last instance there is room for doubt. On the whole it is most likely that ψιλῇ κιθαρίσει τε καὶ αὐλήσει does not mean that the performance is confined to musical instruments alone, but that the tune (μέλος—played on the instruments) which accompanies the bodily gestures (ῥυθμός) has no *words* sung to it.

e 2. προσχρῆσθαι, as generally used by Plato, differs no more from χρῆσθαι than "to call in the aid of" differs from the simple "to use" in English, but here προσ- seems to mean "as an accompaniment" (to the ῥυθμός).

e 4. ὅτῳ ἔοικε τῶν ἀξιολόγων μιμημάτων: Ast, who mentions that at Xen. *Mem.* iii. 10. 5 μιμήματα is a MS. variant for the undoubtedly correct μιμητά, boldly assumes the converse mistake here, and reads μιμητῶν; Ritter as we saw above, on 668 b 2, holds

that *μίμημα* can be used in the sense of *μιμητόν*; Stallbaum thinks that Plato allowed himself to say *μιμήματα* when he meant *μιμητά*. The most satisfactory account of the passage seems to me a variety of Stallbaum's view, i.e. that Plato allowed himself to put *ὅτῳ τῶν ἀξ. μιμ.* as a brachylogy for *ὅτῳ τῶν ἐν τοῖς ἀξιολόγοις μιμήμασι μεμιμημένων* ("to which individual among those to be found in worthy representations"). We get a hint of what is in his mind from his specification of the contemptible—i.e. not *ἀξιόλογα*—attempts to represent e.g. the cries of animals. As against Ast and Ritter, it is the *attempt* to represent, rather than the thing to be represented, that is characterized here; besides, Ritter by no means establishes for *μίμημα* the sense he desiderates. (For another alternative see above on 668 b 2 *τῷ τοῦ καλοῦ μιμ.*) At 796 b *προσήκοντα* is used much in the sense of *ἀξιόλογα* here —*ὅσα ἐν τοῖς χοροῖς ἐστιν αὖ μιμήματα προσήκοντα μιμεῖσθαι.*

e 5. *ἀλλὰ ὑπολαβεῖν ἀναγκαῖον*, "no: (these men of taste) cannot fail to come to the opinion . . ."—*πολλῆς ἀγροικίας μεστόν*, "is the height of barbarism."

e 6. *πᾶν τὸ τοιοῦτον ὁπόσον τάχους . . . φίλον*: I cannot help suspecting that *σφόδρα φίλον* was originally a commentator's explanation of some out-of-the-way word, such as *ὀρεκτικόν*, which governed the genitives—*φίλον* being used in the poetic and late use of *fond of*. Ast boldly gives *φίλον* that sense in the text. If the text is sound, and if we reject Ast's interpretation, the most likely interpretation of *τάχους* and the other genitives is that they depend on *πᾶν ὁπόσον*, being of the nature of the gen. in *τὸ ἁρμονίας καὶ ῥυθμοῦ* 670 e 6, and the common *τὸ τῆς τύχης, τὸ τῆς τέχνης*; "everything in the way of speed, etc." Less likely is it that the genitives go closely with *φίλον* to denote the *source* of the liking, cp. *θαυμαστὴ ῥαστώνης* at 648 e, and the gen. with *ἄγαμαι, θαυμάζω, ζηλῶ*; or that it is a gen. of *definition*, as in *μακάριον τυράννου χρῆμα* (*Rep.* 567 e). We may translate, "all that sort of display (is the height of barbarism) which consists in speed, perfect execution, and the power to reproduce the cries of animals, which is (so much) the rage that . . ."

e 7. A further looseness of structure in the sentence is that *ὥστε* goes on as if *οὕτως* had preceded it, and a subject has to be provided for *χρῆσθαι*, i.e. the people whose bad taste has just been described.

670 a 1. *πλὴν ὅσον ὑπό*, "except where it is accompanied by," i.e. "without being accompanied by." *πλὴν ὅσον* as a sort of compound preposition occurs again at 856 d 3, where it governs a

gen.—*ψιλῷ ἑκατέρῳ* : this dat. is doubtless governed by *χρήσεως*, and the gen. *χρήσεως* means literally "(*ἀμουσία*) is involved in the employment (of)." The construction is made to seem more natural by the fact that *χρῆσθαι* with a dative has come just before. (Cp. 631 d, 640 b, and 657 c.)—The *δ'* after *ψιλῷ*—we expect *γάρ*—and the abrupt change in construction which it involves, are strange. We may translate, "whereas the employment of either (flute or harp) by itself involves a mere tasteless catch-penny virtuosity."—A comparison of this passage with *Rep.* 531 a, *Laws* 655 a 7 and 812 d e would seem to show that the thought of a certain school of musicians was enough to make Plato go near to lose his temper.

a 3. *ταῦτα μὲν ἔχει ταύτῃ λόγον*, "so much for the philosophy of that."—What follows is as good as saying, "perhaps we have spent too much time on the *wrong* music"; *γε* is "after all."—By the mention of the quinquagenarians separately from the younger men of the mature class, Plato seems to hint that the Dionysiac Choir is not homogeneous: the older men may have different duties and different needs from those of the younger.

a 6–b 2. *τόδε . . . προσήκῃ*, "well, from what has gone before we may logically deduce this much: that all the quinquagenarians who are expected to sing must have had a training superior to that of the members of an ordinary chorus."—As at 829 d 7 *μηδέ τινα τολμᾶν ᾄδειν ἀδόκιμον μοῦσαν*, I think *μούσης* here ought not—as it does in all texts but Ast's—to begin with a capital letter.—The literal meaning is, "to have been taught something better than the choric music."

b 1. *ὅσοισπερ ἂν ᾄδειν προσήκῃ* : it is not clear whether we are to understand from these words that only a select band from among men between fifty and sixty are actually to sing, or whether by *ᾄδειν* we are to understand generally "to take their part in the Music of the State." What follows seems to point to the latter explanation, though the previous reference to the effect of wine on the old (666 b) favours the former.

b 4. *ᾧ προσῆκεν . . . ὀρθῶς ἢ μή* : these words seem to be a loosely expressed explanation of what is meant by *γνῶναι τὴν ὀρθότητα τῶν μελῶν*, and look suspiciously like a commentator's work. I cannot accept Stallbaum's explanation of *ᾧ πρ. ἢ μὴ πρ. τοῦ δωριστί*, "*qui curaverit vel etiam non curaverit harmoniam Doricam, h.e. qui harum rerum fere incuriosus et ignarus fuerit.*" The writer meant, "(and be able to say) what tune the Doric scale suited or did not suit." That settles the question of correctness of

ἁρμονία. The following words, which deal with the question of ῥυθμός, are still more loosely expressed. τοῦ ῥυθμοῦ, like τοῦ δωριστί, goes with προσῆκεν—ᾧ προσῆκεν being supplied in thought; and ὀρθῶς ἢ μή is "short" for πότερον ὀρθῶς προσῆψεν ἢ μή. (Heindorf, commenting on the omission of πότερον before ταὐτὸν ἢ ἕτερον at *Gorg.* 488 d, says: "in Platone exempla ubivis sunt obvia."—Ritter's "whether rightly or not" wants εἴτε ὀρθῶς εἴτε μή.) I have bracketed these words mainly because of their slovenly style, which is matched by the logic shown in the specification of a single "mode" in a general statement (see also on c 2 below). A comparison of e 1 and 812 c 1 ff. suggests that under the term ὀρθότης here Plato includes not only formal, musical correctness, but also the εὖ of 669 b 1, i.e. the moral effect of the music as well.

b 10. Badham's correction of the MS. αὐτῶν to αὐλῷ seems to me a certain one; αὐτῶν is quite out of place. ὁ πολὺς ὄχλος . . . ὅσοι is a variety of the ordinary πάντες ὅσοι, and both ὅσοι and its antecedent refer to the same people, whereas ὅσοι αὐτῶν would modify ὁ πολὺς ὄχλος by the addition of "such of them, that is, who." On the other hand προσάδειν αὐλῷ accords admirably with βαίνειν ἐν ῥυθμῷ.—γεγόνασι διηναγκασμένοι, "have been drilled." Heindorf quotes this passage, along with Soph. *Ajax* 588 and *Phil.* 773, as illustrating *Sophist* 217 c μὴ τοίνυν . . . ἀπαρνηθεὶς γένῃ (Lobeck on *Aj.* 588 quotes Pollux 104 ἴδιον τὸ Πλάτωνος μὴ ἀπαρνηθεὶς γένῃ).

c 1. ὅτι . . . συλλογίζονται, "though they do not realize that they are doing this without knowing a single thing about it."

c 2. τὸ δέ που . . . ἡμαρτημένως, "yet the fact remains that every musical composition is correct if it has the right elements, and faulty if it has the wrong ones." These words gather up the ideas of the Athenian's long speech (669 b 5—670 b 6), by way of specification of what is meant by τὴν ὀρθότητα τῶν μελῶν (b 4). (They would have been quite superfluous if ᾧ προσῆκεν . . . ὀρθῶς ἢ μή had been part of the original argument.) Ritter (p. 77) is surely wrong in holding that ὀρθῶς ἔχει and προσήκοντα here, and the εὐ- in εὐάρμοστον and εὔρυθμον are used not of *technical* but of *moral* correctness, and that the paragraph introduces the *third* of the considerations defined in 669 a 7–b 2.

c 5. τί οὖν κτλ.: these words continue the idea of the ἔχον in c 2, "what, further, about the man who does not even know what the piece contains?" i.e. who does not know one ἁρμονία from another, or does not know the difference between a noble and

a servile *ῥυθμός*.—I follow Schanz and Burnet in accepting Bekker's *ὅπερ* for the MS. *ὅτι περ*.

c 6. *ἐν ὁτῳοῦν*: the only meaning I can suggest for these words is "in any respect," i.e. in any of the points specified in 669 c 3–8. (The general sense "in the case of anything whatever" does not agree with *ὅτι ποτ' ἔχει*, for we must, in that case, suppose that *ἔχει* has not the same subject as the *ἔχει* in the next line.)

c 8. All modern editors accept Boeckh's *αὖ τὰ νῦν* for the MS. *αὐτὰ νῦν*. The *αὖ* refers to the previous traversing of the same ground in 668 b 4–d 2.

c 9. *ἡμῖν*: a genitival dative, like the *ὑμῖν* in 624 a 1.—*τινὰ τρόπον* qualifies and apologises for the "bull": the process is described in 666 b. (This is better than taking it with *ᾄδειν* as implying that it was not *real* singing that was expected from them.)

d 1 ff. The three stages of requirement to be reached by the Dionysiac Choir are not so distinctly enumerated as we should expect, and the connecting particles are not quite logically used. In form it looks as if the *μέχρι γε τοσούτου* and *μέχρι τοῦ δυνατὸν εἶναι* referred only to the first stage, and at the same time the second stage is rather mixed up with the first by the *ἵνα* clause in which it (the second) is introduced, and the third stage again is tacked on to the second merely by a *καί*. But the repetition of *μέχρι τοσούτου* at e 2 shows us that the first *μέχρι τοσούτου* really referred to all three stages. This is a mark of hasty writing, and the clearness of the general meaning may perhaps authorize a little manipulation of the connecting links in translation; e.g. we might translate *ἵνα* "that *further*" (they may be able etc.). I do not think, that is, that Plato means, what he appears to say, that the power of right selection will follow as the result of the power to take an intelligent part in a chorus. In the writer's mind the *ἵνα* goes back to the *μέχρι τοσούτου πεπαιδεῦσθαι*. (Another possibility is that *ἵνα* marks the preceding stage as necessary before they can *καθορᾶν*.)

d 3. *βάσεις* occurs in connexion with *ῥυθμοί* also at *Rep.* 399 e; here it seems to mean not merely footsteps, but any marked division of bodily gesture by which time could be kept with the music.

d 4. *καθορῶντες κτλ.*, "that (further), having their eyes open to the nature of scales or tunes and rhythmic motion, they may both be able to select what befits men of their age and standing,

and may sing them as they should be sung." *καθορῶντες*, like *κατιδών* at 632 c 4, and 652 a 2, is used of a survey which results in knowledge.

d 5. *τηλ. καὶ τοι.*: cp. 686 b *ἆρ' οὐκ ἄξιον ἐπισκοπεῖν τηλικοῦτον καὶ τοσοῦτον σύστημα ἥτις ποτὲ τύχη διέφθειρε;*—The words refer only to the choosers themselves (not "for men of any particular age and kind"), but it is thereby implied that the choosers will be able to choose for others as well as for themselves.

d 6. *οὕτως*: i.e. *πρεπόντως*.

d 7. *ἀσινεῖς*: this word, followed as it is by *ἠθῶν χρηστῶν ἀσπασμοῦ*, refers to the danger against which we are cautioned at 656 a 7 and 669 b 8, that bad music may produce bad morals.

e 1. *ἡγεμόνες γίγνωνται*: it is not clear from this passage whether the influence of the older men on the taste of the younger is that of example, or is by way of precept. A comparison of 666 c inclines us to the latter view; the *τὸ παραχρῆμα* too seems to suggest that the actual singing has more effect on the singers themselves, and that the effect on the young is *subsequent*, i.e. that the older men's theoretical and practical skill enables them to give good teaching to others.—*ἀσπασμός* occurs again at 919 e, where it is used as the opposite of *μῖσος*.

e 3. *τῆς ἐπὶ τὸ πλῆθος φερούσης*: *φέρειν* with *εἰς*, *ἐπί*, or *πρός* is used like the French *porter*, and our "to bear upon" (a subject), for "to be concerned with," "to apply to"; cp. *Rep.* 538 c *ἀλλὰ πῇ πρὸς τοὺς ἁπτομένους τῶν λόγων αὐτὴ φέρει ἡ εἰκών;* (The transitive use of *φέρειν ἐπί* in this sense is common in Plato; e.g. *Rep.* 478 b).—*ἂν εἶεν μετακεχειρισμένοι*, "would have become masters of"; cp. *Polit.* 268 b 5 *τὴν τῆς αὐτοῦ ποίμνης ἄριστα μεταχειριζόμενος μουσικήν.*

e 4. *τῆς περὶ τοὺς ποιητὰς αὐτούς*: equivalent to *τῆς τῶν ποιητῶν αὐτῶν*; it is not necessary to supply *φερούσης*—or even *οὔσης*.

(As first written in A, *τὸ πλῆθος* had no preposition before it: *ἐπὶ* was afterwards put in above the line. According to Schanz and Burnet, Badham substituted *περὶ* for this *ἐπὶ*, and Schanz does so in his text. Badham's note (*Conv. Epist.* p. 10) is ambiguous; I think he means to substitute *ἐπὶ* for the *περὶ* in e 4.)

These remarks of the Ath. are significant of Plato's views on poetry, and the poetic inspiration. At *Rep.* 401 b ff. he says supervision must be exercised over poets by the state (*ἐπιστατητέον καὶ προσαναγκαστέον*), as also over the *δημιουργοί*, to secure that they should produce only what is right and good (*τὴν τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ εἰκόνα*

ἤθους ἐμποιεῖν τοῖς ποιήμασιν). His views on the poets and μουσικοί of his time would seem to have hardened since writing the passage in the *Republic*, for there he contemplated the possibility that there should be δημιουργοί (and, by implication, ποιηταί —cp. 402 d) δυνάμενοι ἰχνεύειν τὴν τοῦ καλοῦ τε καὶ εὐσχήμονος φύσιν: here he talks as if the ποιηταί at all events are not likely to have that power.

e 7. καὶ δευτέρου, "as well as of the thing mentioned in the second place"; i.e. as well as the power to choose the right ῥυθμός and ἁρμονία.

671 a 1 ff. We may perhaps translate, "or with all his chanting he will never enchant the young to love virtue." It is not necessary to suppose that he has the word χορόν in mind when he writes ἱκανὸν ἐπῳδόν (after τοῖς δέ two lines above). As Heindorf says on *Gorg.* 478 c, "satis frequens (est) huiusmodi a plurali ad singularem transitus."—καὶ ὅπερ . . . γέγονεν, "well, when it began, the argument aimed at showing that our advocacy of the Dionysiac Choir was not mistaken, and it has done its best. We must now inquire whether it has succeeded."—As at 664 e 3 (κατ' ἀρχὰς τῶν λόγων), ἐν ἀρχαῖς here means at the beginning of the account of the Chorus of Dionysus. At a 7, however (ὅπερ ὑπεθέμεθα κατ' ἀρχὰς ἀν. εἶναι γίγν.), κατ' ἀρχάς refers to the beginning of the first μέθη discussion (640 c 1).—It is better, with Stallbaum, to take καλῶς λεγομένην as predicative with ἐπιδεῖξαι, not as attributive to βοήθειαν (so Ast and Jowett: "bring eloquent aid"). What follows is in no sense a vindication of the eloquence of the λόγος. It is a justification of the support it gave to the Dionysiac Choir. —The dat. χορῷ, governed by βοήθειαν, is of the same kind as those noticed on 670 a 2. (See Appendix to Bk. II.)

a 5. ὁ σύλλογος ὁ τοιοῦτος: not specially the assembly spoken of at 666 b 2 (of those over thirty), but any symposium, whatever the age of its members might be.

a 6. ἐπὶ μᾶλλον: cp. Hdt. iv. 181 ἐπὶ δὲ μᾶλλον ἰὸν ἐς τὸ θερμόν . . . In this phrase μᾶλλον seems (ungrammatically) to have taken the place of πλέον (cp. *Gorg.* 453 a), which is both adv. and adj. In A there is an erasure mark of three letters after πόσεως; perhaps the scribe wrote ἔτι by mistake, and crossed it out. Eusebius has ἔτι; he also has ἀεὶ for the nonsensical vulgate εἰ afer μᾶλλον. A has εἰ with an erasure mark and a "star" before it.

b 1. All recent editors, except Stallb. and the Zürich edd., follow Eusebius here in reading λεγουένων instead of the MS.

γιγνομένων.—Badham says περί is not Greek here ; that it ought to be ἐπί.

b 3. Cp. 645 d 6 ff.

b 4. Cp. 649 a 4, and for παρρησία 649 b 3.

b 5. The question of the claim to be ἄρχων did not come up before, but it is pertinent to the present subject.

b 8. ἔφαμεν : at 666 b 7 ff.

b 10. μαλθακωτέρας : Eusebius has μαλακωτέρας here, as the MSS. had at 666 b. It is natural that the expression should slightly vary in the repetition.

c 1. Heindorf, on *Gorg.* 479 c (ἆρ' οὖν συμβαίνει μέγιστον κακὸν ἀδικία ;) quotes this passage as an instance where εἶναι "subaudiri potest" with συμβαίνειν, this εἶναι being *expressed* at *Parm.* 134 b 1 ; the participle is also admissible with συμβαίνειν, and ὄν is to be "understood," as H. says, at *Euthydem.* 281 e.

c 2. τοῦτον δ' εἶναι κτλ. : it was not *said* at 666 b that the lawgiver was to be the πλάστης. Indeed the nearest approach to the mention of any πλάστης was the statement that the ψυχῆς ἦθος of the mature man would grow εὐπλαστότερον under the influence of wine. But the process of moulding implies the moulder. The analogy between the symposium of the young, as described at the end of Bk. I., and the Chorus of Dionysus, is to be seen in the fact that the ἀγαθὸς νομοθέτης, through the agency of the sexagenarians, is to stand to the third chorus in the same relation as the ruler of the feast stood to the symposium of the young.

c 3. ὥσπερ τότε, coming after ὅτ' ἦσαν νέαι, evidently means "as in their youth." (Ast suggested ὅσπερ ; the old vulgate was ὅνπερ.) In Bk. I. the νομοθέτης is appealed to, and referred to as arranging the education of the young—e.g. at 647 a, 648 a, 649 a.—οὗ νόμους εἶναι δεῖ συμποτικούς, "and from him must come laws to regulate symposia."

c 4. δυναμένους . . . ἐθέλειν ποιεῖν : see above on 663 e 1.—τόν is predicative with εὔελπιν and the other adjectives ; cp. 730 d 6 ὁ μέγας ἀνήρ, and 732 a 2 τόν γε μέγαν ἄνδρα ἐσόμενον.

c 6. καὶ οὐκ ἐθέλοντα . . . ὑπομένειν, "and will not consent to observe order, or be content with what is his proper share of silence, speech, drink, and song."—There is a slight zeugma in the use of ὑπομένειν.

c 8. εἰσιόντι and εἰσπέμπειν : apparently terms of the athletic arena ; διαμαχόμενον (which governs the dat. τῷ μὴ καλῷ θάρρει) is quite in harmony, "able to bring a champion to hold his own

against." Cp. Soph. *El.* 700 εἰσῆλθε πολλῶν ἁρματηλατῶν μέτα.

d 1. τὸν κάλλιστον φόβον: for the two sorts of fear cp. above 647 a 4 ff.—Eusebius has evidently preserved the right reading in τὸν κάλλιστον; all the existing MSS. have τὸν μὴ κάλλιστον. Orelli thought the μὴ was a mistake for δὴ; probably it was merely due to the μὴ before καλῷ just before.—οἵους τ' εἶναι: an anacoluthon; the sentence depending on δυναμένους was felt to be getting too long, so it goes on as if ἔφαμεν τοὺς νόμους δύνασθαι had gone before.

d 2. μετὰ δίκης: cp. 647 c 7. I think it has the same meaning here, "under the inspiration of" or "with the help of a right judgement"; we may perhaps translate, "in the cause of right." (Ast and Stallb. translate it merely "*ita ut decet, s. oportet.*") —θεῖον φόβον: if these words are sound (Stallb., Bdh. and Schanz would reject them)—and they do not look like a "*glossema*," as Stallb. calls them—we may translate them, "(which champion), heaven-taught fear that it is, (we have called αἰδώς and αἰσχύνη)."

d 7. στρατηγούς: at 640 (a b c) the συμποσίαρχοι were *compared* to στρατηγοί, here they are so *called.*—ὧν χωρίς: for χωρίς after its case cp. 947 b θρήνων δὲ καὶ ὀδυρμῶν χωρὶς γίγνεσθαι.

d 8. εἶναι, which goes with δεινότερον, seems to have been put in this place with a view to the rhythm and balance of the sentence. (Ast would replace it by πολεμεῖν, Orelli by ὁμόσε ἰέναι; Schanz would reject it.)

e 1. τοῖς ὑπὲρ ἑξήκοντα ἔτη γεγονόσιν: this information is slipped in in a curiously unemphatic way. As to the συμπόσια held to train or test the characters of the young—the ὀρθῶς παιδαγωγηθέντα συμπόσια of 641 b 1—we are not directly told, though it is implied, that the συμποσίαρχοι are to come from the *mature* class. So here the συμπόσια of the mature class are naturally presided over by men of an older age than they.

e 5. Perhaps we may conclude that it is the *regulation* of the μέθη (τοιαύτη μὲν μέθη) which is to bring the advantage (ὠφεληθέντες): while it is the *fun* and *enjoyment* (παιδιά), that is to preserve the sweetness of temper which will ensure that the συμπόται part greater friends than before.

672 a 1. δὲ MSS.: this clause comes in awkwardly by way of contrast to a clause which is itself a contrast to the one before it, but Ast's change of δὲ to τε does not mend matters. συγγενόμενοι καὶ ἀκολουθήσαντες κτλ. is just as awkward an addition if coupled by τε to ὠφεληθέντες and φίλοι. These last two words describe

the result of τοιαύτῃ μέθῃ, with τοιοῦτοι συμπόται, but the former are really an explanation of what is meant by τοιοῦτοι. It is because the συμπόται are law-abiding and docile that the good results follow. I have therefore ventured to change δὲ to δὴ, and have put the comma after συγγενόμενοι instead of after ἀκολουθήσαντες. The clause might then be translated, "the reason being that they had played their part in the meeting throughout in accordance with rules, and had obeyed whenever those who were sober issued commands to those who were not."—Ast's further emendations of ὁπότε to ὅπῃ ποτε, and ἀφηγοῖντο (for which L and O have ἀφίκοιντο) to ὑφηγοῖντο, as "Platonic," seem to me probable, particularly the latter. Perhaps, however, ἀφηγοῦμαι was preferred here, as being the *military* term, to keep up the metaphor of στρατηγοί at 671 d 7.—συνουσίαν συγγίγνεσθαι is a variety of συνουσίαν συνεῖναι, to which συνόδους συνιέναι at *Symp.* 197 d 2 is a close parallel.

a 4. Cleinias recurs to the doubt which Megillus and he hinted at 639 c and e.—For A's εἴη O and A^2 have ἐπὶ (the latter *supra versum*); from this mere misreading arose the vulgate εἴη ἐπὶ τοιαύτῃ (or τῇ τοιαύτῃ).

a 5–b 1. μὴ τοίνυν . . . λεχθέν, "we can now see that it was a mistake, in dealing with the gift of Dionysus, to condemn it absolutely as a bad thing, which no state would tolerate. Indeed there is more still that might be said on the subject, but I should hesitate to mention in public the very greatest boon which he confers, because most men, when it is mentioned, misjudge, and misconceive it." ἐπεί in a 8, whether explained by supposing the ellipse of a preceding "but it is no good," or whether we give it the meaning "though" claimed above for ἐπειδή at 669 b 6, has in effect here an *adversative* force, and may be represented by "but." What follows is mainly an instance of the wrong-headedness of the multitude, though it leads up to a defence of the gift of Dionysus.—ἐκεῖνο and ἔτι refer to 638 c d and e; ἁπλῶς corresponds to the εὐθὺς ῥηθέν of 638 c 3 and the εὐθύς of d 2.

b 3. By calling the story a φήμη he implies that it had in men's minds the sanction of religion.—ὑπορρεῖ πως, "is current in some quarters."

b 4. διεφορήθη . . . δεδώρηται, "was deprived of the use of his wits. That is why he inflicts on us Bacchic possession with all its frenzy and dancing—he wants to take vengeance on somebody; and is is from a desire for vengeance that he has given us wine to produce this madness." Then, with a "heaven help

their profanity!" he explains that this very tendency to frenzied motion which is stimulated in later life by wine is the *naturally implanted human instinct* out of which springs the highest of all arts, *μουσική*.—Where is the "senselessness" and the "silly exaggeration" which Bruns (*Plato's Gesetze*, p. 50) finds here, with Zeller's help?—I do not even see the "Mangel an Klarheit des Ausdrucks" which Ritter feels bound to admit.—Euripides, in the prelude to the *Cyclops*, makes Silenus, addressing Dionysus, speak of the time ἡνίκ' ἐμμανὴς Ἥρας ὕπο . . . ᾠχου.—Elsewhere Plato speaks of the ἦθος ψυχῆς (*Rep.* 400 d), the ὄψις ψυχῆς (*Rep.* 519 b), and the ὄμμα ψυχῆς (*Rep.* 533 d), though not of the γνώμη ψυχῆς (or the νοῦς ψυχῆς); Ast cps. the Lucretian *mens animi* (iv. 758).

b 5. *τάς τε βακχείας καὶ πᾶσαν τὴν μανικὴν χορείαν*: cp. *Symp.* 218 b *πάντες γὰρ κεκοινωνήκατε τῆς φιλοσόφου μανίας τε καὶ βακχείας.* (L, O, and A^2 have ἐμβάλλειν; if this were to be adopted, we ought to have δεδωρῆσθαι in the next line.)

b 6. *ὅθεν* is best taken as referring to *τιμωρούμενος*, not to the original *διεφορήθη τὴν γνώμην*; Dionysus was supposed to have compassed the maddening of men by wine *out of revenge*—others should be mad, as well as he.

b 8. *τὸ δὲ τοσόνδε οἶδα*; cp. 644 e 1 *τόδε δὲ ἴσμεν*, where also he is dismissing fancy in favour of fact. In both cases the fancy and the real picture have some traits in common. Here there is a distant analogy between the state of the infant whose *γνώμη* has not yet developed, and that of the God, who has lost it; in both cases too there is a *possession* which leads to gesticulations and cries.

c 4. *πᾶν μαίνεται*, "is quite mad"; *πᾶν* is not, as Stallb. says, a mere repetition of that at c 1 (*πᾶν ζῷον*).—*ὅταν ἀκταινώσῃ ἑαυτὸ τάχιστα*, "as soon as ever he gets on his legs."

c 6. *γυμναστικῆς*—not, so far, mentioned by name, in spite of the ἔφαμεν—is here used probably in the limited sense of the part of *χορεία* which consists of bodily movement—at all events it refers mainly to the bodily training which this demands.

d 1. Cp. 654 a 7 and 665 a 6.—The use of ἐνδεδωκέναι, "yield," suggests the view that the instinctive motion is the *soil*, so to speak, in which the sense *grows*, which is to reduce *ἀταξία* to *τάξις*.

d 2. The MS. *θεῶν*, which with difficulty could be made to mean "from among gods," is very awkward, and I have followed good Dr. Hagenbutte (Cornarius) in substituting *τούτων* for it. This may be taken to refer in particular to *ῥυθμός* and *ἁρμονία*,

or (better) generally to the course of events, or process, just described. Ritter, reminding us that at 653 c d we were told that the gods had *appointed* the Muses and Apollo and Dionysus to share men's feasts, proposes to read *ὑπὸ θεῶν*—F.H.D. would read *μετὰ θεῶν*—but the sentence *wants τούτων*.

d 5. *καὶ δὴ καὶ . . . ἰσχύος*, "so it comes to this, it seems: while the other people's story has it that wine has been given out of spite towards mankind, to make us mad, the account we have now given represents it as a specific given in quite the opposite spirit—as a means whereby our souls may win modesty, and our bodies health and vigour."—"An excellent summary of our discourse," says Cleinias.

e 5 ff. *ὅλη μέν . . . φωνῆς κίνησις*: Ath. "We said above," (654 a 9) "did we not, that *χορεία* as a whole was nothing more nor less than *παίδευσις*, and further, that one half of *χορεία*, that which concerns the voice, was a matter of *ῥυθμοί* and *ἁρμονίαι*?"

Cl. "Yes."

Ath. "And we found that *ῥυθμός* was not confined to the movement of the voice (up and down) but was shared by the movement of the body, though *σχῆμα* (gesture and posture) belonged to bodily action alone; while in the other part the movement of the voice is tune."—In other words, there is a clear analogy between the two halves of the subject, inasmuch as more than one of the same terms have to be applied to both.

673 a 3 f. I have unhesitatingly followed Burnet in adopting Ritter's emendation of the MS. *πρὸς ἀρετῆς παιδείαν* into *πρὸς ἀρετὴν παιδείας*: in that case *τῆς* of course belongs to *παιδείας*. Not only, as Ritter says, do we thereby get a real antithesis to the following *μέχρι τῆς τοῦ σώματος ἀρετῆς*, but 643 e *τὴν πρὸς ἀρετὴν ἐκ παίδων παιδείαν* furnishes us with a confirmatory parallel.

a 4. *οὐκ οἶδ' ὅντινα τρόπον* is a kind of apologetic qualification of the term applied—as we might say, "for want of a better term"; lit. we used the term "*in a sense*."

a 7. *ἃ παιζόντων ὄρχησιν εἴπομεν*, "which we termed sportive dancing."

a 9. *ἔντεχνον ἀγωγὴν ἐπί*: here we have the Greek for "technical education."—*ἐπὶ τὸ τοιοῦτον αὐτοῦ*, "towards such a condition of it" (i.e. of the body).

a 10. Schanz follows Bekker, Ast, and the Zürich editors in adopting from some inferior MSS. *προσείπομεν*. Except at 672 c the word *γυμναστική* has *not* been used in this connexion. The

subjunctive means "I propose to call," and may well be right here.

b 2. *καὶ νῦν οὕτως εἰρήσθω* is equivalent to "and this I would now repeat."

b 7. *πότερον ἡμῶν*, "either the one or the other of us"; cp. *νικησάντων δὲ ποτέρων* at 628 b 7.

d 1 ff. The same metaphor of *parentage* runs through the account of both origins. The animal instinct of movement, impregnated by the human sense of measure, conceives and gives birth to *ὄρχησις* as their offspring. Again, when song awakens the sense of rhythm, their union produces "all the delights of *χορεία* (*χορείαν καὶ παιδιάν* is a hendiadys.—A 2 has *παιδείαν*, which squares with 672 e 5, but—*pace* Ritter—is out of place here); *κοινωθέντ'* then agrees with *μέλος* and *ῥυθμός*. (Ast, followed by Schanz, alters the text to *τὸ δὲ μέλος . . . τοῦ ῥυθμοῦ* on the ground that Plato must have meant, after saying that the sense of *ῥυθμός* had produced *ὄρχησις*, to say that the same *ῥυθμός* ("*saltationis lex*") had produced song, or tune, and then that the two together had produced *χορεία*. But this is dictating to Plato's fancy. He does not choose to describe the birth of *μέλος*, and if he had wished to do so, he would hardly have used the words *ὑπομιμνήσκειν* and *ἐγείρειν*—words which imply that their object had been born already.)

e 3. *ὡς οὔσης σπουδῆς*, "as if it were a matter of public interest"; the words are opposed to *ὡς παιδιᾷ* at e 8.

e 5. I have followed Burnet and Schanz in adopting Eusebius's reading *μελέτῃ* for the MS. *μελέτης*. *μελέτῃ χρωμένη* is a periphrasis for *μελετῶσα*, and corresponds to *μηχανωμένη* in e 7. The simple *χρωμένη* subordinated to *χρήσεται* would be very bald.—*καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἡδονῶν μὴ ἀφέξεται ὡσαύτως*: this is an important and significant addition. It reveals the author's view that for the purpose of his treatise it is enough to take *one instance* as an illustration of a principle. This he develops in detail, and is content to omit the others, with the indication that their treatment would be analogous. Here e.g. he goes on to say that the same line of treatment will show that a state ought to employ the same treatment to all the other tempting pleasures (see above on 632 e and 672 e).

674 a 1. *μετ' ἐπιτηδευμάτων ὧντινωνοῦν ἄλλων*, "and add to this any other indulgences" (Jowett). This must be the meaning of these words, though they can hardly make good their position in strict logic. The fact that a state allows proceedings which

encourage other kinds of vice is no reason why *μέθη* should be banished; the full statement, of which this sort of parenthesis is a hint, would be: "and if any other practices are treated in the same loose way, I should equally vote against them."

a 3. *ἔτι μᾶλλον τῆς* Κρ. *καὶ* Λακ. *χρείας*, "going even beyond the Cretan and Lacedemonian usage."

a 4. With *προσθείμην* Ast and Stallb. understand *τὴν ψῆφον* from above, and all interpreters follow them. But I cannot help thinking that we ought to take *προσθείμην ἂν τῷ νόμῳ* exactly as we must take *καὶ προστίθημί γε τῷ νόμῳ* at *Rep.* 468 b, i.e. "to the Carthaginian law that on campaign nobody is ever to taste this drink, but (that men) must during all such period be water-drinkers, I would add, not only that at home too no slave, male or female, should ever taste wine but, that even the magistrates, etc." For one thing, I think that just after *τιθείμην ἂν ταύτην τὴν ψῆφον*, if he had meant to recall the phrase, he would not have used the compound with *προσ-* but the simple verb; but my main reason for preferring this interpretation is that it suits the context far better than the other.

a 5. Καρχηδονίων: Bruns (p. 51) finds in this a direct contradiction of what was said about Carthaginian drunkenness at 637 d. But surely it is just the drunken nation which would find such a regulation imperative in war time. E.g. the vodka prohibition in Russia in 1914.

b 2. *ἐνεργοὺς ὄντας*, "when on duty."

b 4. *εἰ μὴ σωμασκίας ἢ νόσων ἕνεκα*: i.e. "unless by trainer's or doctor's orders."

c 1. Eusebius's *ἀμπελώνων* is an improvement on the *ἀμπέλων* of the MSS. and Stobaeus.

c 2. *οὐδ' ἥτινι*: for *ὅστις* in the sense of *ὁστισοῦν* (after a negative) cp. *Hipp. Mai.* 282 d *τούτων δ' ἑκάτερος πλέον ἀργύριον ἀπὸ σοφίας εἴργασται ἢ ἄλλος δημιουργὸς ἀφ' ἥστινος τέχνης* (where there is a virtual negative).—*τακτὰ δὲ κτλ.*: i.e. among other ordinances for regulating agriculture would be one for confining wine-growing within very modest limits.

APPENDIX A

671 a 1–4. As I have said above, in a note on the Analysis of Bk. I., I regard the disquisition on *μέθη* in that book as a general introduction to the subject of education, and the

moral effects of *ἡδονή* and *λύπη*. After the *nature* of the educational process has been clearly described at the beginning of Bk. II. (653 a–e), Plato proceeds to deal specially with *μουσική*, and the relation to it of the gift of Dionysus. Among the young, we had been told, the benefit of the gift might be found in a properly conducted symposium: among the mature and elderly, it is to be found in the Choir of Dionysus. After describing the constitution of the latter, he now, at 671 a, turns to consider its applicability to the work of education, and in so doing he recalls (671 a—672 d 10) the main points of the former disquisition on *μέθη* as a possible *ἐπιτήδευμα ἀρετῆς*.

We may well fancy that when Plato wrote 643 a 4–7, the words *μέχριπερ ἂν πρὸς τὸν θεὸν ἀφίκηται* had for him a double meaning: that, to the Athenian's hearers the word *θεός* merely stood—and was meant to stand—for *οἶνος*; but that the author had in mind the subject of the third chorus. Whether this was so or not, the words express so well what I conceive to be the plan of the division of the subject that I will quote them in full. They are: *πρῶτον δὴ οὖν πρὸς τὸν λόγον ὁρισώμεθα παιδείαν τί ποτ' ἐστὶν καὶ τίνα δύναμιν ἔχει· διὰ γὰρ ταύτης φαμὲν ἰτέον εἶναι τὸν προκεχειρισμένον ἐν τῷ νῦν λόγον ὑφ' ἡμῶν, μέχριπερ ἂν πρὸς τὸν θεὸν ἀφίκηται.* Dr. Ivo Bruns (*Plato's Gesetze vor und nach ihrer Herausgabe durch Philippos von Opus*) holds that the tractate in Bk. I. on the possible use of *μέθη* as an *ἐπιτήδευμα αἰδοῦς* (646 a—649 c), and the suggestion of a Chorus of Dionysus, with all the discussion of *παιδεία* and *μουσική* preliminary to it, were written at different times, and with totally different views: —that they can never have been intended by their author to form parts of the same treatise—that indeed they contradict each other in several important points. Also that the section of Bk. II. from 671 a 4 *σκοπώμεθα* to 672 d is a clumsy attempt on the part of an editor to bring the two discussions into harmony; and that all references, in the second book, to the treatment of *μέθη* in the first (e.g. 666 c *καὶ οὕτως . . . μὲν δή*, 659 c *τρίτον ἢ τέταρτον*) as well as all passages in Bk. I. which might seem to look forward to, or lead up to the main discussion of Bk. II., were inserted into the text by the same editor—equally clumsily. Bruns's examination of these and other parts of the *Laws* is very searching, and is written with great ability, and is indeed a very helpful guide to the understanding of many parts of the treatise. His arguments are powerful, and both the destructive and the constructive[1] parts

[1] E.g. his view that the bulk of Bk. II. originally formed part of Bk. VII.

of his book, if they are to be satisfactorily confuted, would need answers far too long to be given here. I can only say here that I am not convinced by them, and that I think the general line of the defence against his criticisms is this: i.e. that the train of thought in Plato's dialogues often winds about in such unexpected ways, that different readers arrive at quite different views as to the importance to be assigned to different sections, and as to the way in which each section was intended by its author to serve as a contribution to the main argument. Often indeed it is impossible to secure agreement as to what the main argument was intended to be. On these grounds I do not accept as final Bruns's statements that the author of such and such a passage *evidently meant* to go on in a different way from that in which the treatise proceeds, or that it is *logically impossible* that Plato could have taken subjects in the order in which he seems to have arranged them. Also there seem to me to be analogous points in the two *μέθη* discussions to which Bruns is blind.

APPENDIX B

672 e 1—673 e 2. The subject of *χορεία* falls into two halves: (1) the training of the (ear and) voice, and (2) the training of the body in rhythmic movement. The first part Plato here calls *μουσική*, giving the word a more restricted sense than usual; the second he calls *γυμναστική*, though he does not imply thereby that the sole object of *γυμναστική* is the training for *χορεία*. The first half of the subject, he says, has been fully dealt with: of the second, though it has not been left out of sight, the treatment has been incomplete; shall he complete it now? Are we, i.e., to have, side by side with the description of the *ἔντεχνος ἀγωγὴ ἐπὶ μουσικήν*, a companion picture of the technical training best adapted for the bodily half?—*περανοῦμεν, ἢ καὶ ἐάσομεν; . . . λέγωμεν, ἢ πῶς καὶ πῇ ποιητέον;* What old blue gets tired of boating "shop"? There is nothing the two Dorians would like better than a long talk about gymnastic training, but the Athenian—or at all events Plato—does not mean to indulge them. In acceding to their request he tells them they know it all already, and then he begins the subject in such a way as to hint that his treatment of it is to follow the lines of the discussion of the training in *μουσική*. Then, with a repeated promise to go on hardly out of his mouth (*τὸ δὲ πειρασόμεθα ἐφεξῆς*

διελθεῖν), he abruptly breaks off; if they do not mind, he says, he will first dismiss the subject of lawful μέθη by a final recapitulation. To the subject of gymnastic training he does not return until the seventh and eighth Books. Ritter agrees with Bruns that the explanation of this silence is that the treatise is here incomplete, though he does not follow Bruns in his theory of an editorial dislocation of Plato's arrangement. Stallbaum, on the other hand, in spite of the following πειρασόμεθα ἐφεξῆς διελθεῖν, holds that in 673 c 9–d 5 we *have* the promised disquisition on gymnastic training. I would suggest that the best explanation of Plato's silence is that he never intended to write this disquisition at all. At 632 e he told us that the treatment of the ἐπιτηδεύματα which would foster *one* virtue would serve as a παράδειγμα for the treatment of those belonging to other virtues, and then he stopped in his career after one virtue had been discussed. In the same way here he makes the conversation turn from the subject proposed when enough has been said to show that there is no need to pursue it further.

BOOK III

In Books I. and II. we have been considering, under various guises, the relation of Law to the Individual—how it acquires authority, and how it helps to discipline the character through the action of pleasure and pain, desire and fear. We now pass abruptly to the political frame-work within which, and upon which Law acts.

676 a 1–c 8. Ath. "Now that we have settled that question, I should like to ask *what is the most elementary form of a state?*—The easiest and best way to discover this is to examine the question in the same way as we examine a state to see whether its progress is towards perfection or towards ruin."

Cl. "How is that?"

Ath. "Why, by taking an immensely long period of time, and observing the changes that take place in it."

Cl. "What do you mean exactly?"

Ath. "You see, states have existed, and men have lived as members of them for a quite incalculable length of time.—You can say how long?"

Cl. "I cannot."

Ath. "You may call it an unlimited time?"

Cl. "You may."

Ath. "Don't you think myriads on myriads of states have come into being during this time? and, whatever the amount, have not an equal number of states ceased to be? Have they not severally exhausted all kinds of constitution many times over? Have they not sometimes grown from small to big, and sometimes sunk from big to small?—changed too from good to bad, and from bad to good?"

Cl. "It must have been so."

Ath. "Now I want, if I can, to get hold of the thing that caused all this transformation; for I expect that would reveal to us the secret of the birth and change of states."

a 1. Cp. Plut. *Demosth.* ch. 4 *καὶ ταῦτα μὲν ταύτῃ, κατὰ Πλάτωνα.—πολιτείας ἀρχήν*: for this expression he substitutes at c 8 *τὴν πρώτην (τῶν πολιτειῶν) γένεσιν καὶ μετάβασιν*: the object of his search is what perhaps in modern phrase we might call "*the secret of political vitality.*"

a 6. *μεταβαίνουσαν*: many editors have been inclined to think Boeckh right in reading *μεταβαινουσῶν.*—Badham wrote it so independently. Ast and Schanz adopt the change. Perhaps, though, Plato preferred the rhythm of the slightly irregular expression. After all it is not straining language much to talk of *the advance of a state* being transformed in the direction of perfection, instead of saying that the *advancing state* is so transformed.

a 8. That is, the point of view from which we must examine the question must be one which takes in an immense expanse of time, and all the transformations which occur in it.—*μήκους τε καὶ ἀπειρίας*: a hendiadys for *ἀπείρου μήκους.*

b 7. I think the *τοῦτό γε* in the next line shows that Stallbaum is right in taking *τὸ δέ γε κτλ.* to mean, "but you can be sure of this much (can't you), that it must be a hopelessly immeasurable time"? He makes *τό* the article to the *ὡς* clause. Hermann, Schneider, Schanz, and Burnet rightly make the sentence a question. Ast and Heindorf take *ὡς* as "*perquam,*" as in *ὡς ὠμά* at *Crat.* 395 b.—Schanz preserves the *ἄπειρον* of A as against the *ἄπλετον* of L, O, and most modern editors.

c 1. For *πάσας*, "all kinds of," cp. 637 a 3 *ἀνοίᾳ πάσῃ*, 688 c 6 *πάσῃ κακίᾳ.*

c 6. *περί*: Ast on this passage, and Heindorf on *Phaedr.* 270 c, have collected instances of the "redundant" *περί*, where the simple gen. might have stood. It is especially frequent with *αἰτία.* Cp. also 664 a *τούτου δὲ πέρι πᾶσαν μηχανὴν εὑρίσκειν,*

and 678 a **3.**—*εἰ δυναίμεθα* : less confident than *ἦν δυνώμεθα*, almost wistful in tone. The line of thought here followed is this : if we can find what is the cause and nature of the *true development* of a state, i.e. of its *progress towards perfection*, we shall learn what is the first principle or vital force which brought it into being. A practical application of this knowledge is described at 683 b ; it will enable us to decide what *laws* are suitable for a state.

c 9. With *προθυμεῖσθαι ἀποφαινόμενον* we may usefully compare *συντεῖναι πειρώμενον δηλῶσαι* in a very similar sentence in 641 e ; it is a more direct expression than the *προθυμεῖσθαι ἀποφαίνεσθαι* which seems more natural to us.

677 a 5. Among many passages from ancient writers which speak of wholesale destruction of life by some physical catastrophe Ast cps. *Polit.* 270 c 11 *φθοραὶ τοίνυν ἐξ ἀνάγκης τότε μέγισται συμβαίνουσι τῶν τε ἄλλων ζῴων, καὶ δὴ καὶ τὸ τῶν ἀνθρώπων γένος ὀλίγον τι παραλείπεται.* There is no need, with Boeckh, to put in *τὸ* before *τῶν ἀνθρώπων* in the present passage. Among other slight variations between the two passages, in the *Pol.* he says "the human race survives in a mere fragment" ; whereas here he says, "only a very few representatives of mankind survive." Cp. *Rep.* 363 d *παῖδας γὰρ παίδων φασὶ καὶ γένος κατόπισθεν λείπεσθαι τοῦ ὁσίου καὶ εὐόρκου.*

a 8. *νοήσωμεν* : *νοέω* does not (as in *Ep.* viii. 352 c *νοήσατε δὲ ἃ λέγω νῦν*) mean *turn one's attention to, ponder, think about*, but is "let us suppose." I have therefore put a (—) after *γενομένην* ; i.e. the speaker meant to add a secondary predicate to *ταύτην*, perhaps in the form of a *ὅτι* or *ὡς* clause. The interruption of Cleinias's question enables him to change the subject of the *ὡς* clause from *αὕτη* (*ἡ φθορά*) to *οἱ τότε περιφυγόντες.*

b 2. I think we may include *ἐν κορυφαῖς* in the picture suggested by *ζώπυρα*, as well as in the statement of fact about the surviving herdsmen ; the speaker is thinking, perhaps, of the seemingly tiny flashes from heath or forest fires seen on distant mountains. There is moreover a special appropriateness in the metaphor, since water puts out fire, and water was the destroying medium in the catastrophe.

b 5 ff. "To say nothing of the other resources of civilization, of course such men as these can know nothing of all the tricks devised by dwellers in cities to over-reach or eclipse or otherwise damage each other." The *τῶν* before *ἐν τοῖς ἄστεσι* is masc.—otherwise the *πρὸς ἀλλήλους* and the *ἐπινοοῦσιν* would be harsh : *μηχανῶν* has to do without an article, for, if it had one, *τῶν* would occur

too often.—It is even possible that the first τῶν is masc.—Wagner suggested that we ought to read ἀστοῖσι for ἄστεσι.—Stallb. and Herm. both inserted the usual τε after the first τῶν, thus adding emphasis to the μηχανῶν; Wagner and Schanz agree.—Cobet alters εἰς to ἐκ; but εἰς, "in the matter of" (cp. 774 b 4, 809 e 7, 860 d 1), suits the context better, and it provides a good construction for the antecedent of ὁπόσα. Cobet cps. *Symp.* 188 b, and takes εἴς τε πλ. κ. φιλ. with the words which follow, not with τεχνῶν and μηχανῶν. — οἱ ἐν τοῖς ἄστεσι is equivalent to "civilized beings."

c 1. θῶμεν; "may we take it?" So 860 c ὡς λέγοντα τίθετε. (Schanz would substitute φῶμεν for θῶμεν here and at c 3, —unnecessarily.)

c 2. ἆρα ἦν A corrected by A^3 to ἄρδην, which is the reading of L, O and Eus.; an instructive mistake on the part of A. Cod. Voss. also read ἆρα ἦν.

c 4–7. "We shall suppose, shall we not, all implements to be destroyed and all serviceable contrivances of statesmen or other experts to disappear entirely at that juncture?" It is hard to say whether τέχνης or σοφίας is to be joined in thought with πολιτικῆς; in either case the meaning is much the same.—In σπουδαίως we have the notion of *professional* or purposeful activity; cp. 656 a 4.

c 7–d 6. Burnet has followed O. Immisch (ut supra, pp. 60 ff.) in attributing πῶς . . . ὁτιοῦν to the Ath. I. says the Armenian translation, Ficinus, and L confirm this division. B. has also placed the τοῦτο, which follows ὁτιοῦν in A (and which, from MS. days downwards, has been either omitted or changed) at the head of Cleinias's answer. The only change I would make in Burnet's reading of the passage is that I follow Herm. in rejecting the first γέγονεν. But it is not only the reading and division of this difficult passage that have been disputed. Interpretations have varied at many points; e.g. as to whether ἔτη or τάδε (understood) is the subj. of διελάνθανεν, whether (τοὺς) τότε means *after* or *before* the flood, and whether Δαιδάλῳ (and the other datives) means (revealed) *by* D. (Ast), or *to* D. Indeed the whole drift of the passage seems to have been differently understood by every interpreter. I would suggest as a translation of πῶς γὰρ . . . γεγονότα: Ath. "If the world was without interruption furnished with all the advantages it now possesses, what room was there for any new invention whatever?" Cl. "It comes to this, that we shall have to suppose (ἄρα) that during myriads of myriads of years, the men

then living" (i.e. after the flood) "knew nothing of them" (i.e. were uncivilized), "and that, one or two thousand years ago—a mere yesterday, you may say—this discovery was revealed to Daedalus, that to Orpheus, etc."

d 1. *τοῦτο*: for a somewhat similar use of a neuter demonstrative cp. the adverbial use of *τοῦτο* "in that case" at 684 c 1 and *ταῦτα* at 700 d 1.

d 5. H. W. Moss, in an article on the use of *ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν*, pointed out that the phrase here qualifies *πάμπολλα*, and that, consequently, the comma which has hitherto stood after that word ought to come after *εἰπεῖν*.

d 7. *ἄριστ' . . . ὅτι παρέλιπες*, "it is very nice" (i.e. modest) "of you to leave out . . . " A and O read *ἆρ' ἴστ'*, which most editors content themselves with altering to *ἆρ' οἶσθ'*. From the margin of Cod. Voss. is reported *ἄριστ'*. There seems no other way of accounting for *ἆρ' ἴστ'* except by supposing, as Burnet does, that *ἄριστ'* was the original reading.

d 9. For Epimenides' date cp. on 642 d.

e 1. *ὑμῖν*: ethic dative.—*τῷ μηχανήματι . . . ἀπετέλεσεν*: a comparison of the Schol. on Hes. *Op. et Di.* 40 f., and Plutarch, *Conv. Sept. Sap.* 157 e (ch. 14) shows that Plato here refers to the belief that Hesiod's words about the virtue of "mallow and asphodel" set Epimenides on the track of sovereign herbal medicaments.

e 10. *καὶ ταῦτα*: i.e. there was an *ἐρημία* of animals as well as of mankind.—*σπάνια . . . νέμουσιν . . . ζῆν*, "few for their pasturers to live on"; so few that the men who grazed them had difficulty in supporting life. The inf. with *σπάνιος* is of the same construction as that with its opposite *ἱκανός*. So at *Rep.* 373 d *ἱκανὴ τρέφειν τοὺς τότε ἡ χώρα ἔσται*.—The *εἶναι* goes with all the accusatives, beginning with *ἐρημίαν*. (This seems better than to take *εἶναι* as equivalent to *ἐξεῖναι*, as at *Theaet.* 207 b 4; in that case *βουκόλια*, *γένος* and *ταῦτα* would be governed by *νέμουσιν*.)

678 a 1. *τὸ, τότε* MSS.: the repetition of *τότε* after that at e 6 seems strange. I think that we ought to read *τὸ κατ' ἀρχάς* here; cp. 679 a 1 *εἰ μή τισιν κατ' ἀρχὰς ἴσως*.

a 3. *ὧν*: for the objective gen. with *λόγος* in the sense of *about* something Stallb. cps. *Apol.* 26 b . . . *θεῶν ὧν νῦν λόγος ἐστίν*, and Soph. *Ant.* 11 *μῦθος φίλων* "tidings *about* friends."—For *περί c. gen.* instead of the simple gen. cp. on 676 c 6.

a 4. *ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν*: this qualifies *τὸ παράπαν*.

a 9. The *vice* and *virtue* spoken of are those of *men*, not those of

institutions referred to at 676 a 5 and c 3 and 683 b. He means, as he explains immediately, that virtue and vice, like the details of civilization, take time to develop, and can only develop in their company. How this applies to vice is explained at e 6 ff. He does not give a corresponding explanation of the rise of virtue, because a virtuous development (the *ἐπιδοσις εἰς ἀρετήν*) is *natural*. The object of the whole treatise is to show how to avoid and obviate the *accidents* which give rise to vice.

b 3. O has *ἢ καὶ* for *ἢ*.

b 6. The *ω* of *ἡμῶν* being in an erasure in A, Schanz conjectures *ἡμῖν*.—*εἰς π. κτλ.*, "the world came to be what the world is," Jowett.

b 9. *κατὰ σμικρόν* at *Prot.* 338 e, *Soph.* 217 d, *Rep.* 344 a and 401 c means "in little bits"; here it is "little by little," as at *Rep.* 407 d, *Phaedr.* 262 a, *Theaet.* 180 e, *Theag.* 130 c. At *Soph.* 241 c *καὶ κατὰ σμικρόν*, like the following *καὶ κατὰ βραχύ*, means "ever so little."

c 1. *πρέπει*: cp. *Phaedo* 114 d 5 *τοῦτο . . . πρέπειν μοι δοκεῖ*. The sense of "to be likely" is not common for *πρέπειν*.

c 3. "*Ἐναυλος* eleganter dicitur tam de sermone, quo adhuc aures personant, quam de re qualibet, cujus adhuc recens est memoria," Ruhnken, *Tim.*

c 5. For *ἑαυτούς* in the sense of *ἀλλήλους* cp. *Lysis* 215 b, *Parm.* 133 e.

c 6. *ἐν τοῖς περὶ ἐκεῖνον τὸν χρόνον*: this has generally, and rightly, been taken as an expansion of such a phrase as *τὰ νῦν*, on the lines of local expressions like (*ἐς*) *τὰ ἐπὶ θάτερα*, *τὰ ἐπ' ἐκεῖνα*, (*εἰς*) *τὸ ἐπ' ἐκεῖνα*, *τὸ ἐπὶ τάδε*, *εἰς τὰ τοῦ ἀδελφοῦ τοῦ ἐμοῦ* (Lysias xii. 12). Schanz, however, marks *ἐν τοῖς* as corrupt, and Badham introduces *καιροῖς* after *χρόνον*. (Rather than this I would take *τοῖς* as masc.)—Steph. altered the MS. *πορεία* into *πορεῖα*, and, as there is a gap two letters long in A before the word, Schanz admirably conjectured *τὰ πορεῖα*. The *τὰ* goes well with the *πάντα* in c 8.

c 7. The *τότε*, to which Boeckh took exception, has the effect of making the *ὥστε* clause (which Boeckh rejected) the most significant part of the complex sentence. It is as if Plato said, "They could not travel to each other as yet, either by land or sea, because all kinds of vehicles had been destroyed."—*σὺν ταῖς τέχναις*: i.e. "as well as the arts necessary for their construction."

d 1. *μεταλλεῖα* for *μέταλλα*: Lobeck, *Paralipp.* iv. 10, gives

many instances of nouns and adjectives in -ος, -η, -α, or -ον which have alternative forms in -ειος, -εια, or -ειον, and mentions this case in that connexion.—*συγκεχυμένα*: i.e. "filled up with mud," like the "nine men's morris."

d 2. *ἀνακαθαίρεσθαι*: used, not, as some take it, of clearing out the mines, but in its technical sense of *extracting metal from the ore*; cp. on 642 a. There could of course be no possibility of doing this if the mines were not accessible.

d 3. *δρυοτομίας*: abstract for concrete; "timber," not merely, as L. & S., "firewood." (Not "they (had) no means of felling timber," as Jowett, but "they were consequently badly off for timber.")—A has *που*, O *πού τι*, Vulg. *τί που*.

d 7. A has *ἄν* with *δή* as an alternative, and O *δή* with *ἄν* as alternative.

d 8. *τοῦθ' οὕτως γεγονέναι*: i.e. that the miners' art revived.

e 2. A has *λέγονται* with *δέονται* as an alternative, O *δέονται* with *λέγονται* as alternative.

e 6. The change in the matters spoken about is not so abrupt as at first it seems: there was no *στάσις*, because *ἄσμενοι ἑαυτοὺς ἐώρων δι' ὀλιγότητα*; no war (partly) because there was a dearth of weapons. Still, the author wishes to add a further result of the *ἐρημία*, i.e. that there was enough for all; also to hint what were the chief curses of civilized societies, i.e. *money*, and *lies*—the unnatural appetite for accumulated wealth, and the loss of faith and truth which comes in the train of selfishness.

679 a 1. *νομῆς*: the following *ᾗ διέζων* shows that this is not to be restricted to the literal sense of pasturage, but, as in the case of *δρυοτομία* at 678 d 3, stands for the resulting product, i.e. flocks and herds; so, at Xen. *Anab.* iii. 5. 2 (*νομαὶ πολλαὶ βοσκημάτων διαβιβαζόμεναι εἰς τὸ πέραν τοῦ ποταμοῦ κατελήφθησαν*), *νομαί* means *pasturing herds*.

a 7. *οὐδὲ ἕν*: this adverbial use of the emphatic form is uncommon.

b 1. Perhaps it is better to say that the clause *τούτω τὼ τέχνα πορίζειν ταῦτα* is the direct object of *ἔδωκε*, than to take *τὼ τέχνα* as the direct object, and explain (as Stallb.) *πορίζειν* to be = *ὥστε πορίζειν*.

b 2. *τοιαύτην ἀπορίαν* seems to refer definitely to the lack of iron, rather than to general distress, such as that caused by the flood. (Jowett trans. "when reduced to their last extremity.") —*βλάστην καὶ ἐπίδοσιν*: *βλάστη* here perhaps means *sprouting* or *birth*; at *Phaedr.* 251 d it means a nascent germ, or sprout; at

Prot. 334 a, all that sprouts above ground from a root; Sophocles uses *βλάσται* of *birth*, *O.T.* 717, *Trach.* 382, and at *O.C.* 972 of *conception*. In that case the two words would exactly correspond to the *γένεσιν καὶ μετάβασιν* of 676 c 8.

b 3. *διὰ τὸ τοιοῦτον*, "that being so."

b 6. *ὃ τότε ἐν ἐκείνοις παρῆν*: Ficinus in his trans. omits these words. Wagner concludes that they were absent from some MSS., and that the scribe who restored them put them in the wrong place. He would place them after *γίγνοιτ' ἄν*. Ast puts a full stop at *ὄντες*, and only a comma after *παρῆν*. Cornarius makes these words mean ". . . (were without the gold) which was then among them." Some of the difficulty is removed if, with Stallb., we take what precedes to be, like the following one, a *general* statement; not "*they* would not have been rich," but "*men* were never made rich (who had no gold and silver, and *that* was the men's condition)." (Ritter takes *τότε* and *ἐκείνοις* to refer to the period and the men of the earlier civilization before the flood; but this does not help.)

b 7. *ᾗ δ' ἄν κτλ.*, "if a community is to breed the best natures, it must admit neither poverty nor wealth: without them no blatant oppression can gain a footing, or jealous envy."

c 1. Stallb. has collected many examples of the way in which variety is secured by the substitution of *τε . . . οὐ* for a second or third *οὔτε*; this is a step towards the not infrequent *οὔτε . . . τε*.

c 2 ff. *ἀγαθοὶ μὲν . . . διεληλύθαμεν*, "last, but not least, among good influences was their so-called *simplicity*. What they heard called fair or foul, they were so 'simple' as to think rightly named, and believe really to be so. No one was 'clever' enough to suspect a lie, as do our wiseacres of to-day. What they were told about gods and men, they took for true, and lived by it, and that is how they came to be just the kind of men we have above described."

d 2. *εἴπωμεν* A (and L and O?); Vat. 1029 reads *εἴπομεν*; so Ficinus and Cornarius, who trans. *diximus*; so Ast conjectured, and so Schanz reads. The substance of this paragraph is almost entirely recapitulatory, so that the indic. may well be right—in spite of the *μέλλουσιν εἶναι* "are bound to be." The only novelty is the mention of *many generations*, but this is implied in the 1000 years of 677 d.

d 6. *κατὰ πόλιν μόνον αὐτοῦ*: if *μόνον αὐτοῦ* is sound, the *αὐτοῦ* seems to have been added to the *κατὰ πόλιν* with the same effect as in *ἐνθάδ' αὐτοῦ* and similar, mostly Homeric, expressions; cp. our "within there," "without there" in Shakespeare. (Ast

and Stallb. put the comma before *αὐτοῦ* instead of after it, and construe it (still with a local meaning) with *λεγόμεναι*. Bdh. reads *ὀνόματι* for *μόνον αὐτοῦ*, also taking it with *λεγόμεναι*. Ritter proposes *αὐτῶν* (i.e. *πολεμικῶν τεχνῶν*) for *αὐτοῦ*, H. Richards *αὖ*: of the emendations I prefer the last.)

e 2. The three comparatives which follow *εὐηθέστεροι* contain the only fresh points in this paragraph. They come in as an expansion of the praise implied in the *ἔζων κατὰ ταῦτα* in c 7.

e 6. *λελέχθω δὴ . . . αὐτοῖς*, "let what we have said, and all the deductions we make from it, be regarded as a means of ascertaining how the men of that time came to want laws, and who their lawgiver was."

680 a 4. *τὸ τοιοῦτον*: not "such a thing as a *lawyer*," but "such a thing as a *law*."—For the plur. *χρόνους* cp. below on 769 c 5.

a 6. *περιόδου*: the cycle that elapses between one natural convulsion and another. Plato seems to assume that such convulsions only occur at great intervals of time.—*ἔθεσι καὶ τοῖς λεγομένοις πατρίοις νόμοις*: we see from 793 a f. that these *ἄγραφα νόμιμα* or *πάτριοι νόμοι* are indispensable to a community even after written laws have been introduced. The *τοῖς λεγομένοις* (and the *οὓς ὀνομάζουσιν* at 793 a) show that *πάτριος* is to be taken as a technical term, in the sense of *traditional*.

a 9. "Herein we have already a form of polity"—if we may use the word polity in Hooker's sense of *political organization*.

b 2. *δυναστείαν*: *patriarchy* is what we should call this particular form of "authority," though Plato hesitates to coin the word *πατριαρχία*. The important point in his eyes seems to have been the fact that *authority* (*δυναστεία*) should attach to any position; hence the term chosen. The leading idea connected with the word (cp. *Rep.* 544 d, Arist. *Pol.* 1292 b) seems that of *personal authority*.—*καὶ νῦν ἔτι . . . καὶ ἐν Ἕλλ. καὶ κατὰ βαρ.*: this must mean that this personal inherited authority existed in some Greek states; not that they were altogether in the same primitive condition as to polity as the Cyclopes.

b 3. *λέγει δ' . . . οἴκησιν*, "Homer, you remember, says it was to be found in the way in which the Cyclopes lived." *οἴκησις* is not "government," as Stallb. translates it, but it would be hard to find a single English word for it here.

c 2. *χαρίεις*, "a *pretty* poet," in the old phrase.

d 2. *τὸ ἀρχαῖον αὐτῶν ἐπὶ τὴν ἀγριότητα διὰ μυθολογίας ἐπανενεγκών*, "when, in his poem, he ascribes their primitive ways

to their wild life"; i.e., Homer, like the Athenian, tells of units of population scattered among the hill-tops, and points to the necessary consequences of such isolation.

d 7. *οἴκησιν*: here the concrete "*household.*"

d 8. *γένος*: the "*family*"; not yet the *clan* into which the household grows.—*κατὰ γένος*, "in *separate* families."—*ὑπὸ ἀπ. κτλ.* gives the reason for *διεσπαρμένων*. *ἀπορία*, "*dearth*," not of men, but of possessions and implements.

e 1. *ἐν αἷς*: the antecedent to this relative is, of course, not (as Stallb.) *φθοραῖς*, though it immediately precedes, but *πολιτεῖαι*. The Ath. does not think it necessary to repeat the words *τοιαῦται πολιτεῖαι γίγνονται*, but they are carried on in sense from his last speech. (Ast, followed by Wagner, Hermann, the Zür. edd., Schanz and Ritter read *ἐν οἷς*.)—In this paragraph we pass from the single family with the father at the head, to the next generation, when *the eldest brother* takes his father's place and, as it were, acts as the "father" of his younger brothers and their families, as well as of his own.

e 2. *πατρὸς καὶ μητρός*: I imagine *καί* to mean *or*, and that Plato is thinking of cases where authority and property descended through the mother. The same interpretation is possible at 690 a 3.

e 3. *πατρονομούμενοι*: Timaeus, *Lex.*, gives two explanations of this word: (1) *οἱ τοῖς γονικοῖς* (i.e. handed down from father to son) *νόμοις χρώμενοι*, and (2) *ὑπὸ τῶν πατέρων ἀρχόμενοι*. The latter is most likely the right one, at least for this passage (in spite of 680 a 6); only the "father" is the father of the tribe, who inherits his position from the original father of the family.—We may translate the whole paragraph: "And so do there not arise, out of these single households and families, whom the dearth consequent on the cataclysms keeps in isolation, communities in which the eldest rule because they inherit the authority from father or mother, and the people follow them, and are soon to be found forming one flock, like so many birds, ruled by paternal authority, the justest of all titles to royal rank?"—This is the fully developed *patriarchy*.

e 6. "Yes, and next, larger numbers (*πλείους* subj.) join together to form greater communities such as we may term *πόλεις*." The word *πόλεις* seems strangely used of these primitive communities. Naber conjectures *ἐπαύλεις*. If *πόλεις* is correct, it must be used proleptically. F.H.D. conj. that *πόλεις* is a mistake for *οἰκήσεις* due to the adjacent *πλείους*.

e 7. γεωργίας: as we use the words "planting" or "plantation" for a planted space, so "cultivation" is used here for *cultivated spaces.*

681 a 2. τειχῶν ἐρύματα, "as walls of defence."—οἰκίαν: he uses the word οἰκία, figuratively, for what he has just called a πόλις. At a 7 he calls it an οἴκησις.

a 8. παρεῖναι . . . ἔχουσαν, "should bring with it."

b 1. οἰκεῖν: the subj. to this verb is really the ἑκάστους, which is not definitely expressed till b 5.—ἕτερα ἀφ' ἑτέρων ὄντων . . ., "(each) a distinct set, derived from a distinct set of . . ." ἕτερα is governed by an imaginary ἔχοντας, agreeing with the same ἑκάστους understood.

b 3. κοσμιωτέρων . . . ἀνδρικώτερα, "the more orderly or spirited the forbears, the more orderly and spirited would be the dispositions of the descendants they had brought up." I think κοσμιωτέρων and ἀνδρικῶν are under the government of an imaginary ἀπό, repeated from ἀφ' before ἑτέρων. (Boeckh unnecessarily proposes ἀνδρικωτέρων for ἀνδρικῶν.)

b 4. κατὰ τρόπον here seems to mean "duly," "as was to be expected."—οὕτως, "in this manner," i.e. by descent and training. (Or ought we to take οὕτως as "merely," "just," with κατὰ τρόπον, as in ἁπλῶς οὕτως? In such an idiomatic phrase it is hard for us to be certain; "just in the same way" would fit in well here.)

b 5. ἀποτυπουμένους ἄν, "ready to imprint," or "likely to imprint." Not only would each contingent bring its own traditional manners and dispositions, but it would be sure to perpetuate its own preferences in its descendants.—It is surprising what a light is let in upon the sentence by Schneider's ἂν αἱρέσεις for the MS. ἀναιρέσεις. Burnet adopts it; so do Herm. and Wagner, though they are probably wrong in taking ἄν with ἥκειν; it goes much better with ἀποτυπουμένους. Ast saw part of the truth when he proposed to read αἱρέσεις (so Schanz), instead of ἀναιρέσεις.—Ast also proposed ἀνευρέσεις, and Winckelmann ἀνευρήσεις, Orelli ἀεὶ αἱρέσεις. Stallb. actually retains ἀναιρέσεις and translates it "ea quae susceperint."

c 1. Schanz says that A has αὐτῶν.

c 2. With ὑστέρους we must supply ἀρέσκειν. This added clause (τοὺς δὲ . . . ὑστέρους), which Schanz would eject from the text, gives the whole sentence the same effect it would have had if πρώτους had been put in (predicatively) with νόμους, and the second clause omitted.—This is exactly the informal way in

which thoughts drop out in conversation. It says, in effect, "I don't mean that other people's laws will be positively *dis*pleasing to them; only that they will like their own *best*." (H. Steph. wanted to insert the πρώτους.)

c 4. ἀρχῇ . . . ὡς ἔοικεν: in other words, "is not this, after all, how a definite enactment of laws came about?"—i.e. from the necessity of *choosing*, for the united community, the best out of the laws of the clan-units out of which it was formed. If this is the right interpretation of these words, it follows that the next speech of the Ath. is a development of this idea; and this view is supported by the explanatory γοῦν added to the adverbial τὸ μετὰ ταῦτα.

c 7. τὸ γοῦν . . . ἑαυτῶν, "it is clear that, when the separate families had once united to form one community, they" (could not go on with different notions in their minds as to what was permissible and what not, but) "would have to choose certain representatives of their whole body," etc.

c 8. These κοινοί, or public representatives, would have a double task: (1) that of selecting the best from the *laws* of the several tribes, and (2) that of selecting the best from among the rulers of the several clans, to serve for the united state.

c 9. αὐτῶν: i.e. τῶν νομίμων.—εἰς τὸ κοινόν ("for the use of the community") goes with what follows.

c 10. οἷον βασιλεῦσι, "with king-like power." (There is no need, with Hug, to reject these words.)

d 1. φανερὰ δείξαντες: φανερά is proleptic, "indicate *clearly*"—not, as Schneider and Jowett, "publicly present."—ἑλέσθαι τε δόντες, "propose for their acceptance"—rather than "give them the choice of them," Jowett—implying that it had been settled that whatever the κοινοί chose *would* be accepted.

d 2. τοὺς δέ: i.e. the ἡγέμονες; ἄρχοντας is predicative.

d 3. ἢ καί τινα βασιλείαν, "or perhaps monarchy," Jowett.

d 4. ἐν ταύτῃ τῇ μεταβολῇ τῆς πολιτείας οἰκήσουσιν: the subject to the verb is still οἵ, i.e. the κοινοί, and it is apparently used absolutely, "will direct affairs during this change of constitution." Cp. 779 c 6 καὶ ὅσα ἐντὸς πόλεως . . . πρέπον ἂν οἰκεῖν εἴη. (Most interpreters take the verb to mean "will live," i.e. they suppose the subject somehow changed to "the whole community." Apart from this change of subject, what a feeble end to the paragraph! "And in this altered state of the government they will live," Jowett.)

d 6. ἐφεξῆς, "step by step"; cp. *Polit.* 281 d ἵν' ἐφεξῆς ἡμῖν ὁ

λόγος ἴῃ.—The subj. to γίγνοιτο may be μεταβολή, but perhaps it is only "things would come about."—Stallb. points out that the formula οὕτω (τε) καὶ ταύτῃ recurs at 714 d 9, and 947 d 5, and cps. ταύτῃ καὶ κατὰ ταῦτα 929 c, and 889 c (where οὕτως is added).

d 7. τρίτον τοίνυν . . . γίγνεσθαι, "we have yet to mention the rise of a third kind of polity; and at this stage both the polities and the cities themselves display complete variety of form and history," i.e. the full development of the city in the plain brings with it all kinds of activities for its inhabitants, and offers facilities of intercourse with the outside world. As a consequence, not only do the relations of classes in the city change, but it is entangled in conflicts with other cities—sometimes with disastrous results. The εἴδη refer mainly to the πολιτειῶν, the παθήματα to the πόλεις.

682 a 1. λέγει . . . ταῦτα . . . εἰρημένα: such a form of expression as καὶ ταῦτα λέγων ὀρθῶς ἄν τις λέγοι is common. This is a variety of it. An intermediate form would be καὶ ταῦτα ἄν λέγοι τις ὀρθῶς λέγων. Ast cps. 689 e 1.

a 2. κατὰ θεόν πως εἰρημένα καὶ κατὰ φύσιν: so we might say of a biblical story, "It's holy scripture, and, what's more, it's human nature."

a 3 ff. θεῖον γὰρ . . . ἑκάστοτε, "for poets too, being a heaven-born race—a race (specially) inspired at their times of singing,—helped by many a Grace and Muse, often reveal the secrets of nature" (lit. "seize in many cases on the way in which things really happen"). The general sense of this passage is clear, but the reading and the exact inter-relation of the words are doubtful. Proclus quotes it four times in his commentaries on Plato; on *Rep.* 393, *Rep.* 368, *Tim.* 20, and *Rep.* 401. The quotations respectively are: θεῖον γὰρ οὖν δὴ καὶ τὸ ποιητικὸν ὂν γένος, θεῖον τὸ ποιητικὸν γένος ἀποκαλῶν, θεῖον γὰρ οὖν δὴ καὶ τὸ ποιητικόν ἐστι γένος, and ὁ μὲν γὰρ θεῖον φησὶ καὶ τὸ ποιητικὸν ἐνθεαστικὸν ὂν γένος ὑμνῳδοῦν. Boeckh, followed by Stallb., Herm., Wagner, and Schanz, rejects ἐνθεαστικόν as a marginal explanation of θεῖον by a late commentator (Stallb. suggests by Proclus himself), partly, too, because the word ἐνθεαστικός is not recorded elsewhere from Plato or any author of his time. As to the latter point, Hdt. i. 63 uses ἐνθεάζω, therefore we may conclude that ἐνθεαστικός would be perfectly intelligible to Plato's readers; also, perhaps, ἐνθουσιαστικός (which Winckelmann proposes to read here) had to his mind a slightly derogatory suggestion of

"possession" and "excitement," and this may have made him choose a less familiar form. (*ὑμνῳδέω* also does not occur elsewhere in Plato.) As to the former point I think it is best to suppose that Proclus only quoted the *ἐνθεαστικόν* when he meant to bring in the *ὑμνῳδοῦν* as well—and this gives us a hint how to take *ὑμνῳδοῦν*.—The other three quotations are not verbal, and the point of them lies in the *θεῖον*. Heindorf and Badham (who also alters *ὑμνῳδοῦν* to *ὑμνῳδῶν*) take the *καί* as connecting *θεῖον* and *ἐνθεαστικόν*, and suggest (the former as an alternative to another arrangement) that *τὸ ποιητικόν* is the "gloss" that should be rejected. But Proclus's quotations seem to establish *too* (i.e. as well as other classes of *θεῖοι ἄνδρες*) as the meaning of *καί*, and moreover *ὑμνῳδοῦν*, which is rather a difficulty any way, becomes more difficult if *καί* is *and*.

a 7. *τοῦ νῦν ἐπελθόντος ἡμῖν μύθου*, "in the imaginary history which has now occupied our attention."

a 8. *τάχα γὰρ . . . βουλήσεως*, "it may perhaps give (you) an insight into my meaning." (Generally interpreted "tell us something about *our object*"; i.e. the discovery of the origin of law.) Cp. 668 c 8.

b 4. *ἔχοντα*: loosely used for "in the neighbourhood of."

b 7. For *ἐν* with a measure of time, in the sense of *after*, cp. *Phaedo* 107 e *ἄλλος δεῦρο πάλιν ἡγεμὼν κομίζει ἐν πολλαῖς χρόνου καὶ μακραῖς περιόδοις*.

b 10. *γοῦν*, "what I mean is"; cp. 681 c 7.

c 1. For *ὑπό c. acc.* meaning (to put or go) "close up to" (something above) cp. *Rep.* 496 d *ὑπὸ τειχίον ἀποστάς*, *Lysis* 203 a *ὑπ' αὐτὸ τὸ τεῖχος*. The mountain streams are naturally supposed to be felt as coming down from above.

c 3. *λόφοις*: the change to the plural after the *λόφον* at b 3 seems merely due to a desire to vary the expression.

c 4. Stephanus's emendation of the MS. *τι* to *τινα* is a certain one. The loss of *να* was doubtless due to the following *μα*, and the preceding *πολλοῖς τισι χρόνοις* gives the pattern—a very common one—for the expression.

c 6. *κατῴκουν*: probably here, if not in *κατοικοῦντας* (677 c 2), and *κατῳκίσθη* (682 b 2), the *κατα-* has the meaning of *down into the plain*.

d 6. The *τά* marks the *κακά* as historical.

d 7. *στάσεις*: this word introduces us to the stage of *violent* revolution, foreshadowed perhaps in the word *παθήματα* at 681 d 8, and marking a new age.

e 1. *ἀλλ' ὥστε*: used somewhat loosely, like our "instead of that," with a change of subject.

e 2. *οἵ*, "*and these exiles*"; for, as at e 4, *φυγάς* is used for *φυγάδας*.—Ritter is possibly right in taking *πάλιν* with *κατῆλθον*, but if it be taken with *ἐκπεσόντες* it need not mean "banished a second time," but merely "sent away again"; cp. Hdt. v. 72 where *πάλιν ἐξέπιπτε* is said of Cleomenes, when, after occupying the Acropolis, he was forced to relinquish it again. (Stallb. takes the *φυγάς* to be the exile of the veterans from Troy, and the *οἵ* to be the *νέοι* who were driven out *in their turn* (*πάλιν*); but this interpretation of the second *οἵ* is very harsh.)

e 4. *τὰς τότε φυγάς*: abstract for concrete, i.e. *τοὺς τότε φυγάδας*, which is actually the reading of O. So at 680 e 7 *γεωργίας* stands for *ἄγρους*. Stallb. quotes Thom. Mag. p. 902 *φυγή· καὶ οἱ φυγάδες· Θουκυδίδης ἐν τῇ ὀγδόῃ* [viii. 64], *καὶ γὰρ καὶ φυγὴ αὐτῶν ἔξω ἦν*. Cp. also our "*flights*" of birds.—*ταῦτα . . . πάντα . . . τἀντεῦθεν*, "all the subsequent course of these events"—"the rest of the story" (Jowett).—The *ὑμεῖς* is emphatic: "you Lacedaemonians" are the people to tell that; i.e. "it is part of Lacedaemonian history."

e 8. Though in grammatical structure *κατ' ἀρχάς* goes closely with *ἐξετραπόμεθα*, in *idea* it belongs to the subordinate participle *διαλεγόμενοι* (not "we turned aside at the beginning while discussing," but "we turned aside at the beginning of our discussion").—The difference of tense between the two subordinate participles, *διαλεγόμενοι* and *περιπεσόντες*, indicates that it is the second participle which goes specially with the main verb—and further defines the action it describes; for the main verb is also an aorist.—*περιπεσόντες* has very much the same meaning as *περιτυχόντες* at 683 e 5—used of chance subjects encountered in a discourse or a mental survey.

e 10. *ὥσπερ κατὰ θεόν*, "providentially" (Jowett).

e 11. *λαβὴν ἀποδίδωσιν*: acc. to the scholiast on *Rep.* 544 b (*τὴν αὐτὴν λαβὴν πάρεχε*), *λαβή* (or *λαβαί*, cp. *Phaedr.* 236 b) means the *hold* or *grip* which wrestlers get of each other; so that *λαβὴν παρέχειν* or *ἀποδιδόναι* is "to allow your antagonist to get hold, to get to grips." The application of the metaphor is plain. The two antagonists are the personified Λόγος and the Athenian —or perhaps the three of them—and they are this time going to discuss seriously and exclusively the *origin and character of Dorian institutions*.

683 a 1. It is perhaps permissible to wonder whether *αὐτήν* is

not a mistake for *αὖ*.—*ὀρθῶς* goes with *κατοικεῖσθαι*.—*ἔφατε*: e.g. 626 c, 637 a.—*κατοικεῖσθαι*: Ast is possibly right in thinking that this is a mistake for *κατῳκίσθαι*. A and one or two early edd. did make the mistake of substituting *κατοίκησιν* for *κατοίκισιν*. Still *κατοικεῖσθαι* is possible here, if we suppose it said of the concrete "settlement," i.e. state of Lacedaemon, which is implied in the words *κατοίκισιν εἰς Λακεδαίμονα*; the *καὶ Κρήτην* facilitates the supposition.

a 2. The relation of the added clause *καὶ Κρ. κτλ.* is best expressed by putting a (—) before it. It does not all of it belong to the relative sentence; though *ἔφατε ὀρθῶς κατοικεῖσθαι* has to be supplied with it, the *ὡς ἀδελφοῖς νόμοις* has nothing to do with the *ἦν*. (Ast and Schneider take *ἀδελφοῖς καί* as equivalent to *ὁμοίοις καί*, "with the same sort of laws as Crete.")

a 4. *διεξελθόντες* limits the meaning of *πλάνῃ* (*τοῦ λόγου*) to the part of it concerned with the imaginary history.—The explanatory asyndeton (*ἐθεασάμεθα κτλ.*) is common in Plato; cp. 684 a 2, *Menex.* 239 d 1.

a 7. *τετάρτη*: the fourth representative polity does not present any marked development or alteration of internal constitution, as compared with the third. The difference is mostly one of size. It is a *nation* of three cities. Also, what is very important for the argument, the polity is a real, not an imaginary one.

a 8. *κατοικιζόμενόν τέ ποτε καὶ νῦν κατῳκισμένον*: i.e. not only does history show us the formation stage, but we can use our own eyes, so to speak, because the foundation has endured to the present day.—A and the margin of O have *πρὸ νῦν* for *νῦν*; perhaps they did not understand *κατῳκισμένον*. L has *νῦν* alone.

b 1. *ἐξ ὧν ἁπάντων*: I think it is better to take these words with *τί*—"what out of all these (political) arrangements," rather than "as the result of all this history, or description." For one reason, this interpretation provides a natural explanation of *αὐτῶν*. —This involves taking *κατῳκίσθη* in the sense of *established, settled, arranged*—of a part of the civic establishment. Cp. *Tim.* 24 c. (C. Ritter suggests that perhaps Lacedaemon is the subject of *κατῳκίσθη*.)—L has *εἴ τε καὶ*, A and O omit *καὶ*: it adds a useful emphasis to *δυνάμεθα*, and is more likely to have been omitted than inserted, so I restore it.

b 5. This sentence and the following one gain greatly in point if, with C. Ritter, we read *ταὐτὰ* for the MS. *ταῦτα*—but not with his explanation. He takes *ταὐτὰ λεκτέον* to mean "we must now

go over the same ground, in examining historical fact, which we have gone over before, when we were imagining what was *likely* to happen"; and in the following sentence he finds a caution that perhaps history may contradict their theoretical hypothesis. What ταὐτὰ οἷον ἐξ ἀρχῆς λεκτέον means is "(if it is within our power to find out something definite about the effect of laws) *we must go over the same ground again pretty much from the beginning* (as the logos seems to suggest that we should)." That is, we shall have to ask much the same question that was asked at the beginning; i.e. "*Are the Dorian Laws perfect?*" Only *then* we asked "can they be defended in theory?" now we ask "have they worked well in practice?"

b 6. ἐγκαλοῦμεν is most likely fut. The Ath. does not want to press the discussion on his hearers unless they express themselves as satisfied with what was said before on the same topic.

682 e 8—683 b 6. "There is a providence in it; here we are back again at the same point from which we diverged, near the beginning of our talk about laws, when we fell upon the subject of Music and drinking-bouts. Here is the argument offering us to begin over again, 'as we were'; for it has come round to that same foundation of the Lacedaemonian state, which you both claimed to be correctly ordered—that and Crete, whose laws are akin to the Spartan. Something certainly we have gained from the round-about track of the argument, from that part of it, that is, in which we reviewed several polities and state-foundations. We examined a primitive, a more advanced, and a yet further advanced community, following upon each other, as we conceive, in order of establishment, through countless ages of time; and here now a fourth state, or perhaps you would prefer to call it a nation, presents itself, in the process of acquiring a civic existence which has continued to the present day. And if we can get to see, not only what of all these arrangements was rightly or wrongly established; but also, what kind of laws and customs they are which keep alive the parts of the polities which survive intact, and to what kind of laws and customs ruin is due when it comes; and again, what changes in these laws and customs would be salutary to the state — if we can do this, my Megillus and Cleinias, it is worth while to (take the argument's offer and) treat the same subject pretty much all over again—unless (of course) we have some fault to find with what has gone before."

(Bruns pp. 163 ff. holds, naturally, that all in this passage that points back to anything in Bks. I. or II. is a forgery of the editor; consequently whatever he cannot interpret as a reference to a previous part of Bk. III. he rejects.)

c 2. *οὐ χείρους οὐδ' ἐλάττους*, "as good, aye, and as long."

c 4. *σχεδόν* (a favourite form of qualification in the Laws), "if I am not mistaken" (it is Midsummer Day).

c 8. *γενώμεθα ταῖς διανοίαις*: a bold phrase; "let us put ourselves in thought." Stallb. cps. *Menex.* 239 d *ἐν ἐκείνῳ τῷ χρόνῳ γενόμενον λόγῳ*.

c 9. By *τὰ μετὰ τούτων* he probably means the territories of these three states, including the towns dependent on each.

d 1. *ἱκανῶς*: its position suggests that this word rather qualifies than strengthens *ὑποχείρια*; i.e. that it means not *thoroughly*, but *virtually*.

d 2. *ὥς γε λέγεται τὸ τοῦ μύθου*: "significat ipse Plato, se in his enarrandis incertos sequi fontes. Quod profecto dignum est animadversione, quandoquidem in iis, quae deinceps exponit, aliquoties discessit ab iis quae ab Herodoto, Xenophonte, aliisque scriptoribus de iis rebus memoriae prodita sunt," Stallb. We cannot help suspecting that Plato is here continuing to some extent the *invention* of history in which he has been recently engaged.

d 10. *πάντες οἱ τότε*: all the inhabitants of those three states —the kings included.—*τούτοις* and *αὐτῶν* refer to the kings. The oaths are repeated below in detail, when the position of the *δῆμοι* is defined.

e 1–3. *διαφθείρῃ . . . καταλύεται*: in both these remarks the Ath. seems to be contemplating the overthrow of a form of government by a force *within the state*, not, as at 709 a 3, the conquest by another state, and consequent subjection of the inhabitants, or even such interference of one state with the constitution of another as was common at the time of the Peloponnesian War.—For the omission to repeat the preposition *ὑπό* before *σφῶν αὐτῶν* cp. 635 e and 685 b.

e 5. *νυνδὴ μέν*: "here," says Bruns, "is conclusive proof that the part of the treatise which preceded Bk. III. was not,—or, at least, not merely—Bks. I. and II." If we follow Bruns we get into trouble with his "Redaktor." What editor who could *insert* so many forged references, would fail to *expunge* one which evidently stultified his arrangement?—Badham and Cobet are clear that *ὀλίγον ἔμπροσθεν* is a wrongly inserted marginal explanation of *νυνδή*. If so, it must have been a very early

insertion, for Photius quotes this passage as it stands (s.vv. *νῦν δή*, though he omits the *μέν*, and says it is from Bk. IV.; the next quotation he gives—Eur. *Hipp.* 233—has, like our present passage, *νυνδὴ μέν* followed, after an interval, by *νῦν δέ*). Besides, both phrases have their own work to do in the sentence. *νυνδὴ μέν* is contrasted with *νῦν δ'* in e 6, while *ὀλ. ἔμπ.* specifies the time of the action of *περιτυχόντες*: "a little time back, when we happened, the other day, on this subject in our conversation." It seems to me that it is the least extravagant of all the assumptions necessitated by this passage, to suppose it to refer to a *previous* discussion—either an imaginary discussion, or one recorded in a lost dialogue.[1] There is nothing at the beginning of Bk. I. to suggest that this is the *first* meeting of the three interlocutors. The sentiment is entirely *in harmony* with Plato's views as expressed in the *Laws* and elsewhere as to the perfect self-sufficiency of *ἀρετή*, whether of men or of political organizations. Besides, it is a well-known Platonic doctrine that "nothing that is can be destroyed, except by its own proper and specific evil" (A. E. Taylor, *Plato*, p. 87). Cp. *Rep.* 609 a 9 *τὸ σύμφυτον ἄρα κακὸν ἑκάστου καὶ ἡ πονηρία ἕκαστον ἀπόλλυσιν, ἢ εἰ μὴ τοῦτο ἀπολεῖ, οὐκ ἄν ἄλλο γε αὐτὸ ἔτι διαφθείρειεν.* But nowhere in the *Laws* is there (*pace* Ritter) anything to justify the very specific reference in the text—nowhere such a statement as e.g. we find at Arist. *Pol.* 1312 b 38 *βασιλεία δ' ὑπὸ μὲν τῶν ἔξωθεν ἥκιστα φθείρεται, διὸ καὶ πολυχρόνιός ἐστιν· ἐξ αὐτῆς δ' αἱ πλεῖσται φθοραὶ συμβαίνουσιν.* Whereas, however, Aristotle in this passage merely says "revolution comes, as a rule, *from within the state*," what Plato means, I take it, is that "revolution is the government's or king's *own fault*;" i.e. I take *σφῶν αὐτῶν* to refer, not to the *people* of the state concerned but, to its *government*.

e 9. *ἔργοις γενομένοις*: i.e. the ascertained subsequent history of the three kingdoms, contrasted with which not only the description of the first three polities, but even the traditional and varying accounts of the first Dorian establishment are *κενόν τι*. (Some interpreters have thought that *κενόν τι* refers to *pure theory*, apart from facts.)

e 10. *λόγον*: almost *doctrine, view*.

684 a 1. Badham is doubtless right in excluding from the text the second *τὸν αὐτὸν λόγον*. It disturbs the construction, and looks like a mere accidental repetition.—*ἀλήθειαν*, "reality."

[1] F.H.D. thinks the reference is to the disastrous result of *τὸ ἡττᾶσθαι αὐτὸν ὑφ' ἑαυτοῦ* at 626 e 3.

a 3. *τριτταῖς*: not merely a variety for *τρισί*; each time the oath was taken three kings or three communities were addressed.

a 4. The gen. of the inf. indicates the purpose of the common laws of the three states, and goes closely with *ἔθεντο*: they were the laws, i.e., which regulated the mutual relation of kings and subjects—the *οἱ μέν* and the *οἱ δέ* respectively of the oath.

a 6. For *ἐμπεδόω* in the sense of *keep* an oath cp. Eur. *I.T.* 790 *τὸν δ' ὅρκον ὃν κατώμοσ' ἐμπεδώσομεν.*

b 2. An ungrammatical corrector of A altered *δῆμοι* to *δῆμον.*

b 5. *τό γε μέγιστον . . . ὑπῆρχεν . . . ποῖον; τὸ βοηθούς γε εἶναι κτλ.* This use of *τό γε* is the same as in the parallel expression at *Euthyd.* 291 a, where the best MSS. have *τό γε εὖ οἶδα ὅτι οὔτε Εὐθύδημος ἦν κτλ.* There Bernhardy altered *τό* to *τόδε* (as Badham does here). A MS. variant of *τὸ δὲ* (not *τὸ δέ γε*) for *τό γε* gave some confirmation to Bernhardy's conjecture, and Burnet adopts it in the text. But he does not even mention Badham's correction of this passage. I think the text ought to stand at both places.—*τό* does not go closely with *μέγιστον* as an attribute: it is an independent demonstrative; cp. 807 a 6 *οὔκουν τό γε δίκαιόν φαμεν,*—"was not *that point* of the greatest importance to the political arrangements?" (Lit. "to the establishments of polities, as by law established, in the three states.")

b 7. *εἴτε κτλ.*: this clause seems added by way of implication that the agreement was not more in the kings' interest than in that of the peoples.

b 9 f. Here we have the principle of our "League of Nations" proposals.

c 1. The following little apology for the use of a certain amount of force was thought so inapposite by Zeller and Stallb. that they reject from *καὶ μήν* to *τί μήν;* at c 10, and Schanz follows them. The connexion of ideas from c 1 to e 5 may be thus expressed: although the Dorian body politic could not dispense altogether with the surgeon's knife, it had at all events this advantage, that it was free from the diseases of *millionaires* and of *debt*; it is true that it was necessary to encounter the popular prejudice against the use of force, but its rulers and guides were not hampered by the conservative cry "*μὴ κινεῖν τὰ ἀκίνητα*" (i.e. "vested interests").

c 3. For *καθάπερ ἄν εἰ* cp. below 872 c 4.

c 7. *τὸ δέ γ'*: cp. *Apol.* 23 a 5, *Rep.* 340 d 7 ("whereas, in point of fact," Adam), *Laws* 691 d 6, 731 e 3. "For all that (one must

often be satisfied, etc.)."— For *ἐστὶν ἀγαπητὸν . . . εἰ καί τις . . . δύναιτο* cp. Thuc. ii. 39 *εἰ ἐθέλοιμεν κινδυνεύειν, περιγίγνεται ἡμῖν . . . μὴ προκάμνειν*, where Dion. Hal. *Περὶ Θουκ. ἰδιώματος* xii. 1 finds fault with Thucydides' grammar: "*ἐνταῦθα γὰρ τὸ μὲν ἐθέλοιμεν ῥῆμα τοῦ μέλλοντός ἐστι χρόνου δηλωτικόν, τὸ δὲ περιγίγνεται τοῦ παρόντος*," and editors emend to *ἐθέλομεν*, and cp. *Rep.* 435 d, where it is made clear that *ἀγαπητόν* (*ἐστιν*) can be *τοῦ μέλλοντος χρόνου δηλωτικόν*, by the substitution of it for *ἱκανῶς ἂν ἔχοι*, and *ἐξαρκέσει*. So that here we must take *ἐστὶν ἀ. π.* to mean "we may often have to be satisfied." (Cp. Goodwin, *M. and T.* 500.)

d 5. *αὐτοῖς*: Ast calls this "redundant." Now in the passages he—on 625 a 3 (cp. Heindorf on *Gorg.* 482 d 1)—cites for the redundant *αὐτός*, the noun or pronoun thus resumed in the *αὐτός* has been partially lost sight of, owing either to a turn in the construction, or the length of the intervening part of the sentence; whereas here there is no such reason for the renaming of the person spoken of. Wagner proposes *ἀστοῖς* for *αὐτοῖς*; Schneider, reading *αὐτοῖς*, takes it to refer to the *citizens*. This last is the best way out of the difficulty.—*ἥπερ . . . γίγνεται*, "and that is just the reproach which *is* made."

d 6. A, L and O have *ἀλλήλαις νομοθετουμέναις*. All the edd. follow the marginal reading of Cod. Voss., and two inferior MSS., in reading *ἄλλαις νομ.* I conjecture the original reading to have been *ἄλλῃ νομοθετουμέναις*, and that an early corrector wrote *-λαις* over *-λῃ*, with the result that this was subsequently read as *ἀλλήλαις*.—"In many cities whose laws were formed under other circumstances" gives a more apposite sense here than "quae multis aliis in civitatibus, cum leges accipiunt, usu venit" (Schneider).

d 7. It is better to take *διάλυσιν* as governed by *ζήτῃ*, than (supposing a zeugma) by *κινεῖν*.—*ὁρῶν ὡς*, "from a perception that."

d 8. *ἀνεὺ τούτων*, "failing such measures," "on any other terms."—*ὡς*, "because."

e 1. For the proverbial *μὴ κινεῖν τὰ ἀκίνητα* cp. Schol. on *Theaet.* 181 a.

e 2. The MSS. have *εἰσηγούμενον*. I have adopted H. Richards's suggestion that we ought to read *εἰσηγουμένῳ*. There is no other instance, I believe, of *ἐπαρᾶσθαι* with the *acc.* of the person denounced, and the analogy of similar compounds is against it. Burnet suggests (privately) that probably we ought to read *εἰσηγουμένων*.

e 3. *πάντ' ἄνδρα*, "any lawgiver" (however able). At *Prot.*

323 a *πάντα ἄνδρα* means "any man" (however unskilled).—*καὶ τοῦθ' . . . ὑπῆρχεν*, "had this advantage as well" (as that spoken of above at b 5 ff.).

e 4. *οὕτως*, "as it was."—*καλῶς καὶ ἀνεμεσήτως*, "whereby they escaped all painful animosities."—The *τε* and *καί* mark that the advantage consisted in two facts: (1) there could, from the nature of the case, be no disputes about anybody's share of land, and (2) no one had to be relieved of debt: *διανέμεσθαι* is pass.—The change in construction is a marked instance of the tendency to vary the form of expression.

e 8. "*κατοίκισις* scr. rec.: *κατοίκησις* A L O," Burnet.

685 a 1. *αὐτῶν* probably refers to the *αὐτοῖς* of the previous question: "what point in their conduct?" Megillus does not like hearing "Dorian institutions" and "failure" connected. (Another alternative is to suppose *αὐτῶν* to refer to the *κατοίκισις* and *νομοθεσία*: the answer to the question rather makes for the former interpretation.)

a 2. As Stallb. says, *οἴκησις* is the right word here. Cp. 681 a 7.

a 6 ff. *ἀλλὰ μὴν . . . πορεύεσθαι*, "easy or not, we have got to consider and investigate this point now or else relinquish our old men's sober pastime of law-hunting, with which we promised ourselves on starting to sweeten the toil of our journey."—The explanation of the Cretan at the end of this book changes the *παιδιά* into *σπουδή*.—*ἁλύπως* recalls the *οὐκ ἀηδῶς* of 625 a 6 and the *μετὰ ῥᾳστώνης* of b 7.—Ritter cps. *Phaedr.* 276 d where Socrates speaks of *writing a book* as being the preparation of a *pastime* for old age; cp. also *Parm.* 137 b 2, and below 712 b 2.

a 8. *σώφρονα*: H. Steph., followed by Ast, inserted a *καὶ* before this word; Wagner would reject it as a marginal interpretation of *πρεσβυτικήν*; Schanz reads *σωφρόνως*. No change is needed. Stallb. aptly cps. 769 a *ἡ πρεσβυτῶν ἔμφρων παιδιά*; cp. also *Tim.* 59 d *μέτριον ἂν ἐν τῷ βίῳ παιδιὰν καὶ φρόνιμον ποιοῖτο*, where Plato is speaking of philosophic theorizing.—Burnet has cleared up a good deal of the difficulty of the passage by putting the comma after *ἐξετάζοντας* instead of after *νόμων*.—The participles *σκοπ. καὶ ἐξ.*, which both govern *τοῦτο*, though grammatically subordinate to *διελθεῖν*, really contain the main idea of the sentence. It reads as if, when he began it, he meant it to be merely *δεῖ . . . ἡμᾶς τοῦτο σκ. καὶ ἐξ., π. ν. παίζειν παιδ. πρ. σώφ.*, but changed it, as the further thought occurred, to *παίζοντας διελθεῖν κτλ.*

b 4. For the omission of *περί* before *τούτων* cp. 635 a 7.—With

ταύτας supply πόλεις (rather than οἰκήσεις), and so with ἑτέρας two lines below.—οἳ . . . διακεκοσμήκασιν: the tense of the verb helps the quasi-personification of νόμοι, and is decidedly against taking τούτων as referring to *persons*; and the word might have been so taken without changing νόμων to νομοθετῶν, as Badham does (and τίν' to τίνων), simply by supposing ἢ τούτων to stand for ἢ περὶ τῶν νόμων τούτων (τῶν ἀνθρώπων).

b 5. εὐδοκιμωτέρων and μειζόνων both qualify πόλεων, and περί (so Ast for the MS. πέρι) governs κατοικίσεων (on which πόλεων depends).—For the plur. κατοικίσεων cp. ταῖς καταστάσεσιν τῶν πολιτειῶν at 684 b 5.—Steph. first corrected the MS. κατοικήσεων to κατοικίσεων. Ast and Stallb. take κατ. πολ. closely together, Ast translating the two words by "Staatsverfassungen." A comparison of *Rep.* 497 b, μηδεμίαν ἀξίαν εἶναι τῶν νῦν κατάστασιν πόλεως φιλοσόφου φύσεως, might seem to suggest that κατοικίσεων πόλεων here are treated as a single noun, and that the adjj. agree with them both, not with πόλεων alone; Adam in his note cps. *Prot.* 319 d and *Pol.* 296 e (ὀρθῆς πόλεως διοικήσεως).

b 6. As Ast says, ἀντί here means *in preference to*, as at *Phaedr.* 232 a (with αἱρεῖσθαι); cp. also *Tim.* 26 e 1 ἢ τίν' ἔτ' ἄλλον ἀντὶ τούτου ζητητέον, and *Gorg.* 526 e ὃν ἐγώ φημι ἀντὶ πάντων τῶν ἐνθάδε ἀγώνων εἶναι.

b 7–e 4. At 684 a attention was called to the measures adopted by the Dorian states to secure internal stability; here we are concerned with their defence against a possible attack from without.

b 7. There is no δέ corresponding to this μέν, only the resuming δή in πρὸς δὴ ταῦτ' in d 2.

c 2 f. οἱ περὶ τὸ Ἴλιον οἰκοῦντες, and τῇ . . . δυνάμει τῇ περὶ Νῖνον γενομένῃ: we saw on 676 c 6 that περί *c. gen.*, when joined to such words as αἰτία, μηχανή, μνήμη—i.e. such words as naturally take a dependent gen.—often stands in the place of a simple gen. Plato moreover often uses περί *c. acc.* as a substitute for the simple gen. after other kinds of noun. In other words περί *c. gen.* represents our *objective*, περί *c. acc.* (generally) a *possessive* gen. In the two phrases given above we have a transitional stage, in which a *participle* is added to the περί; τῇ περὶ Νῖνον γενομένῃ is hardly to be distinguished in sense from τῇ τοῦ Νῖνου. Cp. below 690 d 6 οἱ περί τε Ἄργος καὶ Μεσσήνην βασιλεῖς. A similar periphrastic use of κατά may be observed in κατὰ γῆρας and κατὰ γένος at 692 a 1, which stand for *subjective* genitives.

c 4. θρασυνόμενοι τὸν πόλεμον ἤγειραν τὸν ἐπὶ Τροίαν, "by

their insolent behaviour provoked the (Greek) expedition against Troy."

c 5. *σχῆμα* here used in the sense of *dignity, glory*; a poetical use, which is only general in late prose authors.

c 6. *τὸ σῳζόμενον*, "while it lasted," lit. "which still lasted." — *καθάπερ νῦν . . . καὶ τότε*: "ad illustrandam sententiam superiorem quae afferuntur per comparationem, ea *ἀσυνδέτως* accedere solere non uno loco ostendimus: v. ad Gorg. 448 e, Rep. 497 b, 577 c, Crat. 433 a, Theaet. 173 d, Phaedon. 61 a, Legg. 628 d, 659 e" [as Stallb. stops the passage], "Pol. 296 e," Stallb.—who compares the "apposition" of the explanatory comparing clause to the apposition of single nouns. It is like the direct answer to a question, which needs no connecting link (cp. e.g. 685 a 2).

c 7. *ἐκείνην τὴν συσταθεῖσαν σύνταξιν*, "the united Assyrian Empire," Jowett. The selection of an expression, which would apply to the Dorian federation as well, suggests an equality of power on both sides.

c 8 f. *μέγα . . . ἐγεγόνει*, "for the fact that Troy had again been captured was a strong ground of complaint against the Greeks." The story of the first capture is told at *Il.* v. 640 ff. The analogy of *ἐγκλήματα πρὸς ἀλλήλους* at *Rep.* 464 d, and *Laws* 737 b shows that *πρός c. acc.* denotes not the people appealed *to* (here the Assyrians), but those appealed *against*. Even *ἐγκαλεῖν* can have *πρός c. acc.* instead of the ordinary dat.; cp. *Demod.* 384 e *τοιαῦτα ἐγκαλοῦσιν πρὸς ἀλλήλους*.

d 1. *τῆς ἀρχῆς . . . μόριον*: "hoc unde Plato hauserit, incertum," Stallb.

d 2. *πρὸς δὴ ταῦτα πάντα*, "propter haec omnia," Ast; better "to meet all these perils," "in the face of all this."— "*ταῦτ' ἦν* Schneider [and Hermann]; *ταύτην* A L O; *ταῦτα* vulg." Burnet. If it were not for the *πάντα* and the *ὡς* after *καλῶς* in d 5, it would be simpler (omitting *πάντα* and *ὡς*) to adopt the MS. *ταύτην*. The *ὡς* may plausibly be ousted, as Steph. suggested, and as Ficinus seems to have read; and though *πάντα* might conceivably be a mistake for a *ταῦτα* which had been written in the margin as a variant for *ταύτην*, such a variant was not likely to be suggested *unless the πάντα had been already in the text.* As the *πάντα* is there, and as Ast is no doubt right in denying that it can be construed with *ἀνηυρημένη καὶ κατ.* as *omni ex parte*, Schneider and Hermann's emendation must be regarded as certain.

d 4. The *μία* and the *ἀδελφῶν* bring into prominence the

cohesion that *ought* to have continued among the forces of the Dorians.

d 6. The διαφερόντως was probably not felt to be, like καλῶς, a qualification of ἀνηυρημένη and κατακεκοσμημένη, but, like the μετρίως in οὐ πάνυ μετρίως γίγνεται at *Rep.* 504 c, to have, with the ἦν, the force of an adjective: "and the force had the advantage over that which went against Troy."—The point of the sentence is that the defensive arrangements were admirably devised, and calculated to impose on an opponent.

d 7. The ἡγοῦντο ("people thought") resumes the ὡς ἐδόκει.

d 8. ἀρχόντων ἄρχοντας: as we might say "general for general, the French had the advantage," only in Greek the quasi-absolute expression fits more compactly into the syntax.

e 2. Stallb. takes τούτους to be τὸ ἐπὶ Τροίαν ἀφικόμενον στρατόπεδον; but this means that the same people are referred to as ἐκείνους, in the same breath. Ritter is no doubt right in holding (on 682 d e) that both νενικηκέναι and ἡττῆσθαι refer to the same victory, and that τούτους and τούτων are the Dorians, and ἐκείνους the Achaeans. There is no need to suppose that either side was identical with the Trojan veterans; the ἐκπεσόντες of 682 e 2 may have included *both* νέοι and survivors of the Trojan expedition. It was the *name* of the Achaeans only that was identified with the Trojan expedition. Under the new name of Dorians and with Heraclid leaders the returned exiles showed by their victory that they were better men than those who had retained the old name.—As in the case of Epimenides at 642 d, Plato treats history very carelessly. It is only at this second reference to the events that the Heracleidae are mentioned at all. He must have known the common account, which represented the Dorians as foreigners who came under the Heraclid (i.e. Achaean) leadership, *eighty years* after the Trojan war, to settle in the Peloponnese. His view seems to be, that about these prehistoric times, one story was as good as another. (Cp. Thuc. i. 12, where the author gets into difficulties in trying to reconcile tradition with the *Iliad*.)—ἡττᾶσθαι; the MS. reading, if correct, must stand as a historic present. Boeckh was probably right, however, in emending it to ἡττῆσθαι.

e 3. τινι διανοίᾳ ταύτῃ is the original MS. reading (so Burnet; Schanz gives τινι δ. τοιαύτῃ), but it was early altered, either to τῇ δ. ταύτῃ, or τινι δ. τοιαύτῃ. οὗτός τις is used as a variety for τοιοῦτός τις; cp. οὗτος for τοιοῦτος at Pind. *O.* iv. 38 οὗτος ἐγὼ ταχύτατι, and below ταῦτα for τοιαῦτα at 706 c 7.

e 6. The order of the words in this sentence is peculiar. (For the *τό* which goes with *οἴεσθαι* cp. *Rep.* 498 d 6 *τὸ μέντοι μὴ πείθεσθαι τοῖς λεγομένοις τοὺς πολλοὺς θαῦμα οὐδέν.*) "Is it not also likely that they should think that the arrangement would be a stable one, and would be likely to last?" (Badham's alteration of the first *καὶ* to *διὰ* does not give the right sense.)

686 a 1. *αὐτούς*: i.e. the *οἱ τότε* of 685 b 7 (and e 4), the Dorians of the time.—*ταῦθ'*: the Dorian federation or empire.

a 3. A has *διακεκοσμῆσθαι* and this is given as a variant in O, though O and L read *διακεκοσμημένους*. A break in the construction, which goes on as if an "and they reflected" had been interposed before this and the following inf. *κεχρημένους εἶναι*, is a quite natural method of varying a chain of participles. Those who read *διακεκοσμημένους* have to do something with the *εἶναι* in a 4. Badham, followed by Schanz, strikes it out; Apelt, p. 5, would read *οἶμαι* for it, Madvig *ἀεί*.—The three things that made it reasonable to expect that the Dorian federation would be firm and lasting were: (1) the memory of common exploits, (2) the kinship of their rulers, and (3) the fact that they were assured, by the oracles that they had consulted, of the blessing of Heaven. And yet, as we learn from the following paragraphs, these glorious prospects soon vanished. Sparta alone maintained the Dorian tradition, and that was weakened by constant conflict with the two other members of the Confederacy.

b 2. *μέχρι τὰ νῦν*: the *τά* is supported by all MSS., and by a marginal note in O stating that it existed "in all copies." Steph. corrected it to *τοῦ*, and Schanz followed him.—*ἐπεί*, "*and yet*," "*though*"; cp. above on 669 b 6, and 875 c 3.

b 3. *γενομένη γε ἡ τότε διάνοια*, "if the plan had been carried out."—*καὶ συμφωνήσασα εἰς ἕν*, "and if the confederacy had been unanimous." There is a slight zeugma here; the *plan* was that of a confederacy, and the *carrying out* of the plan involves the existence of the confederacy, and it is with this that, in sense, *συμφωνήσασα* agrees.

b 8. There is much to be said for Ast's (and Badham's) *ἄλλοσε* for the MS. *ἄλλο*; "by looking elsewhere" fits in much better with the rest of the sentence than "by looking at anything else," or "at any other *σύστημα*"; and the omission of the *σε* is a likely mistake.—The *ἄλλας*, and the *ἀμελήσειε τούτων* are both *redundant*.—Is it not possible that the words *ἄλλο⟨σε⟩ σκοπῶν* were not written by Plato, but by a commentator?

c 1. *σῳζούσας*: the Ath. (speaking from the general Hellenic

point of view) thinks of what Hellas had *lost* in being disappointed of a powerful champion; the Spartan, on the other hand, thinks more of the καλὰ καὶ μεγάλα πράγματα—the great tradition, that his own state had kept alive; and so he puts this consideration first.

c 4. τοῦτο: adverbial, "in this case, here." Cp. 677 d 1, ταῦτα at 700 d 1, and καὶ τοῦτο at *Apol.* 29 b (where Burnet however follows Eusebius in reading καίτοι against the MSS. and Stobaeus).

c 7 ff. ἆρ' οὖν . . . διανοηθῶσιν, "my good sir, can it be that we have fallen unawares into a common mistake? Everybody, when he contemplates some event or production that has excited his admiration, thinks 'what a good thing! it might have produced marvellous results, if people had only known how to take a proper advantage of it!' Is it not possible that, on this occasion, *we* may form wrong and untrue ideas about this very subject?—just as any men may on any other subject, about which they should think as I have above described?"—Instead of directly continuing this "satisfactory" investigation into the mistakes in the Dorian laws and constitution, the Ath. here interposes a caution—which he dramatically confesses (at d 7 f.) that he needs himself—against being dazzled by mere *power* or *force*—as if it were the great object, with the state or man, *to be strong enough to do as he likes in the world.* It is not enough to be strong enough to defy the Persians; you must be *wise* as well. Even if the Dorians had known how to maintain their empire, it might not have been for their own or their neighbours' good. This protest is, as he says, quite on the same lines as the deprecation of the cultivation of mere *bravery* in Bk. I.—The construction, as in a 3, is broken in the middle; the δέ in d 1 corresponds to the μέν after οἰόμενοι, but it introduces, not a participle, as we should expect, but a finite verb.

d 1. Cobet would reject καλῶς and τινα, but this impoverishes the clause: κατά τινα τρόπον implies "in a way which the (imagined) speaker could specify"; the ἄρα in c 9 "imagines" the speaker.—τό is best taken with νῦν, and not adverbially with δέ, as Stallb.

d 3. οὔτε κατὰ φύσιν, "and against the natural course of things," "contrary to the law of the universe." Cp. 682 a 2, 642 a 3 ἡ κατὰ φύσιν αὐτοῦ διόρθωσις.

d 5. Naturally Megillus takes some time to see what the Ath. is driving at.

d 7. For the tense of *κατεγέλασα* cp. *ἐμνήσθην* 688 a 3.

d 8. *ἀποβλέψας γὰρ . . . ἔδοξέ μοι*: a typical conversational irregularity; cp. 811 c 7.—*στόλος* here, like *στρατόπεδον* below at 687 a 5, seems used, not merely of the Dorian *army* but, of the Dorian nation, and the terms are chosen because the nation had a military organization; cp. 666 e 1 *στρατοπέδου γὰρ πολιτείαν ἔχετε.*

d 9. I strongly suspect that we ought to insert *ἄν* somewhere; probably after *θαυμαστόν.* If we do not, we must supply, in sense, after *Ἕλλησιν*: "or *would* have been."

e 2. Megillus is still quite in the dark. "What," he says, "wasn't there sense in all we have been saying?" "Maybe," answers the Ath.

e 5. *ἔπαθε*: a gnomic aorist in a dependent sentence is a rarity.—*ἔπαθε τοῦτο, ὡς*: the brachylogy is less remarkable in English if we translate *ἔπαθε* "feels." It is, at any rate, far less irregular than the passage in *Phaedo* 75 b—*ἐκεῖσε ἀνοίσειν, ὅτι προθυμεῖται κτλ.*—with which Stallb., after Heindorf, compares it.

e 8. The word *εὐδαιμονοῖ* (cp. the use of *εὐδαίμων* above at 662 d 4) first gives the key to the ground of the Ath.'s objection. He has called a halt, because they were in danger of thinking that the lost opportunity necessarily meant the loss of national "happiness." There were other ways of missing that, besides not being strong enough.

687 a 1. Still Megillus does not see. "What is the harm of that?" he says.

a 2 ff. The question now started is: "what are the limits to the advantages to be derived from mere power and force?"—*ποῖ βλέπων . . . ὀρθῶς λέγει*: i.e. "*by what prospects* is the praise justified?" This question is not directly answered. Indirectly Megillus (at e 5 ff.) is brought to see the answer.

a 4. *κατὰ τρόπον*: cp. 635 d 7.

a 4 f. *πῶς . . . τοῦ καιροῦ πως ἂν ἔτυχον;* "how, exactly, would they have made the best they could out of the situation." Winckelmann's *πῶς ἂν ἔτυχον* goes very well by itself, but not after the preceding *πῶς*; nor does Hermann establish the second *πῶς* by reading the first as an enclitic, and taking it with *λεγομένου*: the subject has not been encountered by chance. (He translates: "de ipso cujus nescio quomodo nunc mentio incidit.") On the other hand the enclitic (*pace* Badham) is very much in place where it stands. It gives just the *general* significance to *τοῦ καιροῦ ἂν ἔτυχον* which shows us that we are not to apply these words merely to the utilizing of the opportunity spoken of

above at c 9 and e 6. It gives the preceding interrogative the meaning "to what extent?" or "in what respect?" Jowett and others take the question to mean merely "what would have been the way in which they would have gone to work in order to be successful?"—But what follows is *not* "would it not be by taking such and such steps, and securing such and such results?" but "*would not men praise them*, supposing such (necessary) steps had been taken, and such results secured?"—All this assumes the correctness of Ast's startlingly enlightening emendation of ἐπιθυμοῖεν in b 2 to ἐπαινοῖεν.

a 5. στρατόπεδον: cp. above on στόλον d 8.—τοῦ καιροῦ τυχεῖν occurs at *Alc. II.* 148 a 6 in the sense of "to make the best use of an opportunity."

a 6. The ἆρ' οὐκ is resumed and explained by the μῶν οὐ κτλ. in b 2, which shows that the Ath. is asking whether *the world in general*, would not be satisfied with the result described.—συνέστησαν . . . ἀσφαλῶς αὐτό, "had bound them firmly together."—The change to the impf. in διέσῳζον marks the enduring consequence, as compared with the initial act described in συνέστησαν.

b 2. ἐπιθυμοῖεν MSS., ἐπαινοῖεν Ast. Badham (reading ἐπιθυμοῖεν) would reject the question altogether. But the very weakness of ἐπιθυμοῖεν forbids us to suppose that anyone could have *inserted* a sentence including it. Even if it could mean: "are not those the things which would make them covet power?" it is out of place; but the previous ἐπιθυμοῖεν prevents us from thus supplying the missing object to ἐπιθυμοῖεν here. But with ἐπαινοῖεν (for which the other word is, in the circumstances, a very likely error) the sentence aptly resumes the reference to τὸν ἔπαινον τοῦτον in a 2. The question then means: "if such a result as I have described were achieved, you would think people's praise justified, wouldn't you?"—With ἐπαινοῖεν we must supply οἱ ἄνθρωποι as subj., as at 685 d 7 with ἠγοῦντο.

b 4. The question: "what would it all amount to?" which we expect, is not put yet. Instead, we have another picture of coveted worldly distinction. "It is the same," he says, "with every kind of coveted position: a man praises it because he thinks it gives the power to *do as one likes*—and, after all, what does *that* amount to by itself?"

b 5. τιμὰς γένους: i.e. "distinction conferred by noble ancestry." (Wagner takes γένους as an objective gen.: "honours *paid* to his race.")

b 6. *εἶπεν* : another gnomic aorist.—*πρὸς τοῦτο βλέπων εἶπεν*, "the prospect which makes him say so is . . ."—*ὡς . . . γενησόμενα . . . πάντα* : a clear instance of an acc. absolute—*attracted* perhaps into the case of *τοῦτο*.

c 1. Ast writes *ἔστι*.

c 2. I quite agree with Stallbaum that the words *ὡς αὐτός φησιν ὁ λόγος* would be better away; they must be due to a commentator, who put them in, either as an explanation, or as a parallel passage.—*ἕν τι* = "definite." I would translate: "all men have in common, as a definite object of desire, that which the argument has just brought out."

c 11. *εὐχοίμεθα ἀναγκαίως* A, *εὐχόμεθα ἀναγκαίως* L O, and this was long the vulgate; the restoration of the lost *ἄν* between the two words of A is due to a marginal note of Cod. Voss., and was first printed by Bekker.

d 1. *τοῖς γε φίλοις* : it is here ingeniously hinted that, though each of us may think it an admirable thing for ourselves to be able to do as we like, we may yet see clearly that it is not always good for our friends to have this power. For instance, fathers would not grant it to their sons, nor, e.g., would a son in Hippolytus's position grant it to his father. This suggestion completely opens Megillus's eyes, and he sees the Ath.'s drift; he was beginning to see it at d 9.—*ταῦτα* : "acute demonstravit Boeckhius *ταῦτα* non esse in *ταὐτὰ* commutandum," Stallb. "Ταὐτὰ flagitat canon Cobetianus," Schanz; but he reads *ταῦτα*.

d 2. It is curious to note that A reads *ἑαυτοῖσιν*, but L and O *αὐτοῖς*, though O mentions the former as a variant.

d 4. *παῖς ὢν ἀνδρί*, "though one is a boy and the other a man."

d 9. For the parenthetical *λέγεις*, "you mean," or "you would say," cp. *Crat.* 421 c 7, and *Philebus* 49 a 9.

d 10. It is impossible to give the force of these words in the absence of an English word which, like *νεανίας*, means both *young* and *hot-headed*. The *ἔτι νέος* (*ὤν*) is, by implication, "because he is too young," so the *γέρων ὤν* is "because he is too old," and so Jowett's "in the dotage of age, or the heat of youth" comes near to the Greek.—*ἢ καί*, "or perhaps."

e 1. *μηδὲν τῶν καλῶν καὶ τῶν δικαίων γιγνώσκων*, "quite blind to the right and justice of the case"; and at e 3 *ὁ δὲ παῖς γιγνώσκῃ* is, "while the son is *not* blind."—As is usual with Plato's illustrations, there is a special appositeness in Theseus's case, for it was by a *wish* that the fatal result was produced.

e 2. I think *παθήμασιν* is used here, as at 681 d 8, and 695 e 3, in the sense of "*circumstances*," "*plight*," though the analogy of 812 c 3 *ἐν τοῖς παθήμασιν ὅταν ψυχὴ γίγνηται* tells in favour of the meaning "*emotions*": *τοῖς γενομένοις Θησεῖ πρὸς . . . Ἱππόλυτον* is more naturally taken as "which befel Th. in relation to Hipp.," than "which overcame Th. in reference to Hippolytus."

e 7. The utmost apparently that can be got out of the MS. reading *τὴν βούλησιν δὲ μηδὲν μᾶλλον τ. ἑ. φ.* is "without praying that his desire should any the more be in accordance with his own reason." (Jowett's "for his wish may be at variance with his reason" cannot be got out of any of the readings.) As, however, A L O all give *πολὺ* as a variant for *μηδέν*, and as in A there is a gap before *μηδὲν* which may well have held *πολύ*, we may perhaps (with Schanz and Burnet) substitute *πολὺ* for *μηδέν*, and thus obtain a more natural meaning. At the same time the question must be faced: how did *μηδὲν* come there if it was not what Plato wrote? Also *τοῦτο δέ* looks like the *main* antithesis to *οὐ τοῦτο* in e 5 f., and perhaps with *μηδὲν μᾶλλον* we might translate, "unless at the same time he prays that his desire should be in accordance with his own reason."

e 8. The following words do more than repeat what has just been said if we read *πολύ*; having said that it is far more desirable that the wish should harmonize with wisdom, he now adds that the *one thing* we ought to pray for—whether for men or for states—is that our wisdom may be great.—*δεῖν σπεύδειν* (as active) corresponds precisely to *ἐπεικτέον ἐστί* (as passive).

688 a 1. *ἄνδρα νομοθέτην*: for the simple *νομοθέτην*, like *ἀθλητοῦ ἀνδρός* at *Rep.* 620 b 7. Ast unnecessarily inserted *καὶ* before *νομ.*, and Schanz, equally unnecessarily, rejected the word altogether.—It is best to take the *ὡς* clause not as dependent on a *λέγειν* supplied from the above *λέγειν δοκεῖς* but on the following *ἐμνήσθην*; I would therefore put no comma at *νόμων*, but would insert one after *ἐμνήσθην*, to mark that *καὶ ὑμᾶς ἐπαναμιμνῄσκω* has the *ὅτι* clause (in a 4) as object: "I not only am reminded myself that a statesmanlike lawgiver ought always etc. . . . but I would further (*ἐπ-*) remind you," etc.

a 2. *τοῦτο*: i.e. the need for, and the need for encouraging, *νοῦς* or *φρόνησις*.

a 3. For the tense of *ἐμνήσθην* cp. *κατεγέλασα* 686 d 7. Neil on Ar. *Eq.* 696 says aorists of instantaneous action are almost confined to the dramatists. — *κατ' ἀρχὰς . . . λεχθέντα* is

parenthetical, and should be so marked—He uses the 1st pers. because it is a reminder to them all.

a 4. *τὸ μὲν σφῷν . . . παρακέλευμα*: for the gen. taking the place of a possessive pron. cp. 631 a 2 *σοῦ τὴν μὲν ἐπιχείρησιν*, and 822 d 8 *ἡμῶν ἐμπέπτωκεν τοῖς λόγοις*.

a 6. *τὸ δὲ ἐμὸν ἔλεγον*: in a note on 643 a 3 Ast classes together cases in which, as there, the neuter possessive pron. has its verb in the 3rd pers. (e.g. 723 b, 778 e, *Rep.* 533 a, *Lach.* 188 c, Ar. *Eccl.* 393) with those in which, as here, and at 860 c, and *Theaet.* 161 e, the verb is in the same person as that of the pronoun. He lays it down that in all these cases the neut. poss. is a periphrasis for the personal pronoun. I suggest that it is better to take the neut. poss. in the latter class of cases as adverbial—"as for me," "for my part." (Stallb. says that we ought to supply *παρακέλευμα* with *τὸ ἐμόν*—"while I uttered *my* injunction.")—*τοῦτο μέν*: possibly adverbial (cp. 686 c 4, 677 d 1, 700 c 8), possibly agreeing with *παρακέλευμα* understood—which anyhow is the subject to *κελεύοι*.

b 1 f. *μάλιστα δὲ καὶ πρὸς πρώτην*, "but most of all and first of all he should have in mind" etc. Stobaeus, apparently quoting from memory, omits *καί* and writes *καί* in the place of the *τήν*.

b 2. *συμπάσης ἡγεμόνα ἀρετῆς*: cp. 631 c 6, 963 a 8.

b 3. *δόξα μετ' ἔρωτός τε καὶ ἐπιθυμίας τούτοις ἑπομένης*: these words are best understood through a comparison of the contrasted state of mind described at 689 b 5 ff. *ὁπόταν καλοὶ ἐν ψυχῇ λόγοι ἐνόντες μηδὲν ποιῶσιν πλέον*. The *right view* must be accompanied by a *passionate desire* to see it acted on and enforced.

b 4. The asyndeton is of the *explanatory* kind; cp. on 685 c 6. "The fact is that."—It is instructive to note that there was a variant *ὃ ἔλεγον ἐγώ*, mentioned and condemned by O, for *ὁ λέγων ἐγώ*.—He means that he affirms as strongly as ever the need of *νοῦς*.

b 6. *εἰ δ'* is Boeckh's incontestably right correction of the MS. *εἴθ'*. For the sense cp. 636 c 1 *καὶ εἴτε παίζοντα εἴτε σπουδάζοντα ἐννοεῖν δεῖ τὰ τοιαῦτα*. In both cases he means that it is with him more than a mere "academic" opinion—such, e.g., as he would uphold in the course of their *παιδιὰ πρεσβευτικὴ σώφρων* (685 a 7); he is strongly impressed with the necessity of carrying it out in practice. In other words, the notion is one which would stand the test of practical experience. We may well suppose that the Ath.'s earnestness here suggested to one of his

hearers the advisability of getting his advice in the circumstances explained at the end of the book.—For *παίζειν* and *παιδιά* used of mere philosophical *speculation* cp. *Parm.* 137 b 1 *ἢ βούλεσθε, ἐπειδήπερ δοκεῖ πραγματειώδη παιδιὰν παίζειν, ἀπ' ἐμαυτοῦ ἄρξωμαι.* (Ritter, pp. 17 and 19, who suggests by the way that perhaps we ought to discard the words *εἰ δ' ὡς σπουδάζων*, and would doubtless, with Ast, put only a comma after *γίγνεσθαι*, takes the whole to mean: "it may sound like a joke, but I mean it.")—*ὅτι δή φημι*, "I go so far as to say that" etc. What follows is an *extreme* statement of the Ath.'s belief—previously expressed—that *φρόνησις* is indispensable. We are not to conclude from the *τότε* that exactly this extreme statement was made before—though at 662 a 1 ff. he says something like it.—*εὐχῇ χρῆσθαι κτλ.*: cp. *Gorg.* 466 e 9 *ἀγαθὸν οὖν οἴει, ἐάν τις ποιῇ ταῦτα ἃ ἂν δοκῇ αὐτῷ βέλτιστα εἶναι νοῦν μὴ ἔχων;*

b 7. If we accept, as we ought, I think, the traditional interpretation of *εὐχῇ χρῆσθαι* as "to obtain one's request," we must, in order to explain the following *ἀλλά*, regard *σφαλερόν* as a sort of contradiction of the idea of *εὐχῇ χρῆσθαι*—almost as if he had said: "to succeed in his prayer is a failure," i.e. "is *not* to succeed, *but*" etc. At 662 a 7 we have been told that *τὸ (ζῆν) ἀηδῶς καὶ μὴ συμφερόντως αὐτῷ* is a necessary consequence of wrongdoing. Perhaps some will, with Schanz, prefer to adopt Badham's *ἀλλ' ἢ* for *ἀλλὰ*; in which case the whole passage will mean, "that it is dangerous (for such a man) to pray, unless he prays that the opposite of what he wants may happen." Ritter well points out that the use of *βουλήσεσι* in this passage quite accords with the distinction drawn in the above-quoted passage in the *Gorgias* (466 e ff.), where Socrates distinguishes between *ἃ δοκεῖ αὐτῷ*, i.e. the means a man chooses to adopt, and *ἃ βούλεται*, the object he wishes to secure; *ignorance*, he says, of the effect of the means may make the man miss his ultimate object; see especially 468 d. Now Badham's interpretation of our present passage ignores this distinction.

c 1. I think it possible that *σπουδάζοντα δ' . . . τίθετε* was originally a commentator's explanation of *εἰ δ' ὡς σπουδάζων*; it serves that purpose admirably, and does not do much good where it stands. The following remarks merely emphasize the importance of *νοῦς* and the dangers of *ἀμαθία*.

c 2. *τῷ λόγῳ*: i.e. the historical investigation, interrupted at 686 c 7, and soon to be renewed; so that *τῷ λόγῳ ἐπ.* does not mean, "if you attend to what was said then," but "if you attend

to the argument as it proceeds," "if you let the λόγος guide you (in the future)"; cp. d 4.

c 3. If βασιλέων is correct, φθορᾶς must be taken in a general sense, as *downfall*, not in the special sense of *death*. Very likely, though, Boeckh was right in altering βασιλέων to βασιλειῶν; cp. 684 a 2.

c 4. διανοήματος: called at 686 b 3 ἡ τότε διανοία, "the (imperial) idea," or "scheme."

c 5. τὰ περὶ τὸν πόλεμον: cp. on 685 c 2 ff., also below c 7.

c 6. All modern editors adopt a late MS. (Ven. Marc. 184) reading προσῆκεν for the clumsy προσήκειν of the best MSS.—τῇ λοιπῇ δὲ πάσῃ κακίᾳ, "but by their manifold faults of another kind"; for πάσῃ cp. 637 a 3, 676 c 1.

c 7. διεφθαρμένα agrees with τοὺς βασιλεῖς (or τὰς βασιλείας) and τὸ διανόημα understood.

d 2. εἴ που: for the ellipsis of the γίγνεται cp. *Rep.* 497 e 2 οὐ τὸ μὴ βούλεσθαι, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἀλλ' εἴπερ, τὸ μὴ δύνασθαι διακωλεύσει, and Arist. *Nub.* 226 f. ἔπειτ' ἀπὸ ταρροῦ τοὺς θεοὺς ὑπερφρονεῖς, ἀλλ' οὐκ ἀπὸ τῆς γῆς, εἴπερ. There is no need, with Bekker, to read εἴ που γίγνεται, γίγνεται. Cp. the similar, but more remarkable, ellipsis of γενομένας at *Phaedr.* 267 d 2 ἀπολύσασθαι διαβολὰς ὅθεν δὴ κράτιστος.

d 5. ὡς οὖσιν φίλοις, "for the friendship I bear you."

d 6. ἐπαχθέστερον, "would be distasteful to you" (and therefore we won't do it).

d 8. ἐν οἷς: quite general; "and that is where," i.e. in *conduct* rather than in words.—I have adopted Ast's ἐλευθέρως for the MS. ἐλεύθερος, not merely because the sentence runs better so, but because it gives us a better sense: "if you compare *words* with *actions*, you will soon see which *praise* is of the highest quality," comes in better here than: "the man of right feeling is never shown in his true character more clearly than by whether, in such circumstances, he praises or does not praise." Nor can we get a better sense by taking καὶ μή with ἐλεύθερος.

e 3. Stobaeus, in quoting this passage, has δὲ before δή, but the asyndeton is more impressive.

e 5. ταὐτὸν τοῦτο πεφυκέναι ποιεῖν, "must inevitably produce the same effect."—τόν γε νομοθέτην: Ast on 643 a 6, and Heindorf on *Phaedr.* 272 e have collected many instances of this "Attic," and, as Heindorf says, peculiarly "Platonic" acc. with verbals in -τέον.

e 7. ἄνοιαν: another name for ἀμαθία. Boeckh, on the

grounds (1) that Ficinus translates the word here, and at 689 b 3, and 691 d 1, by *ignorantiam*, and (2) that Plato elsewhere couples ἄγνοια with ἀμαθία (*Lysis* 218 a, *Soph.* 229 c, *Theaet.* 176 c, *Prot.* 360 b, *Alc. I.* 118 a), concludes that ἄγνοιαν was what Plato wrote here. But, of the passages quoted, those from the *Sophist* and the *Theaetetus* do not support the view that in his later writings Plato used ἄγνοια and ἀμαθία as synonymous. In these two passages he denotes a special kind of ἄγνοια by the name of ἀμαθία, distinctly adding, in the former passage, that there are other kinds of ἄγνοια which could not be so called. Moreover, one of the arguments by which Ast supports Boeckh's view is that Plato opposes ἄνοια to νοῦς, and ἀμαθία to φρόνησις. This does not sever ἄνοια from ἀμαθία here; for, just above, νοῦς and φρόνησις have themselves been used as synonymous (688 b 2). Again, the definition of ἀμαθία given in 689 a corresponds much better with the general meaning of ἄνοια than with that of ἄγνοια, however likely may be restitution of the latter word in some passages; e.g. (?) *Laws* 819 d 2, *Phil.* 38 a, and 48 c, where Burnet prints it against MS. authority.—For the use of ἄνοια cp. *Theaet.* 176 e 5 ὑπὸ ἠλιθιότητός τε καὶ τῆς ἐσχάτης ἀνοίας λανθάνουσι τῷ μὲν ὁμοιούμενοι διὰ τὰς ἀδίκους πράξεις, τῷ δὲ ἀνομοιούμενοι.

689 a 5. The τήν goes with the sentence ὅταν . . . ἀσπάζηται, which is felt to be in apposition to ἀμαθίαν and so to be the equivalent of a noun.—δόξαν: this may well have been (Schanz says *was*) the original reading of A; but it was altered in that MS. to δόξῃ, which is the reading of L and O and Stobaeus. Some late MSS., however, recovered the correct reading. The absolute neut. part. is necessary to the sense of the sentence.

a 7. The διαφωνία is not, of course, between pleasure and pain, but between these two sensations, and rational (or philosophical) opinion. It is the opposite of the συμφωνία spoken of at d 5.

a 9. μεγίστην δέ, ὅτι τοῦ πλήθους ἐστὶ τῆς ψυχῆς, "and it is of very wide extent, because it resides in the main division of the soul."

b 1. ὅπερ δῆμός τε καὶ πλῆθος πόλεώς ἐστι, "corresponds to the *commons*, or *multitude* in a city."

b 2. ὅταν . . . ἡ ψυχή: when, that is, in the soul, viewed as a sort of community, power gets into the hands of the multitude, instead of into those of the men who are fit to rule.

b 4. In form the τε after πόλεως connects θείην ἄν with

προσαγορεύω; in reality the second statement is not so much an addition to, as an amplification of, the first.

b 5. ταὐτόν: this is used adverbially, in the sense of ὡσαυτῶς—"equally in the case of a city and in the case of a single man." (O omits the καὶ before δὴ, which shows that the writer did not understand ταὐτόν; καὶ is added in the margin of O, and is found in A and Eus. and Stob.—Badham would reject ἡ ψυχή in b 3.)

b 7. ταύτας, if singular, would probably have been neuter; cp. above τοῦτο ἄνοιαν προσαγορεύω.

c 1. ἀλλ' οὐ τὰς τῶν δημιουργῶν: i.e. "I should *not* call the ἀμαθία of a hand-worker the worst kind of ἀμαθία." In other words, it is a far worse evil for an unwise man to have his way as against the rulers of the state, than for a cobbler to mend shoes badly. Cp. what is said below at d 3 about the relative unimportance of the inability to read or swim.

c 6. τοῦτο . . . λεγόμενον, "this much then we are clear about, and will constantly affirm." The perf. part. expresses the making up of the mind once for all; the pres. λεγόμενον the readiness to declare the opinion whenever it should be necessary. (Badham would read λελεγμένον, Schanz brackets καὶ λεγόμενον because Theodoret omits it, and Eusebius puts it after ἐχόμενον.)

c 7. A L and O and all other MSS. of Plato have ταῦτα μανθάνουσι. Eusebius, in his quotation of the passage, preserved nearly the right reading—he has ταῦτα ἀμαθαίνουσι—which is found first in a late hand in the margin of A and some other MSS. Stobaeus quotes it as εἰς ταῦτα ἀμανθάνουσι (see below d 9)—εἰς also Boeckh, as a conjecture.—For the acc. of the inner object ταῦτα ("in these respects") cp. *Soph.* 228 b 3 ἐν ψυχῇ δόξας ἐπιθυμίαις καὶ θυμὸν ἡδοναῖς καὶ λόγον λύπαις καὶ πάντα ἀλλήλοις ταῦτα τῶν φλαύρως ἐχόντων οὐκ ᾠσθήμεθα διαφερόμενα; where ταῦτα διαφερόμενα means "*thus* differing" (πάντα does not go with ταῦτα). Ast cps. 700 d ταῦτ' οὖν οὕτω τεταγμένως ἤθελεν ἄρχεσθαι τῶν πολιτῶν τὸ πλῆθος.

c 8. I think it is better to put a comma after ἐχόμενον, so that ἂν καὶ κτλ. may refer specially to ὡς ἀμαθέσιν ὀνειδιστέον. (So at d 2 ff. the commendation of wisdom goes with the *absence* of intellectual qualification.)

c 9. πάνυ λογιστικοί: what we should call "senior wranglers."

d 1. διαπεπονημένοι (ὅσοι) is best taken as middle, governing both πάντα τὰ κομψά and ἅπαντα ὅσα πρὸς τάχος τῆς ψυχῆς πεφυκότα (ἐστί)—"and have perfected themselves in all the accomplishments and dexterities of which the mind is capable."

(Theodoret, perhaps quoting from memory, has *ἀγνοοῦσιν* for *ἀμαθέσιν*, and the more matter-of-fact *αὔξην* or *αὔξησιν* for *τάχος*.—This passage, so much quoted by the early fathers, doubtless reminded them of the 13th chap. of the 1st Ep. to the Corinthians.)

d 2. *τοὺς δὲ τοὐναντίον ἔχοντας τούτων*: i.e those in whom there was no *διαφωνία* (a 7) between their *likes* and their *judgement*. For *τούτων* (dependent on *τοὐναντίον*) which is probably neuter, and may be said to be the gen. of the *ταῦτα* at c 7, Eusebius has *τούτοις*, which might be either neut. or masc., and Theodoret has *τούτους*. *ἔχοντας* is probably intransitive.

d 3. Stallb. and Zürr. wrongly write *ἐπιστῶνται* for *ἐπίστωνται*; cp. 934 d 1.

d 4. *ὡς ἔμφροσιν*, "on account of their *wisdom*." Cp. above at 654 c 4 ff., the comparison between the education of the *taste*, and that of the mere executive powers in Music.

d 5. *ἄνευ συμφωνίας*: it would come far short of Plato's meaning merely to explain that both *state* and *man* are hopelessly inefficient, if the executive is at variance with the legislative element. True wisdom, according to him, consists not in the *doing* what is right but in *liking* to do it. The choice of a musical term, denoting the harmony ordained by Nature between certain sounds, suggests that the same Nature is violated by discord in the soul, as is violated by discord in the physical world of sound. This way of considering the matter is well illustrated by *Tim.* 47 d *ἡ δὲ ἁρμονία, συγγενεῖς ἔχουσα φορὰς ταῖς ἐν ἡμῖν τῆς ψυχῆς περιόδοις, τῷ μετὰ νοῦ προσχρημένῳ Μούσαις, οὐκ ἐφ' ἡδονὴν ἄλογον, καθάπερ νῦν εἶναι δοκεῖ χρήσιμος ἀλλ' ἐπὶ τὴν γεγονυῖαν ἐν ἡμῖν ἀνάρμοστον ψυχῆς περίοδον εἰς κατακόσμησίν τε καὶ συμφωνίαν ἑαυτῇ σύμμαχος ὑπὸ Μουσῶν δέδοται.* Cp. also *Rep.* 591 d *ἀλλ' ἀεὶ τὴν ἐν τῷ σώματι ἁρμονίαν τῆς ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ ἕνεκα συμφωνίας ἁρμοττόμενος φανεῖται*, where, as at 430 e, and 443 d (an elaborate musical analogy), *σωφροσύνη* is spoken of as a *συμφωνία ψυχῆς*; also *Phaedo* 93 c ff., where the *soul* itself and *virtue* are both spoken of as a *ἁρμονία*. The same analogy between the physical and moral world is claimed by Wordsworth when, in his Ode to Duty, he says:

> Thou dost preserve the stars from wrong:
> And the most ancient heavens through thee are fresh and strong.

—καὶ τὸ σμικρότατον εἶδος: as we should say, "not the ghost" or "the shadow of."

d 6. We should not be far wrong in saying that here, as in the passages of the *Republic* cited above, the *συμφωνία* spoken of is what Plato elsewhere calls *σωφροσύνη*. He definitely explains that it consists of a *state of mind*, not in the character of a man's deeds, which might be rightly done from a wrong motive.

d 8. *ὁ δὲ ἀπολειπόμενος*: sc. *τῆς σοφίας* (not, as Jowett, *τοῦ λόγου*; he translates "he who is devoid of reason").—*περὶ πόλιν*: a variety for *πόλεως*, which admits of being joined to *ἀμαθαίνων* in sense, as well as to *σωτήρ*.

d 9. *πᾶν τοὐναντίον*, "far from it!" The contrast between *σωτήρ* and *ἀμαθαίνων* is not that of logical opposites, but of incongruities.—*εἰς ταῦτα* must mean the same as the *ταῦτα* at c 7; i.e. "in this respect."

e 2. *λελεγμένα τεθήτω ταύτῃ*: *λελεγμένα* here corresponds to and sums up the *δεδογμένον καὶ λεγόμενον* above, as the *τεθήτω* corresponds to the *κείσθω*.

e 4. We now pass to a different subject; i.e. the various "titles," as a lawyer would call them, by which rule is exercised. The *δὲ* (for which A first wrote *τε*, and afterwards corrected it to *δὲ*, which is what Stobaeus has) marks the thought which serves to pass from one subject to the other: i.e. "men without *σοφία* must *not* rule, but rulers we must have, all the same."

690 a 1. *ἀξιώματα . . . τοῦ τε ἄρχειν καὶ ἄρχεσθαι*: *ἀξίωμα* is used from the point of view of the *ruler*. It is his *title*, or *claim* to the position; so that the addition of *ἄρχεσθαι* constitutes a zeugma. The claim is that *he* should rule and others should *be* ruled. Hence we may translate: "titles to rule and obedience," or "claims to rule and to be obeyed." This furnishes a better explanation of the genitives *πατρός* and *μητρός* than if we took *ἀξίωμα* to mean *ratio*, with Ast, who translates "*ratio de patre et matre*." (So Jowett, who translates it "*principle*."—Ficinus seems to have read *πατέρα τε καὶ μητέρα*, and Badham conjectures *πατέρας τε καὶ μητέρας*.)

a 2. The connecting links need attention. The *τε* after the first *ἕν* does not go with the next *καί*, which means *or*, but with the *τε* after the second *ἕν*. The *τε* in *τό τε*, again, does not go with the *καί* next to it (which possibly also means *or*—see above on 680 e 2), but with the *καί* before *ὅλως*.

a 4. The second of the two statements thus connected by *τε* and *καί* is almost a repetition of the first; *γονέας* puts *πατρὸς καὶ μητρός* in a slightly more general form, and *ἐκγόνων* suggests a second or even a third generation as added to those who are to obey.

b 6. Cl. "A most compelling kind of rule, that" (i.e. "superior strength is indeed an unanswerable claim").

Ath. "Yes, and all over the animal kingdom it is the commonest kind of rule, and Pindar tells us that it is so ordained by Nature."

b 8. Pindar's words, as quoted at *Gorg.* 484 b (where see Thompson's note)—and referred to at *Gorg.* 488 b and *Laws* 714 e and 890 a—do not contain the words *κατὰ φύσιν* or *φύσει*, though there, c 1, in expounding them, Plato uses the word *φύσει*, and at 488 b *τὸ κατὰ φύσιν*. Also, as Boeckh says, Hesychius has *Νόμος πάντων ὁ βασιλεὺς κατὰ τὴν φύσιν*. All these references point to the fact that Pindar spoke of "club-law" as "*Nature's*" law—in Wordsworth's words, "the good old rule"—and make it extremely likely that Boeckh (p. 178) was right in supposing that *κατὰ φύσιν* had dropped out at *Gorg.* 484 b 6 after *φησίν*. (Ast, agreeing with de Geer in thinking that *κατὰ φύσιν* is too prosaic an expression to have occurred in Pindar, conjectures that *φύσει* is what has fallen out.)—Both here and at 890 a, it will be seen that Plato is not content with Pindar's dictum.—*τὸ δὲ . . . πεφυκυῖαν*, "but there is a sixth title to rule which is the greatest of all; that which ordains that the ignorant must follow, and the wise must lead and direct. And yet in this case (*τοῦτο*), O most sapient poet, I would venture to affirm that that which is really (*πεφυκυῖαν*) the rule of law over willing subjects, where no compulsion is necessary, is not against Nature; it is Nature's own arrangement."

c 1. *τοῦτο* is probably adverbial; cp. 677 d 1 and 686 c 4: literally, "in the case of," or "about *this* title." The rule of *law* must always be, if the law is rightly made (by the common sense of the community—*ἑκόντων*), the rule of wisdom (cp. below, 714 a 2 *τὴν τοῦ νοῦ διανομὴν ἐπονομάζοντας νόμον*), and the excellence of the governed is to acquiesce in it; and excellence in man or community is, of course, what Nature demands.

c 3. The words *ἀλλ' οὐ βίαιον* mark the contrast with the rule of *force* described above. (Stallb. takes *τὴν . . . ἀρχήν* as in apposition to *φύσιν*; explaining that it is *nature's law*, not *force* that makes the ignorant obey the wise. But it is impossible so to explain away *τὴν τοῦ νόμου ἀρχήν*. It is possible, with Ast, to take *τοῦτο* and *τὴν τοῦ νόμου ἀρχήν* to be in apposition.)—Cp. Hdt. iii. 38 *ὀρθῶς μοι δοκέει Πίνδαρος ποιῆσαι νόμον πάντων βασιλέα φήσας εἶναι.*

c 5. The seventh title to rule, which depends on the decision

of the *lot*, is *θεοφιλής*, because the lot is believed to be the pronouncement of the divine will. The ruler too, himself, may be supposed to be the favourite of heaven. Cp. *Phil.* 39 e 10 *δίκαιος ἀνὴρ εὐσεβὴς καὶ ἀγαθὸς πάντως ἆρ' οὐ θεοφιλής ἐστιν;*

c 6. *εἰς κλῆρόν τινα προάγομεν*: the words are difficult. I think they mean, "we bring (the seventh kind of ruler) before the tribunal of the lot in some form." Cp. 741 b 5 *ὁ νείμας κλῆρος ὢν θεός.*

c 7. *ἀπιόντα ἄρχεσθαι*, "to take his place among the governed."—For the article with *δικαιότατον* cp. 624 a 3.

d 1 ff. "From all this," the Ath. proceeds, "we may see that the right to govern is not so simple as a man might think, and that there are so many kinds of claims to be a governor, that there may well arise discord in a state from their conflict. However, our immediate business is to see what was the rock on which the governors of our primitive Dorian community split."

d 2. *παίζοντες πρός*, "addressing our speculations to"; cp. on *παίζω* and *παιδιά* above on 685 a 6 f. The idea is that of "joining in the game" with the constitution-mongers.

d 3. *πρὸς ἄρχοντας*: *πρός* is difficult; apparently it is "which apply to" or "belong to, rulers," a rather curious variety of expression for the (*ἀξιώματα*) *τοῦ τε ἄρχειν καὶ ἄρχεσθαι* of a 1. (Madvig would read *περὶ* for *πρὸς*, and Schanz follows him; but all difficulty does not vanish then.)—*ὅτι*: an adverbial neuter; "in what respect," i.e. "how inconsistent they all are with each other." And he goes on to say that his light-hearted framer of schemes of government will find these conflicting claims very hard to reconcile.

d 5. *θεραπεύειν* is probably a medical metaphor: "*treat.*"

d 6. *πῶς τε καὶ τί παρὰ ταῦτα ἁμαρτόντες*: i.e. which of these rights were outraged, or strained, by the kings of Argos and Messene.—For *περί c. acc.* in place of a gen. cp. above on 685 c 2 and 688 c 5. We thus get back to the question which was put in 684 e 7, and again at 686 b 6, though here the scope is narrowed.

e 1 ff. We have here an example of the nice applicability of Plato's illustrations. It is precisely the *halving* of the *whole* power that saves the Lacedaemonian dynasty. His readers, too, may well have remembered that *βασιλῆας δωροφάγους* are mentioned in the immediately preceding lines of Hesiod—*Op. et D.* 38 f. (And yet Zeller could say that the quotation was not an apt one here!)

e 2. *ἀγνοήσαντες* answers in proper form the question *τί*

ἁμαρτόντες;—"because they were blind to the fact that . . ." Cp. the way in which Plato introduces this favourite quotation at *Rep.* 466 c (where he is talking of the (possible) mistaken desire for self-aggrandizement on the part of the φύλακες) γνώσεται τὸν Ἡσίοδον ὅτι τῷ ὄντι ἦν σοφὸς λέγων . . .

e 4. μέτριον is here used in two different senses: (1) that of "*sufficient*" (cp. *Phaedo* 117 b—of the dose of hemlock), and (2) that of "*moderate*."—For the explanatory asyndeton introduced by ὁπόταν cp. on 685 c 6. Hermann rightly brackets ὁπόταν . . . χείρονος as a scholiast's "languida dicti Hesiodei interpretatio," and Schanz follows him.

e 7. ἐγγίγνεσθαι περὶ βασιλέας is "to arise in connexion with one of the kings"; ἐγγίγνεσθαι ἐν τοῖς δήμοις is simply "to have its rise among the populaces."

e 8. The πρότερον is an important part of the question, and this part of it is answered by the πρῶτον in 691 a 3.

691 a 1. τὸ μὲν εἰκὸς καὶ τὸ πολύ, "to judge by probability and experience." For the τό cp. on 690 e 7 and 624 a 3. (Badham would read ἐστι for καὶ.)

a 2. In νόσημα we have more distinctly the medical metaphor suggested at 690 d 5. It is very apt here, inasmuch as physical τρυφή is a natural source of bodily disease.

a 3 ff. οὐκοῦν . . . διέφθειρεν; "clearly the kings of that age were the first to be infected with the vice of self-aggrandizement at the expense of the laws of the land. Where they had promised, and even sworn, there they broke with themselves, and the discord in them, being, as we have explained, most grievous folly, for all its apparent wisdom—*that* was what ruined the whole Dorian community by its distressing untuneful dissonance."

a 4. ἔσχον: the natural tense to denote the catching of a disease.—ᾧ, which I have translated by "where," is adverbial; lit. "in respect of that which they agreed to."

a 7. πλημμέλεια: the musical metaphor is preserved here; i.e. the word means a *dissonance*, not an *error* in conduct. So at *Rep.* 349 e the idea of πλεονεξία is (by implication) pronounced to be repugnant to the mind of a μουσικὸς ἀνήρ. τὸ πλεονεκτεῖν τῶν τεθέντων νόμων is what these kings are accused of. By such conduct they rudely break the harmony of their being, and so are guilty of the μεγίστη ἀμαθία described at 689 a.

b 2. For the arrangement of the two genitives and περί cp. 640 b 6 οὐ στραποπέδου περὶ λέγομεν ἄρξοντος.

b 7. For εἰς with κατιδόντα—"by taking a look at"—cp. Hdt.

v. 35. 10 *κελεύειν Ἀριστα γόρην ξυρήσαντά μιν τὰς τρίχας κατιδέσθαι ἐς τὴν κεφαλήν.—ὑμῖν*: because he included Megillus's fellow-countrymen; "what was done among you Spartans."—It is better to take *ῥᾴδιον* with *ἔστιν*, than to take the latter word to mean "it is possible," and supply another *ἐστί* with *ῥᾴδιον*.

b 11. *τὸ σαφέστατον*: the same use of the article as at 690 c 7. So we might say "that is what is certain," instead of "that is certain."

c 1. Nearly all modern editors agree with Stallb. in rejecting *δύναμιν*, which all MSS. have after *ἐλάττοσι*; "manifestum illud grammatici interpolamentum, qui *μείζονα* neutrum pluralis esse nollet," Herm.

c 2. A first wrote *παριεὶς*, but corrected it to *παρεὶς*, which is the reading of O and Stobaeus.—*παρεὶς τὸ μέτριον*, "paying no regard to proportion." Cp. *Phil.* 64 d 9 *μέτρου καὶ τῆς συμμέτρου φύσεως*. There is the same quasi-moral significance attaching to the word *μέτριος* (whether used in the sense of "not excessive in either direction," or in that of "suited to," "proportioned to," i.q. *σύμμετρος*, which again is used occasionally in the first sense of *μέτριος*) as there is to *συμφωνία*; cp. *Phil.* 64 e 6 *μετριότης γὰρ καὶ συμμετρία κάλλος δήπου καὶ ἀρετὴ πανταχοῦ συμβαίνει γίγνεσθαι*.

c 3. *ἀνατρέπεται πάντα*: not "complete ruin results," but "ruin results *in every case*"; *τὰ μέν* is, in effect, "in the case of the overfed body," and *τὰ δέ* "in the case of the overbalanced *ψυχή*." (Cp. *Julius Caesar*, II. i. 18, "The abuse of greatness is, when it disjoins Remorse from power.") — With *ἐξυβρίζοντα* used metaphorically of bodily disorder cp. our "proud" flesh. We might perhaps translate: "breaking out here in rank flesh, and there in rank insolence (with its offspring outrage)."

c 4. With *ὕβρεως ἔκγονον ἀδικίαν* cp. Soph. *O.T.* 873 *ὕβρις φυτεύει τύραννον*, which very likely was in the writer's mind.—*πίπτει* is given in the margin of A as a variant for *θεῖ*, and may even have once stood in the text. (*θεῖ* seems to be a metaphor from the race-course, and not merely an application of the idea of swift movement, as is probably the case in the English expressions *run to seed*, *run riot*.)

c 7. *καί* is *or*; i.e. both *experience* and a sense of *responsibility* are necessary, if disaster is to be avoided.

d 1. *ὥστε μὴ . . . φίλων*, "without getting its faculties thoroughly infected with the deadly disease of folly, and (thus) alienating its closest friends."—*πληρωθεῖσα*: in connexion with

νόσον this word probably has something of the meaning of *infect*, which belongs to *ἀναπίμπλημι* and *ἀνάπλεως*: cp. *Rep.* 496 d *ὁρῶν τοὺς ἄλλους καταπιμπλαμένους ἀνομίας*.—As to its case, the infin. with *ὥστε*, like other infins., has its subject in the nom. where it is identical with the subj. of the verb on which the infin. depends. Cp. Xen. *Hell.* iv. 8. 32 *Ἀναξίβιος μέντοι φίλων αὐτῷ γενομένων τῶν ἐφόρων, διεπράξατο ὥστε αὐτὸς ἐκπλεῦσαι ἁρμοστὴς εἰς Ἄβυδον.*

d 2. *αὐτῆς*: i.e. *τῆς ψυχῆς*.—*διάνοια* is the intelligence, or thinking power of the man; *ψυχή* being used something in the way in which we say 'soul' for 'man,' when we say "there was not a *soul* there." (Badham would read *αὐτὴν δι' ἄνοιαν.*)

d 3. *διέφθειρεν*: gnomic aorist.—*αὐτήν*: i.e. *τὴν θνητῆς ψυχῆς φύσιν.*

d 4. *τοῦτο . . . νομοθετῶν*, "it would take a great lawgiver so to be inspired with a sense of fitness as to guard against this." At b 1 *τί* (with *εὐλαβηθῆναι*) was the *acc. of the inner object*; here *τοῦτο* (with *εὐλαβηθῆναι*) is *acc. of thing guarded against.*

d 5. *ὡς οὖν . . . τὸ δ' ἔοικεν εἶναι*: I have adopted Burnet's stopping and arrangement of this passage (he puts a comma after *γενόμενον*, a colon after *τοπάσαι*, reads *τὸ δ'* for *τόδ'* and puts a — after *εἶναι*), and take *γενόμενον* to be an *absolute* construction, and *ὡς . . . γενόμενον* as dependent on *τοπάσαι*, in the same way that at 624 a 7 *ὡς τοῦ Μίνω φοιτῶντος* depends on *λέγεις*: "we can at the present day form a reasonable conjecture that this end was then secured" (i.e. that the danger *was* guarded against). "But in point of fact, there seems to have been—" Cl. "What?" Ath. "a special providence watching over you," etc. For the *τὸ δ'* cp. 684 c 7, 731 e 3, *Apol.* 23 a, *Rep.* 340 d 7. (It seems to me that the passage would gain in directness if we read *γενομένων*: "that there were great lawgivers at that day we have now every reason to conjecture; but no *legislator* could have arranged for the birth of twins.") (Ast put in *τὸ* before *τότε*; all the early printed texts from Ald. to Stallb. (except Bekker) had *οἶμαι* for the second *εἶναι*. This necessitated the supplying, in thought, of *ἐστι* with *θεός τις*; Schanz substitutes *εἴη ἄν* for *εἶναι.*)

e 1. *ἐκ μονογενοῦς*, "instead of a single born king," as there had been before. This seems better than to take *ἐκ* as merely "from," i.e. "born from."—*εἰς τὸ μέτριον μᾶλλον συνέστειλε*, "brought them within a more reasonable compass," i.e. by halving the kingly power.

e 2. *μεμειγμένη θείᾳ τινὶ δυνάμει*: this probably refers to the

direction Lycurgus was supposed to have received from Apollo's oracle at Delphi (cp. 624 a 5).

e 3. *μείγνυσιν*: cp. Plut. *Lyc.* ch. v. *πλειόνων δὲ καινοτομουμένων ὑπὸ τοῦ Λυκούργου πρῶτον ἦν καὶ μέγιστον ἡ κατάστασις τῶν γερόντων· ἣν φησιν ὁ Πλάτων τῇ τῶν βασιλέων ἀρχῇ φλεγμαινούσῃ μιχθεῖσαν, καὶ γενομένην ἰσόψηφον εἰς τὰ μέγιστα, σωτηρίαν ἅμα καὶ σωφροσύνην παρασχεῖν.*

692 a 1. For *κατὰ γῆρας* and *κατὰ γένος* cp. above on 685 c 2.

a 3. *ὁ δὲ τρίτος σωτήρ*: Plutarch (*Lyc.* ch. vii.), in quoting a good deal of this passage, attributes the institution of the ephorate to the men of a period a hundred and thirty years later than Lycurgus. At *Epistle* viii. 354 b both the senate of old men, and the ephorate, are attributed to Lycurgus; as also they are by Herodotus (i. 65). Aristotle, *Pol.* v. 9. 1, says Theopompus established the ephorate, and he would seem to be the *τρίτος σωτήρ* spoken of here by Plato. (For further references see Ast's and Stallb.'s notes.)—The words *τρίτος σωτήρ* recall the *τὸ τρίτον τῷ σωτῆρι*—the third cup in honour of *Ζεὺς Σωτήρ* (cp. *Phil.* 66 d, and see Heindorf's note on *Charm.* 167 a 9).

a 5. *ἐγγὺς . . . δυνάμεως*: Aristotle, *Pol.* ii. 6. 16, speaks of the ephors as *ὄντες οἱ τυχόντες*, and says that the method of their election was *παιδαριώδης λίαν*, so that Plato's words here in describing the ephors as "as good as elected by lot," are justified (cp. Grote ii. ch. 6).—The five-fold repetition of the word *δύναμις* in this passage, like the repeated *ἔτι* in the early part of it, are marks of rapid and unrevised writing. Plato takes very little pains about the statement of historical facts. It is the point they are to illustrate that is important. Hence the polishing of such a passage as this was naturally left till the last —and was never done.

a 7. *ἐξ ὧν ἔδει*; we might almost say that *ἀξιωμάτων* may be supplied, in thought, with *ὧν*: the reference to the lot, and to birth, and to the wisdom of the old men recalls the previous list of *ἀξιώματα τοῦ ἄρχειν καὶ ἄρχεσθαι.*

a 8. *μέτρον ἔχουσα*, "being duly regulated" or "limited." Cp. above *εἰς τὸ μέτριον συνέστειλε.*—*τοῖς ἄλλοις*: i.e. the rest of Hellas.

b 1. *ἐπί γε Τημένῳ καὶ Κρεσφόντῃ*, "if it had been in the hands of Temenus and Cresphontes."

b 2. *ἡ Ἀριστοδήμου μερίς*: i.e. Lacedaemon.

b 4. *σχεδὸν γὰρ κτλ.*, "else they would hardly have imagined that they sufficiently curbed by (coronation) oaths a youthful

disposition, on its accession to a power which might easily degenerate into a despotism." It is difficult to be sure of the exact force of *ᾠήθησαν ἂν μετριάσαι*: I think the choice lies between "would have imagined they moderated," and "would have imagined it proper to moderate," i.e. that it was the right thing to moderate. *οἶμαι δεῖν* is so common a phrase that the *δεῖν* may be omitted; cp. *Gorg.* 472 c where *ὃν ἐγὼ αὖ οἶμαι* is replaced at 474 a by *οἷον ἐγὼ οἶμαι δεῖν εἶναι*. (There is no indication that *οἶμαι* with an inf. ever had the meaning *expect* (to do), which the Eng. *think* (to do) sometimes has, and which would suit this passage exactly—"I did not think to draw my sword 'gainst Pompey" *Ant. and Cle.* II. ii. 158.—Cornarius's translation, which Ast quotes with approval, is "alioqui nunquam putavissent se redacturos esse." At *Alc. I.* 126 e *οἶμαι λέγειν* may mean "I mean," or "wish to say," but most likely it is "I think that I mean."—H. Richards would boldly read *μετριάσαι ἄν*, or *μετριάσειν*. See below on 812 b 5, and cp. Goodwin, *M. and T.* § 127.)

b 7. A, L and O have *μὲν οὖσαν*; a late hand in A, and Boeckh, suggested *μένουσαν*; Ven. 184 (Bekker's Ξ) has *μενοῦσαν*, which is doubtless right.

c 1. *νῦν μὲν γενόμενον*: the emphasis is on the *νῦν*, "arrived at *now*"—"the recognition of this truth by us *now* implies no special wisdom."—*ἔμπροσθεν*: i.e. at 691 b 3.

c 3. Here the emphasis is on the *τότε*.

c 4. *μίαν ἐκ τριῶν* [i.e. *ἀρχῶν*] *ποιῆσαι*: the *three* are not, I believe, the three states of Sparta, Argos, and Messene, but the three elements of power contained in the *Throne*, the *Gerousia*, and the *Ephorate*. The only unity of states which seems to be in the author's mind here is that of Hellas as a whole—the *ἡμῶν* of c 7; also, the close connexion of the words *μίαν ἐκ τριῶν ποιῆσαι* with *μετριάσαι τὰς ἀρχάς* suggests that they refer to the mutual checks exercised by the three above-mentioned authorities at Sparta, which resulted in the *moderation* of power desired.

c 5. *τὰ νοηθέντα καλὰ τότε*: i.e. that excellent (mixed) form of government. If legislators had been wise enough to see all this, the right constitution would have been set up in all three states. As it was, it was not legislators' wisdom but the providential birth of twins in the royal house which set Sparta in the right way. (Ast, in a note on *σύμμεικτος γενομένη* at a 7, quotes passages from many ancient authors dealing with the combination of several elements of power in a government.)

c 7. Heindorf, on *Soph.* 242 c *διηγεῖσθαι παισὶν ὡς οὖσιν ἡμῖν*, collects the following instances of a like arrangement of words: *Laws* 645 b, *Polit.* 260 c, *Phil.* 18 d.

d 4 ff. *τὸ πρῶτον μὲν . . . κατὰ κράτος*: a puzzling passage. Notwithstanding its curious position, the *μέν* with its *δέ* has nothing to contrast but *μίαν* and *τὼ δύο*. *ἀμῦναι* seems to mean "to take up arms," *ἐπαμύνειν*, "to arrive on the field of battle." *τὸ πρῶτον*: i.e. in the Marathonian war.

d 6. *δέ*, "while," or "and moreover." — *διεφθαρμένα*: it is noticeable that the same sort of term is applied to the corruption of the *body politic*, as would be applied to moral corruption in a single man. (See above 689 a 7.) The sin of the two recreant cities is want of internal *συμφωνία*, and this is accurately reproduced, on a larger scale, by the hostility shown by them to Sparta and the whole of Hellas, respectively.

d 7. *πολεμοῦσα*: as we have seen before, Plato is not writing history; he uses his memory of history, or even, perhaps, his conception of what the course of history might have been, to furnish *illustrations* of his argument. It seems certain that there was *not* war between Sparta and Messene at the time of Mardonius's invasion, though the two states were old antagonists. Possibly the misstatement has here a *dramatic* reason: the Athenian may well be supposed reluctant to recall the real behaviour of Sparta at the time, to the mind of Megillus. Below, at 698 e, it is suggested that there may have been another reason for the Spartan inaction.

e 1. For *περί* (*bis*) cp. above 685 c 4 and 688 c 5.

e 2. *οὔθ' ὑπήκουσεν οὔτ' ἤμυνεν*: we have here a suggestion that Sparta did all it could in *responding* (*ὑπακούειν*) to the summons of Hellas, and promising assistance. Argos did not even do that; it was philo-Persian. (I see no reason for Ritter's proposed insertion of *αὐτὴ* before *ἤμυνεν*.)—*πολλὰ δὲ κτλ.*, "besides that (*δέ*), if a man were to relate the history of that time, he would find many hard things to say about the conduct of Hellas in the Persian war." There are several other ways in which the words of this passage might be taken. Ast, Schneider, and Burnet take *περὶ ἐκ. τ. πόλεμον* with *γενόμενα*. But, with this arrangement, *τότε* and *περὶ ἐκ. τ. π.* are oppressively tautological. Though strictly, I think, *λέγων* only governs *τὰ τότε γενόμενα*, its position suggests that it is to be supplied, in idea, with *κατηγοροῖ*, in the form of "in the course of his story."

e 4. *οὐδ' αὖ κτλ.*, "in fact, he could not (properly) say that

Hellas did defend itself at all. No: if the allied Athenians and Lacedaemonians had not repelled the threatened slavery, the Greek races would by this time" (have lost their individuality, and would have sunk to the grievous plight of the isolated Greek cities within the Persian dominions).

e 6. *κοινῇ διανόημα*, "unanimity"; almost a compound verbal noun, formed from *κοινῇ διανοεῖσθαι*. So, in English, we might occasionally make an adverbial phrase qualify a verbal noun, and, e.g., from "*all but explode*" form "an *all but explosion*." (Cp. Tennyson's "Sweet Catullus's all-but island" in "Frater ave atque vale.")

693 a 3. *καθάπερ . . . κατοικεῖται*: the antecedent to *ὧν* may be *γένη*, or "Ἕλληνες, or even *ἄνθρωποι*.

a 4. *διαπεφορημένα* refers to the dispersion of the inhabitants of e.g. Greek states, *συμπεφορημένα* to their incorporation into communities of *βάρβαροι*. Cp. Grote, ch. xxxiii. p. 162, "the empire of the Great King was then an aggregate of heterogeneous elements, cemented together by no tie except that of common fear and subjection—no way coherent nor self-supporting, nor pervaded by any common system or spirit of nationality." And later, p. 177, "wholesale translations of inhabitants from one place to another were familiar to the mind of a Persian satrap."—It is very tempting to adopt Cobet's belief that *ἐσπαρμένα* is a marginal explanation of *διαπεφορημένα* which has no right to a place in the text. In that case *κακῶς κατοικεῖται* is "lead a miserable existence." If the word be retained, it will be "lead a miserable sporadic existence," *ἐσπαρμένα* being joined adverbially to *κατοικεῖται*, and *κακῶς* qualifying both words.

a 5. *ταῦτ' ἔχομεν ἐπιτιμᾶν*, "these faults I will venture to find with . . ."; an answer to Megillus's question at 685 a 1 *πῶς δὴ καὶ τί μεμφόμενος αὐτῶν λέγεις;*

a 6. *λεγομένοις* is a slight apology for the use of the term *πολιτικοῖς*.

a 7. In adding *καὶ τοῖς νῦν* he probably has in mind the contemporary Persian despotism into which their *ἄμεικτος ἀρχή* had degenerated.—*ἵνα . . . ἄλλο*, "and my reason for finding fault is this: I hope, by investigating the causes of the errors, to discover what course, different from that which was taken, ought to have been taken."—Ritter, unlike all other interpreters, takes *αὐτῶν* to be masc., and *τὰς αἰτίας* to mean the *charges* (brought against them)—a suggestion not to be lightly rejected; but (1) it seems better to take *ταῦτα* (a 5), *αὐτῶν* (a 7), and *ταῦτα*

(b 1) all to refer to the same thing—i.e. the legislators' errors; (2) the desired discovery of the right course (*ἀνευρίσκωμεν κτλ.*) is more likely to follow an investigation of *causes* than of *charges*; and (3) the gen. *αὐτῶν* in that sense would be unusual.

b 2. *τὸ παρόν = νύνδη*, and is so fixed by the tense of *εἴπομεν*. Cp. *Rep.* 487 c 4 *λέγω δ' εἰς τὸ παρὸν ἀποβλέψας* (of the discussion so far as it had gone).—*ἄρα* is the equivalent of modern quotation marks, and the *οὐ δεῖ . . . νομοθετεῖν* is clearly the recapitulation of the results previously arrived at in the discussion, but it is not made clear whether the following three grounds for the said conclusions are stated as self-evident truths, or whether they are statements, in a new form, of points previously brought out in the argument. The latter, I think, is the case; inasmuch as (1) *despotism*, (2) *folly*, and (3) *unpatriotic dislike* (691 d 2) *of one's fellow citizens and failure to help one's allies*—three faults which he has enlarged on—are respectively inconsistent with the (1) *freedom*, (2) *wisdom* and (3) *fellow-feeling* here desiderated; for (3) cp. 628 a 3 and c 10. The following words seem prompted by a feeling that the reference to his previous views has not been quite explicit enough.

b 6. *πολλάκις*, "perhaps."

c 2. *πρὸς τὸ σωφρονεῖν*: Badham says the whole argument is spoilt, unless we read *πρὸς τὸ ἐλεύθερον* here; Schanz would reject the three words (partly because as originally written the text of A omitted the *ἢ* before *πρὸς* in c 3, as also did O).—If we retain the MS. text we must assume that *ὅταν φῶμεν* does not mean "when we say, *as we do now*," but introduces a general instance of different ways of putting the same thing, and not a repetition of the instance that has just occurred—*σωφροσύνη* being substituted for *ἐλευθερία*, because it does not admit of excess. The best illustration of the identification of *σωφροσύνη* with *φρόνησις* and true public spirit is the passage in the *Republic* which deals with *σωφροσύνη* as the virtue of a *state*—430 d–432 a. Plato there likens it to a *ἁρμονία* (431 e), and further, at 432 a 6, calls it a *ὁμόνοια*, and a *χείρονός τε καὶ ἀμείνονος κατὰ φύσιν συμφωνία*, defining it at 431 d 7 as the condition when *ἡ αὐτὴ δόξα ἔνεστι τοῖς τε ἄρχουσι καὶ ἀρχομένοις περὶ τοῦ οὕστινας δεῖ ἄρχειν*. (The *φρόνησις* or *νοῦς* of a *state* is thus distinguished from the *σοφία* which is the virtue peculiar to the *ἄρχοντες*, and is described at *Rep.* 428 f.–429 a.)—Bruns (p. 170) regards this explanation as too simple ("*naiv*") and self-evident a piece of botcher's work to need a refutation.

c 4 f. *καὶ ἄλλα δὴ πολλὰ κτλ.* : i.e. "many other expressions, which would mean the same thing."—I cannot help wondering whether we ought not to read *⟨ἀπο⟩ρήματα* for *ῥήματα* here.

c 6. *πειρασόμεθα* : the fut., which A's scribe corrected to the subj., is the better reading. Cleinias says they will try and reconcile the different parts of the argument in the way suggested. —*ἐπανιόντες τοὺς λόγους*, "going back (in our minds) over the previous course of our discussion."

c 8. Badham rejects *βουλόμενος*, calling it a *putidum emblema*, and Schanz agrees. Without *βουλόμενος* the sentence means: "(with regard to *φ.*, *φρ.* and *ἐλ.* tell us) at what you were going to say that the legislator ought to aim"; with *βουλόμενος*, though difficult, it may mean: "(tell us) at what you meant the legislator ought to aim when you were about to speak (about those things)." *βουλόμενος ἔμελλες λέγειν* is equivalent to *ἐβούλου λέγειν, μέλλων λέγειν*, the *λέγειν* doing duty twice—a natural conversational irregularity. There is perhaps a reference to the *βουλόμενος* in the *βούλεται* at e 1. (I cannot imagine any reader putting in *βουλόμενος*. Ritter would prefer, of the two, to reject *δεῖν* rather than *βουλόμενος*; rightly, I think.—Apelt, p. 6, comparing *ἐπιχειρῶν λέγειν* at 780 d, suggests that *ἔμελλες* means "*cunctabaris*"—i.e. "you wanted to say, but it did not come out.")

d 2. *ἄκουσον δή νυν* : the main subject of Book III.—the elementary form of a state—the *πολιτείας ἀρχή* spoken of in the first line of the book—now comes more clearly into view. What has been said before enables us to understand the principles on which the following judgements are pronounced, and, e.g., the meaning of *sanity* (*σωφροσύνη*), and its opposite *insanity* (*ἄνοια*), as applied to the mutual relations of the members of a political community.

d 5. *ἄκρον ἔχειν* : with this we must supply *λέγων ἄν τις ὀρθῶς λέγοι*. The sentence means: "the former polity has reached its fullest development among the Persians; the latter among ourselves."

d 6. *καθάπερ εἶπον*. I take to refer to the immediately preceding *ἐξ ὧν τὰς ἄλλας γεγονέναι κτλ.* Stallb. thinks there is a reference to the necessity of *μείξις* spoken of at 691 d e and 692 a.

d 7. *διαπεποικιλμέναι* : the metaphor is from the blending of colours in a woven cloth; cp. below 863 a 6, where the word is used to describe the mixing up of two distinct questions.

d 8. Both elements are necessary. Untempered freedom—the absence of all authority—means that each man does what he likes.

No concerted action of any kind is possible in the state. Untempered, irresponsible autocracy means that, though the state acts as one man, i.e. possesses unity, and though, possibly, its actions may be guided by *φρόνησις*, there is no *φιλία*.—Aristotle at *Pol.* 1266 a 1 speaks as if Plato had wanted to mix the two elements when at their worst, instead of letting them modify each other. Authority in any form—e.g. in that of *αἰδώς*, 698 b 5—is, in a sense, *ἐκ τυραννίδος (μοναρχίας) γεγονός*.

e 1. *φιλία μετὰ φρονήσεως*: as at b 4 and c 3 the two go together. *Concerted action* is not enough, unless there is *wisdom* to direct it. (But it is not to be imagined, he would doubtless add, that *φρόνησις* could accompany unadulterated *ἐλευθερία*.) Ritter reminds us that at 628 b c the danger of *στάσις* is mentioned, and the necessity of *εἰρήνη πρὸς ἀλλήλους ἅμα καὶ φιλοφροσύνη*; also that at 640 c 9 a *φρόνιμος ἄρχων* was said to be as necessary for a *συνουσία συμποτῶν* as for an army.—*ὃ δὴ βούλεται ἡμῖν ὁ λόγος προστάττειν*: this does not mean that the logos has proved it already. The Ath. foretells that this conclusion is inevitable. As explained at a 7, he investigates failure in the hope that if its causes are discovered, the wanderer may be put in the right path. Thus at e 9 he says, "we must point out the *causes*."

e 6. *μειζόνως ἢ ἔδει μόνον*, "overmuch, and to the exclusion of the other."—*τὰ μέτρια τούτων*, "the right measure of the two elements."

e 8. *οὕτω πως*, "succeeded more or less in doing the same," i.e. in achieving a proper combination of the two elements

694 a 1. *τὰ αἴτια* (see above on e 1): i.e. the causes of their later degeneracy.

a 3. *τὸ μέσον . . . ἦγον*: *ἦγον* is used, as is *ἀγαγόντων* below at 701 e 6 (and perhaps *ἄγοντες* below l. 7), in the sense of *to take a certain course*. I have followed Schanz in adopting Hertlein's *μέσον* for the MS. *μέτριον*, mainly because, though it is natural enough that Plato should describe the Persians and Cyrus as in a state *midway between slavery and freedom*, it is not natural that he should say they had *the right amount of slavery*; he would have found a less obnoxious word than *δουλεία* to describe the opposite of *ἐλευθερία*, when urging the necessity of a certain amount of it. —*μᾶλλον* means "more than at a later time."

a 5. *ἔπειτα δὲ ἄλλων πολλῶν δεσπόται*: as immediately explained, this circumstance gives a larger scope to the *liberality* of their disposition.

a 6. *ἄρχοντες, μεταδιδόντες, ἄγοντες*: inasmuch as *φίλοι ἦσαν*

has στρατιῶται for subject, we must regard these nominatives as absolute (cp. Jebb's note on Soph. *Ant.* 260, where he says that φύλαξ ἐλέγχων φύλακα is virtually equivalent to a gen. abs.).—In the parallel sentence that follows at b 2 we have the gen. abs. in the corresponding place. No doubt the variety of construction was intentional.—ἄρχοντες may mean *the ruling class among the Persians*, or the Persians proper, regarded as the rulers of the subject nations just referred to.

b 4. εἴς τι: Burnet's note is: "εἴς τι L O ^{2} (σ s.v.); εἴ τι O; τι A (sed εἴ s.v. A^2)." I have adopted Burnet's solution of this interesting puzzle, rather than Schanz's (who prints τι with A), mainly because "able to advise *about any matter*" makes so much better sense here than "at all able to advise." εἰς may well have been omitted by mistake after τοὺς, though it is difficult to see where εἰ came from. Perhaps A corrected his τι to εἴ τι from a comparison of O or its like, and we must then also suppose that O merely omitted the ς by mistake. It is curious that in some inferior MSS. the ς was transposed to the second word, εἴ τις.—κοινὴν κτλ.: what wisdom there was in individuals was thus available for the community. Cp. νοῦ κοινωνίαν below.—These counsellors furnish an informal counterpart to the Spartan Senate of old men.—ἐπέδωκεν is Steph.'s manifestly right correction of the MS. ἀπέδωκεν.

c 2. μαντείᾳ χρώμεθα: a playfully grandiloquent phrase for what we should call "making a shrewd guess."

c 4. The MS. τοῦτο, if correct, is not the antecedent of ὅπερ, but the subj. of φέρει; it can hardly be both. It is generally interpreted: "this (explanation) at all events brings our investigation to the goal for which we started." But surely for this we ought to have τὴν σκέψιν, and the τοῦτο is awkward. Stallb. translates φέρει ἡμῖν σκέψιν *perducit nobis considerationem*; but the rest does not fit in easily. Badham ingeniously suggested τοῦ for τοῦτο, "it helps us to consider the thing we started to find." Schanz adopts this, and I follow him. For the τοῦ before a relative clause cp. *Phaedo* 75 b 1 ὀρέγεται τοῦ ὃ ἔστιν ἴσον; so in Homer B 841 τῶν οἳ Λάρισαν ἐριβώλακα ναιετάασκον.

c 5. μαντεύομαι: cp. above on c 2.—Ast is perhaps right in preferring δή νυν to δὴ νῦν.

c 6. Athenaeus, who quotes this passage (xi. 505 a) to show that Plato had a spite against Xenophon, has, besides some minor variants, φιλόπονον for φιλόπολιν. Stallb. cps. *Apol.* 24 b Μέλητον τὸν ἀγαθόν τε καὶ φιλόπολιν ὥς φησιν. For στρατηγός certainly φιλό-

πονος seems a more suitable epithet; for all that it may not be what Plato wrote. Athenaeus, in his coarse abuse of the great philosopher, is not likely to have been very careful to quote him exactly.—Plato doubtless had in mind here the author of the *Cyropaedia* and the *Oeconomicus*, and meant this, as Ritter says, as a deliberate protest against the system of education described in the former book.

c 7. ἦφθαι: cp. our conversational use of "tackle" (a subject); it denotes a mere *dealing with* the subject, not a *devoted study* of it. Hence Ast's οὐδὲ for οὐδὲν is out of place, i.e. there could be no heightening of the force of the negative.—It is possible that we ought to read for οὐδὲν τὸν νοῦν, οὐδ' ἠτινιοῦν; Ath. has οὐ δή τινι οὖν.

d 2. εὐδαίμονας . . . καὶ μακαρίους: the two words occur together at *Rep.* 354 a; here they mean "fortune's favourites"—specially gifted and guided by a higher power.

d 3. ἤδη, "from their birth."

d 4. τούτων (οὐδενὸς ἐπιδεεῖς): this word, which Badham would reject, must refer to the advantages implied in the application of the words εὐδαίμονας and μακαρίους, "rolling in luxury," as we should say. Cp. 715 b 8, where τῶν τοιούτων refers to *what is implied* in the previous πλούσιός τις.

d 6. ἐπαινεῖν τε ἀναγκάζουσαι κτλ.: a classical example of such conduct in modern literature is furnished by Countess Gruffanuff's educational methods with the Princess Angelica.—The break in the construction, which leaves the μήτε "in the air," is in the familiar conversational style.

d 7. τοιούτους τινάς: i.e. "in complete licence."

e 1. γυναικείαν μὲν οὖν κτλ., "what could you expect of a bringing up by women—women of the royal seraglio—new to their high station, with never a man to advise them?"

e 6. αὐτοῖς αὖ . . . ἐκτᾶτο, "was all the time acquiring for them."—But with the "flocks" he did not secure for them the *shepherd's* training; a literary conceit.

695 a 2. Ast rejected the words Περσικήν . . . to ἐκγόνων as a manifestly *alienum additamentum*, and Schanz follows him. The passage certainly reads on admirably if σκληράν follows οὖσαν, but there is this special reason, noticed by Stallb., for thinking Περσικήν genuine, that Μηδικήν at a 7 gains special point as a contrast to Περσικήν; so that I should only agree to Ast's rejection, if τὴν Μηδικήν were rejected as well. I cannot believe Stallb. is right in rejecting only Περσικήν. The separation of οὖσαν from its predicate σκληράν (in that case) by the circumstantial absolute clause seems

impossibly awkward. The best way out of the difficulty seems to be furnished by Burnet's insertion of two parenthesis marks, one after Περσικήν, and the other after ἐκγόνων; σκληρὰν κτλ. then reads as an epexegetical apposition to Περσικήν.

a 6. τῆς λεγομένης εὐδαιμονίας: almost "their boasted preciousness," i.e. the notion that, not being "common human clay," they must be subject to no such restraint or correction as ordinary boys receive.—The sentence is very complex: τε does not connect διεφθαρμένην with παιδευθέντας—in that case we should have had τὴν παιδείαν—but τε and καί connect γυναικῶν with εὐνούχων; παιδείαν is "acc. of inner object" to παιδευθέντας; the first ὑπό clause depends on διεφθαρμένην (which is merely attributive to παιδείαν), the second on παιδευθέντας; τὴν Μηδικήν is epexegetic to (διεφθαρμένην) παιδείαν. It was not that the Median way of education was *ruined*, but that the education, ruined as aforesaid, was a genuine *Median* one.

b 1. οἵους ἦν αὐτοὺς εἰκὸς γενέσθαι: much the same in effect as the τοιούτους τινάς at 694 d 7.

b 2. For the absolue use of παραλαβόντες—cp. our absolute use of "to succeed"—Ast cps. *Critias* 109 d 3 διὰ τὰς τῶν παραλαμβανόντων φθοράς; so too τοῖς παραλαμβάνουσι at Ar. *Pol.* 1285 b 8.

b 3. μεστοί goes adverbially with παραλαβόντες—"succeeding in a state of complete and unbridled self-indulgence." (Badham says παρ. cannot stand without τὴν ἀρχήν, and μεστοί wants a participle, e.g. γενόμενοι, and marks a lacuna after Κύρου.)

b 6. ἀπαιδευσίας: a telling substitute here for ἀνοίας or ἀμαθίας.

b 7. τοῦ λεγομένου τότε εὐνούχου: it is not known on what authority the Magian pretender is so described. So at *Epist.* vii. 332 a κοινωνοῖς δὲ μόνον τῆς τοῦ Μήδου τε καὶ εὐνούχου χειρώσεως.—καταφρονήσαντος agrees in sense with Μήδων as well as with εὐνούχου; so at c 4 Δαρείου καὶ τῶν ἑπτά are not to be separated: D. was one of the seven. (Valckenaer on Hdt. iii. 86 proposed to read ἕξ for ἑπτά here.)

c 6. τῷ λόγῳ: not *story*, but the same personified λόγος last referred to at 693 e 1. "Let us see" he says, in effect, "what the λόγος has to teach us by the course of events." Cp. below e 6 ὡς ὁ ἐμὸς λόγος.—A reference to the above-quoted passage from *Ep.* vii.—ἔδειξέν τε [Δαρεῖος] παράδειγμα οἷον χρὴ τὸν νομοθέτην καὶ βασιλέα τὸν ἀγαθὸν γίγνεσθαι—and a comparison of the description (at 691 e ff.) of the wise measures adopted for consolidating the Spartan constitution, show us that the Ath. is here bringing forward

proofs of Darius's political wisdom; he shared his own power with others, and made his people *one* in spirit. Like Cyrus, he was φιλόπολις.

c 8. H. Richards would add αὐτός to ἕβδομος, but it is hard to see how such a natural addition should have dropped out; and ἕβδομος by itself emphasizes more the fact that D. associated six others with himself in the government.—The same division into seven satrapies is mentioned at *Ep.* vii. l.c. Hdt. iii. 89 says D. divided his kingdom into twenty satrapies.

c 10. καὶ νόμους . . . οἰκεῖν, "and set himself to govern by laws of his own making" (whereby he gave his people *égalité*).

d 2. εἰς τὸν νόμον ἐνέδει, "regulated by fixed decree." The context (on both sides) shows that D., instead of keeping the tribute paid by the subject races, divided it among his Persian subjects; another abandonment of arbitrary power.

d 7. ὦ Δαρεῖε . . . Καμβύσην: Burnet follows Stallb. in marking off this passage as an animated—one might almost say an agitated—parenthesis; and this is the best way out of the difficulty.—ὁ δέ resumes the thread of the interrupted sentence, of which Ξέρξης is the subject, very naturally.—Stallb. compares aptly such "tragic" adjurations as that which begins Euripides's *Alcestis*—ὦ δώματ' Ἀδμήτει' ἐν οἷς κτλ., where the relative sentence contains all that is said about the vocative.—We might paraphrase here: "To think that you should have been blind to Cyrus's blunders!"

d 8. ἴσως is a sort of apology for the strangeness of the adjuration—something like an "I think you will admit." (Steph. would read an exclamatory ὡς for ὃς; Ast would reject ὃς; Herm. brackets the whole passage—but Ξέρξης badly wants a verb, especially with ὁ δέ following; Peipers, *Quaest. Crit. de Pl. Legg.* p. 81, accepts Hermann's athetesis and rejects ὁ δέ as well; Badham marks a lacuna after Ξέρξης, and Schanz follows him.)

e 2. ὁ δέ . . . παθήμασιν, "Xerxes, I say, being a product of the same kind of education, duly reproduced Cambyses' career." (Ast, *Lex.*, gives ἀπετέλεσεν the meaning *passus est.*)

e 4. ἔκ γε τοσούτου, "ever since," "from that day to this."

e 5. πλήν γε ὀνόματι: this, coming after ἀληθῶς, is tautological, but apparently Plato could not resist the temptation to play with the word μέγας. (It is possible that it is not Plato, who says it, but a commentator, making explicit the hint which already lay in the ἀληθῶς.)

e 6. For the MS. *τύχης* Steph., Ast, Herm., and Schanz read *τύχη*. But similar genitives occur at Antiphon, *De caede Herodis* § 92 *τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἀκούσιον ἁμάρτημα, ὦ ἄνδρες, τῆς τύχης ἐστί, τὸ δὲ ἑκούσιον τῆς γνώμης*, and at Thuc. i. 142. 9 *τὸ δὲ ναυτικὸν τέχνης ἐστίν*; the gen. is equal to an adjective: "the cause is *no accidental one*." It is explained, 696 a 2 f., that the same effect *always* follows; and we must supply *αἴτιόν ἐστιν* with *ὁ κακὸς βίος*.—*ὡς ὁ ἐμὸς λόγος*: cp. above on c 6.

696 a 1 f. This *καί* means *and*, but those in a 2 mean *or*. The father must be excessively rich, and also possess unrestricted sway over his fellows. Even then the *τὰ πολλά* allows exceptions; but *if* the bringing up is the *ἀνεπίπληκτος τροφή* above described, excellence is out of the question.

a 2. "Boy or man, however long he live," i.e. the effect of the bad education will last a lifetime.

a 3. *τῷ νομοθέτῃ σκεπτέον, καὶ ἡμῖν δὲ ἐν τῷ νῦν παρόντι*: the lawgiver, for practical purposes, we, at present, for theoretical. Such a remark as this prepares the ground for the dramatic fiction of a new Cretan Colony, which serves to mark the transition at the beginning of the fourth book from the purely theoretical to the *practical* part of the treatise.

a 6 f. All the *καί*'s in these two lines are *or*; if the conjunction before *τροφήν* had stood alone, it would probably have been *οὐδέ*. —*πενίᾳ κτλ.*, "whether to rich or poor, subject or prince."

a 7. *τροφήν*: Boeckh, in confuting Cornarius's plausible substitution of *ἀρχήν* for this word, quotes Ar. *Pol.* 1294 b 22 *ὁμοίως γὰρ οἱ τῶν πλουσίων τρέφονται τοῖς τῶν πενήτων* (of the Lacedaemonians). He also says: "Τὸ *κατ' ἀρχὰς θεῖον* est Lycurgus, *φύσις ἀνθρωπίνη, μεμιγμένη θείᾳ τινὶ δυνάμει* (p. 691 e)."—As Ritter says, Aristotle has, at *Pol.* 1313 a 25 ff., adopted Plato's view of the reason for the durability of the Spartan constitution, i.e. the division, and other restrictions of personal power.

b 3. *ἐπεὶ οὐδ' ὅτι ταχύς*, "any more, of course, than because he is a fast runner."

b 4. With *ἀρετῆς* must be supplied *τιμὰς δεῖ εἶναι ὑπερεχούσας* —"even virtue must not be highly honoured if unaccompanied by *σωφροσύνη*."

b 8. *τὸν λόγον ἀκούσας*: we should say, in a similar case, "when you have heard my reasons," but the Greek still refers to the logos as having an external reality and convincing power.

c 2 and **8.** These two instances may be regarded as cases of the virtue of *φρόνησις*, the former being of an inferior kind to

the latter. In the case of the clever artist *ἀρετή* is excellence, rather than virtue.

c 5. This argument involves the assumption that where *δικαιοσύνη* is absent, *ἀδικία* must be present; the neutral state as to *δικ.* is put out of consideration. Here *σωφροσύνη* is shown in what we should call *consideration for others.* The clever man (in any line) might easily take an unfair advantage of his neighbour, but a sense of justice makes him hold his hand.

c 8. *οὐδὲ μήν κτλ.* : i.e. *οὐδὲ μὴν ὁ σόφος φύεται χώρις τοῦ σωφρονεῖν.*

d 1. *ποῖαί . . . ἑκάστοτε* does not explain what is meant by *τόδε*, but it explains the point of view from which *αἱ ἐν ταῖς πόλεσι τιμήσεις* are to be discussed : "There is a further question which arises, when we are considering the principles on which civic honours ought to be bestowed."—We have been told above that *σωφροσύνη* is a necessary *adjunct* to all virtue; now we are asked, for the purposes of the lawgiver, to appraise this *adjunct* on its own account.

d 4 ff. Ath. "Suppose *σωφροσύνη* to exist in a man's soul by itself, unaccompanied by any virtue besides; would it have any claim to honour or not?"

Meg. "I cannot tell."

Ath. "A very proper answer; for really, if you said yes to either of my alternatives, I should think it a mistake."

Meg. "It's just as well then that I answered as I did."

Ath. "Quite so: the fact is that what is a (mere) adjunct to the things which deserve civic recognition or disapproval, is not of a nature to detain us; for the purposes of our argument we may neglect it."

Meg. "The adjunct you mean being *σωφροσύνη*?"

Ath. "Yes. What is important is that whatever, of the things outside it, does us, with its help, the most service, that thing should be most highly honoured, and what comes next in usefulness next. In this way every quality, all down the list, would get its due meed of honour in its turn." As King Lear said to his youngest daughter, "Let it be so: thy truth then be thy dower." But though *σωφροσύνη* is to get no more praise from the public than Cordelia gave herself, this does not mean that it is worthless. We learnt in Bk. I. that *ἐπιτηδεύματα σωφροσύνης* are of great importance, and now we see that no virtue can be operative without it. As a personal virtue, it seems to involve a good deal of what we call *self-respect.* Notwithstanding the colourlessness which

the words ἀλόγου σιγῆς seem to imply, we shall be wrong if we attach a merely negative significance to the word. The σώφρων ψυχῆς ἕξις (631 c 7) means more than the power of stopping at the right place.—At 710 a we shall see that Plato speaks of two kinds of σωφροσύνη, a higher and a lower, an instinctive, and a philosophical one.

d 9. παρὰ μέλος : cp. *Phil.* 28 b 9, ἵνα μηδὲν . . . ἐξαμαρτάνοντες παρὰ μέλος φθεγξώμεθά τι, Ath. 687 b Παρράσιος δ' ὁ ζωγράφος, καίπερ παρὰ μέλος ὑπὲρ τὴν ἑαυτοῦ τεχνὴν τρυφήσας.

d 11. ὧν is omitted in O (though inserted in the margin); Boeckh seems to have been the first of the moderns to put it into the text, though it stands in A and Cod. Voss.—We must not press the addition καὶ ἀτιμίαι so as to make it imply that some *dishonourable* things need this adjunct in order to be truly dishonourable, nor even that he has in mind any similar adjunct of dishonourable things; probably he only means, "and which lack honour in its absence."

697 a 2. νομοθέτου . . . ταῦτα διανέμειν : it will be remembered that in the short sketch of the lawgiver's work given at 631 d 6 ff., great stress is laid on the ψέγειν τε ὀρθῶς καὶ ἐπαινεῖν δι' αὐτῶν νόμων (632 a 2—cp. also 631 e 2 τιμῶντα ὀρθῶς . . . καὶ ἀτιμάζοντα). The great thing for the state, as for the man, is that it should *like and dislike the right things.*

a 5 ff. Leaving to the practical lawgiver the arrangement of detail, we will content ourselves with dividing the objects of public recognition into three main classes, in descending order of merit.

a 7. ἐπειδὴ . . . ἐπιθυμηταί : i.e. we, as theorizers, shall not be content without arriving at some positive conclusion about the laws (therefore we will go so far as to classify them roughly, by merit).—As Stallb. says, the words διατεμεῖν . . . τρίτα are epexegetic of τριχῇ διελεῖν.

a 10. A has λέγωμεν, L, O, and Stobaeus λέγομεν.

b 1. For the conjunction of tenses in σῴζεσθαί τε καὶ εὐδαιμονήσειν Boeckh cps. Ar. *Pol.* 1331 b 25 τὴν μέλλουσαν ἔσεσθαι πόλιν μακαρίαν καὶ πολιτεύεσθαι καλῶς.

b 2. ἔστιν δὲ ὀρθῶς : Boeckh cps. *Euthyphr.* 2 d ὀρθῶς γάρ ἐστι, *Hipparchus* 227 d 1 ὀρθῶς δ' ἐστί, *Crat.* 388 c 5 καλῶς δ' ἐστίν, where, as here, an expression has to be supplied from the immediately antecedent words: "what I mean by doing this in the right way is . . . "

b 3. This threefold division of good things, which has been largely adopted by later moralists (e.g. Arist. *Eth. Nic.* 1098 b 13;

and Cic. *De off.* iii. 6. 28, "quam omnia incommoda subire, vel externa, vel corporis, vel etiam ipsius animi," where the contrasted evils are given just as at *Gorg.* 477 b—*οὐκοῦν χρημάτων καὶ σώματος καὶ ψυχῆς τριῶν ὄντων, τριττὰς εἴρηκας πονηρίας, πενίαν, νόσον, ἀδικίαν ;*), is said to have been Pythagorean in origin. The *λεγόμενα* at b 6 is a hint that some part at least of the definition of the classes is not the speaker's own.

b 4. *κεῖσθαι* : as often, the passive of *τιθέναι*—this time, of *τιθέναι* in the sense of *reckon as.*

b 6. *τούτων ἐκτὸς βαίνειν*, "to overstep the limits imposed by this scheme" ; *τούτων* here stands vaguely for something in the context, as at 694 d 4.

b 7. *εἰς τιμὰς . . . χρήματα προάγουσα* : it would appear from this that material wealth is at least *not* to be honoured ; it is even conceivable that the author meant it to be a disgrace. At 741 e 7 it is laid down that no citizen is to possess any money. At b 2 above *ἀτιμίαι* are spoken of as well as *τιμαί*, and the word may mean disgrace, though it may perhaps mean merely the absence of honour. (At 831 a 1 *καὶ τοῖς μὲν τιμάς, τοῖς δὲ ἀτιμίας διανέμων ὀρθῶς*, it clearly means positive disgrace.) In either case we might translate this passage : "either by promoting wealth to be a recipient of honour, or by raising, through honours, any member of the inferior classes of goods into a class above." (Jowett takes *εἰς τιμὰς προάγουσα* to mean *putting first* ; he translates, "by giving money the place of honour.")

c 1. *οὔθ' ὅσιον οὔτε πολιτικόν*, "as bad in statecraft as it is in morality."

c 6. Schanz recurs to the old accentuation in *Περσῶν πέρι*, taking *πέρι* to govern *Περσῶν* only, and not, as Ast says, *τῆς πολιτείας*. *Περσῶν πέρι* would thus = *Περσικῆς*. But the analogy of 676 c 6 *ταύτης δὴ περὶ λάβωμεν, εἰ δυναίμεθα, τῆς μεταβολῆς τὴν αἰτίαν*, and 691 b 2 *τούτου περὶ τοῦ πάθους τῆς γενέσεως*, are in favour of taking the construction here to be *ἡ διάσκεψις περὶ τῆς Περσῶν πολιτείας*. Cp. above on 685 c 2.

c 7. A has *ἐπὶ ἐπὶ ἔτι* ; the scribe himself seems to have thought that the *ἐπί* had been doubled by mistake, for he put dots under the first, and a line under the second. (At the same time he did not venture to erase either.) Burnet apparently accepts this view, and mentions Schneider's *ἐπὶ ἔτη* as a possible emendation of *ἐπὶ ἔτι*. To this Apelt, p. 6, objects forcibly that the Persian decline was not steady "from year to year" ; there were ups and downs. He prefers to regard A's reading as a defaced form of three words,

and these he suggests were ἔπει εἰπεῖν ἐνί: "to put it shortly" comes in very well after "has led us to make a long disquisition" (c 5). He cps. Hdt. iii. 82 ἐνὶ δὲ ἔπεϊ πάντα συλλαβόντα εἰπεῖν, *Laws* 718 c ἐν ἑνὶ περιλαβόντα εἰπεῖν αὐτὰ οἷόν τινι τρόπῳ, and 811 a 9 τί δὴ περὶ τούτων ἑνὶ λόγῳ φράζων εἴποιμ' ἂν ἱκανόν; Whatever view be taken of this dark passage, ἔτι must be wrong. The state of the Persian constitution is not represented as being *bad to begin with*. The only proposed emendation which would keep it is Ast's ἐπὶ Ξέρξου ἔτι, but that gives a sense unsatisfactory on other grounds. We want here a general summing up of the result of the discussion, not a repetition of a single incident of it. I venture to print Apelt's suggestion in preference to any other.

c 8. τὸ ἐλεύθερον . . . πόλει: that is, they (the Persians) acted in direct violation of the directions given to the lawgiver in 693 b 3 ff. ὅτι πόλιν ἐλευθέραν τε εἶναι δεῖ, καὶ ἔμφρονα καὶ ἑαυτῇ φίλην. Cp. also 695 d 2 ff. (of Cyrus) φιλίαν πορίζων καὶ κοινωνίαν πᾶσιν Πέρσαις.

d 1—698 a 3. As Stallb. says, it is the τε after ὅταν in d 6 which corresponds to οὔθ' in d 2; the first part deals with the conduct of the potentates, the second (ὅταν τε κτλ.) with that of the people.—ἀλλ' ἕνεκα τῆς αὐτῶν ἀρχῆς goes with βουλεύεται; the subj. to ἡγῶνται is ἄρχοντες, supplied from ἡ τῶν ἀρχόντων βουλή; φίλια goes in sense with πόλεις as well as with ἔθνη; the τε after ἐχθρῶς is "and in consequence."—For μισοῦντες μισοῦνται cp. *Rep.* 417 b μισοῦντες δὲ δὴ καὶ μισούμενοι, and below 763 a 5 διακονοῦντές τε καὶ διακονούμενοι, and Soph. *Aj.* 1134 with Lobeck's note. (I see no reason to follow Schanz in making a lacuna after ἀρχῆς, and rejecting the forcible μισοῦνται. At most I would put a (—) after ἀρχῆς and another after καταφθ. to mark the looseness of the construction. After μισοῦντες there is an erasure in A of something (? ὅταν), and the last eight letters of μισοῦνται ὅταν extend beyond the line into the margin. This looks as if A at first omitted μισοῦνται—a natural blunder. Hug would excise from πυρὶ to μισοῦντες.)—We may translate: "Patriotism has vanished. On the one hand the mind of the potentates does not think of the good of their subjects and the people, but only of the establishment of their own authority, so that, if they imagine it will do themselves the least good, when occasion occurs, they overturn and burn with fire cities and tribes of friendly people, and, in consequence, hate and are hated with a deadly and pitiless hatred. On the other hand, when they come to want the common people to fight in their defence, they find

there is no sort of union among them, and no zeal to make them risk their persons in battle. Masters of countless millions, they cannot command a single soldier. They hire outsiders, as if they had no subjects of their own, and actually fancy that strangers and hirelings will be their salvation. Besides all this, there is a folly which they cannot avoid, for they proclaim by their actions on each occasion that whatever counts in the state as honourable and precious is as nothing in comparison with gold and silver."

698 a 9. The older MSS. all have *περὶ τὴν τῆς Ἀττικῆς αὖ πολιτείας*, and so Burnet prints it. If Plato wrote this he must have intended to put in *ἐλευθερίαν*, but, as he puts in *ἐλευθερία* in another construction, it seems the best thing to omit the *τήν*. Late MSS. and all edd. but Burnet alter *πολιτείας* to *πολιτείαν*.

a 10. Though at a 5 f. *τὰ περί γε Περσῶν* seems to be the subject of *τέλος ἐχέτω*, and *ὡς οὐκ ὀρθῶς διοικεῖται* to be epexegetic of *τά*, it seems better here to take *διεξελθεῖν* ("to set forth") as governing the following *ὡς* clause directly, and to take *τὰ περὶ Ἀττικῆς πολιτείας* as adverbial—"with respect to the Athenian constitution."

b 1. Here we have two prepositional phrases depending on nouns: *ἀπὸ πασῶν ἀρχῶν* on *ἐλευθερία*, and *ὑφ' ἑτέρων* on *ἀρχῆς*. In the latter case, as Stallb. says, a simple gen. would have left it doubtful whether it was subjective or objective; the expression used leaves no doubt that government *by*, not government *of*, is meant. The quasi-compound adjective *μέτρον ἐχούσης* adds to the effect of *complexity* given by the sentence. (Ast ingeniously, but wrongly, proposed to read *ὑμετέρας* for *ὑφ' ἑτέρων*.)

b 3. For the dat. governed by the verbal noun *ἐπίθεσις* cp. on 633 c 2.

b 5. *ἐκ τιμημάτων . . . τεττάρων*: we must not press this *ἐκ* to mean that officials of any kind might come *from* any of the four classes of Solon's timocracy. Members of the fourth class were members of the electing assembly, but might not be elected themselves to any office, while some high offices were confined to members of the highest class. *ἐκ* then means "on a basis of," and, to those who knew, the mention of *ἀρχαί* in this connexion would convey the notion that in some way certain offices were confined to certain classes; cp. *Rep.* 553 a *ἐκ τιμημάτων ἔχουσα τοὺς ἄρχοντας*.—*καὶ δεσπότις ἐνῆν τις αἰδώς*: a practical expression,

"besides, we had a conscience; we were still the thralls of shame." ("Reverence still held sway in our hearts.")

b 8. *γενόμενον*: the *hugeness* is spoken of as making itself apparent on sea and land.—*ἄπορον*, "helpless"; a case of the transference of a characteristic proper to a *person* to something in connexion with that person. So at 873 c an *αἰσχύνη* is spoken of as *ἄπορος καὶ ἄβιος*; so we talk of "hopeless despondency," or a "hopeless malady." Here, and below 699 b 4, *desperate* will translate it. Some inferior MSS. have *ἄπειρον*. (Ast is not far wrong, *pace* Stallbaum, in explaining it to mean *invincible*.)

c 1 f. The greatness of the fear made the people humble, and so law-abiding, and dependent on the wisdom of their rulers, besides cementing the ties of a common citizenship.

c 3. *σφόδρα φιλία*: cp. above 639 b *σφόδρα γυναικῶν*, 791 c 5 *παντελῶς παίδων*, *Rep.* 434 c *μάλιστα κακουργία*, and *Rep.* 564 a *ἄγαν δουλείαν*. Schanz follows Ald. in reading the adj. *σφοδρά*.

d 1. *μυριάσι συχναῖς*: rather a dat. of *effective accompaniment* than a dat. of the *instrument*; "at the head of his countless myriads."

d 4. For *ἄρα*, "actually," following *γάρ* cp. *Prot.* 315 c 8 *ἐπεδήμει γὰρ ἄρα καὶ Πρόδικος ὁ Κεῖος*. (It is the same *ἄρα* which an old-fashioned Homeric scholar is said to have insisted on translating as "God help them!" in the phrase *Τρῶες ῥά*; a parenthetic "bless us!" though too conversational, would render it here.)—*σαγηνεύσαιεν*: Goodwin, *M. and T.* § 675, "an indirect quotation with *ὅτι* or *ὡς* and the opt. is sometimes followed by an independent opt. (generally introduced by *γάρ*), which continues the quotation as if it were itself dependent on the *ὅτι* or *ὡς*." Cp. *Phil.* 58 b; at *Phaedo* 96 b an opt. is so used when giving somebody else's opinion, though no *ὅτι* or *ὡς* clause has gone before it.

d 5. Hermann would read *ὃς* for the simple article, and thus remove the asyndeton.

d 6. *εἴτε καὶ ὅπῃ ἀφίκετο*: a euphemism for *εἴτε ψευδής*.

e 1. *οὐδείς*: Hdt. (vi. 108) says the Plataeans joined the Ath. in full force.

e 2. Cp. above 692 d 6.

e 3. *οὐ γὰρ ἴσμεν λεγόμενον*: apparently "for I am not aware that the cause is stated."

e 4. *δ' οὖν*, "be that as it may," "for whatever reason."—As at 707 c 2 Schanz rejects the *ἐν* before *Μαραθῶνι*.

e 5. I think *λεγόμεναι* goes with *ἀπειλαί* as well as with

παρασκευαί ; "reports kept reaching us of immense preparations and never-ceasing threats on the part of the great king."

e 7. νέος (δὲ) καὶ σφοδρὸς ὁ ὑὸς αὐτοῦ, "his son, with all the fire of youth"; the adjs. are predicative.

699 a 5. οὔτε γὰρ βοηθήσειν αὐτοῖς οὐδένα : this οὔτε corresponds to the καί before κατὰ θάλατταν in b 1. He has just said the Athenians saw no way of avoiding destruction, whether they stayed on land, or took to the sea. Then he enlarges on these two points : (1) if they stood their ground they would get no help, and (2) if they tried to sail away they would be intercepted. There is a break in the construction after οὐδένα : μεμνημένοι goes back to the ἡγήσαντο, to which, in sense, βοηθήσειν is subordinate. Schanz and Burnet mark this by parenthesis marks before μεμνημένοι and after γῆν in b 1.

b 1. τό γε κατὰ γῆν : the γε gives the effect of "so much for their chances by *land*."

b 4. ἄπορον, "desperate"; cp. above 698 b 8.

b 5. ὡς ἐξ ἀπόρων καὶ τότε ἐφαίνετο γενέσθαι τὸ νικῆσαι μαχομένους, "and remembered how desperate the chances of success in the field had looked *then*"; ἐφαίνετο, in quasi-reported speech, refers to a time previous to that of συνενόουν, and must therefore be rendered in English by a pluperfect.—ἐξ ἀπ. . . . ἐφ. γεν. : lit. "how victory in fight had seemed to emerge from a hopeless state of things"; i.e. ἐξ ἀπόρων is merely a variety of expression for ἄπορον.

b 6. ἐπὶ δὲ τῆς ἐλπίδος ὀχούμενοι ταύτης : "ὁρμεῖν sive ὀχεῖσθαι ἐπὶ ἀγκύρας dicunt Graeci, ut in notissima Demosthenis sententia οὐκ ἐπὶ τῆς αὐτῆς ὁρμεῖ τοῖς πολλοῖς, ubi subaudiendum ἀγκύρας monet Harpocration. Et cum spes aptissime per ancoram significetur, facillima translatione dicunt, ἐπ' ἐλπίδος ὀχεῖσθαι, unde in proverbium abiit." Porson on *Orest.* 68, who cites Ar. *Eq.* 1244 and this passage, and Plut. *Non posse suad.* ch. 26. 6 (Wyttenb. p. 505 e) καίτοι νεὼς μὲν ἐκπεσὼν ἐπιβάτης διαλυθείσης <ἐπ'> ἐλπίδος ὀχεῖταί τινος, ὡς γῇ προσέξων τὸ σῶμα καὶ διανηξόμενος. Neil on *Eq.* 1244 agrees with Casaubon that in the phrase ἐπ' ἐλπίδος ὀχεῖσθαι the metaphor is of a man on a *raft*, and he cps. *Phaedo* 85 d ἐπὶ τούτου ὀχούμενος ὥσπερ ἐπὶ σχεδίας. Certainly Plutarch did not use the metaphor with the *consciousness* of its coming from the use of an anchor; a shipwrecked swimmer would not fare any better for being anchored. Still I can hardly believe Porson to have been wrong in such a matter.

c 2 f. The noms. ὁ φόβος ὁ παρὼν . . . ὅ τε . . . γεγονώς are in explanatory apposition to ταῦτα πάντα. Both kinds of fear helped to unite the populace. F.H.D. suggests that ὃν . . . ἐκέκτηντο is a "gloss," δουλεύοντες being taken from the foll. δουλεύειν. Badham rejects the words ἐκ τῶν νόμων τῶν. They involve a tautology, but it is difficult to see who could have inserted them. An author does sometimes say the same thing twice over, in slightly different language, if he wants to lay special stress on the idea conveyed. Certainly there is no idea in the *Laws* to which Plato attaches such importance as to this, i.e. that *loyalty to good laws begets a good character.* It was this loyalty, he says, to the laws and institutions of a better time that made the Athenians of that day what they were.

c 5. Cp. 647 a 8 f. νομοθέτης . . . τοῦτον τὸν φόβον ἐν τιμῇ μεγίστῃ σέβει.—Cp. the scriptural use of the word *fear*, e.g. "the fear of the Lord is the beginning of wisdom."

c 6. ἧς ὁ δειλὸς ἐλεύθερος καὶ ἄφοβος· ὃν εἰ τότε μὴ δέος ἔλαβεν, οὐκ ἄν ποτε συνελθὼν ἠμύνατο, "from which (kind of fear) the timorous man is (by nature) free and immune; and yet, had it not been for his seizure by a fear on that occasion, the timorous man would never have joined the army, and repelled the foe." For ἄφοβος with a cognate gen. cp. 647 c 3 ἄφοβον . . . φόβων πολλῶν τινῶν.—ὅν: the rel. clause has here, I think, an adversative force.—δέος ἔλαβεν: used with the consciousness that it was an epic phrase (cp. the Hom. δέος εἶλεν), and, moreover, that δέος had a literary connexion with αἰδώς. Cp. O 657 ἴσχε γὰρ αἰδὼς καὶ δέος, the verse from the *Cypria* quoted at *Euthyphro* 12 b 1 ἵνα γὰρ δέος ἔνθα καὶ αἰδώς, and Soph. *Aj.* 1073–1083, the passage which begins οὐ γάρ ποτ' οὔτ' ἂν ἐν πόλει νόμοι καλῶς φέροιντ' ἂν ἔνθα μὴ καθεστήκῃ δέος, and associates δέος with αἰσχύνη.—The idea of the fight with fear—which here results in the mastering of the first kind of fear by the second—has occurred above at 647 c 10 τῇ μὲν δειλίᾳ τῇ ἐν αὐτῷ προσμαχόμενον καὶ νικῶντα αὐτὴν δεῖ τέλεον οὕτω γίγνεσθαι πρὸς ἀνδρείαν.—After a careful consideration of the ten or more emendations proposed in various parts of this passage, I have come to the conclusion that they all present difficulties at least as great as those in the text; and so, I am glad to see, has O. Apelt (p. 6); only he accepts Schanz's statement that A has ἧ ὁ δειλὸς, and he proposes to read ᾗ ὁ δειλὸς ἐλ. καὶ ἄφ. But Burnet, who comes after Schanz, assures us that A, like all the other MSS., reads ἧς. (The chief emendations are: ἧς ὁ δοῦλος Heindorf and Ast, ἧς ὁ δῆμος Herm.,

<τὸ> τότε Heind., δῆμος for δέος Badham, μηδεὶς for μὴ δέος Stallb., ᾗ ὁ δῆμος Schanz, ὃ for ὃν Ritter; Schmidt would reject καὶ ἄφοβος and συνελθών.)

d 2. ἡμῶν ἕκαστος: if δῆμος had been the true reading at either place above, it would not have been necessary to alter the subject to ἡμῶν ἕκαστος here.

d 3–e 6. Meg. "What you say is not only very true, but there is also a special fitness in its being said by you as an Athenian." Ath. "There *is* a special fitness about my words, Megillus; I mean that it is right to tell that story to *you*, born as you are to an inheritance in your ancestors' character. Moreover, I want you and Cleinias to consider what my story has to do with law-making" (lit. "if I am saying what has in any degree"—τι—"an appropriateness to νομοθεσία"). "For my disquisition is not made for the story's sake, but for the reason I mention" (i.e. to help us to understand the right principles of νομοθεσία). "It is interesting: (lit. "just look!") just as, in a way, our fate was the same as that of the Persians, though *they* reduced the populace to absolute slavery, and *we*, on the other hand, drove our masses towards absolute freedom, so our discourse of a little time back turns out in a way very useful (towards deciding) how and what ought to be said next."

d 6. Ast would read κοινωνὸν δὴ τῶν πατρίων γεγονότα φύσει. He was partly led to this by the fact that πατρῴων (for πατέρων) was (apparently) the only MS. reading he knew.

d 8. H. Steph. alters τὶ to τὰ, Schanz rejects it; Wagner reads προσῆκον for προσήκοντα—all quite unnecessary changes.

e 1. Most interpreters take οὗ λέγω ἕνεκα to mean "with a view to the object of our discussion." It seems more natural to take (τούτου) ὃ λέγω to mean "what I mentioned just now."

e 2. ταὐτὸν πάθος: i.e. national deterioration and decay.—The plpf. συμβεβήκει—in which Schanz may well be right in introducing the augment—does not imply that the process of deterioration took place at Athens sooner than in Persia; it marks the time of the events as previous to that of the verb εἰρημένοι εἰσί.

e 3. For A's ἄγουσι, L and O have ἀγαγοῦσι.

e 5. The chief difficulty in this passage is in the apparent inadequacy of καλῶς εἰρημένοι as an introduction to the subordinate πῶς λέγωμεν. All through the paragraph the idea of *fitness* and *correspondence* has been prominent: this may incline us to read into καλῶς the notion "*aptly*," i.e., in this case, "so as to give an indication." (Ficinus puts in "*demonstrant*.") This is

better than, with Schanz, to suppose a lacuna after τοὐντεῦθεν (to which he affixes a mark of interrogation, having previously made οὗ λέγω ἕνεκα depend on ὁρᾶτε, and accepted Badham's οὐ γάρ; for γάρ before ἐπειδή).—Hug proposed ἦ γάρ; Ritter τί γάρ; Ast at one time was for rejecting πῶς . . . τοὐντεῦθεν; Wagner suspected οἱ προγ. . . . εἰρημένοι.

700 a 4. τινων κύριος: as we might say, "master of the situation"; τινων is neuter.—The τρόπον τινὰ apologizes for the apparent contradiction in ἑκὼν ἐδούλευσε. (Some take τινων to be masc., and supply νόμων.)

a 7. περὶ τὴν μουσικήν: cp. above on 685 c 2. The danger of innovations in music is described in much the same way at *Rep.* 424 b c d.—πρῶτον: he is here answering the question "what laws have you in your mind?" not "what laws were they slaves to?" so that πρῶτον gives the logical and not the temporal order, "in the first place." Though the so-called slavery did not begin with the music, the first indication of the lawless temperament was, he says, visible in this domain. How significant and how important a tendency to lawlessness in music is, can be seen by readers of Book II. and of the above-cited passage of the *Republic*, where Plato emphasizes its importance as a main element in the influences formative of character and disposition. But there was more in it than that, as we shall see at 701 a: along with and as the result of the presumption of the uneducated mob to disregard the established rules and criteria of musical art, *the mob grew conceited*, and this conceit, politically speaking, *poisoned their freedom*, and made democracy dangerous. Men no longer had a proper respect for the judgement of their superiors.

a 9–c 7. διῃρημένη . . . ἐγίγνετο, "our music in those days was divided into definite kinds and styles; one kind of song was used to address the gods, and was called ὕμνοι; as a counterpart to this came a different kind of song, which might well have been called θρῆνοι; of a third kind were παίωνες; still another—so-called, I take it, because describing the birth of Dionysus—was named διθύραμβος. And they used this very word νόμοι to describe a fifth kind: these they further distinguished as κιθαρῳδικοί (for the lyre). Now these distinctions of kind, and others like them, were binding; you could not set any song to any kind of tune which did not belong to it. Moreover the authority to take cognizance of these rules, to pronounce judgement in accordance with them, and punish those who offended against them, was not the catcall, or the discordant outcries of the gallery, as it is now,

nor the clapping of hands either, to signify applause. No: the educated part of the audience had made it a rule, as far as they were concerned, to listen in silence throughout a performance, and there was the reminder of the official's rod to keep order among the children and flunkeys (their attendants) and the mass of the populace."

b 1. *εἴδη* and *σχήματα* here seem used in the same sense as *εἶδος* and *τρόποι* at *Rep.* 424 c *εἶδος γὰρ καινὸν μουσικῆς μεταβάλλειν εὐλαβητέον ὡς ἐν ὅλῳ κινδυνεύοντα· οὐδαμοῦ γὰρ κινοῦνται μουσικῆς τρόποι ἄνευ πολιτικῶν νόμων μεγίστων.*

b 2. Of the two readings *τούτῳ* A and *τοῦτο* L and O, the former is manifestly the correct one.—On the other hand I think a corrector of O was right in changing the *ἄλλο* after *ἐξῆν* into *ἄλλῳ* at b 7. The original scribe was misled by familiarity with the phrase *ἄλλο εἰς ἄλλο* "indiscriminately." If A L and O—and *ὅλα τὰ ἀντίγραφα*, acc. to the scribe of O—are right, we must suppose Plato to have been guilty of a vulgar error. (So also in the case of Aristotle, *De part. anim.* 663 b 31.)

b 3. *ἂν ἐκάλεσεν* and perhaps *μάλιστα* imply that the term *θρῆνοι*, as thus applied, did not date from these early times.

b 5. The *οἶμαι* possibly does not imply doubt in the speaker's mind as to the *subject*, but as to the reason for the name *διθύραμβος*. The apposition is a strange one, anyhow. (Can *γένεσις* possibly be used in the sense of "*a production*"—"a Dionysiac product"?)—*νόμους*: the so-called Nomes must have been, as Wagner and Apelt say, something like the German *Chorale*, and, from their solemn character were necessarily accompanied by the lyre.—This use of the term *law* in music seems to Plato, in a way, to clinch his argument; cp. below 722 e 1 and 799 e 10 ff., Plut. *De mus.* 1133 b c.—The applicability of words denoting fixed standards or rules to music is evident in many languages. E.g. our *canon* (Gr. *κανών*) denotes a composition written strictly according to rule. (Grove's *Dict. of Music*, s.v. canon.) It is amusing to read at Arist. *Probl.* 19. 28 (919 b 38) that the *νόμοι* which were *sung* were so called because, in illiterate ages and peoples, actual laws were sung—like versified Latin gender rules.

b 6. *ᾠδὴν ὥς τινα ἑτέραν*, "regarding them" (i.e. the Nomes) "as a special kind of song"; merely a variety of the previous *ᾠδῆς ἕτερον εἶδος*. (Ritter pronounces *ὡς*, and Apelt *ἑτέραν*, as inexplicable, and the latter proposes to read *ἱερὰν* for *ἑτέραν*.)

b 7. See above on b 2.

c 1. *τούτων* depends on *κῦρος*; Ast well compares a similar gen. and infin. with *κύριος* at Dem. *Adv. Aristocr.* 689 (sub fin.) *τῷ κυρίῳ τῶν φόρων γενομένῳ τάξαι.*—I have thought it well to put a comma after *τούτων*. For the loosely connected epexegetic infins. cp. below 790 c 3, *Rep.* 416 a 6 (with Adam's note), 443 b 8, *Gorg.* 513 e (with Thompson's note), *Tim.* 33 c 4, *Phaedr.* 242 b.

c 5. *τοῖς μὲν γεγονόσι περὶ παίδευσιν*: a vague phrase for what we should call "the cultured classes"—"those who moved in educated circles."—*γεγονέναι περί* = the Lat. *versari in*; for a similar phrase cp. *Phil.* 33 c 5 *καὶ μὴν τό γε ἕτερον εἶδος τῶν ἡδονῶν ὃ τῆς ψυχῆς αὐτῆς ἔφαμεν εἶναι διὰ μνήμης πᾶν ἐστι γεγονός*, so *Theag.* 130 b *δι' ἀπεχθείας ἐγεγόνει.* (Ast and others take the words to mean *the body of teachers and educational officials* —"those engaged in education.")—For *παίδευσις* in the sense of *culture* cp. *Prot.* 349 a 3 *παιδεύσεως καὶ ἀρετῆς διδάσκαλον*, *Tim.* 53 c 2 *ἐπεὶ μετέχετε τῶν κατὰ παίδευσιν ὁδῶν.*

c 6. *αὐτοῖς*: emphatic, "with their own ears." Riddell however, *Digest* § 222, takes it as a mere "pronominal resumption."—*παισὶ . . . ὄχλῳ*: cp. *Rep.* 397 d 7.

d 1. *ταῦτ'*: adverbial, "in these respects"; it goes with *ἄρχεσθαι.*—*οὕτω τεταγμένως*, "so strictly." (If any alteration of the text is to be proposed, I should venture to suggest *τότ'* for *ταῦτ'*.)

d 4. *φύσει . . . ἡδονῆς*, "ignorant, in spite of all their poetical gifts, of what is right and proper in the Muses' domain, frenzied victims of an unhappy itch for pleasure." This censure applies to both words and tune. Aristoxenus, as quoted by Athenaeus (xiv. 632 b), echoes it thus: *καὶ τὰ θέατρα ἐκβεβαρβάρωται καὶ εἰς μεγάλην διαφθορὰν προελήλυθεν ἡ πάνδημος αὕτη μουσική.* See also the quotation from the same author made by Plut. *De mus.* 1142 b, where Telesias of Thebes is said to have forsaken the old school of Pindar and others for that of Philoxenus and Timotheus, with disastrous effects.

d 6. *κεραννύντες κτλ.*: cp. Plut. *De mus.* 1133 b *οὐ γὰρ ἐξῆν τὸ παλαιὸν οὕτω ποιεῖσθαι τὰς κιθαρῳδίας ὡς νῦν, οὐδὲ μεταφέρειν τὰς ἁρμονίας καὶ τοὺς ῥυθμούς.*

e 1. *μουσικῆς . . . ὀρθότητα*, "without intending it, they were guilty of so far slandering their art as to assert, in their folly, that there was no such thing as right or wrong in music: the one proper criterion was the pleasure of the hearer, be he gentle or simple."

e 3. *εἴτε βελτίων εἴτε χείρων ἂν εἴη τις*: the syntax is

peculiar; ἂν εἴη seems to be the reported-speech form of the *iterative* ἂν ἦν :—ὁ κρίνων ἂν ἦν βελτίων τις, "the arbiter would be (on occasion) a man of some consideration"; this, quoted from somebody else's mouth, might be (ὅτι) or (εἰ) βελτίων τις εἴη ἂν ὁ κρίνων. It is not parallel to the εἴπερ . . . πειθοίμην ἄν at *Prot.* 329 b (which is itself not free from suspicion), for that is in direct speech, and the main verb is a present (Goodwin, *M. and T.* § 506).

e 4. It is clear from the context that ποιηταί and ποιήματα are here used of *musical* composers and compositions in the first place, though the same artist "sets" (ἐπιλέγει), to the heterogeneous musical medley, words of an equally extravagant kind (τοιούτους).

e 5. παρανομίαν: at the same time that these lawless poets gave the mob (οἱ πολλοί) an unfounded conceit in their own judgement, they discredited the principles on which alone a true judgement could be passed.

701 a 3. θεατροκρατία: as we might say, "Tom, Dick, and Harry usurped the critic's chair." Cp. *Hamlet* III. ii. 26 "the censure of the which one" (i.e. "the judicious") "must in your allowance o'erweigh *a whole theatre* of others."—"δὴ O et s.v. A^2: ἂν A," Burnet.

a 3–a 7. "For even though a democracy *had* arisen, if confined to music (ἐν αὐτῇ μόνον), and to properly educated men, it would have done no great harm; but, as it was, it did not stop at music, and the notion that *every* man was an authority on every subject, and was above all rules, this was the notion which got the upper hand among us, and Education had to give way to it."—For this sense of συνεφέσπετο cp. 690 b 8 f. ἕπεσθαι μὲν τὸν ἀνεπιστήμονα . . . τὸν δὲ φρονοῦντα ἡγεῖσθαί τε καὶ ἄρχειν.

a 4. "αὐτῇ L (ut vid.): ἑαυτῇ A O," Burnet.—Again at a 5 A and O have ὑμῖν, a manifest error for ἡμῖν, but no good MS. has the latter, and some omit the pronoun altogether.

a 7. ἄφοβοι: without the right kind of fear, that is, of which we heard so much at the end of Bk. I. Pope expresses a good deal of the same idea when he says "For fools rush in where Angels fear to tread."

a 8. τὸ γὰρ κτλ., "for what is it but shocking impudence, when a man disregards the opinion of his betters out of a self-conceit that is begotten of liberty grown over-bold?"

b 2. ἀποτετολμημένης: Ast cps. Plut. *Galba* 1064 (ch. 25)

διὰ τὴν ὀλιγότητα τῶν ἀποτετολμημένων (of men engaged in a desperate venture).

b 6. ἑπομένη ταύτῃ φεύγειν: for ἑπομένη ταύτῃ ἡ ἐλευθερία τοῦ φεύγειν; a remarkable instance of the power of leaving out words recently uttered in a parallel construction.

b 7. L (and two minor MSS.) have νουθέτησιν here for the νομοθέτησιν of the rest. Badham restored νουθέτησιν as a conjecture. (The same restoration may probably be made at Plutarch, *Galba*, ch. 18, where we read ἐδόκει γὰρ οὐκ αὐτὸς ἀποστερεῖν μόνος ἀλλὰ νομοθετεῖν καὶ διδάσκειν τοὺς μεθ' αὑτὸν αὐτοκράτορας.)

b 8 f. ἐγγὺς τοῦ τέλους οὖσιν, and πρὸς αὐτῷ ἤδη τῷ τέλει are metaphors from the stadium. Freedom is running a race to perdition, and the two stages described are the semi-final, and the final.

c 1 ff. πρὸς . . . κακῶν, "in their final stage they are contemners of oaths, and pledges and of everything sacred and divine, and they present (to the world) the spectacle of the Titanic nature of which the old stories tell us—how they had to return to their old quarters, and pass a cruel time of unending woe."—Or, if ἐπεὶ ἐπὶ be read, "for they had to return etc." (H. Steph. puts in ὥστε before ἐπί; Ast said ὥστε should be supplied in thought; Stallb. said it was not needed at all; Schanz writes ἀφικομένοις, but all, apparently, take the words to refer to the degenerate "liberals." The only possible explanation of the πάλιν (in that case) that occurs to me is to suppose Plato to share the view expressed by Dio Chrys. xxx. p. 550 ὅτι τοῦ τῶν Τιτάνων αἵματός ἐσμεν ἡμεῖς ἅπαντες οἱ ἄνθρωποι (whence the enmity of Heaven).)—τὴν λεγομένην is "as related in the old stories," and I believe ἐπὶ τὰ αὐτὰ . . . κακῶν to refer to the Titans, and to depend on something to be supplied in thought from λεγομένην. In the form of the story here referred to the Titans were punished for some offence by being sent to Tartarus. They escaped, fought with the Olympian Gods (*their* superiors), were beaten, and sent back to Tartarus (or worse), to stay. It is a state of eternal punishment like this to which those who abuse their liberty are condemned. καὶ μιμουμένοις then means, by implication, "and giving a representation of their fate." (Possibly an ἐπεὶ has been lost before ἐπί; cf. *Prot.* 353 a 2.)

c 3. ἐ. καὶ μιμουμένοις: these datives like οὖσιν go with γίγνοιτ' ἄν, but would sound like absolute datives.

c 6. ἑκάστοτε ἀναλαμβάνειν = "constantly pull up."

c 7. *κεκτημένον* and *φερόμενον* agree with the subject to *ἀναλαμβάνειν*, i.e. "oneself," and the *στόμα* is one's own mouth which speaks the *λόγος* (Stallb. takes *ἀχ. τὸ στ.* to be "unbridled *in mouth*," and to refer to the *λόγον*)—with a glance at the previous metaphor—, then directly, the *λόγος* itself is pictured again as a runaway horse. Cp. *Prot.* 338 a *ἐφεῖναι καὶ χαλάσαι τὰς ἡνίας τοῖς λόγοις*, Eur. *Bacch.* 385 *ἀχαλίνων στομάτων ἀνόμου τ' ἀφροσύνας τὸ τέλος δυστυχία*, Aristoph. *Ran.* 838 *ἀχάλινον στόμα*; so we talk of "letting one's tongue run away with one."

d 1. *ἀπό τινος ὄνου πεσεῖν*: probably no more than a picturesque and familiar expression for "get a fall." Some commentators take the proverb to imply *clumsiness*, others *blindness to one's own advantages* (cf. Ar. *Nub.* 1274). A L and O have *νοῦ*, O^2 *ὄνου*. The mistake was probably not accidental, but due to a misunderstanding of some grammarian's note to the effect that often—e.g. in the passage from the *Clouds*—*ἀπ' ὄνου* was meant to be heard as *ἀπὸ νοῦ*.

d 2. *χάριν ἕνεκα*: a clear case of *conflation*. I should follow Vat. 177, Schanz, and others in rejecting *ἕνεκα*. Boeckh p. 197 says: "Illud autem cognovi, numquam iungi duas praepositiones *ἐκ παραλλήλου*, nisi quarum alterutra possit absque casu scribi, ita ut adverbii teneat locum." (The passages cited by Stallb. in defence of the text admit either of special explanation, or of a likely emendation.)

d 7. *ἐλέξαμεν*: 693 b 3. Of the three objects, the first two correspond accurately enough to the *Liberté* and *Fraternité* of the early French Republicans; but the *mind* in Plato's state is shown chiefly in the renouncement on the part of the multitude of any claim to intellectual *Égalité*. See especially 689 b 2 f., where the absence of the disposition to obey the wise is called *ἄνοια*, 693 c and *Rep.* 431 d ff.

e 1. *τούτων ἕνεκα δή*, "it is to secure these objects that, etc." —The acc. pl. *πολιτείας* has, in the place of the *δύο* or *δίττας* which we should expect, *τήν τε δ. καὶ τὴν ἐλ.* in semi-agreement with it. Ficinus translates "*duas gubernationum species*," and somewhat so, to preserve the order and emphasis, must we translate in English. But this does not prove that Boeckh (p. 197) is right in holding that Plato must have written *δύο εἴδη πολιτείας*. There is no need, indeed, of the passages he quotes (e.g. below 735 a 5) to prove that such words would be correct and natural Greek. But no one has a right to forbid such a construction as that in the text. There is nothing more illogical in it than in, e.g., *τοῦ*

τε ὀξέος ἅμα καὶ βαρέος συγκεραννυμένων at 665 a 1 ; still closer parallels are θαυμάζοντες ἄλλος ἄλλῳ ἔλεγον (*Symp.* 220 c 6), and καὶ αἱ ἄλλαι πᾶσαι οὕτως τὸ αὑτῆς ἑκάστη ἔργον ἐργάζεται (*Rep.* 346 d 5).

e 3–8. λαβόντες κτλ. : ἑκατέρας is gen. sing. ; τῶν μέν is "in the case of the Persians," τῶν δέ "in the case of the Athenians."—λαβόντες is subordinate to κατείδομεν ; "we perceived that, when we found" or "got" (in either the one or the other, etc.) ; τότε resumes the participial clause.—ἐλευθεριάζειν is used, as at Ar. *Pol.* 1314 a 8, of a self-assertive, pushing sense of freedom.—Ritter appositely compares *Ep.* viii. 354 e δουλεία γὰρ καὶ ἐλευθερία ὑπερβάλλουσα μὲν ἑκατέρα πάγκακον, ἔμμετρος δὲ οὖσα πανάγαθον, and reminds us how near the two passages come to the Aristotelian doctrine of the *right mean.*

e 6. ἀγαγόντων (so L, O and the margin of A) is intrans. ; "when they marched, moved, pushed on"—a military term. A^1 and the margin of O have ἀγαθὸν τῶν, from which Schanz conjectures the original reading to have been ἄγαν ἰόντων. Many other alterations have been proposed of this passage, as may be seen from Schanz's critical note.

e 7. οὔτε τοῖς οὔτε τοῖς : cp. 721 b 3 χρήμασι μὲν τόσοις καὶ τόσοις, τῇ καὶ τῇ δὲ ἀτιμίᾳ, *Rep.* 546 c ἰσομήκη μὲν τῇ, Xen. *Rep. Ath.* 2. 8 τοῦτο μὲν ἐκ τῆς, τοῦτο δὲ ἐκ τῆς, *Theaet.* 167 c ἐν μὲν τῷ . . . ἐν δὲ τῷ. The pure demonstrative use of the article is unusual outside Homer and the tragedians (e.g. Aesch. *Suppl.* 439 ἢ τοῖσιν ἢ τοῖς πόλεμον αἴρεσθαι μέγαν).

702 a 2. αὐτῶν : its position, and the γ' both help to make this word emphatic ; "and that's the reason why."

a 6. λόγους, zeugma ; we must supply from ἐθεασάμεθα a verb to fit it.

a 8. πόλις . . . καὶ ἰδίᾳ : in the first two books we were dealing with the latter subject—i.e. the way laws can help to make a good *man*—and in the third book with the former—the right way to ordain the constitution of a *state.* The mention of this subject is a dramatic introduction to Cleinias's subsequent communication. The following question clinches the matter ; for the Ath. asks if there is any *test* to be applied which would gauge the success of their attempts, and the soundness of their theories.

b 4. κατὰ τύχην τινά : in the same sense κατὰ θεόν is used at 682 e 10 and at *Euthyd.* 272 e 1 κατὰ θεὸν γάρ τινα ἔτυχον καθήμενος ἐνταῦθα ; so at b 7 κατά τινα αὖ καιρόν.

c 2. καὶ πρός (adv.) : cp. *Laws* 746 d 8 καὶ πρός γε τὰς πολε-

μικὰς τάξεις, *Gorg.* 469 b 1 καὶ ἐλεεινόν γε πρός, 513 b 6 καὶ ν. μ. Δ. τῷ Πυριλάμπους γε πρός, *Rep.* 328 a 6 καὶ πρός γε παννυχίδα ποιήσουσιν, 466 e καὶ πρός γε ἄξουσι τῶν παίδων εἰς τὸν πόλεμον ὅσοι ἀδροί, 559 a 2 καὶ πρὸς οὐδὲν ἀγαθὸν ἐνοῦσαι δρῶσιν, *Euthyd.* 294 a καὶ σύ γε πρός, *Men.* 90 e καὶ ἀμαθία γε πρός, *Prot.* 321 d πρὸς δὲ καὶ αἱ Διὸς φυλακαὶ φοβεραὶ ἦσαν, *Soph.* 234 a φημί, καὶ πρός γε θαλάττης, *Menex.* 249 e καὶ πρός γε ἄλλων (-οις) πολλῶν (-οῖς) χάριν ἔχω. It will be seen that only three of these passages have no γε. In other authors the γε is left out as often as not.

c 8. ἐμοί τε καὶ ὑμῖν: the advantage to the three speculators would be—ultimately perhaps—the opportunity of putting their views to the test of experience (see *Timaeus* 19 c), but, at all events, immediately the opportunity of seeing the general principles, above arrived at, applied to concrete instances, and embodied in actual laws. In either case they would be putting their theories *to the test.*

d 1. ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων: possibly this refers only to the conversation which had already taken place—possibly to the whole of the conversation on the subject on which they were then engaged. The former explanation suits the context better, but the word ἐκλέξαντες is in favour of the latter.—τῷ λόγῳ, "in imagination."

d 2. οἷον "imagining ourselves to be."

d 3. ἐπίσκεψις, *inspection, examination*, as at 849 a, rather than *inquiry*, as at *Rep.* 456 c; "we shall be able to look at what we want"—i.e. a *test* of their theories.

d 6. οὐ πόλεμόν γε ἐπαγγέλλεις: "idem proverbium habes Phaedr. 242 B ubi schol. ἐπὶ τῶν ἀγαθὰ ἀγγελλόντων, ἐμνήσθη ταύτης καὶ ἐν τῷ τρίτῳ τῶν Νόμων, dein πρόσαντες est i. q. ἀηδές ut interpretatur Hesych." (Stallb.)

BOOK IV

704 a 1. "Well, what are we to understand that your city is going to be?" ("I don't mean," he goes on, "what it is called now, or what name is going to be given it, but, is it going to be a coast town, or an inland town?")

a 4. καὶ ὁ κατοικισμὸς αὐτῆς, "the mere circumstances of its founding;" e.g. who founded it? or how was it done? Plato later speaks of this imaginary city as ἡ Μαγνήτων πόλις 860 e 6,

946 b 6, 969 a 5. The names Βύρσα and Νεάπολις and Κλαζομεναί would fall under this head.

a 5. ποταμοῦ τινος . . . ἐπωνυμία, "a name taken from some river." Cp. 626 d 4 τῆς θεοῦ ἐπωνυμίας ἄξιος.

b 1. προσθείη τὴν αὐτῶν φήμην . . . πόλει, "will confer on the new-born city the sacred sound by which they themselves are called"—almost "their own special *associations*"; φήμη, in such a connexion, has a flavour of sanctity.—As I think that αὐτῶν refers only to ποταμός, κρήνη, and θεοί, and not to κατοικισμός and τόπος, I would remove the comma which Burnet puts after τόπῳ. We can get an imaginary δοίη for κατοικισμός and τόπος out of προσθείη.—(Apelt, Eisenach prog. 1901, would read γεννωμένη for γενομένῃ, an attractive suggestion which removes all difficulties in the construction; προσθείη would govern τοῦτο and γενν. would govern φήμην. H. Steph. would put in δοίη (Fic. "dabit"), Hug ποιοίη, after τόπος; Schanz would reject τὴν αὐτῶν φήμην—all alterations for the worse.)

b 6. κατὰ ταῦτα αὐτῆς, "on that side of it," i.e. at the point of the coast which is nearest to it; this κατὰ ταῦτα is represented in the answer by ταύτῃ.

c 1. περὶ αὐτήν: cp. above on 685 c 2.—From this sentence, and that at c 8 below, we see that τί δέ; ("what about?") may be used with a variety of constructions. Cp. *Gorg.* 509 d, *Rep.* 470 a, *Phaedo* 78 d.—At c 8 Schanz follows Schneider in reading τί δέ; πεδ.

c 5. It is clear from the context that οὐ πάνυ is here an unqualified negative; "None whatever" (Jowett).

c 10. ὅλῃ, Eusebius's reading, is much better than the ὅλη of the MSS. It is the fact that Crete *as a whole* is mountainous which is in point here. This statement does not exclude the possibility of there being *some* level spaces in the territory. To say that "every yard" of the new territory is like Crete would be nonsense—as if Cretan soil had a colour or texture of its own.

d 1. The fem. adj. may be meant to agree with χώραν (understood), see c 6, or possibly with φύσιν from the previous line.

d 3. οὐ . . . ἀνίατος . . . πρός: lit. "not hopeless for," i.e. "not unfavourable to." For the same use of πρός cp. *Rep.* 433 d ἐνάμιλλον (τῇ σοφίᾳ) πρὸς ἀρετὴν πόλεως, and *Symp.* 179 a ἔνθεον . . . πρὸς ἀρετήν.

d 4. εἰ . . . ἔμελλεν εἶναι: lit. "if it had been going to be," i.e. "if we had had to face the prospect of legislating for a sea-port (it would have been beyond human powers)." Below, at d 7,

εἰ μὴ . . . ἔμελλεν . . . ἕξειν means "otherwise it must have acquired," lit. "if it was not to acquire." The latter use is a quasi-auxiliary one (Goodwin, *M. and T.* 428 a); in the former the verb is more alive—has more of its own proper meaning.

d 5. For ἔδει without ἄν cp. Goodwin, *M. and T.* 415 ff.

d 6. πολλά . . . ἤθη καὶ ποικίλα καὶ φαῦλα: lit. "many ways as bad as they are refined"—"many dangerous refinements"; ποικίλος here, like ποικίλλω at Eur. *Cycl.* 339, has the notion of "over-civilized," "over-complicated," "over-refined" (not "discordant" as Jowett). Cp. *rep.* 557 c πεποικιλμένη πᾶσιν ἤθεσιν.

d 7. τοιαύτη φύσει γενομένη, "in consequence of its natural position"; we should merely say "in consequence." The redundancy is quite in Plato's style. Cp. e.g. *Rep.* 505 b ἢ πάντα τἄλλα φρονεῖν ἄνευ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ, καλὸν δὲ καὶ ἀγαθὸν μηδὲν φρονεῖν;

d 8. παραμύθιον ἔχει, "there is comfort in" (Jowett).—Stallb. well cps. Cicero, *De rep.* ii. 3 and 4, where he talks of the *corruptela ac demutatio morum* in maritime cities, and praises Romulus for putting Rome away from the coast.

705 a 1. ὅσον εὐλιμενωτέραν: cp. above b 8. The better the harbour, the more dangerous it was.—ὅμως δὲ κτλ., "however, we will make shift to do with it as it is." Ast and Wagner wrongly take these words to mean, "so much the better that it is (removed from the sea)" but this entirely neglects the ὅμως δέ. This clause is almost parenthetic—"not that I insist on any alteration";—the γάρ in the following sentence goes back to the ἐγγύτερον τοῦ δέοντος τῆς θαλάσσης, the danger of proximity to the sea.

a 2. τὸ μὲν παρ' ἑκάστην ἡμέραν ἡδύ: spoken probably not, as the modern reader would be inclined to take it, of the visible charm of the sea, but of the convenience to daily life of a varied and well-stocked market. Cp. *Modern Painters*, pt. iv. ch. xiii. §§ 17 ff.

a 3. ὄντως = "in a deeper sense than the superficial meaning of the words"; i.e. there is something *morally* as well as *physically distasteful* about the sea. The words ἁλμυρὸν τὸ γειτόνημα occur, we are told, in a poem of Alcman.

a 4. διὰ καπηλείας does not go closely with ἐμπιμπλᾶσα, but is a quasi-adjectival adjunct probably to χρηματισμοῦ alone; cp. *Rep.* 371 d and *Soph.* 223 d, where ἔμποροι are distinguished from κάπηλοι: the former travel with their goods (and probably sell wholesale); the latter ἱδρύμενοι ἐν ἀγορᾷ . . . (σχεδόν τι οἱ ἀσθενέσ-

τατοι τὰ σώματα καὶ ἀχρεῖοί τι ἄλλο ἔργον πράττειν), buy from importers, and sell, retail, to natives.

a 5. ἤθη παλίμβολα καὶ ἄπιστα, "shifty and dishonourable ways," "trickery and cheating." The word παλίμβολος, which seems to have obtained considerable currency in later Greek, is explained by Ruhnken (*Tim.* p. 148), following Harpocration, as originally applied to something thrown back on one's hands—particularly a *slave*. Dio Chrys. xxxi. 321 d couples the word with παλίμπρατος. Here Dio seems to use the word in the sense of "good-for-nothing" (cp. our phrase "an old shop-keeper," and Uncle Remus's "the same old two-and-sixpence"), but previously on the same page he says a healthy nature has nothing παλίμβολον or δυσχερές about it, where the words evidently mean *shifty* and *spiteful* respectively, as the following words identify the characteristics with ἀπάτη and πονηρία. The meaning *shifty* is vouched for by Timaeus's interpretations πολυμετάβολός τε καὶ ἐπὶ μιᾷ γνώμῃ μὴ μένων. Both meanings are well attested by Ruhnken's quotations. πάλιν in composition, like our *back-*, has often a sinister significance (cp. παλιντριβής at Soph. *Phil.* 448, παλίγγλωσσος Pind. *N.* i. 88, παλίγκοτος,—*backword*, *backfriend*, *backslide*, *backbite*. Dio in the above passage may well have had Plato's words in mind: he says, ἀλλὰ τοὺς μὲν καπήλους τοὺς ἐν τοῖς μέτροις κακουργοῦντας, οἷς ὁ βίος ἐστὶν αὐτόθεν, ἀπὸ αἰσχροκερδείας, μισεῖτε καὶ κολάζετε (? ἀπὸ αἰσχροκερδείας spurious).

a 8. παραμύθιον . . . πρὸς ταῦτα: probably not "an assuagement of these fears of ours," but "*an abatement of these dangers.*" Cp. Thuc. v. 103 ἐλπὶς δὲ κινδύνῳ παραμύθιον οὖσα, and Plato, *Critias* 115 b παραμύθια πλησμονῆς. The word is used at 773 e, and elsewhere in the *Laws*, in the sense of "incitement to," and so Athenaeus 640 e uses it when he misquotes Plato's παραμύθια πλησμονῆς as παραμύθια ἡδονῆς.—καὶ τὸ πάμφορος εἶναι, "the very fact that (it) produces all kinds of crops."

b 1. Schanz's faith in A is here justified. Its original reading was undoubtedly δῆλον ὡς οὐκ ἂν πολύφορος ἅμα, and so Schanz, rightly, as I think. L O, Eus., and Stob. follow a text which reads δῆλον ὡς οὐκ ἂν πολύφορός τε εἴη καὶ πάμφορος ἅμα, and a corrector of A (so Schanz), or (as Burnet) the original writer, has altered the shorter into the longer form—changing πολύφορος to πάμφορος, and adding the missing words in the margin, so as to come before that word. (Stob. has τις for τε.) The ὁμοιοτέλευτον provides a likely explanation of the omission, but the shorter form

gains so much in lucidity as to make it preferable. For the omission of εἴη cp. *Rep.* 371 a 1 ὧν ἂν αὐτοῖς χρεία.

b 4. κακόν goes with εἰς γεν. καὶ δικ. ἠθῶν κτῆσιν, much as ἀνίατος was used with πρὸς ἀρετῆς κτῆσιν at 704 d.—ἀνθ' ἑνὸς ἕν: cp. *Rep.* 331 b, *Phil.* 63 c. This phrase, though often used with superlatives, or expressions equivalent to superlatives, does not in itself mean "prae ceteris" (Ast), or "above all" (L. & S.)—here, for instance, it could not be so translated—but it is like our "taking one thing with another," "taking it all round." The similar εἷς πρὸς ἕνα, however, at *Laws* 738 e and *Epin.* 976 e, has acquired (from its constant use in comparison) just this sense of "above all." Cp. 647 b, 738 e.

b 6. ἐν τοῖς πρόσθεν λόγοις: at 696 a οὐ γὰρ μή ποτε γένηται παῖς καὶ ἀνὴρ καὶ γέρων ἐκ ταύτης τῆς τροφῆς, διαφέρων πρὸς ἀρετήν, where the τροφή referred to is the κακὸς βίος ὃν οἱ τῶν διαφερόντως πλουσίων καὶ τυράννων παῖδες τὰ πολλὰ ζῶσιν.

c 5. πρὸς τὰ τῶν ἐντὸς τῶν πλοίων μέρη: there is a slight redundance here. Badh. insists on correcting to πρὸς τἀντὸς, and Schanz follows him. But why might not Plato say "for the parts of the ships' interiors," instead of "for the parts inside the ships," or "for the inside parts of the ships"? Cp. *Prot.* 334 b, where τὰ ἔξωθεν and τὰ ἐντὸς τοῦ σώματος are used for the *exterior* and the *interior* of the body, and *Phaedr.* 247 c αἱ δὲ θεωροῦσι τὰ ἔξω τοῦ οὐρανοῦ (not "the things beyond the οὐρανός," but "the *outside* of the οὐρανός").

c 6. There is a Platonic redundance also about the ἑκάστοτε ("always") following on ἀναγκαῖον (ἐστί).

c 7. καὶ ταῦτα . . . τῆς φύσεως, "*that* natural feature of the country also is a good one."

c 8. τί δή; "how so?"

c 9. "It is well that a city should find it difficult to follow its enemies' example to its cost."—For the double acc. cp. below on 742 e 3.

d 2. Schanz says that A reads δή τι, and this seems to me to lead up to the Ath's. answer better than the usually received δὴ τί. It is "Have you anything that has been said, in your mind, when you say that?" To which the Ath. answers, in effect: "Yes; but it is something that was said some time ago."

d 3. What he means by φύλαττέ με is further defined at e 1 ff., i.e. "take care that I do not fall into (1) the error of putting something else before virtue, or (2) that of exalting one kind of virtue at the expense of the rest."—I. Bruns, p. 170, of course

regards this reference to Bk. I. as the work of his "Redaktor." The mention of Crete which follows suggested the interpolation to him, he says, and he further remarks that, inasmuch as *ἀνδρεία* alone suffered as the result of the "bad imitation" in question, the interpolation "does not fit." But, though exclusive care for one virtue is wrong in a legislator, it must surely be right for him to oppose the stifling of any one virtue, when it is threatened. Thereby he is avoiding the first of the two dangers mentioned above, i.e. that of setting something else higher than virtue. The following words *τοῦτον γὰρ . . . τῶν προειρημένων* —which Bruns apparently does not include in the "interpolation" —show that Plato is here thinking of that first danger.

d 5. *ἐλεγέτην*: for the termination cf. Curtius, *Gk. Verb* i. 80 (p. 54 Eng. trans.).

d 8. *τὸ δέ*: adverbial, "whereas"; cp. 642 a 3.

706 a 1. *ὅτῳ ἂν . . . μόνῳ*: this sentence was a puzzle to the scribes of our earliest MSS. and is a puzzle still. A originally wrote *τούτων, καλῶν* and *μόνῳ*, L and O originally wrote *τούτων*, and *καλόν*, and O wrote *μόνων*. In A and O *τούτων* is corrected to *τοῦ τῶν*, and a late hand in A gives *τῶν* alone; O corrects *μόνων* to *μόνῳ*, and A *μόνῳ* to *μόνων*, and a late hand in A has *μόνον*. One way out of the difficulty is, with Schneider and Schanz, to write (*ὅτῳ ἂν συνεχῶς*) *τῶν ἀεὶ καλῶν τι συνέπηται μόνον*. Stallb., the Zürich edd., and Wagner read *τούτων τῶν ἀεὶ καλῶν* (the two latter read *μόνον* for *μόνῳ*). Burnet is the first to print L's and O's *καλόν*. (Ast commends *καλόν* in his note, but does not print it in his text.) This, I think, with A's original *τούτων* and *μόνῳ*, gives the best reading of the passage. The awkward *τούτων*, which depends on *ὅτῳ μόνῳ*, is used generally of *objects of legislation*; *ὅτῳ*, with which *μόνῳ* agrees, is dat. after *συνέπηται*. We may translate: "only at that among the objects of legislation which is attended throughout its whole operation, and on every occasion, by some laudable result."—I believe, with Ast, that the *πρῶτον ψεῦδος* was the conversion of *καλόν* to *καλῶν*. The case seems to demonstrate the independent value of L and O. (Ritter, accepting Hermann's ingenious *τοῦ ὅτῳ ἂν σ. τῶν ἀεὶ καλῶν*, reads *μόνου* for *μόνῳ*; F.H.D. prefers Hermann's solution.) —For the *δίκην τοξότου* cp. 934 b *χρὴ . . . τοὺς νόμους τοξότου μὴ κακοῦ στοχάζεσθαι δίκην τοῦ τε μεγέθους κτλ.*—We find *ἀεὶ συνεχῶς* together at 807 e (and Hdt. i. 67)—hence Winckelmann would read here *συνεχῶς ἀεὶ τῶν καλῶν*.

a 2 ff. *τὰ ἄλλα σύμπαντα* are "all the other objects of

legislation," and *τῶν προειρημένων* at a 4 are "the aforesaid objects," i.e. that the law should promote (1) *virtue*, and (2) virtue *in general*.

a 4. *ὃν τυγχάνῃ*: a very vague expression. So we might say "is to be got by it."—*τὴν δὲ δὴ . . . γίγνεσθαι*, "the dangerous imitation of one's enemies, to which I referred, arises in the following way."

a 7. After the apologetic parenthesis the *ἔλεγον γίγνεσθαι* construction is abandoned, and direct narrative is substituted.

a 8. *γὰρ δή* like (the suggested) *δὴ γάρ* at 638 a 7, "for instance," "in fact."

b 7. *ἂν . . . συνήνεγκεν*: so put because the Athenians did not *then* become a sea power. The difficulty with Minos and the Minotaur was got over in another way. (Plato mentions the story also at *Phaedo* 58 a b.) The *γάρ* before *ἄν*, to which Stallb. takes exception, explains and justifies the application of the adj. *κακήν* to *μίμησιν* in a 5.

c 1. *μονίμων* is in strong contrast to the following *πυκνὰ ἀποπηδῶντας* ("making constant starts"), *δρομικῶς . . . ἀποχωρεῖν*, and *μὴ τολμῶντας ἀποθνῄσκειν μένοντας*. Plutarch twice quotes Plato's *μονίμων ὁπλιτῶν*: at *Themist.* ch. 4, and at *Philopoemen* ch. 14.

c 2. *δρομικῶς ταχύ*, "as fast as their legs would carry them."

c 3 f. *δοκεῖν* is in direct, *εἰκυίας αὐτοῖς γίγνεσθαι προφάσεις* in loose dependence on the *ἐθισθῆναι* in c 2.

c 6. Both the *δή* and the *τινας* are scornful.—*οὐκ αἰσχράς, ὥς φασιν, φυγάς*: perhaps Plato had in mind Archilochus's *ἀσπὶς ἐκείνη ἐρρέτω· ἐξαῦτις κτήσομαι οὐ κακίω* (Bergk, *Anth. Lyr.*, Archil. fr.; cp. also similar confessions in fragments of Alcaeus and Anacreon, and in Hor. *Od.* ii. 7. 10).

c 6–8. What is wanting to make this passage intelligible is (1) the discovery of a poem (such as those referred to in the last note) in which the words *οὐκ αἰσχρὰς φυγάς* occurred, and (2) another poem in which the words of the author of the first one were spoken as "worthy of infinite praise" (e.g. *ἄξι' ἐπαινεῖσθαι μυριομυριάκις*). As it stands it seems remarkable that so much should be made of *phrases* or *expressions* applied to the conduct just described. (Does *ῥ.* mean "words of command"? F.H.D.). If, with Schanz, we reject *ῥήματα*, our mind is naturally fixed, all through, mainly on the *conduct* and *habits* (*ἐθισθῆναι* c 2, *ἔθη ἐθίζειν* d 1) of those who use a navy. On the other hand it is hard to see what could have induced any scribe to put in *ῥήματα* if it wasn't there, while the elaborate *μείωσις* of *οὐκ ἄξ. . . .*

τοὐναντίον is almost equally out of place. Another correction of the passage which is attractive—especially if ῥήματα be retained—is that made by "Coraës ad Plutarch. Vol. i. 208. 20" (Stallb.) of ταῦτα to τοιαῦτα. Stallb. defends ταῦτα by referring to *Phil.* 16 c ταύτην φήμην παρέδοσαν, and—for the absence of the art.—*Phil.* 65 d 7 and *Laws* 702 d 1 (so too 685 e 4). (If the suggestion that we are here dealing with a poetical quotation be accepted, perhaps the poetical λήματα—as F.H.D. suggests—was what Plato wrote.)

c 8. Ast is probably right in writing πολλακισμυρίων as one word; cp. *Theat.* 175 a 4.

d 2. τὸ τῶν πολιτῶν βέλτιστον μέρος: the assumption that soldiers are the aristocracy of a state is more explicitly made in the *Republic.*

d 4. αὐτῷ: a kind of "ethic" dat. = "in his" (i.e. Homer's "representation," "according to Homer"; cp. *Rep.* 389 e οἷα καὶ Ὁμήρῳ Διομήδης λέγει, and Ar. *Poet.* 1456 a 27, and *Pol.* 1339 b 8.

d 5. κατεχομένων, "hard pressed"; cp. Xen. *Cyn.* 9. 20 ῥίπτουσι δὲ καὶ εἰς τὴν θάλατταν ἐὰν κατέχωνται.

e 1 ff. Ξ 96–102. The chief difference between Plato's quotation and our Homeric text is that he has πολέμου (e 5) in the place of our πόλεμον. If Plato wrote the gen. he must have meant "lay hold on," "take earnestly to," fighting. At the same time Thuc. at i. 112 uses ἔσχον τοῦ πολέμου in the sense of "stopped" fighting. — Other variations are ἐυσσέλμους for ἐυσσέλμους, ἔλκειν for ἑλκέμεν, ἐελδομένοισι for ἐπικρατέουσι, and οἵ᾽ ἀγορεύεις for ὄρχαμε λαῶν. In all points, I think, our Homeric text is better than Plato's.

707 a 5. The MSS. read ἅμα σωτηρίᾳ τιμὰς. Badham would read σωτηρίας, taking ἅμα adverbially with πρὸς τούτοις, and Schanz and Apelt follow him. Although ἅμα σωτηρίᾳ τιμὰς *may* be possible Greek for "honours conferred in the hour of deliverance," γιγνομένης in b 1 *must* go with σωτηρίας expressed or supplied—it cannot, as Stallb. wants, go with ἐρετικῆς—and τιμάς in the sense of *price* takes a genitive naturally; also the temptatation to a scribe to put a dat. after ἅμα is a strong one. On these grounds I accept Badham's emendation.—The ἅμα, though perhaps improving the rhythm of the sentence, seems somewhat redundant; but οἶμαι, which Apelt would substitute for it, is out of place in such a decided expression of opinion.—We may translate: "Again, cities which owe their power to their navies do not confer the reward for their deliverance upon the

heroes of the fight. The victory is won by the arts of the pilot, the boatswain and the rower, and by a miscellaneous and disreputable crowd (who exercise these arts), and there can be no proper bestowal of honours upon *individuals*."

a 6. *τῷ καλλίστῳ τῶν πολεμικῶν*: *τῷ καλλ.* is neut., and *τῶν πολ.* masc.; lit. "the noblest element among the fighters." For the generalizing use of the neut. cp. 731 e *τυφλοῦται γὰρ περὶ τὸ φιλούμενον ὁ φιλῶν.* (*τοῖς καλλίστοις* here would have sounded like "the handsomest.")

b 1. *παντοδαπῶν καὶ οὐ πάνυ σπουδαίων ἀνθρώπων*: Heindorf on *Phaedr.* 243 c has collected passages from Greek and Latin authors where "sailors" is used as a term of abuse.—The *καί* before *παντοδαπῶν*, which is in all the MSS., was omitted from all printed texts before Stallbaum's, and is again rejected by Schanz. Ast omitted the *διά* before *κυβερνητικῆς* and put it in the place of the *καί* before *παντοδαπῶν*. This greatly simplifies the construction, but impoverishes the sense.—The extraordinary *ἐρετρικῆς* of the MSS. was corrected by Ald.

b 3. The importance of bestowing public distinction has often been urged already—e.g. at 631 e *τιμῶντα ὀρθῶς . . . καὶ ἀτιμάζοντα*, and 632 c *καὶ τιμὰς ἅστινας αὐτοῖς ἀπονέμειν δεῖ*, and more particularly at 697 a b *πόλιν . . . τὴν μέλλουσαν σώζεσθαί τε καὶ εὐδαιμονήσειν εἰς δύναμιν ἀνθρωπίνην δεῖ καὶ ἀναγκαῖον τιμάς τε καὶ ἀτιμίας διανέμειν ὀρθῶς*. Cf. Dio Chrys. xxxi. 321 *τί γάρ ἐστιν ἱερώτερον τιμῆς ἢ χάριτος;* occurring in a passage where a corrupt distribution of public distinctions is denounced as a "debasing of the moral currency."

c 1. The Ath. does not say that Artemisium and Salamis had no part in the deliverance of the Greeks from Persian despotism, but that they did not either *begin* or *complete* that deliverance. After all, he adds, mere *preservation* is, from our present point of view, not nearly so important as the effect of one or the other style of fighting upon the *character* of the citizens.

c 2. As at 698 e 4, Schanz rejects the *ἐν* before *Μαραθῶνι*.

c 7. *σοι* (*dat. ethicus*) indicates that the fresh point is in Cleinias's favour.

d 1. *ἀποβλέποντες . . . ἡγούμενοι*: the participles here, as often, contain the main ideas: "The truth is, our object in these inquiries, whether into the nature of the country or its institutions, is to secure the right sort of constitution, for we don't think, as most men do . . ."—*πολιτείας ἀρετήν*: not as Stallb. "*civitatis virtutem*"—that point comes in later with

ὡς βελτίστους γίγνεσθαι—but "the excellence of its political arrangements."

d 3. μόνον, "above all other things," "of all things the (most valuable)."

d 4. γίγνεσθαί τε καὶ εἶναι balances the σῴζεσθαί τε καὶ εἶναι of d 2 f., just as χώρας φύσιν is balanced by νόμων τάξιν.

d 5. In effect the same lesson was taught at 687, where national preservation and independence is declared not to be enough to ensure real happiness to a state. Cp. also 628 c 6 ἆρα οὖν οὐ τοῦ ἀρίστου ἕνεκα πάντα ἂν τὰ νόμιμα τιθείη πᾶς;—The whole of this noble utterance is clothed in carefully chosen and marshalled words (cp. *Gorg.* 512 d).

d 8. τὴν αὐτήν: the same, i.e., as was advocated ἐν τοῖς πρόσθεν. —For the metaphor Stallb. well compares *Soph.* 237 b τὸν δὲ λόγον, ᾗ βέλτιστα διέξεισι, σκοπῶν αὐτός τε ἴθι κἀμὲ κατὰ ταύτην τὴν ὁδὸν ἄγε, and *Polit.* 268 d δεῖ καθ' ἑτέραν ὁδὸν πορευθῆναί τινα.

d 9. κατοικίσεων (for which L and O have κατοικήσεων) and νομοθεσιῶν correspond more or less to χώρας φύσιν and νόμων τάξιν respectively at d 2; cp. also κατοικίζεσθαί τε καὶ νομοθετεῖσθαι at 708 c 1.

d 11. καὶ πολύ γε: sc. βελτίστην.

e 4. ἢ κατά: it is curious that both Ficinus and Cornarius should have missed the force of these words and taken ἤ as *or* (with πότερον).

e 5. ὑμῖν . . . εἰς τὴν χώραν κατῳκισμένους, "have settled in your country"; in ὑμῖν he includes the rest of the Cretans—not Megillus.

708 a 1. τὸ δὲ δὴ . . . τὰ νῦν; "but pray whence do you expect to draw the troop of citizens with whom we have to deal on the present occasion?" ("the recruits for your present enterprise" Jowett). τὸ παρόν qualifies στρατόπεδον, and τὰ νῦν qualifies παρόν. If τὸ παρόν be taken adverbially, τὰ νῦν is superfluous, and the article is wanted with στρατόπεδον—which is used as an alternative for the λεώς of e 2 above. Cp. 687 a 5 where the word stands for the whole Dorian population.—ἡμῖν goes better with παρόν than with λέγε; perhaps it is as well to mark this, as Schneider does, by putting commas on each side of λέγε. Burnet is right anyway in rejecting the single comma after λέγε which stands in all editions except Schneider's.

a 3. A is clearly right in reading γενήσεσθαι, where L and O have γίγνεσθαι. At a 5 all the MSS. have προσδέξασθαι, which

Ald. altered to the fut. (and so Schanz). Here, however, the aor. is probably correct. It *may* be used, without ἄν, of the moment when the colonists, or rather their leaders, "made up their minds to welcome" Peloponnesian comrades; but, more probably, we ought to read μάλιστ' ἄν μοι in a 4.

a 6. ὡς ἐξ Ἄργους εἰσίν, "that there *are* (some colonists) from Argos (in Crete)."

a 7. With τὸ Γορτυνικὸν (γένος) we must supply in thought "is from those parts." The Peloponnesian Gortys seems to have been in Arcadia, not in Argos.

a 8. ταύτης: cp. *Rep.* 544 c ἡ Κρητική τε καὶ Λακωνικὴ αὕτη, and *Gorg.* 472 b τοῦτο τὸ καλὸν ἀνάθημα; "the distinguished city of Gortyn." In classical times, however, the Cretan Gortyn or Gortys was better known than the Arcadian one. It is mentioned at B 646 and γ 294.

b 2 f. ὅταν μὴ . . . γίγνηται . . . οἰκίζηται: Stallb. cites a parallel from *Gorg.* 505 e to this "explanatory" asyndeton: ἵνα μοι τὸ τοῦ Ἐπιχάρμου γένηται, ἃ πρὸ τοῦ δύο ἄνδρες ἔλεγον, εἷς ὢν ἱκανὸς γένωμαι. In both instances we may think (very likely wrongly) that the sentences would have run better if γίγνηται and γένηται respectively had been absent.

b 4. For πολιορκεῖν in the figurative sense of "hem in," "bring pressure to bear on" cp. Xen. *Mem.* ii. 1. 13 and 17, and *Alc. II.* 142 a.

b 8. ἄρδην κρείττονι κρατηθεῖσα πολέμῳ: κρείττονι agrees with πολέμῳ (not, as Schneider, Wagner, and Jowett, "conquered by a superior power in war"), but it may be doubted whether Plato meant "(completely overpowered) *in* an unequal contest," or "*by* an irresistible attack"; I think the latter.—Cp. Milton, *Par. Lost*, vi. 454 "Against unequal arms to fight in pain."

c 1. τῇ μέν, "in some respects," τῇ δέ, "in other respects."

c 3. ἔχει: the "pregnant" use of ἔχει in the sense of παρέχει; cp. Thuc. ii. 61. 2 τὸ μὲν λυποῦν ἔχει ἤδη τὴν αἴσθησιν ἑκάστῳ. —κοινωνὸν ἱερῶν ὄν: there is an anacoluthon here; ὄν must agree with γένος, which is acc., but it may be doubted whether if a fem. noun had been in the place of γένος we should have had οὖσαν here; ὄν (and ἀνέχεται) proceed as if γένος had been the subject of a previous direct statement; ὄν is "since it is."

c 4. For ἄλλας with a gen. of comparison cp. *Gorg.* 512 d ὥρα μὴ ἄλλο τι τὸ γενναῖον καὶ τὸ ἀγαθὸν ᾖ τοῦ σῴζειν τε καὶ σῴζεσθαι.

c 5. The δ' is adversative to εὐπετῶς ἀνέχεται, "instead of

that the disaffected body, whose withdrawal is sometimes due to bad laws, and which wants to go on living in the same ways which were fatal to it before, because it is used to them, etc." This is better than to take τὸ δ' adverbially. It is wrong to supply γένος with ἐστασιακός, I think.

d 1–7. "On the other hand, while a miscellaneous conglomeration of colonists has not, as a body, prejudices which hamper the lawgiver, it takes a long time and great effort to bring about true union in such a case." The δ' in d 1 corresponds to the μέν in c 2. Then follows a consideration on the other side: "after all, we must face the (last mentioned) difficulty, remembering that the work of a lawgiver and founder must *in any case* demand exceptional ability and virtue."

d 3. συμπνεῦσαι, "coalesce." So Ar. *Pol.* v. 3 στασιωτικὸν δὲ καὶ τὸ μὴ ὁμόφυλον, ἕως ἂν συμπνεύσῃ—exactly the same observation as that in the text.

d 4. The MSS. have καθ' ἕνα εἰς . . . For καθ' ἕνα Stallb. would read καθ' ἓν, and Herm. (pref. to vol. vi.) καθέντα. I suspect that the correct reading is καθ' ἕνα εἷς, with commas before and after,—"man by man"—a phrase similar in form to ἀνθ' ἑνὸς ἕν at 705 b, and πρὸς ἕνα εἷς at Demosth. *C. Mid.* p. 557. The case of εἷς is a difficulty, at first sight a fatal one; but perhaps the cacophony of καθ' ἕνα ἕνα led the writer to proceed as if the sentence, like the preceding one, had a finite verb. No εἰς is wanted with ταὐτὸν συμφυσῆσαι ("to pipe the same tune").

d 6. ὄντως (the reading of the text of A and of the margin of L and O)—"in the nature of the case"—is better than L and O's ὅμως—"after all"—but the latter would give a tolerable sense, which οὕτως, the third MS. variant, would not.

d 7. If the MS. τελεώτατον is correct, the meaning is that "law-giving and city-founding is a sovereign specific for manly excellence." (Cp. *Critias* 106 b φάρμακον . . . τελεώτατον καὶ ἄριστον φαρμάκων, ἐπιστήμην.) This leaves ἀνδρῶν in an adjectival relation to ἀρετήν; but why should "manly" excellence be specified, and what connexion has such a statement with what has gone before? I think Badham was right in reading τελεωτάτων, but I would not, with him, read ἔστιν and take the sentence to be a question.—For the connexion with what has gone before see above on d 1–7. (If it *were* a question I should prefer the MS. τελεώτατον—"*is* it such a specific as we assume?")—For πρός in the sense of "(to be good) at," or "in reference to," cp. *Alc. I.* 120 e τελέους . . . πρὸς ἀρετήν, *Prot.* 318 c

βελτίω πρὸς γραφικήν, *Phaedr.* 263 d τεχνικώτερος . . . πρὸς λόγους.

d 8 ff. "I don't doubt it," says Cleinias, "but I don't quite see why you say so just now." Then the Ath. pulls himself up short, —much as he did in Bk. III. at 686 c 7,—as if suddenly struck by a consideration which would modify his previous statement. This dramatic device would not be necessary if his two interlocutors had been men of greater intellectual power than they are represented to be.—F. Doering (p. 17) argues that the whole passage from εἰκός to μακρῷ at 712 a 7 is an interpolation—written at an earlier time while Plato still held the views maintained in the *Republic*. Zeller held that the passage was not Plato's at all, but a hash-up of the passages in the *Republic* where Plato says his ideal state can only come into being if either philosophers become kings, or kings philosophers. He relies much on the occurrence of the words μνήμων, εὐμαθής and μεγαλοπρεπής in 709 e, as compared with *Rep.* 487 a. But the idea of the passage in the *Laws* is not the same, but one more in keeping with the practical tone of the treatise. He does not suggest, as he did in the *Rep.*—473 b ff. and elsewhere—, that philosophers should be made kings, or kings philosophers, but that a well-endowed and well-disposed despot might be so fortunate as to secure the services of a νομοθέτης ἄξιος ἐπαίνου (710 c 8).

What the Ath. says in this passage is: "After all, are we not in danger of expecting too much of, and of attributing too much to even such θεῖοι ἄνδρες as we have postulated?" Cleinias's question has made the Ath. pause, and "go back on"—ἐπανιών—the subject of the legislator; and he is suddenly impressed with the view expressed later by Dr. Johnson, as to the "small part" played by "laws" in curing the "ills that human hearts endure." We may imagine a short interval of silence after Cleinias's question. Then the Ath. says: "I fancy the result of my reconsideration of the matter of the νομοθέται will be that I shall say something actually (καί) derogatory to them as well (ἅμα). But if my remark is at all apposite, no harm will be done. After all, why should I mind? It is pretty much the same with all things human."

e 1. It was perhaps the contrast between this remark and the high compliment just paid to lawgivers that led to O's variant of ἐπαινῶν for ἐπανιών.

e 2. πρὸς καιρόν τινα, like εἴς τινα . . . καιρον at 926 e 9, "not unseasonably," "to the point."—Ritter takes the whole passage quite differently; i.e. "I think I am going to point out a

practical difficulty (*τι φαῦλον*); but if we develop our theory in view of its application at the right moment"—i.e. the *καιρός* referred to at 709 b 7 as the right moment for the application of skill. But *λέγωμεν* here must refer to *ἐρεῖν*.—Stallb. takes *τι φαῦλον* to mean "*admodum vulgare quiddam*."

e 3. For *οὐδὲν πρᾶγμα* (*ἐστί*) cf. 794 e 6, and Heindorf's note on *Hipp. Ma.* 291 a.—*δυσχεραίνω* is indicative; cp. Eur. *Med.* 873.

709 a 7. A probably read *ἀκαιρίαι*, though the last letter is erased; the *vox nihili* *σκεωρίαι* which occurs in its place in one MS. of Stobaeus, *Ecl.*—a mistake, as Meineke says, for the late *σκαιωρίαι*—confirms this. Following on *λοιμῶν τε ἐμπιπτόντων*, *ἀκαιρίαι* makes an impossibly harsh anacoluthon, and we must either, with Ast, reject the *τε* or, with Stallb., read *ἀκαιρίας*. I prefer the latter. At *Symp.* 188 b Plato says that *λοιμοί* and many other diseases of different kinds are engendered by unseasonable weather. Ast's rejection of *τε* would make it appear that the *λοιμοί* had caused the *ἀκαιρίαι* as well as the *νόσοι*.—*χρόνον ἐπὶ πολύν* and *πολλάκις* are almost adjectival = "lasting," and "frequent."—*ἐνιαυτῶν πολλῶν*, "recurring year after year."—*ταῦτα . . . πάντα προϊδών*, "in view of all these possibilities."

a 8. *ἄξειεν ἂν εἰπεῖν*: perhaps "would venture to say" (Fic. has "non verebitur exclamare"); but the expression is peculiar. Stob. has *ἄρξειεν*, Stallb. conj. *ἀξιώσειεν*; Heindorf thought the error lay in *εἰπεῖν*, and would substitute *εἰπών* for it. *θνητῶν*, the variant in L for *θνητὸν*, is probably the genuine reading. Fic. has "mortalium neminem."

b 2 ff. *τὸ δ' ἔστιν . . . ἂν θείην. ἢ πῶς;* "But the fact is (*τὸ δ'*), while one may say all this with apparent truth about seamanship and navigation and medicine and generalship, there is at the same time something else which may be equally well said on the very same subject."

Cl. "What is that?"

Ath. "That everything is (not Chance but) God, and that God has two auxiliaries by which all human affairs are managed, Chance, and Fit Occasion. That with these, however, we must not forget that there is associated a third, of a gentler nature, namely Skill. I call it a great advantage that skill in navigation, rather than the opposite (*ἢ μή*) should co-operate with the ripening of the occasion in a storm."

Stallb. takes *τό* in b 2 to be the obj. of *εἰπόντα* and to mean "this," and *πάντα ταῦτα* to be "per asyndeton additum" to the previous words, comparing e.g. *Rep.* 598 b *σκυτοτόμον τέκτονα*,

τοὺς ἄλλους δημιουργούς. It seems better to take τό adverbially, particularly because πάντα ταῦτα seems, from its position, meant to be the obj. of εἰπόντα.—ἔστιν in both sentences stands for ἔξεστιν.

b 7. I take θεὸς (μὲν) πάντα (ἐστί) to be a doctrine opposed to that expressed at b 1, τύχας δ' εἶναι σχεδὸν ἅπαντα. Cp. Aesch. *Frag.* 65 a Dind. Ζεύς τοι τὰ πάντα. It is usual to take θεός as one of the subjects to διακυβερνῶσι, and to identify τύχη and καιρός as the *second* guiding agency. (Badham alters πάντα to πρῶτος and θεοῦ to θεὸν—naturally enough, if the usual view is correct.) But *Luck* and *Fit Occasion* are two distinct influences.

b 8. ἡμερώτερον: here too I would desert the ordinary interpretation, which supplies ἐστί with ἡμερώτερον, and makes συγχωρῆσαι depend on it—"mitius est concedere," Stallb. I believe that, by a very mild anacoluthon, the construction (after λέγειν) is varied from ὡς with indic. to an inf. (δεῖν). To describe the admission as ἥμερον is so extraordinary that Badham would read μετριώτερον. But, used as an adj. describing the nature of τέχνη, as contrasted with the two other agencies, it is apt, and recalls the contrast described at *Rep.* 410 d f. between the σκληρότης of the nature whose body only has been developed, and the ἡμερότης of the φιλόσοφος φύσις. τέχνη then represents *man's* share in the work of the universe; *luck* and "*ripeness*" are not in his hands, but *skill* is. I would therefore put a comma or colon after πάντα, remove the comma after καιρὸς, and substitute a colon for the full stop after σύμπαντα.—"Dans les champs de l'observation le hasard ne favorise que les esprits préparés," Pasteur, *Vie* p. 88.

c 1. καιρῷ χειμῶνος cannot (*pace* the dictionaries and the translators) stand either for "in a time of storm," or "on the occasion of a storm," or (as Stallb.) "at the exigency of a storm" (*quum tempestas exigit atque postulat*), nor even "at the critical moment in a storm." All these usages would demand, in classical Greek, a preposition with καιρῷ. As at p. 752 a 1, συλλαβέσθαι (used absolutely) means "to co-operate," and it naturally takes a dat. of the person helped. Here the third agency (τέχνη) is represented as helping the second (καιρός). We could get on without χειμῶνος ("in a storm"), and ἢ μή (conversationally added to κυβερνητικήν in the sense of "rather than the opposite"—this is perhaps better than to take ἢ μή with συλλαβέσθαι, i.e. "rather than that it should not"), but an Englishman's fancy

is hardly enough authority in such a case. Badham rejects both *χειμῶνος* and *ἢ μή* and Schanz follows him. That one version of Stobaeus apparently omits *μή* does not give much support to the latter omission. (L. & S. actually take *κυβ.* as the obj. of *συλλ.*) [F.H.D. would read *ἐν καιρῷ* and trans. "to intervene in a storm at the right moment."]

c 5. I strongly suspect that *κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν ἂν ἔχοι λόγον* is a commentator's amplification which has wrongly found its way into the text. If this was so, Ast's *καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις* and Schanz's *κἂν τοῖς ἄλλοις* are unnecessary.

c 6. *ταὐτὸν τοῦτο*: i.e. the *μέγα πλεονέκτημα* just spoken of. In other words, "law-making as much as any task needs *skill*."

c 7. The asyndeton is of the usual "explanatory" kind.—*εἰ μέλλοι*: most editors (including Schanz) follow Stobaeus in accepting the easier reading *εἰ μέλλει* here, though A and O and some inferior MSS. have *εἰ μέλλοι*. The opt. should be retained; it carries back the mind to the mention of other favourable circumstances—of position and soil—made at 704 a ff.—"which ought, as we saw above, to be enjoyed by a city, if it is ever to be a prosperous one." At *Rep.* 490 a there is a similar opt. in a *ὅτι* clause dependent on *ἀπολογησόμεθα*—*ὅτι . . . πεφυκὼς εἴη . . . καὶ οὐκ ἐπιμένοι*, where Adam says the opt. represents the "philosophic imperfect" in direct speech—"was," i.e. "is, as we saw" and where Ast and Madvig change *ἀπολογησόμεθα* into a past tense. Adam also cps. *Charm.* 156 b 8, where Madvig emends a similar opt. by inserting an *ἄν*.

c 8. *ἀληθείας ἐχόμενον*: for *ἀληθῆ*, a form of periphrasis often occurring in the *Laws*; e.g. 677 c 5 *τέχνης ἐχόμενον* for *τεχνικόν*. It probably goes predicatively with *παραπεσεῖν*.

c 9. *δεῖν* is used much as at c 1; we may supply in thought, "we must allow" before it, from *δοτέον*.

d 2. The MS. reading is apparently *ὀρθῶς τι, παρὸν*, and so the early editions. Correctors of A, L, and O give a variant *παρ'* for *παρόν*. Boeckh first put a comma after *ὀρθῶς*, and wrote *τί* for *τι*, and all recent edd. except Schanz follow him. But the words will not bear Boeckh's translation of *τί παρὸν αὐτῷ διὰ τύχης*—"*ea quae* modo contigerint fortuna . . ." The utmost we can make of them is to suppose a "double-barrelled" question; e.g. "they would be justified in praying, wouldn't they, for what particular thing would it be, the presence of which would render nothing further necessary except their skill?" *πάνυ μὲν οὖν* answers the first question only, but *κελευόμενοι . . . εἰπεῖν* in

d 5 seems to refer to the second. H. Steph. gets the requisite sense by reading *ὀρθῶς τι ὃ παρὸν*, and so does Wagner's *ὅ, τι* for *τι*; but Schanz's reading does this with less alteration of the text. Heindorf had already objected to the MS. *ἐπιδέοι* as an impersonal, and Schanz reads *ἐπιδέον* (leaving *ὀρθῶς τι* as in the MSS.). We may translate this: "would be justified, wouldn't he, in praying for something put in his hand by chance (and) likely to need nothing but his skill besides." Ritter well reminds us that *ὀρθῶς* carries us in thought to the *ill-advised* prayers spoken of at 688 b 6.

d 6. *τὴν αὑτῶν εὐχὴν εἰπεῖν*, "to say what it was they prayed for."

d 8. Stallb. says we may supply *ἄν* with *δράσειεν* from the Ath.'s previous sentence. Better than this is to suppose, with Schanz, that *δὴ* is a scribe's misreading of *ἄν*, or—better still—that *δράσει* is what Plato wrote, the final *εν* being due to the following *ἐγ*.

d 10. *τί* is governed of course by *δῶμεν*, not by *ἔχουσαν*.

e 1. *ἐκ τῶν λοιπῶν*: perhaps "with your remaining resources"; cp. 710 a 1 *τῶν ἄλλων ὑπαρχόντων ὄφελος εἶναί τι*. For this use of *ἐκ* cp. *Rep.* 365 d *συνωμοσίας . . . συνάξομεν, εἰσίν τε πειθοῦς διδάσκαλοι . . . ἐξ ὧν τὰ μὲν πείσομεν, τὰ δὲ βιασόμεθα*; Ast however says it means "*henceforward*"—as it apparently does at *Ep.* 316 d 8—and he is possibly right.

e 3–6. Ritter's arrangement of this passage, which Burnet has adopted, not only involves less change in the words than any—except Hermann's—but gives the most natural continuation of the dialogue. The MSS. make *φέρε . . . ἦ γάρ;* a continuous speech of the Athenian's: to this Cl. answers *Ναί*, and the Ath. goes on again with *τόδε*. Besides giving the question *τί μετὰ τοῦτ' κτλ.* to Cl., Ritter, following Schramm, alters *; ἆρα* to *ἄρα ;* (*ἄρα* is the reading of L). (Schanz adopts Stallb.'s alteration of *ἦ γάρ* to *τί γάρ*—which he gives to Cl., and with him rejects *Ναί*. To this Ritter properly objects that *τὸ ποῖον;* and not *τί γάρ;* is always used in the *Laws* in such a case. Besides, Stallb.'s *τί γάρ;* is—as he himself says of Schramm's ingenious *τὸν νομοθέτην;*—"*justo audacius.*" To Hermann's arrangement, which gives *τοῦ νομ. . . . ἦ γάρ;* to Cl., and begins the Ath.'s answer *Ναὶ τόδε;* the objection is that *Ναί* answers one question, and *τόδε* another.

e 4. Burnet differs from most recent edd. in adopting A^2's correction of *φράζωμεν* to the more suitable *φράζομεν*. "In saying this we are speaking for the lawgiver, are we not?"

(Stallb.—reading *φράζωμεν*—takes this question to mean: "Shall we give *this* answer on the part of the lawgiver?")

e 6 ff. See note on 735 d 3.

e 7. *νέος*: youth is not one of the requisites in the case of the philosopher-king postulated at *Rep.* 487 a. It is necessary here. An older man would not readily accept the philosophic lawgiver's guidance.

e 8. *ἐν τοῖς πρόσθεν*: i.e. at 696 b 4, d, and e. The *σωφροσύνη* he speaks of here—as there—is the gentlemanly self-control and self-respect, without which any great powers of body and mind—or even character—might be felt as oppressive by the rest of the world.

710 a 1. The MSS. have *τῇ τυραννουμένῃ ψύχῃ*. I have no doubt that Dr. Hagenbutte was right in substituting *τυράννου* for *τυραννουμένῃ*. The scribe doubtless had in mind the previous *τυραννουμένην πόλιν*, and the quite different *τυραννουμένη ψύχη* of *Rep.* 577 e. Ast says *τυραννουμένη* is middle, but even if the middle were ever used—which apparently it is not—Plato would not use four lines below the same participle in a passive sense. Stallb. says *τυραννουμένῃ = τυραννικῇ*; it certainly has not this meaning at *Rep.* 577 d, and the meaning is not apt here.—*ἐὰν . . . εἶναί τι*, "if any good is to come of his possession of the other virtues." (This is better than to take *ψύχη* as the subj. of *μέλλῃ*, and *τῶν ἄλλ. ὑπ.* as a gen. abs.)

a 3 f. "I think it is *σωφροσύνη*, Megillus, which the Ath. says must be accessory."—*ἦ γάρ;* is addressed to the Ath.

a 5. "Not the philosopher's *σωφροσύνη*" the Ath. answers, "but the *σωφροσύνη* of daily life." Cp. below 968 a 1 and *Phaedo* 82 a 11 ff. with Archer Hind's Appendix 1 to his edition of the *Phaedo* on *δημοτικὴ καὶ πολιτικὴ ἀρετή*.—Cp. also the distinction at *Phaedo* 61 a between the popular idea of *μουσική* and the philosophic one.—In disclaiming here the higher and "forced" significance of the word, Plato is not rejecting the view of any other philosopher, but is claiming the right to define a word specially, when the argument has a special object in view. He withdraws i.e. from the position adopted by himself e.g. at *Rep.* 430 d ff., and, implicitly, even above in the *Laws* at 689 a ff. For the *συμφωνία* there called the highest *σοφία* (d 6) is the agreement, between the different elements in man, as to what is best and most desirable, and that is much the same as the *σωφροσύνη* of *Rep.* 430 f.

a 7. *τοῖς μὲν ἀκρατῶς ἔχειν πρὸς τὰς ἡδονὰς . . . τοῖς δὲ*

ἐγκρατῶς: a similar notional anacoluthon may be seen in the addition of τε καὶ ἀτιμίαι at 696 d 11, and of ἢ μή at 709 c 2. In all three cases it is necessary to picture to oneself *both opposites* in order to understand the nature of *one*, and the *distinction* is loosely spoken of as if it was the distinguishing mark of *one* member of the pair. In much the same way we use the word *distinction* in the sense of *distinguishing mark*. (Schanz would reject the τοῖς μέν and τοῖς δέ clauses as a commentator's explanation, and Badham would change τοῖς μέν into τοῦ μή and reject the τοῖς δέ clause; but this might be taken to imply that *all* children and animals were temperate, and this, no doubt, Plato wanted to avoid.)

b 1. ἔφαμεν—at 696 e 1.—For μονοῦσθαι with a gen. cp. *Tim.* 46 e μονωθεῖσαι φρονήσεως.

b 4. ταύτην τὴν φύσιν: i.e. τὴν σώφρονα φύσιν (*Polit.* 307 c).

b 5. For the plural φύσεσιν Stallb. (as against Zeller, who finds fault with it) cps. *Rep.* 410 e τούτω τὼ φύσει, and 424 a φύσεις ἀγαθὰς ἐμποιεῖ.

b 6. Badham supposes that ἄριστα is a misreading of ῥᾷστα. The latter, besides getting support from the ῥᾷστά τε καὶ τάχιστα at d 8, and from τάχος καὶ ῥᾳστώνη at 711 a 2, may be thought more significant and expressive; but the ἀμείνων in b 8 seems to me to put ἄριστα beyond a doubt.

b 8. διάθεσις, "process of settlement." Verbal derivatives in Greek retain the power of representing the imperfect as well as the perfect and momentary tenses of the verbs from which they are derived.

c 1 f. Cl. "How, or by what arguments, could a man ever get people to believe that?"

Ath. "Why, it is easy to see that it is in the nature of things that that should be so."

c 5. H. Steph. restored εἰ τύραννος . . . εὐτυχής from the Ath., to whom the MSS. give it, to Cleinias, and Ast saw that St. had gone a word too far, and correctly gave εὐτυχής back to the Athenian.

c 7. The κατά which, logically speaking, should be repeated before τὸ γενέσθαι is omitted for rhythm's sake.—For this use of κατά Stallb. cps. *Phaedr.* 229 d οὐ πάνυ εὐτυχοῦς ἀνδρὸς κατ' ἄλλο μὲν οὐδέν, ὅτι δ' . . .

d 1. I think Stallb., the Zür. edd. and Schanz are right in adopting Ald.'s emendation of the MS. αὐτῷ to αὐτώ.—πάντα σχεδὸν κτλ., "what more could God do for a city?"

d 3. *δεύτερον*, "second best"; for "best of all" had been implied in the preceding *διαφερόντως*.—*τινες* answers to an English "say."

d 4. *τρίτον δ' αὖ . . . ἐναντίον*: *ὡσαύτως* seems to go with *κατὰ λόγον*, and not to stand for the demonstrative *τοσούτῳ*, which is omitted with *χαλεπώτερον*, as at *Lysis* 206 a *οὐκοῦν ὅσῳ ἄν μεγαλαυχότεροι ὦσιν, δυσαλωτότεροι γίγνονται;* "It would be third best, and so on in proportion—more difficult, the more rulers there were, and *vice versa*."

d 6. *ἀρίστην . . . πόλιν*, "the best kind of state"; an expression more natural in Cleinias's mouth than the more technical *πολιτείαν*.

d 7. *μετὰ . . . γε*, "with the help, of course, of"; for *μετά* thus used cp. 720 d 7, 738 d 7, 791 a 7, 862 d 5.

d 8. *εἰς τοῦτο*: i.e. *εἰς τὴν ἀρίστην πόλιν*.

e 1. *δεύτερον*: not, as above at d 3, "the second best thing," but adverbial—"in the second degree."—I agree with Hermann in thinking that *καὶ τὸ τρίτον ἐκ δημοκρατίας* is not from Plato's hand. (1) *πῶς λέγεις* comes more naturally as the end of Cleinias's speech than as a parenthesis; (2) an indication that the words did not stand in the original is to be found in the *τινος* in e 4, which is a sort of apology for the introduction of a new element into the consideration. (3) *οὐδαμῶς* is too strong a negative for the circumstances; for according to the text the second of the three polities enumerated is the only one that the Athenian alters.

e 3. *πρῶτον*: adverbial, like *δεύτερον* above; "in the highest degree," i.e. "most (easily and quickly)."

e 4. *βασιλικῆς*: it has been explained in Bk. III. that the best form of hereditary kingship is that where, as at Sparta, there were two kings at a time.

e 5. For variety's sake the form of the expression is changed, and *τὸ τέταρτον*, like *δεύτερον* at d 3, is "the fourth best thing."—Burnet does well to put a comma after *ὀλιγαρχία* as well as before it.—*τοῦ τοιούτου* = "the best form of state."

e 6. *πλεῖστοι . . . δυνάσται*: for the leaders of the democracy are not only less numerous, but less secure in their position as *δυνάσται*, than the members of an oligarchical class.

e 7. *δή* is almost "remember."—*ταῦτα* is the *τοῦ τοιούτου* of e 5, i.e. *ἡ ἀρίστη πολιτεία*.

e 8 f. *φύσει* as we should say "providentially." (Wagner takes it closely with *ἀληθής*, but it goes better with *γένηται*).—*κοινῇ*—so Ald. for the MS. *κοινῇ*—goes closely with *πρός* in the next

line: "a kind of force which he shares with the holders of supreme power."—The τις helps to express that the kind of force is unique, and not to be confounded with mere station and dignity—and is against Badham's rather attractive substitution of γνώμη for ῥώμη. (τις would then be "more or less.")

711 a 1. τοῦτο: an extreme instance of the boldness with which Plato uses neuter pronouns. It stands for οἱ ἐν τῇ πόλει μάλιστα δυνάμενοι, "this element."

a 4. πῶς; does not ask for the grounds of the opinion just expressed. It is: "What do you say? I can't take it in." "And yet I have said it often enough," answers the Athenian. "It is because you don't realize what τυραννίς is." "No," says Cl., "and I don't want to either." There is a little impatience in the first part of the Ath's. answer—caused perhaps by the tone of the question at 710 c 1 f.

b 1. "Can't you see that the facility I pointed out is involved in the notion of a despotism?"

b 7. Burnet, by putting commas after ἐπιτηδεύματα and πολίτας, shows that it is unnecessary with Stallb. to supply ἐθελήσῃ with προτρέπεσθαι—the two ἐάν τε clauses being amplificatory to ὅπῃπερ, and divided, to balance the sentence properly, by προτρέπεσθαι τοὺς πολίτας.

b 8. ὑπογράφοντα τῷ πράττειν: "metaphora ab iis repetita qui pueris ductus literarum praescribunt" Stallb., who cps. for the whole passage Claudian's "regis ad exemplum totus componitur orbis" (*De qu. cons. Hon.* 299), and Cic. *Legg.* iii. 14.—The ancients had not formulated the idea of the sovereignty of "public opinion."

c 1. ἐπαινοῦντα and τιμῶντα are, in idea, subordinate to προτρέπεσθαι, but the syntactical construction is of the loose order common in the long and somewhat straggling sentences of the *Laws*—the intervening ὑπογράφοντα being explanatory of πορεύεσθαι.

c 3. καὶ πῶς οἰόμεθα . . .; we should say: "But what makes you think that . . ?" A and O originally wrote οἰώμεθα, but it is corrected by the first hand to οἰόμεθα. Schneider reads καί πως οἰόμεθα, "et putamus fere"; Badham goes still further, and by reading πῶς <οὐκ> οἰόμεθα makes the sentence into an emphatic assent. So does Apelt (p. 7), who would read καὶ πρός (adv.). But the reading of the text best fits the course of the conversation. The emphatic word in the question is ταχύ. The conservative Dorian cannot easily imagine any change of view as *rapid*. The

Athenian contents himself with answering that, at any rate, there is no other way half so rapid as the way he has pointed out; and then—to familiarize his hearers with his views—he states the same thing again in slightly different words.

It seems clear that Plato means to represent his two minor interlocutors as unconvinced at this point. It will be remembered that Socrates's young companions in the *Republic* felt that the *possibility* of ever establishing the ideal constitution was the doubtful point. The *Laws* sketches a less "ideal" state—one which deviates less than that of the *Republic* from ordinary conditions. But in any change a dead weight of prejudice has to be overcome, and a Dorian conservative is a natural mouthpiece for the expression of such a prejudice.

d 1. ἀλλὰ τόδ' ἐστὶ τὸ χαλεπὸν γενέσθαι, "but *here* is where the difficulty lies." For the inf. cp. *Rep.* 521 a ἔστι σοι δυνατὴ γενέσθαι πόλις εὖ οἰκουμένη.

d 2. ὀλίγον . . . ἐν τῷ πολλῷ χρόνῳ, "rare in history."—τὸ γεγονός seems natural enough after γενόμενον ἄν and χαλεπὸν γενέσθαι; Schanz thinks it comes from a later hand than Plato's.

d 6 ff. Cp. *Rep.* 499 b c . . . ἢ τῶν νῦν ἐν δυναστείαις ἢ βασιλείαις ὄντων ὕεσιν ἢ αὐτοῖς ἔκ τινος θείας ἐπιπνοίας ἀληθινῆς φιλοσοφίας ἀληθινὸς ἔρως ἐμπέσῃ.

d 8. κατὰ πλούτων ὑπεροχὰς διαφερούσαις ἢ γενῶν: the genitives are best taken as genitives of *definition*. The "distinction" which gives the authorities a commanding position is one either of wealth, or birth. If, with L. & S., we translate κατ' ὑπ. πλ. as "(distinguished by) excess of wealth," the zeugma involved in the addition of γενῶν is very harsh.

e 1. τὴν Νέστορος . . . φύσιν, and τῇ τοῦ λέγειν ῥώμῃ: the weapon of the demagogue, among other "powers," is to be pressed into the good cause. Naturally it must be wielded by one whose temper is the opposite of the demagogue's. This reference to Nestor takes the place, in the enumeration of "powers," of *democracy*.

e 4. ἐφ' ἡμῶν δὲ οὐδαμῶς: this may well be understood as vouched for—like the ἐπὶ Τροίας γέγονεν—by the common voice (ὥς φασι), not as Plato's own statement. The positive, as well as the negative, view thus expressed is left open by the next sentence beginning εἰ δ' οὖν.

e 5. ἡμῶν MSS. Stallb. rightly argues that ἡμῶν τις in Plato's mouth would not mean "one of the present generation" but "one of the present company," and holds that, as we cannot credit his

modesty with the latter meaning, he must have said ἐφ' ἡμῶν here. I suspect that what Plato wrote was ἡμῖν, and that the scribe's eye was caught by the ἡμῶν in the preceding line.—R. Hackforth, *The Authorship of the Platonic Epistles*, p. 153, surmises that Plato here has in mind the young Hipparinus, the son of Dion. This conjecture, he says, if correct, would fix the date of the composition of Bk. IV. at 354–3 B.C.

e 8. συμπάσης δυνάμεως . . . πέρι : i.e. "whatever the form of the government be," or "in whosesoever hand the supreme power may lie."

e 8 ff. ὅταν . . . συμπέσῃ, "quando aliquo in homine prudentiae et temperantiae conjuncta fuerit potentia summa" (Schneider). The φρονεῖν indicates especially the part which might be played by the ideal lawgiver. (In the very similar passage in *Rep.* 473 d 2 I would suggest that the comma be removed after συμπέσῃ and the difficult τοῦτο be taken adverbially, "in this way": καὶ τοῦτο εἰς ταὐτὸν συμπέσῃ δύναμίς τε πολιτικὴ καὶ φιλοσοφία.)

712 a 3. τῶν τοιούτων : i.e. τῶν ἀρίστων.

a 4. ταῦτα μὲν οὖν . . . μακρῷ : cf. on 736 b 6 below. "Fancy that in this oracular deliverance of mine you have been listening to a *story* when I declare that, whereas in general" (lit. "one way") "it is hard for a city to get good laws, yet, if only things happened as I say, it would be the simplest thing in the world."—καί, I think, does not put a fresh point, but is *explanatory* of κεχρησμῳδήσθω. I have removed the comma between the two imperatives. —καθαπερεί does not, like καθάπερ, go closely with the adjacent noun or adj., but with the verb, i.e. with the whole sentence; here we may translate it "fancy that . . ."—μῦθός τις : cp. 841 c 6. According to Plato, conviction does not follow only from logical proof; the mind may accept truth "embodied in a tale," or delivered as an oracle. Stallb. cps. *Phil.* 44 c, *Polit.* 304 c d.

a 8. The connexion of thought is very hard to trace, but I do not think it is absolutely necessary to suppose a lacuna here, or to accept Susemihl's alteration of πῶς ; to καλῶς. This remedy, as Susemihl himself felt, renders the πειρώμεθα too abrupt, and he was obliged to put in δὴ after that word. πῶς ; does not refer to the three preceding lines, which need no explanation, but to ταῦτα . . . κεχρησμῳδήσθω which does. The Ath. has said, in effect: "a truce to exact arguments, and historical parallels; fancy that what I have laid down is a *story*, told by

the mouth of an oracle." "Why?" says Cleinias. Then, with a natural *explanatory* asyndeton, the Ath. answers: "Because I want to bring your city, Cleinias, into the story, and like three grey-bearded children as we are, to make up its imaginary laws."

b 1. I take it that we must supply μῦθον in thought with προσαρμόττοντες.—λόγῳ—)(ἔργῳ—has also the μῦθος in mind: the laws are not to be real ones; πλάττειν is also chosen as being a word associated with *fiction*.

b 2. The παῖδα of L and O and the earlier edd. must have been written by someone who had in mind the passage at 789 e, where the physical *moulding* of the still "soft" infant is recommended. Stallb. was the first to recall the reading of A on Bekker's and Bast's testimony. He rightly explains the "childishness" of the proposal to lie, not, as Hermann held, in the comparison, suggested by πλάττειν, to children's wax modelling, but in the make-believe that they are real lawgivers. (Herm.'s ref. to 746 a 8—though throwing light on our passage—does not prove his point.)

b 5. Burnet's suggested ἐπακούσας is certainly an improvement on L and O's ὑπακούσας. Cp. Thompson's note on *Gorg.* 487 c 5.

b 8. After the solemn invocation, which seems to promise a real start, comes another digression: on the applicability of the ordinary classification of polities. None of the names—Democracy, Oligarchy, Aristocracy, and Monarchy—seems fully to describe any existing polity, and, what is more, it would be a bad thing for it if they did, for they all denote the preponderance of one element in the state, to the detriment of the others. *Nomarchy* or—since all good laws are inspired by Heaven—*Theocracy* would best denote the perfect πολιτεία. Thus the digression brings us round to the spirit of the Invocation, and the place of *Religion* in the state is defined, and its importance explained.—πολιτείαν: already, at a 2, πολιτεία and νόμοι have been placed side by side as objects of investigation, and although the whole work is styled Νόμοι, as contrasted with the earlier work Πολιτεία, the two subjects are felt to be closely connected. In the present work, however, it is naturally the ἄριστοι νόμοι that are the main subject.

c 2. οἷον δὴ τί λέγεις βουληθείς; "In what sense do you mean your question to be taken?"—The repeated οἷον in the next question would in English be: "Do you mean, is it to be . . . ?"

d 3. οὕτως, "straight off," "on the spur of the moment"; amplified below at e 3 into οὕτω ἐξαίφνης.

d 4. καὶ γὰρ τυραννίδι: the καί reminds us that τυραννίς had

been expressly excluded by Cleinias. Even that element is to be found in the Spartan constitution.

d 5. *θαυμαστὸν ὡς* MSS. As Plato elsewhere says *ἀμήχανον ὅσον, θαυμαστὸν ὅσον*, but *ἀμηχάνως ὡς* and *θαυμαστῶς ὡς*, and the like, Schanz is probably right in reading *θαυμαστῶς* here. *θαυμαστὰ ὡς* occurs in Soph. fr. 963 (Dind.), and in a probably spurious line in Eur. *Iph. Aul.* 943 ; but even supposing this to be natural Greek in Plato's time, it would not legitimize *θαυμαστὸν ὡς*, for *θαυμαστά* is used as an adv., *θαυμαστόν* never.

d 6. *καί τις . . . φαίνεται . . . δημοκρατουμένη ἐοικέναι* : seeing that all the MSS. give *δημοκρατουμένῃ*, it is very tempting to adopt H. Stephanus's alteration of the MS. *καί τις* to *καίτοι*, especially as (1) Heindorf and Cobet disbelieve in *ἔοικεν* (in the sense of *videtur*) with a participle ; and (2) *φαίνεται ἐοικέναι* involves in that case what seems to us an awkward redundancy. It must be recognized on the other hand (1) that, if *καίτοι* had been written, it is almost impossible to explain its alteration to *καί τις*, whereas (2) the alteration of *δημοκρατουμένη* to the dat., in the neighbourhood of *ἐοικέναι*, is readily conceivable. As to the objection taken to *ἔοικε* with a nom. participle, though at *Crat.* 419 c (bis) many editors, including Burnet, have followed Heindorf's suggestion and altered *κεκλημένη ἔοικεν* to *κεκλημένῃ ἔοικεν*, and though, at *Politicus* 277 d, one MS. reads *ἔοικα . . . κινῆσαι* for *ἔοικα . . . κινήσας* (so Burnet), at *Crat.* 408 e all MSS. and all editors read *ἔοικε . . . κατάδηλον γενόμενον ἄν*. The reading in the text was suggested by Winckelmann in his edition of the *Euthydemus* p. 74, and adopted by Stallbaum. Cp. also below 948 b 7 *ἔοικεν . . . διανοούμενος*.—Aristotle, at *Pol.* 1265 b 33, seems to be quoting this passage along with some comments on it. —Immediately afterwards Aristotle refers to the opinion expressed at 693 d as to the desirability of mixing despotism and democracy to form a proper polity ; a subject cognate to our present one.

e 4. I think Madvig is right in reading *ἀνερωτηθείς* for the *ἂν ἐρ.* of the MSS.

e 6. Hermann's *κἀγὼ φαίνομαι* for the MS. *καταφαίνομαι* is attractive, but not necessarily right.

e 7. *ἀπορῶ* is here used as at *Polit.* 262 e for *οὐ δύναμαι*, and with the same construction. There is no need, with Schanz, to suppose that we ought perhaps to read *τίνα . . . εἴπω* (or to suppose *δεῖ* to have fallen out between *τίνα* and *διισχυριζόμενον*).

e 8. For *εἰπεῖν* in the sense of *call, pronounce to be*, cp. *Soph.* 225 a 12 *τί τις . . . ἄλλο εἴπῃ πλὴν ἀμφισβητητικόν ;*

e 9. *ὄντως γάρ κτλ.*, "that is because," with a bow (*ὦ ἄριστοι*), "you really live under constitutions. None of the arrangements we have just named are constitutions. They are city settlements in which one component part rules, and the rest are slaves. The name specifies the ruling part in each case. If you had to name your community on that principle" (lit. "after anything of that kind"), "the right thing was for its name to designate the only real master of rational beings, and that is their God." In other words, "if it was to be a '-cracy,' at all, it must be a 'Theocracy.'"

713 a 3. A has *τὸ τοιούτου*, and Schneider and Schanz are content with this. Stallb. (in his notes) will have nothing but *τὸ τοῦ τοιούτου*, which is in O and some minor MSS. In both cases *τό* would have to be taken to mean *τὸ ὄνομα*, and this assumption is a violent one. L has *εἴπερ τοῦ τοιούτου*—the gen. of that *after which* a thing is named; this is better, but Burnet's *εἴπερ τοὐ τοιούτου* is much better still, and gives just the sense we want. Possibly the reading *τὸ τοῦ* either got in by mistake, from the *τὸ τοῦ δεσπότου* just above, or was a deliberate adaptation to the *τὸ τοῦ ἀληθῶς* below; and A's reading may well have been a correction of that.—Perhaps *χρῆν* and *ἔδει* are "philosophic imperfect," as Adam calls it on *Rep.* 490 a 7, and if so, they should be translated by presents.—I think Ritter (*D. des Inhalts* p. 31, cp. *Comm.* p. 110) puts too much into *τὴν πόλιν* when he translates it "*den Musterstaat.*" *πόλιν* is used loosely in the place of *πολιτείαν.*—L and the margin of O have *ἀληθοῦς* for *ἀληθῶς*—an ecclesiastically minded correction.

a 4. I have no doubt Ast was right in rejecting the *τὸν* which comes in the MSS. before *νοῦν*. Stallb. defends it as meaning (*mentem*) *ad eam rem necessariam.*

a 5. *τίς δ' ὁ θεός;* the question, one may fancy, of a religious partizan. The Athenian avoids answering it directly. As Ritter says (p. 110), the real answer would have been *ὁ νόμος*, but the Cretan was not ripe for such an answer; and there were modifications to be made. *ἐμμελῶς πως* hints that the subject is one which needs careful handling.

a 6. In the *μύθῳ* and the *ἔτι* (if genuine) and the *προσ-* we may see a further reference to the *μυθός τις λεχθείς* at 712 a 4.—Schanz says A has *γέ τι* (for *γ' ἔτι*); at all events at 684 d 1 the *ε* of *γε* is not elided before *ἔτι.*

a 8. Wagner, Schanz, and Burnet are probably right in adopting Schneider's distribution of this difficult passage between ΚΛ.

and ΑΘ. The MSS. give *οὐκοῦν . . . δρᾶν* to the Ath., and *πάνυ μὲν οὖν* to Cleinias. Herm. transposes the two passages, making *οὐκοῦν . . . δρᾶν* (not as a question) the beginning of the Ath.'s next speech. But *πάνυ μὲν οὖν* is not apposite in Cl.'s mouth. He cannot be expected to see at once that a *μῦθος* will help them. But it is likely that he should be rather puzzled by the suggestion, and ask : "Is that the way we have to proceed?"

a 9. *ἔμπροσθε* : i.e. in Bk. III. 678 ff.

b 1. The place of *τούτων* makes it clear to the ear that *πόλεων* is governed by the comparative *προτέρα*.

b 3. It would be interesting to learn the origin of L and O's strange variant of *ἀριστοκρατεῖται* for A's *ἄριστα οἰκεῖται*—which L and O have in the margin.—*ἧς μίμημα ἔχουσα* : cp. Eur. *Hel.* 74 *ὅσον μίμημ' ἔχεις Ἑλένης*.

b 5. Cl. is reassured by this orthodox allusion to the good old times of Cronos's reign.

b 8. *καὶ τὸν ἑξῆς περαίνων ἂν μῦθον*, "yes, and if you tell the story right through . . . " *ὁ ἑξῆς μῦθος*, which, in most connexions, would mean "the next story," here must be taken to mean "the whole story from point to point," not merely some incidents in it. Cp. *Gorg.* 454 c *τοῦ ἑξῆς ἕνεκα περαίνεσθαι τὸν λόγον*, where *ἑξῆς περαίνεσθαι* means "to be brought duly to its conclusion," no step being omitted.—The older edd. give this speech to Megillus. H. Steph. so assigned the previous speech (at b 5) as well.

c 5. *καθάπερ ἡμεῖς διεληλύθαμεν* : i.e. at 691 c 5 ff. *οὐκ ἔστ' . . . ἠφάνισεν αὐτῆς ;*

c 6 ff. *ἱκανὴ . . . διοικοῦσα αὐτοκράτωρ πάντα, μὴ οὐχ ὕβ. τε καὶ ἀδ. μεστοῦσθαι* : the participle is here felt to be the principal verb. It would be hard to find a case of a bare *ἱκανὸς μὴ ποιεῖν* in the sense of "able to avoid doing."

c 8. The MSS. have *ἐφίστητο* : the last syllable of this enormity may here be explained by the assumption that *ἐφίστη τότε*, as Julian quotes it, was the original reading—just as at d 7 A (acc. to Schanz) has *ἐφίστητο τῶν* for *ἐφ. τὸ τῶν*. Hermann first put *τότε* in the text.

d 3. *ποιμνίοις* is, in effect, still under the government of *ἐφίστη*, for which *δρῶμεν* is a substitute. — *οὐ βοῦς κτλ.* : the asyndeton is of the ordinary *explanatory* kind.

d 5. *ταὐτόν*, like *τοῦτο* at 686 c 4, *ταῦτ'* at 700 d 1, *ταὐτόν* at *Phil.* 37 d and *Polit.* 308 e, is adverbial : "in like manner."

d 6. One MS. and some early editions read *ταὐτὸν ἄρα καὶ ὁ*

θεὸς δὴ. This mistake perhaps led, by imperfect correction, to the ἄρα καὶ which the best MSS.—but not Julian—place before φιλάνθρωπος. Assuming, with Hermann and Schanz, that Julian's text was correct, I conjecture (1) that someone wrote ὁ θεὸς ἄρα because of ὁ Κρόνος ἄρα at c 5, (2) that someone else transposed ἄρα and δή—either inadvertently, or on purpose, and (3) that some hasty corrector of this transposition brought along the καὶ as well as the ἄρα.—Schramm ingeniously suggested that ἄρα καὶ stood for ἔδρα καὶ, but such a superfluity of expression is unlikely.—Stallb. first rejected the καὶ (before φιλ.), but afterwards defended both ἄρα and καὶ.—He was very possibly right in rejecting the following τὸ—for which Herm. substitutes τότε as at c 8.

d 7. ῥᾳστώνης: a kind of zeugma; with αὐτοῖς it means "ease," and with ἡμῖν "comfort" or "relief"—as at 779 a.

e 1. With αἰδῶ . . . παρεχόμενον Stallb. well cps. *Prot.* 322 c, where Plato calls αἰδώς (mercy) and δίκη κόσμοι τε καὶ δεσμοὶ φιλίας συναγωγοί.

e 2. After αἰδῶ Julian has καὶ δὴ ἀφθονίαν; A has καὶ εὐνομίαν καὶ ἀφθονίαν. ἐλευθερίαν, a well-vouched variant for εὐνομίαν (L, O and A^2 in margin), looks like a deliberate alteration of Plato's text.—Stallb. thought the alteration due to the mistaken idea that there was a tautology in εὐνομίαν καὶ ἀφθονίαν δίκης.—Inasmuch as Plato afterwards represents *good laws* as taking the place of these divine rulers, it is natural that he should give a hint of this beforehand in mentioning their benignant action in this direction. εὐνομίαν and ἀστασίαστα are the two most important words in this description. They represent severally the two branches of the inquiry which have been kept constantly before us, i.e. νομοθεσία and πολιτεία. The inevitability of στάσις in a false πολιτεία, with the wrong sort of laws, is explained below at 715 a b.

e 3. With λέγει δὴ καὶ νῦν οὗτος ὁ λόγος, **ἀληθείᾳ χρώμενος** begins the *practical* application of the μῦθος. The moral is: (1) that the only possible *ruler* of a community is the Deity, and (2) that *law*, the modern substitute for the δαίμονες of the Golden Age, is also of divine origin.—Julian has ὅσων . . . ἄρχει, and, in e 6, ἀνάψυξις.

714 a 1. τὴν τοῦ νοῦ διανομὴν ἐπονομάζοντας νόμον: whereas, of old, obedience was paid to the Deity in the person of his ministers, the δαίμονες, it is now due to the "*immortal*," i.e. *the divine in us*, and that is *the intellect*, represented in the person of

its ministers. These ministers we may call not δαίμονας but νοῦ διανομάς, "*the arrangements*" or "*appointments made by the intellect*," and to which we give the name of *laws*. For the *divinity* of νοῦς cp. *Rep.* 501 b with Adam's note; also *Tim.* 90 a where he calls the νοῦς a δαίμων. I take τοῦ νοῦ to be not an objective gen. denoting the thing distributed but a subjective gen. denoting the maker of the arrangement, which arrangement is the law. Not only is νόμος connected with the idea of νέμειν, but I think Plato's fancy played with the verbal assonance between δαίμονας and διανομάς. (It will be remembered that at Aesch. *Eum.* 727 the former word got into the text by mistake for the latter.) νοῦς in its highest form—*the trained philosophic intellect*—is thus enthroned as the supreme authority in politics and law.—Cp. Cic. *De legg.* i. § 17; *penitus ex intima philosophia hauriendam iuris disciplinam*, though Cicero's philosophy is not the same as Plato's, when he goes on to say (§ 18) *est ratio summa insita in natura, quae iubet ea quae facienda sunt, prohibetque contraria. Eadem ratio cum est in hominis mente confirmata et confecta, lex est.* When Cicero connects the Gk. νόμος with νέμειν, as being so called "*a suum cuique tribuendo*," he is very possibly thinking of Plato's association here of διανομή with νόμος, but he leaves Plato's τοῦ νοῦ out of sight—Below, at 715 c d, Plato almost in the same breath speaks of magistrates as being ὑπηρέται τοῖς νόμοις, and of their service as being τὴν τῶν θεῶν ὑπηρεσίαν, and calls special attention to the fact that serving the *laws* and serving the *Gods* is the same thing. For the fancied etymological connexion of νοῦς and νόμος cp. below 957 c 6.

a 2. ἄνθρωπος (as contrasted with ἀνήρ) points the distinction between human and divine leadership.

a 3. ἡδονῶν καὶ ἐπιθυμιῶν: a hendiadys = "coveted delights."

a 5. στέγουσαν δὲ οὐδέν: cp. *Gorg.* 493 b ff., *Rep.* 586 b.—If ἁπλήστῳ νοσήματι had been the original text, no one could have thought (*pace* Ast) of putting in κακῷ—or, as Heindorf conjectures, κακῶν—between the two words—as if there could be an ἄπλητον νόσημα which was not κακόν!—but if Pl. wrote ἁπλήστῳ κακῷ συνεχομένην, it is quite conceivable that a commentator should remark that by κακῷ he meant νοσήματι, and that, after the two words had become rivals for the place, both should be included in the text. Hence I feel sure that Herm. is right in rejecting the latter word. Stallb. well cps. *Gorg.* 507 e, where the same selfish indulgence is called ἀνήνυτον κακόν. (Ast doubtfully, and Stallb. confidently, take νοσήματι to be "*per appositionem*

additum" = ὡς νοσήματι. Cp. 717 c below ἀποτίνοντα δανείσματα ἐπιμελείας.)

a 6. πόλεως ἤ τινος ἰδιώτου: this selfish, masterful spirit may be shown either in public or in private life.

a 7. ὃ νυνδὴ ἐλέγομεν: i.e. οὐκ ἔστι σωτηρίας μηχανή is another way of saying οὐκ ἔστιν κακῶν αὐτοῖς οὐδὲ πόνων ἀνάφυξις—some confirmation, as Stallb. says, of the reading ἀνάφυξις.

b 3. A possible objection is here raised—Ritter suggests that it may well have been raised by some contemporary whom Plato is here confuting—that there are laws and laws, that laws are anything that states like to make them, and that law is merely an instrument to secure to the ruler his power and ascendancy, and that the *sanction* of law is merely its adaptability to this end. Those who hold this view make right and wrong *depend on* positive law, instead of judging law by a separate standard of right and wrong (c 3 καὶ τὸν φύσει . . . οὕτω).

b 7. πάλιν: though the following words prove that there is a reference to the early part of their conversation, no doubt Plato was thinking of the constant recurrence in his writings of the great question as to the nature of right and wrong, and the sanction of morality, which had been introduced e.g. in much the same terms in Bk. I. of the *Rep.*—The repetition of τὸ in L and O before ἄδικον is the mark of an inferior text.

b 8. πρὸς πόλεμον: in other words πρὸς ἀνδρείαν. The reference to so recent a conversation is legitimately vague.—The reason why this question is so important (περὶ δὲ τοῦ μεγίστου) is that our opponents not only deny that laws have anything to do with *virtue*, but declare that what we call virtue is only *legality*—i.e. the interest of the stronger.

c 2. Schneider's ταύτῃ ἰδεῖν, for the MS. ταύτηι δεῖν, is a highly illuminating emendation. ταύτῃ is not an adverb, but a dat. governed by σύμφερον; for ἰδεῖν in the sense of "look to," "make it our object," cf. Aesch. *Eum.* 540 κέρδος ἰδών. The tense perhaps signifies habit. (Cp. Goodwin, *M. and T.* § 159.) It was possibly because a pres. would seem more natural to us here that Schanz preferred his palaeographically more remote τηρεῖν for δεῖν. (Stallb. is quite satisfied with the MS. δεῖν, and would supply βλέπειν with it; Herm. strongly supports Schneider's emendation, and Badham appears to have made it independently. Herm. cps. Soph. *Aj.* 1165 σπεῦσον κοίλην κάπετόν τιν' ἰδεῖν τῷδ', where ἰδεῖν means "to provide"; as however ἰδεῖν takes

the place of the preceding *βλέπειν*, the slightly different "look to" suits this passage better.)—We must repeat *δεῖν* with *ἰδεῖν*, "that they have got to have in view the interest of that form of government, and to secure its permanence and integrity."—The *ὅπως* clause is exegetical to *συμφέρον*, and sounds the more natural because it might itself depend on *ἰδεῖν*, if necessary. It is repeated in another form below at d 3.

c 3. *τὸν φύσει ὅρον τοῦ δικαίου*: though at b 6 *τὸ δίκαιον καὶ ἄδικον* may have been meant to include *positively enacted* right and wrong, these words show that the larger question of right and wrong in the abstract, as we should say, is the main subject of the *ἀμφισβήτησις*. "And they say that these words best define justice as it exists in nature," i.e. that outside positively enacted law, right and wrong do not exist.

d 3. "Genitivus *τῆς ἀρχῆς* e voce *συμφέρον* pendet, ut dativus *ἑαυτῷ* pro genitivo positus sit" Ast.—*τοῦ μένειν*, "with a view to its continuance." Cp. 876 e 3 *τοῦ μήποτε βαίνειν ἔξω τῆς δίκης*, *Gorg.* 457 e 5 *τοῦ καταφανὲς γενέσθαι*.

d 6. *ταῦτ'* is taken by Wagner to mean "this course of action," i.e. the punishment of the law-breaker. But clearly *ταῦτ'* is *ταῦτα τὰ τεθέντα*, and "using the term *rightful* for them" is an amplification of *ὡς ἀδικοῦντα*, which gives the justification of the punishment.

d 9. It seems equally clear that here too *ταῦτ'* means "these enactments." Ast and Stallb. take it as adverbial: the former translates it by "*propterea, idcirco*," the latter says it means the same as *οὕτω καὶ ταύτῃ*. The sense which they and all other interpreters appear to get out of the sentence is: "that is how it will always be with justice." But the Ath. could never say that, and it by no means agrees with what precedes and follows. What we want, and what he says, is: "These positive enactments will always claim the merit of rightfulness, and that is how they will do it" (i.e. by penal enforcement).—For *οὕτω καὶ ταύτῃ* cp. 681 d 6.—For the art. with *δίκαιον* cf. 630 d 9, 659 b 3.

d 11. *τοῦτο* is the superior strength of the maker of these laws. They are made by *τὸ κρατοῦν* (above c 9) and *superior strength* was one of the *ἀξιώματα τοῦ τε ἄρχειν καὶ ἄρχεσθαι* of 690 a.—Schultheß's *ἀξιωμάτων* is evidently right; the MS. *ἀδικημάτων* is a careless misreading.

e 3. For *τῶν ἅ* cp. below 871 e 3 and 866 d 7.

e 6. *ἐμπόδια ἕτερα ἑτέροισι*: a repetition of 690 d 3 *καὶ ὅτι πεφυκότα πρὸς ἄλληλα ἐναντίως*. The mention of *ἀξιώματα* as

possible ἐμπόδια is a subtle way of discrediting the particular ἀξίωμα immediately referred to.

715 a 1 f. καὶ ἔφαμέν που . . . ὡς φάναι, "and we said, I think, that Pindar *would have it to be by nature*, (thus) *legalizing extreme violence*, to use his own words." The assertion made at 690 b 8 was that Pindar said that "club-law" was "according to nature." From the fuller quotation at *Gorg.* 484 b, we can see that Pindar used the word ἄγει of the action of that "Law which none can gainsay" (νόμος ὁ πάντων βασιλεύς). Probably it means there "takes" (in the sense of "that those should *take* who have the power"); here Plato uses it in another sense of "takes," suggestive of *forcible wresting of the truth.* So he applies to Pindar himself his own words δικαιῶν τὸ βιαιότατον.—ὡς φάναι: cp. the ὡς φαίνεσθαι in a similar position at *Rep.* 359 d 7; Goodwin, *M. and T.* § 755. "As we are told that he said." (Badham rewrites the passage.)

a 4. ποτέροις τισίν, "to which side"; i.e. to those who hold that νόμος depends on force, and act on this belief, or to those who believe in τὴν τοῦ νόμου ἑκόντων ἀρχὴν ἀλλ' οὐ βίαιον πεφυκυῖαν 690 c 3. As the Athenian puts it towards the end of his next speech, the two classes are (1) those who hold that men are above laws, and (2) those who hold that laws are above men.

a 8 ff. "Where office is a thing to fight for, the winners get the government so absolutely in their own hands as not to leave a scrap of power with the losers, in this generation or the next; and moreover" (τε . . . δέ, cp. 649 b 5) "both sides watch each other constantly, to make sure that no man shall come to power who will raise a hand against them to avenge former wrongs. What I say is, that is not a polity, and no laws are proper laws which are not made in the interest of the whole community. When laws are made in the interest of part of the populace, I call those people not citizens but schismatics, and I call their claim to have right on their side a lie."

For the general sense of the passage cp. 875 a 5–8, and the ἑαυτῇ φίλην of 693 b 3.

a 11. παραφυλάττοντες: i.e. each party, as its turn comes.

b 1. ἀφικόμενος: the participle, as often, contains the main idea in the sentence. The "rising against" the party in power would not be serious unless a position of power had first been obtained.

b 2. ταύτας, "such combinations."

b 4. ἐτέθησαν, like ἐσφετέρισαν at a 9, I take to be a gnomic

aor.—For ὅσοι μὴ συμπάσης κτλ. cp. *Rep.* 420 b οὐ μὴν πρὸς τοῦτο βλέποντες τὴν πόλιν οἰκίζομεν, ὅπως ἔν τι ἡμῖν ἔθνος ἔσται διαφερόντως εὔδαιμον, ἀλλ' ὅπως ὅτι μάλιστα ὅλη ἡ πόλις.

b 5. I do not see that anything is gained by the Aldine στασιωτείας and πολιτείας for the MS. στασιώτας and πολίτας. —Cp. 832 c 2 τούτων γὰρ δὴ πολιτεία μὲν οὐδεμία, στασιωτεῖαι δὲ πᾶσαι λέγοιντ' ἂν ὀρθότατα.—Whether, with Ald., we take τούτους to refer to νόμους, or, with the MSS., to τινων, there is something of a παρὰ προσδοκίαν about the sentence. Again, whether τούτων in b 6 be taken to refer to νόμοι or not, at all events φασιν must have a personal subject, and that with any reading will have to be got out of τινων. Besides, I do not think τούτους in b 5 would have been put in at all unless it were to call attention to the change in the object of the verb, and show that the speaker is now talking of the τινων, not of the νόμους.

b 7. τῇ σῇ πόλει is a genitival dat.

c 1. ἰσχὺν κτλ.: the usual explanatory asyndeton.

c 2. τοῖς τεθεῖσι νόμοις: it is significant that in the *Laws* prominence is given to positive enactment when the author is speaking of the principles on which rulers are to be selected. Cp. *Rep.* 412 d ἐκλεκτέον . . . τοιούτους ἄνδρας οἳ ἂν σκοποῦσιν ἡμῖν μάλιστα φαίνωνται παρὰ πάντα τὸν βίον, ὃ μὲν ἂν τῇ πόλει ἡγήσωνται συμφέρειν, πάσῃ προθυμίᾳ ποιεῖν, ὃ δ' ἂν μή, μηδενὶ τρόπῳ πρᾶξαι ἂν ἐθέλειν.

c 3. νικᾷ: a reference to the οἳ νικήσαντες at a 8; there *is* a victory to be won by prospective rulers; to gain this prize they must excel in submissiveness to the laws.

c 4. τὴν τῶν θεῶν ὑπηρεσίαν: I agree with Ritter that Schulthess's νόμων (so Ast and Schanz), and Orelli's θεσμῶν (so Wagner and Stallb.) for θεῶν are mistaken. There is an un-Platonic poverty of thought in such a statement as: "The man who obeys the laws best is to be made chief servant of the laws." At 762 e we are told that the highest distinction falls to the man who well serves the laws ὡς ταύτην τοῖς θεοῖς οὖσαν δουλείαν. At 713 e we were told that no city is safe under any other rule than the *divine*. Laws are the modern representatives of the δαίμονες of the Golden Age: they derive their authority from the divine element in us; obedience to them is therefore obedience to the Gods. I see nothing to invalidate this explanation in the fact that, immediately below, he says he has called the magistrates ὑπηρέτας τοῖς νόμοις. He has just explained that the two terms "servants of the laws" and "servants of the Gods" are

synonymous. (Bury would read *τεθέντων* for *θεῶν*.)—*δοτέον εἶναι*: Badham says this was put in because it was felt to be confusing to have to wait so long for the *ἀποδοτέον εἶναι* at the end. No doubt; but it is more likely that Plato put it in than Bdh.'s "*librarius*."

c 5. *τῷ τὰ δεύτερα κρατοῦντι*: a reference to the "victory" spoken of at c 3; "to him who bears the second palm," Jowett.

c 6 ff. "But I do not now call men who are entitled *rulers* the *servants* of the laws because I want to say something striking: I believe the safety or ruin of a state depends on whether they are this or not."—Ritter thinks there is an indication here that the expression had been publicly criticized.

d 4. *δεσπότης*: Stallb. cps. Hdt. vii. 104 *ἐλεύθεροι γὰρ ἐόντες οὐ πάντα ἐλεύθεροι εἰσίν· ἔπεστι γάρ σφι δεσπότης νόμος, τὸν ὑποδειμαίνουσι πολλῷ ἔτι μᾶλλον ἢ οἱ σοὶ σέ.*

d 7 ff. Cl. "You are right there! You have an old man's penetrating vision."

Ath. "Yes; men are at their blindest in such matters when they are young, and wide awake when they are old."

Cl. "Very true."

Ath. "What next? May we not imagine the colonists assembled in presence before us, to hear the rest from our lips?"

Cl. "By all means."

Ath. "'Friends,' I would say to them, 'as has been said of old, God, who holds the beginning, the end, and the middle of all existence in his hand, through all the revolutions of nature goes straight to his end.'"

(Possibly an echo from this much quoted passage was in Cowper's mind when he wrote: "God moves in a mysterious way, His wonders to perform."

e 8. *ὁ παλαιὸς λόγος*: the Scholiast on this passage says: *παλαιὸν δὲ λόγον λέγει τὸν Ὀρφικόν, ὃς ἐστιν οὗτος· Ζεὺς ἀρχή, Ζεὺς μέσσα, Διὸς δ' ἐκ πάντα τέτυκται, Ζεὺς πυθμὴν γαίης τε καὶ οὐρανοῦ ἀστερόεντος.* Eusebius, *P.E.* xiii. 12 has preserved another Orphic fragment to the same effect: *ἀρχὴν αὐτὸς ἔχων καὶ μέσσατον ἠδὲ τελευτήν.*

716 a 1. The Scholiast says that *εὐθείᾳ* (which is well established, as against the variant *εὐθεῖαν* in some of the quotations, and the early editions) means *κατὰ δίκην*, and that *περιπορευόμενος* means "moving in a circle," and so *αἰωνίως*—the *circle* being a type of immortality. It is a dark saying; no doubt *εὐθείᾳ* symbolically contains the notion of moral rectitude, but if

it is merely an alternative for κατὰ δίκην, Plato would hardly have added τῷ δὲ ἀεὶ συνέπεται δίκη κτλ. περιπορευόμενος (cp. *Tim.* 33 d ff.) is probably meant to bring before our minds the revolutions of the heavenly bodies. The apparent irreconcilability of the two truths is meant to have the form of a paradox, a divine mystery. In the Aristotelian treatise Περὶ κόσμου 401 b this passage is quoted with πορευόμενος, but all other quotations and all MSS. give the compound verb.—For the numerous quotations of this passage see Stallb.'s note.—περαίνειν is used absolutely; its opposite is οὐδὲν περαίνουσιν *Rep.* 426 a; so περαίνει δ' οὐδὲν ἡ προθυμία Eur. *Phoen.* 589.

a 2 ff. τῷ δὲ ἀεὶ κτλ., "and Justice always goes along with Him and punishes those who forsake the divine law; and any man for whom good fortune is in store follows Justice in close attendance, modest and sedate in mien; but any man who is puffed up with pride—whether he be big with the sense of wealth or rank, or foolishly vain of youthful beauty—and kindles in his soul the flame of wanton wickedness, claiming to be above all rule and guidance, and fit to rule others instead,—such a man is abandoned by God; and in this lost state he takes to himself yet other abandoned men, and with mad antics sets himself to work a general havoc. Many men make a hero of him, but before long Justice visits him with a full retribution, and he involves in his own downfall the utter ruin of his house and country."—τῷ δὲ . . . τιμωρός: Stallb. shows by many quotations from ancient commentators that Plato is still following the Orphic line of thought as expressed e.g. in πάρεδρος γὰρ ὁ νόμος τοῦ Διός, and ἡ δίκη ἐστὶν ὀπαδὸς τοῦ Διός.

a 3. ἧς . . . ἐχόμενος συνέπεται: the repetition of the word συνέπεται suggests the thought that the company of Justice means the company of God, whereas he who abandons Justice καταλείπεται ἔρημος θεοῦ (b 1).

a 4. Because Eusebius has no καί before κεκοσμημένος, and because in A καὶ κεκοσμημένος is written in the margin, Schanz regards κεκ. as a gloss on ταπεινός, and excludes it.—ὁ δέ τις: so all MSS. and some quotations. Theodoret, Cedrenus, and some MSS. of Eusebius have εἴ δέ τις. Plutarch, *De Is. et Os.* p. 477 has a modification rather than a quotation of the passage, which begins εἴ δέ τινες. Boeckh, Ast, Stallb., Herm. and Schanz adopt εἴ δέ τις. It is evident that this suits the passage; καταλείπεται in b 1 is the main verb, and the φλέγεται clause is a dependent one. The explanation of the MS. reading seems to be that Plato is archaizing here on purpose, and uses ὅ τις, the Epic form of

ὅστις (cp. in Agamemnon's solemn appeal to the avengers of perjury at Γ 279 *τίνυσθον ὅτις κ' ἐπίορκον ὀμόσσῃ*—a passage which may well have been in Plato's mind at the time); so that ὃ δέ τις (as it should be written) stands for ἀλλ' ὅστις (or ὅστις δέ, which Badham would write here).—Plutarch further modifies *φλέγεται* into *φλεγόμενοι*, which suits the rest of his passage. (H. Steph. altered *φλέγεται* to *φλεγόμενος*.)

a 5. I think it is best to take ἢ *χρήμασιν . . . ἀνοίᾳ* as subordinate in sense to *ἐξαρθεὶς ὑπὸ μεγαλαυχίας*; they are illustrations of the various forms which *μεγαλαυχία* may take.

b 2. The same idea lurks in the metaphorical *σκιρτᾷ* that is to be found in the modern English slang term "a bounder."

b 3. *ἔδοξεν* and *ἐποίησεν* are gnomic aorists.

b 5. *πρὸς ταῦτ' οὖν οὕτω διατεταγμένα*, "in the face then of this dispensation."

b 6. *δρᾶν ἢ διανοεῖσθαι*: the answer *δεῖ διανοηθῆναι ὡς ἐσόμενον . . .* would correspond more exactly to the question, as Badham would write it, with the ἤ omitted, but the more inexact correspondence is quite Platonic. (Bdh. would also reject *δεῖ διανοηθῆναι* in b 9.) Schanz rejects both ἤ and *διανοεῖσθαι*.

b 8. Madvig (followed by Schanz) would remove the emphatic asyndeton by reading *ὅτι ὡς*. This spoils the sentence; even Heindorf's *δεῖν* for *δεῖ* weakens it.

c 1 ff. *μία κτλ.*, "there is only one, and it finds its only expression in the old saying that like will love like,—if it is itself within the proper bounds; things that know no bounds love neither each other nor those which do. Some men say 'man is the measure of all things'; in a far truer sense it is God who really sets the bounds by which all things human (*ἡμῖν*) are measured and judged."

c 1. The selection of the word *ἀκόλουθος* suggests the same metaphor as was presented by *ἐχόμενος συνέπεται*, and by *τῶν συνακολουθησόντων*. Company in a journey implies unanimity.

c 3. The addition of the words *ὄντι μετρίῳ* shows that the speaker is not so much adapting the old proverb as limiting its scope. It always has been applied freely to the association of the wicked (e.g. *Od.* xvii. 218, and Arist. *N.E.* ix. 3. 3); Plato says the natural liking of each other is *confined to the good*. He uses for good the word *μέτριος*, which suggests "*within certain limits*," and this suggestion helps the further deductions of his argument.—Whereas Aristotle (*l.c.*) warns us of the evil results of loving a bad man—i.e. the becoming like him—Plato holds that not even when

you have become like a bad man can you love him. All wickedness is represented as *ἀμετρία*, "extravagance" or "excess," which must arouse universal dislike. At *Polit.* 284 e, after defining the two criteria of size, i.e. (1) the relative, and (2) the absolute, Plato paraphrases *τὸ μέτριον* by *καὶ τὸ πρέπον, καὶ τὸν καιρόν, καὶ τὸ δεόν, καὶ πάνθ' ὁπόσα εἰς τὸ μέσον ἀπῳκίσθη τῶν ἐσχάτων.*

c 4. *πάντων χρημάτων μέτρον*: "Tangitur effatum illud Protagorae . . . de quo v. Cratyl. 385 e, Theaet. 152 a" Stallb.

c 6. *τοιούτῳ* is equivalent to "the author of limitation," and the following *τοιοῦτον* to "one who puts a limitation on his own conduct and behaviour."—*εἰς δύναμιν ὅτι μάλιστα*: so at 771 e *ὅτι μάλιστα . . . κατὰ τὸ δύνατον, Rep.* 458 e, *Polit.* 279 c *κατὰ δύναμιν ὅτι μάλιστα διὰ βράχεων.* A similar redundancy occurs at *Rep.* 427 e *εἰς δύναμιν πάντι τρόπῳ, Phaedr.* 257 a *εἰς ἡμετέραν δύναμιν ὅτι καλλίστη*, and 273 e *πράττειν τὸ πᾶν εἰς δύναμιν.*

d 1. *ὁ μὲν σώφρων ἡμῶν*: *σωφροσύνη* is the virtue most clearly to be identified with *ἐμμετρία.*

d 3. *καὶ ἄδικος* MSS. There is no point in adding *ἄδικος* to the two preceding predicates, and Burnet has adopted Ritter's insertion of *ὁ* before it. To make it clearer that *καὶ ὁ ἄδικος* and *καὶ τὰ ἄλλ'* stand for the rest of the vices, I have put a comma after *διάφορος* (which, as above at 679 b, means "hostile"). Schanz rejects *καὶ ἄδικος*. Faehse reads *καὶ ἄθεος*, and Stallb. suggested *καὶ ἄφιλος* for it.

d 5. The addition of *ἀληθέστατον* signifies that Plato is not so much gloating over the confusion of the wrongdoers, as expressing delight in the grandeur and beauty of the philosophical truth, and the ennobling of religion above the position which it held in popular notions.

d 6. Burnet rightly adopts Schanz's *ἀεὶ* for the MS. *δεῖ*, which Stallb. rejects and most edd. turn into *δὴ*.

e 2. *τούτων τἀναντία πέφυκεν*: i.e., not only is a knave's offering an abomination (and his selfish prayer an outrage) but it will be the worse for him that he has offered it. Stallb. has collected, in his note on the following words, many similar passages from ancient authors.

717 a 1. For the *τό* with *ὀρθόν* cp. above 714 d 9, and 630 d 9, 659 b and 691 b 11.

a 3. Suidas, in quoting this passage (s.v. *μιαρὰ κεφαλή*), has *εὐκαιρότατος* for the MS. *ἐγκαιρότατος*. Cp. *Phaedo* 78 a (*οὐκ ἔστιν εἰς ὅ τι ἂν εὐκαιρότερον* [v.l. *ἀναγκαιότερον*] *ἀναλίσκοιτε χρήματα*); probably in both places a *profitable* expenditure is being spoken of.

This meaning is perhaps more likely to attach to εὔκαιρος than to ἔγκαιρος. I think we should read the former.

a 4. αὐτοῦ, "which belong to it," i.e. "which would be used to hit it." Stallb. cps. *Phaedr.* 230 d τῆς ἐμῆς ἐξόδου τὸ φάρμακον (so too 274 e μνήμης τε καὶ σοφίας φάρμακον), where the gen. stands for *the advantage secured by* the drug. The meaning is here helped out by the immediately previous gen. with στοχάζεσθαι. Ast says αὐτοῦ depends (only) on ἔφεσις (the aiming *at it*), by "trajectio verborum." This is mere hocus-pocus; standing where it does αὐτοῦ must go with βέλη. (It is conceivable that we ought to supply it again with ἔφεσις, but I think it is better not to do so.—Badham, followed by Schanz, would read αὖ for αὐτοῦ.)

a 5. τοῖς βέλεσι: a genitival dative. Plato is fond of such datives; here there is the special reason for it that a gen. with ἔφεσις commonly denotes the object aimed at. Here it means "the *means of discharge* suitable to the missiles." (Ast takes the dat. to be an instrumental one.)—τὰ ποῖ' ἄν λεγόμενα ὀρθότατα φέροιτ' ἄν; lit. "the called what (missiles and engines) most rightly would be carried?" i.e. "What shall we name as the weapons (most proper) to be carried?" The principal verb is, as often, in the participle.—φέροιτο continues the metaphor of βέλη. —τά, which, in idea, includes ἔφεσις as well as βέλη, does not go closely with ποῖα, which is predicate to λεγόμενα. As, e.g., at *Polit.* 282 e 5 we have λέγομεν εἶναι κάταγμά τι in the sense of "we use the term κάταγμα to denote . . .," so here λεγόμενα, which is equal in effect to λέγοιμεν ἄν, means "what names shall we give to . . .?" Schanz's φερόμενα for λεγόμενα, which simplifies the sentence, impoverishes it, and lays too much stress on the metaphorical φέροιτο.—The same objection holds against Richards's γιγνόμενα and Bury's τεινόμενα, for λεγόμενα.—ὀρθότατα goes with φέροιτο, not with λεγόμενα.

a 6 ff. πρῶτον μέν, . . . νυνδή: this, for us, too succinct account of the various ritual by which the different divinities are to be worshipped presents many difficulties, and has been, in several details, variously interpreted. All editors but Schneider and Burnet adopt the Aldine alteration of the MS. τὰ δὲ in b 1 to τοῖς δὲ. Familiarity with the phrase οἱ ἄνωθεν θεοί led to this change, and those who make it take τοῖς ἔμπροσθεν ῥηθεῖσιν as neuter and governed by ἀντίφωνα. But the passage in Plut. *De Is. et Os.* cited by Ast and Burnet gives unmistakable support to the MS. reading. Plutarch says τὰ δ' ἀντίφωνα τούτων δαίμοσιν ἀποδίδωσιν; both ἄνωθεν and ἀντίφωνα are sometimes found with

gen. in the place of the commoner dat. Light is thrown on the subject by Porphyr. *Vit. Pythag.* p. 197 cited by Ast: *καὶ τοῖς μὲν οὐρανίοις θεοῖς περιττὰ θύειν, τοῖς δὲ χθονίοις ἄρτια.*—Ald.'s other change of the MS. *ἀριστεῖα* to *ἀριστερὰ* is confirmed by O and has been universally adopted. Further, at b 1 Burnet rejects *τὰ περιττά* as a very natural commentator's explanation of *τὰ τούτων ἄνωθεν*, which was enough for Plutarch. With Plutarch the two kinds of offering are, for the higher gods *τὰ δεξιὰ καὶ περιττά*, and for the lower—whom he wrongly calls *δαίμονες*, instead of *χθόνιοι θεοί—τὰ ἀντίφωνα τούτων*: I should like to see a further advance on these lines in the rejection of *καὶ δεύτερα* (in a 8). This seems to me just as likely to be a commentator's addition. It still remains a puzzle why Plato should have so very markedly (*πρῶτον μέν*) put the inferior honours of the second class of deities in the forefront of his enumeration. It looks as if he were condemning a tendency to put the *χθόνιοι θεοί* first.

a 7. *τοὺς τὴν πόλιν ἔχοντας θεούς*: apparently the patron god of the city, even if not one of the "Olympians," was put into the same class with them as far as ritual went.

a 8. *ἄρτια [καὶ δεύτερα] καὶ ἀριστερά*: Ast says *τιμάς* in a 6 is in apposition to these words, Stallb. that these words are in apposition to *τιμάς*. I incline to Ast's view; *ἄρτια κτλ.* are the emphatic words: "As for the honours which, next to the Olympian and city-patron deities, you pay to the gods of the world below, you will be acting correctly if you give *them* the inferior honours, and the former the superior." (Schneider seems to make a fresh sentence begin with *τὰ δὲ τούτων ἄνωθεν*, and to treat *τὰ περιττὰ κτλ.* as its predicate. I do not think *δεξιά* in Plutarch and *ἀριστερά* here are used in the sense of "of good" or "evil omen" (Jowett), but literally, like *ἄρτια* and *περιττά*, the symbolism being in both cases implied.

b 2. Here we have another instance of the redundancy observed above at 716 c 7. It seems unnecessary, with Bdh. and Schanz, to reject *ἔμπροσθεν*; he says "just above" instead of "above." Cp. however 683 e 5, 861 a 8.

b 3. *ὀργιάζοιτ'*: the act. *ὀργιάζω* at *Phaedr.* 250 c, *Laws* 910 c (I think), and in Plutarch, *Numa* ch. 8, means (like *τελεῖν*) *perform, celebrate* (*τελετήν, θυσίας, πομπάς, χορείας*); at *Phaedr.* 252 d and Eur. *Bacch.* 415 it is used absolutely, without an object, in the sense given in Suidas s.v. *ὀργεῶνες· ὀργιάζειν δέ ἐστι τὰ τῶν θεῶν ὄργια τελεῖν.* (So too Photius and Gramm., Bek. *Anecd.* i. p. 287.) Thompson on *Phaedr.* 252 d says "*ὀργιάζειν θεῷ* is the

usual construction," but I have not been able to find any instances of it, unless Ast's *ὀργιάζοι* be adopted here. At b 4 *ἱδρύματα ὀργιαζόμενα* implies a transitive use in the sense of "serve" (a shrine), or "worship" (a statue). In late Greek (Plutarch and Lucian) there are two transitive uses of the word, (1) "worship" (a god), and (2) "initiate" (a worshipper). Schanz follows Ast in reading *ὀργιάζοι*, but in the case of a word with such various uses and constructions we have no right to do this, and a middle *ὀργιάζεσθαι* with a dative of the deity honoured may well take rank among the rest of them.

b 4. *ἑπακολουθοῖ*: this is the reading of all the MSS. but one (Bekker's *v*), which has *ἑπακολουθεῖν* with *-οῖ* over it. The earlier edd. including Ast and Stallb. unwarrantably altered this to *ἑπακολουθεῖ*. Either the author, or a transcriber, thought another *ἄν* unnecessary after that with the immediately preceding verb; it can hardly be an independent wish.—*αὐτοῖς*: it is hard to say whether this is masc. or neut.—*ἱδρύματα*: if *αὐτοῖς* is masc. this would most naturally mean *statues* (as at 931 e. So Schneider); if neuter, "those observances," *ἱδρύματα* would mean *shrines*.—"Next after these deities will come the statues of each man's household gods" (i.e. his dead ancestors) "the worship of whom is to conform to the (public) regulations." Cp. 910 c.

b 6. The form of the sentence is changed; instead of *γονεῖς ζῶντες τιμώμενοι* we have *γονέων τιμαὶ ζώντων*. It is assumed that parents stand to their offspring in a quasi-divine relationship. —*ὡς θέμις* MSS. Ficinus in his translation begins this sentence "*quibus fas est*," and I think Hermann argues rightly that *οἷς* and not *ὡς* ought to stand here. It is more natural to leave out the *ἐστί* with *θέμις* if we have *οἷς*, than if we have *ὡς* in the sense of *nam*; in other words *θέμις*, standing where it does, needs the support of a more emphatic word than *ὡς*.

b 8. Like the Latin *antiquior*, the comp. and sup. of *πρέσβυς* are used of *superior obligations*; there seems to be the same kind of punning use of *πρέσβυς* here that there is in the case of *παλαιός* at c 5.—*νομίζειν δέ*: *δέ* without any clause before it to which it is adversative is here "moreover," as in *καὶ . . . δέ*.—It is easy to supply "he ought" from the preceding *θέμις* (*ἐστί*), though the *οἷς* belongs only to the previous clause. (Ast apparently felt that the *οἷς* ought to be carried on in thought as well, and therefore preferred *ὡς*.)—"He should consider, moreover, that all he has in his possession belongs to those who gave

him birth and nurture, and should make his property minister to his parents' service to the utmost of his power, whether of purse or person, or mind, and thereby repay the debt of cares and pains which they have bestowed upon him—an expenditure made of old for his youthful development, which moreover the son repays to the old when age has brought them to need the repayment sorely."

c 2. Both ἐκείνοις and κατὰ δύναμιν πᾶσαν go with ὑπηρεσίαν, not παρέχειν. For the dat. St. cps. 631 d, 633 c, *Crat.* 437 c, *Parm.* 128 c.

c 3. δεύτερα and τρίτα are governed by παρέχειν: the clause explains that πάντα ἃ κέκτηται καὶ ἔχει includes all powers of body and mind, as well as external property.

c 4. δανείσματα is in apposition to ἐπιμελείας and ὠδῖνας.

c 5. παλαιὰς . . . παλαιοῖς: there seems to be an intentional repetition of this word: the debts are of old standing, and the creditors are old when they are repaid. Under these circumstances the unusual and poetical παλαιός in the sense of *aged* (so at *Tim.* 22 b, and *Symp.* 182 b) does not seem out of place.—There is a further verbal antithesis in the conjunction παλαιὰς ἐπὶ νέοις. νέοις, I think, is neut., and refers to the acquired possessions and powers of which mention has just been made: "loans granted of old on the security of what was young." The *man* who has incurred the debt is all through spoken of in the singular. (Ast translates "pueris mutuos datos," Stallb. "pueris tanquam impensas," Wagner "wegen der Kinder erlitten," Schneider "in parvulis elocatas," Jowett "in the days of his infancy.")—The δέ, which Ast and Apelt object to, seems to present no greater difficulty than that after νομίζειν in b 8, and it has much the same meaning here. (Objecting to this δέ and the unusual sense of παλαιοῖς, Apelt conjectures διπλασίως for δὲ παλαιοῖς; but when a man has been told that *his whole possessions* must go in payment, "twice the debt" seems a limitation. A modern actuary would think "twice the loan" a poor return after thirty years.)

c 7. καὶ ἐσχηκέναι, "and always to have had"; the addition of the perf. expresses the abiding effect of a transgression, even in word, against filial piety.

d 1. There is a similar conceit to those noticed above in the use of πρέσβυς, νέος, and παλαιός, in the juxtaposition of κούφων and βαρυτάτη; cp. 935 a ἐκ λόγων, κούφου πράγματος, ἔργῳ μίσῃ τε καὶ ἔχθραι βαρύταται γίγνονται. Plutarch, quoting Plato

at *De garr.* 505 c, and *De ira cohib.* 456 d, and *Conviv. disp.* 634 f and *De cap. ex in. ut.* 90 c, mixes up the two passages.

d 3 ff. *θυμουμένοις . . . διαφερόντως*, "therefore a son should bow before a parent's anger, even when vented in resentful word or deed, and should make allowance for the special provocation there must be in the (mere) thought that a *son* should have done the wrong."

d 8. *μήτε ὑπεραίροντα . . . ἐτίθεσαν*: Herm., Schneider, the Zür. edd. and Burnet, are the only edd. who have left this passage as it is in the MSS.—barring the alteration of *γεννήτας* to *γεννητὰς*.—Stobaeus has *τὸν εἰθισμένον ὄγκον*: Ficinus, "*consuetam magnitudinem excedere*"—if this was the right reading *ὑπεραίροντα* was used transitively in the sense of *exaggerate*, but it seems best to follow the MSS. and take *ὑπεραίροντα* intransitively in the sense of *exceed*.—The acc. part. supposes *σωφρονέστατα θάπτειν κάλλιστόν ἐστι* to have gone before.

e 1. *ὧν* = *τούτων* (i.e. *τῶν ὄγκων*) *οἷς* (instrumental dat.); so at *Prot.* 361 e 2 *ὧν ἐντυγχάνω* stands for *τούτων οἷς ἐντυγχάνω*, and below at 721 d 4 *τιμῶν ὧν* stands for *τιμῶν αἷς*.—*τίθημι*, as at 947 e and *Menex.* 242 c 2, is used in the sense of "bury." (Ficinus translates "quae maiores genitoribus suis *struebant*."—Apelt would read *ἐτίμησαν* for *ἐτίθεσαν*; the tense is against this.) (Badham, followed by Schanz, reads *τῶν εἰθισμένων ὄγκον*, and *τοῖς γεννηταῖς* —only he did not correct the accent of *γεννήταις*.—Cod. Voss. and H. Steph., followed by Ast and Stallb., put in *εἰς* before *τοὺς*, and Ficinus's translation supports this.) Care, he says, should be taken that family traditions in such matters should be upheld; otherwise the later members of the family would feel themselves slighted.

e 2. *κατ' ἐνιαυτόν* is a quasi-adjectival qualification of *ἐπιμελείας*—attentions paid to them on the anniversary of their death —or possibly of their birth.

e 3 f. *τῷ δὲ μὴ παραλείπειν . . . παρεχόμενον*: we should have expected *μηδέν* instead of *μή*, but apparently *παραλείπειν* is here used, like *ἐκλείπειν*, intransitively, and with a participle agreeing with its subject; cp. *Menex.* 249 b *ἡ πόλις τοὺς τελευτήσαντας τιμῶσα οὐδέποτε ἐκλείπει.*

718 a 3. *νέμοντα*—like *παρεχόμενον*—is subordinate to *παραλείπειν*. "Above all honour them constantly by diligently keeping their memory fresh, and grudging the dead nothing of the proper expenditure which fortune has put it in your power to bestow." Badham reads *τὸ* for *τῷ*, and *τοῦτο* for *τούτῳ*, and follows Stobaeus

and Ast in omitting τε after δαπάνης. Stallb. and Schanz agree in the latter point. This makes a weak conclusion. What the MSS. say is: "Above all, never forget them, and don't grudge a penny you fittingly spend in their honour;" the other is: "Above all show that you never forget them by spending a proper sum in their honour."

a 4. Stobaeus omits the ἄν after ἀξίαν.

a 6. Here ends the imaginary exhortation, and the description of the "armoury" of ceremonies by which the favour of all superior beings is to be propitiated. For the right behaviour towards equals and inferiors we are referred to the laws themselves. —The antecedent which has to be supplied to ἅ is an adverbial acc. ταῦτα, qualifying ἡ διέξοδος . . . τὴν πόλιν . . . μακαρίαν . . . ἀποτελεῖ; "as regards those things." (Schneider takes this ταῦτα to be governed by πείθουσα.) ἅ and ὅσα are themselves governed by ἀποτελοῦντα, which is subordinate to φαιδρυνάμενον, which in its turn is subordinate to κοσμεῖν.

a 7. πρὸς θεῶν, which Ast would reject, means, as Stallb. says, *divinitus constituta*; cp. *Od.* ζ 207 πρὸς γὰρ Διός εἰσιν ἅπαντες ξεῖνοί τε πτωχοί τε.

a 8. καὶ ὁμιλίας stands for a more regular καὶ ὅσας ὁμιλίας —"(what) relations with all of these."

b 1. φαιδρυνάμενον . . . κοσμεῖν: i.e. the fulfilment of these various social obligations will give his life orderliness and charm.

b 2. τῶν νόμων αὐτῶν ἡ διέξοδος ἀποτελεῖ is apparently equivalent to οἱ νόμοι αὐτοὶ διεξελθόντες ἀποτελοῦσι (cp. below 768 d 5). —Ficinus translates "*legum ipsarum tractatio demonstrabit.*" This suggests to Ast that perhaps δείξει καὶ has fallen out after διέξοδος.—As Ritter says, the πείθουσα here does not refer to the prefaces spoken of below. This class of laws requires no preface.

b 7. δοκεῖ μοι . . . ἄρχεσθαι: I agree with Apelt (p. 8) in thinking that it is too much to expect that this can mean "it seems to me *the right thing for him* . . . to begin," and accept his suggestion that δεῖν has fallen out before δεῖγμα.—τούτων πέρι: this I take to be a variety of expression for a simple gen. Cp. on 676 c 6.

c 1. τὰ λοιπὰ πάντα εἰς δύναμιν διεξελθόντα: it will be noticed that the subjects of how to behave to (1) children, (2) relatives, (3) friends, (4) fellow-citizens, and (5) ξένοι are all dealt with in this order below at 729 a–730 a. It seems then that the best explanation of this difficult passage is to suppose it to be a

statement of the author's intention of dealing with these subjects, here (718 a 6 ff.) postponed, later on in the general preface, before coming to the actual legislation about them.

c 4. I think we ought to follow Ast in assigning this question to Cleinias. The Ath. has said that such a discourse must not be *ἐν σχήματι νόμου*; it is natural then that Cl. should ask "what *is* the proper form for it?" If with other editors we take it as a "rhetorical" question and put it in the Athenian's mouth, we are met by the difficulty that in all other such questions as are cited by Stallb.—*Symp.* 178 d, below 720 a 6, 722 d, and 723 b—the verb is in the first person.

c 6 ff. "It is by no means easy to confine its delivery within the bounds of what you may call a single pattern; but let us look at it somehow in this way, and see if we cannot get a definite notion about it."

c 9. *τὸ ποῖον* refers in grammar to *τι* in c 7, but the Ath.'s following disquisition is rather an explanation of *οὑτωσί τινα τρόπον*, which = *οὑτωσί πως*.

c 10. *αὐτούς*: Wagner says, either we must suppose *αὐτούς* to refer to *τοὺς νόμους*, and give *εὐπειθεστάτους* an *active* sense, or take *αὐτούς* to be a scribe's mistake for *ἀστούς*. He is not right, however, in saying that the *people* have not been referred to. At c 1 we had *ἐκείνοις οἷς νομοθετήσει*, and *τῶν νόμων* only came two lines later. That *εὐπειθής* should be act. is very unlikely, as it has recently (715 c 2) occurred in a passive sense.—*ἀστούς* makes good sense, but it would want an article before it.

c 11. *τοῦτο ποιεῖν*, "to produce this result"; i.e. "to incline them," or perhaps "to persuade them towards virtue."

d 2. *τὰ . . . δὴ λεχθέντα*: not, I think, (as the Scholiast) "the speech just delivered"—i.e. that beginning at 715 e 7—but "just what I mentioned"—i.e. at 718 b 5.—*ἔδοξεν* is a "conversational" aorist, which we should translate by a present.

d 4. The first thing to note about this perplexing passage is that the vulgate *λαβόμενα, μᾶλλον δ'* has no MS. authority. In A we have *μᾶλλον * * δ'*, the *δ'* in an erasure, and in both A and O *λαβόμενα* is given in the margin, clearly as an alternative to *μᾶλλον δ'*. Burnet adopts the alternative, and this gives a construction, though a harsh one: *εἰς τό* goes with *ἀκούειν*, and there is a threefold change of "person" within the three clauses; the subj. of *παραίνῃ* is (I think) *ὁ νομοθέτης*, *λαβόμενα* agrees with the antecedent to *περὶ ὧν*; the subject to *ἀκούειν* is the man to whom the *νομοθέτης* is speaking. O. Apelt (p. 8) takes a similar

course in reading *μεταλαβόντα* ("getting hold of"), which he thinks more likely than *λαβόμενα* to have been corrupted into *μᾶλλον δ'*. (This I doubt; *λαβόμ.* might very well have been so written in early cursive as to be read as *μᾶλλον*—*μαιομ*—and the three letters replaced by ***δ'* might well have been *ενα.*)—We may translate: "It seems to me, then, that just the discourse I spoke of would do something towards making a man listen in a civil and even kindly mood to the subject of the lawgiver's exhortations," i.e. the actual enactments, "as they would fall on a mind not altogether unprepared." (Madvig, followed by Schanz, writes *ὠμῇ ψυχῇ, μᾶλλον δ'*, Badham *λαβόμενα μᾶλλον δὲ πραείας, ἡμερώτερόν τε ἅμα ποιεῖν*, Stallb. would insert *περαίνειν* (to go with *εἰς τὸ*) after *παραίνῃ*, Ritter contents himself with altering *τὸ* in d 3 to *τὰ*.)—*ὥστε κτλ.*, "in fact it will be a very welcome result, if he brings his audience, by making them, as I say, more kindly, into a more docile frame of mind, however little he may do in that direction."

d 5. Vermehren is doubtless right in reading *φημὶ* for the MS. *φησὶ*: the repetition of *εὐμενέστερον* is marked, and *ὅπερ φησί* is very otiose.

d 6. Badham's *πάνυ* for the MS. *πᾶν* is right here, I think (the case at 801 b 10 is different).—Cp. 723 a 4 *διὰ τὴν εὐμένειαν εὐμαθέστερον*; in both places it is implied that *goodwill* towards instruction conduces to receptivity, and should precede it. It is just this inclination which the following words describe as wanting. The reason is that heaven has ordained that the "first step" in the road to virtue shall be a hard one. Hence the special need that the benefits to follow on this step should be clearly set forth.

e 2. Both at *Rep.* 364 c d, where the passage (Hes. *Op. et D.* 287 ff.) is quoted, and here, there are variants from our text of Hesiod. For *ὀλίγη μὲν ὁδός* Plato has at *Rep.* 364 *λείη μὲν ὁδός*, and here *ἡ ὁδὸς λεία*, a great improvement, as *ὀλίγη* only says the same things as the following words—which are here paraphrased by *μάλα βραχεῖα οὖσα*. So too is *ἵκηαι* for *ἵκηται*, of which the subject is not clear. Even the *φέρειν* (for *πέλειν*) in v. 292, in the sense of "(easy) to endure," may be correct. The two last variants are not supported, as *λείη* is, by the quotation at Xen. *Mem.* ii. 1. 20. It was a favourite passage with Plato; cp *Prot.* 340 d and *Phaedr.* 272 c.

719 a 5. *αὐτὸ* MSS.; for this Bdh. proposed *αὖ* (and so Schanz). O. Apelt (p. 9) thinks it more likely that *αὖ* should have become

αὐτὸ if τιθέναι followed it rather than θεῖναι, especially as τίθει immediately follows. But I think Burnet is right in leaving αὐτὸ unaltered. τοῦτο would be quite regular: αὐτὸ is slightly anacoluthic; it implies a causal force in the preceding clause, something like "since this is the effect which the previous argument has produced upon me, I should like to lay it before you." αὖ is certainly not wanted.

b 4. Because the first hand of A has not μὲν (before δὴ) Schanz omits it; L and O both have it.—σμικρῷ . . . πρόσθεν: i.e. 656 c.

b 6. ποιεῖν in the technical sense of "utter as poetry"; L and O have λέγειν for it.—οὐ γὰρ ἂν εἰδεῖεν: Ast would remove the ἄν; either, he says, we ought to have εἰδέναι, or—ὅτι being supplied in thought—εἰδεῖεν. But this very passage shows us that there is a third alternative: as in ὡς . . . δεῖ, we may have the tense used by the original speaker; here this was οὐκ ἂν εἰδεῖεν, "they would not *be likely to know*"; οὐ γὰρ εἰδέναι or οὐ γὰρ εἰδεῖεν would be "*because they did not* know."—τί ποτ' ἐναντίον τοῖς νόμοις ἂν λέγοντες: here the part. λέγοντες is the more important verb, "for they would have no idea what of their utterances would be against the law and do harm to the state." This is better than to make τί ποτ' go with βλάπτοιεν ἄν. It is the ignorance of the nature of their own utterances, rather than the ignorance of their effect, which makes the poets dangerous.

b 9 ff. It is a rich piece of Platonic humour which gives the much decried and dangerous poet the task of teaching the νομοθέτης his duty. "We poor poets," he is made to say, "have to suit our words to the chance ideas of our characters; you lawgivers have to be quite sure what is right, and why: if you are not, you have no right to dictate to others."—All through this speech the Ath. is speaking on behalf of the poets (ὑπὲρ τῶν ποιητῶν), and at times he assumes the person of a poet; so at c 1 αὐτῶν ἡμῶν means "by us poets ourselves," and at d 7 ἐγώ means "I, the poet."—The poet, as the master of *the way of saying things*, is the natural adviser of the lawgiver in the matter of the wise and conciliatory *representation* of his laws to the minds of his subjects. Plato shows by his frequent quotations from poets how much he values their power of expression.

c 6. ποιῶν: again used in the technical sense.

d 2. δύο περὶ ἑνός: i.e. δύο λόγους, in explanatory apposition to τοῦτο. Ast rejects τοῦτο in d 1, which Ficinus does not translate.

d 4. νυνδή: the reference is to 717 d 7, where the νομοθέτης had stipulated for a μετρία ταφή.

d 6. *προστάττεις* used of the legislator's constant injunction, *ἐπῄνεσας* "timeless" (aor.) of his arguments in its support.

d 7. *εἰ μὲν γυνή μοι . . . εἴη*, "if one of my characters was a woman of great wealth."

d 8. *ἐν τῷ ποιήματι* : this goes with *εἴη* almost as directly as with *διακελεύοιτο*. Ficinus takes it only with the following *ἐπαινοίην*, and so does the MS. of Stobaeus. Many wrong-headed alterations of *ποιήματι* have been made, e.g. *γράμματι* Ast, *ἐπιστήματι* Winckelmann, *μνήματι* Stallb., *νοσήματι* Haupt, *προσήκοντι μνήματι* Richards, *(τῳ) οἰκήματι* Apelt — by editors who failed to see that the "poet" is speaking here of what his character *in his poem* would say.

e 1. In *ἐπαινοίην* the poet speaks as if it were *he* who expressed the opinions of his characters—while the following *ἐπαινέσαι*, like *διακελεύοιτο*, fixes the responsibility on the *character* in his poem —conscious all the time that the former view is the correct one.

e 3. *τὸν αὐτόν* : this *may* be correct—i.e. *τὸν αὐτὸν τῷ νομοθέτῃ*, "the same kind of tomb that you, the lawgiver, would enjoin" ; but I am much disposed to accept H. Richards's suggestion that we ought to read *τοιοῦτον* here.—The MSS. and that of Stobaeus have *ἐπαινέσοι* ; Bekker was most likely right in reading the now discredited form *ἐπαινέσαι* (cp. 773 c 8). Bdh. proposed *ἐπαινοίη σοι*, which would help to explain *τὸν αὐτόν*.—*νῦν* is evidently used in the sense of *νυνδή*, which Schanz suggests for it.

e 5. I.e. as a *lawgiver* you have no right to use the term *μέτριον* unless you *define* it.

e 7 ff. Having established the fact that the *νομοθέτης* is *able* to recommend the law by argument and persuasion, he now proceeds to explain the best way of doing it. This speech is very conversational in style, but quite clear. Stallb. is right in marking a break, and a fresh start, after *θεραπεύειν*. "I ask then, is our dispenser of laws to put no such preface in the forefront of his ordinances ? Must he say straight off what has to be done or not done, name the penalty attached to transgression, and pass on to the next law without adding to his enactments a single bit of conciliation or persuasion ? Why, just as doctors for instance are in the habit of treating us, one this way, and one that, when we are ill (*ἑκάστοτε*)—just call the two styles to mind, and then we can appeal to the law-maker—just as children would appeal to the doctor to be as nice to them as possible. Give you an instance ? What I mean is, there are doctors and *doctors' men*, who bear the name, you know, of doctors themselves." "They do." "And they

are all so called whether they are free men, or slaves who pick up their skill by listening to their masters' directions and watching their proceedings, learning by rote and not by principle, which is the way the free-born doctors themselves learn, and the way they teach the members of their school. You grant the existence of these two kinds of doctors?" "Certainly."

e 8. For *προαγορεύῃ* O has *-εύει* and A^2 *-εύοι*; in O *-ει* is corrected to *-ῃ* and there is a marginal note saying "all copies have the subjunctive"; in *φράζῃ* and *τρέπηται* both A and O have the subj., which A corrects to opt. and O (in *φράζῃ* only) to the pres. ind. — Ast, not recognizing that the subjunctives are deliberative, reads opt. and puts in *ἄν*.

720 a 1. *τοῖς νομοθετουμένοις*: the expression *ἡ νομοθετουμένη πόλις* at 701 d 8, and still more *τοὺς νῦν νομοθετουμένους* at 857 c 6 prove that the part. here *may* be masc., and denote the people for whom the laws are made (so Jowett), but I think Wagner is right in taking it to be neuter, and to mean "enactments," as at 785 a. The latter meaning fits in with the *προσ-* in *προσδιδῷ* better than the former.

b 2. I believe that all commentators and translators are in error in thinking that Plato admits the possibility of the *empirics* being *free citizens*. From *κατ' ἐπίταξιν* to *δὲ μή* applies solely to *δοῦλοι*; the previous words mean: "Yes, (we call the whole lot "doctors") whether they belong to the free-citizen kind, or the slave kind"— then follows a description of the slave kind. This is also clear from b 4 and b 5, as also below at 857 c d.

b 5. *οὕτω* seems to us pleonastic; it serves to give a unity and emphasis to the part of the sentence containing *μεμαθήκασι* and *διδάσκουσι*. The course of *learning* and *teaching* systematically (*κατὰ φύσιν*) in medical schools is opposed to the random picking up by their slave assistants of bits of doctors' skill.—With *τοὺς αὑτῶν παῖδας* Stallb. cps. *οἱ ζωγράφων παῖδες* 769 b 1. Cp. *Rep.* 408 b 6 *πάνυ κομψούς, ἔφη, λέγεις Ἀσκληπιοῦ παῖδας*, "quite philosophic practitioners you make them out to be!" where there is a slight pun, as Machaon was really Asclepius's son, L. & S. s.v. I. 3 and the biblical phrase "the sons of the prophets."

c 2. *καί*: we should say "or."

c 3, 4. Schanz says one *ἑκάστου* must go. But if the second be omitted the sentence runs awkwardly: if the first was not originally there, who would think of putting it in? *ἑκάστου τῶν οἰκετῶν* bears a very relevant sense. The slaves were not treated as individuals, but in the lump.

c 5. *οὐδ' ἀποδέχεται* : i.e. he would cut his patient very short if he showed a disposition to explain his case or to ask for an explanation.

c 7. I cannot but think that Plato wrote *αὐθάδης* here, and that some early scribe wrote *-ῶς* because he had so recently had three consecutive words ending in *-ως*. If the MS. text be retained, it might be as well to put a comma after *τύραννος*, to show that *αὐθαδῶς* goes with *προστάξας*. "He writes him a second-hand prescription, with a cock-sure air, issuing his orders like a tyrant whose will is law, and then rushes off to the next slave-patient." (*αὐθαδῶς* will hardly bear the meaning "with the absolute air of a tyrant"; Jowett takes *αὐθ.* with *οἴχεται*—"rushes off with equal assurance.")

c 8. *καὶ ῥᾳστώνην κτλ.*, "and by so doing lightens his master's professional labours"—i.e. by relieving him of his slave-patients. (Jowett unaccountably translates: "and so relieves the master of the house of the care of his invalid slaves.")

d 1. *ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πλεῖστον* leaves it open to us to suppose that a physician now and then treated the case of a slave.

d 3. *ἐξετάζων ἀπ' ἀρχῆς καὶ κατὰ φύσιν* : terms which suggest a philosophical, systematic investigation; for the latter cp. above b 4.—*τῷ κάμνοντι κοινούμενος κτλ.*, "taking the patient, and his friends as well, into his confidence."

d 5. *τῶν νοσούντων* : a curious change of number.

d 6. *ἐπέταξεν* : gnomic aor.

d 7. For *μετά* "by the help of" cp. *Rep.* 560 d *ὑπερορίζουσι . . . μετὰ πολλῶν καὶ ἀνωφελῶν ἐπιθυμιῶν*, and cp. *Theaet.* 180 c 8 and above 710 d 7, 738 d 7, 791 a 7.

e 1. *ἀποτελεῖν* seems by all interpreters to have been taken absolutely, in the sense of "make (him) whole," or "complete (the cure)." I do not believe this use to have been possible. The analogy of 767 a 9 *ᾗπερ ἂν κρίνων τὴν δίκην ἀποτελῇ* suggests that *ἀποτελεῖν* could be used with a participle in the sense of "*finish doing, succeed in doing*"; I would therefore remove the comma which all texts insert before *ἀποτελεῖν*—"does his best to restore him to complete health"—lit. "to succeed in bringing him to health."

e 2 f. *τε . . . καὶ γυμναστὴς γυμνάζων* : the suggestion of another analogy, which the reader is left to work out for himself.

e 3. *διχῇ . . . ἀπεργαζόμενος;* "(would you prefer that he should) perform his one function in two methods, or confine himself to the worse method of the two, and make his patient hate him?"

e 11 ff. ἆρ' οὐ . . . τάξεσιν; Badham, in rewriting this sentence—from τὴν to τάξεσιν—changes half the words and puts in two fresh ones. Ritter also would rewrite it, though less drastically; leaving us the alternative of keeping the MS. text, if we will supply, in thought, τάξιν with τήν. None of these courses are necessary if we recognize (1) that πρώτην is not the attribute of ἀρχήν, but, like the πρῶτον in the previous sentence, the πρῶτοι below at a 6, and the πρῶτον at a 9, is *predicative*, and goes with the verb; and (2) that περί *c. gen.* is, as Ast says on 676 c 6, "*genitivi circumlocutio.*" "Will it not be natural that he should first regulate by his ordinances the first stage of production in civic communities?"—τὴν περὶ γενέσεως ἀρχὴν πρώτην πόλεων πέρι is expressed in the next speech of the Ath. as ἀρχὴ τῶν γενέσεων πάσαις πόλεσι—the dat. being another "circumlocution" for the gen.

721 a 6. "We may conclude then that in every state, if it is to be well regulated, legislation should begin with the subject of marriage."

b 1. τριάκοντα: the chief point emphasized in the specimen preface which follows at b 6 is the necessity that by *thirty-five* every man should have taken to himself a wife. Where the marriage-law occurs in its place among the other laws (772 e ff.), the chief point dwelt on in the preface is the need of circumspection, on the part of the man, in choosing the family to which he is to ally himself. In neither case is any fear expressed that marriage may take place too *early*. Thus it will not be felt to be a very important inconsistency that, although here, and at 785 b, he names 30 as the earliest age at which a man should marry, at 772 e he would allow a young man to begin to consider the question at 25. There is a similar inconsistency between *Rep.* 460 e, where the time when a woman's child-bearing is to begin is fixed at 20, and *Laws* 785 b, where he allows a girl to be married as early as 16.—Thirty was the usual age for a man to marry according to Greek ideas, though Aristotle advised him to wait till 37 (*Pol.* 1335 a 29).

b 3. The reading in the text is that of L and O; A has τῇδε καὶ τῇδε; Ast read τῇδε δὲ καὶ τῇδε, Heindorf, followed by Schanz, τῇ δὲ καὶ τῇ. This last may seem to us more natural, but the very peculiarity of L and O's reading marks it as genuine. It was likely to be corrected, and is quite unlike a correction of anything else.

b 8. Schanz holds that φύσει τινί is spurious, being originally

a commentator's explanation of ἔστιν ᾗ; but the two phrases do not mean the same thing: "There is a sense in which mankind is by nature partaker of immortality," i.e. "Mankind enjoys by its nature a kind of immortality."

c 1. πᾶσαν, "of every kind," a not unusual use of πᾶς; cp. 723 d 1.—The kind spoken of in the *Phaedo* is for the time left out of sight. *One* of the kinds of this desire is, he goes on to say, the wish to know that one's *name* will not be unheard after one's death. A desire for fame is thus seen to be a kind of desire for immortality. A further motive is adduced at 773 e (where the thought of this passage recurs), i.e. the individual's part in the service of heaven does not lapse, if he leaves children to represent him.

c 2. γένος οὖν ἀνθρώπων: Plato speaks of mankind as if the race had a sort of collective consciousness of the possibilities open to it, and as if it had what in an individual we should call an instinctive desire to prolong its existence. There is a sense in which every parent of a living child shares in the race's immortality. Cp. *Symp.* 206 c 6 and e 8, 207 d 1, 208 b 5, Aristotle, *De anima* 415 a 26 ff.

c 3. τι συμφυὲς τοῦ παντὸς χρόνου: a marvellous phrase, in which the unusual gen. suggests a specially close relationship between *time* and the *human race*; some such a relationship we may fancy to have been in Plato's mind as that between *space* and the *material world* unfolded in the *Timaeus*.—Cp. also *Tim.* 37 d–38 b, where Time is called "a moving image of eternity that abides in unity."

c 6. γενέσει: an instrumental dat. Reproduction is the means by the help of which the race secures the blessing of immortality. (Schneider's "ortu" is insufficient.)—"So the race of man is time's coeval twin, bound to it in a fellowship which will never be dissolved. The fashion of mankind's lasting is this: it attains to immortality by a reproduction of itself; for, as generation succeeds to generation, the race is one and the same throughout the ages. From this succession it is impious for any man to cut himself off, and that is what that man deliberately does who neglects to surround himself with wife and children."

d 4. A good instance of καὶ . . . δέ, "and besides," "and moreover." A omitted the καί at first writing, L and O have it.

d 5. ἐν τῇ πόλει, "in public."

d 8. αὐτούς: i.e. laws (in general).—οὕτω is explained by the following διὰ τὸ πείθειν κτλ.

e 1. τὸ σμικρότατον, "at the very least," qualifies διπλοῦς. Ast and Stallb., by putting a comma after γίγνεσθαι, obscure the fact that τῷ μήκει also goes with διπλοῦς. (Schanz would reject τῷ μήκει τὸ σμικρότατον, and others would emend it.) The added τοῖς μήκεσιν rounds off the sentence and helps to show how τῷ μήκει is to be taken.

e 5. γράμματα is here used in the sense of *statutes*, written laws; so below 823 a 1, 858 e 4, 922 a 4, *Polit.* 302 e 10.

e 7. μοι seems best taken as an ethic dative.

722 a 1. εἰ γίγνοιτο ἑκάτερα: apparently "if both sorts were in existence," i.e. "were possible." διδοῖτο would seem the natural verb here.

a 2. All the early MSS. wrote ἐροίμην for αἱροίμην.—οὐ μὴν ἀλλά κτλ.: i.e. "after all, what is important is that Cleinias here should approve of the legislation now produced; for it is *his* city that is now contemplating the task of putting such laws into practice."

a 4. τοῖς τοιούτοις νόμοις, "*such laws as we make*," not "such laws as you have described as preferable."—I cannot help thinking that νόμοις ought not to be in the text. It is not "*laws of such a kind*" that the new Colony was *thinking of* profiting by, but merely *laws* of some kind or other. This Megillus would naturally denote by τοιούτοις, i.e. γεγραμμένοις, τεθεμένοις νόμοις, "legislation." Some commentator perhaps put in νόμοις at the side to explain τοιούτοις, and it got into the text by mistake.

a 6. These words, I think, not only convey Cleinias's thanks, but his approval of Megillus's choice of the longer form of law. "You are right, Megillus, and I thank you." Cp. 723 c 1 καλῶς . . . δοκεῖς μοι τό γε τοσοῦτον λέγειν.

a 7. γραμμάτων: not, as Ast, *Lex.*, in the same sense as above at e 5, but simply in that of "written matter." It is "too foolish" to "take account of" the mere length of a law—"length," says the parenthesis, "is in itself neither a vice nor a virtue."

b 1. τὰ δ' κτλ.: this δέ corresponds to the μέν in a 7. τά here, though not in the previous parenthesis, should, I think, have γράμματα supplied in thought. The written matter of the longer of the two kinds of laws, which was to be "at least twice as long" as the shorter one, is of *more* than twice its practical utility. In fact the case is analogous to that of the two kinds of physician above mentioned. In that case the superiority of the better one was "great" (720 e 6).

b 2. διάφορα εἰς ἀρετὴν τῆς χρείας (cp. 969 c 3 πρὸς ἀρετὴν

σωτηρίας), lit. (*pace* Ritter) "superior in the matter of the excellence of their usefulness." Cp. *Gorg.* 480 a 1 τίς ἡ μεγάλη χρεία ἐστὶ τῆς ῥητορικῆς; (Ritter says it means: "the one class exceeds in excellence by more than twice the usefulness of the other class"—a very roundabout way of saying that one class was more than three times as useful as the other.)

b 4. πρὸς τοῦτο δέ, "yet in the face of this," "yet for all this"; so L and O. πρὸς τούτῳ, the reading of A and the margin of L and O, is out of place; what follows is in no sense *an additional point.*

b 5. ἐξόν: the participle contains the main idea of the sentence. It does not seem ever to have occurred to any of the lawgivers that, all the time during which they have been employing nothing but force, *there was another course open to them*; i.e. "as far as the uneducated state of the masses would permit," they might use *persuasion.* (Wagner must be wrong in taking the καθ' ὅσον clause with what follows.)

c 1. I am inclined to adopt Ast's emendation of ἀνάγκην for the MS. μάχην; if the initial α were faint, μ might easily be read as μ, and αγκ be read as αχ. The only defence of the MS. reading that seems possible is the assumption that πειθοῖ κεραννύντες μάχην is a poetical quotation. Bdh. and Stallb. suggest ἀρχὴν, and this Schanz adopts.

c 6. νῦν: I do not feel sure about Schanz's alteration of the MS. νῦν to νυνδὴ. The following δι- may well have helped a -δὴ to disappear, but νῦν is not out of place. The reference is not to any *recent part* of the discussion about laws, but to the *whole* discussion. In English we should say "to-day," or "on the present occasion," not "just now" in such a case. Cp. below e 4 ἡ νῦν διατριβὴ γεγονυῖα.—κατὰ θεόν τινα: Porson (on Eur. *I.A.* 411, *Adversaria* p. 251) pointed out that θεῶν τις and not θεός τις was usual in tragedy, but it is not so in Plato. For the phrase κατὰ θεόν cp. above 682 e 10, where it is also used of a felicitous turn of the conversation.

c 7. γεγονός is not (as Jowett) "which comes into my mind," but "which has been brought out,—emerged." The three old men have talked through four books before making any laws. This means (e 5) that, before making a law, we must be clear about the principles on which it is to be made. The further analogy of musical νόμοι, which has been before us already, suggests that some *science* (ἔντεχνον d 5) must go to the fitting of the *prelude* to the *piece* proper. The *style* and *tone* of the prelude

to one law is as different from that to another as the two styles of the two physicians described above.—σχεδὸν γὰρ . . . ἄρχεσθαι, "since the time when we began our discussion about laws, dawn has passed to noon, and here we are in this delightful resting-place, (still) uninterruptedly (οὐδὲν ἀλλ' ἤ) discussing laws, and yet it is only just now, I believe, that we have begun to mention any laws."

c 8. ἐξ ἐωθινοῦ is not, as Stallb. says, epexegetic of ἐξ ὅσου; it is literally "from (being) early morning (it has turned to noon)."

c 9. οὐδὲν ἀλλ' ἤ: Schanz says A has ἄλλ'. Even e.g. at *Phaedo* 76 a 6, and *Soph.* 226 a 1, where most editors read ἄλλ' ἤ, Burnet reads ἀλλ' ἤ.

d 3. If, with Ast, we were to transpose πάντων and καὶ, it would make the construction much more straightforward, but it would leave out of sight the fact that λόγοι, like ποιήματα, are of various kinds—epideictic, forensic, etc. We may repeat the πάντων in thought before ὅσων.

d 4. σχεδὸν οἷόν τινες ἀνακινήσεις: Stallb. thinks that these words mean "what you may call stirrings-up of the audience," but the οἷον points to a more special metaphor and it is better, with Ast and L. & S., to translate "a kind of preliminary *sparring*" (a metaphor from pugilistic encounters). The point about the προοίμια on which Plato enlarges here is that they are designed to bring the audience into the required frame of mind, and so secure a welcome for the law which is to follow; and he says this definitely in the following words ἔχουσαι κτλ.

d 5. ἔχουσαι . . . περαίνεσθαι, "bringing to bear a systematic method of procedure, auxiliary to the ensuing performance." ἔντεχνον ἐπιχ.: lit. "a way of setting to work according to the rules of the art."—Adam on *Rep.* 532 a 3 notes that περαίνειν is the regular word for "to perform," specially of music. Here it is used of other "performances" as well.

d 6. The analogy is here extended from λόγοι and ποιήματα to the realm of music, and again, as above at 700 b (and below at 799 e) Plato takes advantage of the musical use of the word νόμοι to illustrate his point. Cp. Ar. *Rhet.* 1414 b 19 ὅπερ ἐν ποιήσει πρόλογος καὶ ἐν αὐλήσει προαύλιον. The whole chapter is illustrative of our present passage.

d 7. πάσης μούσης, "all kinds of musical compositions"—i.e. not νόμοι only.

e 2. οὔτ' εἶπέ τι . . . φῶς, "has either named such a thing as

a *προοίμιον*, or taken the trouble to compose and produce one." *συνθέτης* implies *careful composition*. For *ἐξήνεγκεν εἰς τὸ φῶς* see below on 781 a 1.

e 4. *ἡ νῦν διατριβὴ . . . σημαίνει*: see above on c 6 f.

e 5. At e 3 Cod. Voss. has *ὄν* for *ὄντος* and so Bdh. conjectured here. The construction of *ὡς ὄντος* is, as Ast says, precisely similar to that noticed on 624 a 7. The adoption of this construction heightens the force of the contradiction of *ὡς οὐκ ὄντος φύσει* at e 3.—Bdh. would reject *γε* and Schanz follows him.

e 6. With *εἶναι* we must supply *δοκοῦσι* from *ὡς ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ* at e 4.—*οὐκ . . . διπλοῖ*: i.e. it is not the same thing twice over.

e 7. *ὃ δὴ . . . τοῦτ' εἶναι*: the asyndeton is of the explanatory kind.

e 8. *ἀπεικασθὲν ἐρρήθη*: the participle contains the more important verb; "whose pronouncement was likened . . ."

723 a 1. *εἶναι* still depends on the imaginary *δοκοῦσι* supplied at e 6.

a 2. *ὑπὸ τοῦδε*: as Ritter says, this in the *Laws* would naturally mean "by that one of the two Dorians who had not spoken last," i.e. in this case "by Megillus." M. has nowhere called the *προοίμιον πειστικόν*. Perhaps the best way out of the difficulty is to suppose an imperfect recollection on Plato's part of what had been the actual terms of Megillus's declaration (at 721 e 4 ff.) of a preference for the law *plus* the preface. Schanz suspects the words. Ast would take them to mean "on that account," *propterea*.—Ritter mentions the possibility of taking *τοῦδε* to refer to the speaker himself, as at *Laches* 180 d 7, but follows Schanz in rejecting the words. Apelt, *Eis. Prog.* 1901, suggests *ἀπὸ τοῦδε*, "henceforward."

a 3. *μήν* is a strong *δέ* to the previous *μέν*.—*περὶ λόγους* (at which Ritter stumbles) is "rhetorical"; i.e. by the rules of art it is as necessary for a *law* to have a *προοίμιον* as it is for a speech (of any kind) to have one.

a 4 f. *ἵνα . . . εὐμενῶς . . . δέξηται*: again the function of the *προοίμιον* is insisted on. It is to produce a *receptive* frame of mind in the hearer. This is what it does in rhetoric, in poetry, and in music; and we must recognize that in a law too the *προοίμιον* is not *merely* persuasive. It has an artistic, or stylistic function; it strikes the key-note (as Aristotle says of the rhetorical *προοίμιον*, at *Rhet.* 1414 b 25) of what is to follow. The addition of this "artistic" aid is the *τρίτον γίγνεσθαι δέον* of 722 c 2.

a 5. *ἐπίταξιν*, like *ἐπίταγμα*, is a natural word for a doctor's

prescription, which corresponds to the *law* proper. The neuter ὅ is quite natural here; there is no need for Bdh.'s οὗ.

a 6. κατεφάνη and εἶπεν are not gnomic aorists, but refer to the model προοίμιον given at 721 b ff. It is possible though that κατεφάνη is used colloquially of a discovery recently made: "I see that . . ." Cp. 718 d 2 and ὁρῶ at 722 c 3, and c 6.

b 1. λόγος is here, and below at c 4, used in the sense of "text" or "body" of the law, as opposed to introductory matter.

b 2. For the εἶναι with προσαγορεύειν cp. *Phil.* 13 b 5 and *Prot.* 325 a 2.

b 3 f. ὡς τὸν νομοθέτην . . . διηνεγκάτην: in interpreting this difficult and awkward sentence we must start from the contrasted πρὸ πάντων τῶν νόμων and καθ' ἕκαστον. Apparently there is to be a *general* introduction to the body of laws as a whole, and separate preambles, which are to be prefixed to individual laws, "in which way," i.e. "in virtue of which they will surpass their former selves as much as the double law above given surpassed its former self" (i.e. the so-called *simple*, and *double* laws of 721 b ff.). The awkwardness arises from the fact that μὴ ἀμοίρους αὐτοὺς προοιμίων ποιεῖν, which would suit both cases, comes after the injunction to supply a general preamble to the whole. This difficulty would be removed if καὶ καθ' ἕκαστον had immediately followed χρεών ἐστιν. But on the other hand there seems a fitness in putting καθ' ἕκαστον immediately before ᾗ διοίσουσιν ἑαυτῶν. A revision on the part of the author would doubtless have removed the awkwardness, but *not* as Stallb. suggests, by substituting προοίμια παρατιθέναι for μὴ ἀμ. αὐτ. πρ. ποιεῖν.

b 7. With τό γ' ἐμόν for ἐγώ cp. τὰ ὑμέτερα for ὑμεῖς at 643 a 2, and τὸ ἡμέτερον for ἡμεῖς at 778 e 1.

c 1. "So far, Cleinias, I think you are right, when you admit that all laws have preambles belonging to them, and that when beginning any piece of legislation one ought to put at the head of each law the preamble that suits the whole text of the law—for it is no unimportant pronouncement that is to follow, and it will make a great difference whether or not the laws are distinctly retained in the memory—still we should not be right in laying it down that a preface is as necessary for what we call small laws as for great ones. You ought not to make such a rule in the case of all kinds of songs or speeches either—and yet there *is* a natural preface to them all, but you need not use all the prefaces. No;

you must leave it to the orator, or the musician, or the lawgiver, to deal with each case as he thinks fit."

c 2. Cleinias may perhaps have been surprised to find his expression of agreement expanded into what follows, but it is nothing but a repetition of some points in the Ath.'s last speech.

c 3. *προτιθέναι . . . ἑκάστοις*: there is much difficulty here. L. & S., Schneider, and Wagner take *π. τ. λόγ.* with *προτιθέναι*, and *ἑκάστοις* with *πεφυκός* ("*conveniens natura singulis prooemium*," "*den für die einzelnen geeigneten Eingang*"). This must be wrong. Whenever *προτιθέναι* means prefix A to B, B is in the dat.; besides, what sense does it make to say that when a man starts to legislate, he must put at the head of the whole body of law "the preamble that suits the separate individuals"? At least we ought to have had *προοίμια*. Clearly *προτιθέναι* goes with *ἑκάστοις*, and *παντὸς . . . προοίμιον* means "the proper preamble belonging to the whole *text*"—*λόγος* used as at b 1.—*παντὸς τοῦ λόγου* suggests a *long* law, and this prepares us for the statement that in the case of slight enactments the preamble may be omitted. (F.H.D. would reject *τοῦ*.)—Ast and Stallb. are doubtless right in taking *ἀρχόμενον* as agreeing with *τινά* understood. (Jowett apparently takes it as neut. agreeing with *προοίμιον*.)

c 5. *σαφῶς . . . μνημονεύεσθαι* recalls the *εὐμαθέστερον* of a 5; *μνη.* (pass.) does not mean "to be recorded" (Ast, *Lex.*) but "to be remembered."

c 6. *αὐτά*: the plural of what was just spoken of as *τὸ ῥηθησόμενον*, i.e. the laws.

c 7. *λεγομένων*: almost "so-called."—*ὁμοίως*: the context (*καίτοι . . . ἅπασιν*) shows that this word does not mean "to an equal extent" or "(by preambles) of equal length," but "equally," "invariably."

d 1. *τὸ τοιοῦτον δρᾶν*: not "to make such a rule," but "to do such a thing" (as to make prologues). The genitives *ᾄσματος* and *λόγου* suppose some such construction as *προοίμια ποιεῖν*, for which this is a substitute. The anacoluthon is as harsh as that noticed at b 5. H. Steph. held that *ἐπὶ* had fallen out before *ᾄσματος*, and Ast and Stallb. agreed with him. (Cp. Riddell, *Dig.* § 17.)

d 6. *τῆς μελλήσεως* is a gen. of *definition*; "let us make no more hesitating delay, but let us retrace our steps and start, if you do not mind, from those things you said above when you were not avowedly prologizing. Let us hope, as they say at

games, to have 'better luck next time' (with our second attempt), and go over the ground again, conscious that we are no longer arguing on chance lines, but preludizing in due form; let us, I say, start on our subject with an avowed preamble."

d 7. *ἀπ' ἐκείνων*: i.e. the speech begun at 715 e 7.

e 1. *δευτέρων ἀμεινόνων· παροιμία λεγομένη μὲν ἐπὶ τῶν θυομένων ἐκ δευτέρου, τῶν προτέρων ἀπαισίων ὀφθέντων δηλαδή· μετῆκται δὲ ἐκ τούτων καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν λεγομένων δεύτερον τῶν αὐτῶν, ὁπόταν μὴ κατὰ γνώμην ἡμετέραν προβῇ τὰ πρότερα.* The Scholiast ignores Plato's application of the phrase to what we should call the "second shot" in a game.

e 4. *τὰ μὲν περί*, "as regards."

e 5. *καὶ τὰ νυνδὴ λεχθέντα*, "just what you said above."—*τὰ δ' ἑξῆς*: i.e. finish the preface so as to include admonition on the subjects cognate to the religious duties enumerated above; not, to finish a preface which is to stand before *all* the laws which are to be made on different subjects. The procedure followed in the rest of the treatise is to divide laws into chapters, according to subject, each chapter having a preface prefixed. The Ath. recalls Cleinias's request at 772 e 3.

724 a 1. *τῶν μετὰ θεούς*: cp. 717 b 2 *μετὰ θεοὺς δὲ τούσδε καὶ τοῖς δαίμοσιν ὅ γε ἔμφρων ὀργιάζοιτ' ἄν, ἥρωσιν δὲ μετὰ τούτους.*

a 3. *ὡς νῦν λέγομεν* refers, I think, to *ἱκανῶς*, not (as Schneider and Wagner, apparently) to the use of the term *προοιμιάζεσθαι*; in other words, "we will all agree" to let that count as a sufficient preface.

a 4. *τοῦ τοιούτου*: i.e. of such a preface. —*πρὸς τὸ φῶς ἐπανάγειν*: used naturally of something that has been left in obscurity, and here the obscurity is suggested by *ἀπολειπόμενον*. —*πρὸς τὸ φῶς, εἰς τὸ φῶς, εἰς φῶς ἐξενεγκεῖν* is used much like our "bring to light," in the sense of "produce," "expose."—The *οἷον* here betrays a sense that it was still a metaphor.

a 7 ff. After *religion* comes the subject of *education* or the *moulding of the disposition*. Both the lawgiver and his "public" must master this subject by "ruminating on the measure and limits of the energy to be devoted by men to the interests of their souls, of their bodies, and of their property." (Cp. below 726–732)—The *παιδεία* here spoken of is not only that of children; cp. 730 b 6. The *καὶ ἀνέσεως* suggests that duty may often enjoin the *forbearance* to persevere in an effort of soul or body, or to press for our own interests. (Jowett's "as regards

both their occupations and amusements" is, I think, far too limited.)

b 1. *καὶ κοινότατον*, "and to their most mutual advantage"; "*communiterque omnium interest*," Stallb. (Stallb. takes *λέγοντα* of the Ath., and *τοὺς ἀκούοντας* of his two hearers.)

b 4. *ὄντως* emphasizes the *necessity* expressed in the following verbal adjectives—"undoubtedly."

BOOK V

726 1. *ἀκούοι πᾶς κτλ.*: with the exception of a few lines at the end, the whole of this book is addressed to the same imaginary audience who were instructed above at 716 and 717 on the duties to Gods and parents.

3. [*μετὰ θεούς*]: below at 727 a 1 and b 4 these words are quite in place as a qualification of *δευτέραν*, but I cannot believe that the author put them in here. They involve the twofold absurdity of implying that the Gods are (1) possessed by mankind, and (2) godlike. Ritter was the first to call attention to the difficulty. The former absurdity was lessened by Stobaeus, who substituted *τῶν ἐν τῷ βίῳ* for *τῶν αὐτοῦ*. He, apparently, found *μετὰ θεούς* already inserted.—*οἰκειότατον ὄν*, "sein eigenstes Eigenthum" (Wagner).—*διττὰ πάντ' ἐστὶ πᾶσιν*: an elegant variety of *παντάπασι διττά ἐστι*, i.e. "all, in all cases" = "unquestionably." The Louvain edition has *διττά ἐστι παντάπασι*.—It is tempting, with Iamblichus, to omit *οὖν* and put merely a comma after *πᾶσιν*.

727 a 1. *ὄντας δεσπότας*: an echo of *δεσπόζοντα* above; natural *supremacy* is the title to honour which ennobles both the Gods and our souls.—[Commas after *ψυχήν*, *ἑπομένους* (as well as after *δευτέραν*) make the sentence clearer. J.B.M.]—*τοὺς τούτοις ἑπομένους*: cp. 717 b 2 ff.

a 2. *δευτέραν* goes closely with *μετὰ θεούς*, as at b 4.—The object to be supplied in thought with *τιμᾷ* is *τὴν αὐτοῦ ψυχήν*.—For the idea cp. Tennyson's "*Self-reverence*, self-knowledge, self-control" (Oenone).

a 3. *θεῖον γὰρ ἀγαθόν που τιμή, τῶν δὲ κακῶν οὐδὲν τίμιον*, "honour, you know, is a priceless benefit; if a thing harms you, it cannot bring you honour." There are, Plato says, many ways, which we are all prone to take, of honouring our own souls, "*as we think*," which do it no honour at all. The only way to honour

our souls is to *make them better.* Instead of which, much of the conduct whereby we think to honour them, does them harm. Apparently Plato nowhere else uses τίμιος in an active sense, but I think he makes it clear by the context that it is active here. If we understand him to say that honour cannot be paid to anything bad—especially if we go so far as to accept Stallbaum's emendation θείων γὰρ ἀγαθῶν, which accentuates that idea—this clashes with the statement that every honouring of the soul βελτίω ἐκ χείρονος ἀπεργάζεται. The modest confession with which Plato begins at a 2, as well as much of the subsequent exhortation, shows that he starts with the assumption that there is much in *every* ψυχή that needs amendment. We are not to wait till this imperfection is removed, to honour the soul. [St. Peter tells us to "honour all men." J.B.M.] Every step we take towards its removal *is* an honour paid to it. Honour then *can* be paid to something that is imperfect, and consequently *bad.* I agree with Ritter in taking ἀγαθόν to mean "something *beneficial,*" and κακόν "something *harmful,*" but I do not see that he gains anything by reading θετέον for θεῖον. The latter word, besides being a high commendation, adds the implication that since the *Gods* receive honour and glory, it must be a good, and therefore a beneficial thing. Schanz's ψυχή for τιμή seems to go still further from the context—ignoring, as it does, the contrast between ἀγαθόν and κακόν. All the above-mentioned objections also apply to Susemihl's suggestion to bracket ἀγαθόν as a "gloss" on θεῖον. —For the active use of τίμιος cf. Aesch. *Eum.* 853 οὐπιρρέων γὰρ τιμιώτερος χρόνος ἔσται πολίταις τοῖσδε, and τίμιον ἕδραν in the next line. Plato uses ἄτιμος both in the sense of *bringing disgrace* (*Gorg.* 527 d 1) and *suffering disgrace* (*Gorg.* 486 c 2). [F.H.D., J.B.M., and A.M.A. take τίμιον as passive, and incline to Stallbaum's θείων γὰρ ἀγαθῶν.]

a 5. λόγοις ἢ δώροις ἢ ὑπείξεσιν: three headings under which fall the various κίβδηλοι τιμαί (728 d 5) enumerated below. It should be noticed that he does not say that *words,* e.g., or *gifts,* or even *shirkings* or *compliances* cannot honour the soul, but only such words, gifts or compliances as fail to do it good.—(1) Self-confidence and self-praise, and (2) self-excuse, fall under the head of λόγοις; (3) self-indulgence, and (5) the preferring beauty to goodness, and (7) the preference of wealth to virtue, fall under the head of δώροις, while (4) the shrinking from toil, and (5) the shrinking from death fall under that of ὑπείξεσι.

a 7. αὐτίκα, "for instance." Cp. Ruhnken, *Tim.* s.v. — παῖς

εὐθὺς γενόμενος, ["a man is hardly in his teens before . . .," J.B.M.].

b 1. προθυμούμενος ἐπιτρέπει, "eagerly encourages it."

b 2. τὸ δὲ νῦν λεγόμενόν ἐστι : a variety of οὗτος ὁ λόγος φησί ; below at 746 b 4 τὸ νῦν λεγόμενον is personified, and is subject to the verb διεξέρχεται.

b 7. ἐξαιρῇ Stob., ἐξαίρῃ MSS. Cp. Heindorf on *Theaet.* 162 e : "vulgatum ἐξαίρω mutavi in ἐξαιρῶ, velut ubique scribendum ubi *eximendi* significatum verbum hoc habet."

c 2. παρὰ λόγον τὸν τοῦ νομοθέτου καὶ ἔπαινον, "in the face of the lawgiver's exhortation and eulogium."—[λόγον is the lawgiver's speech recommending the law. J.B.M.] ἐπαινουμένους in c 4 again introduces in another connexion the consideration of the lawgiver's *praise*, which is a kind of τιμή, the great agency for the encouragement of moral conduct. (Schanz would change λόγον to ψόγον, and reject καὶ ἔπαινον.)

c 3. κακῶν : as at b 6, not only *suffering*, but *damage* (to the soul).

c 7. δρῶν τὰ τοιαῦτα σύμπαντα : i.e. when guilty of that, or any other, shirking of a hard duty. Wagner suggests <οὐ> δρῶν, applying τὰ τοιαῦτα σύμπαντα to the duties shirked. [J.B.M. suggests that the οὐ before τιμᾷ really belongs here.]

d 1. πάντως, "under any circumstances," goes with ἀγαθόν.—For the sense cp. *Apol.* 29 a 7, 37 b 7 and 42.

d 3. καὶ οὐκ ἀντιτείνει διδάσκων τε καὶ ἐλέγχων ὡς . . ., "instead of combating, the notion by convincing demonstration that . . ." For the time, νοῦς and ψυχή are taking opposite sides. Stobaeus's ἡγούμενος in d 2 spoils the passage.

d 5. τὰ περὶ τοὺς θεούς : for the more usual τὰ τῶν θεῶν ; cp. above on 690 d 6. We may translate "the kingdom of the Gods below."

d 7. οὐχ ἕτερον ἤ : a variety of οὐδὲν ἄλλο ἤ ; elsewhere in Plato ἕτερος in the sense of *different* is followed by a gen.

d 8. All the later edd., except Stallb., Schneider, and the Zür. edd., have a comma after εἶναι ; but it seems best, since the next sentence gives a proof of the statement contained in ψευδόμενος, to omit the comma and to take ψευδόμενος φησί closely together—"is wrong in saying" ("for this reckoning, which makes more of the body than of the soul, is a false one").

e 2. Burnet does well to eject the comma which most edd. have after ἀγνοεῖ.—There is much variety among the interpretations given of ὡς : Wagner translates it by a simple *that* (*dass*), Jowett

by "how greatly," Schneider makes it qualify *θαυμαστοῦ*—"quam admirabilem hanc possessionem negligat." This last is nearly right, but does not quite reproduce the relation of the Greek words. I think *θαυμαστοῦ κτήματος* is predicative to *τούτου*: "how precious a possession this is which he so despises." The attraction of the pronoun denoting the soul is not unusual.—To arrive at Jowett's translation we should have to suppose that Plato wrote *ὡς θαυμαστῶς*, and perhaps *τούτου τοῦ κτήματος*.

728 a 1. *ἢ μὴ δυσχερῶς φέρῃ κτώμενος*: the two evil alternatives presented by the text as we have it are (1) the desire for unlawful or dishonourable gains, and (2) the absence of compunction or dissatisfaction in their acquisition. If we adopt Badham's view that, by a slight dislocation of the text, the *μή* has been shifted from its proper place before *κτώμενος*, the second alternative is: the dissatisfaction felt by the man who does *not* get that kind of wealth. In either case we must supply *μὴ καλῶς* with *κτώμενος*. At first sight Badham's two alternatives seem to fit the argument better than the former two; but a consideration of the ensuing context shows that they do not. The man who is dissatisfied because he is poor, could not be thought by anyone to be "*honouring his soul by gifts.*"—*ἄρα* answers to the *ὡς δὴ δοκεῖ* of b 7 above.

a 2. *παντὸς . . . λείπει* corresponds to the *πολλοῦ δεῖ* at c 1 above.—Cp. Aesch. *P.V.* 961 *πολλοῦ γε καὶ τοῦ παντὸς ἐλλείπω.* —"He is, on the contrary, as far from it as can be." This is best marked, as Burnet marks it, as a parenthesis. In A *παντὸς* (so O and Stob.) which appears to be a correction of the first hand, was apparently *πάντως* at first; so too Cornarius—by conjecture—who further ventured to emend *λείπει* into *λυπεῖ*, without knowing, apparently, that the same emendation had been suggested in O. Respect (apparently) for the original reading of A (manifestly a mistake) has induced Schanz, like Herm. and Wagner, to follow Cornarius. But *λυπεῖ* is quite out of place here. Whatever the after effects might be, it is assumed that the misguided soul *delights* in ill-gotten wealth at the time. There is no suggestion either of a *grieved conscience.* As in the case of the fear of death, the soul itself is represented as sharing in the mistake.

a 3. *τὸ αὐτῆς τίμιον*: Schanz says A has *αὐτῆς*—as if *ψυχή*, and not its owner, were the subject of the sentence. As the main idea of the sentence is *bartering* and *price*, I think these words mean "the soul's *treasure*" rather than "the soul's *good name.*" [J.B.M. dissents.]—Schneider and Schanz keep A's *χρυσοῦ* instead

of the χρυσίου of O and Stobaeus, and rightly, I think. It is not a question of a small "*piece of money*" (Jowett), or small *sum* of money, but of an *amount of gold*, small in comparison with "all the gold on the earth and in the earth," of which we hear immediately. So, at the end of the *Phaedrus*, Socrates wishes for a certain χρυσοῦ πλῆθος. [Clem. Al. *Strom.* vii. § 78, p. 879 quotes χρυσὸν μὲν πάντα τὸν ἐπὶ γῆς καὶ ὑπὸ γῆν. J.B.M.]

a 5. What was hinted above at c 2, is here expressly set forth: that, for the citizen, the (ideal) lawgiver's enactment is the ultimate canon of morality.

a 6. διαριθμούμενος τάττῃ, "sets down in his list."

a 7. It is better to suppose that ἐθέλῃ may, under the circumstances, dispense with ἄν—ὃς ἂν ἅπερ ἄν would sound awkward—than to read ἐθέλει with Peipers. Cp. 920 d 3 with Stallb.'s note. Of the passages cited there 873 e 3 πλὴν τῶν ὅσα . . . δράσῃ is almost parallel with this.

a 8. οὐκ οἶδεν . . . διατιθείς, "without knowing it, the man, whoever he be, is bringing hideous disgrace upon the majesty of his soul."—οὐκ οἶδεν, a repetition of ἀγνοεῖ at e 2, and ὡς δὴ δοκεῖ at b 7 above, is below expanded and explained by οὐδεὶς ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν λογίζεται κτλ.

b 2. λεγομένην, "so-called," qualifies the word δίκην alone—cp. 695 a 6 ὑπὸ τῆς λεγομένης εὐδαιμονίας, and 747 c 2 τὴν καλουμένην πανουργίαν; so too I believe we ought to explain λεγομένην at *Ep.* 335 b 4, connecting λεγομένην οὐκ ὀρθῶς ἡδονήν. —What he means by "so-called" he explains below at c 2 ff. The ordinary translation—"what is said to be the heaviest penalty for wrong-doing"—involves a contradiction of what follows. If it is *generally said to be so*, how is it that "no one takes it into account"?

b 6. κατὰ τὰς συνουσίας goes closely with προσκολλᾶσθαι; lit. "by way of their companionships," i.e. "in intimate communion." Schneider wrongly takes it with διώκοντα—"istorum sectans consuetudinem"; and so Wagner, and (in effect) Jowett. An examination of the two contrasted clauses shows that ἀποσχίζεσθαι is balanced by προσκολλᾶσθαι, φεύγειν by διώκοντα, (ἀγαθοὺς) ἄνδρας by τοῖς δέ; we cannot, therefore, help feeling, as we read, that κατὰ τὰς συνουσίας is put in to balance λόγους: it is in *talk* that *communion* mainly consists. (Hence I think Schanz wrong in rejecting καὶ λέγειν in c 1.)

c 2 f. When we call this consequence δίκη, we give it too good a name, for δίκη is the *right* treatment of an offender, with a view

to his reformation—*ἰατρικὴ γίγνεται πονηρίας ἡ δίκη Gorg.* 478 d —in a passage where the whole theory of what we may call *official* punishment is explained on the same lines as here. Plato feels that the Greek language cannot easily express what he means; the nearest he can get to a *bad* name for punishment is *τιμωρία*. Perhaps he chooses this because it has in it the suggestion of *anger*, which the just judge never feels. At *Gorg.* 525 b and at *Prot.* 324 a *τιμωρία* is used in a neutral sense, but in both passages we are told that there is a right and a wrong kind of *τιμωρία*—in the former we read that if a man is *ὀρθῶς τιμωρούμενος* it has a beneficial effect; in the latter, of the man who punishes out of revenge for the crime, it is said *ὥσπερ θηρίον ἀλογίστως τιμωρεῖται*. On the other hand, at *Theaet.* 177 a 2, the wrong form of *τιμωρία* is spoken of as *δίκη*.

c 3. *ἀδικίας ἀκόλουθος πάθη*, "a painful consequence of wrong-doing" (Jowett).

c 4. *ὅ τε τυχὼν καὶ μὴ τυγχάνων*: for the remarkable conjunction of the aor. and impf. participles in apparently the same sense cp. below 782 e 1 *δι' ὧν ἀρετή τε αὐτοῖς ἀγομένοις ὀρθῶς καὶ τοὐναντίον ἀποβαίνει κακῶς ἀχθεῖσιν.*—*ἄθλιος*: at *Rep.* 380 b Plato explains that a man is never *ἄθλιος* as the result of duly ordained *δίκη*: *ὡς δὲ ἄθλιοι μὲν οἱ δίκην διδόντες, ἦν δὲ ὁ δρῶν ταῦτα θεός, οὐκ ἐατέον λέγειν τὸν ποιήτην*; at *Gorg.* 472 e *ὁ ἀδικῶν τε καὶ ὁ ἄδικος πάντως μὲν ἄθλιος, ἀθλιώτερος μέντοι ἐὰν μὴ διδῷ δίκην*; *this τιμωρία* however does leave a man *ἄθλιος*, so it cannot be *δίκη*.—*ὁ μὲν οὐκ ἰατρευόμενος, ὁ δέ, ἵνα ἕτεροι πολλοὶ σῴζωνται, ἀπολλύμενος*: the worst penalty that can be incurred by the wrong-doer is that he is cut off from the society of the good and incorporated in that of the bad and completely assimilated to them. If he is *not* so cut off and so incorporated, he is still *ἄθλιος*, for the good, among whom he still lives, are likely to get rid of him as an incorrigible villain; this is *ὁ μὴ τυγχάνων* whose fate is likely to be "destruction," as an example to others (cp. below 854 e 7). On the other hand *ὁ τυχών* is *ἄθλιος* because he does not get the only treatment that would cure him, which is *proper punishment*. (This interpretation of a most perplexing passage I owe to the late Prof. J. B. Mayor. F.H.D. also takes *ὁ μὴ τυγχάνων* to be the man who is put to death (*ἀπολλύμενος*), but assumes the words to mean that he is put to death by the law for his crimes; and that the *only* way a man can avoid the above described penalty is by disappearing from the world. Prof. H. Jackson, on the other hand, holds that the

arrangement is chiastic (and so Ficinus), and that ὁ μὴ τυγχάνων (τιμωρίας) is the man who is said not to be cured "because he does not get the treatment he wants,"—if he does not get the τιμωρία, *a fortiori* he does not get δίκη—and that ἀπολλύμενος only means that such a man goes hopelessly to the bad, and is a lesson to the rest of the world.)

c 6. ἡμῖν is a genitival dative, "our glory." [Dat. of reference, "in our judgement," J.B.M. and A.M.A.]

c 7. τοῦτ' αὐτὸ ὡς ἄριστα ἀποτελεῖν, "to accomplish this very result" (i.e. τὸ βελτίω γενέσθαι) "as well as we can." In short, man's true glory consists in choosing the good, and in doing his best to remedy all remediable evil.

c 9. οὐκ εὐφυέστερον εἰς κτλ. : it is the soul's natural affinity with the Good that gives it the value as a κτῆμα claimed for it at 726 2 and 727 e 1. This is implied in the statement just made, that the true glory of the soul is the pursuit of the Good, and the rejection of evil.

d 3. δεύτερον : next, that is, to the Good—τὸ πάντων ἄριστον. ἐτάχθη may be gnomic, or may refer to the fact that the order of merit was given on the preceding page ; more likely the latter. The Aldine τιμῇ for the MS. τιμή must be right (unless some words are lost, e.g. <ἡ> τιμὴ <τοῦδε>).—Burnet is the first among modern editors to print πᾶς . . . νοήσειεν as a parenthesis—like that at e 1 below. (There are difficulties both ways, but perhaps the harshness of taking τοῦτό γε as a restatement of τὸ τρίτον is the greater evil.) [J.B.M. dissents, translating "as for the third, every one would consider that *this* was etc."]

d 4. I think it is best to take εἶναι to depend on νοήσειεν ἄν, repeated in thought ; so that in effect the sentence is equivalent to : "everybody will recognize that the natural (and proper) honour paid to the *body* comes third in importance."—δ' αὖ, "here again."

d 5. ὅσαι implies that the κίβδηλοι are more numerous than the ἀληθεῖς τιμαί.

d 6. μηνύειν δή μοι φαίνεται : this curious phrase seems to mean : "as I imagine, he distinguishes them (as follows)." Explanatory asyndeton ; as also is the case with the sentence beginning τίμιον εἶναι ; but this is so regular after ὅδε and τοιόσδε that it is hardly noticeable.

e 2. τὰ δ' ἐν τῷ μέσῳ . . . μακρῷ, "but that those bodies which possess all these qualities" (lit. "the whole of this condition") "to an extent half-way between these two extremes ["are in the

mean, being in contact with the whole category" J.B.M.]—are the most self-respecting, and also the safest by far." (Against H. Steph.'s *σωφρονέστερα* and *ἀσφαλέστερα*, which Schanz adopts, it should be noticed that there are *three* things compared, i.e. the two extremes, and the mean.)

e 4. *τά* still, I think, means the (two kinds of) *bodies*, not *qualities*.—For the doctrine cp. *Rep.* 410 c–e. [*τά* = "these bodily conditions" J.B.M.]—*χαύνους*, "puffed up," "conceited."

e 6. The second *καί* connects *ὡσαύτως* and *τ. κατὰ τ. αὐ. ῥ.* "It is the same way with the possession of money and goods, and it falls under the same scale of valuation." The *τιμήσεως* repeats the notion of the *τίμιον* of d 7. (We could have dispensed with this *καί*; Cornarius and Ast actually venture to reject it.)—*τιμήσεως* depends rather on *ῥυθμόν* than (as Stallb.) on the whole phrase *κ. τ. αὐ. ῥ. ἔχ.* (Ast makes it depend on *ὡσαύτως*, Ficinus and Jowett [and J.B.M.] on *κτῆσις*—"et census," and "and distinction.")

729 a 1. *ἔχθρας καὶ στάσεις . . . ταῖς πόλεσιν καὶ ἰδίᾳ*. chiasmus; *στάσεις* applies to *πόλεσιν* and *ἔχθρας* to the individual citizens; *δουλείας* in the next line would apply equally to both. *στάσις* would arise between the moneyed class and the poor (cf. below 744 d 3 ff.); hatred would be felt by a very poor man for a very rich one. Again, both a state with no resources, and a man with no property, would be liable to be brought into subjection. Cp. *Rep.* 373 d. [J.B.M. contrasts *Phaedo* 66 c . . . *στάσεις οὐδὲν ἄλλο παρέχει ἢ τὸ σῶμα καὶ αἱ τούτου ἐπιθυμίαι.*] But at *Phaedo* 66 c he goes on *διὰ χρημάτων κτῆσιν πάντες οἱ πόλεμοι γίγνονται, τὰ δὲ χρήματα ἀναγκαζόμεθα κτᾶσθαι διὰ τὸ σῶμα.*

a 2. *μὴ δή τις*: the asyndeton apes the form of a legal enactment.—For the selection of topics now to be treated—down to 730 a 9—see the note on 718 c 1 above.

a 4. There is the same reference to the double effect of great wealth—that on the state, and that on the individual—as at a 1.

a 5. *ἀκολάκευτος*: i.e. so moderate as not to attract flatterers to its possessor; a bold and significant expression, but hard to translate (? "not buzzed about"). There is a similar boldness shown above at 728 e 3 in the application of the adj. *σωφρονέστατα* to the moderately endowed *bodies*, and in that of the adj. *μουσικωτάτη* in the next line to *οὐσία*.

a 6. *μουσικωτάτη*: the metaphor in this word is continued

in the *συμφωνοῦσα* and *συναρμόττουσα* which follow; the word means something like "harmonious."—*ἡμῖν* is an ethic dative.

a 7. *εἰς ἅπαντα*, "generally," i.e. in the case of men of all stations; to be taken with the two preceding participles. [J.B.M. and A.M.A. take it with *ἄλυπον*.]

b 1. *αἰδῶ πολλήν, οὐ χρυσόν*: this remark forms a neat transition to what may be regarded as a true member of the series now before us (see on 718 c 1). We are concerned with *objects of honour and respect*; there is a true sense, he goes on (b 6) to tell us, in which *children*, who are always being told to *pay* respect to others, are deserving of respect themselves. (The remarks are not made "per occasionem," as Stallb. would have us believe.)

b 3. *τό* has a stronger demonstrative force than usual here. Cp. 730 c 4.—*ἔστιν γιγνόμενον* is a sententious periphrasis for *γίγνεται*: "We fancy that we are going to secure this legacy to them by scolding them when they show a lack of it. But modesty is not created by the admonition which people nowadays address to the young, when they tell them that it is the duty of one who is young to show respect to everybody."

b 5. *πάντα*: masc. (So Ritter: Schneider transl. "*omnia*.") It is the obj. of *αἰσχύνεσθαι*, not an attribute of *τὸν νέον*.

b 8. *αὐτόν*: not the *ἔμφρων νομοθέτης*, of course, but the elder to whom the lawgiver gives the advice. The change of number in such a case is not uncommon in Plato. Stallb. cps. *Prot.* 324 a.—Cp. Juv. xiv. 47, with Mayor's note.

c 3. *ἅμα καὶ αὐτῶν*, "*simul atque ipsorum*" Schneider.

c 5. *ὁμογνίων θεῶν κοινωνίαν πᾶσαν κτλ.*: Ruhnken, s.v. *ὁμόγνιοι θεοί*, quotes from Pollux iii. 5 a description of relations as *θεῶν ὁμογνίων κοινωνοὶ καὶ τῆς αὐτῆς ἑστίας μετόχοι*. The following *ταὐτοῦ φ. αἵ. ἔχουσαν* obliges us to take the abstract noun to stand for the concrete in translation: "all the members who share the worship of the family gods, and who have the same blood in their veins" (lit. "the same natural blood").

c 7. Ruhnken was the first to point out that Stobaeus had in *γενεθλίους* preserved for us the true reading for the curiously perverse *γενέσθαι οὕς* of the MSS. and early editions. The corruption is readily explicable palaeographically.

d 1. The subtlety of this wise counsel of humility consists in the selection of the man's own *state of mind*, and not in his *outward expressions*, as the determining cause of his popularity.

If he really thinks his friend's services to him of more worth and importance than what he does for them, his behaviour to them cannot fail to be conciliatory and void of offence.—*εὐμενεῖς*, the MS. reading, has been unnecessarily altered by H. Steph., Ast, Bekker, and the Zürich edd. to *εὐμενὲς*, which Stobaeus also has. Stallb. refers to 657 d above, and *Phil.* 45 e, and Schramm also to *Rep.* 563 c, passages which show that such a phrase as *τό γε φίλων καὶ ἑταίρων* is regarded as quite equivalent to *τούς γε φίλους καὶ ἑταίρους*.

d 3. *ἢ ἐκεῖνοι*: sc. *ἡγοῦνται*.

d 4. *αὐτῶν τῶν φίλων τε καὶ ἑταίρων*: as far as grammar goes, this gen. might stand either for *ἢ αὐτοὶ οἱ φίλοι διανοοῦνται* (so Schneider and Wagner), or, by brachylogy, for *ἢ τὰς αὐτῶν τῶν φίλων χάριτας* (Jowett); but the sense of the sentence points to the former interpretation. A is to set a higher value on B's services to him than B himself sets on them, and is also to set a lower value on his own services to B than B sets on them. There is no question of a comparison of service with service.

d 5. *τοῦ Ὀλυμπίασιν*: with *τοῦ* we must supply *ἄγωνος* from the following *ἀγώνων*.—"In preference to the Olympian or other contests" is, by brachylogy, for "in preference to conquering at the Olympian, etc."

d 7. *δόξῃ*: "*Ruhm*" (Wagner) is nearer than *opinione* (Schneider). Plato suggests that *glory* may be gained by pre-eminence in more lines than one.—The *ὡς ὑπηρετηκὼς . . . ἐν τῷ βίῳ*, which explains *δόξῃ ὑπηρεσίας* seems a rather clumsy addition. Can it be due to a commentator who took *δόξῃ* to be merely (as Schneider) "in a reputation for"?—It is perhaps not fanciful to see a link between this and the preceding recommendation in the fact that the *value* of a *ὑπηρεσία* is considered in both.

e 2. *ἁγιώτατα ὄντα*, "have a special sacredness."

e 3. *τῶν ξένων*: if the reading *καὶ εἰς τ. ξέν.* is sound, although the rest of the passage dealing with *ξένοι* treats only of offences committed against them, it is better to take *ξένων* here as a subjective gen. than to make it synonymous with the following *εἰς τοὺς ξένους*. Schn., Wagn. and Jowett can hardly be right in translating *πάντα τὰ τῶν ξένων* as "all that concerns strangers." In that case the *τά* would surely have to be repeated before *ἁμαρτήματα* to make this clear. Besides, *τὰ τῶν ξένων*, in this sense, is not "inseparable from heaven's vengeance." I think it best though to follow F.H.D. who would bracket *καὶ εἰς τοὺς ξένους* as a marginal gloss on the *objective* gen. *ξένων*.

e 4. παρά goes closely with the following μᾶλλον; cp. 747 b 5 παρὰ τὴν αὑτοῦ φύσιν ἐπιδιδόντα.

e 7. For μᾶλλον heightening the force of a comparative cp. below 781 a 3, and *Gorg.* 487 b. Here too it repeats the *sound* of the previous τιμωρὸν μᾶλλον. [J.B.M. takes μᾶλλον with δυνάμενος here and with τιμωρόν above at c 5.]

730 a 1. ὁ ξένιος ἑκάστων κτλ. : i.e. whether it were a δαίμων or a θεός who in any particular case had the ξένος under his protection, they were all ministers of Ζεὺς ξένιος.

a 4. πρὸς τὸ τέλος αὖ. πορ. : cp. *Rep.* 330 d 4 ff.—ξενικῶν καὶ ἐπ. ἁμ. We have the same bold use of these adjectives below at b 2 in ξενικά τε καὶ ἐπιχώρια ὁμιλήματα.

a 7. ἔτυχεν MSS., but in A there are two marks before the word standing for two missing letters. Badham ingeniously suggested that ἀπέτυχεν was the original reading. (So Schanz.) ἀπέτυχεν ὁμ. would mean, I think, not "failed to secure the *fulfilment* of a promise of safety," but simply "failed to secure" such a promise. This directly *states* the offence which brings down the God's vengeance, and directly explains the fate of the suppliant. The reading ἔτυχεν ὁμ. leaves it to be *inferred* that the promise was broken, and seems, in so far, inferior, as a direct representation of what happened.

b 1. Possibly in this enumeration of the subjects just dealt with, τὰ περὶ ἑαυτόν refers to the honouring of the *soul*, and τὰ περὶ τὰ ἑαυτοῦ to the proper regard to be had to one's *body*, and one's property. Ritter holds that τὰ περὶ ἑαυτόν includes the *body* as well as the *soul*.—It seems better to take the τά at the beginning of b 1—which also goes with περὶ πόλιν τε καὶ φ. κ. συγ. and with ξενικά τε καὶ ἐπιχ.—with ὁμιλήματα, than to make ὁμ. agree only with ξενικά τε καὶ ἐπ. Cp. above 718 a 8, where θεραπεύματα went with πρὸς ἐκγόνους κτλ. as well as with ξενικά. The position of ὁμιλήματα is also in favour of so taking it.

b 3. ποῖός τις ὢν αὐτός: as Ritter says, there is a want of clearness in the arrangement of the subject matter here. This passage, down to 732 d 7, might well be described as directions for the *real* honouring of the soul, and would seem to be more in place after the description of the kinds of *false* honouring of the soul given in 727 f. or as an amplification of the τοῖς ἀμείνοσιν ἕπεσθαι in 728 c 6. The ostensible ground of the division is that the qualities here praised depend not on *law*, but on *public opinion* for their sanction. Also the virtues here to be described are *spontaneous*—not the result of external restriction.

b 5. ὅσ' ἂν . . . ἀπεργάζεται MSS., ὅσ' οὖν . . . ἀπ. Stobaeus. The early edd. read ὅσ' ἂν οὖν . . . ἀπεργάζεται. Ast makes two suggestions: (1) to read ὅσ' ἂν ἀπεργάζηται, and (2) ὅσα . . . ἀπεργάζεται. Most recent edd. adopt (1), Schanz and Burnet rightly adopt (2). Stobaeus's οὖν is doubtless due to a wish to remove the asyndeton, which is of the ordinary explanatory kind. The ἂν of the MSS. is most likely due to the α of ὅσα coming before a μ, which might well be mistaken for a μ, and, by a further mistake, read twice. Ritter suggests that perhaps ὅσων μὴ νόμος (ἐστί) was the original reading. Schmidt's ὅσ', ἂν μὴ νόμος, which Hermann adopts, does not give the right sense at all. It is here pointed out that the matters now dealt with are such as do *not* fall to the *law*, but to the *preface*—Cp. above 728 d 6—and ἂν μὴ νόμος throws this idea into the background. —The salutary and educative force of public opinion, as directed by the wise lawgiver's apportionment of praise and blame, has been repeatedly appealed to. Cp. e.g. 727 c, 631 e.

b 6. For εὐηνίους (MSS.) the early edd. have εὐνοϊκούς, "*manifestum germanae lectionis glossema*," Stallb.

b 7. μετὰ τοῦτο: a repetition of the ἑπόμενον τούτῳ in b 4.

c 1. ἀλήθεια . . . ἀνθρώποις: this oft-quoted utterance—which may well stand beside Achilles's grand words at *Il.* ix. 312 f.—is said to have been borrowed from the Pythagoreans. Cf. Porphyr. *Vit. Pyth.* p. 41 τοιαῦτα παρήνει, μάλιστα δ' ἀληθεύειν· τοῦτο γὰρ μόνον δύνασθαι τοὺς ἀνθρώπους ποιεῖν θεῷ παραπλησίους.

c 3. εἴη: like ἀκούοι at 726 a 1, an independent optative of *exhortation*; cp. also 871 b 4 and 917 a 1. It gives an antique form to the expression. διαβιοῖ is opt. by attraction. Both optatives find analogies in Ar. *Vesp.* 1431 ἔρδοι τις ἣν ἕκαστος εἰδοίη τέχνην. (Ast would insert ἄν here.)

c 4. ὁ δέ: the article has a strong demonstrative force, like the τό at 729 b 3. "That man is untrustworthy, to whom, etc." The conjunction of πιστός and ἄπιστος makes it read as if ὁ μὲν γὰρ πιστός had preceded.

c 5. ὅτῳ δὲ ἀκούσιον (ψεῦδος φίλον ἐστίν): i.e. the man who does not mind (or who cannot help) being mistaken—who would as soon hold a false opinion as not. For the distinction between τὸ ὡς ἀληθῶς ψεῦδος—the *lie in the mind* and the *spoken lie*, see *Rep.* 382 a ff. Cf. also *Hipp. Min.* 372 ff.—ἄνους, ἀμαθής, ἄνοια, ἀμαθία are used by Plato very much as *fool* and *folly* are used in our version of the Psalms and Proverbs; there is moral as well as intellectual condemnation in the words. Cp. e.g. 689 a

and b, *Soph.* 228 d 4, *ψυχὴν ἄρα ἀνόητον αἰσχρὰν καὶ ἄμετρον θετέον.*

c 6. Schanz is, I think, right in adopting Hermann's *τε* for *γε*. The same man is not supposed to have both faults, and *both* are declared to be prejudicial.

c 8. *πᾶσαν*, "complete"; so *ὁμοιότητα . . . πᾶσαν* at *Phaedr.* 253 c 1, *πάσῃ ἀπορίᾳ* at *Soph.* 250 d. This comes very near the use noticed on 637 a 3, and elsewhere, for "all kinds of."—*κατεσκευάσατο*: gnomic.

d 1. *σχεδὸν ὁμοίως*: i.e. he has estranged his friends, and even his children—if he has any—and it is all one to him whether they are alive or not; he is absolutely alone.

d 2. Next in honour to regard for truth, as a necessary social characteristic, comes *eagerness for public service*—an active, or aggressive form of virtue—first as shown in combating *ἀδικία*. *δικαιοσύνη* is eminently a social virtue; but, as we read at e 1 ff., even *σωφροσύνη* and *φρόνησις* have their social aspects, inasmuch as they can be communicated to others.

d 4. *ἐκείνου*: we have a similar gen. after *διπλάσιος* below at 743 a 6; only here it is by brachylogy for *τῆς ἐκείνου τιμῆς*.—*πολλῶν ἀντάξιος ἑτέρων*: as we have seen above, this Homeric phrase is a favourite with Plato. Here he means that the righteous man multiplies the value of his own righteousness every time he helps to make another man righteous by checking him in wrongdoing.

d 5. *μηνύων*: Stallb. quotes (from Stob. xliv. 40), from the so-called *προοίμια νόμων* of Charondas, a similar injunction.

d 6. *συγκολάζων*: this active co-operation with the magistrate is the crowning development of *social* *δικαιοσύνη*.—*ὁ μέγας ἀνήρ*: for the article with a predicative adj. cp. *Menex.* 248 a 4 *οὗτός ἐστιν ὁ σώφρων καὶ οὗτος ὁ ἀνδρεῖος καὶ φρόνιμος*, and Aeschin. *Περὶ παραπρεσβείας* 267 *καὶ τὸν καλὸν στρατιώτην ἐμὲ ὠνόμασεν*. It has almost the force of putting the adjective into the superlative. Cp. below 732 a 2 *τόν γε μέγαν ἄνδρα ἐσόμενον*. Cp. St. Matthew v. 19.

d 7. Schanz and Burnet rightly put a comma after *τέλειος* (and so Stob. i. 95 ed. Meineke, but not at ix. 55). Other editors either put no comma, or else put one after *ἀναγορενέσθω*.—The Emperor Julian, in quoting this passage, has *ἀρετῆς*. This is, no doubt, a possible construction, and the gen. is analogous to that after *νικητήρια φέρειν*—e.g. at 964 b 4—and Schanz adopts it in his text. At 953 d 5 we have *τῶν νικηφόρων τινὸς ἐπ' ἀρετῇ*, and

Ast puts in *ἐπ'* here. But the simple dat. of all the MSS. is also a possible construction, on the analogy of the dat. with *νικᾶν*—856 c 8 *τὴν πλήθει νικῶσαν*, *Menex.* 247 a *ἂν μὲν νικῶμεν ὑμᾶς ἀρετῇ*.

e 2. *κέκτηται*: Schanz, in his preface, expresses his belief that, though good MSS. vary on the point, the reduplicated form was never used by Plato except after a word ending in a vowel (cp. *Lach.* 192 e *πλέον ἐκτήσεται*—so Burnet with B and W for T's *πλεονεκτήσεται*).

e 3. *δυνατὰ μὴ μόνον αὐτὸν ἔχειν ἀλλὰ καὶ ἄλλοις μεταδιδόναι*, "which admit, not only of a man's having them himself, but of his imparting them to others." An extraordinary "stretch" of the application of *δυνατός*, due to the Greek preference for the *personal* rather than the *impersonal* construction. Cp. *Rep.* 521 a *ἔστι σοι δυνατὴ γενέσθαι πόλις εὖ οἰκουμένη*, *Phaedo* 90 c *λόγου . . . δυνατοῦ κατανοῆσαι*, Xen. *Anab.* iv. 1. 24 *αὐτὸς δ' ἔφη ἡγήσεσθαι δυνατὴν καὶ ὑποζυγίοις πορεύεσθαι ὁδόν*. There is a similar stretch, and personification in our familiar "easy to read," "good to eat." Cp. above on 663 e 1 for a similar "pregnant" use of *δύνασθαι*. (There is not the slightest ground for emending, with Schanz, to *ὅσα . . . τις δύναται . . . αὐτὸς ἔχειν*, or with Apelt, Eis. Prog. 1910, to change *δυνατά* to *δέον αὐτά*.)

e 4 ff. *τὸν μὲν . . . ψέγειν*: it is easier to picture to ourselves the three types of men here described in the case of *φρόνησις* than in that of *σωφροσύνη*. It is hard to imagine a man who would grudge to others the possession of the latter characteristic, while having it himself.—[J.B.M. suggests that a man who prides himself on his *good manners*, and wishes to keep them for his own set, is a case in point.] All this disquisition on social duty is an explanation of what was meant at 701 d 9 by saying that a community ought to be *φίλη ἑαυτῇ*.

e 5. Ast would read *ἐθέλοντα δὲ δρᾶν, δεύτερον*; Stallb., keeping the MS. reading, says we ought to supply *τιμᾶν* after *ἐᾶν*. It is best to keep *ἐᾶν δεύτερον*, and to translate "leave him in the second class"; *ἄκρος* is "first-class," cp. *Polit.* 292 e *ἄκροι πεττευταί*.

731 a 2. *ἀτιμάζειν*: depreciation of the "precious jewel" savours of the ill-nature which makes "the toad ugly and venomous."

a 3. *ἀφθόνως*: the desire to rise by the detraction of others (a 5) not only takes away all merit from the "informer," but vitiates all the efforts he may make towards excellence himself.

We may notice that it is implied that such a desire is likely to prompt false accusations (a 8 τῷ ἀδίκως ψέγεσθαι).

a 6. δεῖν οἰόμενος ὑπερέχειν, "fancying that he is gaining credit." οἶμαι δεῖν εἶναι, from meaning "I think it must be," passes to the meaning "I *fancy* that it is." Cp. *Rep.* 535 a 9, and *Alc. II.* 144 d 8, 146 b 5, where (ἢ) οἰηθῆναι δεῖν ἡμᾶς εἰδέναι is replaced at 146 b 9 by (ἅ τις οἶδεν ἢ) δοκεῖ εἰδέναι. In other words δεῖν is becoming *redundant*. Cp. below on d 5. [J.B.M. interprets it—"fancying that his only way to win is by running down others," i.e. that δ. οἰ. ὑ. means "thinking that he has got to."]

b 1. ἀγύμναστον ποιῶν = "crippling."

b 2. [τὸ ἑαυτοῦ μέρος, "as far as he is concerned" J.B.M.]

b 4. ὡς ὅτι μάλιστα emphasizes the injunction to mercy, as being the more necessary one.—χαλεπά, "dangerous."

b 6. μαχόμενον and ἀμυνόμενον are subordinate to νικῶντα. Cp. above 638 d 5 τοὺς μὴ χρωμένους αὐτῷ ὁρῶμεν νικῶντας μαχομένους, 699 b 6 τὸ νικῆσαι μαχομένους.—τῷ μηδὲν ἀνιέναι = "inflexibly."

c 1. τὰ δ' : sc. ἀδικήματα. This is an adverbial neut. acc.; "as to the sins of all those who, etc."—τῶν ὅσοι : of this demonstrative use of the article when followed by a relative Ast gives, besides ten instances from the subsequent books of the *Laws*, others from *Epin.* 974 c, *Phil.* 21 c, *Prot.* 320 d, *Soph.* 241 e, *Rep.* 469 b, 510 a, cf. also *Theaet.* 168 a. Except at *Theaet.* 168 a and *Laws* 761 e and 871 e the relative is always ὅσος or ὁπόσος.—For αὖ τῶν Stob. and A have αὐτῶν (acc. to Burnet)—Schanz says A has αὐτῶν—a curious mistake which the other MSS. seem all to have escaped.—ἰατά is acc. with ἀδικοῦσι understood.

c 2. ἑκών, "deliberately," or "with his eyes open"; i.e. he fails to see the intrinsic connexion between misery and wrongdoing. This, in effect, was called at 689 a ἡ ἐσχάτη ἀμαθία. So at 663 b f. the error of thinking that τὸ ἡδύ can ever be separated from τὸ δίκαιον is partly explained and clearly condemned. There, and at *Rep.* 589 d, this doctrine—the *Kern des Socratismus*, as Gomperz calls it (*Gk. Denk.* ii. 53)—is defended on the ground that no man who thoroughly understood where his own interest lay could possibly be persuaded to go in any other direction; and so it is defended here.

c 4. κεκτῆτο : though A^2 added an iota above the line to the η of A's κέκτητο, all the other MSS. and Stob. and all the editions up to Ast have κέκτητο. Ast notices the mistake in his note—probably after reading Elmsley on Eur. *Heracl.* 283.

c 6. The omission of the seventeen letters -τον ἐν οὖν τῷ τιμιωτά-

in A is a striking instance of a common transcriber's error; from one *τιμιωτα-* his eye strayed to the other.

c 7 f. *ἀλλὰ . . . ἔχων*, "you are bound to pity the wrongdoer just as much as any other sufferer." An idiomatic use of *γε . . . καί*; cp. above on 730 c 6.

d 1. *ἐγχωρεῖ*: this way of putting it suggests that the right-minded man will *want* to pardon all wrongdoers.

d 2. *καὶ μὴ . . . διατελεῖν*, "instead of storming away like an angry woman"; *ἀκραχολοῦντα* is subordinate to *πικραινόμενον* and *γυναικείως* qualifies the latter.

d 3. *ἀκράτως*, "thoroughly," rather than "immoderately" as Wagner (*masslos*), though at 773 a, and *Phil.* 64 e the contrast with *τὸ σύμμετρον* gives *ἄκρατος* the meaning of *excessive, immoderate.* There is no reason, with Ast, to emend to *ἀνιάτως*, which would be merely a repetition of what has been said before: "thoroughly and incorrigibly disorderly and vicious."

d 4 f. H. Steph. would reject either *πρέπειν* or *δεῖν.* Ast, in his note, would read *εἰ πρέπει* for *πρέπειν*—this would make *ἑκάστοτε* superfluous—but he takes the right view in his *Lex.* when he says that *δεῖν* is redundant, as it is below at e 3 after *ὀρθῶς ἔχει* and at *Rep.* 473 a, 486 d, and 535 a—*οἷον δεῖν ἐκλεκτέας εἶναι.* (Stallb. here, and Adam at *Rep.* 535 a, hold that both the *δεῖν* and the other expression have their full force.) The redundancy is conversational, and similar to the slovenly English "I should have liked to have seen." [J.B.M. would prefer to omit *εἶναι*, and take *πρέπειν* to mean "to be conspicuous as."]

d 5. *ἑκάστοτε*: the distributive use, "as occasion demands"; so at 801 a 6 *τοῖς θεοῖς οἷς θύομεν ἑκάστοτε.*

d 6–e 5. *πάντων . . . ἑκάστοτε*, "but there is a fault of the soul more serious than any other—one which most men are born with, which nobody thinks so seriously of as to try to get rid of it; and that is that which people mean when they say that everybody is naturally dear to himself, and that this [law of nature] is quite right. Whereas it is in reality the source of all kinds of sins that men commit from time to time, just because they are too proud of their own selves." Plutarch paraphrases this whole passage at the beginning of his treatise *Quomodo Adulator*, etc. Wyttenbach, in his commentary on Plutarch, suggests that Plato had in mind Eur. *Fr.* 460 (Nauck) *ἐκεῖνο γὰρ πέπονθ' ὅπερ πάντες βροτοί· φιλῶν μάλιστ' ἐμαυτὸν οὐκ αἰσχύνομαι.* (Cp. also *Cyclops* 334.) Cp. Arist. *Rhet.* i. 1371 b 19 *ἀνάγκη πάντας φιλαύτους εἶναι ἢ μᾶλλον ἢ ἧττον*, and Ar. *Pol.* ii. 1263 b 2 *τὸ δὲ φίλαυτον εἶναι*

ψέγεται δικαίως; where Ar. explains that it is the *excess* of self-love that is bad.

e 3. For the redundant δεῖν see above on d 5. (Ast and Stallb. say that τὸ δεῖν stands for "the saying that it ought" or "the idea that it ought"; and H. Steph. actually proposes to insert λέγειν after τό.—J.B.M. translates the δεῖν by the words given above on a 6. (Ought we possibly to read τόδ' εἶναι for τὸ δεῖν εἶναι?) —τὸ δέ: possibly "whereas"—the adverbial use; cp. on 630 d 8, and *Apol.* 23 a, where τῷ ὄντι follows τὸ δέ just as ἀληθείᾳ does here; cp. also above 642 a 3. But perhaps it is better to take τό as a demonstrative as J.B.M. suggests.—The words διὰ τὴν σφόδρα ἑαυτοῦ φιλίαν are added pleonastically. There is a conversational confusion between "it is at the bottom of all kinds of faults," and "all kinds of faults occur because of it." (This is perhaps better than to suppose these words spurious, though they do look rather like a marginal explanation.)

e 5. This is a neat application of the proverb "Love is blind"; —"no love," he hints, "is so blind as *self*-love."

732 a 1. τὸ αὐτοῦ is vaguer than any corresponding English expression; it stands for "what he himself has, or is, or does, or says."—πρὸ τοῦ ἀληθοῦς: i.e. he does not ask first what is the real nature of a thing, but whether it is *his* or not. He feels bound to respect anything that is his own, more than "the real thing," as we might say.

a 2. τὸν μέγαν ἄνδρα: cf. 730 d 6.

a 6. ὅθεν κτλ., "and in consequence of this notion, when we know little or nothing we think we know everything, and, instead of getting others to do things which we can't do, we incur inevitable disaster by trying to do them ourselves."

b 3. τὸν ἑαυτοῦ βελτίω διώκειν: a similar precept to that which tells us, at 728 c, τοῖς ἀμείνοσιν ἕπεσθαι. Cp. *Theaet.* 168 a καὶ σὲ μὲν διώξονται καὶ φιλήσουσιν, αὐτοὺς δὲ μισήσουσιν καὶ φεύξονται ἀφ' ἑαυτῶν εἰς φιλοσοφίαν. Schanz (followed by Burnet) is doubtless right in adopting the reading ἀεὶ for δεῖ; Stob. i. 95 has ἀεὶ, though at xxiii. 18 he has δεῖ in quoting the same passage.

b 4. μηδεμίαν αἰσχύνην . . . πρόσθεν ποιούμενον: cp. 648 d τὸ τῆς αἰσχύνης ἐπίπροσθεν ποιούμενος. He must not let shame come between him and his purpose. To be ashamed of inferiority is one of the consequences of excessive love of self.—ἐπὶ τῷ τοιούτῳ may mean "(shame) at such a course," i.e. at the accepting an inferior position, or "at such a fact," i.e. that he *is* inferior.

b 6. The parallelism between σμικρότερα μὲν τούτων and

χρήσιμα δὲ τούτων οὐχ ἧττον forbids us to follow Stallb. in removing the comma after ἧττον and placing it after δέ.—λέγειν ἑαυτὸν ἀναμιμνήσκοντα, "repeat by way of reminding oneself of them." (The "Vere de Vere repose" is only to be secured by constant self-reminders.)

b 7. τοὐναντίον = "by a movement in the opposite direction"; not, as Wagner, "auf der entgegengesetzten Seite."—The subj. to ἐπιρρεῖν would be αὐτό, supplied from τινος.—Plato here, using language especially suggestive of the ebb and flow of the tide, appeals to the law of Nature expounded at *Phaedo* 72 a b, according to which (γένεσις being always from opposite to opposite) all change "goes in a circle," now this way, now that. Cp. what he says about action and reaction at 676 b 9–c 4, and at *Rep.* 563 e 8; cp. also the ἀνακύκλησις spoken of at *Pol.* 269 e.

b 7 ff. This passage should, I think, be stopped with a *full stop* after ἀναμιμνήσκοντα, and *colons* (or possibly commas) after ἐπιρρεῖν and ἀπολειπούσης, to mark ἀναμν. . . . ἀπολ. as a *parenthesis*. The ὥσπερ does not go naturally with the gen. abs. The construction is like that at *Rep.* 330 c ὥσπερ γὰρ . . . ἀγαπῶσιν, ταύτῃ τε δὴ . . . σπουδάζουσιν.—διὸ δὴ χρή—a conversational brachylogy (so Stallb.) for "and that is why I say (everybody) ought"—"resumes" ὥσπερ γὰρ . . . δεῖ, and δ' introduces what we may call the second premiss of the argument. He founds the need of his injunction upon the natural law of "action and reaction," as exemplified in ἀνάμνησις (for which cf. *Phil.* 34 b).

c 2. παραγγέλλειν must have an object inf. supplied: "urge everybody else so to do." Badham's ὅλην <πόλιν> and Schanz's πᾶσαν καὶ ὅλην περιχάρειαν alter the construction and make πειρᾶσθαι depend on παραγγέλλειν; this arrangement, though it gets rid of a slight difficulty—that of the want of an obj. to παραγγέλλειν—does more harm by obliterating the correspondence between γελώτων τε εἴργεσθαι and καὶ ὅλ. περιχ. ἀποκρ. εὐσχ. πειρᾶσθαι, i.e. between the particular and the general repression of emotion.

c 4 ff. κατά τε . . . πράξεσιν, "whether each man's destiny is steady and fair" (lit. "established in prosperity"), "or it chance that men's destinies find themselves face to face with certain undertakings as with a high steep hill." τε . . . καὶ is *sive* . . . *sive*.—For ἑκάστου cf. *Phaedo* 107 d ὁ ἑκάστου δαίμων, and *Rep.* 620 d ἑκάστῳ ὃν εἵλετο δαίμονα.—κατὰ τύχας is "in the course of Fortune's changes."—The contrast is between a steady run of good fortune, and a period of strenuous fighting with obstacles. Most

interpreters take δαιμόνων to denote an external opposing force—as if a man's Genius sometimes helped, and sometimes hindered him. It seems better to suppose the Genius to be so closely identified with the man as to *share* his difficulties, as well as his good fortune. At *Tim.* 90 a Plato calls each man's *soul* his δαίμων. The language in both cases is poetical and, to a certain extent, metaphorical.—The change to the plur. (δαιμόνων), after ἑκάστου, is a quite common variety of expression. (τύχας may mean *fate* in a sinister sense, but not, by itself, *misfortune.* This is against Zeller's proposal to translate κ. τ. by "auf die Seite des Unglücks," and omit οἷον . . . πράξεσιν as a "Glossem." Schanz adopts Zeller's ἀθέτησις, avoiding the above-mentioned difficulty by reading, with Badham, κατ' ἀτυχίας.—Badham further remodels the passage by excluding δαιμόνων and reading ἀνθιστάμενον.—It is a hard passage. [J.B.M. inclines to Badh.'s κατ' ἀτυχίας.])

c 6 ff. τοῖς . . . ἀγαθοῖσι . . . ἐλάττους ποιήσειν, "will alleviate (the toils) *by the blessings.*" (Schneider cannot be right in making ἀγαθοῖσι *masc.*, and translating ἃ δωρεῖται "*per* ea quae largitur.")

d 1. I think τῶν παρόντων is neut., "their present lot"—so Ficinus *praesentia*; most interpreters supply πόνων with παρόντων.

d 2. With μεταβολάς we must supply ποιήσειν from the preceding clause.—περὶ δὲ τὰ ἀγαθὰ . . . τύχης, "while as for their good things, they must hope that, by God's good help, entirely the opposite of this (diminution) will always happen to them."—The change from the singular (ἀποκρυπτόμενον) to the plur. (αὐτοῖς) was really made when δαιμόνων in c 6 was substituted for δαίμονος. (τὰ ἐναντία τούτων is generally taken to be in apposition to τὰ ἀγαθά; but this—as Peipers (p. 100) says—is a very weak addition; besides, τὰ ἐναντία πάντα makes a much better subject to παραγενήσεσθαι than πάντα referring back to περὶ τὰ ἀγαθά.—πάντα τὰ ἐναντία is a plural variety of πᾶν τοὐναντίον.—The first of these objections to the ordinary interpretation would be obviated if, with Peipers, we rejected τὰ ἀγαθά, or placed it after παραγενήσεσθαι—but not the latter.)

d 4. ταύταις ταῖς ἐλπίσιν and ταῖς ὑπομνήσεσι π. τ. τ. may be described as "datives of effective accompaniment"; ταύταις goes with both.

d 5. μηδὲν φειδόμενον, "without any relaxation of effort."—κατά τε παιδιὰς καὶ σπουδάς, "whether in work or play."

d 6. ἀναμιμνήσκοντα ἕτερόν τε καὶ ἑαυτὸν σαφῶς is a repetition of ἑαυτ. ἀναμν. at b 6 and παραγγέλλειν δὲ παντὶ πάντ' ἄνδρα at

c 2. In general these recommendations are an injunction to have faith in the beneficence of Providence—"*μὴ μεριμνᾶτε*."

d 8 f. The *ἐπιτηδεύματα* are those described from 726 to 730 a 9. The *ποιόν τινα χρεὼν εἶναι* has been dealt with from 730 b 1 to 732 d 7.

e 1. Hermann rightly altered the MS. *αὑτοῦ* to *αὐτοῦ*.

e 2. The arguments used to recommend certain conduct under both heads are described as *θεῖα* because the religious motive and the religious sanction have been appealed to throughout. What follows (*τὰ ἀνθρώπινα*) is an appeal to *a man's own interests*.

e 5. *ἐξ ὧν . . . μεγίσταις*, "to which you may say no single mortal creature can help being bound by ties of closest and most complete dependence." *σπουδαῖς* denotes, not the "eager interest" (Jowett) which we take in these matters, but the *serious, vital* nature of their influence on us.

e 7. *ὅτι τῷ σχήματι κρατεῖ πρὸς εὐδοξίαν*: i.e. such high ground as this is what we have been taking in discussing the *religious* aspects of conduct; the motives now appealed to are lower, and concern, not our reputation, but our comfort.

733 a 1. For *ὡς* "on the ground that," "because of" cp. *Gorg.* 509 e 2, 512 c 2, *Tim.* 58 b 2. There is no need, with Stallb., to say that it is used "perinde ac si *λέγειν* antegressum sit."

a 2. *νέος ὤν*: this is a hint that youth is the time when we are most in danger of being blind to the advantages of a virtuous life. Like the Preacher's "in the days of thy youth," too, it implies that devotion to virtue is more valuable and efficacious then, than at a later time.

a 6 ff. The words from the first *σκοπεῖν* to the second *σκοπεῖν* —*εἴτε . . . σκοπεῖν*—were omitted in the first four printed editions, though Ficinus translated them. They were first printed by Stephanus. Probably he read them in the Venice MS. Ξ, for this MS. seems to be the only one which has his *δέ* after the first *βίον* in a 8. This *δέ*, which remained in Ast, Herm. and the Zür. ed., led to the placing of a full stop after *παρὰ φύσιν*, and this punctuation survived the expulsion of the *δέ*. Burnet was the first to substitute a comma for this full stop; and he also placed a colon after the first *σκοπεῖν*, where previous edd. had either put a comma, or no stop at all. Burnet's reading may be rendered, "but what is the right way to appreciate it? That is what the Argument has now got to teach us to see: we must compare one life with another, the more pleasant with the more painful, and ask, in the following way, whether in such and

such a case (*οὕτως*) it" (i.e. the *life*) "suits our nature, or, in another case (*ἄλλως*) it does not suit it." The investigation that follows reaches the converse of the conclusion stated at *Tim.* 81 e: *πᾶν γὰρ τὸ μὲν παρὰ φύσιν ἀλγεινόν, τὸ δ' ᾗ πέφυκε γιγνόμενον ἡδύ.* (Ritter's objections to *παρὰ φύσιν* seem to me to be invalidated by taking—as above—*εἴτε . . . εἴτε* as dependent on *σκοπεῖν*—cp. *Phaedr.* 275 c *οὐ γὰρ ἐκεῖνο μόνον σκοπεῖς, εἴτε οὕτως εἴτε ἄλλως ἔχει*—and by taking *βίος* as the subj. of *πέφυκε*. He treats *οὕτως* and *ἄλλως* as the emphatic words, and *κατὰ φύσιν* as a colourless amplification of *πέφυκε*; also, I conclude that he, and former interpreters, either take *πέφυκε* as impersonal, or make *ἡ ὀρθότης* its subject.)

b 1. *τὸ μηδέτερον*, "what is neither pleasure nor pain." (This, acc. to Epicurus, is "the chief good.")

b 2 ff. From *ἡδονῆς* to the second *μείζονος* was omitted in the first four printed editions (but again not by Ficinus), but Cornarius, whose translation appeared with the fourth of them (Basil. 2) discovered the omission.

b 5 f. *ἴσα . . . διασαφεῖν*, "we could give no positive reason for desiring a mixture in which both these two ingredients were in equal quantity." No doubt, however, if it were a question of *choosing* this mixture in place of one where *λύπη* predominated, there *would* be a reason for so choosing it—just as *τὸ μηδέτερον* was declared above to be preferable to *λύπη*. This is in fact stated below at c 6 ff.

b 6–c 1. Ast objects that *πρὸς βούλησιν* and *πρὸς αἵρεσιν* say the same thing twice over, and holds that the words *πρὸς αἵρεσιν ἑκάστων* were originally placed either before or after *ἐξ ἀνάγκης* in the next sentence. Schanz would reject *πρὸς βούλησιν*. Burnet, by putting a comma after *βούλησιν*—i.e. taking the words with *ἐναντία*—provides them with a construction. At b 1 we had a distinction made between *αἱρούμεθα* and *βουλόμεθα*, and at 734 c 1 *βούλησις* and *αἵρεσις* are both used. Here, indeed, both are needed for the sense, which is, that what incites or repels *desire*, decides the *choice*. We may translate "all these objects of choice are either preferable or not" (lit. "are superior or not in respect to the choice of each several object"), "in virtue of frequency, of amount, of intensity, or again of equality of composition, or in virtue of qualities which are the opposite to such as I have named in their appeal to desire" (i.e. by being few, small, or feeble). Ast is right, I think, in saying that *τὰ μηδὲν διαφέροντα* are—not objects of dislike, but—what

Aristotle would have called τὰ ἀδιάφορα. Plato means that—while desire may be excited by strong motives or by weak—if the objects of desire and repulsion are *equally mixed* in any life, or in any object of choice, such an object will *not* be chosen.

c 1–6. We have not yet come to the consideration of the case where a *neutral* object is placed side by side with a positively repulsive one (for that cf. c 8 ff.). We are now dealing with the *measurable amount* of pleasure or pain; and he goes on to remind us that when a life contains amounts of *both*, we must decide by the *preponderance* of one or the other. And so he leads up to the pronouncement that, though e.g. the vehemence of a pleasurable emotion is in itself desirable, a situation, or a *life*, in which pleasure is feeble, is preferable to one in which the pleasure is intense, if in the latter case the pleasure is overbalanced by concomitant pain, whereas the feeble pleasure is not so overbalanced.

c 7. καθάπερ ἐν τοῖς πρόσθεν: i.e. just as we did above (at b 1) in considering the case of τὸ μηδέτερον.

c 8. It seems clear to me that Ritter is right in reading ὑπερβάλλοντα here. (Ast had suggested τὸν μὲν ὑπερβάλλοντα . . . τὸν δ' αὖ.) Plato says: "The life of equipoise, as surpassing the one class—i.e. those lives where pain predominates—in the possession of what we like, *we desire*; but, as surpassing the other class in what we dislike, *we do not desire it*." E.g. where pain is 5 and pleasure 5, there is, in effect, more pain than where pain is 5 and pleasure 6, and also more pleasure than where pain is 6 and pleasure 5.

(Prof. Burnet, for reasons which he has kindly communicated to me, prefers to retain the MS. ὑπερβαλλόντων. He finds in the ἡμῖν κατὰ φύσιν and παρὰ φύσιν of a 7 f., and specially below in the τὸ φίλον ἅμα καὶ ἡδύ of e 1, a suggested distinction between what is ἡδύ generally, and what is ἡδύ to the individual *by being specially adaptable to his nature*. Thus there may be, he holds, a kind of ὑπερβολή even in the ἰσόρροπος βίος. He construes (c 8 ff.) ὡς τῶν μὲν (sc. τῶν ἡδέων) τῷ φίλῳ ἡμῖν ὑπερβαλλόντων, . . . τῶν δ' αὖ (sc. τῶν λυπηρῶν) τοῖς ἐχθροῖς (ἡμῖν ὑπερβαλλόντων).)

d 2. ἐν τούτοις ἐνδεδεμένοι (πεφύκασιν), "are shut up (by nature) to these alternatives"; a repetition, in other words, of οὕτω . . . τούτων ἐξ ἀνάγκης διακεκοσμημένων c 1 f.

d 3. Stallb. proposes to reject δεῖ διανοεῖσθαι at c 7. It does seem out of place here. I suspect, though, that we ought not simply to dismiss it, but to substitute for it διαιρεῖσθαι, or possibly δεῖ διαιρεῖσθαι: "we have got to *explain* (on these principles)

which lives nature bids us desire." For this use of *διαιρεῖσθαι* cp. 647 c 1.

d 4. By *ταῦτα* he means the same limits or conditions as by *τούτοις* in d 3 ff. If, that is, we say that we are guided in our desires by any other consideration than that of the preponderance of pleasure, it must be because we know nothing of the world.

d 7 ff. I follow all editors but Badham and Schanz in adopting the first-hand correction of A's *ὥνπερ* to *ὧν πέρι*; it is a correction evidently made from A's original, and not out of the scribe's head.—I also accept Burnet's sagacious *ἀθέτησις* of *ἑκούσιον ἀβούλητόν τε καὶ*; it looks exactly as if some presumptuous scribe had doubted the possibility of using *ἀκούσιον* as the opposite of *βούλητον*; besides, it greatly overweights the article *τό*. — The accumulation of participles — *προελόμενον, ἰδόντα, ταξάμενον, ἑλόμενον*—makes the sentence clumsy, as *read*. The intonation of the *speaker* is wanted, to put each into its place The participles *ἰδόντα* and *ταξάμενον* convey the main ideas; i.e. it is they which depend on *δεῖ*. "What lives, and how many lives are there, between which when a man selects, on a review of the desirable and the undesirable, he ought to make this consideration into a law for himself, and so, picking out what not only he likes, and finds pleasant, but also is best and noblest, lives the happiest life he possibly can?"

e 1. I am strongly inclined to accept Badham's ingenious *ἴδιόν τινα* for *ἰδόντα*; it relieves us of one participle, and makes an apposite qualification of *νόμον*. (Against his rewriting of the previous words—*ὥνπερ δεῖ προελόμενον τὸν βούλητόν τε καὶ ἑκούσιον ἀβουλήτων τε καὶ ἀκουσίων*—it is to be urged that all along it is the particular thing *in the life*, not the *life itself* that has been spoken of as the object of desire; here, in particular, we are said to make ourselves a law out of such preferences as will guide us in the choice of a life.)—*τὸ φίλον ἅμα καὶ ἡδύ* I take to be a sort of explanation and resumption of the phrase *τῷ φίλον ἡμῖν* used at d 1.

e 3. *ἄνθρωπον* MSS. I feel sure that Plato wrote *ἀνθρώπων* here.—Cp. 637 a 1 *κάλλιστ' ἀνθρώπων* and 729 e 1 *πάντων κάλλιστ' ἀνθρώπων*. — The *προελόμενον* in d 7, to which we naturally supply *τινά*, is not helped by the distant *ἄνθρωπον*.

e 6. *σώφρονα μὲν οὖν . . . πάντα*, "anyone who is familiar with the discreet life will set it down as *mild* in every respect."

734 a 4. The *τε* after *ἐπιθυμίας* should be rejected, I think.

It may be due to the confusion between δέ and τε after σφοδράς. (See Burnet's note.)

a 7. For Plato's arguments in support of this cf. *Gorg.* 493 f.

a 8. πυκνότησιν: to find the meaning of this word here we must consider it in relation (1) to its neighbours μεγέθει and πλήθει, (2) to σφοδρότησιν at 733 b 7, and (3) to μανότερα below at c 6. All the translations I know, except Jowett's, take it to mean *frequency of occurrence.* If so, in order to fit it in with its neighbours, we must suppose πλήθει to refer to the large number of *different* pleasurable or painful sensations, and πυκνότησιν to the frequent recurrence of the *same.* Sometimes *number* and *frequency* mean the same thing. A large number of sensations, which only occur at long intervals, would have much the same effect on us as a small number. This consideration no doubt made Jowett translate it here by the same word he used for σφοδρότησιν at 733 b 7, i.e. *intensity.* On the other hand, it was not very clear how we ought to distinguish between σφοδρότησιν and μεγέθει at 733 b 7, and below we shall find a similar difficulty with either ἐλάττοσιν or σμικρότερα and μανότερα—according as we take the latter word. Therefore, though πυκνός and μανός *may*, as at *Tim.* 53 a, mean *solid* and *flimsy* respectively, it is better to recognize that, in all three of our enumerations, the members are not very sharply defined—that two out of each three mean very much the same thing—and hence I would accept the more ordinary meanings of *frequency* for πυκνότησιν here and *rarer* for μανότερα at c 6. (At *Rep.* 573 e πυκνός is apparently distinguished from σφοδρός.)

b 6. ἐνδεὴς ὤν, "when it lacks"; Plato does not mean that all mankind always live without restraint, but that *when* any man lacks it, the reasons are what he describes. "There's not a man living, whose self-indulgence is not due, either to ignorance, or to lack of self-control."

c 1. ἡ βούλησις τῆς αἱρέσεως, "(our) intention in choosing."

c 3. In this formal statement—the φαῖμεν ἄν marks it as such—Plato repeats the conclusion already arrived at, before adding the two new ones which rely on the same sort of arguments; each analogous case supports the other. There is no reason to follow Cornarius, Ast, and Wagner, in rejecting ὁ δὴ . . . ἀκολάστου. By a similar irregularity the pair of lives ὑγιεινός and νοσώδης only takes its place in the last of this series of enumerations. The grouping, as always with Plato, is picturesque; the order is not that of parade.

c 5. ὁ τῆς ἀνδρείας (βίος): this expression, so natural in English of a formal style, whether of poetry or prose, was a poetical one in Greek. Stallb. cps. Eur. *Bacch.* 388 ὁ τᾶς ἡσυχίας βίοτος, *Phaedr.* 276 d εἰς τὸ λήθης γῆρας ἐὰν ἵκηται, where Heindorf's comment is "verba autem haec poetam sapiunt." (Zeller adds this to his list of faulty phrases from the *Laws.*)

c 6. μανότερα: cp. above on a 8.—τῇ τῶν ἡδονῶν, "on the score of pleasure." Lobeck, *Paral.* p. 363, is indignant that the *neuter* article or adjective should "adminiculo egere nullo" in expressing an abstract notion, while a *feminine* must always be supposed to have an attendant in the background. It is not necessary to "supply" anything here with τῇ. (ὑπερβολῇ, μερίδι, τάσει have been suggested.)—ἑκάτερος ἑκάτερον: it is absurd of Ast—in his anxiety to support his ἀθέτησις of ὁ . . . ἀκολάστου—to say that these words could only be used of *two* pairs of lives. Strictly they only apply to a single pair—ὁ ἀνδρεῖος and ὁ δειλός, because the last mentioned; but in sense ἑκάτερος goes with all the subjects of νικῶσι, and ἑκάτερον with all its objects. He might have said ἑκάτεροι ἑκατέρους ὑπερβάλλοντες as far as the meaning of ἑκάτερος goes.—ἀμφότερα: i.e. both pleasurable and painful sensations.

c 7. ἐκείνων ὑπερβαλλόντων: an adversative clause, subordinate to ἑκάτερος . . . ὑπερβάλλων.

d 1. There is a break here, and the place of the subject is *resumed* by ὁ μὲν ἀνδρεῖος. (Peipers, p. 97 note, goes further than Cornarius and Ast, for he would reject the whole passage from ὁ δὴ σώφρων to νικῶσι, on the ground (1) that it repeats what was said before, (2) that the construction is a tangled one, and (3) that the meaning of several words is obscure.)

d 4. There is a triumphant exuberance about the emphatic summing up of the often argued cause.—I fancy that a final revision would not have left two ὥστε clauses so near each other as those at d 2 and d 7.

d 5. κατὰ σῶμα ἢ καὶ κατὰ ψυχήν, "whether it be in body or in soul"; the implication is that, though it is easier to see in the case of the body, the truth is just as undoubted in the case of the soul. (Schanz follows H. Müller in rejecting the ἤ.)

d 6. τοῖς ἄλλοις: i.e. in other respects besides being more enjoyable; the following datives are in explanatory apposition to τοῖς ἄλλοις.

e 1. ἀπεργάζεσθαι has τὸν ἔχοντα . . . ζῆν as its object: "secures that its possessor lives, etc." (It is anyhow an awkward construc-

tion; is the ζῆν possibly spurious?)—εὐδαιμονέστερον is adj., not adv.

e 3–735 a 6. "So far the preface to our laws, and there it ends. After the 'prelude' it is right and proper that a 'tune' should follow, and this is really the place for a general outline of civic institutions. Now just as, in the case of a web or woven structure of any description, you cannot make both woof and warp of the same kinds of thread, but the substance of the warp must be of a superior nature to that of the woof—for the former is strong and endowed with a character of firmness, while the latter is softer and is bound to yield—from this comparison we may conclude it to be reasonable that the men who are destined for rule in our cities should in each case be set apart in some such way (as the warp threads are) from those whose temper has been tried by only a slight education. For (you must know that) there are two branches of civic organization, the one being the conferring of office on individuals, the other the providing your officers with (a code of) laws (to administer)."

e 4 f. The use of the singular shows that νόμος—and consequently προοίμιον too—are used in the technical musical sense (as at *Rep.* 531 d, *Tim.* 29 d), to which there is a punning reference in the subsequent νόμους. Cp. Jowett, *Introd.* p. 76, though in his, and all other translations or commentaries that I know, the musical sense is ignored here.

e 6. ὑπογράφειν: the "outline" of the subject, for which he selects this place in the treatise, is the division of the politician's domain into two branches, defined at 735 a 5 f.,—(1) the (training and) selection of magistrates, and (2) the provision of laws for them to execute. This division corresponds in spirit to the disposition of the subject matter throughout the *Laws*. Roughly speaking, two thirds of the treatise deal with the "personnel" of the citizens of all ranks—their selection, their training, and their enlightenment by means of προοίμια, and the way they can be influenced generally; the other third consists of statutes. Naturally the character of the magistrates is more important than that of any other citizen.—συνυφήν: this and its fellow accusatives have no verb to govern them; they are "dropped" with the modification of the structure of the sentence.

735 a 1. Ast would read ἐν ταῖς στροφαῖς for ἐν τοῖς τρόποις, but such a general word as τρόπος is quite in place, and is useful in the metaphor. Cp. Hdt. iv. 28 κεχώρισται δὲ οὗτος ὁ χειμὼν τοὺς τρόπους πᾶσι τοῖσι ἐν ἄλλῃσι χώρῃσι γενομένοισι χειμῶσι.

a 2. *ὅθεν δή* : another conversational break in the form of the sentence. After *καθάπερ οὖν* at e 6 we should expect "*ὡσαύτως καὶ* vel simile quid" (Ast). He goes on as if the simile had been fully drawn out, instead of hinted at.—*τοὺς τὰς ἀρχὰς . . . ἄρξοντας* : this is the reading of L and O—the reading which Ficinus translated—"qui magistratus in civitate gesturi sunt,"—and to which Aristotle refers when he says (*Pol.* ii. 1265 b 18) *ἐλλέλειπται δὲ τοῖς νόμοις τούτοις καὶ τὰ περὶ τοὺς ἄρχοντας πῶς ἔσονται διαφέροντες τῶν ἀρχομένων. φησὶ γὰρ δεῖν ὥσπερ ἐξ ἑτέρου τὸ στημόνιον ἐρίου γίνεται τῆς κρόκης, οὕτω καὶ τοὺς ἄρχοντας ἔχειν δεῖν πρὸς τοὺς ἀρχομένους.* A has *μεγάλας* for *τὰς*, and so a marginal variant of O. For a long time the reading in printed edd. was *τοὺς τὰς μεγάλας . . . ἄρξοντας*—though the first four edd. had *ἄρξαντας*. Schanz adopts A's *μεγάλας* for *τὰς*, and, further, Bücheler's alteration of *σμικρᾷ* in a 4 to *σμικρὰς* (so too Bruns). (Schanz and Burnet say Stob. has *τοὺς τὰς ἀρχὰς*, but in Meineke's ed. vol. ii. p. 194 the text is *τοὺς τὰς μεγάλας ἀρχὰς*.) Apart from authority, the passage becomes comparatively meaningless if we assume that the comparison is between the superior "grit"—to use another metaphor—of *the greater magistrates, as compared with the lesser ones.* The stouter threads are clearly magistrates—of all orders — who execute the laws, and the "yielding," weaker ones the general populace who have to obey them. It is hard to account for the *μεγάλας*; possibly it was due to a commentator's suggestion of *μεγάλῃ* for *σμικρᾷ*, made under the impression that *τοὺς . . . παιδείᾳ βασανισθέντας* was a further description of the magistrates themselves, and their class.

a 3. *τινα τρόπον ταύτῃ* : a variety for *τοιούτῳ τινὶ τρόπῳ*.

a 4. *βασανισθέντας* : this word suggests, on the one hand, the *teasing* and *twisting* of the thread, and, on the other, the "severity" and "thoroughness" of the educative and testing process.—*ἑκάστοτε* : almost our "respectively." — Stobaeus inserts *καὶ* before *κατὰ λόγον*.—There is a surprising variety in the interpretation—as well as in the reading—of this whole passage : e.g. Ast finds in it a comparison between warp and the *harsh power* of the *ruler*, and beween the woof and the milder action of the *legislator*. Stallb. says the woof typifies the *laws*.

a 5. *γὰρ δή*, "nam profecto," "for I must tell you." The clause throws a fresh light on the subject just discovered, revealing the important part played by the election of magistrates in the organization of a state, and providing us, in so doing, with the *ὑπογραφή* we have been promised above at e 6.—Bruns

(p. 191 note) pronounces this sentence "inept"; the γάρ, he says, is only explicable on the assumption that the method of selecting and appointing magistrates was immediately to follow.—See also on 751 a 4 below.—δύο πολιτείας εἴδη: this phrase is repeated in the same sense at 751 a—δύο εἴδη ταῦτα περὶ πολιτείας κόσμον γιγνόμενα τυγχάνει.—The εἴδη πολιτειῶν at 681 d and 714 b means something quite different.

a 7. τὸ δὲ πρὸ τούτων ἁπάντων: neither of the above-mentioned branches is considered until the beginning of Bk. VI. The rest of this book deals with the preliminary conditions of citizenship—ὃ δὴ λαχὼν κεκτήσθω, φαμέν, τὸν κλῆρον ἐπὶ τούτοις οἷς εἰρήκαμεν 744 a 8—which are mainly these: (1) The government is to have the power of rejection and expulsion of citizens—whose numbers are to be limited; (2) Property, though allowed, is to be by all possible means kept in the background, and kept equal.

b 2. παραλαβών goes with all three nominatives.—L and O have ἐπιχειρήσει, A (and L^2, O^2 and Stob.) has ἐπιχειρήσηι, but the last two letters have been altered from something else. The first six printed edd. read ἐπιχειρήσειε. (Cp. Goodwin, *M. and T.* § 295.)

b 3. καθαρμὸν καθαρεῖ: the religious associations of these words seem to add a sanction to this purging process.

b 4. καθάρῃ MSS., καθαρεῖ Ast. It is curious that the manifestly incorrect form—possibly subj. of the late first aor. ἐκάθαρα, but most probably a mere copyist's error—should have held its ground longer than the quite possible ἐπιχειρήσῃ above; even Schneider keeps καθάρῃ (but not ἐπιχειρήσῃ), Zürr. and Herm. keep both subjunctives. It is possible that the first mistake was the earlier, and drew the other in its train.—τῇ συνοικήσει: at first sight these words seem unnecessary, and we could easily supply ἀγέλῃ with ἑκάστῃ. Possibly it was put in to improve the rhythm of the sentence, and suggest the human community to which the ἀγέλη or συνοίκησις is being likened.

b 5. τὰ μὲν κτλ.: cp. *Rep.* 410 a 1 τοὺς μὲν εὐφυεῖς τὰ σώματα καὶ τὰς ψυχὰς θεραπεύσουσι, τοὺς δὲ μή, ὅσοι μὲν κατὰ σῶμα τοιοῦτοι, ἀποθνῄσκειν ἐάσουσιν, τοὺς δὲ κατὰ τὴν ψυχὴν κακοφυεῖς καὶ ἀνιάτους αὐτοὶ ἀποκτενοῦσιν.—Plato uses his favourite chiasmus here. (Wagner thinks there is no chiasmus, but that the good are sent away, and the bad retained for medical treatment. But θεραπεύειν is much more likely to be used—as in the *Republic* passage just quoted, and as at *Gorg.* 516 e—of the *training of the good*, than of the *curing of the bad*. *Expulsion* and not *cure* is what he contemplates in the case of the bad citizen.

b 6 ff. *διανοούμενος . . . διακαθαίρηται*, "for he will reflect how vain and endless must be the pains he will have to take with the animals' bodies or with their souls if he does not purge his herds by discriminating selection, since either natural depravity or evil nurture, not content with ruining its victims, spreads the fatal taint to tempers and bodies, of one beast after another, which were hitherto sound and uncontaminated."

b 7. For *ἀνήνυτος πόνος* cp. *ἀνηνύτῳ καὶ ἀπλήστῳ κακῷ* 714 a, *ἀνήνυτα πονοῦσιν Rep.* 531 a, *ἀνήνυτον κακόν Gorg.* 507 e.

c 3. *κτημάτων*: as Stallb. says, here, and at *Gorg.* 484 c *βοῦς καὶ τἆλλα κτήματα*, and possibly at *Laws* 902 b 8, *κτήματα* seems to be used for *κτήνη*.

c 4. *τῶν ἄλλων ζῴων* depends on *τὰ μέν*, not on *σπουδή* (Stobaeus has *ἐλάττω τε σπουδῇ*). In all three sentences *ἐστί* has to be supplied.

c 6. The infins. *διερευνᾶσθαι* and *φράζειν* are epexegetical to *σπουδῆς τῆς μεγίστης*, and the *τε*, possibly for rhythm's sake, has been put earlier than its natural place, which is after *διερευνᾶσθαι*; Stobaeus has *γε* for it.

c 7. *τὸ προσῆκον ἑκάστοις*, "the treatment proper to each case."

d 1. *πράξεων*, "dealings with them, measures, treatment generally"—"and the whole of the rest of their treatment."—*αὐτίκα γάρ*, "to begin with," "for instance."

d 3. *τύραννος μὲν ὢν καὶ νομοθέτης ὁ αὐτός*: F. Doering (p. 14) is mistaken in saying that 709 e 5—712 a 7 is the only passage in the *Laws* in which Plato admits that a *τύραννος* may be useful to a state. In both cases there is a big *if* in the background. The possibility of the existence of a *κόσμιος τύραννος* (710 d 7) or another Nestor (711 e) is spoken of as contrary to experience (*ἐφ' ἡμῶν δὲ οὐδαμῶς* 711 e 4), so that Doering exaggerates when he says that it is impossible that 709 e ff., 691 c 6 ff. and 713 c 6 ff. could have been originally written as parts of the same book. There is not much difference between saying that an occurrence is extremely rare, and contrary to experience, and saying that you must act on the assumption that it is impossible.

d 7. *ἀγαπώντως*, the reading of A and Stobaeus, is mentioned as a variant in the margin of L and O, which have *ἀγαπητῶς*, which is also given as a variant in the margin of A. Probably the former was early altered to *ἀγαπητῶς*, a word which was used in the sense of "with difficulty"; for this meaning admirably suits this passage. It is found at *Critias* 106 a, *Lys.* 218 c, and possibly at Lysias, *C. Andoc.* p. 107 § 45.—("You must *be content*

with that"—cp. 684 c 7—is not far from "it is much if you get that.") ἀγαπώντως does not seem to occur elsewhere; it is in formation like ὁμολογουμένως, which is common in Plato, and it possibly meant here "he would be quite content to do merely that."

e 1. τιμωρία is not here used in the sinister sense which it bears above at 728 c.—The whole expression seems strangely pleonastic.

e 2. θάνατον . . . ἐπιτιθείς, "exacting the penalty of death or exile"—(lit. "making death or exile the accomplishment of the penalty").

e 6 ff. ὅσοι . . . ἔπεσθαι, "all citizens who, in the struggle for existence" (lit. "owing to scarcity of food"), "let it be known that they have made themselves ready, in their poverty, to follow their leaders in an attack on the property of the wealthy."

736 a 1. τούτοις is governed by τιθέμενος: ἀπαλλαγήν *may* be in apposition to ἀποικίαν, "while calling these people a colony—a method of banishment which brings no disgrace"—but it is better, as suggested by Burnet's comma after ἀπαλλαγήν to see in the word the peculiarly Euripidean *acc. in apposition to the action of the verb* (ἐξεπέμψατο). So Riddell, *Idioms* § 13. Cf. *Gorg.* 507 e ταύτας ἐπιχειροῦντα πληροῦν, ἀνήνυτον κακόν. (The early printed editions read δι' εὐφημίαν ἀπαλλαγῆς, with no MS. authority. Ast suggests ἀπαλλαγῇ; but this leaves τούτοις unaccounted for. Wagner would reject ἀπαλλαγήν; Stallb. suggests ἀντ' ἀπαλλαγῆς. Apelt (p. 9) would read ὑπαλλαγὲν ὄνομα: ingenious, but the text seems more natural.)

a 3. εὐμενῶς ὅτι μάλιστα, "hurting their feelings as little as possible."—παντὶ . . . δραστέον, "everybody who undertakes to frame a constitution must start by getting rid of undesirables somehow." Then he goes on to say that for *their* new settlement they will not be obliged to "plan (to send away) a colony, or select a method of purgation"; all they will have to do is to admit none but such as they approve among the applicants. This is described by the MSS. as ἔτι ἀτοπώτερα than all the καθαρμοί that have been previously described, whether ἀλγεινοί or πρᾳότεροι. It is clear that Ritter's ἀκοπώτερα, which Burnet accepts, fits this statement exactly, while it is most remarkable that all previous translators or commentators should have been content with the MS. reading. (Jowett neglects the ἔτι and translates "Our present case, however, is peculiar.")

a 6. οὔτ' ἐκλογήν τινα καθάρσεως: all translations apparently take καθάρσεως to be a *gen. of definition*; Schn. "delectum aliquem purgantem," Wagn. "irgend eine Auswahl für die

Reinigung."—I would suggest that it is more natural to take it, as at 872 e 10 *οὐκ εἶναι κάθαρσιν ἄλλην*, to mean *method or process of purgation*, and to translate *μηχανᾶσθαι ἐκλογήν τινα καθ.*, "contrive a selection of a purgative process." *ἐκλογή* is almost always used of selecting *something you want*, and would sound strange as applied to the process of picking (or casting) out the *bad* citizens. "Our task," he goes on to say, "is to see that none but the good are admitted."

a 7. Madvig is right, I think, in rejecting *ἐκ*. If it be retained we must, I suppose, supply *ὑδάτων* with *πολλῶν*, or else with *συρρεόντων*. (Wagner transl. "von vielen *Orten* her," Schn. "*ex multis locis*.")

b 1. *τὰ μὲν πηγῶν*: we are to understand, I think, that the *spring water* is what we *want* in our reservoir, and the muddy mountain torrent what we wish to avoid; and it seems that *ἐξαντλοῦντας* in b 3 describes the drawing off of the spring water into the reservoir (*λίμνη*) and the two following participles —both compounded with *ἀπό*—the various ways of preventing the mountain torrents from joining the spring water. *συρρεόντων* will then be *conative*. In the natural course of things they *would* have flowed into the same *λίμνη* as the *πηγαί*.

b 4. "Clearly no political machinery can secure us from trouble and risk. True (*γε*); but as in our present attempt at constitution-making we can arrange our facts to fit our theory, we will suppose the gathering of the citizens complete, and its select character duly secured. To do this last we must refuse admittance to the bad ones among the applicants for citizenship, after we have plied them with all good advice and allowed a sufficient time for a thorough appreciation of their character, while we must do all we can by kind and gracious treatment to win the good ones to our side."

b 6. *τά* (in *τὰ δ'*) has a demonstrative force, and is the subject of *ἐστὶν πραττόμενα*, and *τὰ νῦν* is an adverb of time; lit. "but since these attempts (of ours) are being made now in (the world of) theory and not in (that of stern) fact." The early editions—even Ast's—have *ἀλλ'* for *τὰ δ'*, on no MS. authority; they apparently took either *τὰ νῦν* or *τὰ νῦν πραττόμενα* as the subject. The MSS. of Plato all have *τάδ'*, though there seems to have been some hint of *τὰ δ'* in O. Those of Stobaeus have *τὰ δ'*, which is clearly right. In A an o is written over the *τ*. This is difficult to interpret; for though *τὸ δ'* (adverbial) might begin the sentence as well at least as *ἀλλ'*, it is hard to make anything of *τόδ'*.

b 7. *πεπεράνθω τε . . . καὶ . . . ἡ καθαρότης ἔστω συμβεβηκυῖα*: so, in the analogous passage at 712 a, we had two imperatives, *κεχρησμῳδήσθω* and *ἐπιδεδείχθω*. The substance of both passages is the same; i.e. (1) the *claim* that the political theorist should should not be expected to obviate, by his arrangements, all possible difficulties, and (2) the *admission* that there must be a certain amount of assumption and "make-believe" in the foundations of his structure. He admits this, as we see here, even in framing the laws for the actual community of Magnesia which is now in prospect. He can only legislate for that on the assumption that certain conditions are fulfilled. It is a mistake to suppose that Plato had in view (1) some theoretical conditions of city-founding, and (2) the actual conditions of the founding of Magnesia, as two distinct cases, and is talking sometimes about one and sometimes about the other. As Ritter says (p. 143), there is a constant intermingling throughout the Laws of *fundamental principle* and *positive enactment*. (See below on 739 b ff.)

c 2. Schneider and Wagner take *πειθοῖ πάσῃ* (as instrumental) with *διακωλύσωμεν*; it is better (as Jowett) to take it with *διαβασανίσαντες*: persuasion, and good advice, are not efficient means of *exclusion*, but it is reasonable that none should be finally condemned who have not had a good opportunity of knowing and choosing the right way. (Badham says *πειθοῖ* is a mistake for *πεῖρᾳ*, and Schanz agrees with him. But *πειθοῖ* fits the circumstances best. The object aimed at is not to discover the bad—they are under suspicion, I take it, from the first—but to find which of them are *curable*.)

c 3. *εἰς δύναμιν* seems to qualify *εὐμενεῖς ἵλεώ τε* rather than *προσαγώμεθα*. "Do all we can to win them" would leave the method to us, but, as the method is suggested, the qualifying words must apply to that.

c 6 ff. *εὐτυχεῖν, ὡς . . . ἐξέφυγεν*, "was lucky in having escaped." Ficinus translates *ὡς ἐξ.* by *quum effugit*; Stallb. and Wagn. and Jowett take *ὡς* as an otiose repetition of *ὅτι*—as at *Rep.* 470 d, Hdt. iii. 71 and ix. 6. Such a repetition, though not in Plato's style, is possible, but Stallb. has no warrant for introducing *civitas nostra* as the subj. of *ἐξέφυγεν*. It is best to suppose that the sentence started, as anybody can see, with the intention of finishing with "so it is with us"; but lost itself in a description of the disadvantages of a state in which it was otherwise. Sixteen lines lower down (737 a 2) he says: "and this (disadvantage) I maintain that we escape"; and this somewhat lamely

fills the gap. Ficinus filled it boldly by inserting after *τρόπον* (in d 2) "*itu ferme et nobis accidisse videtur.*" (Müller omitted *καθάπερ*, and took *ὅτι* to be the neut. of *ὅστις*. Schanz also prints *ὅ, τι*, but keeps *καθάπερ*. Both these readings put too much weight on *γιγνόμενον*, and even so do not straighten out the construction.)

c 7. *νομῆς* refers to the distribution of money as well as of land: "dissension about land, about the cancelling of debts, and about the distribution of property." (Wagner believes that *νομῆς* means *pasture* here; most interpreters take it to apply to *γῆς* only.)

c 8. *ἦν*: although in grammar this probably agrees with *ἔριν*, it is really the *subject* of dispute rather than the dispute itself about which the city is called upon to legislate—either in a conservative, or a liberal spirit. *ἦν* is governed both by *νομοθετεῖσθαι*, and by *ἐᾶν*, and *κινεῖν*.—*ἀναγκασθείσῃ*: the compelling cause is the discord between the "haves" and the "have-nots."

d 1. *πόλει τῶν ἀρχαίων*, "any old-established state"; so Ficinus and Schneider. The earlier editors, on no MS. authority, inserted *οὐδέν*, after *ἀκίνητον*, for *τῶν ἀρχαίων* to depend on. Stallb., though abandoning the *οὐδέν*, still takes *τῶν ἀρχαίων* as a partitive gen. with "anything" understood—as at *Rep.* 445 e—governed by *ἐᾶν* and *κινεῖν*, and he may be right. [A.M.A. suggests that *τῶν ἀρχαίων* may mean "any of the *capital*."]

d 2 ff. *εὐχὴ δὲ . . . ἥδε*, "little but an impossible aspiration remains, and a slow and cautious change, advancing at long intervals by imperceptible degrees, in the following manner." *εὐχή*, as at 841 c 7, *Rep.* 450 d, and elsewhere, is what we might call a "Utopian ideal"—in German "ein frommer Wünsch" (Stallb.).—The *μεταβιβάζουσιν*, and the *κινούντων* in the next sentence, are the same people.

d 4. *ἥδε*: the MSS., and almost all editors, write *ἡ δὲ*, and begin the next sentence with it. Burnet rightly adopts Bekker's addition of it, as *ἥδε*, to the previous sentence,—marking it more clearly by altering the comma which Bekker placed after it into a colon, and putting a comma before it.

d 5. The early editions, again on no MS. authority, read *ὑπάρχει*—and so Stallb. and Herm.—as verb to *ἡ δέ*. *τῶν κινούντων ἀεὶ . . . ὑπάρχειν* means "(all that remains is) that there should be a supply of reformers from time to time (men who, etc.)." *τῶν κινούντων* is a partitive gen., like that after *ἅλις*. According to Porson, who reads *οἴκοις* for *οἶκος* at Aesch. *Ag.* 961, we have

there ὑπάρχει τῶνδε in the same sense: "there is a store of those things." For the gen. cp. Aristoph. *Ach.* 184 συνελέγοντο τῶν λίθων. (Badham suggests altering ὑπάρχειν into ἀπ' ἀρχῆς.)

d 6. Stallb. rightly points out that τούτων does not agree with ἐθελόντων, but is a part. gen. depending on τοῖς ἀπορουμένοις. It is the specially distressed among their debtors who excite the pity of the liberal-minded rich.

e 2. νεμομένους: the middle voice is peculiar. At 739 e 8 νειμάσθων, and at 740 a 2 νεμέσθων are used of the community dividing up its own property among its own members: here it seems to mean "sharing their property with them." (Badham suggests that we ought to read ἀπονεμομένους: the middle of this compound is used at *Epinomis* 991 b in an active sense.)—The four acc. participles are quite in order, as agreeing with the subject to κοινωνεῖν—which is used absolutely.—Plato's favourite chiasmus again: τὰ μὲν ἀφ. refers to the debts, τὰ δὲ νεμ. to the gift of land; these two subjects were mentioned in the reverse order at d 5. —ἁμῇ γέ πῃ . . . ἡγουμένους, "they manage to show regard for moderation, and act from a conviction that poverty consists . . ." Cp. Arist. *Pol.* ii. 1266 b 29 μᾶλλον γὰρ δεῖ τὰς ἐπιθυμίας ὁμαλίζειν ἢ τὰς οὐσίας, τοῦτο δ' οὐκ ἔστι μὴ παιδευομένοις ἱκανῶς ὑπὸ τῶν νόμων.

e 4. σωτηρίας ἀρχὴ πόλεως μεγίστη, "the surest source of civic well-being."

e 5. αὕτη: i.e. *the true estimate of property*—especially the repression of ἀπληστία—not necessarily μετριότης, though it would come to much the same.

e 7. τῇ τοιαύτῃ καταστάσει: i.e. "for conditions so desirable as those above described."

737 a 1. The words τῆς μεταβάσεως have given much difficulty. Ficinus boldly translates ταύτης τ. μ. by *hoc fundamento*, and Herm. (*De vestig.* p. 27) concluded that Ficinus had read and Plato written βάσεως, and not μεταβάσεως (Schanz accepts this). Ficinus's translation, however, does not prove either that he read τῆς βάσεως, or that he translated μεταβάσεως by *fundamento*. He may have read simply ταύτης δὲ σαθρᾶς οὔσης, and supplied κρηπῖδος in thought from the context. The scribe of A may well have had two readings before him, for before μεταβάσεως there is a gap filled with two dummy letters. I would suggest that Plato wrote the simple ταύτης, and that this was interpreted by one commentator to stand for καταστάσεως (and rightly so); and by another for κρηπῖδος, for which he substituted

the to him more familiar word *βάσεως*; this last was, owing to a remembrance of what was said at d 3, corrected to *μεταβάσεως*. It is to be noticed that *ἥν* in a 2, "the thing which we (in Magnesia) are escaping," fits in better as referring to *an unsound political condition*, than as to *a rotten political foundation*; *ταύτης* then would refer to *καταστάσεως*. (Schneider, Stallb., Wagn., and Jowett make the best they can of *μεταβάσεως* in the sense of *change*—"*laborante hoc transitu*," etc.—the "change" being, acc. to Ritter, that from inequality of possessions to equality.)—*οὐκ εὔπορος ἡ πολιτικὴ πρᾶξις γίγνοιτ' ἄν*, "the statesman's course will be full of difficulty."

a 2. *μετὰ ταῦτα*: i.e. after an *un*sound condition has been established. — Most editors now adopt Bekker's *οὐδεμιᾷ* for the MS. *οὐδὲ μία*.

a 3. *ἦν κτλ.*: see above on e 7 and c 6.—*ὅμως δὲ . . . φυγήν*, "for all that, it is just as well to have it explained how we *should* have contrived to escape it, if we had *not* been so fortunate."

a 5. Many recent editors rightly adopt Ast's *δή νυν* for the MS. *δὴ νῦν*; for *νῦν* is unnatural when introducing a recapitulation. —The MS. reading *διὰ τοῦ μὴ φιλοχρηματεῖν μετὰ δίκης* may quite well stand for "by means of absence of avarice, combined with justice," and it has this advantage over the (easier) reading *φιλ. μετ' ἀδικίας*, suggested by Heindorf, and adopted by Schanz, that—as below at 747 b 7, and as implied above at 736 e—*avarice* is thus *by itself* declared to be a danger, whether satisfied justly or not. Heindorf's reading would confine the blame to unjust gains; and so would have the same effect as the *εἰκῇ* added by later hands to St. Matth. v. 22 *πᾶς ὁ ὀργιζόμενος τῷ ἀδελφῷ αὐτοῦ ἔνοχος ἔσται τῇ κρίσει*; in both cases the commentator seeks to modify the moral censure of what is an ordinary state of mind.—The sentence introduced by *εἰρήσθω δή νυν* is recapitulatory: he restates (1) the vital importance of *μετριότης* in the words *μετὰ δίκης*, and (2) the deadly danger of *ἀπληστία πλούτου* in the words *διὰ τοῦ μὴ φιλοχρηματεῖν*. So too at b 2 he restates the impossibility of going further in the lawgiver's work until this danger has been removed (see e 5 above).

a 6. *ἄλλη . . . διαφυγή*, "and there is no other way of escape, broad or narrow, than such a plan as that." As *φυγὴν αὐτῆς* has occurred in the previous sentence, there is no need here to specify what the escape is *from*. Badham maintains that Plato must have written *μηχανὴ διαφυγῆς*—and Schanz agrees—but to say, as he does, that a *μηχανή* can be described as "broad or

narrow" because it is equivalent to ὁδός, is only less preposterous than to hold, with Ast, that by μηχανῆς διαφυγή Plato meant us *to understand* μηχανὴ διαφυγῆς. (Stallb. takes τῆς τοιαύτης μηχανῆς as a gen. of definition with διαφυγή: "effugium quod tali machina effici possit.") Plato often makes ἄλλος govern a gen.

b 1. ἔρμα, "prop," varies the metaphor used above in κρηπῖδος. O has preserved for us the reading δεῖ, though the scribe altered it to δὴ. On Schanz's theory that O is merely a copy of A, we should have to suppose, not only that the scribe of O hit on the right reading by mistake, but also recognized it as a mistake. Ficinus's *oportet* shows that he too read δεῖ.

b 2. ἀλλήλους is said of the possessors who are implied in οὐσίας; a characteristic boldness of expression.

b 3 ff. ἢ μὴ . . . μετῇ: in this rather confused sentence I adopt Ast's ἑκόντας for the MS. ἑκόντα, the universally accepted ᾖ of the early editions for the MS. ἢ, after οἷς, and (like Burnet) follow Ritter in rejecting the καὶ before ὅσοις, which was first questioned by Stallb.—"Otherwise all men of any sense will refuse to go forward with the arrangement of the constitution for citizens who have long-standing disputes with each other (about property)."

b 4. The gen. κατασκευῆς depends on εἰς τοὔμπροσθεν as in πόρρω σοφίας at *Euthyd.* 294 e.—For the poetical rel. with bare subj. cf. Goodwin, *M. and T.* § 540. Ast, followed by Schanz, inserts ἄν before ᾖ, but not before μετῇ—as ὅσοις and οἷς have different antecedents, it is hard to see why not.

b 5. The καί before ὅσοις may well have been due to the idea that the two relatives had the same antecedent.

b 7 f. ἀλλήλους is used of the whole population of Magnesia, including the three (self-constituted) legislators; τούτους, like οἷς and ἡμῖν in b 5, of the three legislators alone. For one reason, οἰκίζειν is much more naturally used of the *founding authority*, than of the populace of the colony. Where that is spoken of—as it is at 708 b 3—the middle οἰκίζεσθαι is used.

b 9. I.e. "no human being could be at once so mad and bad as that" or "no human being, however vile, could be guilty of such folly as that"—i.e. as to stir up strife, where it did not exist, by dividing land unfairly. In other words, even the most incompetent and misanthropical of legislators would never make arrangements which would be sure to cause dissension.

c 2. A's αὐτῶν here, like the αὐτοῖς of all MSS. at c 4 (which was probably meant to go with ἀνομολογητέον) assumes that

arrangements are to be made by the whole populace, instead of by the three lawgivers now consulting. Boeckh corrected the first error, and Herm. the second. (The *αὐτὸν* of L and O is merely a copyist's error of a very ordinary kind.)—*ὄγκον τοῦ ἀριθμοῦ*, "numerical amount," like *ὄγκος πλήθους* at c 6.

c 5. For *ἐπί c. acc.* describing distribution *among* cp. *Od.* π 385 *δασσάμενοι κατὰ μοῖραν ἐφ' ἡμέας*, and *Prot.* 322 d *ἢ ἐπὶ πάντας νείμω*; similarly at *Tim.* 23 b *ἄριστον (γένος) ἐπ' ἀνθρώπους* means "noblest *among* men." So we speak of spreading a *gift*, or a *charge*, *over* a number of people.

c 6. *ὄγκος δὴ κτλ.*: the two points to be taken into account in fixing the number of heads of families are (1) the size of the territory, and (2) the necessity of having a population large enough to take its place among the surrounding states. The latter consideration fixes the limit *downwards*, the former *upwards*. But instead of saying, as we should expect: "you must not have a larger population than your territory will support," he says, in effect, "you must remember (when you are estimating the capacity of your territory) that only enough need be allowed to each man to satisfy *moderate* desires."

As to this sentence I thoroughly agree with Stephanus in two important points: (1) that *ποσούς* is the indeterminate pron. (like *ποτέρων* at 628 b 7), and (2) that the sense demands that *δεῖ* should be supplied mentally from *προσδεῖ*. Those who accent *πόσους*, and make the question a double one,—"how much land will support *how many*?"—imply that the amount and the nature of the territory available is yet to be ascertained; while *πλείονος . . . προσδεῖ* sinks into a mere parenthesis. But the previous sentence implies just the opposite of this: i.e. that our decision as to the number of the people must depend on the size of the land. It is as if a man, after saying, "you must cut your coat according to your cloth," went on to say, "we must calculate how much cloth will make a decent coat." (Ficinus read *ποσούς*, for he translates "*ut tot moderatis hominibus sufficiat.*" So too Jowett.) —As to the second point, I would (mentally) add *δεῖ* even if reading *γῇ* with A or *γῆ* with Schneider and Burnet and L and O, i.e. I would supply *ταύτης τῆς γῆς (δεῖ)* as an antecedent to *ὁπόση*. I think, however, that the Aldine correction of *γῆ*—or *γῇ* as A—to *γῆς* gives us the true reading. This brings it into line with *πλήθους δέ* at d 2, with which we must supply *δεῖ* also. —Possibly the *ι* in A's *γῆι* is a mistake for **c**.

Between *πόλεις* and *γῆς μέν* I can see no gap in the sense such

as Badham discerns—only the ordinary explanatory asyndeton.—(At Aristotle, *Pol.* ii. 1265 a 18 ff., where he seems to be referring to Plato's two considerations as here given, I suspect we ought to read *πρός τε τὴν χώραν καὶ τοὺς <γειτνιῶντας> ἀνθρώπους*; for he proceeds to suggest as an addition to what Plato had said, *καὶ πρὸς τοὺς γειτνιῶντας* **τόπους**, i.e. he thinks Plato ought to have considered the *kind of country* the neighbours inhabited, as well as (the numbers and character of) the neighbours themselves.)

c 7. *λεχθείς* here and *λέγωμεν* at 738 a 2 have the meaning "choose" (*pace* L. & S. *s.v.* *λέγω* B).

d 6. *ἔργῳ καὶ λόγοις*: i.e. we shall not only make such settlements as to number and size of lot as the circumstances warrant, but we shall *give the reasons* for them.—*νῦν δὲ κτλ.*, "on the present occasion (when we have none of the necessary details) all we can do is to complete the *outline* of the legislator's task." I do not think he means here (as Wagner), "we will leave this subject in outline and proceed to the task of making laws so as to complete our discourse." *ἵνα περαίνηται* belongs, I take it, to *σχήμ. ἕν. κ. ὑπογραφῆς*, and I would take away the comma which separates them in all editions. The subj. of *περ.* is *νομοθεσία*, not *λόγος*.—For the *σχήματος* and the *ὑπογραφῆς* Ast well cps. *Rep.* 548 c f. *ὡς λόγῳ σχῆμα πολιτείας ὑπογράψαντα μὴ ἀκριβῶς ἀπεργάσασθαι.*

e 1–e 7. "Let there (be assumed to) be—to choose a convenient number—5040 landholders—men ready to fight for their land. Likewise let the land and dwelling-places be divided so as to make the same number,—man and portion of land making a pair. First then let the whole number be divided by two, and next by three; in fact (*γάρ*) the number admits of divisions by four, and five, and all numbers up to ten without a break."

e 3. *τὰ αὐτὰ μέρη*, like *τέτταρα* and *πέντε* (*μέρη*) at e 6, are acc., while the *δύο μέρη* in e 4 and the *τρία* in e 5 are nom.

e 4. *συννομή*, the MS. reading, seems to mean a lot which counts as one single division; here it is "a pair." Ast's suggested *σύννομα*, the adj., would give the same sense, but would not be quite so explicit; *γενόμενα σύννομα* would be "counting together."—What follows seems to be merely advice to the lawgiver to familiarize himself with the various groups into which his whole number may be divided.

e 6. I would, with Schanz, adopt Stephanus's correction of the MS. *τὸν αὐτὸν* into *τοῦ αὐτοῦ*, so as to retain the same construction for *τρία* as for *δύο*; for if *τὸν αὐτὸν* is right,

ἀριθμόν, and not *λόγον*, as Ast suggests, must be supplied with it.—(Ritter thinks that the divisions by two and three are laid down as *imperative*, whatever whole number be selected by the lawgiver, and he translates *νεμηθήτω* "must be obtainable by division"—where he takes the *πέφυκε γὰρ κτλ.* to apply only to the 5040. He gives as his reason the frequent occurrence in the subsequent civic arrangements of divisions into twelve and groups of twelfths. To this division he thinks that by two *and then* by three—i.e. into six—is intended to lead up.)

738 a 2. *λέγωμεν δή*—so A, O^2, and Ficinus's *dicamus*—is "let us choose etc."; *λέγομεν δή*—so L and O—"we choose etc."

a 4. *ὁ πᾶς* (*ἀριθμός*) here is evidently not the same as *τοῦ παντὸς ἀριθμοῦ* at e 5 above—for that is 5040, and this is contrasted with 5040 — but "*the complete number*," Ficinus's "universus numerus," perhaps we might say "the ideal whole number" ["number in general," F.H.D.], "the unlimited numerical series" ["infinity" A.M.A.], "totam numerorum seriem," Ast. This is obviously impossible. He will have to content himself with one which admits of "no more than fifty-nine different factorizations" (which, I am told, is the case with 5040. It is also pointed out to me that $5040 = 1 \times 2 \times 3 \times 4 \times 5 \times 6 \times 7$). The *οὐ πλείους* in a 7 accounts for the adversative *δέ* in a 4, and is manifestly inconsistent with the absurd correction of the first *ὁ* in a 4 to *οὐ*, which is adopted by Boeckh, Ast, Wagner, Hermann and Schanz. (Grynaeus in his "correction" of Ficinus's version translates as if he read *οὐ μὲν δὴ* in a 4, and it is curious to read in Serranus's translation, side by side with Stephanus's Greek text *ὁ μὲν δὴ πᾶς*, "*neque enim omnis numerus.*" (Boeckh, p. 54, to support the neg., quotes from the "corrected" Ficinus.)—*εἰς πάντα*, "for all purposes"; so *εἰς πόλεμον καὶ ὅσα κτλ.* in the next line. Cornarius unaccountably translates it as masc., "*in quemvis*" (? *numerum*).

a 6. *πρὸς ἅπαντα τὰ συμβόλαια καὶ κοινωνήματα*: these words come in very awkwardly after *ὅσα κατ' εἰρήνην*. I suspect they were the marginal comment of someone who was thinking of the necessity of arithmetic *for business purposes*. "Business engagements and dealings" are not spheres in which the multiple divisibility of men's total number—i.e. varied grouping—is of special importance. But it *is* of great importance in arranging (1) an army and (2) the collection of taxes or the distribution (*διανομῶν*) of state allowances. (Cobet rejected *καὶ κοινωνήματα*, thinking *κ.* a gloss on *συμβ.*—Cp. *Rep.* 333 a *συμβόλαια δὲ λέγεις*

κοινωνήματα, ἤ τι ἄλλο.—Ficinus for πρὸς ἅπαντα (τά) has "*ad contraria omnia*"; can he have read πρὸς τἀναντία πάντα, of which our text is an explanation? Cf. Xen. *Mem.* iii. 12. 4 πάντα γε τἀναντία συμβαίνει.).

b 2. "These numerical relations must be seriously studied and clearly comprehended by men whose business it is to do so—they will find it just as I say—moreover the founder of a city needs to have his attention called to them, and I will tell you why." The reason is then explained to be that it is of the highest importance —to put it into modern language—that the number of *parishes* should coincide with the actual number of *patron saints* already venerated by the people, and that every opportunity be taken to localize and keep alive religious sentiment. The number 12 which he recommends below at 771 b for the tribes, is chosen ostensibly because the Olympian deities were twelve in number; but Plato may well have had in mind the thought that it was perhaps some wise old arithmetician who fixed on 12 for the number of the deities, because it was such a convenient number for human divisions. Number was itself, in a way, a sacred thing to Plato.—καί emphasizes κατὰ σχολήν.—For βεβαίως λαβεῖν cf. Xen. *Cyr.* iii. 3. 51 λαβεῖν δ' ἐν ταῖς γνώμαις βεβαίως τοῦτο.

b 3. ἔχει γὰρ οὖν οὐκ ἄλλως ἢ ταύτῃ: these words should be marked off, as by Stallb., as a parenthesis; i.e. the comma, which Schn. and Burnet put after ταύτῃ, should be a colon. Cf. 771 c 5 ὡς δ' ἐστὶν ταῦτα ἀληθῶς ὄντα, κατὰ σχολὴν οὐκ ἂν πολὺς ἐπιδείξειεν μῦθος, where, as here, we are assured that *study* will prove the truth of what has been said.

b 4. The following δέ is not violently adversative; the contrast is between the *study* of the facts by the proper officials, and the *recognition* of them necessary on the part of the city-founder. (I see no need to assume any lacuna in this passage, as has been done by Badham, Bruns, and Schanz.) Further on, b 5–c 7 enjoins on the νομοθέτης the supreme importance of preserving every available feeling of veneration existing in his citizens, no matter whence obtained, and this injunction is summed up in the words τούτων . . . οὐδὲν κινητέον at c 7. Then with τοῖς μέρεσιν ἑκάστοις the arithmetic is brought into connexion with religion. Each tribe must be provided with a patron deity, and a "God's acre" of its own, to serve as a centre and type of its corporate and social life.

b 7. ὧντινων ἐπονομάζεσθαι θεῶν: Theseus's promise to Heracles at Eur. *H.F.* 1329 furnishes an example both of the relation described and of the grammatical construction: ταῦτ' ἐπωνομασμένα

σέθεν, τὸ λοιπὸν ἐκ βροτῶν κεκλήσεται, only there ταῦτα is τεμένη instead of ἱερά, as here.—ἱδρῦσθαι applies to the case of a newly founded city; ἐπονομάζεσθαι to that of a regenerated old one.

c 1. ὅσα ἐκ Δελφῶν κτλ.: it seems best to take ὅσα as governed by ἔπεισεν ὁ θεός to be supplied from the following ἔπεισαν.

c 2. ὁπῃδή . . . θεῶν, "in whatever way they persuaded people —whether telling of visions of the Gods which had appeared, or of an inspired message delivered from heaven."

c 3. λεχθείσης: not "qui dicitur" Stallb., *angebliche* (Wagn.), or "reputed" (Jowett), but "*reported*." θεῶν belongs to both clauses; either the Gods themselves appeared on the spot where they wished a temple to be built, or they inspired a man with the knowledge of their preference, and he "reported" it. (Herm. unnecessarily rejects πείσαντες in c 2,—and so Schanz.)—With πείσαντες δέ the subject changes from the old-time *stories*, to the old-time *men* (*veteres* Fic.), who told them. So, as Stallb. points out, at 761 b c, the subject changes from νάπαι to ἄνθρωποι, though there the gender of the participles in agreement with the different subjects gives an indication of the change. (I do not see why Stallb. postpones this change of subject to καθιέρωσαν instead of making it begin at once with κατεστήσαντο.)

c 5. καθιέρωσαν δέ: δέ is not adversative, but introduces an amplification of the preceding statement.—"And moreover, by such stories they gave sanctity to oracles, and images, and altars, and shrines, and provided each of these with a piece of consecrated ground." For φήμη in the sense of *seat of an oracle* cp. Eur. *Hel.* 820 φήμη τις οἴκων ἐν μυχοῖς ἱδρυμένη.

d 3. πρώτοις: i.e. before any portions of land are assigned to human occupants.

d 6. εἴς τε τὰς χρείας ἑκάστας εὐμάρειαν παρασκευάζωσι: as the subject of παρασ. is not the same as that of the next verb, it is better to put a comma after it. These words are generally taken to mean "may provide opportunity for the satisfaction of all kinds of *needs*," but Ficinus took them to mean "may provide opportunity for the discharge of *all the services they can render* (*et facultatem sui facilius ad quoslibet usus exhibeant*").—Is it possible that the words mean "(not only) provide facilities for the several *religious functions*"? ["No." F.H.D.]

d 7. φιλοφρονῶνται: again there is a (slight) change of subject, from the *meetings* to the *citizens* engaging in them.—μετὰ θυσιῶν, "thanks to the sacrifices"; for this use of μετά see above on 720 d 7. ("Vermögen der Opfer." Wagn.). — οἰκειῶνται καὶ

γνωρίζωσιν : hendiadys, "become intimately acquainted with one another." Cp. 953 a 7 ἐπιμελεῖσθαι καὶ τημελεῖν.

e 1. οὗ μεῖζον οὐδὲν . . . ἤ : "Frequens hic Graecis est mos post genitivum comparativo junctum ἤ inferendi" (Heindorf on *Gorg.* 500 c, where he quotes, among this and other passages, Dem. *Phil.* i. p. 43 τί γὰρ ἂν γένοιτο τούτου καινότερον ἢ Μακεδὼν ἀνὴρ καταπολεμῶν τὴν Ἑλλάδα ;)

e 5. ἓν πρὸς ἓν τοῦτο, "this among all objects"; litotes for "this above everything." Cp. above 647 b, and 705 b.

739 a–e. To understand this very difficult passage it will help us if we go back to 737 a, where we were told that it is "ὀρθότερον"—here, at a 6, it is ὀρθότατον—to consider the possibilities under less favourable circumstances than those actually to be enjoyed by Cleinias's prospective fellow-citizens. The τρίτη πολιτεία (as he here calls it) is a general name for all such inferior arrangements as either the invincible conservatism of a lawgiver, or the unfavourable circumstances of a community may render necessary. The δευτέρα πολιτεία marks the first, and a moderate, deviation, in the same direction, from the perfection of the ideal state. Generally speaking, we shall find that Cleinias's new city will be in a condition to adopt this second best constitution (cp. below 807 b c), but the Athenian will not dogmatize ; he will have done his duty when he has laid all the possibilities before Cleinias, and left him to choose between them.

a–b 1. "The next move that I am going to make in my process of lawgiving—a move like that of the desperate draught-player who has to abandon his "sacred" line—is of an unusual kind, and may cause surprise at the first hearing. Still, reflection and experience will make it clear that a city is likely (ἄν) to attain to (only) a second-best constitution. Possibly people whose only conception of a lawgiver is that of an arbitrary dictator, will say I ought to have given them something better. No ; the right course is to set forth the best constitution, the second-best and the third-best, and leave the choice between them to the authority who is responsible for the community in question."

a 1. The φορά—the "move" for which he apologizes—is the abandonment of ideal perfection, and is well typified by the draughtman's abandonment of the "sacred" middle line on the board.

a 3. I would put a full stop at ποιήσειεν.

a 4. Attention must be paid to the ἄν with οἰκεῖσθαι : he does not say, "it will appear that a πόλις is being constituted," but "is

in danger of being constituted," "*is likely to be constituted*" (cp. 790 a 5 πρὸς τῷ μὴ ἐθέλειν ἂν πείθεσθαι). All translators and commentators ignore the ἄν, except Stallb. who translates by a fut. infin. He takes the sentence to mean: "apparebit secundo loco conditam civitatem conditum iri ita ut ad id quod est optimum temperetur et conformetur;" in other words, "that the *second-best*" will turn out the *best*; which is too paradoxical.—πρὸς τὸ βέλτιστον is best taken as a qualification and explanation of δευτέρως; cp. d 4 ὑπερβολῇ πρὸς ἀρετήν.—(Badham's οὐχ ἑτέρως for δευτέρως simplifies the immediate context at the expense of the general sense of the passage; αὐτήν in the next sentence would then have nothing to stand for but "a *well*-constructed state," and this is not what we want.)

a 5. At first sight it seems more natural to take διὰ τὸ μὴ σύνηθες to mean "owing to the unsuitability (of the second constitution) to a lawgiver who is not absolute"; but the μὴ σύνηθες recalls the ἀήθης οὖσα of a 2, and suggests that (as the τις here is the same person as the ἀκούοντα there), it may mean, "owing to the want of familiarity (on the part of τις) with a lawgiver who leaves anything to a people's choice." This second interpretation suits the general idea of the passage better. Ficinus takes it so: "quia consuetus non fuerit cum legumlatore more tyrannico inferendis legibus non utenti."

b 3. These are not the headings of separate divisions of the succeeding portion of the work. The author here gives us to expect that, with a view to the practical utility of the work, he will often give alternative enactments on the same subject. Ritter (p. 146) has collected several instances of such alternatives. Cp. especially the alternatives at 740 e f.

b 4. I have adopted Burnet's correction of the MS. ἂν εἴποτε to ἀεί ποτε.

b 5. κατὰ τὸν ἑαυτοῦ τρόπον . . . πατρίδος, "to choose in accordance with his own disposition such of his native institutions as are to his taste." In other words, familiarity will sometimes count more than abstract excellence.

b 8 ff. What Plato here says is this: "Although the φορὰ ἀφ' ἱεροῦ has been made—although it has been admitted that some of the enactments now to be suggested are incompatible with the ideal constitution described in the *Republic*—for all that, the only proper test of the excellency of any provision or enactment will be this: *how nearly does it approach that ideal?*" The vigorous denunciation of selfishness in all its forms which we have already

had at 731 d 6—732 b 4 is quite in the same tone.—The practical result of the *φορά* here is that Cleinias is to be allowed to retain the institutions of (1) the family, and (2) private property—though with limitations.

c 1. The mention of the proverb (see *Rep.* 424 a and 449 c) makes it quite clear that Plato is here explaining the relation of his present disquisition to the *Republic*, and the theories there propounded. The old *theory* is here reaffirmed in the most impressive manner, but I think we should not be wrong in reading between the lines an indication of the different circumstances under which the two treatises were conceived. The *Republic* was more than half *philosophical speculation*: the Laws has a practical object, i.e. (1) the suggsetion of a polity such as might be adopted by a new state under favourable circumstances, and (2) the reformation of existing laws.

c 2. *λέγεται δὲ ὡς*, "the saying is that . . ."—*ὄντως* is the philosopher's addition to the proverb: there is a deeper meaning in it, he implies, than people suspect.

c 3. *τοῦτ' οὖν κτλ.*: the resumption of this which begins at d 6 —*εἴτε που . . .*, and the conclusion there—suggest that he began this sentence with the intention of saying: "This state of things, whether possible or not, is the true way to happiness." But the details of the ideal scheme made him forget the form in which the sentence began, and he finishes by saying that the *laws* (d 3) which breathe this same spirit are only excellent in so far as they do so.

c 4. The *acc. c. inf.* clauses—*εἶναι* goes in sense with the first and third as well—are in apposition to *τοῦτο*. Burnet, by marking off *κοινὰς . . . σύμπαντα* as a parenthesis, makes it quite unnecessary, with Steph. and Stallb., to change the indicatives in c 6 into infinitives; these verbs must have *εἰ* supplied with them from the previous *εἴτε . . . εἴτε*.

c 5 ff. "And if all means have been taken to eradicate utterly, from all sides of our life, what we mean by calling a thing *one's own*, and if means have been devised to secure that, as far as possible, even what nature has made our *own* should somehow become common property—I mean that our very eyes and ears and hands should seem to see, hear, and act as if they belonged not to us alone but to *all of us*—and if again we have all been brought to praise and blame, as far as possible, in unison, and to be pleased or pained at the same things on the same occasions."

c 7 f. The infins. *γεγονέναι*, *δοκεῖν*, *ἐπαινεῖν*, and *ψέγειν* depend on *μεμηχάνηται*.

c 8. *κοινά*, "communem in usum" (Fic.).

d 3. *καί* is *denique* (Ficinus and Stallb.).—*κατὰ δύναμιν ὅτι μάλιστα*: the usual pleonasm.

d 5. *ἄλλον*: i.e. "no one will find *any other criterion of superior excellence for laws* (*τούτων*)" than the knowledge how far they serve the purpose of binding the community together by a common interest. (There is much that is attractive in Ficinus's way of taking *τούτων* as dependent on *ἄλλον*—"any definition of perfect excellence *other than* (*all*) *this*"—"this" being its doing away with *ἴδιον*, and putting *κοινόν* in its place.—But then he has to "go round" the *οἵτινες νόμοι* clause, which he translates: "ac denique (si) pro viribus *sub his legibus vivant* quae unam quam maxime civitatem efficiunt"; the "vivant" is not in Plato.—Badham's *ζητοῦντας*, which he imagines to have fallen out after *ἀπεργάζονται*, provides a construction for *οἵτινες νόμοι κτλ.*, but introduces a foreign element into the passage. *τούτων* then for him, as for Ficinus, will be "all these conditions"—"all this unity." He would also read *ὑπερβολῆς* for *ὑπερβολῇ*; I imagine he made *τούτων* depend on *ἄλλον* and *ὑπερβολῆς* on *ὅρον*. I see no reason for the latter change, but *ζητοῦντας*—after *-ζονται* — should be carefully considered. On the whole, I prefer the MS. text.

d 6. *πόλις* is left "pendens." (Badham would reduce this to order by reading *εἰ* for *ἥ*, and then *ἔστι που, θεοὶ δ'*, for *εἴτε που θεοὶ*.)—For *ἤ* after *εἴτε* cp. below 862 d 4 *εἴτε ἔργοις ἢ λόγοις*.

d 7. [*πλείους ἑνός*]: apparently, as we should say, "two or more," "a few,"—for there must be at least two to form a community—but it is a strange phrase.—Possibly *οἰκοῦσι* means not *inhabit*, but *manage*. If so we must supply "*its citizens*" with *διαζῶντες*. Anyhow we are meant to infer that *superhuman* conditions may be necessary for the realization of the perfect polity. I think that the *πλείους ἑνός*,—which also agrees with *παῖδες* understood—in 740 c 3, has got in here by mistake. It is not unlikely that in some MS. the two passages were the length of a column apart, and so might have stood side by side on a page.

e 1. *ἄλλῃ*, "alibi" (Fic.).

e 4. *ἀθανασίας ἐγγύτατα καὶ ἡ μία δευτέρως*: so the MSS.; we may well believe, he has suggested, that only divine natures could support the perfect polity. "The polity which we have now set ourselves to evolve in our conversation is the *nearest approach we can get to the divine conditions*, and is (only) in the second degree the (really) *one* state we spoke of"—"si non primo, certe secundo loco erit *una*" (Fic.). It must be admitted that, in

spite of the apparent reference to the *μίαν* of d 3 above, the utmost significance to be got out of *ἡ μία* is small. (Can it mean "a united state"?). Perhaps Apelt's suggestion (p. 10), to read *τιμία* for it, gives us what Plato wrote. (Heindorf removes the comma before *εἴη* and puts one after *ἄν*, reading *εἴη γε ἄν*, in the sense of "*is* a possible one." Schanz supposes *ἡ μία* to be a mistaken interpretation of *ᾱ^ης*, i.e. *πρώτης*, which he actually prints: "next nearest to the divine and the first polity.")

e 5. This must not be taken, I think, to mean that the author proposes to furnish a complete polity and set of laws for the conditions which admit of only the "third-best" polity.—He does not definitely propose that, even for the "second-best" conditions. —The word *διαπεραίνειν* (without some such word as *παντελῶς*) does not always mean *to complete*; e.g. at *Tim.* 89 e *τὸ δ' ἐν παρέργῳ . . . διαπεράναιτ' ἄν* is opposed to *δι' ἀκριβείας . . . διελθεῖν*; at *Gorg.* 451 a *τὴν ἀπόκρισιν ἣν ἠρόμην διαπέρανον* only means "favour me with the answer to my question." Cp. also 790 c 3 below. (For *περαίνειν*, "perform," of music, or a dramatic representation, see Adam on *Rep.* 532 a; used of a speech it is "*deliver*," cf. Plut. *Mor.* 130 a.) What he here contemplates is the *furnishing his hearers, when the opportunity occurs*, with specimens of such legislation as will be wisest in conditions still further removed than the "second-best" from "the ideal." (See above on 739 b 8.)

e 6. *ταύτην* is the "second-best" polity.—*τίνα . . . καὶ πῶς γενομένην ἂν τοιαύτην* recalls the introductions to the descriptions in the *Republic* of the oligarchical and other constitutions and characters; *Rep.* 548 d 6 *τίς . . . πῶς τε γενόμενος* and 553 a 3 *ὥς τε γίγνεται, οἷός τε γενόμενος ἔστιν.*

740 a 1. *μεῖζον ἢ κατὰ . . . εἴρηται*: not "has been declared to be too great a task for" but "is a proposal which is too big for"—"majus sonat" (Schneider). So at *Soph.* 226 c 3 *διαιρετικά που τὰ λεχθέντα εἴρηται* is not "have been declared to be concerned with division," but "are uttered as terms denoting division."

a 2. *γένεσιν καὶ τροφὴν καὶ παίδευσιν*: i.e. the citizens are not a picked "strain," like the *φύλακες* of the *Republic*, nor has their early nurture or subsequent training fitted them for the "ideal" conditions.

a 4. *κοινὴν αὐτὴν τῆς πόλεως συμπάσης*: to this fundamental principle of ancient and modern law Plato adds two considerations designed (1) to endear, and (2) to dignify the possession

of land. (1) He appeals to patriotic sentiment:—"The country of which it is a piece is your native land"; and (2) he reminds his hearers of the fact that the Earth, of which it was also a piece —which, at *Tim.* 40 b c, he calls *γῆν δὲ τροφὸν μὲν ἡμετέραν . . . πρώτην καὶ πρεσβυτάτην θεῶν ὅσοι ἐντὸς οὐρανοῦ γεγόνασι* —claims allegiance and honour from all mortals. Cp. 877 d 5 ff.

a 5. Neither the *αὐτήν* nor the *δεῖ* are necessary to the sense, but their repetition gives clearness and importance to the following clauses. I would therefore neither expel *δεῖ* with Stallb., nor change it to *ἀεί* with Schanz.

a 6. *τῷ καὶ . . . γεγονέναι*: this awkward addition means apparently "all the more (ought we to cherish it) because, being itself a goddess, it is the mistress of such as are mortal."

a 7. *ταὐτὰ . . . δαίμονας*: though in form this is a command to extend these sentiments of reverence to all the supernatural beings who haunt the country, in effect it serves to bind all such religions up into a mutually supporting whole. (I therefore see no reason with Usener to reject this passage.)

b 3. A^1 wrote *ἐστι* for *ἑστίαι*; mistakes like this, and *ὑπερβάλλειν* (for *παρεμβάλλειν*) at 741 a 3, shake one's confidence in the scribe of A.

b 5. Schanz adopts the Aldine *ᾧ δ'* for the MS. *ὧδ'*, with a comma after *πόλιν*.

b 7. *ἕνα μόνον κληρονόμον*: Herm. (*De vestigiis* etc. p. 23) says it is probable that Attic law attempted to restrict the number of *families* to a fixed number, but did not interfere with the size of the families. Plato sees that, to do the first, it is necessary to do the second as well.

c 1. *θεῶν . . . γένους*: i.e. his *ancestors*, called at 717 b 5 *πατρῴων θεῶν*. I take *καὶ* (*γέν.*) . . . *καὶ* (*πόλ.*) to be "both . . . and," and *γένους* and *πόλεως* to depend on *θεῶν*. Those who take the *καί* before *πόλεως* as "and" (Wagn. and Jow.) saddle the heir with a great responsibility; how is he to be the *θεραπευτής* "of the city and of all the dead and living citizens"? It is not clear how Fic. and Schneider take it.—*τῶν τε ζώντων καὶ ὅσους κτλ.*: a comparison of 717 b 5 shows that this means all the inheritor's own *ancestors, including his parents.* Apparently the new *κληρονόμος* is to enter upon his office during his father's lifetime, and *εἰς τὸν τότε χρόνον* ("up to that time") would then be the date of his installation. At 775 e 5 ff. we are told that the heir when he marries is to occupy the second family residence, i.e. that away from the city.

c 2. *τοὺς δὲ ἄλλους παῖδας* : instead of some verb meaning "to dispose of," which we expect to govern the accusatives, we have only the two infins. which indicate the special ways in which the two sexes are severally disposed of. These infins. replace the imperative *καταλειπέτω*. It is not easy to say whether they would be felt *as imperatives*, or whether a *δεῖ* was imagined as preceding.

c 4. *νόμον* : probably that as to the age of marriage ; cp. 772 d e.

c 5. *ἐλλείπῃ* : at 844 b 2 we have a similar impersonal *ἐλλείπει c. gen.*, *καὶ ἐλλείπει τῶν ἀναγκαίων πωμάτων*, and Stallb. cps. Dem. *De cor.* p. 326. 20 *ὧν δ' ἐνέλιπε τῇ πόλει, ταῦτα προσθεῖναι.* Ast adopts Steph.'s insertion of *τά* before *τῆς γενέσεως*, and remarks, with a curious self-contradiction, that "when this verb is used *impersonally*, it must have a subject in the nominative."

c 6. *κατὰ χάριν* : i.e. "among friends,"—to such as would be glad to have them on personal grounds. (This refers, I think, both to the marriage of daughters and the giving away of sons.) *ἐὰν δέ τισιν ἐλλείπωσιν χάριτες* will mean "those who have no such personal friends" (among the marriageable or the childless). The expressions include the notion of a possible personal inclination on the part of the daughter or the son.—*ἢ πλείους ἐπίγονοι κτλ.* : i.e. if there is a large family of younger children, whether girls or boys, it is too much to expect the parents to find new homes for them all.

c 8. *τοὐναντίον ὅταν ἐλάττους ὦσιν*, "when there is a deficiency" (lit. "when there are too few children of any parents"). This covers the case of those who had only one child, as well as that of those who had none.

d 1. *πάντων τούτων* depends on *μηχανήν* in d 3.—*ἀρχήν* : if this word had come third in its clause instead of first, no one would have wanted to change it to the nom. (as Schanz does). Its position emphasizes it ; calling special attention to the intervention of the civic magistrate. As a nom. it would not be so emphatic, because its position would be an ordinary one.

d 3. *ἢ τοῖς ἐλλείπουσι* : this "bull" is a sacrifice to the desire to balance both parts of a sentence against each other, and to the preference for the concrete. The Ath. is talking here of the superfluity and deficiency in particular families, not (as Ast) in the state as a whole.—*ποριζέτω κτλ.* : cf. *Rep.* 460 a 2 *ἵν' ὡς μάλιστα διασῴζωσι τὸν αὐτὸν ἀριθμὸν τῶν ἀνδρῶν.*

d 6 ff. *οἷς*, "(to be applied) in the case of those who." (As

this word was omitted by the first hand in A, Schanz omits it.) —*καὶ τοὐναντίον . . . ὃ λέγομεν*: I do not think that any alteration of the MS. reading is necessary here; but I agree with Burnet that, of the many suggested emendations, Winckelmann's insertion of *αἳ* before *δύνανται* is the best. But why not take *τε* after *τιμαῖς* not as *both* but as *and*—connecting *εἰσίν* and *δύνανται*?—*ἐπιμέλειαι καὶ σπουδαί* form a hendiadys—"deliberate encouragements."—*ἀπαντῶσαι* is a difficulty. It seems to be used in the same sense as at 830 a 5 *εἰς αὐτὸν ἂν ἀπαντῶμεν τὸν ἀγῶνα*, i.e. that of "*take the field*"—here, more particularly, "*operate*,"—*τιμαῖς* and the other datives being instrumental. Both *ἐπισχέσεις* and *ἐπιμέλειαι*, not the latter alone, are the subjects of *δύνανται*; *περὶ νέους* is the equivalent of an objective gen. The meaning we may thus get from the MS. reading is: "And on the other hand (there are) deliberate encouragements of larger families, and (both of these), operating [through the voice of warning] by means of honour and disgrace, and the admonition given by the old to the young, are able to secure the object abovementioned." The chief awkwardness in this sentence seems to me the repetition of the idea of *νουθετήσεσι* in *διὰ λόγων νουθετητικῶν*. Is not the latter a marginal comment? I have inserted a comma after *εἰσίν* and bracketed *διὰ λόγων νουθετητικῶν*. (*ἀπαντῶσαι* is certainly not "*respond to*"; there is no notion of *concord* in the Greek *ἀπαντᾶν*, as there is in the English *meet*.—Ast turns *τιμαῖς* κτλ. to noms., Herm. rejects *εἰσίν*, Badham turns it into *τισὶ*, Schneider reads *δυναταί* (for *δύνανται*), Schramm *ἀπαντώσαις*, and Schanz *ἅπαντας αἳ δύνανται*.)

e 2 ff. In case of the failure of all possible methods for keeping the numbers down, we must send out a colony.—*πᾶσα*, "complete," as in the common *πᾶσα ἀνάγκη*.

e 6. *ὑπάρχει*, "is at their command."

e 7. *ὧν*: dependent on *ἀποικιῶν*, "consisting of such people as . . ." The Ald. ed. emended *ὧν* to *οἷς*, which Schanz adopts; but this substitutes a less important for a more important consideration.

e 8. *ἐάν τ' . . . ἐπέλθῃ ποτὲ κῦμα κατακλυσμὸν φέρον νόσων*, "and if ever a flood of disease comes surging upon them." We have a like metaphorical use of *κῦμα* (and *κατακλύζω*) at *Tim.* 43 b, and at *Rep.* 473 c. (Cornarius puts in *ἤ* before *νόσων*, and takes *κῦμα* and *κατακλυσμόν* literally. Ast, comparing 677 a, approves.)

741 a 3. *νόθῃ παιδείᾳ*: stronger than the *σμικρᾷ παιδείᾳ* of

735 a 4. There, the education referred to was less stringent and complete: here it is "a base imitation" of the education of the higher classes.—ἑκόντας, "if they can possibly help it."—For παρεμβάλλειν see above on 740 b 3.

a 4. Cp. 818 d 8, *Prot.* 345 d, Simonides, *Fr.* 5.—The string of alternatives here concluded furnishes a striking instance of the feature of the *Laws* mentioned on 739 b 3.

a 5. νῦν = *νυνδή*. — φῶμεν: almost "let us imagine." — ἡμῖν belongs, as Stallb. says, to τὸν λεγόμενον λόγον. As a rule it is taken with παραινεῖν.—Here the λόγος personified appeals—not, I think, to the three, nor to the three *plus* an imaginary group of colonists, but—to the imaginary assembly of the new colonists, in the same strain as that of the prelude at the beginning of the book. I think the speech is supposed to finish at σαφεῖς in 745 b 1. Though some new regulations are introduced at 741 e 7, the whole passage consists mainly of arguments and explanations designed to secure compliance with the regulations as to property. At 744 a 8 there is a repetition of what was said at 741 b 7 f., which suggests that the speaker is still the same.

a 6 ff. τὴν ὁμοιότητα . . . πραγμάτων, "never cease to follow Nature in honouring conformity, and equality, and identity, and correspondence, whether in number or in any (other) influence productive of fair and noble things."—ὁμολογούμενον is *middle*, "that which agrees"; cp. 746 c 8. I agree with Ritter (p. 147) that the genitive is *objective*, and that we are meant to infer that ἀριθμός is a δύναμις τῶν καλῶν κἀγαθῶν πραγμάτων.

b 4. μέτριον is not merely "*mediocre*" (Fic.), or "modest" (Jow.); it has the notion of symmetry and suitability. He speaks as if the *amount* were a *statue* of which they are begged "not to spoil the true proportions," by adding to or detracting from them *by trafficking in it.*

b 5. κλῆρος: this was the reading of the first hand in A, and O. In both MSS. there is a suggested correction, possibly by the original hand, to κλῆρον, ν being written over the ς. In A the ς is in an erasure. This suggests that the writer was at first in doubt as to which was right. Ficinus's "neque deus ipse distributor" leaves us in doubt as to his reading. He may well have been in doubt himself. I cannot think that if the original reading had been κλῆρον, anyone would have altered it to the nom.; but the very recent use of the word in the sense of *portion of ground* may well have led to the reverse change. At 690 c 5 Plato speaks of the ruler chosen by lot as θεοφιλῆ. This

is quite in accordance with the description of the *lot* as a minister of heaven, and so a θεός. Hermann cps. the deification of Ὅρκος at Hes. *Theog.* 231. The addition of the ὤν marks the word as in need of an *explanation* or *reminder*. The reminder that the *lot* is *divine* is in place, but not so the reminder that the previously mentioned "distributor" was a God. Evidently κλῆρος is right. —Burnet marks off οὔτε γὰρ . . . νομοθέτης as a parenthesis. This abruptness makes it a little easier to dispense with the somewhat complicated verbal notion "will (help you) if you do"; but it obscures the connexion with what follows. The *law* (b 7) and the *religious considerations* (c 2) definitely refer—in the usual chiastic order—to the νομοθέτης and the θεός of Burnet's parenthesis; so, too, at d 3 ἅμα νόμῳ καὶ τῷ θεῷ. I would therefore mark the passage off with colons only.

b 6 ff. What follows is involved in structure, and consequently obscure. πρῶτον (in b 6) seems to correspond with the πρὸς τούτοις δ' ἔτι at c 8; the second πρῶτον (at c 1) with εἶτα at c 2. To confirm what he has said of the antagonism of the *God*, and the *Law* to the recalcitrant citizen, he adds: (1) (b 6 ff.) that the law enjoins further that—as he took his land knowing beforehand that it was already sacred to the gods, and that it was going to have this sacredness ceremonially confirmed — punishment must follow the infringement of the original arrangement; and (2) (c 8 ff.) that there was to be constituted a special machinery for inflicting this punishment where it was due.

c 1. ἢ μὴ κληροῦσθαι: this depends on προειπών. The law had warned this man (who is now unwilling to obey it) that his land must either be taken on these particular terms, *or let alone*. (There is therefore no such "bull" here as Stallb. discerns.)

c 4. τὸν πριάμενον . . . πάσχειν does duty *both* as the direct object of προστάττει in b7 and as an expression of the substance of the *prayers* mentioned in c 3; in the latter case it is "will pray that the sentence may be duly executed." (Stallb. takes it as dependent *only* on εὐχὰς ποιησομένων, and translates προστάττει προειπών —regardless of the difference in *tense*—by "*ita praescribet ut . . . moneat*"; Schneider finds an object for προστάττει by putting in "*obedientiam* (injungit)."

c 6. γράψαντες—anyhow a break in the construction—must agree with the subj. of καταστήσουσιν as well as that of θήσουσι, and therefore I think it describes not the *priests*, but the *legal authorities*; this is confirmed by the νόμῳ in d 3.—[Longinus] Περὶ ὕψους § 4 rebukes Plato for fantastically calling δέλτους

κυπαριττίνας μνήμας. He might well have blamed him for the obscurity of the whole passage.

c 8. φυλακτήρια τούτων, ὅπως ἂν γίγνηται, καταστήσουσιν ἐν . . ., "will give the duty of seeing the punishment enacted to . . ."

d 2. The use of παραγωγή for *transgression* is peculiar.

d 3. αὐτούς, like the subj. of θήσουσι and καταστ., is the *legal authorities*.—The ἵνα clauses, coming after ὅπως ἂν γίγνηται, are somewhat tautological.—Truly ὁ θεῖος Πλάτων, as Longinus calls him, has given us an obscure piece of writing to decipher here.

d 4–e 6. ὅσον γὰρ δὴ . . . χρήματα, "how great a boon the enforcement of this policy confers on states which accept it—given an organization to correspond—no one can know, as the old saying is, while he is unregenerate. He must find it out by a course of training in good habits. In a state organized on this model there are no great fortunes to be made—a society in which it is natural that men should find it not only unnecessary, but illegal to make money by any vulgar trade—witness the way in which a liberal soul shrinks from the reproach implied in the terms "mercenary," and "mechanical." He would as soon think of flying as of amassing wealth by such means."—The γὰρ δή introduces a reason for the course just prescribed.

d 5. τὴν ἑπομένην κατασκευὴν προσλαβόν: for the permanence and success of the equality arrangement, certain conditions are necessary. The repetition of the word κατασκευή at e 2 shows that what he means by it here is the organization of society in such a way as to relieve the fully educated classes from all "illiberal" employment or pursuit.

d 7. κακὸς ὤν: the "saying" must have been something like οὐδεὶς εἴσεται ἄπειρος ὤν or *experientia docet*. — As Ritter (p. 148) says, this thought is akin to that of 733 a 1 ff. If we shirk the necessary training, we shall never have our eyes opened to the glory and advantage of what is good. Somewhat in the same strain is Wordsworth's "and you must love him, ere to you he will seem worthy of your love" ("A Poet's Epitaph"), and, on the positive side, the Gospel saying ἐάν τις θέλῃ τὸ θέλημα αὐτοῦ ποιεῖν, γνώσεται περὶ τῆς διδαχῆς. Cp. also 968 d 6 ff. —ἕθεσι goes, I think, with both ἔμπειρος and ἐπιεικής: habit is the essence of the training, and also of the resulting virtue.

e 1. οὔτ' . . . σφόδρα: litotes, as sometimes in the case of οὐ πάνυ.

e 4. *βανανσία*: cf. Ar. *Pol.* 1337 b 8 *βάνανσον δ' ἔργον εἶναι δεῖ τοῦτο νομίζειν καὶ τέχνην ταύτην καὶ μάθησιν, ὅσαι πρὸς τὰς χρήσεις καὶ τὰς πράξεις τὰς τῆς ἀρετῆς ἄχρηστον ἀπεργάζονται τὸ σῶμα τῶν ἐλευθέρων ἢ τὴν ψυχὴν ἢ τὴν διάνοιαν*, and see Adam's note on *Rep.* 495 e 2.

e 7. *πρὸς τούτοις δ' . . . τούτοις*, "there is besides yet another law which goes with all these ordinances." (It is unusual to find a phrase repeated so soon in Plato; cp. c 8 where also we have *πρὸς τούτοις δ' ἔτι*.)

742 a 2. *ἰδιώτῃ*: it is explained at b 2 why the *community* needs money. The community's money would doubtless be of gold or silver, whereas the daily uses of *internal* traffic would be served, it is implied, by an inferior currency.

a 2–5. I can find no complete explanation of this very difficult passage. Some light is shed on it by *Rep.* 371 b 3–e 5, where Plato explains why coined money is needed within the state itself. He there says (1) the *δημιουργοί* want it to facilitate their buying and selling intercourse with each other, and (2) it is needed for the payment of *διάκονοι*; he does not say (in the *Republic*) whether these are paid by *φύλακες* or by *δημιουργοί*. Inasmuch as the former are forbidden to have any private property whatever (416 d), it is probable that the currency was only to be touched by the *δημιουργοί* and *μισθωτοί*. So in our passage the *ἀλλαγή* which necessitates a currency is spoken of as taking place (1) between the *δημιουργοί*, and (2) between *πᾶσιν κτλ.* (whoever they are). This last point is made clear by the *τε . . . καί*, and is, I think, generally ignored. Ast alters *ὁπόσων* to *ὁπόσοις*, and translates "(et omnibus) quibus illo opus est ut mercedem . . . solvant"; *τῶν τοιούτων*, he says, means *money*. Stallbaum says *ὁπ. . . . τοιούτων* stands, by attraction, for *πᾶσιν τοιούτοις ὁπόσων χρεία (ἐστίν)*, and means "(quam facere fere necessarium est opificibus) *atque omnibus istiusmodi hominibus quorum opera utimur*." Ficinus —like the early editors, who put a full stop at *ἰδιώτῃ*—did not, like the modern editions, take *νόμισμα* to be governed by *ἐξεῖναι κεκτῆσθαι* understood. His translation though could hardly have been made from our text; it is: "sed *quia nummis opus est* quotidianae commutationis gratia, quae inter artifices *et huiusmodi* ferme est necessarium, *cum* mercenariis et servis et colonis *merces aliqua debeatur*, iccirco nummos habere concedimus etc."—Badham cuts out *ἀλλάττεσθαι*, and *τῶν τοιούτων μισθούς*; but then he has to take *ἥν*, i.e. *ἀλλαγήν*, as the object of *ἀποτίνειν*, and this does not help us. Schanz, so far, has the last word in saying

"*locus haud dubie corruptus.*" If driven to translate the text I would suggest, for καὶ πᾶσιν . . . ἀποτίνειν, "and for all men whose function it is to pay, to hired slaves or aliens, wages for services of such a kind"—the "*services*" being spoken of as the equivalent of the *work* produced by other artificers. In this way the paying wages for services would be represented as a kind of barter. F.H.D. suggests that τῶν τοιούτων μισθούς = "wages *in money*"—consisting in νόμισμα (as opposed to wages in kind): A.M.A. would reject τῶν τοιούτων.

a 6. αὐτοῖς . . . ἀδόκιμον, "current at home, but worthless abroad."

a 7–b 2. The occasions which take representatives of the state abroad are divided into (1) military, and (2) peaceful missions. The second class may either go as negotiators (πρέσβεις) or mere state-messengers (κήρυκες). At 950 d 8 a third class of mission is added—κήρυξιν ἢ πρεσβείαις ἢ καί τισι θεωροῖς.

b 1. The first five editions omit all the words between this τῇ πόλει and that in the next line. Steph. discovered the omission too late to include the words in his text.

b 3. νόμισμα Ἑλληνικόν: this addition is grammatically otiose, but welcome in the interests of clearness. Ast rejects it.—ἰδιώτῃ δέ: the position of the private traveller is not explicitly defined on all points. (1) We may conclude, I think, from what goes before, that he had to get leave from the authorities, not only to travel, but to employ some of the state fund of Greek currency for the purpose. (2) The next question, which is at first sight obscure, is what is the νόμισμα ξενικόν which is (possibly) left in his pocket on his return? Is it some money current only in a foreign state, or is it some of the aforesaid νόμισμα Ἑλληνικόν, or is it perhaps some "barbarous" coinage? The answer is, I think, that the term ξενικόν would apply to all three cases and is meant here to do so. (3) We may again conclude, I think, that, though we are not told of the transaction, the returned traveller gives back, as a matter of course, all he had not spent of the state money. But if, *over and above this* (περιγενόμενον), he has in his possession some foreign money—either given him by a foreigner, or made by him in trade—*he must not keep it in this form*, but must change it into the home (i.e. *brass*, or *copper*) currency. This regulation might be partly prompted by a fear that the travelled citizen might have entered into secret compact with some foreign power, for the purposes of which compact the possession of foreign currency would be useful. The words do not warrant Ficinus's

interpretation that the traveller *first changed his foreign money and then deposited it in the state treasury.* It is to be noticed that the penalty of concealment is (b 8) *confiscation.* This would be no penalty if the money was the state's by rights already.

b 4. The first five printed edd.—and some edd. of Stobaeus, apparently—forsake all the Plato MSS. in reading *παραιτησάμενος* for *παρέμενος.* There could hardly be a better instance of the way in which a marginal interpretation makes its way into the text.

b 6. *πρὸς λόγον*: apparently in the sense of the more usual *ἀνὰ λόγον*; cf. Dem. *Pro Phorm.* 954. 19 *πρὸς μέρος* and *Gorg.* 464 c *πρὸς τὸ βέλτιστον.*

b 7. The object of *ἰδιούμενος* is not "anything"—e.g. any part of the sum of state money borrowed—but the sum of *foreign money* in question. This is made clear by the fact that the fine to be paid by the man with the guilty knowledge is to be "not less than the sum of the foreign money brought back."

b 8. *ἀρᾷ καὶ ὀνείδει*, "exsecratione et infamia" (Schneider); the former *religious*, the latter *social.*

c 2. Perhaps the author here imagines himself to be asked: "How is a man to marry his daughters if he has no property?—or get security for money lent, if his debtor has no money, or, for that matter, how can he lend money at all? The answer is: "The Law will give you no help in either of these latter transactions; and it forbids dowries altogether."—The usual chiasmus.

c 3. The Law wishes to make trade impossible, and therefore will not recognize *credit.* It is suggested at *Rep.* 556 a that that is the best way to prevent the creation of *debt* in a state: *εἴργοντες τὰ αὐτοῦ ὅπῃ τις βούλεται τρέπειν.* Cp. also Stob. *Flor.* 44. 22 *ἡ ὥσπερ Χαρώνδας καὶ Πλάτων; οὗτοι γὰρ παραχρῆμα κελεύουσι διδόναι καὶ λαμβάνειν, ἐὰν δέ τις πιστώσῃ μὴ εἶναι δίκην, αὐτὸν γὰρ αἴτιον εἶναι τῆς ἀδικίας.* Cf. also below 849 e 8 *ὁ δὲ προέμενος ὡς πιστεύων, ἐάν τε κομίσηται καὶ ἂν μή, στεργέτω ὡς οὐκέτι δίκης οὔσης τῶν τοιούτων περὶ συναλλάξεων*, and 915 e 2 ff.—As to usury cf. below 921 d.—As to dowries, at 774 c d Plato gives reasons for this law, and penalties for its infringement. This was apparently the law in Sparta "teste Aelian. *V.H.* vi. 6, Hermann, *De vestig.*" Stallb.

c 7. *ἐπιτηδεύματα*: used in the neutral sense of *habit*, rather than *practice.*

d 1. *ἐπαναφέρων κτλ.* explains *ὧδε.—τὴν ἀρχὴν . . . καὶ τὴν βούλησιν*: we may translate the words as a hendiadys, "the

fundamental intention." ἀρχή is used in the sense of "first principle" much as at *Tim.* 48 (b, c,) e 2 ἡ δ' οὖν αὖθις ἀρχὴ περὶ τοῦ παντὸς ἔστω μειζόνως τῆς πρόσθεν διηρημένη.

d 3. All the edd. which I have examined—except the Louvain ed. (1531), which has a comma after *νομοθέτην*—put a comma after *φαῖεν*; Steph. and Ast put a comma after *νομοθέτην* as well. The latter comma seems to me right, the former wrong. This was Ficinus's view, for he translates "quam in legumlatore optimo esse debere multi affirmant"; Schneider also translates as if there were no comma after *φαῖεν*. δεῖν, which is anyhow rather redundant (see above on 731 d 5), is less so if taken to depend directly on *φαῖεν ἄν*.—Those who adopted O's *βουλεύεσθαι* for *βούλεσθαι* would naturally put a comma after *φαῖεν*.

d 4. *νοῶν εὖ = εὔνους ὤν*, as far as construction goes, but the former has a suggestion of *good sense*, as well as *benevolence*; cp. 692 c 5 τὰ . . . νοηθέντα καλά.

d 5. *νομοθετοῖ*: if the "reported speech" had depended upon a *primary* tense, this would have been (ᾖ) ἄν (νοῶν εὖ) *νομοθέτῃ*; after a *secondary* tense, any dependent clause's ἄν *c. subj.* becomes, in the reported form, optative, e.g. *Euthydem.* 276 e ἀπεκρίνατο ὅτι μανθάνοιεν οἱ μανθάνοντες ἃ οὐκ ἐπίσταιντο. Here *φαῖεν ἄν* has the same effect as a secondary tense. So in English we say: "I should say that it *was*" but "I say that it *is*"; i.e. *I should say* has the effect of a secondary tense.

d 6. Burnet was the first to print the correct MS. reading *χρύσεια* and *ἀργύρεια*. Even Schanz prints *χρύσια* and *ἀργύρια* without comment.

d 7. προσθεῖεν δ' ἄν, "I dare say they will add."—It will be remembered that the doctrine here taught has been put forward before at 687 f., where it was explained (688 b 6) εὐχῇ χρῆσθαι σφαλερὸν εἶναι νοῦν μὴ κεκτημένον.

e 3. τὰ δὲ μὴ δυνατὰ οὔτ' ἂν βούλοιτο ματαίας βουλήσεις οὔτ' ἂν ἐπιχειροῖ: it is true that this sentence would be clear and grammatical without ματαίας βουλήσεις, but I find it much harder to imagine (as Schanz does) that anyone would complicate the construction by inserting these two words, than to explain them as they stand. Occupying, as they do, the same relation to τὰ μὴ δυνατά as βούλοιτ' ἄν in the previous sentence does to τὰ δυνατά—and standing side by side with ἐπιχειροῖ ἄν, which also governs τὰ μὴ δυνατά—the words ἂν βούλοιτο ματαίας βουλήσεις are enabled *to govern* τὰ μὴ δυνατά *directly*. So above at 705 c 9, in μιμήσεις πονηρὰς μιμεῖσθαι τοὺς πολεμίους, and at Eur. *I.A.*

1181 σ' ἐγὼ καὶ παῖδες δεξόμεθα δέξιν ἥν σε **δέξασθαι** χρεών, verbs with *acc. of the inner object* are enabled to govern a direct object as well. At *Symp.* 222 a ὑμῖν εἶπον ἅ με ὕβρισεν the με is in a similar position. (Ast says ματ. βουλ. are "epexegetic" to τὰ μὴ δυνατά, Stallb. that τὰ μὴ δυνατά are "absolute posita"—"quod vero pertinet ad ea quae non possunt fieri"; the objection to this is that ἐπιχειροῖ wants a direct object.)—"He will send no vain wishes in the direction of the impossible, any more than he will try to attain to it."

e 4 f. σχεδὸν . . . γίγνεσθαι: i.e. they could hardly be one without being the other as well.

e 7. οὓς γε δὴ πλ. οἱ πολλοὶ καταλέγουσι: Ritter (p. 148) reminds us that it follows from the definition of *poverty* given above at 736 e 2 f. that Plato would call *rich* the man who is *abstemious* and independent of external possessions.

e 8. ἐν ὀλίγοις τῶν ἀνθρώπων: a variety of σφόδρα, or διαφερόντως. Stallb. well cps. the Lat. "homo *in paucis* doctus."

e 9. ἃ καὶ κακός τις κεκτῆτ' ἄν: I think this means "and that is just what a bad man would be likely to acquire." But all previous interpreters take it to mean "and that is what *even* a bad man might possess." If they are right, the argument halts. Plato has previously said—*not* that it is *not necessary* for great riches and great goodness to be united—but that it is *impossible*. The ordinary interpretation would be a good proof of the former, but it is superfluous after the latter. Moreover, as he has just said that a very rich man *cannot* be very good, why should he here state it merely as a *possibility* that the great fortune should be in the hands of a bad man?

743 a 1. The argument then proceeds to deduce from the previous statement (at e 5) that goodness and happiness must always go together, that the very rich cannot be *happy* either.—αὐτοῖς is οἱ πολλοί, who are assumed to hold that great riches are necessary to happiness.

a 3 f. ἀγαθὸν δὲ . . . ἀδύνατον: this is a simple restatement of what he said above at e 6 f. Its repetition is not necessary to the argument. Probably it was put in to make it clear that this is what the following arguments are destined to prove.—It is noticeable that Stobaeus (*Flor.* 93. 26), in quoting this passage, reverses the order in which the two forms of the statement occur; ἀγαθὸν δὲ ὄντα διαφόρως . . . comes *before* πλουσίους δ' αὖ σφόδρα . . . —Not only nearly all Plato MSS., but the MSS. of Stobaeus and Origen who quote this passage, read διαφόρως in a 3. Elsewhere

Plato always uses this word in the sense of *differently*. Ast, Herm., Zürr., Stallb., and Schanz read διαφερόντως. I think Burnet is right in following the MSS. For variety's sake Plato used the word in an unusual sense, trusting to the following διαφερόντως, in a similar position, to define it.

a 5. ἥ τε ἐκ δικαίου καὶ ἀδίκου κτῆσις : Stallb. says the τε goes with the καί. He compares *Crito* 43 b 4 ἐν τοσαύτῃ τε ἀγρυπνίᾳ καὶ λύπῃ, and *Phaedo* 86 c αἵ τ' ἐν τοῖς φθόγγοις καὶ [αἱ] ἐν τοῖς τῶν δημιουργῶν ἔργοις. May be; but I am inclined in this instance to think that ἥ τε . . . κτῆσις was meant to go entirely with τά τε ἀναλώματα. (So Schneider.)

a 6. πλέον ἢ διπλασία : this implies the belief that *more than half* the money made in trade or other intercourse is made by asking too much for one's goods or services.—τά τε . . . ἀναλίσκεσθαι, "the expenditures, which" (in the case of the bad man) "shrink from being made equally when it is right to spend and when it is disgraceful to do so." The negatives go in sense with ἐθέλοντα, which is used with a curious "personification" of the expenditures. Stallb. cps. *Rep.* 370 b 10, where also the subj. of ἐθέλει is inanimate. In both cases ἐθέλειν seems to be used as a *semi-auxiliary*—like our own "will."

a 8. τῶν . . . δαπανᾶσθαι, "which are rightful and are ready to be incurred on rightful objects."—The καλῶν καὶ εἰς καλά balances μήτε καλῶς μήτε αἰσχρῶς *in sound*, but not in sense, as it only deals with *one sort* of expenditure.—διπλασίῳ ἐλάττονα : this time it is not πλέον ἢ διπλασίῳ, i.e. the necessary expenditure of both men is assumed to be about equal to what the good man spends on charity and the like; e.g. A spends £100 on necessary objects, and £100 on charity and the like, while B only spends £100 altogether. In the subsequent calculation both expenditure and saving are spoken of as if they were in the relation of 2 to 1 and 1 to 2 respectively.

b 1 f. τῶν (masc.) is gen. after πλουσιώτερος. With τῶν ἐκ we must supply something like πραττόντων, as suggested by the following πράττων; τούτων (neut.) is the *getting* twice as much and the *spending* twice as little.

b 4. ὁ δὲ οὐ κακὸς ὅταν ᾖ φειδωλός : the miserliness of the bad man keeps him in a neutral state as far as regards expenditure on disgraceful objects; though it does not make him *good*, it keeps him from being *bad* in a particular direction.—The less well attested reading οὐκ ἀγαθὸς (for οὐ κακὸς) comes to the same thing, i.e. "the other (the bad man) is not *good* when he forbears to spend on

bad objects—only *miserly*"; but οὐ κακός goes much better with the next line (ἀγαθὸς δέ κτλ.).—Early edd., e.g. Louv. and Steph., have τοτὲ; so Ast, who points out that, as at Λ 63, τοτὲ δέ is used without the usual τοτὲ μέν preceding it. So Stallb. and Burnet. Other recent edd. read τότε, which would mean "when he *is* miserly." The words τοτὲ δέ ποτε mean "though on occasion"; i.e. when it is a question not of *spending*, but of *making* money. Then the bad man's actions are positively—even superlatively—bad. (A's πάγκαλος is clearly a mistake.)

b 5. ὅπερ εἴρηται τὰ νῦν is equivalent to a geometrical Q.E.D.—For "The Philosopher Leo" or "The Great Leo" mentioned in Burnet's note to this passage as here ceasing to correct the text see Gibbon ch. liii. (vol. vi. p. 104 Bury's ed.).

b 7. ὅταν καὶ . . . πένης, "provided that he is at the same time of a niggardly nature, though in fact the superlatively bad man is very poor, because he is generally a profligate spender."—Granting, as everybody seems disposed to do, that πάγκαλος (b 4) in A is a writer's slip for πάγκακος, the text appears quite sound, and needs none of the alterations great or small proposed by Madvig, Badham, and Schanz. Plato treats the situation thoroughly—turns it inside out. He then turns to consider the way in which men become *very poor*. Here, too, the very bad have the pre-eminence; indeed it is only the vice of niggardliness which keeps a few very bad men at the other end of the scale.

c 3. Again "Q.E.D."

c 5. Above at 718 a 6–b 5 we have been told that the details of our code will teach us what behaviour to our fellows τὴν πόλιν ἡμῖν, συμβουλευθέντων θεῶν, μακαρίαν τε καὶ εὐδαίμονα ἀποτελεῖ. Again, at 693 b 4 we read πόλιν ἐλευθέραν τε εἶναι δεῖ καὶ ἔμφρονα καὶ ἑαυτῇ φίλην, καὶ τὸν νομοθετοῦντα πρὸς ταῦτα βλέποντα δεῖ νομοθετεῖν. At the same time, ἡ τῶν νόμων ὑπόθεσις ἐνταῦθα ἔβλεπεν does not, I think, refer to any definite statement in an earlier part of the work, but is a completion of the statement begun just above at 742 d 2 ff. There he tells us what the statesmanlike lawgiver would *not* make his object in framing his laws. Hence I would translate: "The object of our laws (which I was explaining) *is*." The imperfect is what Goodwin, *M. and T.* § 40, and Adam on *Rep.* 490 a, call the "philosophic imperfect"—"was" being equal to "is, as we saw."

d 2. λέγομεν δή: the asyndeton emphasizes the statement.—δεῖν: in O εἶναι is written before χρυσόν, but is marked as doubtful. This means that the writer—or corrector—knew of a

text in which there was no *εἶναι*. Stobaeus also has *εἶναι* before *χρυσόν*. Schanz's note—"*at cf. Theaet. 176 d*"—reminds us that, as there in *οἷους δεῖ ἐν τῇ πόλει τοὺς σωθησομένους*, so here in *δεῖν ἐν τῇ πόλει* we have a—probably conversational—use of *δεῖν* in the sense of "to be proper," "to be of the right sort." We get the same use in the absolute *δέον* and in (e.g. *πρωϊαίτερον*) *τοῦ δέοντος*.

d 4. *μηδὲ βοσκημάτων αἰσχρῶν*: this expression is a puzzling one. Ficinus translates as if the right reading were *αἰσχρῶς* (for *αἰσχρῶν*)—"nec ex pecoribus turpiter." So Stallb. "Videtur intelligi turpe lucrum ex re pecuaria," Wagner "(durch) schimpfliche Viehzucht." Schneider translates baldly "*nec* questum multum artibus exercendum sordidis et fenore *aut turpibus pecoribus*"; Jowett has "or rearing the meaner kinds of live stock." Susemihl asks if *βοσκήματα* could possibly mean "slaves"? Ritter thinks that what is forbidden is (1) the rearing of beasts for sport (cp. 789 b f.), and especially (2) the fattening up of beasts to serve as delicacies for the table, and that the term *αἰσχρῶν* is used because animals so fattened are generally castrated. Ritter rightly points out that he cannot mean to forbid all rearing of stock, as that is allowed at 849 c 1. I would suggest that in *βοσκημάτων* Plato is merely carrying on and enlarging the metaphor contained in *τόκος*, and that *αἰσχρῶν* belongs to both nouns. I would translate: "And we will have no great money-making out of base trade, or vile money-breeding —or money-feeding either." The capitalist is represented as not only "breeding" from his money, but as rearing—"nursing"—his stock so bred.

d 4 f. *ὅσα*, and *ὁπόσα* ("such only as") are "vi deminuendi posita" (Stallb., who cps. *Soph.* 217 e and *Phaedo* 83 b). So at Ar. *Nub.* 434 *ἀλλ' ὅσ' ἐμαυτῷ στρεψοδικῆσαι*, and at Aesch. *Septem* 732 *χθόνα ναίειν διαπήλας ὁπόσαν καὶ φθιμένοισιν κατέχειν*.

d 6. Money, he goes on to say, is only needed to supply human wants, and the first of these is a proper training for soul and body. If *χρηματισμός* bulks too large in the state, it will not only take up time and energy which is necessary for *education*, but it will make men forget the *need* for education.

e 1. *τῆς ἄλλης παιδείας*, "the corresponding (mental and moral) training." (The usual chiastic arrangement.)—*οὐκ . . . ἄξια λόγου*, "will never be anything but poor things."

e 5. *ὀρθῶς*, like *ὅσα* and *ὁπόσα* above, is used in a limiting sense.

e 7. *οὕτω*: i.e. in accordance with the order of importance just given.

e 8. *νομοθεῖται*, the reading of O^1, is doubtless a writer's slip for *νομοθετεῖται*, which is the reading of Stobaeus. The perf. (as A), though less natural after *εἰ τάττεται*, is more significant: "we have been right in the laws we have made;" i.e. the fact that the right qualities are held in the highest honour is a proof that the legislation has been right.—*οἱ αὐτόθι προσταττόμενοι νόμοι* are "any laws which may hereafter be made in the colony," i.e. "and the same test will be applicable to all future legislation."

744 a 3. *ἐπισημαίνεσθαι*, "make it clear to himself."

a 4. *εἰ . . . ἤ*: as *ἐπισημαίνεσθαι* is equivalent to "ask himself the question," this question can be treated as if it were an indirect one. If it were put directly, the two alternatives would be introduced by *πότερον . . . ἤ;* "The lawgiver, I tell you, must often ask himself these two questions: first, 'What am I aiming at?' and secondly, 'Am I hitting the mark, or missing it?' In this way, and this only, he may possibly so discharge his task as to leave nothing for others to do after him." (Schanz marks a lacuna after *σκοποῦ*.)

b 1. *ἦν καλόν*: so *δικαιότατον ἦν* at 869 b 6. See Goodwin, *M. and T.* § 416.

b 3. *χρήματα*: though we are not told so, we must assume that this portable property was not allowed to remain in the form of money—for the possession of gold and silver was forbidden (742 a)—but was exchanged for land which was added to the original *κλῆρος*.—The *κλῆρος* was doubtless *given* by the state, so that a citizen, who arrived with only enough money to enable him to work it, could take his place among the rest.—The property qualifications for the four classes would probably be estimated not in (acres of) *land*, but in (bushels of) *produce*.

b 4 ff. The difficulties in this passage—and they are great—fortunately do not obscure its main point, which is contained in the words *δεῖ δὴ . . . τιμήματα ἄνισα γενέσθαι*.—"It would have been more convenient," we are told, "if each colonist had brought the same amount of property with him, but they have not." It being so, it is best (for certain reasons) for the state to recognize this inequality, and to make it the basis of a classification of the citizens into four divisions.—The difficulties concern the *reasons* for this proceeding.—Ritter (p. 149 ff.) has a helpful discussion of the passage. I follow him generally—except in what he says at the end about the readings—and more particularly

in taking the ἕνεκα clauses to furnish the *grounds* for the classification, not the *purposes* which it was meant to serve.—δεῖ δὴ . . . ἰσότητος ἕνεκα : πολλῶν . . . τε is on the model of ἄλλως τε . . . καί. He will not go into *all* his reasons, but only mentions one —i.e. the promotion of internal peace by allowing its due weight to wealth. We may translate : "especially as the state allows all a fair chance."

b 5 ff. ἵνα κτλ. : I prefer to regard this final clause as containing a rather gross zeugma, than as either deficient, or redundant. (Steph. would remedy its supposed deficiencies by adding κατά before τήν in b 6 and γίγνωνται (or καθιστῶνται) before τὰς τιμάς, and putting δέ (for τε) after it.—Ritter accepts the κατά, and would reject ἀρχαί . . . διανομαί. Ast—followed by Schanz —would reject from ἀρχαί to τιμήν, and the latter also brackets ἰσότητος ἕνεκα.)—I imagine that, when the speaker begins ἵνα . . . τὴν . . . τιμήν he personifies the occasions of election and tax-fixing, and has in mind some such expression as "may take account of," "may estimate," to govern τιμήν—"the price of each man's value," and, when all that does follow is ἀπολαμβάνοντες—agreeing with a different subject—and διαφέρωνται, he has a vague notion that enough may be got thence to fill the gap. (Stallb., with a quite different explanation, adds τε to ἰσότητός.) The only change I would make in Burnet's text is to reject the comma after διανομαί.

b 6. διανομαί : in the case of *distributions* I imagine that the lower classes would receive *more*, while of εἰσφοραί they would pay *less*.

b 7. μὴ . . . μόνον . . . ἀλλὰ καί : he does not say that birth and personal *distinction* of mind or body are not to weigh with those who appoint, but that *the size of a man's estate ought to be considered as well.*

c 1. All editors agree in reading μηδὲ with O^1 for A's μήτε.

c 2. χρῆσιν and πενίαν are the MS. readings (though O^1 has πενίας). If the simpler κτῆσιν (Ast) had stood for the former, it is hard to see how the more out-of-the-way χρῆσιν came to be substituted for it.—With τὰς τιμάς τε we must suppose the subject to change and become "men," i.e. the men mentioned in ἑκάστοις. —ὡς ἰσαίτατα τῷ ἀνίσῳ συμμέτρῳ δέ : how real equality can be ensured by an award which though *unequal* is *proportional* to some recognized standard, is explained—as Ritter says—below at 757 a b, where we are told, however, that the true standard can only be discerned by the divine intelligence.—I would translate

(*ἵνα . . . διαφέρωνται*): "that all occasions of election to offices or fixing of taxes or bounties (may estimate) each man's real worth not *merely* by his own or his ancestors' virtues, nor yet by their bodily strength or attractiveness, but *also* by his enjoyment of or his lack of *wealth*, and that men may be endowed with dignities and responsibilities on so fair a principle of proportional, though unequal, distribution, that no quarrels may disturb their peace."

c 4. *μεγέθει*: an instrumental dative with *τιμήματα ποιεῖσθαι*, which is equivalent to *τιμᾶσθαι*: "arrange by size of property in four classes." Ficinus translates *μεγέθει τῆς οὐσίας* "magnitudine differentes bonorum."

c 7. *ὅταν τε . . . καὶ ὅταν*: with *προσαγορευομένους*; i.e. in any event the *names* (and property qualifications) of the classes will remain the same, whether the individual members change or not.—O's correction of its *πλουσιώτεροι* to *πλουσιώτατοι*—which is the reading of A—suggests that the latter was not a mere copyist's mistake on the part of the scribe of A (see below on d 4) but an old variant.

d 2. *τόδε . . . νόμου σχῆμα = νόμον σχήματος τοῦδε.*

d 4. The scribe of A seems to have been under some disturbing influence about this time. Not only does he make such a careless mistake as *νομίσματος* here for *νοσήματος* and *δὴ* for *δεῖ* at e 1, but he omitted altogether, at the first writing, a long passage from 745 a 2 (*θεοῖς*) to c 4 (*δὲ*).—*ὃ . . . κεκλῆσθαι*, "which may more rightly be said to be disintegration than discord." Cp. Arist. *Pol.* iv. 1296 a 8 *ὅπου γὰρ πολὺ τὸ διὰ μέσου, ἥκιστα στάσεις καὶ διαστάσεις γίγνονται τῶν πολιτειῶν.* (Some translators—Fic., Serr., Wagn.—take *ἤ* to be *or*.)

d 6. With *πλοῦτον* we are meant to supply some "strong" epithet equivalent to *χαλεπήν*.

d 7. *ταῦτα ἀμφότερα*: i.e. *στάσιν καὶ διάστασιν.* Here we may call them *class-division* and *class-discord*. (Ritter says that, as these are only two names for the same thing, *ἀμφότερα* should be rejected.)—The persistence of the reading *ἀμφότερα* for *ἀμφοτέρων* in d 6—so A, O, Stob.—gives weight to Wagner's suggestion that it is the *second* *ἀμφότερα* in A and O which ought to be altered to the gen. So Schanz, but Burnet prefers the authority of L which alters the first.—*ἑκατέρου*: i.e. *πενίας καὶ πλούτου.*

e 1. *ἄρχων οὐδεὶς . . . τῶν τε ἄλλων οὐδεὶς κτλ.*, "no magistrate, and no *good citizen*."

e 5. *καὶ μέχρι τετραπλασίου*: Aristotle, *Pol.* 1265 b 23, says *τὴν πᾶσαν οὐσίαν ἐφίησι γίνεσθαι μέχρι πενταπλασίας*; he

evidently took κτᾶσθαι to mean "acquire in addition to the κλῆρος."—πλείονα, like τούτων and τὰ περιγιγνόμενα, is neut. pl.; hence δοθέντων and ἡμίσεα.

745 a 4. φανεῖ . . . ἡμίσεσιν, "it will be open to anybody to get half by disclosing the fact."—ὁ δὲ ὀφλών: if convicted, the culprit will lose an amount of his lawful property equal to that of the surplus which he had held unlawfully.

a 6. τὰ δ' ἡμίσεα τῶν θεῶν: it would thus appear that the informer and the Gods would together get an amount equal to the illegal surplus.—Below at 754 e f. the penalty for holding too much property is different: the culprit is to be excluded from the benefit of any future distribution (of land) and to bear publicly the reproach of αἰσχροκερδεία.—The addition of πᾶσα facilitates the omission of the art. before χωρίς; possibly it is best to take χωρίς closely with γεγράφθω. Perhaps there would be two records: one giving the name (or number) and position of each κλῆρος, under the owner's name, and the other registering only each man's surplus holdings. These need not be near either half of the original κλῆρος, and so would go best in a separate register. Such a register would give the courts sure ground (cp. σαφεῖς in b 1) to go on.

a 7. φύλαξιν ἄρχουσιν: the former word seems to be explanatory of the latter, so that the two words might be rendered "in charge of the magistrates."

b 1. I would adopt H. Steph.'s ὅσα for ὅσαι. The difficulty of the MS. reading is the only reason for thinking it genuine: "so as to simplify legal actions as far as property is concerned."

b 2. ἱδρῦσθαι: lit. "to have (his city) placed" (middle); cp. *Symp.* 195 e τὴν οἴκησιν ἵδρυται. (Ast, *Lex.* calls it pass.)

b 3 f. καὶ . . . ἐκλεξάμενον, "after he (the legislator) has chosen a spot possessing besides all the qualities advantageous to a city." Badham "requires" ὑπάρχοντ' ἔχοντα. It looks as if it was to avoid this jingle that Plato chose the more long-winded ὅσα . . . τῶν ὑπαρχόντων. τῶν ὑπαρχόντων is "the attendant circumstances." (Ast makes it masc.—sc. τόπων—and translates "ex iis locis qui praesto sunt.")

b 7. ἱερόν: this has been variously interpreted: (1) as = τέμενος; so Ficinus—he understands it to be the *first* of the twelve divisions—πρῶτον being πρῶτον μέρος; (2) as = *templum*—one for all three deities (Jowett); (3) as *one* temple *apiece* for the three deities (Wagner). I believe (1) is right, but that the sacred ἀκρόπολις is independent of the twelve divisions.—ἀφ' οὗ: from

the Acropolis, as from a centre, are to radiate the dividing lines of the districts. (Ficinus takes ἀφ' οὗ to be "starting from which"; another meaning which might be given to it is "apart from which.")—This central portion is particularly suitable for Hestia; cp. *Phaedrus* 247 a with Thompson's note.

c 1. τὰ δώδεκα: the art. here and in the next line is not merely "the just-mentioned"; it suggests that the number is the rational one. At 771 b Plato justifies the selection of the number twelve—a division, he says, ἑπομένην τοῖς μησὶν καὶ τῇ τοῦ παντὸς περιόδῳ.—It is clear that the dividing lines are to radiate from the central enclosure because each division is to contain part of the city proper.

c 2. ἴσα: the equality, he explains, is not to be reckoned by size, but by the productivity of the divisions.

c 3. ἀγαθῆς γῆς and χείρονος are genitives of *material*.

c 5. καὶ συγκληρῶσαι . . . ἑκάτερον, "and to join together as a lot two pieces of land partnered each with its near piece or with its far piece," i.e. each piece will have a fellow, the "far" one a "near" fellow, and the "near" one a "far" fellow. So I understand Peipers (*Quaestiones Cr.* p. 96) to take the passage, and though the use of μετέχειν—"hold on to a partner"—is extraordinary, it seems better so to take it than to alter ἑκάτερον to ἑκατέρου (Ast) or ἑκατέρωθεν, either of which would be superfluous, or even to ἑκάστοτε (Schanz), "in the case of each κλῆρος," which would be equally superfluous—and, besides, τοῦ τε . . . μετέχοντα would then seem a very complicated expression for τὸ μὲν ἐγγύς, τὸ δὲ πόρρω.

c 7. εἷς κλῆρος: again I would follow Peipers (p. 97) in rejecting εἷς κλῆρος as an intruder from the margin. The only possible way of explaining it, if it be retained, seems to be to supply συγκληρωθήσεται in thought from the previous συγκληρῶσαι. Ast's ἔστω would not account for the *datives*. On the other hand, if only a comma be placed after ἑκάτερον, and εἷς κλῆρος be omitted, the next two clauses fall quite smoothly into their places.

d 2. μηχανᾶσθαι δὲ . . . διανομῆς, "likewise in arranging the separate halves we must regulate the proportion of poor soil to rich, of which we spoke just now, using differences of size to produce equality"—i.e. the poverty and richness of the soil must vary inversely as the size. Not that each half κλῆρος must be equal to its fellow half, but that the near halves should be equal, and the far halves too. τὸ φαυλότητός τε καὶ ἀρετῆς χώρας is

"the matter of the poverty etc. of the land," and, by a natural, though apparently unexampled expansion of this idiom, Plato makes *νυνδὴ λεγόμενον* agree with the *τό*. Ast and Schanz do not believe this expansion possible, and insert *περί*—Ast before *φαυλ.* and Schanz after *χώρας*. Stallb. makes the gen. by itself equal to the gen. with *περί*, comparing *Rep.* 576 d 7. But this does not mean the same thing; it is not "what he said above," but the "matter" itself, which is the object of *μηχανᾶσθαι*.—The expression is like *τὸ τῆς τέχνης* at *Gorg.* 450 c. The article is probably left out here because, if put with one of the three nouns, it must have been put with all. At Eur. *Phoen.* 403, in a similar expression, we have *τὰ φίλων* for *τὰ τῶν φίλων*, and at *Herc. Fur.* 633 *τἀνθρώπων* for *τὰ τῶν ἀνθρώπων*.—*δίχα τμήμασι* is equivalent to a compound. (Ought we possibly to read *διχοτμήμασι*?)

d 5. The MS. *νείμασθαι*—Fic. "*dividere*"—would have to usurp the sense of the *act.* here, "we must divide the *men* too into twelve bodies"; if not, how is *συνταξάμενον* to be explained? Schanz holds that there is a lacuna after *μέρη*. I believe that Plato wrote *νεῖμαι*.—As at e 1 above the MSS. vary between *δὴ* and *δεῖ*; this time A is right, and O wrong.—*τήν*: with this I think we are meant to supply *διανομήν*, as suggested by *διανομῆς* and *νεῖμαι* just before. (Ast would supply *κτῆσιν*, or, in preference, change *τήν* into *τά*.)—*ἄλλης*, "superfluous," i.e. over and above the *κλῆρος*.

d 6. *εἰς ἴσα τὰ δώδεκα μέρη*, "(arranging the distribution) so as to make the twelve tribes equal (in wealth)." (No need with Schanz to reject *τά*.)—This division would spread the rich men equally throughout the twelve tribes.

d 8. The twelve Gods are to have their *κλῆροι* as well as the citizens. This assigning of each territorial division to a patron deity would foster tribal patriotism, and prevent separate coalitions amongst either the *rich* or the *poor* throughout the state.

e 1. *λαχόν*: see L. & S. s.v. § V.

e 4. *νέμεσθαι ἕκαστον*: there is a change of subject here. "Each citizen is to possess two houses."

e 5. All edd. now adopt Boeckh's correction of the MS. *κατοίκησιν* to *κατοίκισιν*. Cp. above 683 a 1 and a 6.

e 7. *ἐκ παντὸς τρόπου*: Stallb. cps. *Euthyd.* 282 a.

e 8. *τὰ νῦν εἰρημένα πάντα κτλ.*, "all the arrangements suggested above are not likely ever to find just the conditions which will ensure that they should all be carried out quite literally."

e 9. *οὕτω* ("quite") goes with *κατὰ λόγον*—as in the phrase *ἁπλῶς οὕτως* at 633 c 9.

746 a 1. *ἄνδρας τε* here, and *ἔτι δὲ χώρας . . . μεσότητάς τε καὶ . . . οἰκήσεις* at a 6 introduce the two main divisions into which the above-mentioned "arrangements" fall—the accusatives being in each case in apposition to *σύμπαντα*. (Stallb. takes *μεσ.* and *οἰκ.* to be governed by *ἔχοντες*.)

a 4 f. *χρυσοῦ*: here regarded as an *ornament*.—The two clauses which express what the "men" will not submit *to have*—limited money, and limited families—are balanced by two clauses which express what the men will not submit *to be deprived of*—i.e. decorative gold, and other luxuries which the legislator will evidently forbid.—*προστάξων* is rather strangely used for "add to the list of things forbidden." (Badham proposes to read *ἕτερα ἅ*, regarding it as the *second* out of *three* things which are not likely *σύμπαντα συμβῆναι γενόμενα*, i.e. (1) *ἄνδρας τε κτλ.*, (2) *καὶ ἕτερα* and (3) *ἔτι δὲ χώρας κτλ.* But things *ἃ δῆλος ὁ νομοθέτης προστάξων* are not of the nature of *things which may be expected not to happen*. They are within the power of the legislator, to ordain or not as he sees fit.

a 6. Here we have the usual chiasmus: it is the city which is to be in the *middle*, in the ideally arranged state, and it is to have dwellings arranged "all over the country" round it. The plural *μεσότητας* is chosen perhaps to balance the plural *οἰκήσεις*, and to avoid the two short syllables at the end of *μεσότητά τε*, and, though strange, it can be explained as "central positions for all states which have a city." (I think it is possible though that we ought to read *μεσότητά τε*.—Wagner would read *μεσαιτάτας*, in agreement with *οἰκήσεις*; the superlative seems hardly natural.)

a 7. *οἷον ὀνείρατα λέγων, ἢ πλάττων καθάπερ ἐκ κηροῦ*: Stallb. aptly cps. *Rep.* 471 c, where Socrates is said to have forgotten to show *ὡς δυνατὴ αὕτη ἡ πολιτεία γενέσθαι, καὶ τίνα τρόπον ποτὲ δυνατή*.—Burnet has rightly gone back to the arrangement of the older interpreters—e.g. Ficinus and Ast—in putting the comma after *πάντῃ* instead of before it.

b 1 f. *χρὴ δ' . . . τὰ τοιάδε*, "he" (the legislator) "must go over his ground again in the following manner."—It looks as if this and the following sentence were two alternative ways of saying the same thing. Plato can hardly have meant both to stand as they are. (Schneider, Wagner, Stallb., and Schanz prefer the *δὲ πάντα λαμβάνειν* of A to the *ἐπαναλαμβάνειν* of L and O. Schneider translates: "sed opus est ut quisque haec secum reputet." In so

doing he ignores the fact that *τὰ τοιάδε*, especially coming, as it does, so soon after *τὰ τοιαῦτα*, *must* mean "*what follows.*". It is hard to say what Ficinus read; his translation of *χρὴ . . . τόδε* is: "sed ea quoque narranda quae legislator adversus diceret.")

b 2. *πάλιν φράζει* repeats the notion of *ἐπαναλαμβάνειν*. What follows is, in effect, a "repetition" of what we read at p. 739 about the degrees by which a state may fall off from perfection. What is here the *model* is (as Ritter says, p. 154), what was spoken of above as the *δευτέρα πόλις*.

b 4 f. The subject of *διεξέρχεται* is *τὸ νῦν λεγόμενον*—see above on 727 b 2; Burnet therefore does well to reject the comma after *λεγόμενον*. (Winckelmann would read *τὸν* for *τὸ*; but no "man" has so far been mentioned.)

b 5. *ἐν ἑκάστοις τῶν μελλόντων ἔσεσθαι*: i.e. "whenever there is contemplated any future course or performance."

b 6. O has here the correct *τόδε* as against the *τόνδε* of A, L and O^2; cp. below 967 d 1 where also O preserves the right reading.

b 8. *ᾧ*: masc. (Ast would like to read *πῃ* for *τι* in c 1, and take *ᾧ* as neut.)

c 2. *τῶν λοιπῶν*: i.e. "among possibilities"—what are left over after impossibilities have been "ruled out."

c 3. *συγγενέστατον . . . πράττειν*, "is most akin to what it is good to do"—i.e. to the perfect institutions of the "pattern."

c 4. For *διαμηχανᾶσθαι* cf. *Rep.* 518 d.

c 5. *τέλος . . . βουλήσει*: i.e. "to make his *παράδειγμα* as perfect as his heart could wish." Not only must the colonists' representative (i.e. Cleinias) do his utmost to carry all that is practicable in the pattern into effect, but, *before deciding* what is practicable or not, he must let the lawgiver (i.e. the Athenian) finish his description of the "best possible."

c 7. *τῶν εἰρημένων* (which depends on *ὅτι*), and *τῆς νομοθεσίας* (which depends on *τί*) both describe the lawgiver's proposals as conveyed in the *παράδειγμα*, and *συμφέρει* and *πρόσαντες* (*ἐστί*) are used absolutely. (Ficinus, and apparently Wagner, translate *τῆς νομοθεσίας* as if it were a dative governed by *πρόσαντες*: "quidve ferendis legibus adversetur"—"und was der Gesetzgebung Feindseliges angeführt worden.")

c 8. *ὁμολογούμενον αὐτὸ αὑτῷ*: this refers to *συμφέρει*. An instance of *in*consistency would be the placing the city in the middle of the country, when there was a manifestly better site for it elsewhere. "Self-consistency" is also the subject of the following passage about numerical arrangements.

d 3–e 3. I think the key to the explanation of this very difficult passage is to be found in Stallbaum's suggestion that τοῦτ' αὐτό in d 3 is τὸ ὁμολογούμενον αὐτὸ αὑτῷ—or rather "*the need for self-consistency*"; but he did not follow out this idea far enough. He stopped at the word πεντακισχιλίων, whereas the reference to this self-consistency is not made clear until we get to the words ἔμμετρα, and ἀλλήλοις σύμφωνα, at e 2. The main part of the sentence I take to be this: προθυμητέον ἰδεῖν τίνα τρόπον πάντα ταῦτα ἔμμετρα καὶ ἀλλήλοις σύμφωνα δεῖ τὸν νόμον τάττειν. πάντα ταῦτα "resumes" τὰ δώδεκα μέρη καὶ τὰ τούτοις συνεπόμενα (including the μέτρα etc.)—ὅθεν . . . σταθμά being, as Burnet marks it, a parenthesis.—I believe that for the MS. τὴν δόξαν τῆς we ought to read τῆς δοξάσης—μετά would then mean "in conjunction with" instead of "in sequence to."—δῆλον I take to agree with τρόπον.—αὐτοῦ, if genuine, must be the adverb (as in ἐνθάδ' αὐτοῦ, κατ' οἴκους αὐτοῦ), but I prefer to accept Stallbaum's suggestion that it is a mistake for αὖ. We may translate: "That very self-consistency we must now do our best to consider in conjunction with the proposed division of the state into twelve parts, inquiring in what conspicuous way the twelve parts, which in their turn admit of being divided in very many ways,—these and their immediate subdivisions, and those which spring from them, until we get down to the 5040 individual citizens—and such divisions will give you your φρατρίαι, your δῆμοι, and your κῶμαι, and besides these, your military divisions, whether for battle or the march, yes, and your money-values and your measures, whether of solids, liquids, or weights—how all these, I say, are so to be fixed by law as to harmonize with and to fit in with each other."

Hermann proposes a very ingenious emendation of δῆλον δή, i.e. διελεῖν δεῖ; and upon this Wagner founds a still more ingenious explanation, which some may prefer to that given above. It is that the original text ran: τὸ τίνα τρόπον διελεῖν δεῖ τὰ δώδεκα μέρη. δῆλον δὴ κατὰ μέρη τῶν ἐντὸς κτλ., and that, owing to the similarity of the two clauses, διελεῖν . . . μέρη was accidentally omitted. (He does not explain how κατά then became τὰ δώδεκα.) He then takes πλείστας as a true superlative: "clearly you will split them up into the parts which have the greatest number of divisions"—he accepts Ast's αὐτῶν for αὐτοῦ.—This explanation is more natural (than that given above) *so far*, but it does not accommodate itself so well to what follows.—As to πλείστας διανομάς in d 5, 420 ($\frac{1}{12}$ of 5040) is divisible by 1, 2, 3, 4,

5, 6, 7, 10, 12, 14, 15, 20, and 21, to say nothing of larger numbers.

d 7. *φρατρίας καὶ δήμους καὶ κώμας*: the first, as in Athens, would be a *personal* division, founded on blood-relationship; the last two are *local* ones. Herm. *De vest.*, in commenting on the adoption of these familiar terms, reminds us that Aristotle, *Poet.* 1448 a 35, says that *κώμη* is the Spartan word for what the Athenians called *δῆμος*. On this passage of Ar. Bywater quotes Isocr. 149 a *διελόμενοι τὴν μὲν πόλιν κατὰ κώμας, τὴν δὲ χώραν κατὰ δήμους*. This does not seem to have been Plato's idea, for below at 848 c the *δώδεκα κῶμαι* are evidently *in the country*.

e 1. A^2 made a bad suggestion in changing *ἀγωγάς* to *ἀγῶνας*. Cp. 819 c 4 *εἴς τε τὰς τῶν στρατοπέδων τάξεις καὶ ἀγωγάς*. The arrangement of an army *on the march* differs from the battle order.

e 3. O^2 makes a natural but quite unnecessary suggestion that for *νόμον* we ought to read *νομοθέτην*.

e 4. *δείσαντα* follows the construction noticed above on 643 a 6, and 688 e 5, of the acc. of the agent after a verbal adj. in *-τέον*.—*τὴν δόξασαν ἂν γίγνεσθαι σμικρολογίαν*, "what might appear to be a peddling minuteness."

e 6. The *standardizing* of the parts of machinery, due largely to Sir Joseph Whitworth, has conferred incalculable benefits on modern mechanical engineering. (We want a world-lawgiver to-day, to ordain a metric system on a duodecimal basis.)—*καὶ κοινῷ λόγῳ νομίσαντα*: advantage is taken of the fact that *δείσαντα* has preceded, and the construction is continued; but the connexion with the main verb (*φοβητέα ἐστί*) is not the same. In translating we must begin afresh, as Ficinus does—"*Et communi ratione censeat, etc.*"—Schanz would slightly mitigate the *ἀνακόλουθον* by omitting *πάντα* in e 5.

747 a 2. *ὅσα ἐν ἑαυτοῖς*: i.e. pure arithmetic; *ὅσα ἐν μήκεσι καὶ ἐν βάθεσι*: plane and solid geometry. Then follow the numerical aspects of the sciences of harmony and kinetics.

a 5. *πρὸς ταῦτα πάντα βλέψαντα*: i.e. in view of this general applicability (*πρὸς πάντα χρησίμους* a 1) the lawgiver must insist on the importance of this *standardizing* (*συντάξεως*). The reason is that men's minds will be accustomed to think of each number *as having certain* relations to other numbers.

b 1 ff. "For home life, for public life, for all kinds of arts and crafts, the most efficacious branch of education is mathematics. But the great point is that it wakes up the sleepy and stupid nature, and makes it quick, and mindful, and shrewd; the

improvement upon its original self is miraculous." For the usefulness and intellectual effect of mathematics cf. below 819 c 6 *καὶ πάντως χρησιμωτέρους αὐτοὺς αὑτοῖς καὶ ἐγρηγορότας μᾶλλον τοὺς ἀνθρώπους ἀπεργάζεται.* Cp. also *Rep.* 522 c, 525 c, and 526 a 8.

b 5. The use of *παρά* is much the same as above at 693 b 1 *τί παρὰ ταῦτα ἔδει πράττειν ἄλλο*, and grows out of the meaning *in comparison with* which is often found in *παρ' ἄλληλα*, e.g. *Rep.* 435 a; cp. above 729 e 4. (Wagner translates: "indem er, vermögen dieser göttlichen Kunst, *gegen seine Natur* Fortschritte macht.")

b 6. *ἄλλοις* is almost our "further."

b 7. *τις*: our "you."

b 8. *αὐτά* is, of course, mathematical proficiency.

c 2. *τὴν καλουμένην ἂν τις πανουργίαν ἀντὶ σοφίας ἀπεργασάμενος λάθοι*, "you would find, to your surprise, that you had made a regular rogue of him, instead of a philosopher." *τὴν καλουμένην* = "regular," "professional."

c 5. *ἄλλων*, as at b 6, denotes the rest of the habits and influences (besides mathematics) which mould the dispositions of these unpopular Semites. Cp. *Rep.* 436 a *τὸ φιλοχρήματον ὃ περὶ τούς τε Φοίνικας εἶναι καὶ τοὺς κατὰ Αἴγυπτον φαίη τις ἂν οὐχ ἥκιστα.*

c 6. *κτημάτων ἀνελευθερίας* is put for *φιλοχρηματίας*—"owing to the debasing effect of the rest of their pursuits, and of their wealth." (The Egyptians got no further in their "geometry' after they had learnt enough to make practical land-surveyors. It was the "free" spirit of the Greek which built mathematical science on this foundation.)

c 7. Without *ἄν* this sentence would mean "whether it was a bad lawgiver who did it"; the *ἄν* makes it "whether it might have been a bad lawgiver who did it . . ." (Steph. would change the *ἄν* to *αὖ*, Ast would read *ἐξεργάσαιτο* for *ἐξηργάσατο*, Stallb. confines the force of *ἄν* to *γενόμενος*, Schanz changes it to *δή*.)

d 1. *εἴτε καὶ φύσις ἄλλη τις τοιαύτη*, "or even some natural influence of such a tendency apart from these." One such possible influence, as he proceeds to say, is that of locality.

d 3. The *οὐκ*, which Ast would reject, is established by all MSS., and by those of Galen and Stobaeus. Stallb. rightly defends it as the same negative which is put in after *ἀπαρνεῖσθαι*, and cites similar negatives at *Prot.* 350 d and *Philebus* 26 d, where they are inserted after *ὡς οὐκ ὀρθῶς ὡμολόγησα*, and *οὐκ*

ἐδυσκολαίνομεν respectively. Here μηδὲ . . . ἡμᾶς λανθανέτω = "let us not be so forgetful as to imagine that . . ." (Schanz follows Ast in deleting οὐκ ; other proposals are to read ἐοίκασιν (Dübner) or πεφύκασιν (Haupt) for οὐκ εἰσὶν.)

d 6. All editors adopt Ruhnken's δι' εἱλήσεις for the MS. διειλήσεις, though such a word as the latter would be quite natural here with παντοίας understood.—ἐναίσιοι : there is no need to alter this word, nor is Stallb. right in assigning a sinister meaning to it. The καί in all three cases is *or*. Different neighbourhoods, Plato says, produce ἀμείνους καὶ χείρους—some good men, some bad ; and the lawgiver must recognize this. He then explains how the effect is produced : differences in the prevailing winds, and in the amount of sunshine are *either prejudicial or the reverse* (so Wagner), just as the drinking-water and the crops impart *benefits or evils* (ἀμείνω καὶ χείρω) to souls as well at bodies.

d 7. Stobaeus's δι' αὐτὴν—so Ast conjectured—for which Galen has simply διὰ (so Schanz), is much more natural than the MS. διὰ ταύτην.—ἀναδιδοῦσαν is transitive. (Fic. makes it intrans.)

e 1. For the δέ after οὐ μόνον cf. above, 667 a 1.

e 3. For τόποι χώρας cp. 760 c 7.

e 4. θεία ἐπίπνοια : cf. below, 811 c 9, and *Rep.* 499 c 1.—The notion in δαιμόνων λήξεις is the same that we met at 745 d 8, where we read of the κλῆροι of the Gods.—The special salubrity of certain districts is so marked, as only to be explained, he says, by some supernatural agency. Cp. Eur. *Med.* 824 ff.—For the τοὺς of O and L, A has an inexplicable τοῖς ; the scribe's eye must have strayed to a neighbouring οἷς.

e 5. οἷς—for which Ast would read οὓς—goes with τιθέναι τοὺς νόμους. He will make his laws *to fit* these special local conditions.

e 8. A strongly marked explanatory asyndeton (πρῶτον τρεπτέον).

BOOK VI

751 a 4. δύο εἴδη : we were told above at 735 a 5 that two main divisions of statecraft are (1) the appointment of the executive, and (2) the giving of laws. Here the first of these two divisions is subdivided into (*a*) the selection of those who are fittest to be magistrates, and (*b*) the apportioning, among the various offices, of the laws which have to be administered.—A and O^1 have

γιγνόμενον. Like the τοὺς in all MSS. at d 1, the mistake was due to a careless assimilation to a neighbouring word. L has γιγνόμενα.

b 5–c 2. The main idea of this difficult paragraph is: "the sharper the instrument, the more dangerous it is in inefficient hands." The main difficulty lies in the infinitive clause τοῦ . . . νόμοις, which depends on οὐδὲν πλέον ἂν συμβαίνοι. The context shows, I think, conclusively that Plato's general meaning is: "no advantage can spring from a well-equipped city's well-made laws, if it appoints incapable magistrates to administer them." The construction is hard to grasp, but I do not think it is improved if with Steph. we change τοῦ to ἐκ τοῦ, or with Schramm (who is followed by Hermann, Wagner, and Schanz), we change τοῦ into τῷ. We may say, I think, that the gen. τοῦ ἐπιστῆσαι is "prospectively" or "proleptically" attracted by τεθέντων. Riddell (*Dig.* § 27) calls it "a genitive placed at the beginning of a construction, for the sake of premising mention of it, without any grammatical justification of the gen."—A minor difficulty arises in connexion with the gen. abs. clause μεγάλου . . . ἔργου. Wagner translates "*inasmuch as*" (*da*),—Jowett, and probably the Latin translators, by "*although* . . . lawgiving is a hard task," or "an important matter." I think the former is preferable to the latter, but that, though the syntax would allow either, and μέγα ἔργον is often thus used, the hint of the εὖ παρεσκευασμένην and the emphatic position of μεγάλου entitle us to translate: "where the product of lawgiving is an elaborate one"—the τοῦ belonging to ἔργου being left out for rhythm's sake. For μέγα ἔργον in the sense of "grand achievement" cp. *Symp.* 178 d. I would translate the whole clause: "that, where your code of laws is an elaborate one, what follows if a well-equipped state sets inefficient officers to administer its well-made laws is this: not only does it reap no benefit from their excellence, and become a laughing-stock to the world, but you may be pretty sure (σχεδόν) that states in such a condition would find such laws particularly dangerous and injurious." (Heindorf's idea, which Ast adopts, that ἀρχὰς ἐπιτηδείους ἔχειν has fallen out before ⟨ἐκ⟩ τοῦ is sufficiently refuted by Hermann in his critical note. The whole passage is unintelligible if we do not grasp the fact that νομοθεσία and ἀρχῶν κατάστασις are two *quite distinct things.* —F.H.D. suggests that εὖ τεθέντων is a "gloss.")

c 4. I think τοῦτο refers back, and means "the danger of having incapable magistrates appointed."

c 6. *βάσανον . . . εἶναι δεδωκότας*: further references to the (Athenian) *δοκιμασία* occur at 754 d 1 and 755 d 6.

c 8. The correction of A's *αὐτοὺς* to *αὖ τοὺς* was made in some MSS., and in all the printed editions.—The periphrastic *εἶναι δεδωκότας* is peculiar.

c 9. Ast suggested that *τε* is a mistake for *δεῖ*. Schanz held that *τεθράφθαι* and *τε* ought both to be rejected; but, though there is some tautology in *τεθράφθαι πεπαιδευμένους*, it is awkward to suppose the *εἶναι* from c 8 to be supplied in thought with *πεπαιδευμένους*. Hermann and Burnet think it better, with Stallbaum, to bracket only *τε*. It is hard to believe that anyone deliberately inserted the *τε*: it must be due to careless writing; either the scribe's eye was caught by the *τε* in the next line, or he unconsciously repeated the first syllable of *τετράφθαι*, which came after another *-θαι*. (Ficinus's "esse educatos" gives some support to Schanz's view.)—*ἐν ἤθεσι νόμων*: cp. 625 a 5 *ἐπειδὴ δὲ ἐν τοιούτοις ἤθεσι τέθραφθε νομικοῖς σύ τε καὶ ὅδε*. Good laws breed good characters and habits of mind in those who live under them.

d 1. For the MS. *τοὺς* see above on a 4.—*κρίνειν καὶ ἀποκρίνειν*: the usual chiasmus. The latter verb is used in the same sense at 961 b 6.

d 3. *ταῦτα δέ* is adverbial, and seems here to have the meaning "but *in this case*"; cp. 873 a 3.

d 7 ff. *ἀλλὰ γὰρ . . . φαίνοιτο*: in other words "what we began in a speculative, imaginative vein, has turned into *reality*, and we have now gone too far to retreat; *your* state we must found, under whatever disadvantages. Even the imagination too has claims. I don't like to leave *my* fancy picture unfinished."—The omission of the *φασὶν* in the MSS. was probably due to its similarity to the last two syllables of the preceding word; it was recovered from a scholiast's quotation of this passage in his commentary on *Crat.* 421 d.

e 1. *μὲν δή*: "*μέν* balances *δέ* (after *ἐγώ*), and should not be taken with *δή* in the ordinary sense of the collocation *μὲν δή*." Adam on *μὲν δή* in a similar passage at *Rep.* 556 b.

752 a 1. *κατὰ τὴν παροῦσαν ἡμῖν τὰ νῦν μυθολογίαν*: cp. above on 712 a 4, b 2, 736 b 6. Most translators take *μυθολογία* to mean *conversation* (Ficinus, Schneider, Wagner, and L. & S. s.v.), but it is clear that the Ath. regards his function to be that of providing the *ideal* to which the *actual* is to conform as far as may be. His proposal when the conversation began, and as it developed,

was to *draw a picture* of a perfect polity. At first it was all "make-believe" and the make-believe is not all to be given up, even now.

a 3. πλανώμενος . . . φαίνοιτο, "if it went about the world without a head, it would look hideous." For the metaphor cp. *Gorg.* 505 d, *Phaedr.* 264 c, *Phil.* 66 d, *Tim.* 69 b. The scribe of A did not understand this passage; he put a stop after πλανώμενος and left out the γάρ which we owe to L and O. They also preserve the reading καταλίποιμι, which A^2 altered to καταλείποιμι. After the ἄν with πλανώμενος and the ἄν in the preceding line it is natural that the ἄν with φαίνοιτο should be omitted. Ast (who conjectures ἂν ἁπαντᾷ) adds it, and so Cod. Voss. Heindorf's ἅπαντι for ἁπάντῃ is not lightly to be rejected, but πλανώμενος seems to want an amplification more than φαίνοιτο. Herm. would reject ἁπάντῃ.

a 6. οὐ μόνον γε ἀλλά: for the ellipse Stallb. cps. *Phil.* 23 b, *Phaedo* 107 b.

a 8. The repetition of this reservation (cp. above 739 e 5 and 632 e 7), coupled with a reference to the author's age, is a pathetic indication of his fears that he might not live to complete his task satisfactorily.

b 2 ff. ἑπόμενοι κτλ., "with his help we will not forget." "What?" "What a bold stroke our present attempt at state-founding will prove."

b 7. περὶ τί βλέπων . . . αὐτὸ εἴρηκας; "on what subject are you thinking in saying so?" and the ὡς in the answer depends on a supplied βλέπων: "(I am thinking) how, etc." καὶ ποῖ μάλιστα (βλέπων) is "and *why* do you say so?" Stephanus's πρός for περί amounts to saying the same thing twice, for πρὸς τί is here just the same as ποῖ; Badham's transposition of καὶ ποῖ to the place before βλέπων (which Schanz adopts) would make it less clear that βλέπων has to be supplied in thought with the following ὡς. The two questions are answered chiastically: "I say we are venturesome because our future citizens will find our laws new and strange, and what I am afraid of is that they will reject them."

b 10. ὅπως δέξονταί ποτε, "in the hope that they will manage to accept."

c 1 ff. As explained above (751 c 8 ff.) no *elector* can choose magistrates properly who is not imbued with the spirit of the *laws* they will have to administer. Manifestly this will not be the case with the new colonists. There must be an interregnum to allow a generation to grow up who have acquired familiarity with the new

laws. Thus leavened—thus παιδαγωγηθεῖσα, as Plato says—the community may be trusted to elect its magistrates.—For the MS. προσδέξασθαι the Louvain edition (of 1531) was the first to substitute the future. Schneider, Stallb. and the Zür. edd. retain the MS. reading, Stallb. defending it by a comparison of *Phaedo* 67 b 9, where κτήσασθαι follows ἐλπίς (ἐστι). Madvig would read γ' ἂν for γε.

c 2. εἰ δὲ μείναιμέν πως, "but if we could manage to survive."—Madvig's emendation of μείναιμεν to μείνειαν, which Schanz adopts (so too F.H.D.), would simplify the construction, but is not necessary.

c 3. παῖδες is predicative, "from childhood" (Jowett).—The συν- in συντραφέντες and συνήθεις γενόμενοι couples the two expressions so closely that the ἱκανῶς is felt to qualify them both.

c 4. τῇ πόλει πάσῃ: it is difficult to decide whether this (as a possessive dative) goes closely with ἀρχαιρεσιῶν, or with κοινωνήσειαν, i.e. whether it means "in the election of the whole list of state functionaries," or "share with the whole state." I incline to the former view.

c 6. εἴπερ τινὶ τρόπῳ καὶ μηχανῇ γίγνοιτο ὀρθῶς: this (like the πως in c 2) suggests that the temporary arrangement for the administration would have to be very carefully devised.

c 7. By τὸν τότε παρόντα χρόνον is meant the period of the interregnum—the τοσοῦτον χρόνον of c 2.

c 8. For the use of παιδαγωγηθεῖσαν cp. above 641 b 1 and 3 συμποσίου δὲ ὀρθῶς παιδαγωγηθέντος, and παιδὸς ἑνὸς ἢ καὶ χοροῦ παιδαγωγηθέντος κατὰ τρόπον ἑνός. It answers to our phrase "to go in leading-strings."

d 4. μὴ μόνον ἀφοσιώσασθαι περὶ τῆς χώρας: some emphasis should be laid on χώρας—which all translators but Wagner ignore; "ought not to restrict themselves to bare ceremonial relations with the *land* (which your colony is occupying)"—the *soil* i.e. as contrasted with the human element in the settlement.

d 5 and 7. L has ἣν νῦν κατοικίζετε, A and O^2 ἣν νῦν κατοικίζεται, which A^2 corrected by changing ἣν to ἥ, and O^2 by changing -ται to -τε. Those who follow A^2 (Stallb., Schneider, Zürr., Hermann, Wagner, and Schanz) hold that the πρῶτον ψεῦδος was the careless addition of ν to ἥ, due to the following νῦν; those who follow O^2 (Ficinus, the early edd. up to Ast, and Burnet) hold it to have been a case of the common mistake of αι for ε. (Stallb. says one of the Flor. MSS. has ἣ . . . κατοικίζετε.) The testimony of L seems to me to settle that matter in O^2's and the vulgate's favour.—But this reading does not go well with

Hermann's ἱστῶσιν for the MS. στῶσιν in d 7. The subject to κατοικίζετε is not "you and Megillus," for there is no reason to regard them apart from the trio, but "you Cretans," or "you Cnossians," and, as Cleinias is a Cnossian (cp. 702 c 4), *you* must be supplied as the subject of ἐπιμεληθῆναι. But the subject of ἱστῶσιν must be *they*, i.e. the Cnossians. A still more decisive reason against ἱστῶσιν is that the Ath. does not explain until the following paragraph *who* is to appoint the magistrates. It is only then that we find that the appointment is to be made by the Cnossians alone. Cp. 754 c.

d 6. τὰς πρώτας ἀρχάς: this acc., which furnishes the main support of Herm.'s conjecture ἱστῶσιν, is intelligible, I think, with στῶσιν. The construction whereby what should be the subj. of a dependent sentence is put in the acc. is a sterotyped one, something resembling the *acc. c. inf.* Cp. Aristoph. *Nub.* 1148 καί μοι τὸν υἱὸν εἰ μεμάθηκε τὸν λόγον ἐκεῖνον εἴφ', and 1115 τοὺς κριτὰς ἃ κερδανοῦσιν . . . βουλόμεσθ' ἡμεῖς φράσαι, where Blaydes unnecessarily conjectures τοῖς κριταῖς.—Along with this question we may consider the reading in e 1 where A has ανμιν, and L and O ἂν ἡμῖν—and so A^2—and the vulgate is δ' ἂν ἡμῖν. ἄν has no place here, and Steph. (followed by Ast and Wagner) changed it to αὖ, while Herm. (followed by Schanz and Burnet) discards it, supposing it to have arisen from a mistaken reading of δ'. I would suggest that ἀν μιν is almost as likely to be a mistake for δ' ὑμῖν as for δ' ἡμῖν, and that the former would suit the context better.

d 7. τὰς ἄλλας must be supposed to be under the government of an αἱρεῖσθαι.

e 1. καί, "merely."—νομοφύλακας: for the functions of the Athenian officers of this title cp. Grote, *Hist. of Greece*, vol. v. (ch. xlvi.) p. 226 f. One of their chief duties seems to have been to keep the ordinary magistrates "up to the mark." Ritter compares *Epist.* viii. 356 d where it is proposed to give to thirty-five νομοφύλακες the decision of war or peace, and of sentences of death and exile. Above at 671 d, as R. says, it is not an official title, but a general description of men who enforce particular laws. (The following passage from p. 161 of Lord Acton's *Lectures on the French Revolution* describes a similar constitutional device to that of Plato's νομοφύλακες: "He" (the Abbé Sieyès) "mitigated democracy by another remarkable device. The Americans have made the guardians of the law into watchers on the lawgiver, giving to the judiciary power to preserve the Constitution against

the legislature. Sieyès invented a special body of men for the purpose, calling them the Constitutional Jury, and including not judges, for he suspected those who had administered the ancient law of France, but the *élite* of veteran politicians.") Wagner well reminds us, in this connexion, of the use of the term φύλακες in the *Republic* — first introduced there at 374 e. The φύλακες παντελεῖς of 414 b, and the τέλεοι φύλακες of 428 d correspond to the νομοφύλακες of the *Laws*.

e 5. τῶν πολλῶν πόλεων : a reminiscence of ἑκατόμπολις, the Homeric epithet of Κρήτη.

e 8. Ficinus confirms Steph.'s ἐποικησόντων for the MS. ἐποικησάντων, for he translates τῶν ἀφικομένων by "qui convenere," and τῶν ἐπ. by "qui habitabunt." I think we should follow him.

753 a 3. Schanz may be right in thinking τῇ a mistake for τινι, especially as in A the ι of τηι is in an erasure ; still, τῇ μετ. δυν. might well mean "by means of the power which they are entitled to exercise."

a 6. ἐκοινωνησάτην : for the termination see above on 705 d 5.

a 7. μέγα φρονοῦσιν : in saying that the enterprise was "beneath the dignity" of Athens and Sparta, the Athenian may well have meant to hint that the interference of two such great powers would be dangerous to the independence of the new state, to say nothing of the possible want of harmony between them.

a 9 f. καὶ τοῖς . . . λεγόμενα, "and this remark applies equally to the other founders, as do the proposals just made about yourself," i.e. the nine other Cnossians, mentioned above at 702 c 5, are also to be induced to become citizens of the new state. It is a question whether we ought not to put a comma after ἔχει. Serranus, Schneider and Stallb. are right in taking οἰκισταῖς to mean *conditoribus*. Ficinus and other translators take it to mean simple "colonists." The mistake of λέγομεν for λεγόμενα seems to have originated with Ald. No MS. has it, and Ficinus translates the true reading.

b 1. Both A and O seem to have copied from a text which had μὲν νῦν instead of μὲν οὖν, but both corrected the error early.

b 2. εἰρήσθω (cp. 814 d 8) is equivalent to our "so much for . . ." The question *how* the "interregnum" νομοφύλακες are to be elected is re-opened below at d 7. But he considers it important to give details of the *normal* election proceedings first.

b 6. ἐν ταῖς σφετέραις αὐτῶν τῆς ἡλικίας δυνάμεσιν, "while their ages permitted," i.e. the electors are to be all who *are* serving

(ὅπλα τιθῶνται), and all who *have served* (πολέμου κεκοινωνήκωσιν), as long as their age allowed it. Clearly it would not be intended to deprive the veterans of a vote after their retirement.

b 7. Inasmuch as κοινωνούντων is equivalent to δεῖ κοινωνεῖν, ποιεῖσθαι and the following infinitives are felt to be dependent on a preceding δεῖ; with φερέτω at d 4 he returns to the imperative. Cp. below 755 d 5.

c 2. βωμόν: Stallb. refers to Plut. *Them.* ch. 17 and *Pericles* ch. 32 for instances of votes being placed on an altar. A corrupt vote would thus be sacrilegious.

c 4. κατὰ ταὐτὰ οὕτως: the οὕτως is used as in ἀληθῶς οὕτως.

c 5. ὅτιπερ . . . γεγραμμένον: i.e. if any citizen *took objection* to any of the names proposed, he might submit it to publicly delivered magisterial decision. Any names to which such objections were sustained would be ἀποκριθέντα.

c 7. μὴ ἔλαττον τριάκοντα ἡμερῶν: I think this does not mean "for a period of not less than thirty days," as most translators take it—but "within as much as thirty days." He is to have *full thirty days* during which he may make his objection.—κριθέντα ἐν πρώτοις means the same as the subsequent προκριθέντας at d 3, and the κριθέντα implies either that the names have not been objected to, or that the objection has not been sustained. There is naturally no power of objection at the two later stages of the election.

d 1. φέρειν is used as at 756 c 2—φέρειν ἐνενήκοντα βουλευτάς—here in the sense of "*vote for*," there in that of "*elect by voting*."

d 4. ἐκ τῶν ἑκατόν goes with ὃν ἂν βούληται, not with ὃ βουληθείς (as Zeller).

d 5. διὰ τομίων πορευόμενος: this further religious sanction makes the third and definite vote a still more solemn ceremony. Stallb. well cites Dem. *Contra Aristocr.* p. 642 οὐδὲ τὸν τυχόντα τιν' ὅρκον τοῦτον ποιήσει ἀλλ' . . . στὰς ἐπὶ τῶν τομίων κάπρου καὶ κριοῦ καὶ ταύρου.

d 6. The subject of ἀποφηνάντων is οἱ ἄρχοντες which we may supply from the τοὺς ἄρχοντας at c 8 which is the subject of the infinitives δεῖξαι at c 8 and d 3.—Zeller not only makes the "semi-final" hundred *elect* the thirty-seven (from among themselves), but *preside* at the election as well; i.e. he makes them the subject of ἀποφηνάντων. Ficinus goes further and makes the thirty-seven the subject of ἀποφηνάντων; i.e. he makes them return themselves. It is the absence, in a brand-new state, of proper presiding and returning officers which necessitates the arrangements now to be

described at d 7—754 d 4. ἀποφηνάντων is "*appoint*," cp. 767 b 3; not, as Jowett, "*proclaim*." κρίναντες here (as Ritter says) = δοκιμάσαντες; cp. below 755 d 6.

d 7. τίνες οὖν: the description given above applies to normal elections in the adult state. But "in our state"—ἡμῖν ἐν τῇ πόλει—which is just beginning, there are no ἄρχοντες who can "publish" names, and of whom it can be said κρίναντες ἀποφηνάντων ἄρχοντας. Some special provision therefore must be made of presiding magistrates for the *first* election of νομοφύλακες.

e 1. δοκιμασιῶν: Ritter aptly cites Deinarchus, *Contra Aristog.* § 17, where the questions supposed to be asked at a δοκιμασία are: "Is he a good son? Has he done his military duty? Can he show any monuments to his ancestors?" (reading ἠρία) "Does he pay his taxes?" The presiding magistrates' inquisition however would hardly extend, as Ritter thinks, to such questions of personal suitability for office as are described above at 689 c d.

e 2. For πρῶτον οὕτω cp. above on c 4.

e 4. πρὸς πασῶν τῶν ἀρχῶν: these words present great difficulty. Ficinus translates them *ex omnibus magistratibus*. But as yet *there are no magistrates* in the newly formed state. That is the cause of the difficulty in question. Ast, the Zürich edd., Wagner and Hermann adopt Cornarius's emendation of πρὸς to πρὸ. The words will then mean "before a single magistrate has been elected." This gives a satisfactory sense, but it is hard to see how the easy πρό could have been changed into the difficult πρός. Schneider's ingenious προστασῶν τῶν ἀρχῶν ("under the presidency of the (proper) magistrates)" is palaeographically more likely, but does not give nearly so satisfactory a sense as πρὸ πασῶν τῶν ἀρχῶν. Stallbaum keeps πρὸς πασῶν τῶν ἀρχῶν, translating "von Seiten aller Behörden." I am inclined to keep the MS. πρός and translate "of all conceivable authorities there are none to be produced." (F.H.D. would follow the majority of edd. in reading πρό.)—Badham's rewritten sentence, as so often in his case, while making excellent sense, does not fit in with the larger context. The following δεῖ μὴν ἀμῶς γέ πως implies not a preceding "we must have," but a "we haven't." All Bdh. gives us is ἀνάγκη ἡμῖν εἶναί τινας, οἵτινες εἶεν ἂν πρὸ πασῶν τῶν ἀρχῶν γεγονότες (deleto οὐκ ἔστι).—For οὐκ ἔστιν . . . οἵτινες cp. *Minos* 320 a 2 οὐκ ἔστιν οἵτινες ἀπέχονται συμποσίων.

e 6. I think Naber is right in rejecting the words ἐν ταῖς παροιμίαις as a marginal comment. They are in an awkward position in the sentence.

e 8. τὸ δ' : best taken, as e.g. at 642 a, adverbially, "whereas."

754 a 1. αὐτό : i.e. τὸ ἄρξασθαι, or τὴν ἀρχήν. The two stages are distinct, as in the previous statement : "not only is *any* beginning," he says, "*more* than half the business, but a *good* beginning is beyond praise." Our "well begun is half done" modifies this in two directions. Cp. below 775 e 2.

a 6. Ast tells us to take εἰπεῖν with εὐπορῶ (and consequently πλήν as a preposition, and πρὸς τὸ παρόν closely with ἀναγκαίου καὶ συμφέροντος), and Ast (*Lex.*) and L. & S. s.v. quote *Phaedr.* 235 a, as if it were εὐπορῶν πολλὰ λέγειν instead of εὐπαρῶν τοῦ πολλὰ λέγειν, in support of such a construction. It seems better, with Steph., to take πλήν as a conjunction, and εἰπεῖν as dependent on ἀναγκαίου καὶ συμφέροντος—ἑνός being governed by εὐπορῶ. (The decision between the two grammatical views is so difficult that it is not surprising that Steph. forbears, as he says, to mark his own view by the punctuation.)

b 1. πολλαὶ . . . ἔνιαι is something like the conversational English "a good few." It is hard to say whether πολλάκις goes closely with ἔνιαι, or generally with the verbs of the sentence. Ficinus's simple *multas* ignores πολλάκις ἔνιαι altogether.—A came to grief both with κατοικισθεισῶν and κατοικισάσαις, writing first κατοικισέων, then κατοικισθέντων for the former, and first κατοισάσαις and then κατοικησάσαις for the latter; L and O^2 wrote the former correctly, L and O have κατοικησάσαις for the latter.

b 3. νῦν μὴν ἐν τῷ παρόντι : the sentence thus begun is never finished; ἃ δὴ . . . γεγονότα at b 7 ff. is a substitute for its conclusion; in other words ἃ δὴ νῦν "resumes" νῦν μὴν ἐν τῳ παρόντι.

b 4. ἔν γε τῇ παρούσῃ παιδίας ἀπορίᾳ, "while the helplessness of childhood lasts." I have followed Burnet in reading παιδίας. Even if the MS. reading παιδείας be retained, it must still mean *childhood* (not, as Jowett, "while he is in want of education"). As to the form of the word cp. Schneider on *Rep.* 537 c 1 and below, 808 e 2 and 864 d 5.

b 6. ἀναγκαίους is the emphatic word, "finds allies solely among his own connexions." Ficinus's "ad suos semper refugiens in his solis praesidium reperit" suggests that possibly οἰκείους was a marginal interpretation of ἀναγκαίους.

b 7. ἅ : i.e. the mutual affection natural between young children and their parents, and the sense of dependence on the latter felt by the former.—Κνωσίοις διὰ τὴν ἐπιμέλειαν, "erga curatores eius

Gnosios" (Fic.). διὰ τ. ἐπ. does not (as Jowett) give the ground for the assertion; it is rather "thanks to their care."

c 1. ὑπάρχειν ἑτοίμως γεγονότα: for ἑτοίμως where we should have expected the adj. cp. 880 b 1.

c 2. δή L and O^2, and so Burnet; for this Schneider adopts the γε of A and O; all other editors give the δέ of the early printed texts. Ficinus's *igitur* justifies Burnet's choice.

c 4. The construction from προσελομένους to ἑκατὸν ἀνδρῶν is conversational—almost slipshod.—As this is a repetition of χρῆναι . . . ταύτην at 752 e 4 ff., we are bound to take κοινῇ to mean "in conjunction with the colonists," for there we read κοινῇ μετὰ τῶν ἀφ. εἰς τ. σ. τ. In other words προσελ. τῶν εἰς τ. ἀπ. ἀφικομένων explains κοινῇ, and is a loose equivalent for μετὰ τῶν ἀφ. κτλ. at 752 e 5. (Steph. takes κοινῇ closely with προσελομένους, placing the comma before it, instead of after.)

c 8. The συν- in the verb marks the contrast with the state of things described in d 2 ff. *Before*, and during, the election the 100 Cnossians and the 100 colonists act *together*. As soon as the colony's magistrates are duly appointed, the alliance ceases.

d 4. τῶν ἑ. κ. τ.: for the partitive genitive as the predicate of εἶναι or γίγνεσθαι Ast cps. 762 e 9, 948 b 1 (ὁ τοῦ μεγίστου τιμήματος), 950 e 2, 951 c 7.

d 5. ἐπὶ τοῖσδε: a little more than "for the following purposes"; ἐπί has the notion of *presiding over a certain province*, as in the phrase τοὺς ἐπὶ τοῖς πράγμασιν ὄντας in Dem. *Phil.* iii. 110. 22.

d 7. ὧν, for ἐν οἷς, is not too "strong" an attraction for the conversational style of the present passage.—ἀπο-, "duly."—τοῖς ἄρχουσι too is rather loose for "for the (proper) magistrates to keep"; cp. above 745 a 6 ἡ δὲ κτῆσις χωρὶς τοῦ κλήρου . . . ἐν τῷ φανερῷ γεγράφθω **παρὰ φύλαξιν ἄρχουσιν.**

d 8. πλὴν κτλ.: the full construction would be ἐν ᾧ ἄν ἀπογράψῃ ὁ μέγιστον τίμημα ἔχων τὸ πλῆθος τῆς αὐτοῦ οὐσίας πλὴν τεττάρων μνῶν. No man of the highest class would be held guilty of a misdemeanour if he had only understated his property by about £20. (Interpreters from Ficinus to Ast were content to hold Plato to have meant that the property of a man of the highest class *was four minae*; and that, as Hermann remarks (*De vest.* note 137), though a man of the highest class is said at 948 b 1 to be liable to a fine of twelve minae for a single offence.) In keeping with the loose style of this whole passage is the careless arrangement of subject matter, involving a repetition (as

Ritter points out) of much that we have had before in Bk. V. at pp. 744 d e, 745 a. (Schanz accepts Badham's suggestion that there is a lacuna after *ἀπογράψῃ*.)

e 4. *πρὸς τούτῳ δὲ κτλ.* : a comparison of 745 a shows us that, besides the confiscation of the offending sum, an equal sum was to be produced by the offender, half of which was to go to the informer, and half to Religion.

e 8. For *ἐν* of the *tribunal* cp. 784 d 2 *ἐν δικαστηρίῳ* and *Gorg.* 464 d (*εἰ δέοι*) *ἐν παισὶ διαγωνίζεσθαι*.

755 a 1. At the mention of *τῶν κοινῶν κτημάτων* and *διανομή* an Athenian citizen would think e.g. of the rents of the state silver mines, and of the *διωβελία*.

a 2. *τοῦ κλήρου* is not governed by *πλήν*, but by the notion "*possessed of*" to be supplied from *ἄμοιρος*; after each distribution he is to be left possessed only of his original lot.

a 7 ff. I believe that *ἑβδομήκοντα* should be rejected, as also the (after a 4) quite unnecessary and very awkwardly expressed *μηκέτι . . . διανοηθήτω*. With *ὑπερβάς* we must from a 5 and 6 supply *πεντήκοντα*. This provides a natural explanation for the apparently tautological *πλέον ὑπερβάς*; the *πλέον* is *more than ten years.*—*κατὰ τοῦτον τὸν λόγον* provides an antecedent to *ὅπως*, or, more strictly speaking, the antecedent to *ὅπως* is contained in the *τοῦτον*. We should say "*and so*, in proportion, according as the *νομοφύλαξ* has gone further (than that) beyond (the age of fifty)"; e.g. if sixty-two he has only eight years of office before him. (There seems no reason, with Hermann, to think *ὁπόσ'* a more likely expression here than *ὅπως*.—Apelt (p. 10) would read *ἅπας* for *ὅπως*, putting a comma after it, and none before it. He justly points out that *κατὰ τοῦτον τὸν λόγον* must mean something more definite than "*for this reason*"; it means "*in this proportion*"; but I cannot follow him in his alteration and interpretation of the succeeding words. He translates from *κατά* to *διανοηθ.* "nach diesem Verhältniss soll *jeder* (nicht bloss der 60-jährige), wenn (*ἄν*) er (beim Antritt des Amtes) schon über 60 alt die 70 erreicht, nicht länger daran denken, dies Amt zu verwalten."—F.H.D. also holds that *πλέον ὑπερβάς* means "having passed (sixty) *by more*." Stallb. holds that *ὅπως* is "de *tempore* accipiendum," and translates "atque secundum hanc rationem, ubi quis hanc aetatem transgressus plus septuaginta annos vivat, ne jam cogitato etc.")—As Ritter points out (p. 157), it would not happen that *exactly thirty-seven νομοφύλακες* would have to be chosen at every election, as the time of office would in many cases be shorter than

the maximum twenty years, and vacancies in the body would occur at irregular intervals.

b 3 f. *τὰ τρία περὶ τῶν νομοφυλάκων προστάγματα* are, I think:
(1) They are to have a general surveillance over the laws.
(2) They are to have the charge of the property-registers.
(3) They must form a court for the trial of the over-rich.

b 5. *ἕκαστος*: sc. *νόμος*; each fresh law will give the *νομοφύλακες* some fresh work to do.

c 1. The correction by A^2 and O^2 of the more "elegant" *ὑπηρεσίας* to *ὑπηρέτας* was very probably due to a previous marginal interpretation.

c 3. *οἷον καί*: Badham would change this to *εἰ καί*, under the impression that the *ὄνομα* in question is *φύλαρχοι*, and that P. is thinking mainly of the *first* half of the compound. It looks though as if he were thinking rather of the second part—the *-αρχος*. We may translate *οἷς . . . ἐπονομάζουσι* "to whom we may appropriately give just that sort of title—in fact most people *do* call them *ταξίαρχοι*." Ficinus has "quos merito multorum more praefectos ordinum nuncupabimus."—Plato will not propose quite *sans phrase* to adopt the Athenian titles.

c 5. *προβαλλέσθων*: the *νομοφύλακες* are to *draw up a preliminary* list, i.e. a list of fit candidates for the office of *στρατηγός*.

d 2. *τοῦτ' αὐτό*: i.e. the fact that he believes him to be the better man.

d 3. (*ὁπότερος δ'*) *ἂν δόξῃ διαχειροτονούμενος*, "whichever of the two is fixed on by the public vote" (is to be added to the nominated list).

d 6. *δοκιμασθέντων*: generally (Ast, Wagner, and Stallb.) taken to be a gen. abs. without a subject; "after they have passed the scrutiny." (Cp. below 829 d 5, *Rep.* 586 d, 590 d, *Parm.* 137 c 2 *ἀλλ' ἐρώτα ὡς ἀποκριναμένου*.) But it is better to follow Ficinus in making *τρεῖς* (nom.) the subj. to the imperative *δοκιμασθέντων*; *τούτους εἶναι . . . πόλεμον* will then depend on the immediately preceding words *οἷς . . . γίγνηται* which are equivalent to "about whom it is decided."

d 6 ff. *ταξ. . . . προβάλλεσθαι . . . δώδεκα, (ἑκάστῃ φυλῇ ταξίαρχον)*: this seems to be a loose expression for "they must provide themselves with a candidates list, with a view to the election of twelve taxiarchs." We are distinctly told in the sequel that the proceeding is to be identical with that followed in the election of the *στρατηγοί*. There is to be a *προβολή*, an opportunity for *ἀντιπροβολή*, an *ἐπιχειροτονία* and a *δοκιμασία*

(called here κρίσις). If, as is usually assumed, the generals are only to nominate twelve, the χειροτονία would be a farce. (One way out of the difficulty would be to suppose that *each* of the three generals is to produce a list of twelve candidates. But there is no hint of any limitation of the number of candidates in other cases, and the "*one for each tribe*" could only apply to *candidates* on the further assumption that each general must choose one of his from each tribe. F.H.D. proposes to reject ταξίαρχον; this would give us "twelve candidates out of each tribe.")

e 1. ἑκάστῃ φυλῇ is the reading of L and Eus. It is strange that both A and O should have the extraordinary ἑκάστη φυλακή, and that the corrector of A should have got no further than putting a "vitii nota" in the margin.

e 2. Madvig was possibly right in inserting ἡ before τῶν, so as to bring the expression into line with that below at 756 a 7. Stallb. thinks both expressions allowable.

e 4. τὸν δὲ σύλλογον κτλ.: the assumption that, in ordinary circumstances, no popular assembly could be convened except by the βουλή and its representative officials shows us Plato here writing as an Athenian for Athenians. The dramatic standpoint is abandoned. Herm. (*De vest.* p. 39) says that for some points the *Laws* tells us more about Attic arrangements than we can get from any other source.

e 8. πᾶν ὅσον ἐμπολέμιον is not, as L. & S., "all who are of military *age*," but, as 756 a 3 shows, "all who belong to the forces (in any capacity)."—The ἐφεξῆς τούτοις is not local—does not qualify καθίσαι, but ἐμπολέμιον, and takes the place of the word for "remaining" which we should expect: "all who *after* the cavalry and the hoplites have a claim to belong to the forces."—χειροτονούντων κτλ.: "Unum tantum apud Platonem ab Atheniensium usu recedere videtur, quod taxiarchos a solis peditibus, hipparchos ab equitibus, inspectante tantum reliquo exercitu, creari jubet, quod Athenis ab universo populo factum esse constat" (Herm. *De vest.* p. 40).

e 9. ἱππάρχους πάντες: this seems to be in direct contradiction to b 1 in the next page, where we are told that *the cavalry* is to elect the ἵππαρχοι. Many ways out of the difficulty have been suggested. Stallb., Wagn., and Madvig, whom I follow, reject καὶ ἱππάρχους here; Herm. rejects the account, given a few lines below, of the election of the hipparchs; Badham would read ὑπάρχους —"vice-generals"—here. Possibly the fact that the hoplites looked on at the election may be thought to justify the πάντες.

756 a 1. A further difficulty is presented by τούτοις. If, like the similarly placed datives τούτοις (755 b 8), αὐτοῖσι (d 7), ἑαυτοῖς (756 a 3), it means "in subordination to," "as assistants to," and represents *the superior officers*, there will be nothing to which this τούτοις clearly refers—even though we do not remove the καὶ ἱππάρχους with Stallb., Wagn., and Madvig. For this reason Madvig (followed by Schanz) proposed to take out the sentence φυλ. . . . αἱρείσθω and put it after ἱππευόντων (b 3). An argument against this is that at a 4 Plato seems to imply that the *only* election that had still to be arranged was that of the ἵππαρχοι, whereas, by this arrangement, the φύλαρχοι are left out as well. Of course Hermann's athetesis of ἱππάρχων . . . ἱππευόντων, if accepted, cuts away the ground for Madvig's transposition. The difficulty is best met, I think, by Ast's proposal to read αὐτοῖς for αὖ τούτοις. (If the MS. text be left unaltered, we must suppose that its contradictions and irrelevancies are due to the absence of the author's final revision.—F.H.D. would reject αὖ τούτοις.) —(τὴν ἀσπίδα) τιθέμενοι: not, as Ast, for περιτιθέμενοι, "*sibi induentes*," but the same technical use which occurs above at 753 b 6, i.e. "serving as hoplites."

a 6. The MSS. and the early printed edd. all had ἀντιβολὴν for ἀντιπροβολὴν, though the early translators got the meaning right. Ast was the first to correct the error.

b 5 f. If, after the second *recount* (i.e. the third count), the decision as to which two candidates had the largest number of votes was challenged, the tellers were to settle the matter by voting among themselves. The Aldine edition was doubtless right in correcting the MS. τούτοις (assimilated) to τούτους.—οἵσπερ τῆς χειροτονίας μέτρον ἑκάστοις ἕκαστον ἦν: a strange expression: "to whom severally in each case had fallen the duty of counting the hands held up." μέτρον ἔχειν πρός at 836 a is "to provide a curb for," "to account for," "to be competent to deal with," and so μέτρον ἐστὶν αὐτῷ τῆς χειροτονίας might well mean "it is his duty to deal with the votes." This expression would fit in particularly well where the duty was one of *counting*.—ἕκαστον ἑκάστοις might mean that a separate set of tellers were appointed for each count, or merely that separate tellers dealt with separate bodies of voters.—If these tellers were merely required to settle among themselves what the result of the voting had been, they would only be resaying what they had said before. Evidently the *election was put into their hands* by the challenge of the third count. (The general view is that the words denote *the presiding magistrates*.)

b 8. *γίγνοιντο ἂν πρέποντες ταῖς διανομαῖς*, "will form a convenient number for our subdivisions" (e.g. the *πρυτάνεις*).

c 1. I think Stallb. and all other interpreters (except Ast) are wrong in taking *τούτων* to depend on *τὸν ἀριθμόν*, and that it depends on *μέρη*, while *τὸν ἀριθμόν* (if genuine) qualifies the numeral as at *Phil.* 17 c 12 *ὁπόσα ἐστὶ τὸν ἀριθμόν*. Ast, quite unnecessarily, substitutes *οὕτως* for *τούτων*, appealing for support to Ficinus's *ita ut*—"et in quattuor partes per nonaginta distribuatur, *ita ut* a censibus singulis consiliarii nonaginta ferantur." —A change I would suggest is the rejection of the words *κατὰ ἐνενήκοντα τὸν ἀριθμόν*. In view of the next sentence they are superfluous, and they are awkward. An arithmetically minded commentator may well have added the words in the margin.

c 3. *μεγίστων* here, and *σμικρότατον* at d 1 and d 3, refer of course, not to the numbers of the classes, but to the amount of the property-qualification. We must translate by "highest" and "lowest." He seems to use the plural and singular indifferently in the same sense.—*ἅπαντας*: the same as *πάντα ἄνδρα* at e 4. Apparently the whole community, not only the soldiers, as in the case of the election of magistrates (753 b 5).—At the first reading it looks as if from each class, on its election-day, ninety senators were chosen. But when we come to the fifth day, and the final election, we find that it is possible, out of the number voted for out of each class, to select 180. The first voting, therefore, must have been a *προβολή* like the first voting in the case of the *νομοφύλακες* described at 753 c, where everybody wrote the name of the man he wanted to elect.

c 4. *τῇ δοξάσῃ ζημίᾳ*: the same as what, at e 1 and e 5, is called *ἡ πρώτη ζημία*. (We may guess it to have been three drachmas.)

c 6. *κατὰ ταὐτὰ καθάπερ τῇ πρόσθεν*: i.e. on this, as on all the days, *the whole community voted.* At *Pol.* 1266 a 14 ff., Aristotle describes the arrangement for the election of the *βουλή* given in Plato's *Laws.* At e 16 he gives *ἴσους* (i.e. *βουλευτάς*) as representing this *κατὰ ταὐτὰ κ. τ. π.* *Either*, then, Aristotle made the same mistake as Muretus, Stallb., and others—i.e. understood the fixed number of ninety senators to have been elected on each day—*or* Nickes is right in emending *ἴσους* to *ἴσως*. (See Susemihl and Hicks ad loc.)

e 1 f. We may conclude that, on the third day, when the candidates from the third class were being nominated, a member of the third class who failed to vote was fined *double* the *πρώτη ζημία*.

e 3. *ἰδεῖν* stands for *ὥστε ἰδεῖν*; cp. *ἡμεροῦν* 890 c 8, also 759 d 8, 857 a 6, and 917 e 6.

e 4 f. *φέρειν δ' ἐκ τούτων αὖ πάντα ἄνδρα*: it is not easy to see why this *second* election took place. Why not take from each class the 180 who had most votes (i.e. nominations) at the first election? Perhaps it was intended to give those citizens who had voted for themselves, and saw it was no good, a chance of voting for someone else. The only difference between the two elections would be that on the fifth day the members of the two lowest classes would be compelled to vote, whereas on the third day the fourth class, and on the fourth day the third and fourth classes were let off, if they liked—the principle being that the classes are to be fined which would be most likely to be defaulters. The publication of the first list would show who were the likely candidates, and the third and fourth classes would, on the fifth day, have the opportunity, as Ritter says (p. 159 f.), of upsetting a previous decision of (mainly) the two higher classes. Aristotle's account (e 19 f.) of what happened on the fifth day is very inadequate. As to his further conclusion that there will be "more," and "better," men from the "highest class," if he means more (definitely elected) *senators*, he has misread, or misremembered Plato's account. If he means "more" among the nominated candidates, it is hard to see, even if it were so, how it would much affect the final result; for each class must have 180 representatives. S. and Hicks take it to mean "more" *voters*. But is it likely that abstentions would be so frequent in the fourth, and far more numerous class, as to reduce the number of voters below that of the highest?

e 5. As at e 1 in the previous page, L alone has the correct reading (*ἐκλέξαντας* where A and O^1 had *ἐκλέξαντες*).

e 7. *ἀποκληρώσαντας*: the introduction of the lot would confound the machinations of such a "caucus" as Aristotle (*Pol.* ii. 1266 a 27) deprecates in the election of magistrates.

e 10. *ἧς ἀεὶ δεῖ μεσεύειν*: cp. above 693 d 8 *δεῖ δὴ οὖν καὶ ἀναγκαῖον μεταλαβεῖν ἀμφοῖν τούτοιν, εἴπερ ἐλευθερία τ' ἔσται καὶ φιλία μετὰ φρονήσεως.*—The *ἧς* is a curious case of *attraction*; in *sense* it stands for *ὧν*, but is attracted into the number of the immediately preceding *πολιτείας*.

757 a 2. The MS. *διαγορευόμενοι* looks like the right word, and Stobaeus's *διαγόμενοι* and Boethius's (Photius and Suidas) *διαγενόμενοι* like imperfect recollections of it. It is used, as *διειπεῖν* often is, in the sense of *pronounce*—*ἀναγορευόμενοι*, which Badham proposes to substitute for it here, is *announce, proclaim*—

and with the three preceding words is equivalent to our phrases "being placed in the same class," "being judged to deserve equal honour." We may translate: "slaves and masters will never make friends, nor will worthless and worthy to whom equal honour is awarded—for equal treatment results in inequality when it is given to what is unequal—unless given in a due measure—and both those two false relationships are the fruitful sources of civic discord." τοῖς ἀνίσοις is not, as Wagner takes it, an instrumental dative—"durch das Ungleiche"—but a common dative of the recipient.

a 3. εἰ μὴ τυγχάνοι τοῦ μέτρου: the *really* equal treatment is that which takes cognizance of the inequality of the recipients; so we read above at 744 c 2 that if honour and power are bestowed with discrimination, they are bestowed with *real equality* (ὡς ἰσαίτατα). We use the same metaphor, in almost the same phrase, when we talk of a man's being "*equal to*" or "*unequal to*" his position or his task.—Proper weight should be assigned to the τυγχάνοι; the idea of *due proportion* is contained partly in the verb, which means to "*hit the mark*." (Campbell, on *Politicus* 284 d, says of this passage: "here we seem to find the point of transition from the Platonic to the Aristotelian μεσότης.")

a 4. διὰ . . . ἀμφότερα ταῦτα: not, as Jowett, *equality* and *inequality*, but, as Ritter (p. 161 f.), the two varieties of ἀνισότης which are found, one in the σφόδρα δουλεία or δεσποτεία of absolute rule, and the other in the σφόδρα ἐλευθερία of complete democracy. Both these relationships provoke rebellion in different ways. Both are equally unstable political conditions, because incompatible with the φιλία without which we have often been told that no community can cohere. (Cp. 693 b 4, 697 c 9, 699 c 1, 701 d 9, 743 c 6.)

a 5–c 6. παλαιὸς . . . κατὰ λόγον, "There is real philosophy in the true old saying that equality is the mother of friendship, but the ambiguity as to which kind of equality it is which has this effect leads to grievous mistakes. There are two sorts of equality, which go by the same name, but in action produce in many cases virtually opposite results. Any ordinary state or lawgiver can employ the one in bestowing dignities. All that is necessary is to use the lot, and so distribute them by the indiscriminate impartiality of numbers and scale. But the truest and best kind of equality is hidden from the ordinary sight. None but the divine eye can discern it. Man's vision cannot penetrate far enough to help him much, but what he can see of

it is of priceless value to states and to individuals. To the greater it gives more, to the lesser less, adapting its gift in due proportion to the nature of each, and when it comes to honours, it assigns the higher ones to those whose worth is higher, and whenever it deals with those who are deficient in disciplined virtue it gives them their fit share, all in due proportion" (reading ἑκάστοτε in c 5).

a 5. *ἰσότης φιλότητα ἀπεργάζεται*: this proverb, says Plato, might seem to prove that if men are placed on an equal footing, they must thereby be made friends. In effect, he says, this result would only follow if they are *rightly* so placed. In other words, the real meaning of the proverb is no more than "like will to like."

b 4. *μέτρῳ . . . καὶ σταθμῷ καὶ ἀριθμῷ*: what Lord Acton (*Fr. Rev.* 161) calls "by coarse and obvious arithmetic."

b 6. In just this spirit Sir Henry Taylor's Philip van Artevelde says: "The world knows nothing of its greatest men." So, too, Coleridge:

> "It sounds like stories from the land of spirits,
> If any man obtain that which he merits,
> Or any merit that which he obtains."

(Cp. Aristotle on *τὸ διανεμητικὸν δίκαιον* in *Eth. Nic.* v. 1131 b 27.)

b 7. The scholiast on *Gorg.* 508 a (*ἡ ἰσότης ἡ γεωμετρικὴ καὶ ἐν θεοῖς καὶ ἐν ἀνθρώποις μέγα δύναται*) says: *τουτέστιν ἡ δικαιοσύνη· ταύτην δὲ τὴν γεωμετρικὴν ἀναλογίαν Διὸς κρίσιν ἐν Νόμοις ἐκάλεσεν, ὡς δι' αὐτῆς τῶν πάντων κεκριμένων τε καὶ ὡρισμένων.*—*ἀεί* is almost "as a matter of fact."

b 8. The subject of *ἐπαρκεῖ* is not *ἰσότης*, nor *Διὸς κρίσις*, but *ἰσότητος κρίσις*, the power of discerning the true equality, whereby each man would be treated proportionally to his merit.—*πᾶν ὅσον ἂν ἐπαρκέσῃ*: lit. "every bit of help it gives."

c 5. *ἀρετῆς τε καὶ παιδείας* is a kind of hendiadys—"disciplined virtue"; the great object of all training is *ἀρετή*.—It is quite possible that, in order not to overweight the sentence, Plato did not complete the parallel, but left what was missing to be extracted from the general summary that follows. Steph., however, thought that some words must have fallen out after *παιδείας*, and Ast thinks they were *ἧττους διδοῦσα*. Schanz marks a lacuna after *παιδείας*. Ficinus translates: "minoribus autem virtute et disciplina minores." I suspect that we ought to read *ἑκάστοτε* for *ἑκατέροις* (due to the preceding *ἑκατέρῳ*);

then all is in order. (F.H.D. would keep *ἑκατέροις*, but put a dash after *παιδείας*.)—For *κατὰ λόγον* see above on 755 a 7 *κατὰ τοῦτον τὸν λόγον*.

c 6. *ἔστιν γὰρ κτλ.*, "denn es ist doch wohl auch die Staatsklugheit für uns stets das Recht an sich" (Wagner). Plato will not recognize a statecraft that is not founded on just principles. —"Honesty is the best policy" is another variant of the same theme.

d 2. *ταὐτὸν τοῦτο*: i.e. the "just policy" just enunciated as such, and expressed in the next line but one by the words *τὸ δίκαιον*.—*σκοπούμενον πρός* is "in the interest of."

d 3. For the *ἢ . . . τι* cp. above on 643 b 8.

d 4. *τὸ κατὰ φύσιν ἴσον ἀνίσοις ἑκάστοτε δοθέν*, "the sort of equality meted out by Nature's decree to the unequal"; *ἴσον* here is used in the sense of "*fair*."

d 5 ff. *ἀναγκαῖόν γε μὴν κτλ.*: as Ritter says (p. 163), *ἀναγκαῖον* here has somewhat the meaning "the best we can do"; this use is further discussed in his note on p. 173, where he refers, among other passages, to 628 d 1, and e 6 below.—*πόλιν ἅπασαν*: not, I think, as Jowett, "every city," but as Wagner, "der gesammte Staat"; the implication is that the *state* need not be so precise in its use of terms as the *individual*. We may translate: "When, however, a community as a whole applies these terms"—those of *natural equality* and *civic justice*—"it must be content sometimes to use them in a modified sense unless it is willing to admit a certain amount of civic discord in its midst—(all) *equity and indulgence are infractions of the perfect and strict rule of justice*"—(the last words in italics are Jowett's). (F.H.D. and A.M.A. prefer "every state" for *π. ἅπ.*)

d 6. *παρωνυμίοισι*: predicative. The relaxation from the true sense of the word *ἰσότης* is *in the direction* of the spurious *ἰσότης* which holds that all men have an equal right to power and honour. As explained at 756 e 5 ff., such an equal chance is to be given within a strictly limited area.

e 1. *γάρ* is not "for," but "you know." Burnet properly indicates the relation of this clause to the preceding one by marking it as a parenthesis. The *reasons* why the lot is to be introduced into the political machinery are threefold: (1) because man's judgement of character and worth cannot be trusted very far (b 7); (2) because the *temper* of both rulers and ruled will not always stand the strain of the position (e 4); and (3) because, by so doing, we invoke the guidance of Heaven (e 4 f.). Of these

reasons the second is explicitly stated, the two others indirectly indicated.

e 3. *τῷ τοῦ κλήρου ἴσῳ*: spoken of above at b 4 as the *ἰσότης* which is *μέτρῳ καὶ σταθμῷ καὶ ἀριθμῷ*. (The *προσ-* in the verb at d 6 and e 3 possibly implies that where the agency of the lot is used, it is an accessory, not the main instrument.)

e 4. *θεὸν καὶ ἀγαθὴν τύχην*: it will be remembered that, in the enumeration of the *ἀξιώματα ἀρχῆς*, the *lot* was spoken of (at 690 c 5) as *θεοφιλής* and *εὐτυχής*.

758 a 3. *τὴν μέλλουσαν σῴζεσθαι . . . πόλιν*: cp. *Rep.* 543 a 1 *τῇ μελλούσῃ ἄκρως οἰκεῖν πόλει*.

a 6. *τῶν ἄλλων πόλεων*: gen. of definition; the foreign states, with which ours is brought in contact, are represented as so many threatening billows on the wide sea of international politics. Of the numerous poetical and rhetorical passages which compare the state to a ship, Aesch. *Septem* 2 perhaps comes nearest to this in combining a reference to the need of sleepless vigilance on the part of the authorities:

> *ὅστις φυλάσσει πρᾶγος ἐν πρύμνῃ πόλεως*
> *οἷακα νωμῶν βλέφαρα μὴ κοιμῶν ὕπνῳ.*

—When using *κῦμα* in a metaphor (as at *Rep.* 457 b, 473 c and 611 d, *Tim.* 43 b, and *Laws* 740 e 8) Plato thinks of a wave as bursting on or flooding the *land*; *κλύδων* represents danger at *sea*. —*διαγομένη*: as Adam says (on *Rep.* 344 e), this is probably not a middle used in the sense of the act. *δίαγων* (intr.), but a passive of the active use given at L. & S. s.v. § III. The notion is that of a wind-*driven* ship.

a 7. *οἰκεῖν* is hardly more than *live, pass its time* (as a city), as in the passage quoted above on a 3. The *ἐν κλύδωνι διαγομένη, οἰκεῖ*, and *ἁλίσκεσθαι* show that Plato was no more averse than Shakespeare from a mixture of metaphors.

a 8. *συνάπτειν* is best taken to be intransitive here; otherwise we must suppose a very awkward change of subject between *συν-άπτειν* and *λήγειν*—which are connected by *τε*. Cp. *Ep.* 353 a 6 *συνάπτει δὲ ἀεὶ παλαιὰ τελευτὴ δοκοῦσα ἀρχῇ φυομένῃ νέᾳ*.

b 2. *πλῆθος*: not *the* multitude — the common people, as opposed to the rulers (as Ast and Wagner)—but *a* large number (of rulers, or counsellors).

b 4. The *δή*, which Ast and Hermann substitute for *δέ*, makes an awkward asyndeton. The slight irregularity caused by the introduction of two consecutive co-ordinate clauses by *δέ* may be

rendered in English by beginning the second with "No."—*τὸν πλεῖστον τοῦ χρόνου*: Burnet is the first editor who has ventured to restore the idiomatic *τόν* of A and O for the vulgate *τό*.

b 6. Though at d 3 he calls this twelfth part of the *βουλή τὸ προκαθήμενον τῆς πόλεως*, he does not until 760 b 1 use for them the Athenian term *πρυτάνεις*.

b 7. *ἓν ἐφ' ἑνί*, "severally" (lit. *ἓν μέρος ἐφ' ἑνὶ μηνί*). (Fic. takes it to mean "one (part) after another.")—The *αὐτοὺς* which Steph. and Ast print for the MS. *αὐτοὺς* involves a change of subject for the infin., which is the more awkward because *νείμαντας* manifestly agrees with the vague "they" or "we" which is the subj. of *ἐᾶν*. (If not, they ought to have printed *αὐτῶν* as well.)

c 1–5. *ἰόντι τε . . . τὰς ἀποκρίσεις*: Plato's preference for a chiastic arrangement makes it probable that the *ἀγγέλλειν* is supposed to be the task of the man *ἐξ αὐτῆς τῆς πόλεως*, while the *πυνθάνεσθαι* takes place at the interview with the *ἰόντι τινί ποθεν ἄλλοθεν*.

c 2. *ἑτοίμως ἐπιτυχεῖν*, "so as to meet at short notice," is epexegetic to *παρέχειν αὐτοὺς φύλακας*. (H. Richards would read *ἑτοίμους*. It is hard to see how so simple a reading as that could have been altered to the more difficult—and recherché—adverb.)

d 1. For *μάλιστα μέν*, "if possible," cp. 830 d 4; literally it is "*for choice*."—*ὅτι τάχιστα* qualifies *αἰσθομένης*; the *early* revelation of a seditious plot is of cardinal importance.

d 2. Winckelmann's *δι' ἃ* explains the MS. *διὰ*—which the vulgate *διὸ* does not—and has been rightly approved by Wagner, and adopted by Schanz and Burnet.—*συλλογῶν τε . . . καὶ διαλύσεων*: *συλλογῶν*, as Burnet writes it, is the proper correlative to *διαλύσεων*; i.e. the opposite of a *διάλυσις* is not a *σύλλογος* but a *συλλογή*. The Greeks kept the two senses of our *convocation* distinct. Besides, this correction supplies *προσπιπτουσῶν* with a second fem. noun to agree with it.—These same presiding magistrates—this standing committee of the *βουλή*—is to have the power of convoking and proroguing all state meetings, regular, or extraordinary.—It is doubtful whether *τῆς πόλεως* depends on *προκαθήμενον*, or on *συλλογῶν καὶ διαλύσεων*—probably on the former, in its *technical* sense of *preside*, as at Aristot. *Pol.* vi. 1322 b 14 *ἡ προκάθηται τοῦ πλήθους*.

e 2. *ἡνίκα* is *temporal* ("now that," "as soon as ever"), not causal, as Ficinus, Serranus, and Jowett. It may be doubted whether Plato ever uses *ἡνίκα* in a causal sense; but when used

temporally with a perfect tense, as here, it is nearly causal.—We shall learn at 760 b why the twelvefold division of the country and city (cp. above 745 b 6 ff.) was an important preliminary to the appointment of various magistrates.

e 4. *οἰκήσεων* is "*private houses*," *οἰκοδομιῶν* "*public buildings*." As to the former, doubtless no houses could be built in any situation or style that was not approved of by the city officials. At *Pol.* vi. 1321 b 19 Aristotle speaks of *ἡ τῶν περὶ τὸ ἄστυ δημοσίων καὶ ἰδίων (ἐπιμέλεια), ὅπως εὐκοσμία ᾖ.*

759 a 1. The usual chiasmus; the subject coming last in the previous enumeration is dealt with first.—*νεωκόρους τε καὶ ἱερέας καὶ ἱερείας*: here the priesthood is supposed to be separate from the office of *νεώκορος*; below at b 3 f. the offices are joined. Cp. Arist. *Pol.* vi. 1322 b 22 *συμβαίνει δὲ τὴν ἐπιμέλειαν ταύτην ἐνιαχοῦ μὲν εἶναι μίαν, οἷον ἐν ταῖς μικραῖς πόλεσιν, ἐνιαχοῦ δὲ πολλὰς καὶ κεχωρισμένας τῆς ἱερωσύνης, οἷον . . . ναοφύλακας.* (There is no need to bring the two passages into line by rejecting, with Badham and Schanz, the *τε καί* in a 1.)

a 2. *ὁδῶν*: this and the following genitives may be said to depend on *ἀρχόντων (εἴδη)* at a 6, or to be assimilated to the genitives in e 5 above.

a 3. *κόσμου τοῦ περὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα*: e.g. at Athens the *ἀστυνόμοι* had the superintendence of the scavengers (Boeckh, *P.E.* p. 204 Eng. Trans.), though the word *κόσμος*, as at line 8 below, has a much wider signification; in the latter case the officials' duties extended to the regulation of trade.

a 5. *καὶ προαστείῳ*: at Athens *ἀστυνόμοι* and *ἀγορανόμοι* were regularly appointed, five for the city, and five for the Piraeus.—*τὰ προσήκοντα πόλεσιν*, "the stateliness and decorum of a city."

a 6. *ἐλέσθαι δεῖ*: Stobaeus, whose quotation begins with the word *ἐλέσθαι*, puts in a *δέ* before the *δεῖ*—evidently to round off the quotation. Schanz, however, accepts the *δέ* as part of the original, and, like Ast (who rejects *δεῖ*), founds on it the (not unnatural) conclusion that the previous text is deficient. Ast supposes that before *ἐλέσθαι* has fallen out a reference to the duties of the *ἀγορανόμοι*; but this, as Stallb. says, is refuted by the fact that *τὸ νυνδὴ λεχθέν* is declared to belong only to the *ἀστυνόμοι*. *If* the text is sound, we must suppose the *τρία εἴδη* to include the temple officials. In that case we have again a reverse chiasmus. At a 1 ff. the temple officials were named first, and the police last; now the city and market police are dealt with first, and the temple officials last.

a 7. *ἐπονομάζοντα*: the last time we had a participle so describing the action of the agent (*νείμαντας* 758 b; cp. also 757e 5 *ἐπικαλουμένους*) it was in the plural—possibly agreeing with an imaginary *ἡμᾶς*; here, as at b 8 and c 1 below, it is singular—used, apparently, of a single *νομοθέτης*—or, perhaps, merely *τινά* or *σε* is to be supplied.

a 8 ff. *ἱερῶν δὲ . . . τοῖς θεοῖς*, "temple priests or priestesses whose office is hereditary must not be removed; but if, as may well happen with such appointments in the case of newly settled people, either no temple or only a few temples (have priesthoods), to any which are unprovided with them priests and priestesses must be appointed to undertake for the deities the charge of the shrines." With *μηδενί* and *τισιν ὀλίγοις* we must supply *ἱερωσύναι εἰσίν* from the previous sentence.—*οἷς μὴ καθεστήκοι* is literally "to any" (? *ἱεροῖς*; Stallb. and F.H.D. say *θεοῖς*) "to which appointment should not have been made." Its meaning is made clear by the following *καταστατέον* (*ἱερέας*). *καθέστηκα* is virtually the perf. pass. of *καθίστημι*. It is here used as an impersonal passive like *πεπόνηται* at *Phaedr.* 232 a 4 or the Thucydidean (*ἐπειδὴ αὐτοῖς*) *παρεσκεύαστο* (i. 46). (Many emendations of the passage have been proposed. H. Steph. would read *ὀλιγίστοις* for *ὀλίγοις οἷς*.—I think Ast was the first editor to put a comma after *ὀλίγοις*.—Ast would read *ἱερωσύνη*, O. Apelt *οἶμαι*, Wagner *ὁσία τιμὴ* for *οἷς μὴ*, Orelli *ὅσια* for *οἷς*, while Schanz rejects *οἷς μὴ καθεστήκοι* altogether. Stallb. and Wagner take *μηδενί* and *ὀλίγοις τισί* to be not temples but *people* (and so F.H.D.), in which case *εἰσὶν πάτριαι ἱερωσύναι* has to be supplied.)—Hermann was the first to remove the (.) or (·) from after *ἱερέας* in a 8 and put it after *ἀγορανόμους*.—*πάτριαι* is used in the sense of *πατρικαί* (which Ast would substitute for it).

b 1. As above at 754 b 1 and 755 e 1, L alone seems in *αἷς* to have preserved the true reading. Schanz does not note the fact that A reads *ἃς*.

b 4. The sentence *τούτων . . . εἴη* comes almost as a parenthesis in the middle of the directions about the priesthood; hence the asyndeton—which Herm. wanted to remove by reading *δὲ* for *δὴ*.

b 6. *μειγνύντας*: there is a double laxity in the use of this word: (1) it is plur. whereas the corresponding participles on each side of it—*ἐπονομάζοντα*, *ἐπιτρέποντα*, and *ἀποδιδόντα*—are sing.; and (2) the inf. *καταστῆσαι*, with the subj. of which it is supposed to agree, is not there, but has to be evolved mentally as the equivalent of *ἐν ταῖς καταστάσεσι* (cp. below 760 e 6).—*δῆμον καὶ μὴ*

δῆμον: the discussion on p. 757 has prepared us to associate the *lot* with κράτος δήμου τι (d 3). Hence I am inclined to think that δῆμος is not a *local division* here (as Stallb.), nor merely, as Ritter (p. 163), F.H.D., and A.M.A., *vulgus* (Ficinus's *plebs*), but a *democratic form of government*, as at Aristot. *Pol.* iii. 1277 b 3, where he talks of ὁ ἔσχατος δῆμος. The word is used almost in this sense above at 714 d 1 δῆμον νικήσαντα, ἢ τινα πολιτείαν ἄλλην. In no other way, I think, can its proper meaning be assigned to μειγνύντας or to μὴ δῆμον.—By πρὸς φιλίαν ἀλλήλοις Plato signifies that the *partial* employment of democratic methods would please the πλῆθος, and prevent friction between different classes. The words in b 5 admit of the supposition that, as in the case of the Senate's election, both principles might be combined. Ast takes the passage to mean that the Astynomoi and Agoranomoi were elected entirely by *vote*, the priests by *lot*.

b 7. ἐν ἑκάστῃ . . . πόλει must mean, in this connexion, in each *urban division* (as opposed to the rural divisions).—The same mixed principle of election is to be applied both in town and country.—For εἴη (Ast would read ᾖ) cp. Goodwin, *M. and T.* § 330. —The MS. ὁμονοῶν has nothing but δῆμος to agree with it. It would avoid a good deal of difficulty if we could read ὁμονόων (gen. plu. of ὁμόνοος) for ὁμονοῶν, or read ὁμονοῶσιν instead of ὁμονοῶν εἴη. Ficinus has "*ut maxima sit in omnibus consensio.*"—τὰ τῶν ἱερέων (= τοὺς ἱερέας) is governed by κληροῦν.

b 8. τῷ θεῷ . . . γίγνεσθαι, "leaving it to the god to secure that the appointment should be such as to please *him*" (not merely "leaving it to the god himself"). We may conclude from this that the *lot* was to be either the *main* or the *sole* agent of the priests' election.

c 3. οἰκήσεων: not "families" (as Jowett), though it comes to much the same thing; as at *Phaedo* 58 b the *city*, and at 947 d below a *funeral ceremony*, are said καθαρεύειν, so here the *dwellings* of the priest's father's and mother's families are considered as capable of pollution.

c 4 f. δέ seems here to be used with the force of the not uncommon δὲ δή; "and in fact he himself, and his father and his mother likewise (κατὰ ταὐτά—cp. 753 a 9)—must have lived free from all taint of blood-shedding or any such offence against Heaven."

c 6. Here again L seems alone to have avoided the extraordinary blunder of δευτέρην for δὲ χρὴ νό-.

c 7. As to the office of ἐξηγητής—"interpres religionum"—cp. Ruhnk. *Tim.* s.v.

d 1. *τούτοις*: i.e. *τοῖς νόμοις.*

d 2. *μὴ ἔλαττον ἑξήκοντα*: Hermann, *De vest.* p. 41, says this restriction is the only point on which Plato differs from general Greek usage in the matter of the priesthood.—The following words, especially the *ἱκανῶς*, admit of the supposition that there might be some younger priests not fully qualified.

d 5–e 1. Adopting A^2 and O^2's correction of *τρὶς* for *τρεῖς* (Ficinus has "*ter*") in d 5, we may (freely) translate: "Four out of the twelve tribes are on three (separate) occasions to elect (by voting) four men, each from themselves, and after duly examining (and thereby definitely appointing) the three (from each lot of four) who get most votes, must send (the remaining) nine to Delphi (for the oracle) to pronounce for one out of each lot of three" (i.e. the set elected by each group of four tribes). The *ἐξ αὐτῶν* (d 6) leaves us in doubt whether each voter could only vote for men of his own tribe, or for any members of the four tribes of which his own was one; probably the former was the case.—The association of the tribes into three separate, probably territorial, voting-bodies of four tribes each may have been meant to secure that the final six should not all come from the same part of the country. The *δοκιμασία* is to take place in the case of these as well, and all vacancies occasioned either by failure to pass it, or by death, are to be filled—not by Delphi, but by the original voting-bodies—from the same source from which the defaulter came (e 1–3).

d 8. *ἀνελεῖν = ὥστε ἀνελεῖν*, "oraculo designari" (Ast); the technical expression for the pronouncement of the oracle. The early printed edd. up to Steph. had *ἀφελεῖν*, but not Stob. or any MS.—If this explanation is right the total number of *ἐξηγηταί* would be six, of whom three only would be chosen by Delphi. (Ritter would retain *τρεῖς* in d 5 and read *τετράκις* for *τέτταρας*, or else thinks that these three latter ones form the whole body, and so F.H.D.; but *δοκιμάσαντας* is against this, as also the *οἷς ἂν πλείστη γέν. ψῆφος.*)

e 1. *τοῦ χρόνου τὴν ἡλικίαν*, "the age-limit."

e 2. *τὸν λιπόντα* (*προαιρείσθωσαν*), "(*elect*) the missing man"; we should say "fill the vacancy." The main point is not in the word for *elect*, therefore it seems unnecessary, with Herm., to make it more significant and apposite by reading *προσαιρείσθωσαν.*

e 3. *τε δή*, as O^2 would write it—probably on some authority—seems more appropriate here than *δὲ δή*.

e 5. *τούτων*: i.e. *τῶν τεμενῶν*.—Coupled as it is with *καρπῶν*, *μισθώσεων* here probably means *rents*—doubtless *grazing* rents.

760 a 1. *τῶν μεγίστων τιμημάτων*: plur. for sing. as at 763 d 6 and 756 c 3.

a 3. *καθάπερ ἡ τῶν στρατηγῶν ἐγίγνετο*: cp. above 755 c f.

a 7. For *περί c. gen.* as a substitute for an objective gen. see above 685 c 2.—For *ταύτῃ* followed by an explanatory clause cp. 687 e 8 *τοῦτο δὲ . . . εὔχεσθαι δεῖν . . . ὅπως νοῦν ἕξει.*

b 1. *πρυτανέων*: see above on 758 b 6.

b 4. Eusebius has *νενεμήσθω* for *νενέμηται*. Plato doubtless wrote the latter. He has twice before mentioned the division of the rural territory into twelve equal parts (745 c 1 and 758 e 3). An author quoting the passage would be likely to bring this verb into line with the imperatives which follow.—*φυλὴ δέ*: as at Athens, "the tribe, as a whole, did not correspond with any continuous portion of the territory" (Grote, *Hist.* ch. xxxi. p. 60). The assigning of a definite portion of country to a tribe by lot is an *ad hoc* arrangement—for organizing the rural police. Moreover, it will be seen that the arrangement only holds for a month. The twelvefold division of the land for administrative purposes has already been referred to at 745 e 1; they were probably wedge-shaped districts arranged round the city as a centre—as is implied by *κύκλῳ* at d 1.

b 5. *κατ' ἐνιαυτόν*: either these words are not Plato's, or they were written before he had matured the plan explained at d 2–e 3; for they are irreconcilable with that on any interpretation. I would therefore bracket them.

b 6. *οἷον*: this rather strange qualification is perhaps due to the fact that the officials have two titles given them.—Hermann's conjecture that the MS. *φυλάρχους* is a mistake for *φρουράρχους* is confirmed by two MSS. of Eusebius.—*ἔστω*: apparently for *ἐξέστω*; "let it be open to them," by way of meiosis for "they will have to." Is it possible that we ought to read ⟨*ἐν*⟩ *τούτοις δ' ἔστω*, "let it be their duty"?—The natural order of the following words would be *ἑκάστῳ τῶν πέντε καταλέξασθαι δώδεκα ἐκ τῶν νέων τῆς αὑτῶν* (or *αὑτοῦ*) *φυλῆς*. It must have been the unusual order which gave rise to the variants *δωδεκάτῳ* and *δωδέκατον* for *δώδεκα τῶν*. (F.H.D. would bracket *τῶν πέντε*.)

c 2. *διακληρωθήτω*: the *δια-* in the verb not only describes the original *distribution* by lot of the twelve *μόρια* among the twelve *φυλαί*, but the subsequent *change of distribution* described

by the words *ἕκαστα ἑκάστοις κατὰ μῆνα*; but the subsequent changes were decided by a fixed rotation, not by casting lots. In other words the *κληρωθήτω*, in its strict meaning, only applies to the first distribution, the *δια-* to all the subsequent distributions as well.

c 5. *φρουροῖς τε καὶ ἄρχουσιν*: the usual chiasmus.—I think we may conclude that both the sixty *φρουροί* and the five *ἄρχοντες* in each tribe were all called *ἀγρονόμοι*. (Cp. 843 d 4 ff., and on e 4 below.)

c 6 ff. *ὅπως . . . κύκλῳ*: I believe that the difficulties of this passage have all arisen from the improper inclusion in the text of the words *τοὺς τῆς χώρας τόπους*, which were a marginal interpretation of *τὰ μέρη*, made by a commentator who feared that *τὰ μέρη* might be taken to mean the twelve tribes. The intruding words were taken to be the object of *μεταλλάττοντας*, and this involved either the change of the earlier edd. (and Stallb.) of *τὸν ἑξῆς τόπον* to *τῶν ἑξῆς τόπων*, or else the insertion (by Schanz) of *εἰς*. The comma which Burnet puts after *τόπους* restores *τὸν τόπον* as the proper obj. of *μεταλλάττοντας*, and brings the four offending words into their proper place—i.e. of apposition to *τὰ μέρη*—but, at the same time, reveals them as intruders.—*ὅπως ἄν* is not *temporal*—"*cum primum*" (Ficinus)—but describes the positions—or order—from which the "changes to the next lot" are to be made; "auf welche Weise" (Wagner), "*quemadmodum*" (Stallb.).

d 1. *ἐπὶ δεξιά*: i.e. following the sun, or, as we should say, the hands of the clock.—*φυλή* No. I. would spend the twelfth month in lot No. XII. and then would begin to retrace its steps, beginning with lot XI. The following explanation shows that Plato knew of some "observers" who faced the South, and consequently had the East on their left hand.

d 5. *πρὸς τῇ χώρᾳ* stands for "besides learning the country."—*τῆς ὥρας ἑκάστης* ("within the course of each season") is a temporal gen. going with *τὸ γιγνόμενον*.

d 7. *μεταβάλλειν εἰς τόπον* means just the same as the previous *μεταλλάττειν τόπον*.

e 3. I quite agree with Schanz in rejecting *τοὺς . . . ἐπιμελητάς*. It is just such an insertion as *τοὺς τῆς χώρας τόπους* at c 7—a marginal explanation that *ἀγρονόμους καὶ φρουράρχους* was here used, as at b 6, of the *five head magistrates*, and did not include the subordinate sixty (cp. on c 5 above).—It is impossible to suppose that the outgoing five are each to choose thirteen successors; i.e. that *ἐπιμελητάς* is the *subject* of *αἱρεῖσθαι*. Ficinus's transla-

tion is: "Tertio autem anno quinque alii agrorum et custodiae principes *a primatibus tribuum* deligantur ipsorum duodecim curatores." The words in italics are an explanatory addition of the translator's own; his separation of the predicative ἐπιμελητάς from τοὺς πέντε makes the best that is to be made of the MS. text.—Some later translators take ἀγρ. of the sixty subordinates, and φρ. of the head five. Doubtless the sixty were to be renewed also, though he thinks it unnecessary to say so.

e 4. διατριβή here means "time of office." It is in the plural because they passed separate periods at separate places. As a noun containing the notion of a verb, it has the power of governing the dat. τῷ τόπῳ ἑκάστῳ (cp. above 631 d 3 and 715 c 7). (It would have been awkward to have a second ἐν in the sentence.) Jowett translates, "while on service at each station."

e 6. ταφρεύοντας: for the construction cp. 759 b 6.

e 7. ἀποσκάπτοντας does not seem to be used of a different operation from that described in ταφρεύοντας, but amplifies the notion by adding, in the ἀπο-, the mention of its *purpose*. The ditches are to serve as impediments to the foe. (Is it possible that ταφρεύω may also have meant "raise embankments"?)—The MS. reading ἐν οἰκοδομήμασιν . . . εἴργοντες is naturally interpreted by Jowett "confine in fastnesses (the evil-disposed)"—though Ficinus avoided this conclusion by a vague "turribus et claustris pro viribus circumductis." But this notion is quite foreign to the passage, which—from e 5 to 761 a 3—is solely occupied with precautions against attack by a *foreign* foe. Also such summary imprisonment as these words would describe is not likely to have been in the powers of any rural police. Clearly Schneider's ἐνοικοδομήμασιν is the right reading; ἐνοικοδομεῖν is used, like the Lat. *inaedificare*, for "*to block up*." The noun then will mean *walls built across ravines* to block the way. (Ast and Stallb. would take ἐν as denoting the instrument, and οἰκ. to mean any structure designed as a fortification.—Herm. proposed ἐνοικοδομήμασιν independently.)

761 a 2. τῶν οἰκείων . . . ἐκλεγομένους, "avoiding their busy times as much as possible"; lit. "picking out their leisures from their own work." The "pregnant" use of *leisure* for *time of leisure* is like that of e.g. αἴσθησιν (with παρέχειν) in the sense of *opportunity for seeing*.

a 3. δὲ δή: summarizing, "and in short."—I unhesitatingly adopt Burnet's μὲν for the MS. ἐν: (1) ἐν τοῖς ἐχθροῖς is nonsense here, as the scribe of O saw; (2) we want a μέν for the

following δέ; (3) after the final μ of ποιεῖν an μ was likely to fall out. As to its position see Burnet, Pref. to vol. v.

a 6. The rain-water is to be diverted from flooding the crops and conducted by artificial channels and dykes into reservoirs.

b 2. εἴργοντας is subordinate to ἐπιμελουμένους.—ταφρεύμασιν: not *dykes* in the sense of *embankments*, but *channels* for drawing off the water from the reservoirs in the desired directions.

b 3. καταδεχόμεναι καὶ πίνουσαι: the former participle refers to the water which remains above ground in the κοῖλαι νάπαι and which goes off as νάματα or ποταμοί, the latter to the water which the ground absorbs and gives off in springs (κρῆναι).

b 5. It is perhaps permissible to wonder whether Plato did not write προιεῖσαι, not ποιοῦσαι here.—καί, "even."

b 6. πηγαῖα (ὕδατα): this adj. is used to denote the clear water from spring or lake, as opposed to the turbid storm-torrent (cp. above on 736 b).—The language of the whole of this hastily written passage (b 6–d 3) more resembles the latter than the former.

b 6 f. τά τε πηγαῖα ὕδατα κτλ., "and that, enhancing the beauty of the clear water, whether stream or spring, by plantations and stone structures, and collecting the streams in rock-channels, they may ensure abundance, and, by means of artificial runnels, should any sacred grove or consecrated enclosure be near, may add to their charm by discharging their streams at every season of the year into the very interior of the temples of the Gods."

b 7. κοσμοῦντες: there is a change of subject here, from the νάπαι to the rural engineers.

c 2. ἄφθονα πάντα seems to have been a common phrase for abundance. Cp. Plut. *Conv. Disp.* iv. 4 (667 c) καὶ συνουσίας ποιοῦνται μετ' ἀλλήλων ἐν ἀφθόνοις πᾶσι.—καθ' ἑκάστας τὰς ὥρας: not "to suit the seasons," "pro singulis anni temporibus" (Schn.), "je nach den einzelnen Jahreszeiten" (Wagn.), but simply "at all seasons" (Jowett)—even the driest.

c 3. L again alone has the right reading, ἄλσος. A, and probably O, had δάσος, a mistake easily to be accounted for by the similarity between **Α**, **Δ** and **Λ**.—περὶ ταῦτα: i.e. in the neighbourhood of the ποταμός or κρήνη.

c 4. ἀφειμένον MSS.; as ἀνίημι is often used of the consecration of men or animals, Ast, followed by all subsequent editors, except Winckelmann and Burnet, rightly altered this to ἀνειμένον. It is possible that Plato used the more out-of-the-way compound on purpose. On the other hand, the occurrence of ἀφιέντες just

afterwards in its natural sense is in favour of *ἀνειμένον*, and provides a possible account of the source of the error.—Schanz rightly rejects the difficult *ᾗ* in c 4. Cp. below 958 d 4.—I accept Stallb.'s and Burnet's punctuation whereby *αὐτά* goes closely with *τὰ τῶν θεῶν ἱερά*.

c 5. *κοσμῶσι*: a final revision would scarcely have left this word so soon after *κοσμοῦντες*; its object is *ἄλσος ᾗ τέμενος* understood.—(The Zürich edd. adopt the reading *ὑδρείας* of the Ven. MS. Ξ, making it the object of *ποιῶσιν*, and Madvig would insert a *τε* after *εἰ* in c 3.)—*γυμνάσια κτλ.*: since Ficinus all translators (as far as I know), in spite of the natural meaning of the particles in c 6, treat the *gymnasia* and the *baths* as two separate institutions—the former for the young men themselves, the latter for their elders. Ficinus, however, follows the literal sense of Plato's words, according to which the young men are to make the gymnasia (c 6) "not only for themselves, but for old men as well," and they are to do this by adding (not only a *frigidarium*, which all gymnasia would have, but also) a *tepidarium*. This would render the institution a boon to the old and "to the sick and the toil-worn." I would even insert a comma after *γέρουσι* to make this plain.

c 7. Vat. 1029 (Bekker's Υ) omits *θερμά*, and Naber would reject it—rightly, I think. The mention of the supply of firewood is enough by itself to show that *hot* baths are meant. The expression *γεροντικὰ λουτρά* is quoted by Pollux, *Onom.* ii. 13, p. 158.—With the use of the adj. Stallb. cps. that of *ξενικά* with *θεραπεύματα* at 718 a 7, and with *ἁμαρτήματα* at 730 a 4.

d 1. It is hard to piece together these disjointed jottings. *ἐπ' ὀνήσει* ("with a view to their amendment") seems to go closely with *δεχομένους εὐμενῶς*, and *τε . . . καί* to connect *καμνόντων νόσοις* (*σώματα*) and *τετρυμένα πόνοις σώματα*.

d 3. *δέξιν*: Winckelmann has undoubtedly recovered the original word for us in changing the MS. *δ' ἕξιν* to *δέξιν*. Its construction is that of a "cognate" acc. with *δεχομένους*—as at Eur. *I.A.* 1182 *δεξόμεθα δέξιν ἥν σε δέξασθαι χρεών*. As to *ἰατροῦ*, perhaps it is best, with Stallb., to take it as "nota breviloquentia dictum pro *ᾗ δέξιν ἰατροῦ μὴ πάνυ σόφου*." Another possibility is to take *ἰατροῦ μ. π. σ.* to stand "pregnantly" for "than *treatment by* a poor physician." Ficinus translates: "quae sane curatio longe melior est quam medici parum periti medela." We should say: "a *visit* to the bath is much more efficacious than a visit to a poor physician."

d 5. *μετὰ παιδιᾶς οὐδαμῆ ἀχαρίτου*: a pregnant use of the preposition; "and will provide the means of delightful recreation."—The connexion of ideas between *παιδιά* and *σπουδή* seems to be this: "The *ἀγρονόμοι* have to provide recreation for themselves and others—but they have also work to do which is no play; they have to risk their lives in our defence."

d 6. *περὶ ταῦτα* is quite general: "(the serious part) *of their business.*"—*τοὺς ἑξήκοντα*: the sixty young subordinates from each tribe.

d 8. *γειτόνων* refers, I think, to neighbouring *foreigners*, so that *ἄλλος ἄλλον* in the following line does not apply to them, but only to the *natives*—*τῶν ἄλλων πολιτῶν*; if this is so, *γειτόνων* is short for *ἤν τις γειτόνων ἀδικῇ*.

e 2. *αὐτούς*, "by themselves."

e 3. *μετὰ τῶν δώδεκα*, "cum *duodenis*" (Schneider); cp. below 762 e 9. This must mean that each of the five *φρούραρχοι* of the tribe associated his twelve young subordinates with him to form the tribunal; its numbers would then be sixty-five. The following *τοὺς ἑπτακαίδεκα* is doubtless rightly rejected by Hug as a hasty comment of someone who simply added together twelve and five. There is nothing to make us think that only one lot of twelve was thus associated with the five *φρούραρχοι*. The *τῶν* with *δώδεκα* implies that the number had been mentioned before. This was only done at 760 b 7, and no subsequent mention has been made of *any particular twelve.*

e 5. *δικάζειν καὶ ἄρχειν*: the arrangement is remarkable, because it is not chiastic.

e 6. *πλὴν . . . βασιλέων*, "except those quasi-regal judges whose judgement is final." For *τέλος ἐπιτιθέναι* in this sense cf. below, 767 a 4, and 768 b 6 (*τέλος κρίνειν*), 957 b 4.

e 7. The acc. *τοὺς ἀγρονόμους* has nothing to govern it. He starts as if *ὀνειδιστέον* or *δεῖν ὀνειδίζειν* were to follow, and ends with *ὀνείδη φερέσθωσαν* as if a nom. had preceded.

762 a 1. *λαμβάνειν καὶ φέρειν*: a variety of *ἄγειν καὶ φέρειν*. At *Rep.* 574 a 3 *φέρειν* is used alone in this sense.—*τῶν* (partitive) is, I think, neut., and refers to the *ὑποζύγια* and *οἴκεται* mentioned at 760 e 9. Already there it was intimated that the "commandeering" was not to be quite arbitrary.

a 2. *ἐὰν . . . διδόντων*, "if they accept a present offered with corrupt motives." Plato's custom is to put *παρά* with the gen. of the person from whom a thing is received, but here it would be inconvenient to put in *παρά*, so he takes advantage of the fact

that the person is expressed by a participle, which might count as a gen. abs., and leaves it out.

a 3. ἢ [καὶ δίκας] ἀδίκως διανέμωσι: the fact that O gives ἢ ἀδίκως as a variant for ἀδίκως, suggests that there was a MS. reading which rejected καὶ δίκας, and supplied τι from a 2 with διανέμωσι. This I believe to be the true reading: διανέμειν is the natural counterpart of δέχεσθαι, but δίκας διανέμειν is not a natural expression at all.—ταῖς μὲν θωπείαις ὑπείκοντες, "if they fall victims to corruption."

a 4. ὀνείδη φερέσθωσαν: probably this degradation would involve disqualification as magistrates. Their names would be removed from the rolls.

a 6. For the "neighbours'" courts see below 766 e 3 ff. and 956 c 2.

a 7. ἑκόντες is contrasted with the following ἐὰν μὴ 'θέλωσιν (ὑπέχειν). The smaller suits can only be settled by the rural tribunal with the defendant's consent.

b 1. τῷ μεθίστασθαι . . . εἰς ἕτερον τόπον is not governed by πιστεύοντες, but is dative of instrument with ἀποφευξεῖσθαι.

b 2. φεύγοντες: as Ast says, this is a pun; "while they are defendants in the suit" is what the word means technically—as we might say, "hoping that as defendants they may defend themselves successfully."

b 3. A alone gives τούτῳ περιλαγχάνειν for τούτων πέρι λ., and it is uncorrected.—λαγχάνειν, "must proceed"; infinitives alternate with imperatives in much the same sense.

b 4. I agree with Burnet that L (again) with A^2 and O^2 preserves in δίκαις the right reading, and that A and O, and the edd. who follow them (Herm., Zürr., Wagner, and Schanz) go wrong in reading δίκας. δίκας or δίκην may easily have been left out by the author after λαγχάνειν here—in spite of the fact that λ. is not used elsewhere without δίκην in this sense in Plato—seeing that ἐν ταῖς . . . δίκαις follows.—The κοιναὶ δίκαι were presumably the city courts.

b 6. τὰ δύο ἔτη, "during their two years (of office)."

b 7. καθ' ἑκάστους τοὺς τόπους: this leaves it vague whether there was one "mess" for each local division, or more than one. It is conceivable that each of the five leaders, with his twelve subordinates, formed a separate mess, but, as τῶν ἀρχόντων, and not τοῦ ἄρχοντος, are spoken of, in the next line but one, as having power to dispense with attendance, or make other arrangements, it is more probable that the sixty-five messed together.

c 4. ἐὰν ἀποφήνωσιν αὐτόν, "if they take cognizance of his

offence"; *ἀποφαίνειν* is used as "to name" is used as a technical term in the House of Commons. The following words describe the process by which this is done. It is implied that the five might overlook an offence in one of the sixty, though, as we see below, the juniors were to show the seniors no mercy. (Ficinus translates *ἀποφήνωσιν* by *damnent.*)

c 5. "And post him in the Agora as a deserter."

c 6. *τὸ ἑαυτοῦ μέρος*, "quantum in se sit" (Fic.).

d 1. *ἀτιμωρήτως* qualifies *κολαζέσθω*, not *κολάζειν.*—If Plato meant both the *αὐτῶν* of the MSS. and *αὐτός* to stand—which is doubtful—his object was to emphasize the fact that in the case of the *ἄρχοντες* there was no one whose orders or permission could excuse absence; *αὐτός* would then be "on his own authority, *ultro.*"—Probably *αὐτῶν* is a mistake for *αὖ.*

d 2. There is a delicate *μείωσις* about *ἐπιμελεῖσθαι*, "attend to."

d 4. *(μὴ) ἐπεξιών* is subordinate to the preceding participles: "he who notices or hears of it *without indicting the offender.*"

d 5. *περὶ κτλ.*: a striking instance of an explanatory asyndeton. It tells us what "the severer (*πλείονι*) penalty" was.

d 6. *ἠτιμάσθω* MSS. Schanz is very likely right in substituting for this the more technical *ἠτιμώσθω* (cp. *Rep.* 553 b *ὑπὸ συκοφαντῶν ἢ ἀποθανόντα ἢ ἐκπεσόντα ἢ ἀτιμωθέντα*). The offender is to be *disqualified* from ever again holding office over any of the young *ἀγρονόμοι.*—*τούτων*: neuter; "the *νομοφύλακες* must pay strict attention to such lapses. If they can't prevent them, they must at least be sure that they are duly punished." Then follows a most valuable little *προοίμιον* on the philosophy of authority and government in general. The asyndeton makes it the more impressive. (Stobaeus's *δέ*, which Ast adopts, is a natural error.) "Believe me—I wish everybody would believe me—that there is not a man living who will ever make a good master without being a servant first; and no success as a ruler can bring a man so much honour and credit as *loyal service*, first of all to the laws,—for therein he serves the gods—and next, while he is young, to all elders and superiors."

e 5. *ὡς ταύτην τοῖς θεοῖς οὖσαν δουλείαν*: this construction is here felt to be an expansion of the simple *δουλείαν* used as the "acc. of the inner object" with *δουλεύειν*; *ὡς* with a noun and participle in the acc. can, however, by itself be used in the sense of "under the idea that." So at *Phaedo* 109 d *ὡς . . . τὰ ἄστρα χωροῦντα*, and *Rep.* 345 e *ἀλλὰ μισθὸν αἰτοῦσιν ὡς οὐχὶ αὐτοῖσιν ὠφελίαν ἐσομένην ἐκ τοῦ ἄρχειν ἀλλὰ τοῖς ἀρχομένοις.*—For the

dat. τοῖς θεοῖς, depending directly on the noun δουλείαν, cp. above on 760 e 4. For the statement itself cp. on 715 c 4 ff.

e 6. καὶ ἐντίμως βεβιωκόσι: as Wordsworth says, "we live by admiration." The veneration felt by the young "squire" for the distinguished veteran who commands him is half his training. —Burnet preserves the letters of the MS. ἔπειτα εἰ in writing ἔπειτ' ἀεὶ; Stobaeus has ἔπειτα ἀεὶ, and so Schanz. All edd. before Schanz print ἔπειτα alone.

e 7. Schanz would follow Ast in rejecting τοὺς νέους, but though unnecessary it comes in quite naturally as the (superfluous) correlative of τοῖς πρεσβυτέροις.

e 8. The MS. reading ἀπόρου, if right, means "poverty-stricken," "scanty," "penurious"; at 680 d 8 we had ἀπορία in the sense of *dearth*. But, though I do not think ἀπόρου impossible here, I believe O. Apelt (p. 11) is right in reading ἀπύρου for it. Plutarch (*Bellone an pace* etc. ch. vi. p. 349 A) uses ἄπυρα σίτια of the meagre fare of soldiers on a campaign, as contrasted with the rich diet allowed to a chorus in training. This meaning exactly suits our present passage.—For γεγευμένον εἶναι as a substitute for γεγεῦσθαι cp. βλεπούσας εἶναι at 631 d 3, and βλέποντ' εἶναι at 963 a 3, for βλέπειν.—For τὸν τῶν ἀγρονόμων γεγονότα cp. on 754 d 4.

e 9. οἱ δώδεκα: i.e. the five lots of twelve each—"*duodeni*" (Schneider); the same who are called τοὺς ἑξήκοντα at d 3 above. (Cp. on 761 e 3.)

e 10. βουλενέσθωσαν ὡς . . . οὐχ ἕξουσιν, "they must reckon on not having."

763 a 1. οἱόνπερ, like οἷον at *Charm.* 153 a 2, and οἷα at *Critias* 113 e 3, is *utpote*—"cum famuli sint" (Schneider).

a 2. ἐκ is lit. "from among"—"and they must not (seek aid) from the neighbouring farmers and villagers, and use *their* slaves, etc."

a 4. ὅσα εἰς τὰ δημόσια stands for ἐπὶ τοσαῦτα ὅσα εἰς τὰ δημόσιά ἐστιν (ὑπηρετήματα).—τὰ δ' ἄλλα: other ὑπηρετήματα, that is, than those done for the sake of the public. To mark this I have changed the colon before τά to a comma. ἄλλα is governed by διακονοῦντές τ. κ. δ.

a 6. I have ventured to bracket ἑαυτοῖς. There is nothing in it which has not already been expressed by αὐτοὶ δι' αὑτῶν. For the collocation of act. and pass. cp. 697 d 6 μισοῦντες μισοῦνται. I have also marked the fact that διεξερευνώμενοι brings a change of subject matter by putting a dash instead of a comma before πρός.

b 2. *οὐδενὸς ἔλαττον*, "as important as any"; he is, doubtless, not thinking here of the educational value of the study—as he was in his panegyric of mathematics at 747 b—but only of the value of the information itself.

b 5. *ἄλλης*, "attendant"; we must supply *χάριν* from b 3, with the genitives.

b 7 f. *εἴτε τις . . . τοῦτο προσαγορεύων*, "while calling them κρ. or ἀγ., or whatever he likes"; i.e. "under whatever name he prefers, let each man do his best to protect his country." With *τοῦτο προσαγορεύων* ("calling them *by that name*") Stallb. cps. *Symp.* 212 c *τοῦτον οὖν τὸν λόγον . . . ὅτι καὶ ὅπῃ χαίρεις ὀνομάζων, τοῦτο ὀνόμαζε.* (Though *ἐπιτηδευέτω* governs *τὸ ἐπιτήδευμα*, supplied from b 6, Ast is wrong in saying that *τοῦτο* refers to *ἐπιτήδευμα*.) As the Spartan *κρυπτεία*, mentioned above at 633 b 9, was a similar kind of service to that of the *ἀγρονόμοι*, it is natural to refer to it here. As the exhortation seems to be specially addressed to the rank and file of the *ἀγρονόμοι*, it is not likely that, as Orelli suggests, Timaeus's (and Photius's) *ἱππαγρέτας* ought to be substituted for *κρυπτούς*, for that word is said (by Tim.) to be the title of a (probably) high official.

c 3. *τὸ δὲ μετὰ τοῦτο . . . ἦν ἑπόμενον*, "next in our election of magistrates came that of the Agoranomoi and Astynomoi." *αἱρέσεως* depends on *μετὰ τοῦτο*; cp. *Symp.* 217 e 1 *μέχρι δεῦρο τοῦ λόγου*, and similar genitives with *ἐνταῦθα*. *ἀγορανόμων πέρι* and *ἀστ. πέρι* are periphrases for the simple gen. (cp. above on 685 c 2), so that *τὸ ἀγορανόμων πέρι* stands for *τὸ τῶν ἀγορανόμων*, and is the subj. to *ἦν ἑπόμενον*. (Possibly the *τό* was, by a slovenly conversational laxity of construction, allowed to do double duty: (1) to form the adverbial *τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο*, and (2) to go, as above explained, with *ἀγορανόμων πέρι*.) —As to the reading, I believe Burnet's is the right solution of the difficulty. All other MSS. but A, and all the printed edd. have *ἀστυνύμων ἦν ἡμῖν ἑπόμενον*, but in A *ἦν* is in an erasure which is too big for it. In the margin stands *τρειν* ("cum vitii nota," Schanz). Burnet naturally supposes that *τρειν* originally stood in A where now *ἦν* stands, and further conjectures that it was a clumsy scribe's version of an indistinctly written *πέρι ἦν*. —The *ἦν* refers to 760 b 1.

c 5. Bekker substituted *γε* for the MS. *τε*, which is certainly wrong; Ast would simply reject it. We may conjecture that the insertion of *γε* after *ἀγρονόμοις* improved the rhythm of the sentence; it is hard to see how it improved its meaning.—It is

strange that the three ἀστυνόμοι should be said to correspond in function to the sixty subordinate ἀγρονόμοι of each tribe, rather than to the five φρούραρχοι. They, like the five, were *elected*, while the sixty were selected by their superiors. We are not told that they had any subordinates, nor what was the length of their period of office. We may conclude from 760 a 6 f. that the military officials undertook the *defence* of the city; so that the ἀστυνόμοι would be relieved of the military part of the duties of the ἀγρονόμοι.

c 7. ἐπιμελούμενοι is subordinate to μιμούμενοι. It explains wherein the resemblance lies.—τῶν κατὰ τὸ ἄστυ: i.e. those main and cross streets which lay wholly within the city, while those next mentioned are the "extensions" (τεταμένων) within the city of the main thoroughfares converging from different parts of the country.

d 1. κατὰ νόμους: the city was not to be allowed to build itself anyhow.

d 3. τεθεραπευμένα: the same care which the ἀγρονόμοι (οἱ φρουροῦντες) bestowed on the quality and conduct of the water outside the city walls, will be expected from the ἀστυνόμοι within the city.

d 4. κοσμῇ: cp. above 761 c 5 κοσμῶσι, of the decorative effect of fountains and streams and pools.—καὶ τούτους: a reference to the importance of the office of ἀγρονόμοι, implied above in c 1 f.

d 5. δυνατούς: not, I think, as Ast, Schneider, and Wagner (and F.H.D.), *divites*, *proceres*, but, as Jowett, "men of ability." It does not follow that because, as e.g. at Thucyd. viii. 21, οἱ δυνατοί could be used to denote "the rich," "the upper class," δυνατός by itself could mean "rich." As is explained by Plato at *Prot.* 351 a 1 ff., a man becomes δυνατός partly by *training*; the requisite training, and the "leisure" would be more likely to be found in men of the highest class, hence the διό in d 6. Besides, the καί before τούτους would then mean that the φρούραρχοι were to come from the highest class. Fic. does not take δυνατούς absolutely, but joins it, like σχολάζοντας, with ἐπιμελεῖσθαι, and he is very likely right.

d 6. A comparison of e 4 f. shows that the plur. τιμήματα is here used (as at 756 c 3 and 760 a 1) as a variant for the singular —and shows also that it is the ἀστυνόμοι, and not their *proposers*, who are to come exclusively from the highest property class.—πᾶς ἀνήρ = ὁ βουλόμενος.

d 7 f. *διαχειροτονηθέντων . . . γίγνωνται*, "when a show of hands has decided between the candidates, and you have found the six who have most votes." I think *διαχειρ.* is gen. abs. with the subj. left out, and that *καί* is *explanatory*—i.e. introduces a more detailed account of the same process described by *διαχειρ.* The subj. to *ἀφικομένων* is the antecedent to *οἷς*. Where the Greek says when those who have most votes (*χειροτονίαι* has to be supplied with *πλεῖσται*) "*come to six*," we should say "when *you come* to the six, etc." In both cases the *coming* is metaphorical. (It would spoil the sentence to put in *κρίσιν*, with Heindorf, or—rather better—*ἐξέτασιν* with Winckelmann, after *εἰς*.)

e 2. *οἷς τούτων ἐπιμελές*: probably, as Ritter says, the *πρύτανεις*. R. cps. 758 d 2 ff. and 755 e 4.

e 3. Here again, in *αὐτοῖς* L alone among our MSS. preserves the right reading; A and O have *αὐτοὺς*.

e 6 ff. *δέκα . . . ἀποφῆναι*: Aldus's insertion of *ἐκ* before *τῶν ἄλλων*, adopted by all editors, leaves the main difficulty of this passage untouched. After the preceding words no description of the process of the election of the Agoranomoi is *needed*; if given, it should repeat the substance of d 7 ff. *διαχειροτονηθέντων . . . ἐπιμελές*. But our text, in reading *χειροτονηθέντας*, introduces an unheard-of novelty. It makes the elected ten *themselves* select by lot five from among their number, and proclaim their appointment. Ficinus has: "quippe de decem qui ceteros suffragio superarint quinque sorte designentur, et comprobati magistratus declarentur." This suggests a reading *δέκα τῶν ἄλλων προχειροτονηθέντων* (or *προκριθέντων*). The view that *ἄλλων* is governed by a word denoting *preference* is supported by the reading of L and O (which is also that of A^2) *ἢ τῶν ἄλλων*. This variant I take to be due to a marginal *ἢ οἱ ἄλλοι*, intended to explain *τῶν ἄλλων*. I think the best course here is to bracket *δέκα . . . ἀποφῆναι*; the next best merely to read *δέκα τῶν ἄλλων προχειροτονηθέντων*, in either case rejecting Aldus's *ἐκ*.

e 8. *χειροτονείτω δὲ πᾶς πάντα*: these words are difficult. If we apply them to the election of the Agoranomoi they introduce a further contradiction of *γίγν. τὴν αἵρεσιν καθάπερ ἡ τῶν ἀστυνόμων*. Besides, what can be the result of an election where "every voter votes for every candidate"? The only way out of this difficulty is to suppose that every member of the voting assembly was bound, under penalty, to lift up his hand *either for*

or against each of the προβαλλόμενοι. But we have no other reason to assume that there was any such process as *voting against* a candidate. I therefore think the words mean that every member of the voting assembly is to vote *at the election of every official*; i.e. whether it be for Agronomoi, or Astynomoi, or Agoranomoi. It will be observed that the risk of having to pay the large fine of fifty drachmas need not be run by any member of the two lower classes, for he may absent himself from the assembly with impunity (764 a 3 ff.). (Ficinus translates πάντα by *quemlibet*. Jowett takes πάντα to be "*all the ten*." Ritter mentions—to reject it—the possibility that the following ὁ μὴ 'θέλων means "the (elected candidate) who refuses to serve.")

764 a 3. εἰς ἐκκλησίαν καὶ τὸν κοινὸν σύλλογον: this seems to be a general direction applying to deliberative as well as voting assemblies; and this gives some support to the assumption just made that the χειρ. πᾶς πάντα was of *general* application, and did not refer to one election alone.

a 7. τι may perhaps have arisen from dittography of the following π, and Schanz rejects it. If genuine, it is an adverbial acc. of inner object—"unless the magistrates issue some sort of order."

b 1. τοὺς δὲ δὴ ἀγορανόμους, "to go back to the Agoranomoi." δὲ δή recognizes that there has been a digression.

b 7. αὐτούς, "by themselves," as at c 3 below.

c 6. ἑκατέρων depends, I think, not on ἄρχοντας ("of each of the two subjects"), but on διττούς ("two sets of each kind of official"); there would thus be four kinds altogether.

c 7. αὐτῶν, if correct, must mean "in the subjects"; i.e. music and gymnastic. αὐτῆς, which is the reading of L and which Ed. Lov. and Steph. print, seems to mean "(*of education*) *proper*," as distinguished from the public contests which tested it. It would be interesting to know where αὐτῶν came from; its only warrant to us is Cod. Voss., a late hand in A, and a somewhat earlier one in O. I believe L again is right. For this use of αὐτῆς cf. b 7 and c 3. [F.H.D. prefers αὐτῶν as the more *difficult* reading.]—The fact that παιδείας . . . ἀγωνιστικῆς was omitted both in O and in A is prima facie evidence that one of the two MSS. was copied from the other. But (1) they may both have been copied from the same original, or (2) from MSS. which shared the omission, or (3) the omission, of which the cause is patent, might have been made independently by the scribes of both.—With the second παιδείας, as with ἀγωνίας in d 3, we ought, I think, to supply ἄρχοντας from the preceding sentence.

c 8 ff. *γυμνασίων καὶ διδασκαλείων ἐπιμελητάς*: these words count as a titular designation, and *κόσμου . . . κορῶν* are loosely tacked on to part of it, i.e. to *ἐπιμελητάς*: "by superintendents of *education* the Law means overseers of gymnasia and schools, to look after both their outward seemliness and the instruction given in them, and the regulation of these matters, and to regulate the attendance and residence of boys and girls." (Stallb. would make *γυμν.* and *διδασκ.* depend on the genitives which depend on *ἐπιμελητάς*.)—Stephanus's correction of the MS. *διδασκαλιῶν* to *διδασκαλείων* (cp. 804 c 3) is supported by the reading *διδασκαλίων* in Vat. 1029.

d 1. *κόσμου* is used, I think, of the dignity and beauty of the buildings and other surroundings of the places of education. It will be remembered that at *Rep.* 401 b ff. Plato attaches great importance to the beauty of the surroundings in which a child learns. (F.H.D. prefers *arrangement*, Jowett "order.")

d 2. *οἰκήσεων*: not, I think, as Jowett, "lodging," i.e. home accommodation; this would hardly fall within the sphere of the Education Authority. Its connexion with *φοιτήσεων* suggests that it means that the education official should assign pupils to the several schools *according to residence*—should see, in other words, that each child went to the school nearest its home, and that there was a school within easy reach of every home. Hermann's *ἀσκήσεων* which Schanz adopts, denotes a part of the subject which has been already mentioned—i.e. the *παίδευσις* itself—and does not come well in connexion with "the going to and from school."

d 3. *ἀγωνίας*: both A and O first wrote *ἀγῶνας* here. Such a mistake could hardly be made independently. It seems to have been corrected early in both MSS., and probably existed in the MS. or MSS. from which they were copied.—This branch of the *μουσικῆς καὶ γυμναστικῆς ἄρχοντες* might incidentally serve as "examiners" of the schools and superintendents of their public displays, but their main duty was with adults. The word *ἀγωνία* is here used generally of all public contests, though at d 5 (if the reading is correct) it is used, as at *Meno* 94 b, of *gymnastic* contests only. On the other hand *ἀθληταῖς* in d 4 is rather unusually applied to competitors in "musical" *ἀγῶνες* as well as to those in gymnastic contests.

d 5. Stallbaum suggested that we ought to read *ἀγῶνας* for *ἀγωνίαν* here. The suggestion gets some little support from the mistaken *ἀγῶνας* at d 3, but still leaves the sharp contrast between

the restricted meaning of *ἀγωνίαν* in d 5 and the general meaning of *ἀγωνίας* in d 3. I am more inclined to bracket *περὶ μ. . . . ἄλλους* as a (quite unnecessary) marginal comment. The words add nothing to what was said at d 3 f. *ἔν τε . . . ἀθληταῖς*.

d 6. *ἀνθρώπων τε καὶ ἵππων*: Ast notices that Plutarch (*Symp. Probl.* ii. 5, 639 F) remarks that the horse is the only animal which can share with man the distinction won in athletic contests, because he alone shares in the discipline and danger of the soldier. (Plutarch is arguing that the true significance of all games is that they are *μιμήματα τῶν πολεμικῶν*.)

d 7. *τοὺς περὶ μονῳδίαν τε καὶ μιμητικήν*, "artists who perform by themselves"; *μονῳδίαν* is the emphatic word. Dramatic representations are not mentioned; probably because, for reasons given in the *Republic*, they were to be prohibited.

e 2. The loose style of this classification, and its minuteness, are characteristic of the *Laws*. The author's first object is not to settle precisely the divisions of *μουσική* or *γυμναστική*, but to give a general indication of the duties of the "Ministry of Education." Hence he resumes what he had begun to say at d 7 by an unnecessary repetition of *ἑτέρους*. At first sight Stallbaum's rejection of this second *ἑτέρους*—he thinks it was a gloss on *ἄλλους*—seems to regularize the sentence completely; but then it is discovered that *ῥαψῳδῶν*, and the four other genitives with it, are left rather awkwardly stranded, because we are then obliged to take *ἀθλοθέτας* (as a secondary pred.) with *τοὺς αὐτούς* in d 6 as well as with *ἑτέρους* in d 7, whereas with the second *ἑτέρους* the informal "resumption" serves to show what had been left out in the previous expression, without putting it all into grammatical order.

e 3. The arrangement of subjects is chiastic as usual.

e 4 f. *παιδιάν*: we have no word for this display of a delighted and delightful activity, in which the delight is heightened by the restraints imposed by the artistic sense. With us a *game* implies *skill*, and therefore *practice* and *training*, but not necessarily that satisfaction of the artistic instincts which was associated with the Greek *παιδιά* as here used.—*ἐν ὀρχήσεσι . . . μουσικῇ*: I follow Ficinus in taking this prepositional adjunct to be a qualification of *παιδιάν*; this would be made quite clear if, as I think we ought, we read *γιγνομένην* for the hardly construable *γιγνομένῃ* in e 5. (Wagner and Jowett take the words with *ἄρχοντας*.) Fic. has "Primum igitur in chori ludo, ubi viri pueri et puellae tripudio ceterisque musicae modis exercentur, principes eligendi."

—τάξις is "system," "systematic arrangement," what we should call *the rules of the Musician's art*, not merely (as Wagner and Jowett) the ordering and arrangement of the performance by the ἄρχοντες. (Reading γιγνομένην), we may translate: "as displayed in dancing and the whole round of artistic manifestation." —τοὺς ἄρχοντας: the plural is quite general, "the authority." It is necessary to use the plural as long as the number is not definitely ascertained, even though it may turn out to be only one.

e 6. The mistake of ἱκανῶς for ἱκανὸς must have been an early one; A L and O all three have it; only A corrected it. Schanz believes that A had ἱκανὸς to begin with, though he admits some disturbance in the MS. at the syllable -ὸς. (Possibly the text once was ἱκανῶς δὲ ἔχει.)

765 a 2. ἤ: at 721 b 1 ἐπειδὰν ἐτῶν ἢ τις τριάκοντα shows that τριάκοντα γεγονὼς ἐτῶν would be good Greek. There is therefore no necessity with Ast (and Schanz) to reject the ἤ here. —εἰσαγωγεύς: this title denotes the official as the man to whom all intending competitors must apply; who would certify their right to compete, and assign them their order (cp. διαθετῆρα below), as well as decide the result (τὴν διάκρισιν διδόναι).

a 4. It would have seemed simpler to us if he had said εἰσαγωγεύς τε εἶναι καὶ . . . ἀποδιδόναι; as it is we must take τε καί as coupling εἰσαγ. and ἀποδιδούς, and take εἶναι with them both.—διαθετῆρα: this title cannot be supposed to imply any placing of the members of the chorus in a proper position—that duty would fall to the Choragus.

a 5. ὅσοι μὲν φιλοφρόνως ἐσχήκασι περὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα, "quicumque haec studia adamarunt" (Schneider); i.e. "devote themselves to the subject." Ficinus has "qui huic rei *vacant*." Is it possible that he read σχολάζουσι, and that our φιλοφρόνως ἐσχήκασι was originally a marginal interpretation of it? At b 1 these musical devotees are called οἱ ἔμπειροι.

a 8. καὶ τὴν προβολὴν δὴ τὸν αἱρούμενον ἐκ τῶν ἐμπείρων ποιητέον, "in proposing a name too, the elector must take one from the class of musicians."

b 1. ἔν τε . . . ἄπειρος ὁ λαχών: I think the dictionaries are wrong in assigning to κατηγόρημα here the meaning *objection*, and to ἀπηγόρημα the meaning "*defence*." κατηγορεῖν is used by Plato in the sense of *assert*, *declare*, while the force of ἀπ- is constantly that of *rejection*. The author's decided fondness for chiasmus too is an argument on the same side. τῶν μέν are the challengers, τῶν δέ the defenders. Ficinus has: "una haec approbatio repro-

batioque habeatur" (though he alters the order of the subsequent clause because the chiasmus does not suit the Latin idiom).

b 4. The sole result aimed at by the *δοκιμασία* is to get the best musician of the ten selected candidates. I would therefore, retaining Stephanus's comma, which Burnet has reinserted *after* *δοκιμασθείς*, reject (Ast's) comma *before* it. In *λάχῃ* **δοκιμασθείς** the participle is as significant as *λάχῃ*, and the words mean "succeeds in passing the examination and (so) gets the appointment." Otherwise *ὃς ἂν λάχῃ* is a lame repetition of the information conveyed by *ὁ λαχών* in b 3. (Heindorf thinks *τῶν* has fallen out before *δέκα*; on the other hand Hermann, at c 6 below, would remove the *τῶν* which the text has there. If either change be thought necessary, I should prefer Hermann's.—F.H.D. thinks *δοκιμασθείς* a gloss.)

b 5. *κατὰ ταὐτὰ δὲ . . . ὁ λαχὼν τὴν κρίσιν*: two controversies divide interpreters of this passage. (1) In the first place it is disputed whether (*a*) *ἀρχέτω* governs *μονῳδιῶν τε καὶ συναυλιῶν*—as it does the corresponding *τῶν χορῶν* in the preceding sentence; or whether (*b*) *μον.* and *συναυλιῶν* depend on the preceding *κρίσιν*—in other words whether *τῶν ἀφικομένων εἰς κρίσιν* refers (*a*) to the candidates who are "examined" for the office of *ἄρχων* or *ἀθλοθέτης μονῳδιῶν*, or (*b*) to the *competitors in musical ἀγῶνες*. Ficinus, Ast, and Stallbaum take the former view; Wagner, Schneider, and Ritter the latter. The previous *τῶν χορῶν ἀρχέτω*, the importance attached in the case of the corresponding election to the *δοκιμασία*, the *κρίσιν* in d 1, the tense of *ἀφικομένων* and the number of *μον.* and *συναυλιῶν* are all arguments in favour of (*a*). The main reasons against (*a*) are that the final words *εἰς . . . ὁ λαχὼν τὴν κρίσιν* are tautological and somewhat otiose; also the position of *τὸν ἐνιαυτὸν ἐκεῖνον* is peculiar, and the meaning of *λαχών* strained. Whichever view be taken, no great harm is done to the general tenor of the passage.—But (2) those who in the second controversy hold, with Stallbaum, Susemihl and Jowett, that *εἰς τοὺς κρίτας ἀποδιδοὺς . . . τὴν κρίσιν* means that the *ἀθλοθέτης μονῳδιῶν* is not to decide between competitors, but to refer the decision *to another body*, stultify the whole description of these elections. The one most important function of all these Presidents is undoubtedly to *judge* at the contests (see e.g. 765 a 3). The term *ἀθλοθέτης* itself proves it. Wagner gets out of the difficulty by rejecting *εἰς τοὺς . . . ὁ λαχὼν τὴν κρίσιν*, and Schanz follows him. Ficinus, Ast, Schneider, Wagner, and Ritter refer the words, as undoubtedly they ought to be referred, to the *δοκιμασία* to be

passed by each of the ten selected candidates, and as such, though somewhat tautological, they are, considering the importance attached to the δοκιμασία, not out of place.—We may infer that οἱ κριταί were the special body of musical experts chosen (by the νομοφύλακες —see above a 7) to conduct the δοκιμασία. We may translate: "that man among the candidates for examination who is appointed (λαχών) by proceedings just like these, for that year, shall be president of solo-performances and concerted pieces; and each man" (of the ten) "drawn by lot must" (as described in connexion with the previous election) "submit to the decision of the jury (of musicians)."—(Ast, followed by Stallb., may be right in thinking ὁ λαχών in c 1 an explanatory comment. If so, it is a correct comment. It is almost "(each of the ten) *when his turn comes.*"

b 7. συναυλία: probably a piece of music in the performance of which the flute alternated with the lyre. See Athenaeus 617 f. and 618 a, and the commentators on Hor. *Odes* iv. 1. 22, and *Epod.* 9. 5. (Some think that the two instruments sounded together.)

c 3. ἐκ τῶν τρίτων τε καὶ ἔτι τῶν δευτέρων τιμημάτων: the *musical* and *literary* critics might apparently belong to any property class, even the highest. (Nowadays these would mostly come from the two middle classes, while the best judges of horseflesh or athletics would belong either to the richest class, or to the poorest.)

c 5. It is hard to see how the καί arose, which A, L and O have after τρισὶν. No printed edition has it, I think. A^2's substitution of τρισὶ for τρισὶν καὶ seems to suggest that καὶ arose from a misreading of ν.

c 6. λαχεῖν is here used, as at b 4 and b 6, in the sense of "to be definitely appointed."

c 8. τῶν δοκιμαζόντων: i.e. a jury of experts—corresponding to the κριτάς of c 1. The word ψῆφος suggests that there might be differences of opinion among the jury, and that a majority carried the day.

d 1. ἀρχῆς λῆξιν καὶ κρίσιν: a hendiadys; almost "appointment to an office by examination." The two processes are closely connected, as in the words λάχῃ δοκιμασθείς at b 4. The καθ' ἡντιναοῦν seems to make the application general to all the kinds of official whose election has been mentioned since 764 d 5. These final words are meant to emphasize the importance of the δοκιμασία.

d 4. περὶ τὰ προειρημένα = τῶν προειρημένων, i.e. μουσικῆς καὶ γυμναστικῆς (764 c 5).

d 7. For the ἤ cp. above on a 2.—The age limit is established

independently by the fact that this official was to be chosen from among the *νομοφύλακες*, who must all be over fifty.

d 8. *θάτερα*: a curious adverbial neuter; "(he must be the father of children) *of one sex or the other*."

e 1. *ὁ προκρίνων*: this does not mean, any more than *τὸν αἱρούμενον* at b 1 meant, that this official is to be appointed *by one man*; the words would apply to anyone who took part in the appointment—either as nominator, voter, or *δοκιμάζων*.—For the *ὡς* with the acc. part. cp. on 643 d 8 and 762 e 5.

e 2. The *παιδονόμος* whom Lycurgus put in charge of the Spartan boys was to be elected *ἐξ ὧνπερ αἱ μέγισται ἀρχαὶ καθίστανται* (Xen. *Rep. Lac.* 2. 2).

e 3. *παντὸς . . . γῆ*, "whatever the creature—whether plant or animal, tame or wild [or man]—if its early growth makes a good start, that is the most important step towards the happy consummation of the excellence of which its nature is capable. Now man we hold to be a tame animal; all the same, while with correct training, and a happy disposition, he will turn into the most divine and gentlest of creatures, if reared carelessly or ill, he is the fiercest creature upon earth."—The comma which Burnet inserts after *ὁρμηθεῖσα* guards against the error into which Ficinus, Serranus, and Jowett have fallen of connecting *πρὸς ἀρετήν* with *ὁρμηθεῖσα* instead of with *κυριωτάτη*. (Cp. below 931 e *πρὸς θεοφιλῆ μοῖραν κυριώτατα*, *Tim.* 84 c *κυριώτατα πρὸς θάνατον*, and *Alc. I.* 120 e *τελέους γίγνεσθαι πρὸς ἀρετήν*.)

e 5. The *τὸν* in Hermann's and Burnet's original text is of course a misprint for *τῶν*.

766 a 1. I cannot help suspecting *καὶ ἀνθρώπων* to be a (very early) commentator's addition. The enumeration is complete without it. In grammatical form it is awkward; the *τε* and *καί* best suit a *pair*, and the absence of *τῶν* with *ἀνθρώπων* increases the awkwardness. (Stobaeus's *τε* after *ἡμέρων* mends matters a little.) The case of the *man* is quite sufficiently introduced and considered in the following clause. Further, as they stand, the words imply that there are tame and wild men, as well as tame and wild beasts, and so anticipate what is given as a piece of fresh information in the following sentences.—Ast well cps. Aristotle, *Pol.* i. 2, 1253 a 31, who doubtless had this passage in mind when writing.

a 4. F. A. Wolf's conjecture that *τῶν* has fallen out after *ἀγριώτατον* is a very likely one.—So too Ast, independently.

a 6 ff. *πρῶτον δὲ . . . ἐπιμελητήν*: this difficult sentence has

suffered from many misapprehensions. To begin with, Ald. altered the MS. *προστάττειν ἐπιμελητήν* into *προστάτην καὶ ἐπιμελητήν*, a mistake which even Ritter has perpetuated; Hermann, to simplify the construction, rejected the important *αἱρεθῆναι*, taking *τὸν μέλλοντα αὐ. ἐπιμελήσεσθαι* to be the *νομοθέτης*; Stallb. and Schanz follow him; Schneider and Wagner translate *ἄρξασθαι αἱρεθῆναι* by "auctorem fieri ut eligatur," "veranlassen dass . . . gewählt werde," also understanding, as do Stallb. and Apelt, *τὸν μέλλοντα κτλ.* to be the *νομοθέτης* instead of *the director of Education*; these latter interpreters also make an awkward break in the sense after *ᾗ*, and separate *τοῦτον*, the manifest antecedent of *ὃς ἄν*, from its relative; further, Ritter unaccountably makes *τῶν ἐν τῇ πόλει* depend on *πρῶτον* instead of on *ἄριστος*. But it is Ritter who has shown us the right way out of the difficulty; and that is to take *χρεών* as an "accusativus absolutus," as at Thuc. iii. 40. 4: "but inasmuch as the *right choice* of the man who is to have charge of them (*παίδων*) is bound to come first and foremost, (he must) do his utmost to appoint and make their Director that man who out of all in the state is in every respect the best man."—Both *αὐτῶν* in a 7 and *αὐτοῖς* in b 1 refer to the children.—With *τῶν ἐν . . . ᾗ* cp. below 878 a 2 *γένος ὅτπερ ἂν ᾗ τῶν ἐν τῇ πόλει εὐδοκιμώτατον πρὸς ἀρετήν*.—With *προστάττειν* we must supply *δεῖ* from a 5. (Jowett slurs over the difficulty by putting for *ἄρξασθαι χρεὼν . . . αἱρεθῆναι*, "he should begin by taking care that he is elected who etc."; otherwise he follows Schneider and Wagner.—I do not think that anything is gained by Apelt's ingenious substitution of *εὔξασθαι* for *ἄρξασθαι*, though it makes that part of the sentence easier from his point of view.

b 2. *πλὴν βουλῆς κ. π.*: the inclusion of the 360 *βουλευταί* would have made the electing body unwieldy.—*τὸ τοῦ Ἀπόλλωνος ἱερόν*: a place peculiarly suitable for deciding a matter connected with *μουσική*.

b 3. It is interesting to note that though all other interpreters and editors before Bekker took *τῶν νομοφυλάκων* to be governed by *κρύβδην*, the Louvain editor (Rutger Ressen), while keeping the comma after *νομοφυλάκων*, shows, by putting a comma also before it, that he sees the right way to take the words.—*φερόντων ψῆφον . . . ὅντιν' ἂν ἕκ. ἡγ.*: if *ψῆφον* had been omitted, the antecedent to be supplied in thought with *ὅντινα* would have been *τοῦτον* (cp. above on 753 d 1); as it is we must supply *τούτῳ*.

b 5. The addition of *γενομένων* to *τῶν* (neut.) *περὶ παιδείαν* is strange, and Hug would reject it; but it would be stranger if

any commentator or scribe put it in when it was not there to begin with. The reason for its insertion was probably rhythmical. Plato would hardly end a sentence with five consecutive long syllables.

b 7. *πλὴν νομοφυλάκων*: we are left to conjecture the reason for this exclusion. Could such great and wise men be suspected of jealousy? [F.H.D. says "yes"—"by others than the electing body."]

c 2. *πρὶν . . . ἡμερῶν*: in other words, "while there is more than a month of his time left to run."

c 5. From Steph. onwards all edd. have *μέλον*, which was the reading of A and O. This was thoughtlessly corrected in A and O to *μέλλον*, probably the mistaken reading of some other MS.

c 6. *οἱ προσήκοντες*: i.e. of the *ὀρφανοί*, not of the *ἐπίτροπος*.—*καὶ ἐπιδημοῦντες*: i.e. only those who lived within reach of the home circle.

c 7. *μέχρι ἀνεψιῶν παίδων*: this definition of relations who are to count legally occurs below at 877 d 1 and 878 d 7; at Dem. *C. Macart.* p. 1067 we have *μέχρι ἀνεψιάδων* [*παίδων*]. The same grade of relationship is expressed at 925 a 6 by *μέχρι πάππου παίδων* (*υἱδῶν*): the grandchildren of the children of one's grandfather are one's own first cousins one remove.—The only connexion between these two injunctions is that both are cases of *substitution*. A final revision would hardly have left them as they stand.

d 3 ff. Before describing the appointment of this next kind of officials, i.e. the *judges*, Plato introduces a short preface in which the two main points are: (1) the judges must be men of superior intellect, and (2) the machinery for giving legal decisions must be such as will favour (*a*) clear presentment of cases, and (*b*) due deliberation.

d 4. For *κατὰ τρόπον* see above on 635 d 7.—*ἄφωνος*: below at 876 b he talks of *δικαστήρια φαῦλα καὶ ἄφωνα*, which give their decisions by ballot. A true judge, Plato implies, ought to be able to throw light on the principles of justice which underlie the statutes, and not content himself with a safe legal yes or no, like a mere arbitrator.

d 5. *μὴ πλείω τῶν ἀντιδίκων ἐν ταῖς ἀνακρίσεσι*: the preliminary procedure for legitimizing the position of the two parties to the trial was naturally mostly formal.

d 7. *οὔτε πολλοὺς ὄντας*: there are two reasons for this: (1) a large bench of judges could not all give reasoned judgements;

it must be a question of voting yes or no; and (2) the number of superior intellects is necessarily small. The tribunal must be both small and good.

e 1. *παρ' ἑκατέρων* goes closely with *τὸ ἀμφισβητούμενον*; "what the contention of each side is."

e 2. *καὶ τὸ βραδὺ τό τε πολλάκις ἀνακρίνειν*: in effect explanatory of what is meant by *ὁ χρόνος*; "tempus autem et mora, frequensque inquisitio ad aperiendam controversiam conferunt" (Fic.).

767 a 7. *οὐκ ἄρχων . . . γίγνεται*, "while not a ruling official has yet a very high authority." The *καί* emphasizes.

a 9. *κρίνων . . . ἀποτελῇ*, "finally decides." Cp. on 720 e 1.

b 1. *ἂν εἶεν πρέποντες* stands for *πρέποιεν ἄν* in the sense of "would be the right ones," i.e. "ought to be appointed."

b 2. *τίνων* and *ἕκαστον* are both neuter, and so too *τῶν λοιπῶν* b 4. — *κυριώτατον*: with this word obscurity begins. At first sight the words seem to be reintroducing us to the three tribunals mentioned at 766 e 3 ff.: (1) that of neighbours and friends; (2) the first court of appeal; and (3) the final court of appeal. But, if *κυριώτατον* means, as Ficinus thinks, "augustissimum" (Schneider's "summa dignitate praeditum"), the epithet can hardly apply to a court composed of arbitrators informally appointed by the litigants themselves. (Below, at 915 c 6 the "neighbours'" court, and the *αἱρετοὶ δίκασται* are spoken of as two distinct courts.) Ritter thinks *κυριώτατον* means "*most competent*" ("*befugtest*"). Even so, it would seem to exclude the notion of an *appeal* from it. Susemihl thought it a mistake for *τὸ πρῶτον*—and it may perhaps be worth considering whether *πρῶτον* at c 2 and *κυριώτατον* here may not, by some accident, have changed places. Some difficulties, but not all, would disappear if this transposition were made. I think Plato means that *if both sides agree* to the court, the decision is to be final.—As we proceed, we find, instead of the two appeal courts, two courts for the trial of different kinds of suits: (1) b 5, those suits in which one private citizen has a grievance against another: (2) b 7, those in which the alleged offence is one committed against the state.—Still more puzzling is the question, what relation does the next court mentioned—that introduced at c 2—bear to any or all of those just described? The words *τὸ τρίτον ἀμφισβητοῦσιν* seem to mark it as the third court (of appeal) mentioned above at a 2 f., and the words *ἰδιώταις πρὸς ἀλλήλους* exclude the supposition that it is the court which is cognisant of offences against the state—that mentioned at b 7. If, however,

at c 1, we follow Burnet—alone among editors—in adopting the uncorrected reading of the MSS., and read λεκτέον ὁποῖοι, putting, with him, only a comma after βοηθεῖν, we are driven to identify the *Treason Court* with the *Court of final Appeal*; for we must translate: "but as for that (court) when someone thinks the state wronged by a citizen, we must say of what kind and who the judges (in that court) are"; and then follows the method of election of the judges of the *Appeal Court*. I think, as to this, that we cannot avoid taking O²'s correction, and reading λεκτέον δ', with a full stop after βοηθεῖν. It might be thought that the two-fold division mentioned at b 4 (δύο δὴ κτλ.) is to extend to *both* appeal courts; that, perhaps, i.e. there were to be *parallel* courts—(1) second and third appeal courts for "Common Pleas," and (2) second and third for state trials; but such a supposition does not agree with what we read at e 9 ff.—Plato, by calling this account of the courts a περιγραφή at 768 c 5, shows that he is conscious of the "sketchy" nature of this description. See below on 768 b 4.

c 2. πρῶτον (if correct, and it most likely is) is adverbial, "first of all" (we must set up the third Appeal Court).

c 4. πάσας τὰς ἀρχάς, as shown when the subject to συνελθεῖν is resumed at c 8, is used in the sense of πάντας τοὺς ἄρχοντας.

c 6 f. ἐπειδὰν . . . πρόσθεν, "on the day before that on which the New Year is about to begin with the (new) moon that follows the summer solstice."

d 1. All MSS. seem to have had ὀνομόσαντας—a thoughtless mistake due to the dittography of the last syllable of θεόν.—ἀπάρξασθαι is used as a transitive verb governing ἕνα δικαστήν, in the sense of "offer as first-fruits" or perhaps "as a ceremonial dedication"—and so "*consecrate*."—πάσης ἀρχῆς ἕνα, "one from each body of magistrates." The gen. is governed by the ἀπό in the verb; ἀρχή, as in the following line, is used as a collective noun.

d 2. ἄν . . . διακρίνειν is "to be likely to decide." Cp. 769 b 1 οὐκ ἄν ποτε δοκεῖ παύσασθαι κοσμοῦσα.—Wagner's suggestion that we should read διακρινεῖν—like Heindorf's at *Euth.* 287 d to read ἀποκρινεῖ for ἀποκρίνῃ—gratuitously adds one to the small list of doubtful cases of ἄν with the fut. Out of the list given by Adam on *Rep.* 492 c, and Goodwin, *M. and T.* 197, those at *Crito* 53 d, *Crat.* 391 d, and *Phaedr.* 227 b have only partial MS. support, while that at *Euth.* 287 d has no MS. support at all. The only instance left by Burnet in his text is *Rep.* 615 d οὐδ' ἂν ἥξει δεῦρο.

d 3. *αὐτῷ*: a possessive dat., used as a variety for *αὐτοῦ*.

d 5. *αὐτοῖς* is probably the right reading, though the Cod. Voss. *αὐτοῦ* points to a quite possible variant *αὐτούς* (**ATTOTCAN** being read **ATTOTEAN**).

d 7. *τοῖς τἆλλα δικαστήρια φυγοῦσι*: possibly *φεύγειν* was a technical term used of those who "had recourse to" a higher court; the notion being that the highest court was a place of *refuge*. Cp. Eur. *Hipp.* 1076 *εἰς τοὺς ἀφώνους μάρτυρας φεύγεις;*

e 2. *τοὺς ἑλομένους αὐτούς*: as Ritter points out, this would not be true of all *individuals*, only of the different magisterial bodies, each as a class. By that time many of the individuals who served in the previous year would have been replaced.

e 3. *ἐὰν δέ τις κτλ.*: this enactment may well apply, as Ritter thinks (p. 168), to *all* courts.

e 5. *ὑπεχέτω*, "let him be under an obligation."

e 6. *τὸ ἥμισυ*: so the MSS.; Ritter, comparing 846 b 3—*τῶν διπλασίων ὑπόδικος ἔστω τῷ βλαφθέντι*—thinks this a mistake for *τὸ διπλάσιον*; although it is only a minimum penalty, it may be all the injured man will get; for acc. to e 8 f. anything beyond this is to be paid to the state and *τῷ τὴν δίκην δικασαμένῳ*, and he might be an informer. Wherever *ἥμισυ* comes from it is clearly a mistake. [F.H.D. suggests that the mistake arises from a misreading of a *numerical* expression.]

e 8. All editors but Wagner have adopted the Ald. *τούτῳ* for the MS. *τούτων*; *πρὸς τούτων* would involve a feeble tautology —"the judges are to decide what penalty they are to suffer at *their*" (i.e. "the judges'") "hand."

e 9. *περὶ δὲ τῶν δημοσίων ἐγκλημάτων*: here we go back to the court first referred to at b 7, for the trial of offences against the state. In this the public is to take an important part. Whereas, in the tribal courts for trying suits between private citizens, the public is only represented by a section of itself, elected by lot, in state trials the jury, as we should call it, is to be the whole *δῆμος*—the Public Assembly of all the citizens.

768 a 1–5. Burnet has made the connexion of ideas clearer by marking off *οἱ γὰρ . . . διακρίσεων* as a parenthesis. This parenthesis gives the reason for the arrangement outlined in the main sentence, which is as follows: "(It is necessary) in the first place to admit the public to a share in the trial (of state offences) . . . but, while the inception, and the final decision of such a suit must lie with the whole body of citizens, still the investigation must be conducted by such three of the highest order of

magistrates as the defendant and plaintiff shall agree on." To the μέν in a 1 corresponds the ἀλλ' in a 4, which is "resumed" by the δέ in a 5; ἀρχήν τε . . . ἀποδιδομένην is a *concessive* clause.

a 3. ἐν δίκῃ, "justly" ("and they would justly resent being excluded from all share in such decisions").

a 5. ἐν is technically used of the *court before which* a case is tried.—Apparently then the Public Assembly had to give leave to prosecute, and to acquit or condemn (and assess the penalty), on a report from a competent legal tribunal who had investigated the case. It is to be noticed that this leaves no room for the influence of *rhetoric* on the susceptible public.

a 8. L, and several other MSS., for αὐτοί—which is clearly right—read αὐτοῖς; this reading occurs as a marginal variant in O, and was printed in the four first edd. Ficinus would seem to have read αὐτήν, as he translates "consilium *ipsum* electionem utriusque cognoscat et judicet." (Possibly a scribe in whose ears αὐτοί and αὐτῇ sounded alike, wrote the latter by mistake; this then became αὐτήν in one MS. and αὐτῆς in another, this last changing back to αὐτοῖς by the converse of the original error. There is no trace of a reading αὐτώ.)—ἐπικρίνειν αὐτῶν τὴν αἵρεσιν ἑκατέρου: αὐτῶν probably depends on ἑκατέρου—"the choice of each of them," not "the choice of them (i.e. judges) made by each." Most likely each litigant chose one judge; the difficulty would be to agree on the third. If each persisted in his own choice for the third judge, the βουλή would have to select one of the two. It would therefore be manifestly unwise for either of the litigants to choose a decided partisan.—By βουλή we ought perhaps to understand the πρυτάνεις, who were a standing committee of the βουλή.—The ἐπι- in ἐπικρίνειν seems to mark the action of a superior authority.

b 2. ὁ γὰρ ἀκοινώνητος . . . εἶναι, "no man can feel himself a true citizen, who does not share the right of pronouncing judgement on his fellows." This little piece of political wisdom helps to form a true conception of the state, and citizenship. It may rank with another enlightening little sentence at 740 a 2–4, which reminds us that the land which belongs to a citizen also belongs to the state.

b 4. The καί marks the φυλετικὰ δικαστήρια as a fresh tribunal, and yet at b 7 below they seem to belong to the class of courts of first appeal mentioned above at 767 a 2 (ἄλλο δικαστήριον). Stallbaum is inclined to regard them as alternatives

to the court of neighbours and friends; but in that case there would be only *one* appeal court, and it is clearly laid down at 767 a 3 that there are to be two. See also 915 c 5 f. which distinctly speaks of the neighbours' courts as distinct from and inferior to the *φυλετικαὶ δίκαι*. The truth seems to be that in this *περιγραφή* (c 5) Plato did not attempt to give us a complete plan of courts as they might be arranged in detail, but only to enumerate certain leading principles of such an arrangement; e.g. (1) that there must be separate courts for state and private trials; (2) that there must be a second and a final court of appeal; (3) that this final court must be carefully constituted.

b 5. *ἐκ τοῦ παραχρῆμα*: these words mark the contrast between the elaborate constitution of the final appeal court and the haphazard choice, for the tribal courts, of the first citizens at hand, as occasion demanded. Probably it was not contemplated that the whole tribe should be assembled for their election.—It seems to be hinted by the coupling together of the three points of (1) election by lot, (2) election as occasion demanded—i.e. when there was a cause to try—and (3) the inaccessibility to motives of personal sympathy, that somehow (3) was more likely to be found in conjunction with (1) and (2).—Perhaps these tribal courts were conceived as *country* courts, and the second Appeal Court in the city would sit more regularly, and be of a more elaborate constitution. — Both *κλήρῳ* and *ἐκ τοῦ παραχρῆμα* logically qualify some such word as "be appointed"; this idea is *implied* in *δικάζειν*.

b 7. *ὅ φαμεν . . . παρεσκευάσθαι*, "which we assert to have been endowed with as complete an impartiality as the wit of man could devise."

b 8. No editors put a comma after *παρεσκευάσθαι*; i.e. they all take *τοῖς μὴ δυναμένοις* with it, and not with *κρίνειν*. I prefer, though not very confidently, to take the dat. with *κρίνειν*, and would therefore insert a comma before *τοῖς*.—Ficinus for *φαμεν παρεσκευάσθαι* has "esse debere diximus," as if he had read *παρασκευαστέον*.—*τοῖς* is *masc.*; Fic. takes it to be neut. ("ad eas lites dirimendas").

c 1. The *φυλετικὰ δικαστήρια* are mentioned below at 915 c 5.

c 2. At 915 c 5 *ἀπαλλάττεσθαι*, when used in exactly the same connexion as here, is expanded by the addition of *πρὸς ἀλλήλους* and *τῶν ἐγκλημάτων*; Ast is therefore probably right (*Lex.* s.v.) in giving to the word in these two passages, not its ordinary sense of "get rid of," "finish with," but the meaning

which is more commonly found for διαλλάττεσθαι, and καταλλάττεσθαι, of "to be reconciled, compound their differences."

c 6. εἴρηκεν: this προσωποποιία is like that which Plato often uses in the case of ὁ λόγος; it is still more marked in the ταύταις . . . εἰρήσθω two lines below.—τὰ δ' ἀπολείπει: it is possible that τά is nom. here, but most likely ἀπολείπει is used, as at *Rep.* 603 d 9 (ὃ τότε ἀπελίπομεν) in the unusual sense of *omit*.—This use of a qualifying σχεδόν is a mannerism with Plato in his later works.—Again L has the best reading, A and O giving ἀπολείποι (probably meant as an opt. of wish: "some points, however, it had perhaps better leave out").

c 7. νόμων θέσις is equivalent to a compound noun, and, as such, it and not merely θέσις is coupled with διαίρεσις as the subject of the verb γίγνοιτο. It means *regulation*, and Plato would no doubt have used νομοθεσία for it, if he had not used that word just before. The two subjects which are best reserved for a final chapter are (1) the detailed regulation of legal and judicial procedure, and (2) the elaborate distinction between the different kinds of suits—and consequently of courts to try them in. The ἅμα marks that the ἀκριβής goes with both νόμων θέσις and διαίρεσις. (All previous interpreters have adopted the view that both θέσις and διαίρεσις are to be construed with δικῶν νόμων: "judicialium legum exacta positio atque partitio" Fic. Stephanus proposed to read δικανικῶν for δικῶν. Bekker would reject νόμων [and so F.H.D.], which is left out in one MS. (Vat. 1029), and Orelli would read νομικῶν for it.)

c 8. ταύταις κτλ., "let these subjects be told to wait till we have reached the end"—lit. "to wait for us at the end."

d 2. τὴν πλείστην . . . νομοθεσίαν: the contrast with subjects said to be *half* treated shows that this means "have received their full regulation," not "have occupied the most of our legislative attention" (Wagner and so Jowett). For the use of πλείστη for *complete* cf. *Rep.* 564 a δουλεία πλείστη, *Soph.* 249 e ἐν ἀγνοίᾳ τῇ πλείστῃ.

d 3. τὸ δὲ ὅλον . . . σαφές: like Schanz, I would certainly print Ast's διοίκησιν for the MS. διοικήσεων. "But a complete and exact description of every single department of the state and of civic administration in general, is impossible"—(with διοικήσεων: "about every single point in the arrangements of the state and of the whole civic administration"). Objections to the MS. reading are (1) the two words διοικήσεις and πολιτική would both mean the same thing, i.e. *management, control*; (2) the

use of πολιτική as an adj. is more in accordance with Platonic usage than its use as a subst., and when Plato does use it as a subst., it is generally—as e.g. at 650 b 9—in the sense of the *science or art of government* (Wagner tries, in vain, I think, to fit that sense in here); (3) the dependence of τῶν διοικήσεων on the neut. ἑνός τε καὶ πάντων, or on τὸ ὅλον τε καὶ ἀκρι(βές), though not impossible, is awkward.

d 5. For this use of διέξοδος in the sense of *enumeration, account*, cp. above 718 b 2. A sketch of the whole, he says, must precede the details of the parts, because in the explanation of these details a reference to other departments is often necessary. Cp. below 812 a 8.

d 7. Here he goes on to say that we have now reached the right (ἱκανή) point in our sketch where the subject of the appointment of magistrates may end for the present, and the account of laws proper begin. Ficinus and Schneider take γενομένης as a gen. abs. with τῆς διεξόδου understood—the latter translating it by "quoniam progressa est." Wagner takes γεν. with αἱρέσεως—"bis zur erfolgenden Wahl der Obrigkeiten." The former is clearly the right view. "You see (νῦν μήν), at this point, now that the general outline has been completed as far as the election of magistrates, this would be a fit conclusion for the preliminary part of our subject."

e 2. καί connects ἱκανή—which is supposed to be carried on to ἀρχή—with ἀν. καὶ ὅκν. οὐ. ἔτι δεομένη; the failure to see this led the first three printed edd. to substitute ἐστὶ for the MS. ἔτι. Though Bas. 2 corrected this error, it reappeared in Steph.

e 7. φιλίως: what specially pleases the Athenian's hearers is that he has enabled them to see the subject as a whole in its two main divisions of (1) Political Machinery, and (2) Legal Enactment.

769 a 1. Above at 685 a 7 the Ath. says περὶ νόμων παίζοντας παιδιὰν πρεσβυτικὴν σώφρονα, and at 712 b 1 πειρώμεθα . . ., καθάπερ παῖδες πρεσβῦται, πλάττειν τῷ λόγῳ τοὺς νόμους. There is the same contradiction of terms in Parmenides's πραγματειώδη παιδιὰν παίζειν (*Parm.* 137 b) as in the ἔμφρων παιδιὰ . . . διαπεπαισμένη here: παιδιά involves the notion of a *pastime*, and of *make-believe*; but there is a *method* and a *meaning* in this παιδιά, as is shown by the words πραγματειώδης and ἔμφρων.

a 3. This contrast is still further brought out by Cleinias's answer. The connexion between the two remarks is better seen when we notice that the first begins with καλῶς and the second with καλήν. "A fine game," the Ath. says: "A fine piece of

work," Cleinias answers. Notice also the contrast between *πρεσβυτῶν* and *ἀνδρῶν*.—*δηλοῦν* is "set forth," "display." The "work" is the actual constitution of Cleinias's new state.

a 7 ff. *οἶσθ' ὅτι κτλ.*, "just as the artist's brush, you know, seems never to get to the end of its work upon the several figures in his picture, but looks as if it were going on everlastingly heightening colour or 'relieving' it, or whatever the initiated call the process,—never reaching the point at which it admits of no further increase of beauty or vividness." (*τὰ γεγραμμένα* comes in better earlier in the English sentence.) Ast wished to eject *καθάπερ*, but it is better to suppose a conversational inconsequence —"just as the artist's brush, you know," standing for "you know how the artist's brush"; the *καθάπερ* enables us to put in the "how," and marks the *simile*.

a 8. *ζῷων*: though *ζῷον* is used for "picture" below at c 1 and 5, I think Ast and Stallb. are wrong in translating *ζῷων* by "*pictures*" here; it is "figures."

a 9. *ἀποχραίνειν*: at Arist. *De color.* 796 a 24, where, however, there is a variant *ἀποχρώζεται*, this verb is taken to mean "to change the colour of." If, however, it means here to *change*, or to *tone down*, or simply to *remove* colour, as some have thought, the expression is too straightforward to be *technical*; and that is what the subsequent words proclaim it to have been. At *Rep.* 586 c 1 spurious pleasures are said to look like real pleasures because they are "thrown into relief" (*ἀποχραινομένας*) by adjacent pains. The sense of "throw up," "relieve" (by adjacent contrast) also exactly suits our present passage. Therefore I think Ast and Stallb. right (but see Adam, on the *Republic* passage) in taking the use in the two Platonic passages to be the same. (A.M.A. holds that *ἀποχραίνειν* describes *removal of colour*, the *relief* being obtained by contrast, which normally consists of removal or darkening of adjacent colour. The explanation of *ἀποχραίνειν* in Tim. *Lex.* —*τὸ τὰ χρωσθέντα ἑνοποιεῖν*—does not help us much, unless it be thought that "*combination*" of colours is akin to the bringing out the force of one colour by the juxtaposition of a contrasted one.)—*τοῦ χρ. ἢ ἀποχρ.* and *κοσμοῦσα* both depend, in different ways, upon *παύσασθαι*.

b 1. For *οἱ ζωγράφων παῖδες* cp. above on 720 b 5.—*ἂν παύσασθαι* is just like *ἂν διακρίνειν* at 767 d 2.

b 2. *ὥστε*: the words *οὐκ ἂν ποτε . . . παύσασθαι* contain the idea "will never reach a particular final point," and on this idea depends "such as to admit of no further improvement."

b 5. ἐπεί, "alioqui," Ast; cp. on 669 b 6. A clear case of ἐπεί "*although*." All interpreters but Ast and Jowett seem to have taken ἀκούων as governing ταῦτα, as if Cl. said "listening to your words teaches me," and translate ἐπεί by *since*, or *for*, as if it introduced a reason why it was *only* by such listening that he could learn. This is far-fetched. What Cl. says is: "*I* know pretty well from hearsay what you mean, though I am no expert in the painter's craft."—The καὶ αὐτός is best translated by emphasizing the first *I*.

b 6 ff. "That doesn't matter; we can easily use the above-mentioned fact about it as an illustration."

b 7. ὡς is epexegetic of τὸ τοιόνδε—"nempe, scilicet" (Ast).—"Let us put it to the following use—such as to ask . . ."

c 1. ζῷον: a survival of the Gk. use of ζῷον—"living creature"—for "*picture*" may perhaps be seen in the Art term "still life."

c 1–8. From Ast downwards, all edd. have adopted Van Heusde's correction of the MS. τέως to τε ὡς; but there remain two violent breaks in the construction—quite (*pace* O. Apelt p. 4) beyond the range, I think, of Platonic *anacolutha*. The second is the jump from τοῦ ἐπανορθοῦν τε in c 4 to οἷός τε ἔσται in c 6. This is entirely obviated by supposing, with Herm., that Plato wrote not τοῦ but ὃς before ἐπανορθοῦν. Schanz alone ventures to follow Herm. in his text. The τε and the καί link the two clauses together in a way which is impossible if the text stands as the MSS. have it.—The earlier break is in c 1–3 καὶ τοῦτ' . . . χρόνου, and should be remedied, I think, by inserting <ἰέναι> after ἀεὶ—for which some early copies seem to have had δὴ. If this δὴ was a true variant, and not a corrector's guess, it points to some confusion in the text at this point; and it does not seem impossible that ἰέναι—which exactly represents Ficinus's *progrediatur*—should have been accidentally omitted. Without some such addition I think it is impossible to arrive at any of the renderings which have been given for the passage. The τό before φαυλότερον in O^2 I take to be a guess, made to bring it into line with τὸ βέλτιον, by a corrector who did not see that the τό does not go with βέλτιον but with ἴσχειν (intr.). Whether we insert the τό or not, we cannot construe the sentence satisfactorily if we take ἴσχειν as transitive; nor has ἴσχειν, however we take it, any satisfactory predicate in the received reading. Ficinus's rendering is: "quod non ad peius sed ad melius futuro tempore progrediatur." (A.M.A. suggests taking τοῦτ' to be the subject to ἴσχειν in the sense of γίγνεσθαι—cp. βελτίων γίγνηται at e 1.)

c 3. *συννοεῖς*, "nonne vides?" Fic. All edd. except Ast print the whole sentence as a question.

c 5. (*ἐάν τι σφάλληται . . .*) *ὑπὸ χρόνων*: cp. *Tim.* 22 d *διὰ μακρῶν χρόνων γιγνομένη τῶν ἐπὶ γῆς πυρὶ πολλῷ φθορά*. The pl. *χρόνοι* seems to have been a mannerism of Plato's later style; cp. *Laws* 850 b 5, 798 b 1, 872 e 6, 680 a 4, 738 d 5, (*Phil.* 36 b 6).

c 6. *πρὸς τὴν τέχνην* goes, not with *παραλειφθέν*, as Schneider —"praetermissum ad artem,"—but with *ἀσθενείας*—"wegen seiner eigenen Schwäche in der Kunst" (Wagner). Cp. *Laws* 757 c 3 *μείζονι πρὸς ἀρετήν*, *Prot.* 318 c 4 *πρὸς γραφικὴν (βελτίω ἔσεσθαι . . . καὶ ἐπιδώσειν)*, *Phaedr.* 263 d 5 *τεχνικωτέρας πρὸς λόγους*, *Alc. I.* 120 e 4 *πλείους . . . πρὸς ἀρετήν*.

c 8. All edd. but Herm. follow Steph. in emending the MS. *παραμένει* to *παραμενεῖ*.

d 1–e 1. "Well, don't you think the lawgiver will want to do likewise:—first to frame laws as nearly perfect as may be, and then, as time goes on, and he finds how his plans work in practice, is there, think you, a lawgiver in creation so foolish as to be blind to the fact that there must be numberless details left in a condition which will need the attention of a correcting hand, if the administrative system of the state he has founded is to go on getting more perfect instead of less?"

d 6. If *παραλείπεσθαι* is right, it ought not to be translated as if it were a simple *λείπεσθαι*—"be left behind him"—as do Fic., Schn., and Wagn. It must be "that there are many omissions, or deficiencies" (for successors to correct). I think it possible, though, that the simple *λείπεσθαι* is what Plato wrote. It is like him to vary the expression of a corresponding passage; and like a commentator to make the two passages uniform. As it is, the MS. text is somewhat redundant. [F.H.D. thinks Plato meant *παραλείπεσθαι*.]—We may imagine Plato applying this analogy to a philosopher, and the doctrines which he leaves to his school.—*συνεπόμενον* does not, I think, denote *following* the lawgiver, but *attending to* the laws—the same notion as is contained in the *φυλάττειν (καὶ ἐπανορθοῦν)* at e 7.

e 1. *περί c. acc.* is equal to a possessive genitive. Cp. on 685 c 2.

e 3. For *πῶς γὰρ οὔ;* inserted in the middle of a sentence Heindorf on *Gorg.* 487 b cps. Soph. *Electra* 1307 *ἀλλ' οἶσθα μὲν τἀνθένδε, πῶς γὰρ οὔ; κλύων*. Steph. was the first to suggest the correct punctuation of this passage.—*πάντα ὁντινοῦν*: I have not been able to find another instance of *πᾶς ὁστισ(οῦν)* declined as if it were *πᾶς τις*.

e 5 ff. Burnet is clearly right in taking ἔργῳ καὶ λόγοις with διδάξειεν ἄν rather than with μηχανὴν ἔχοι, though he has only Ficinus among previous interpreters on his side.—τίνα τρόπον διδ. ἄν is a dependent interrogative explaining what τοῦτο is; the διδάξειεν ἄν after τίνα τρόπον is just like the γίγνοιτ' ἄν after ὅπως at 770 d 1. As A, acc. to Schanz, has τινὰ the scribe evidently took διδ. to be the apodosis to εἰ ἔχοι.—εἴτε μείζονα εἴτε ἐλάττω: some make this agree with ἕτερον (Fic.), some with ἔννοιαν (Schneider, Wagner); Jowett takes it with τρόπον. The alternatives already mentioned admit of six different translations of the passage; and there is further the doubt which has been felt whether πρὶν ἐπὶ τέλος ἐλθεῖν means (1) "until he has finished his explanation," or (2) "until he succeeds in his object," or (3) Stallb. thinks it may mean "while life lasts." (2) is right, I think.—As to the reading in e 5, Ald. was no doubt right in correcting the MS. τοῦτον to τοῦτο. Possibly the scribes understood τοῦτον to be τὸν νομοθέτην, but more likely the final ν was accidental. (I think Fic. read τινὰ, and either read or put in a καί after νόμους; but his translation is not literal enough to indicate his reading clearly.) We may translate: "Well, supposing a man discovers a way to teach another, however imperfectly, by precept or example, the right method of conserving or improving laws, he will persevere, won't he, in his explanation of his method, until he succeeds?"

770 a 6. ἐν δυσμαῖς τοῦ βίου: the reading at Arist. *Poet.* 1457 b 24, which attributes this phrase to Empedocles, rests on inferior MS. authority; but it looks like a sensible correction of Aristotle's text, and may even have had the support of some independent tradition unknown to us.

a 8. καὶ τούτους, "them too" (as well as ourselves).—αὐτούς, "at the same time," goes with the following words. (Schneider's "hos quoque ipsos" is pointless.)

b 1. Cl. "Certainly; if we *can*."

b 5. ἡμεῖς πάμπολλα παραλείψομεν, "we lawgivers shall leave innumerable deficiencies in each of the subjects about which we legislate"; i.e. "in every division of our legislation."—For the omission of περί with ὧν cp. above 659 a 7 ἐκ ταὐτοῦ στόματος οὕπερ τοὺς θεοὺς ἐπεκαλέσατο, 714 d 2 πρὸς ἄλλο τι . . . ἢ τὸ σύμφερον.

b 6 ff. οὐ μὴν ἀλλ' . . . περιηγηθέν, "at the same time we shall do our best to provide what I may call a sketch of the important details, and the general outline. This sketch it will be for you to turn into the finished picture."

c 2. *αὐτά*, "what it is"—the guiding principle, i.e., indicated by the words *ὅποι βλέποντες*. It is the same as *ταῦτα εἰς ἅπερ κτλ.* at c 5.—The following passage is a reminiscence of 630 e 2 and 631 d, which is again recalled below at 963 a 3.

c 7–e 6. "Our unanimous decision amounted briefly to this: in whatsoever way our citizen's nature, be it of man or woman, young or old, was likely to achieve a full measure of the excellence of soul of which it is capable, as the result of some occupation, some habit, some kind of possession or desire, or opinion, or of some mental discipline, towards this same object every nerve shall be strained as long as life lasts; nobody in any station must show a preference for any kind of thing that thwarts these means (of achieving perfection); he must sacrifice even the state, if it appears necessary that it should be overturned, sooner than see it bow to a servile yoke at the bidding of its meaner citizens, or else he must give up the state and become an exile. Any such fate must be suffered by men sooner than they should accept a régime productive of their deterioration."

d 1. *ἀνὴρ ἀγαθός* is predicate, the subject being *φύσις* in d 4. —For *γίγνοιτ' ἄν* cp. on 769 e 6.

d 3. For *ποιᾶς κτήσεως* Apelt (1901 Prag) would read *ποτ' ἀσκήσεως*; after *ἐπιτηδεύματος*, however, *ἀσκήσεως* is *de trop.* [F.H.D. "probably right; see 896 d."]—The (*ἐκ*) *μαθημάτων ποτέ τινων* is a foreshadowing of the *ἀκριβεστέρα παιδεία* of 965 b 1.

d 5. This *ὅπως* is the indirect form of *ὡς*, and introduces the gist of the above-mentioned *συγχώρησις*.

d 6. Stephanus's restoration of *τεταμένη* for the MS. *τεταγμένη* is confirmed by Ficinus's "omni studio tendat."

d 7. *τούτοις* is not (as Ficinus) "this object," but these *ἐπιτηδεύματα, ἤθη κτλ.*

e 1. *μηδ' ὁστισοῦν*: i.e. whether he be an official or a private citizen. (Stallb. prefers *μηδ' ὁτιοῦν*, which occurs in a MS. of no authority.)—*τελευτῶν*: so MSS. Here we approach the central knot in this bundle of entanglement. I see no way of untying it. It has been cut in different ways. From Stallb. I would adopt the change of the MS. *ὑπομείνασα* to *ὑπομείνασαν*, and I would put a comma after *γίγνεσθαι*, and read *τελευτᾶν* for *τελευτῶν*, taking it with *πόλεως* in the sense of "part with the state," "sacrifice the state" (on the analogy of *βίου, λόγου τελευτᾶν*). It seems to me that we want two alternatives of which *ἢ λείπειν* is the second, the infinitives being governed by an imaginary "but must choose" implied, by contrast, in *μηδὲν προτιμῶν*. If we

have no such infinitive in the place of τελευτῶν we are driven (with Fic.) to take ἐθέλειν κτλ. as the alternative to λείπειν—i.e. (do something) "sooner than either sit down under the rule of mean men, or go into exile"; and it is not clear what the "something" is: Ficinus takes it to be "die for his country." But even if he could get this out of τελευτῶν δὲ καὶ πόλεως, and could fit in ἐὰν . . . γίγνεσθαι, the words πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα in e 4 imply that more sacrifices (than that of life alone) have been mentioned. His translation is: "Pro patria praeterea, si necesse sit, mori paratus sit antequam velit aut eversam videre civitatem iugoque servitutis subiectam a peioribus gubernari, aut fuga ipsam deserere."—Of the alternatives as I read them, the latter (exile) would only be adopted when the "right minded" were too few to make a fight; the former danger (extinction of the state) would result when neither side was strong enough to gain the upper hand, and they destroyed each other. (Ast would read καὶ πόλεως ἀνάστατος, ἐὰν ἀν. φ., γίγν., and ὑπομείνας; his two alternatives then are (1) banishment, (2) flight.—Stallb. keeps ἀνάστατον, makes πόλεως depend on it, reads ὑπομείνασαν, and, like many editors, puts only a comma after πόλιν. Wagner would read τὸ πόλεως for πόλεως; he supplies, I imagine, ἐὰν ἀνάγκη φαίνηται with λείπειν. With these two interpreters ὡς in e 4 is not *for*, but *that*. Schanz reads ὑπομείνας with Ast, and rejects ἤ with Madvig.)

e 7. ὑμεῖς, like the ἡμεῖς at b 5, is emphatic: that was "*we lawgivers*"; this is "you νομοφύλακες."—ἡμῶν goes with τοὺς νόμους.—The ταῦτα ἑκάτερα (and the ταῦτα in the following line) are not, as Ast and Stallb., (1) private, and (2) public, virtue, but (1) the encouragement of such pursuits etc. as are helpful to virtue (d 2), and (2) the discouragement of ὅποσα ἐμπόδια τούτοις (d 7). —I accept unhesitatingly O. Apelt's (p. 11) restitution of ἐπάνιτε for the MS. ἐπαινεῖτε; "pass in review" exactly describes the action proper to the νομοφύλακες. Above at 708 e 1, O and all the inferior MSS. had ἐπαινῶν where A alone had preserved ἐπανιών. Cp. also 693 c 6, *Theaet.* 186 b 8.

771 a 1. Ficinus puts in *eas inquam vituperate* after νόμους; acting on this hint, or on one from Cornarius, Steph. silently inserts ψέγετε μὲν into the Gk. text at that point.

a 3. τῶν ἀγαθῶν λεγομένων: the worst of it is that some of these ἐμπόδια—e.g. great wealth—are regarded as legitimate objects of ambition.

a 5. ἀρχὴ δὲ . . . ἠργμένη, "we must next begin our laws somewhat as follows, keeping religion in view from the first."

That is, we must obtain the sanction of religion to our political divisions and arrangements. (He has said this before, at 738 b ff., with reference to the territorial divisions.)

a 6. *ἀναλαβεῖν* is rather more than "call to mind"; at 738 b 2 those concerned were bidden "*to give their minds to*" (*λαβεῖν*) the arithmetic of the civic arrangements: here we are told to "give our minds to it *again*," and in this case to consider the *subdivisions* of 5040.

a 7. *εἶχεν* is the "philosophic" imperfect—"how many we found that it had."

b 1. *προσφόρους*, "convenient."

b 3. *ὀρθότατα*, "exactly."—In *φύν*, *θεοῦ δῶρον*, and *σύμφυτον* at b 5 and 7 Plato emphasizes the notion that the properties of number lie deep in the nature of things.

b 4. *ἑκάστην . . . τὴν μοῖραν*, "each of these twelfths."

b 5. *ἱεράν*: Ficinus's translation "sacrum esse dei munus," though it fits Steph.'s conjectural *ἱερόν*, does not prove that he had not our MS. text before him. He always allows himself a translator's right to vary modes of expression. The gender of *ἑπομένην* is in favour of *ἱεράν*.—*ἑπομένην*, "corresponding to."

b 6 ff. *τῇ τοῦ παντὸς περιόδῳ*: "haud dubie ad orbem signiferum s. zodiacum haec spectant," Ast.—*διὸ . . . διανομήν*, "that is just why its instinct sways every city by consecrating these divisions, though some (authorities) perhaps make a more exact partition and consecrate it with more happy results than others." *διό* is strengthened by *καί* as at *Epist.* 335 a 6, and *Phaedr.* 258 c 4.

b 7. For *ἄγειν* used in this absolute sense cp. Eur. *Hipp.* 1268 *σὺ τὰν θεῶν ἄκαμπτον φρένα καὶ βροτῶν ἄγεις*, Κύπρι. —Ficinus takes *ἱεροῦν* to be an inf., translating *ducit . . . ad eas sacrandas*; though such a statement fits the context far better than any translation we can get out of *ἱεροῦν* as a participle, *ἄγειν* cannot be used in the sense of *compels* (to do something). Is it possible that we ought to read *ἱεροῦσαν* = 'leads them along a course of hallowing of the divisions"? (Ast, Schneider, and Wagner take *πᾶσαν πόλιν* to be *totam civitatem.*)

c 4 f. *ἐπὶ θάτερα ὑγιὴς γίγνεται*, "you can mend it *one way*." There are two ways of arriving at an exact multiple of eleven, either by addition or subtraction (Wagner).—*ἀπονέμειν* does not mean exactly "*to subtract*," but "*to set aside.*" This meaning comes out clearly when there is no dative of the person or thing to which something is assigned; e.g. at *Polit.* 276 d *τὴν ἀπονεμηθεῖσαν ἐπιμελητικήν* it means "which is made into a

special class." Cp. also *Laws* 848 a 7. (Grou conjectured *ἀποτμηθείσαιν*, and Ast accepted it. Ficinus takes *ἐπὶ θάτερα* with *ἀπονεμηθείσαιν*, "si . . . ad alteram partem . . . accesserint.")

c 7. *τῇ παρούσῃ φήμῃ καὶ λόγῳ*: hendiadys, "the principle just enunciated."

d 1. *ταύτην*: Schneider, who translates "et distributionem hanc faciamus," apparently takes *ταύτην* to stand for *τὴν διανομὴν ταύτην*; all other interpreters take it to mean *τὴν πόλιν* or *τὴν γῆν*. Ast reads *αὐτήν* for it. Ficinus leaves it out in his translation.

d 3. *ἐπ' αὐτοῖς*: i.e. at the *altars* (Schn. "ad *eos*"; apparently he takes *αὐτοῖς* to refer to the patron deities).

d 4. *δώδεκα μὲν . . . διαμερισμῷ*: apparently each tribe had one rural, and one urban festival every month; the former for the tribe as a whole, the latter for that tribe's division of the city proper (cp. above 745 e 2).

d 5. *θεῶν . . . θεούς*: in the previous exposition of the advantages of these religious *σύνοδοι* or *σύλλογοι* at 738 d 6, the advantages were likewise represented as being of two kinds: (1) religious, and (2) social. The second class there corresponds almost exactly to the second class here. The first there was expressed in the difficult words *ὅπως ἂν . . . εἰς τὰς χρείας ἑκάστας εὐμάρειαν παρασκευάζωσι*. The words which here represent the first class I take to mean "to secure the favour of heaven and all the heavenly influences," taking *τῶν περὶ θεούς* as well as *θεῶν* to depend on *χάριτος*. At 796 c 3 we shall find a similar difficulty in dealing with the elusive word *χάρις—τὴν τῆς θεοῦ χάριν τιμῶντας*. Here it has generally been interpreted to mean either *gratitude*, or *worship* (and by some *τῶν περὶ θεούς* is made to depend directly upon *ἕνεκα*): "primum quidem diis habendae gratiae et rerum divinarum causa" (Schneider)—"haec deorum primo divinorumque colendorum gratia ita fiant" (Ficinus). (A.M.A. agrees with this.)

d 7. *ὡς φαῖμεν ἄν* marks the inclusion of the last named object as an opinion for which the speaker is personally responsible. The necessity of mutual acquaintance to the members of a community was enlarged on at 738 e 1 ff.

e 1. *πρός*, "in view of."

e 2. *τὴν ἄγνοιαν . . . ἐκδίδωσι*: *ὧν*, *ἅ*, and *οἷς* are generalizing neuters; *τούτων* (depending on *ἄγνοιαν*) has to be supplied in thought as their antecedent.—*τις* is almost equal to a plural—"people."—We may translate: "to put an end to ignorance o brides' families and brides themselves, as well as of families int

which daughters marry." For the neut. plur. cp. *πρέποντα* at 772 d 7, and Soph. *Ant.* 659 *εἰ γὰρ τά γ' ἐγγενῆ φύσει ἄκοσμα θρέψω, κάρτα τοὺς ἔξω γένους*, and Soph. *Phil.* 448 f. There is no need, with Ast, to write *ἣν* for *ἃ*.

e 5. *σπουδῆς . . . παιδιὰς . . . χορεύοντας*: Plato is never tired of finding "earnest" in pleasurable sport; cp. 672 e 5 *ὅλη μέν που χορεία ὅλη παίδευσις ἦν ἡμῖν*, and 656 c 2 *τὴν περὶ τὰς Μούσας παιδείαν τε καὶ παιδιάν*, and the place assigned to *pleasure*, and *festivals* in the theory of education as expounded at 653 c ff.

772 a 2. *μετὰ . . . προφάσεις*: this is not to be done at all times, and as a matter of course; a reason must be assigned, and a particular age fixed on. Some old story might associate such relaxation of ordinary rules with a particular age, and so give it a quasi-religious sanction. The *τινὸς* is possibly an indication that *ἡλικία* is not used in the ordinary sense of *time of life*, but in that of *occasion, season*; cp., however, *Symp.* 206 c *ἐπειδὰν ἔν τινι ἡλικίᾳ γένωνται*.

a 3. *μέχριπερ αἰδοῦς σώφρονος ἑκάστων*, "under the restraint of a clean-minded shame on the part of all." A *σώφρων αἰδώς* would admit of greater relaxation than an *αἰδώς* of the wrong sort. Cp. Plut. *Lyc.* ch. xiv. *ἡ δὲ γύμνωσις τῶν παρθένων οὐδὲν αἰσχρὸν εἶχεν, αἰδοῦς μὲν παρούσης ἀκρασίας δ' ἀπούσης.*—*ἑκάστων* suggests that there might be some who would not be fit for such a function.—For the connexion of *αἰδώς* and *σωφροσύνη* cp. *Phaedr.* 253 d *τιμῆς ἐραστὴς μετὰ σωφροσύνης τε καὶ αἰδοῦς*, and *Charm.* 160 e f.

a 5. *τοὺς τῶν χορῶν ἄρχοντας καὶ νομοθέτας*: these would be the *ἀγωνιστικῆς ἀθλοθέται οἱ περὶ χορῳδίαν* mentioned above at 764 e 2; *νομοθέτας* seems used here in the limited sense of *ἀθλοθέτας*.

a 6. *ὅσον ἄν*, "wherever," lit. "to whatever extent."—The Aldine *τάττοντας* looks simpler at first, but *τάττοντες* goes rather better with the neut. sing. *ὅσον*. (If *τάττοντας* be read it would seem better to put the comma after *νομοθέτας* instead of after *νομοφυλάκων*.) Schneider and Burnet are the only editors retaining the MS. text. (Schneider, and others, take *νομοθέτας* to be predicative, i.e. coupled by *καί* with *ἐπιμελητάς* and *κοσμητάς*.)—Ald. also changed the MS. *ὅσον* to *ὅσων*, but only the next three printed edd. followed him in this.—Is it possible that *νομοθέτας* is a mistake for *ἀθλοθέτας*?

a 7. Ast would make *ὅσα σμικρὰ καὶ πολλά* the direct obj.

of ἐκλείπειν, but it is best to take ὅσα κτλ. closely with τοιαῦτα πάντα, and supply "aliquid" (Schn.) with ἐκλείπειν.

b 2. κατ' ἐνιαυτόν, "*quotannis*," strengthened and amplified by the ἀεί; "in each succeeding year."

b 4. ἕως ἂν ὅρος κτλ., "until the regulations for such proceedings shall seem to have been sufficiently defined."

b 5. The MS. χορὸς for χρόνος was very likely due to the ὅρος in the preceding line.

b 6. As no MS. has a possible reading, we shall do well to follow Schanz and Burnet in adopting what is by far the best of the conjectures in place of the δεκάτηρις of A and O, i.e. Schneider's δεκαετηρὶς. This, like the vulgate δεκαέτηρος, might be an adj., in which case the genitives θυσιῶν and χορειῶν would depend on ἐμπειρίας, but it is best to take it as a noun on which the two genitives depend directly: "a ten years' cycle of festal sacrifice and dance would be a reasonable and adequate period to assign" (lit. ταχθείς is "if assigned") "for each and all of the details." (Ast, holding that πάντα καὶ ἕκαστα, and the lawgiver's enactments, both during and after the χρόνος ταχθείς, refer, not to ἱερά alone, but *to all legislation*, would reject the words θυσιῶν τε καὶ χορειῶν; but, as Ritter says (p. 171), the mention at d 2 of θεῶν μαντείας favours the general view that the whole passage refers to ἱερά alone.

c 1. κοινῇ: i.e. in consultation with the lawgiver.

c 2. εἰσφέρειν here means "*report*."—τῆς αὐτῶν ἀρχῆς, "within the sphere of their office."

c 3. ἕκαστον: i.e. ἕκ. τὸ παραλειπόμενον.

c 4. τοῦ καλῶς ἐξειργάσθαι depends on and explains τέλος.

c 6. αὐτοῖς: i.e. the various officials.

c 7. "καταλαμβάνειν proprie dicitur quicquid inopinatum et repentino quasi impetu nos deprehendit, et in universum quod improvisum nobis accidit," Ast.—πάσας . . . ἐπελθόντας: ἐπελθεῖν is used, I think,—as at 850 c 2 ἐπελθὼν καὶ πείσας τὴν πόλιν—rather in the sense of *consult, lay a matter before*, than in that of *visit*; and so it governs ἀρχάς and δῆμον as well as μαντείας. The χορῶν ἄρχοντες and the νομοφύλακες are to consult first the whole body of state officials, next the public assembly, and thirdly all the oracles. A single objection from any of these quarters is to be fatal to a project of change.

d 4. For κρατεῖν abs. in the sense of "to have the best of it" cp. *Phaedr.* 272 b ὁ μὴ πειθόμενος κρατεῖ, and below 839 a 4 and 5, *Tim.* 54 a.

d 5. After this important digression the Ath. resumes the thread broken at a 4.—Ald. (not Steph., as Stallb. says) altered the MS. ὁπότε into ὁπόθεν—an improvement in every respect; cp. *Rep.* 362 b ἔπειτα γαμεῖν ὁπόθεν ἂν βούληται.—πέντε καὶ εἴκοσι. See note on 721 b 1.

d 6. σκοπῶν καὶ σκοπούμενος ὑπ' ἄλλων: the occasion seems to be thought of as a quasi-medical examination of candidates for matrimony. At the same time in the κατὰ νοῦν ἑαυτῷ we discern recognition of the part which personal preference may play in the matter. Cp. on 773 b 7.

d 7. πρέποντα: cp. above on 771 e 3. (Heindorf quite unnecessarily conjectured πρέπον τι.)

e 1. A has τὰς for πᾶς, and τῶν for ἐτῶν; L and O^2 corrected the first mistake, and A^2 the second.—τῶν πέντε: the article implies that this limit has been mentioned before; cp. 721 b 1.

e 2. ὡς, "quo pacto" (Fic.). For the use of ζητεῖν cp. 630 e.

e 3. ὥς φησιν Κλεινίας: cp. above, 723 d 5 ff.

e 5. ἔλαβές τε κτλ.: it is not clear whether Cleinias means that the subject of marriage comes in aptly at the point where the Ath. has introduced it, or that marriage is a subject which will specially profit by a wise preamble; probably the latter.

e 6. καί emphasizes μαλ'; so at 773 c 2 καὶ μάλιστα.

773 a 1. τοὺς . . . γάμους, "such marriages as commend themselves to the wise." This matter is discussed in just the same sense at *Polit.* 310 b ff.

a 3. ἐὰν τἆλλα ἰσάζῃ: i.e. if a man is hesitating between two choices, the only difference being that there is rather more money in one case than in the other, he should choose the poorer.—All through this disquisition it is the choice of the family into which to marry, rather than the choice of an individual bride which the speaker has in view.

a 4. τιμῶντα: used like our "prefer," in the sense of "choose." The participle contains the more significant idea: "prefer, when you marry," etc. Cp. *Hipp. Mai.* 303 e 2 ταύτας πρὸ τῶν ἄλλων τιμήσαντες.

a 6. τὸ γὰρ ὁμαλὸν . . . πρὸς ἀρετήν, "for homogeneity and proportion are far superior to a state of excess." Here he is thinking, not of the married pair, nor even of the families united by the match, but of the effect produced by various kinds of marriages on the state of society at large. If men always aim at marrying into richer families than their own, wealth will tend to

accumulate in a narrow area, and a similar excess of poverty will be found at the other end of the scale.

a 7. In the same way endowments of mind and character must be tempered by the admixture of opposites, if the state is to be manned in a salutary fashion. (Plato would doubtless, in modern times, have counselled alliances between families of opposite political views.)

b 5. *μνηστεύω γάμον* sounds like a poetical expression ; possibly it is a reminiscence of Eur. *I.A.* 847 *μνηστεύω γάμους οὐκ ὄντας ὡς εἴξασιν.*

b 6. *φέρεται δέ πως* κτλ. : again it is the *family* with which the alliance is to be made, rather than the positive qualities of the particular bride or bridegroom, which are supposed to determine the choice. It does not seem to have occurred to Plato that personal inclination, if more play were allowed to it, might act in the same way as the counsels of *οἱ ἔμφρονες.*

c 1. *τρόπων ἤθεσιν* : cp. 968 d 2 *τρόπων ἤθεσιν καὶ ἔθεσιν.*

c 2. *ἡμῖν* is emphatic, "to us, the founders of this state," as opposed to *ταῖς πλείσταις πόλεσι.*—*καὶ μάλιστα* : cp. *καὶ μάλα* at 772 c 6.

c 3. *διὰ λόγου*, "expressly" (not "per rationem" as Fic.).—*νόμῳ* is an instrumental dat. (not "add to the law" as Jowett).

c 7. *γελοῖα* qualifies the infinitives *προστάττειν* and *ἀναγκάζειν.* So at Xen. *Mem.* iv. 2. 32 *καὶ τὸ ὑγιαίνειν καὶ τὸ νοσεῖν . . . ἀγαθὰ ἂν εἴη.*

c 8. *ἂν ἐγείραι* (Ast) is better than *ἂν ἀνεγείραι* (Bekker) for the MS. *** ἀνεγεῖραι.* Both A and O have a blank space between *θυμὸν* and *ἐγεῖραι*, which may well have been filled with *ἂν*, due to dittography of the first syllable of the already misread *ἀνεγεῖραι. ἐγείρειν* is far commoner in Plato than *ἀνεγείρειν*, more particularly in the figurative sense—cp. *Rep.* 440 c 5 *οὐκ ἐθέλει πρὸς τοῦτον αὐτοῦ ἐγείρεσθαι ὁ θυμός ;*—The rare optative form in *-αι* (cp. above 719 e 3) was not so unusual in Homer as in Attic prose, and was perhaps adopted here from a vague reminiscence of Homer's *Τρωσὶν θυμὸν ἐγεῖραι*, though the latter, like the Homeric *μένος ἐγείρειν* (with dat.), is used, not in the sense of *incense*, but in that of "put heart into."—The early printed edd. insert *καὶ* before *θυμὸν ἀνεγεῖραι.*

d 1. *δίκην κρατῆρος κεκραμένην*, "mixed after the fashion of a drinkers' bowl."—*οὗ* κτλ., "in which the wine, when poured in, is hot to madness, but when chastened by another and a sober divinity, thanks to good company, yields a wholesome

and innocuous beverage."—*μαινόμενος* is not merely an epithet of *οἶνος*; it is part of the predicate.—At *An seni*, etc. 792 b Plutarch paraphrases *κολαζόμενος* by *σωφρονίζεσθαι κολαζόμενον*. Plutarch's comment at *De aud. poet.* 15 e illustrates *ἀγαθὸν καὶ μέτριον*; it is *ἀφαιρεῖ γὰρ ἡ κρᾶσις τοῦ οἴνου τὸ βλάπτον, οὐ συναιροῦσα τὸ χρήσιμον*. [F.H.D. cps. also *Phil.* 61 c 6.] To Athenaeus this passage is simply a "familiar quotation"; he applies it, in a manner quite inconsistent with its context, merely to enforce the precept *οὐ χρὴ μεθύειν*. [Longinus] *Περὶ ὕψους* says that in the judgement of many Plato's own style here needs the chastening of a "spirit of soberness": *νήφοντα γάρ, φασί, θεὸν τὸ ὕδωρ λέγειν, κόλασιν δὲ τὴν κρᾶσιν, ποιητοῦ τινος τῷ ὄντι οὐχὶ νήφοντός ἐστι.*

d 5. *ἐὰν μὲν νόμῳ τὰ τοιαῦτα ἀναγκαῖον*: not "the law must leave such matters" (Jowett), nor even, as Schneider and Wagner, "we must omit such matters *in our law*"; the following *δέ* clause shows that we ought to supply *πειρᾶσθαι* from it, and translate "(the wise man) must give up trying to attain such objects *by law*."

d 6. *ἐπᾴδοντα πείθειν*: so at 664 b 4 *ἐπᾴδειν* is used of the persuasive power of *μουσική*; similarly at 671 a 1 *ἐπῳδὸν γίγνεσθαι νέοις πρὸς ἀρετήν*. Stallb. cps. 837 e 6 *ἐπᾴδων πείθειν*, and 944 b 3 *τοιαῦτα παραμυθούμενος ἐπᾴδειν*, and *Rep.* 608 a 3 *ἐπᾴδοντες ἡμῖν αὐτοῖς τοῦτον τὸν λόγον . . . καὶ ταύτην τὴν ἐπῳδήν*.

d 7. *τὴν τῶν παίδων ὁμαλότητα αὐτῶν αὐτοῖς*: above at b 7 he said the *state* would be ill-balanced if some citizens were excessively rich while others were excessively poor; here he points to the fear that the natures of the offspring would be *one-sided* if the temperaments of the parents both inclined towards the same extreme. There he was thinking of the external circumstances of the citizens; here of the natures and temperaments of the children. It is not easy to determine whether *ὁμ. αὐτ. αὐτ.* means that the object which each single father (*ἕκαστον*) must have in view is (1) the approximation of all citizens to a common type, (2) the resemblance of the man's own children to each other—so Wagner—or (3) the "equability"—so Schneider and Jowett—of each child's own temperament. The emphatic *αὐτῶν* inclines me to the third interpretation. Schanz says A has *αὐτοῖς*.

e 1. Steph. was the first editor to print *ἀπλήστου* for the *vox nihili ἀπλείστου* of the MSS., though A^2 and O^2 made the correction.—The insatiability of those who desire the wrong sort

of "equality" is, by a rhetorical figure, transferred to the equality itself.

e 4. *βιαζόμενον*—which is a variety in expression for *βίᾳ*—is antithetic to *δι' ὀνείδους*; like *ἐπᾴδοντα* in d 6 it agrees with the subject of *πειρᾶσθαι*, on which *ἀποτρέπειν* depends. (Schanz reads *βιάζεσθαι*; Stallb. says *βιαζόμενον* "stands per anacoluthon" for the inf.; while Ast compares it to idiomatic participles after verbs of saying and perceiving where we should expect an inf.)

e 6. *ἔμπροσθε*: at 721 b 6 ff. Here we have a further glimpse into Plato's deepest thoughts on human destiny. There we read that *γένεσις*, the power of reproduction, gives the human race a hold on immortality; here he says that *γένεσις* provides for the continuous service of *τὸ πάντων ἄριστον* (728 d 1), the supreme object of worship, and implies that only those who serve the Highest get into touch with *τῆς ἀειγενοῦς φύσεως*—real, indestructible existence. Thus we are led on to that wonderful passage at 903 c, where we are told that every *γένεσις* fashions an instrument for helping to secure the felicity of the universe, and that the great mistake to which each insignificant mortal is liable is to fancy that the universe is made for him, and not he for it. —With *τῆς ἀειγενοῦς φύσεως ἀντέχεσθαι* cp. above 721 c 6 *ἀθανασίας μετειληφέναι*, and Aristot. *De an.* 415 a 29 *ἵνα τοῦ ἀεὶ καὶ τοῦ θείου μετέχωσιν, ᾗ δύνανται.*

e 7. Steph. first corrected the MS. *καταλείποντι* to the acc., though he left the dat. in his text.

774 a 1. With *ὑπηρέτας ἀνθ' αὑτοῦ παραδιδόναι* cp. 776 b 3 *καθάπερ λαμπάδα τὸν βίον παραδιδόντας ἄλλοις ἐξ ἄλλων, θεραπεύοντας ἀεὶ θεοὺς κατὰ νόμους.*

a 2. *ὡς χρὴ γαμεῖν*: these words are difficult. Ficinus, misled either by his text or by his eye, seems to have joined them to the *περὶ γάμων* in 773 e 5; for there his translation is: "ad nuptias igitur, ut decet, celebrandas"; here it is merely "de nuptiis ineundis." Wagner takes *ὡς* to be *how*—going back, i.e., to the subject of the *sort* of marriage which is advisable—a subject discussed above at 773 a ff.—he would even read *οὓς* for *ὡς*. But the following threat of penalties upon obstinate bachelors is in favour of Schneider's and Jowett's view that *ὡς* is *that*, and that the words mean "that marriage is a duty," and depend rather upon *προοιμιαζόμενος* than on *εἶπον*. I would suggest that it may have been a marginal *heading* which strayed into the text. Its place in Ficinus's translation gives some slight support to this view.

a 3. *προοιμιαζόμενος ὀρθῶς*: not "if he makes a fitting preface" (as Serranus), but "by way of apposite preface."

a 4. *ἀκοινώνητον* does not denote merely the absence of the marriage tie ("alienus ab hoc consortio" Fic.), but *unsociable* in character and behaviour; for marriage is a duty to the state. The *καί* after *ἔχῃ* is *explanatory*.

a 6. *ἑκατὸν δραχμαῖς*: Clem. Alex. *Strom.* ii. 423 a, in describing this law, calls the sum paid *τροφὴν γυναικός*, and seems to say that there were magistrates' fees to be paid as well. In the *Times* of Nov. 21, 1911 it was stated that the Mecklenburg Provincial Diet had resolved to tax all bachelors over thirty who had no relatives dependent on them. They were to pay twenty-five per cent more than married men. Wives are evidently more expensive to keep nowadays than in Plato's time.

b 4. *πᾶς*: not, I think, every *ταμίας τῆς Ἥρας* (though the *ἑκάστους* at e 3 is somewhat in favour of that view), but *every citizen*. It was incumbent, i.e., on every citizen, if questioned at the *εὔθυνα* of the magistrate concerned, to give evidence as to *his own* liability to the tax, and say whether he had paid it or not. (Herm. would read *πᾶσι*—in the sense of *τῷ βουλομένῳ* (*μετιέναι*). He truly observes that it is superfluous, after stating the steward's liability, to say it applies to all stewards.)—*εἰς*, "in the matter of"; so at 677 b 7, 775 a 7, 784 b 5, and 809 e 7.

b 6. *ἑκών* here is "if he can help it."

b 7. *βοηθείτω καὶ ἀμυνέτω*, "must rise and defend"; *βοηθεῖν* is "to take the field," "to be up in arms," and not, in itself, "to assist," as the dictionaries say. Cp. Thuc. v. 75. 1 *τῆς δὲ μάχης μελλούσης ἔσεσθαι. . . . Πλειστοφάναξ . . . ἐβοήθησε· καὶ μέχρι μὲν Τεγέας ἀφίκετο, πυθόμενος δὲ τὴν νίκην ἀπεχώρησε.* No doubt, in certain cases, when construed with a personal dat., it gets the meaning *assist*. So "*to be out*" for the Pretender is to *assist* the Pretender).

c 3. *πρότερον*: i.e. at 742 c 2.

c 3 ff. *εἰρήσθω δὲ πάλιν ὡς ἴσα ἀντὶ ἴσων ἐστὶν τὸ μήτε λαμβάνοντι μήτ' ἐκδιδόντι διὰ χρημάτων ἀπορίαν γηράσκειν τοὺς πένητας*: at 733 b 5 *ἴσα ἀντὶ ἴσων* was "in a case of equality"; here, with *ἐστίν*, it is "it is a case of equality," i.e. (with a negative in the following clause) "there is just as little probability one way as another." The proper object of *ἐκδιδόντι*, and therefore of *λαμβάνοντι* also, is *a bride*, not, as has generally been assumed, *a dowry*; as at d 2 and 742 c 2, we should in that case have *διδόντι*. These datives are genitival, and go with *ἀπορίαν*.

The negatives are difficult; for they do not negative the participles so much as γηράσκειν. We may translate: "But I would return to the subject, and insist that there is no great probability that, on account of dearth of money, whether in the case of the bridegroom, or in that of the bride's father, the poor should fail to reach old age." The reason follows: "in our state there *is* no abject poverty." The early printed edd. turned τὸ into τῷ, and so all subsequent edd. except Schanz and Burnet. Another alteration of this passage suggested in the margin of O and the Florentine MSS. was the substitution of διδάσκειν for γηράσκειν. Ficinus read γηράσκειν. Ast and Stallb. welcome this change, and take διδάσκειν as an inf. with an imperative force: "we must teach the poor that it is as broad as it is long if a dowry is neither given nor received, all being equally poor," "propterea quod isto modo omnibus sit pecuniarum pecunia" Stallb. The following γάρ clause does not in the least support a statement of this nature. Schneider and Schanz give the passage up and suppose a lacuna after ἐκδιδόντι. Apelt proposes to read γεραίρειν for γηράσκειν, retaining the unauthorized τῷ, and expressing doubt about the previous part of the sentence. His idea is that Plato is here urging us *to pay respect to parents.*

c 6. ὑπάρχοντά ἐστι stands for ὑπάρχει, as at 903 c 4 ἥ ὑπάρχουσα stands for ὑπάρχῃ.—The gen. after πᾶσι is unusual; Schanz emends it to τοῖς.—It would be better to put a colon after πόλει; what follows is a distinct reason for dispensing with dowries.

c 7. ὕβρις: Stallb. ad loc., and Bekker in the Excursus to the twelfth chapter of *Charicles* have collected many passages from ancient writers illustrative of the airs and tyranny of the *uxor dotata* (ἄλοχος πολύδωρος). Even Justinian iii. 3 adopts Plato's arguments, speaking of dowries as "*frena.*" The original reading in A and O was ὕβρεις; the correction made by A^2 and O^2 to ὕβρις has been universally adopted. Steph.'s ἧττων for ἧττον has no MS. authority. The adverb fits both clauses better than the adj.; especially as δουλεία has two adjs. already. Ficinus's *minor* is not conclusive for ἧττων, though somewhat in its favour.

d 2. ἓν τῶν καλῶν δρᾷη τοῦτ' ἄν, "will so have one good deed to his credit."—ἤ: we should have expected an explanatory καί instead of the first ἤ. This ἤ is not *or*, but *either*, or *whether*. The early printed edd., not seeing this, coolly put in ἀλλ' before it; they also, *de suo*, changed the δέ before μιᾶς to μέν. Contrary to his usual custom, Plato here begins the enumeration

of the four classes at the bottom. The sentence leaves several points unexpressed, and to be supplied from the context; if all were there it would run: <ὁ μὲν> πλέον . . . ὁ δὲ <πλέον ἢ> μνᾶς <ἄξια> κτλ.

d 4. ὁ τὸ μέγιστον τίμημα κεκτημένος: these words might well be marked off as a parenthesis. Their addition renders the corresponding additions in the previous clauses unnecessary. [F.H.D. suggests that the words are a commentator's "gloss."]

d 5. ὀφειλέτω μὲν τῷ δημοσίῳ: so L and O; it is doubtless the right reading. The scribes of these MSS., however, knew of a variant τῷ δεῖ for τῷ δημοσίῳ, which variant is the text reading of A, which has the correct reading in a late hand in the margin. A further knows of a variant ὀφλήσει for ὀφειλέτω.—The author leaves us in some doubt as to the nature of the penalty. It is clear that the temple stewards concerned are to confiscate the surplus money or goods given with the bride; but it is not stated whether one or both of the guilty parties—and if one which—is to pay the equivalent fine to the public exchequer. We may conclude that in case of a marriage between members of different property-classes the rate of the higher class would fix the amount.

e 2. παρ' αὑτῶν ἑκάστους, "each out of his own private store." This payment by the defaulting stewards would apparently go to the temple treasuries.—Stallb. cps. Plut. *Solon* ch. xx. τῶν δ' ἄλλων γάμων ἀφεῖλε τὰς φερνάς, ἱμάτια τρία, καὶ σκεύη μικροῦ νομίσματος ἄξια κελεύσας, ἕτερον δὲ μηδέν, ἐπιφέρεσθαι τὴν γαμουμένην. There probably the φερνή was not the dowry in general, but only the trousseau.

e 4. ἐγγύην: Herm. *De vest.* p. 9 (note 25) notices that the two points in which Plato's law differs from that given at Dem. *Contra Steph.* p. 1134 are (1) that Plato characteristically admits relatives on the female side, and (2) mentions the *grandfather* as coming before the *brother*.—Steph. would write πρώτην for πρῶτον. The case is like that of ἧττον at c 7; he has not here, however, any support from Ficinus, who has *primum* for πρῶτον, *deinde* for δευτέραν, *tertia* for τρίτην.

e 7. L and O do not share A's mistake of συμβαίνει for συμβαίνῃ.

e 8. κυρίους: the adj. can be applied, in a slightly different sense of course, to the people who are capable of making a "valid" betrothal. On the validity of the betrothal depended the legitimacy of the children of the marriage.

e 9. For προτέλεια cp. schol. on Aristoph. *Thesm.* 973 Ἥρα τελεία

καὶ Ζεὺς τέλειος ἐτιμῶντο ἐν τοῖς γάμοις ὡς πρυτάνεις ὄντες τῶν γάμων· τέλος δὲ ὁ γάμος. διὸ καὶ προτέλεια ἐκαλεῖτο ἡ θυσία ἡ πρὸ τῶν γάμων γιγνομένη. See also Ruhnken, *Tim.* s.v.—For the MS. ἤ τις I think we ought to read ἤ τίς. ὅσα and τίς would then both introduce interrogative sentences dependent in grammar on ἐρωτῶντα. Stallb. wished to read ἤ εἴ τις.

775 a 2 f. πειθόμενον ἐκείνοις ἡγεῖσθαι πάντα ἑαυτῷ μετρίως γίγνεσθαι, "and be quite satisfied to do as they tell him."—τοὺς ἐξηγητάς: these officials have already been mentioned at 759 c d.

a 4. For the "absolute" περί clause Stallb. cps. *Phaedr.* 250 c 8 περὶ δὲ κάλλους κτλ.

a 5. Ficinus unaccountably has *ex latere paterno* for what in our MS. text is ἑκατέρων; so Serranus *ex parte patris.*

a 7. εἰς χρήματα: cp. above on 774 b 4.—As at 774 d 4, the graduated arrangement of property-classes forms a framework which renders full expression of the points connected with each stage unnecessary; τῷ μεγίστῳ is loose for "the man of the highest class."

a 8. ἐφεξῆς οὕτω, καθάπερ, "just in series according as . . ."

b 3. ὡς ἀπειρόκαλόν τε ὄντά καὶ ἀπαίδευτον τῶν περὶ τὰς νυμφικὰς Μούσας νόμων: for the two ideas cp. *Rep.* 403 c 1 ψόγον ἀπειροκαλίας καὶ ἀμουσίας ὑφέξοντα.—For περί *c. gen.* as a variant for a simple possessive genitive cp. above on 685 c 2. For the genitive after ἀπαίδευτος cp. *Rep.* 619 d 3 πόνων ἀγυμνάστους.—I think Jowett is right, as against all other interpreters, in giving νόμων its technical *musical* sense. *Laws* are not things you are *educated* in; *music* is. It may be said that "the laws of the hymeneal Muses" is itself a figurative expression for "a cultivated, liberal state of mind and feeling"; but the Muses are not readily compared to legislators; and the sense of *strains* or *melodies*, or *harmonies* fits the phrase better: "as a vulgar soul that is not attuned to the melodies of the Muse of marriage."

b 4. The subject of excessive drinking comes in naturally on the mention of the wedding feast.

b 6. οὐδ' ἀσφαλές, "besides, it is dangerous."—οὔτ' οὖν δή (coming after οὔτε ἄλλοθί που) is "above all" (it is out of place, and dangerous).—The MSS. of Athenaeus, who quotes this passage at x. 39, have οὐδ' ἄλλοθι, and οὐδ' ἀσφαλές; the Plato MSS. have οὔτε in both places. Dindorf corrected the first οὐδέ in Athenaeus, and Bekker the second οὔτε in Plato.

c 2. I am convinced that we ought to put a full stop after

μεταλλάττοντας, and to treat *ὅπως γίγνηται* as an independent injunction, similar to the prohibitions treated of at Goodwin, *M. and T.* § 283 (*Prot.* 313 c, *Euthyd.* 296 a, *Charm.* 157 b, Aristoph. *Nub.* 824, Dem. iv. 20 (p. 45). If it be held that only a future could be used in such a sentence when it is *positive*, we must suppose the clause to be an abrupt anacoluthon. A colon should follow *μετὰ θεοῦ*. The whole passage—b 6 *οὔτ' οὖν . . .* d 4 *ποτ' ἄν*—is thus arranged, as to its main ideas: "To drink deep is especially wrong at one's wedding—is to cloud the mind at a crisis in one's life when above all the mind should be clear. Your possible offspring too will suffer in mind if *your* mind is cloudy when it is made. And its body will suffer too, from the relaxed state of *your* body. Both body and soul of the drunken man are at war each with itself, and offspring then generated will in all probability be perverse and crooked in body and mind."

c 6. *ἐν μοίρᾳ*—"uti par est" (Schneider)—seems rather otiose. Cornarius—he was a doctor of medicine—plausibly suggests *ἐν μήτρᾳ* for it.

c 7. *ὁ δὲ διφνωμένος κτλ.*, "why, when a man is in liquor, he drives and is himself driven all ways at once; there is war in his body and in his soul: a drunken man *must* be but a staggering and fumbling sire, and produce ill-balanced and shifty offspring, whose minds are probably as crooked as their bodies."

d 4 f. *μᾶλλον μέν* introduces the two *higher*, *μάλιστα δέ* the indispensable *lower*, and *διαφερόντως δέ* the *lowest possible* of the requirements.

d 8. *ἐξομοργνύμενον ἐκτυποῦσθαι*: both words are probably middle, and have as their object "the faults just spoken of." We are told by the scholiast on this passage, and by Timaeus in his *Lex.*, that *ἐξομοργνύμενος* has the same meaning as *ἐκματτόμενος*—Tim. adds *ἀποτυπούμενος*; i.e. it probably was used as a technical term of the sculptor's art in the sense of *to mould a likeness*. At Eur. *Bacch.* 344 *μηδ' ἐξομόρξει μωρίαν τὴν σὴν ἐμοί;* the metaphor is still perhaps that of the *coming off* of colour from one contiguous surface to another. Cp. also Aristoph. *Ach.* 843.

e 1. *πάντῃ*, "in every respect"—whether in body or mind.—*φαυλότερα*: not "worse than their parents," but "sadly inferior creatures."

e 2. *ἀρχὴ γὰρ καὶ θεὸς ἐν ἀνθρώποις ἱδρυμένη σῴζει πάντα*, "men recognize in all beginnings a divinity of universal efficacy, if etc."—lit. "beginning, set up as a very deity among men, makes all right." This is the third handling of this theme in the sixth

book. At 753 e 8 we were told that the proverb *ἀρχὴ ἥμισυ παντός* did not honour *ἀρχή* as highly as it deserved, and again at 765 e 3 the significance and importance of *ἡ πρώτη βλάστη*—"the seeds and weak beginnings" *Hen. IV.* Part 2, iii. 1. 85—was eloquently described.—Ast suggests that *καί* may be a misreading of the tachygraphical sign for *ὡς*. This would give us an easier sentence, but we are not driven to this assumption—still less to Schanz's athetesis of *καὶ θεός*: the emphasizing *καί* and the abrupt identification of *ἀρχή* with the divine power seem not out of place in such a striking sentence. Probably Schanz, like Stallb., took the *θεός* to be the deity mentioned at c 4—*μετὰ θεοῦ*. *ἀρχὴ σῴζει πάντα* was very likely a proverbial saying. (Apelt holds *καὶ θεός* to be a mistake for *κατ' ἔθος*, and translates *κατ' ἔθος ἱδρυμένη*, "der sich durch Gewohnheit fest eingewurzelt hat." But does not this make the following *if* clause superfluous? *ἀρχή* cannot gain a firm footing unless it is duly honoured.)

e 3. *ἱδρυμένη*: *ἱδρῦσθαι* is the regular word for the establishment of a divinity.

e 5. *ταῖν οἰκίαιν*: the *δύο οἰκήσεις* belonging to each *κλῆρος* mentioned at 745 e 4.

776 a 1. *νεοττῶν*: there is here none of the disapproval which was implied in the use of this metaphor at *Rep.* 548 a, where he speaks of wedded homes as *ἀτεχνῶς νεοττιὰς ἰδίας*.

a 2. *χωρισθέντα* is the most significant verb in this passage. The motive for this separation from the paternal home is explained by the following *γάρ* clause, and its necessity is again urged at a 7 ff. *νομίσαντα* is subordinate to *χωρισθέντα*; the *τε*, inserted after the latter word in Ald. and the next three printed texts, obscures the true significance of *χωρισθέντα*. (Ritter p. 405 suggests that perhaps *νομίσαντα εἶναι* stands for *νομίζειν*.)

a 5. *κατακορὴς δὲ . . . πλησμονῆς*, "while a companionship which is too close, and which misses the desire begotten by long absence, makes (the same natures) fall apart from sheer satiety (of companionship)."

b 1. Plato does not seem to have used *ἐπισκοπεῖν* elsewhere in the sense of *visit*.

b 3. *καθάπερ λαμπάδα τὸν βίον παραδιδόντας ἄλλοις ἐξ ἄλλων*: Boeckh p. 140, among other instances in which Lucr. "colorem duxit a Platonicis," compares this passage with *De rerum nat.* ii. 78:

> Inque brevi spatio mutantur saecla animantum
> Et quasi cursores vitai lampada tradunt.

For the λαμπαδηφορία, or λαμπάς, as it was also called, cp. Hdt. viii. 98, *Rep.* 328 with Adam's note.

b 4. With θεραπεύοντας ἀεὶ θεούς cp. above 774 a 1 ἀεὶ τῷ θεῷ ὑπηρέτας ἀνθ᾽ αὑτοῦ παραδιδόναι.

b 6. All subsequent editors have rightly adopted Ast's correction of the MS. κέκτητο to κεκτῆτο.—τὰ μὲν οὖν πολλὰ . . . λεγόμενα, "Of the majority (of such belongings) it is as easy to give an account as to get possession of them; but slaves are a difficulty every way" (i.e. it is difficult to get possession of them, and difficult to give directions about them). "And the reason is, that we say things about slaves which are partly right and partly wrong; for we contradict experience of their serviceableness as well as follow its teaching in the form which our very language takes about them"; in other words, "our very language about slaves is inconsistent, and our experience shows a similar diversity and contradiction." This enigmatical sentence naturally brings from the downright Megillus a request for further explanation. "*Do* we?" he says; "what do you mean?" At c 6 ff. the Ath. admits the obscurity of his remark, and then explains that he meant that about any known system of slave-holding you will find a bewildering diversity of opinion; more particularly that, though we all know cases where slaves have been more to their masters than even brothers or sons, we sometimes talk of them as if they were good-for-nothing:—e.g. you find Homer saying that by divine ordinance slavery is essentially degrading to the slave. (Susemihl takes χρεῖαι to be "our needs," and tries to get from the words the meaning "sometimes we speak of slaves as if they were the reverse of useful to us, and sometimes as if they were useful"; but, as Ritter says, even if the words could be made to mean this—which they cannot—that would be no *reason* (αἴτιον) for the *difficulty* of the subject. Ritter himself construes ἐναντία . . . καὶ τὰ λεγόμενα "for according to the way we treat them, slaves show characteristics that are the opposite of each other, and in accordance with the way in which we treat them, we also mould our judgement about slaves." This general conclusion harmonizes well with the following remarks of the Ath. about the treatment of slaves, but ignores entirely the manifest opposition between ἐναντία ταῖς χρείαις and κατὰ τὰς χρείας.)

c 3. The τά which was left out in A is supplied by an early hand in the margin, and is present in O, though τὰ λεγόμενα is in an erasure; it seems as if in the original of both there was some indistinctness about the τά.

c 7. *πάντων τ.* Ἑ. : the gen. goes with the superlative *πλείστην*, and is like that of the idiomatic *ἀνθρώπων*—"in the world"—with a superlative. It is equivalent to "throughout the whole of Greece"; cp. *Prot.* 342 a 7 *φιλοσοφία γάρ ἐστιν παλαιοτάτη τε καὶ πλείστη τῶν Ἑλλήνων ἐν Κρήτῃ τε καὶ Λακεδαίμονι*, and *Laches* 197 d 4.

c 9. *ἡ Ἡρακλεωτῶν δουλεία τῆς τῶν Μαριανδυνῶν καταδουλώσεως*, "the slavery-system of Heraclea under which the Mariandyni are held in serfdom." This is (nearly) Stallbaum's interpretation, and is right, I think, as against Ruhnken's view—adopted by Liddell & Scott—that *δουλεία* is "abstract for concrete"—as in the next case cited—and stands for *body of slaves.* R. is however right, as against Stallb., in taking *καταδουλώσεως* to be a genitive of *definition* (cp. on 723 d 6), rather than a genitive of *origin.*—For the relation of the Mariandyni to the people of Heraclea Pontica, Ast and Stallb. refer, among other authors, to Strabo xii. 3. 41, p. 817. Athenaeus vi. 263 e f. and 264 a f. gives authorities for regarding the servitude of the Mariandyni and Penestae as the result of voluntary compacts.

d 4. *ὃ δὴ . . . τόδε ἐστίν* : an abrupt explanatory asyndeton. —*παριὼν τῷ λόγῳ*, "in the course of my argument"—lit. "as I passed along it in my argument."

d 5. *ἴσμεν . . . ἀρίστους* : in other words, we all admit the possibility of slaves being capable and well-disposed. The *γάρ* in d 7 is "why!" or "you know," rather than "for."

d 8. It would be interesting to know whether O has any trace of the senseless dislocation of letters by which A arrived at *γενομένοισ εσώ κασιν.* (A new collation of the now recovered O would be of great value.)

e 4. With *τοὐναντίον* we must supply either *λέγεται*, or *ἴσμεν λεγόμενον.*

e 5. *τῷ γένει* is sufficiently defined by the *δούλης* in the preceding line. Ast wanted to insert *τούτῳ*, and Stallb. *τῶν δούλων* before *γένει.*

e 6. *καὶ ἀπεφήνατο*, "explicitly declares"; the *καί* emphasizes the verb.

777 a 1. For the variety of reading see scholia and notes on *Od.* xvii. 322 f. *τε νόου . . . ἀνδρῶν* sounds more like Homer than *τ' ἀρετῆς . . . ἀνέρος*, and gets some confirmation from the *ἀνθρώπων . . . νόον ἔγνω* in *α* 3.—The first hands in A and O thoughtlessly wrote *ἀπαμείβεται*; L and A^2 and O^2 have *ἀπαμείρεται.*

a 3. *ταῦτα δὴ διαλαβόντες ἕκαστοι τοῖς διανοήμασιν*, "between these two views a man decides for himself."

a 4. *κατὰ δὲ θηρίων φύσιν*: "as if they were dealing with brute beasts."

a 5. *οὐ τρὶς μόνον ἀλλὰ πολλάκις . . . δούλας*: cp. Plut. *Lyc.* ch. xxviii. *ὥστε τοὺς λέγοντας, ἐν Λακεδαίμονι καὶ τὸν ἐλεύθερον μάλιστα ἐλεύθερον εἶναι καὶ τὸν δοῦλον μάλιστα δοῦλον, οὐ φαύλως τεθεωρηκέναι τὴν διαφοράν.*

b 2. *κτήσεως*: like *κτήσασθαι* at 776 b 7—which referred by implication to slaves—this word denotes not so much the *acquiring* as the *form of possession*—in other words, the legal position of the slave with regard to his master.

b 5 f. O. Apelt's suggestion that we ought to read *ἐστί τι θρέμμα* for *ἐστι τὸ θρέμμα* seems, at first sight, to improve the construction, but if we are to make *εὔχρηστον* predicate to the subject "man," it will be hard to justify the gender, if *ἄνθρωπος* alone is the subject, whereas it is quite in order if *τὸ θρέμμα ἄνθρωπος* is the subject. I think Burnet is right in leaving the MS. reading untouched. Most recent editors (Stallb., Wagner, Zürr., Herm., Schanz) follow Ast in reading *ἐθέλει* for *ἐθέλειν*, and assigning *φαίνεται* to Cleinias. This makes Plato say: "It is clear that *because* man is a 'difficult creature' to deal with, *therefore* he is wont to be difficult in a particular case." The MS. reading says: "because he is difficult (in general), and particularly in the relations of master and servant, the servant question is bound to be an awkward one." This suits the argument at least as well as the former, to say nothing of the awkwardness of the asyndeton after *φαίνεται* in the former arrangement.—*ἀναγκαίαν*, "inevitable."—Plato is probably not thinking solely of the *disinclination to serve*, but also of the possible failure of the *capacity to rule*. It will be remembered that in the *Republic* he is anxious to provide means for removing from a lower or a higher class in the community individual members who were manifestly out of place. He hints here, rather than expresses, the view that the difficulty has its source in the diversities of a nature which refuses to be forced into our artificial categories:—that the source of much trouble caused by slave-holding is that some slaves were better than their masters, and some masters only fit to be slaves.

c 1. The *γάρ* introduces confirmation of the *οὐδαμῶς εὔχρηστον* rather than of the *χαλεπόν*.

c 3. *ἐκ μιᾶς φωνῆς*, "eiusdem linguae," Ficinus.

c 4. If the *τά*, which O alone omits, is correct, it stands for

περὶ τὰ κτλ. — the περί being naturally left out in view of the περί in the following line; it is easily supplied from the preceding περὶ τάς, and περί γε τάς. If the τά be rejected, the construction must be καὶ ὅσα συμβαίνει περιδίνων . . . ἔργα καὶ παθήματα.—For περιδίνων (so a late hand in A and O for περιδείνων) the scholiast in A, and Hesych. s.v., give the interpretation πειρατῶν.

c 5 f. Athenaeus and Stobaeus have παντοδαπῶν, clearly an error.—The MS. κλοπῶν, which Naber would reject, Burnet well emends to κλωπῶν. In A the o is in an erasure. We may translate: "History has repeatedly shown (how many troubles result from this source) in the case of the frequent revolts wont to be made by the Messenians, and in that of the states which own many dependents of the same race; and again in the case of the multifarious robberies and adventures of the so-called 'Rovers' of the Italian shore." It is implied that these Italian pirates had once been held in subjection as slaves. The people in that part of the world have always taken naturally to brigandage. —Stobaeus has doubtless preserved the correct reading in ἂν πάντα, where all other texts have ἅπαντα. Cp. Adam on *Rep.* 437 b: "I have noted the—certain or probable—omission of ἄν in all or the best MSS. in *Phaedo* 62 c, 109 e, *Euthyd.* 291 e (?), *Rep.* 457 d, 516 e, 558 d, where the omission is lipographical; also in *Phaedo* 72 b, *Euthyd.* 281 c, *Crat.* 389 e, 409 a, *Alc. I.* 132 b, 133 e, *Soph.* 266 a, *Phil.* 47 b, *Hipp. Mai.* 295 a."—This sentence is a curious—perhaps we may say careless—repetition of the εἰς ἃ καὶ πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα βλέψαντας κτλ. at 776 d 2.

c 7. δύο δὴ λείπεσθον μόνω μηχανά, "all I can find to recommend by way of policy is these two things."

c 8. τοὺς μέλλοντας ῥᾷον δουλεύσειν, "if they are to bear the yoke easily."—The Grammarians quoted in Stallb.'s note tell us (1) that πατριώτης was used in the sense of συμπατριώτης, just as πολίτης is used for συμπολίτης, and (2) that πολίτης would be used for a free Greek, πατριώτης for a slave or a barbarian.

d 2. μὴ μόνον . . . προτιμῶντας, "paying them attention, not merely on *their* account, but still more on their own." προτιμᾶν, as at 770 d 7, is not used in the sense of *prefer*, but is merely a stronger τιμᾶν. With αὐτῶν we must supply ἕνεκα from the former part of the sentence.

d 3. ἡ δὲ τροφὴ τῶν τοιούτων, "the proper way to treat men in that position is . . ."

d 4. *εἰ δυνατόν* marks the statement as something of a paradox; *ἀδικία* is, of course, never *allowable*. The following *γάρ* clause sets the precept in its right light. The justice which shows itself when there is *no compulsion*, must be *genuine*, and is therefore admirable.

d 7. *ὁ περὶ τὰ τῶν δούλων ἤθη καὶ πράξεις* stands for *ὁ περὶ τὰ περὶ τῶν δούλων ἤ. κ. π.* Schneider is, so far as I know, the only interpreter who takes these words in the right way; all others content themselves with the reproduction of Ficinus's senseless "circa mores actionesque servorum." *ἤθη καὶ πράξεις* is fairly rendered by the English *behaviour*—"the man who shows himself free from all taint of wickedness and oppression in his behaviour towards his slaves."

e 1. *σπείρειν εἰς ἀρετῆς ἔκφυσιν (ἱκανώτατος)* must be a poetical quotation; "ad producendas virtutis fruges aptissimus" Fic. Cp. *Cymbeline* IV. ii. 180, "valour | that wildly grows in them, but yields a crop | as if it had been sow'd." The poetical *ἀμίαντος* was doubtless part of the same passage. It reads like a bit of Pindar.

e 2. *εἰπεῖν ὀρθῶς ἅμα λέγοντα*, "to say, and with truth." "Rhetoribus tritum est dicere *εἰπεῖν λέγων, ἔφη που λέγων*" Lobeck on Soph. *Aj.* 757.

e 3. *καί* is "or," and *πᾶσαν* "any kind of."—Here, as in the injunction at 729 b, *αἰσχύνεσθαι τοὺς νέους*, we come very near to chivalrous and even Christian sentiment.

e 4. *πρὸς ἀσθ. ἐαυ.* does not go with *δυναστεύοντι*—that would be tautological—but with *εἰπεῖν*—"to declare in the case of any superior with reference to his inferior." Cp. the note on *πρός* at 778 a 2.

e 5. The *δ' ἀεί* of A and O is a peculiarly senseless reproduction of a scribe's error, due to the dittography of the Δ of *δεῖ*. If it had not been for the quotations in Ath. and Stob. we should no doubt have acquiesced in the vulgate *ἀεί*.—*καὶ μὴ κτλ.*, "instead of debauching them by mere admonitions such as we should use to our equals."—Aristotle at *Pol.* i. 1260 b 5 directly contradicts Plato on this and the following point.

778 a 1. *πᾶσαν*, "pure and simple."

a 2. *ἃ δή*, "whereby"; a curious adverbial neuter plural—something like *τὸ δέ* used for "whereas." Nearly the same *ἃ δή* occurs at *Phaedr.* 244 d 6 (possibly in a poetic quotation), at Soph. *Aj.* 1043 (Lobeck's note), Dem. *Epist.* 1490, and stands for *ἅτε δή* or *οἷα δή*.—*πρὸς δούλους* is the greatest difficulty; it seems

to be used "pregnantly," in the sense of "in their treatment of slaves." Cp. on 777 e 4; the sense is helped by the previous *πρός* in *προσπαίζοντας*.

a 3. The active *θρύπτοντες* is manifestly used in the sense of the previous *θρύπτεσθαι ποιεῖν*, and we must supply *αὐτούς*, or, better, *τὸν βίον*, from the context, as its object. *ἄρχεσθαι* and *ἄρχειν* are somewhat irregularly epexegetic of *χαλεπώτερον*. (Schneider takes *ἅ* to be directly governed by *θρύπτοντες*—"cujusmodi deliciis multi admodum stulte in servos utentes.") | We may translate: "whereby, in their treatment of slaves, many people, most unwisely, in bringing over-refinement into their life, make it harder both for the slaves as slaves, and for themselves as masters."

a 7. *ὅτε τις . . . κατεσκευασμένος . . . εἴη . . . χρή*: an unusual construction—the *indefinite* *ὅτε εἴη* for the simple temporal *ὅτε ἐστί* or *ὅταν ᾖ*. It is as if we should say *as often as*, in the place of *as soon as ever*; the *ἕως εἴη* at *Theaet.* 155 a 4, where the apodosis is *φήσομεν ἂν γενέσθαι*, is somewhat analogous, but less extraordinary. I think it possible that Plato wrote *χρῆν*—a "philosophic" imperfect; if so, the opt. would be more regular.

b 2 f. *τὴν . . . πόλιν ἐπιμελητέον εἶναι*: for the acc. of the agent with a neut. verbal adj. cp. 643 a 6 and 688 e 5.

b 3. *περί τε ἱερὰ καὶ τείχη*: I think interpreters are wrong in treating these words as if they were *περὶ τά τε ἱερὰ καὶ τὰ τείχη*; i.e. *τε* is not *both*, but *and*. *περὶ ἱ. καὶ τ.* are a variety of expression for *τῶν ἱερῶν καὶ τείχων*, and as such are coupled by *τε* with *τούτων*. What Plato says is that the virgin city's task is to go into all details of city architecture, "and (more particularly) the details of the structure of the temples and the city walls." That is to say, he does not *here* limit the question to the consideration of temples and walls alone. It is only at *νῦν δὲ μόνον* in c 1 that he lets us know that the subject of city architecture is not to be treated at length.

b 4. *ἦν*: a variety of the "philosophic" imperfect; "really, properly, came before . . ." He goes on to explain that, though *in reality* the houses would have to be built before the family life was begun, *in a disquisition* on the subject we may arrange matters in the reverse order, if we like.

b 5. The subject to *γίγνεται* is *πόλις* (understood).—*λόγῳ* is a repetition of the *λόγῳ* at a 10.—*καὶ μαλ' ἐγχωρεῖ*, "it is perfectly legitimate"—the strengthened *μάλα*.

b 7. *ἐὰν θεὸς ἐθέλῃ*: as at 632 e 7 this is added, by way of "make-believe," about a topic which will *not* be found in the

Laws. We never get the details referred to as *πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα*. —*ἤδη τότε*, "at last," for the more usual *τότε ἤδη*, as at *Theaet.* 165 e 3.—*ἐπί*, "on the top of," "after."

c 1. *νῦν δὲ μόνον ὅσον τινὰ τύπον* : the adversative *δέ* refers to the statement *συμπάσης τῆς οἰκοδομικῆς ἐπιμελητέον τίνα τρόπον ἕκαστα ἕξει*, which has in a way been "resumed" in the words *πᾶσιν τοῖς τοιούτοις*.

c 4–d 3. These directions for temple-building are obscure, and in parts the text is corrupt. In the first sentence I follow Ast in making *πέριξ* govern both *πᾶσαν τὴν ἀγοράν* and *τὴν πόλιν ὅλην* : the *τε* and *καί* point to this ; besides, the question of the position of the city as a whole—which other interpreters suppose here indicated—is foreign to our present subject, and has been dealt with to some extent at the beginning of Bk. IV. ; moreover, the expression *πρὸς τοῖς ὑψηλοῖς τῶν τόπων* denotes not one site, but several. The second division of the passage, which is hopeless as it stands, I would propose to reconstruct as follows : (1) For *δικαστηρίων* read *δικαστήρια*, and (2) reject the second *δικαστήρια ἐν οἷς*—that in d 2—as an accidental repetition of the *δικαστήρια ἐν οἷς* at c 7. Possibly it was originally a marginal correction of the erroneous *δικαστηρίων ἐν οἷς* ; perhaps it caught the scribe's eye in a moment of vacuity. We may translate : "The temples we must build not only all round the Agora, but also in all directions about the city, on elevated spots, for the sake of both security and cleanliness ; and adjoining them magistrates' quarters, and courts of law, in which judgements will be pronounced and received as on holy ground, partly because they are on solemn subjects, partly because the buildings are the abodes of solemn deities ; and in these buildings trials for murder would fittingly be held, and for all such offences as are punishable by death." [F.H.D. would reject *καὶ ἐν τούτοις δικαστήρια*.]

c 8 f. *τὰ μὲν . . . ἱδρύματα* : this is difficult. I think we should put a colon after *ἱδρύματα*, and take the full expression of the thought to be *τὰ μὲν ὡς ὁσίων πέρι εἰσὶν αἱ δίκαι, τὰ δὲ καὶ ὡς τοιούτων θεῶν ἱδρύματά ἐστιν τὰ ἱερά*.

d 1. *τοιούτων = ὁσίων*.

d 5. The author of Περὶ ὕψους, § 4, who couples this metaphor with *κυπαριττίνας μνήμας* (741 c), as instances of *τὸ ψυχρόν*, reads *ἐπανίστασθαι* ; he also has *ἐγὼ ξυμφεροίμην ἂν τῇ Σπάρτῃ*—evidently quoting from memory.

d 6. *καλῶς μὲν καὶ ὁ ποιητικὸς ὑπὲρ αὐτῶν λόγος ὑμνεῖται*, "I quite agree for one thing" (*μέν*) "with the poet's often quoted

words in which he tells us."—The author and poem are unknown. —Here again Aristotle disputes Plato's judgement: at *Pol.* 1330 b 32 he says *περὶ δὲ τειχῶν, οἱ μὴ φάσκοντες δεῖν ἔχειν τὰς τῆς ἀρετῆς ἀντιποιουμένας πόλεις λίαν ἀρχαίως ὑπολαμβάνουσιν.* —The *μὲν καί* marks the first of the two reasons given as subordinate in importance to the second, which is introduced by *δ' . . . ἔτι πρὸς τούτοις.*

e 1. *γήινα*: not necessarily of *earth*—or even of brick. He uses this word rather than *λίθινα* because of the previous *ἐν τῇ γῇ κατακείμενα.* The substance of the "earth" in Greece is rock, and the walls *dug out of the earth* would be walls of stone. Ast quotes the orator Lycurgus (*Adv. Leocr.* 153) *ἀλλὰ τὴν μὲν αὐτῶν ἀνδρείαν ἀσφαλεστέραν φυλακὴν εἶναι νομίζοντες τῶν λιθίνων περιβόλων.* Plut. *Lyc.* ch. xix. represents the legislator Lycurgus as saying, "*οὐκ ἂν εἴη ἀτείχιστος πόλις ἅτις ἀνδράσι καὶ οὐ πλίνθοις ἐστεφάνωται.*" Here *πλίνθοι* means blocks of stone.—*τὸ ἡμέτερον* is a periphrasis for *ἡμεῖς.*

e 2. *τὸ κατ' ἐνιαυτὸν μὲν ἐκπέμπειν εἰς τὴν χώραν τοὺς νέους*: the reference is to the tasks proposed at 760 e 6 ff. for the *ἀγρονόμοι*; the *μέν* corresponds to the *δέ* at e 6, where the construction goes on as if we had *εἰ μὲν ἐκπέμποιμεν* here.

e 5. *ὡς δὴ . . . οὐκ ἐάσοντας ἐπιβαίνειν*, "with the manifest intention of keeping them out of the country."

e 6. Steph. would substitute *εἰ* for *δέ*, and Wagner supports *εἰ* by the argument that it is not the mission of the *ἀγρονόμοι*, but the building of the walls that is said to be "ridiculous." But what Plato says is ridiculous is the *inconsistency* between the two actions, and that is exactly expressed by the *μέν* and *δέ*.

e 7. Ast is certainly right in taking *πρός* to be an adverb. (Stallb. would have us couple *πρὸς μαλθακὴν ἕξιν ποιεῖν* in the sense of "conduce to effeminacy.")

e 8. *προκαλούμενον κτλ.*, "a city-wall incites men to run inside it instead of facing the foe, and instead of seeking safety by ensuring that some of them are vigilant night and day, to fancy that the real way to be safe is to shut oneself up and go fast asleep inside walls—as if men were meant for inactivity! Such men don't know that real ease and rest is what comes *after toil*:—what is more, I can tell them that ease and rest of the disgraceful kind, which is nothing but laziness, inevitably produces toil and trouble in its turn."

779 a 4. The close coupling of *καθεύδοντας* with *φραχθέντας* by *τε καί* is a humorous touch, as if not *to be wide awake*

(φρουρεῖν νύκτωρ) but *to go fast asleep* were the right way to protect oneself.

a 6. With τὴν ῥᾳστώνην ὡς ὄντως ἐστὶν ἐκ τῶν πόνων, where the ὄντως marks the expression as proverbial, we may compare 2 *Henry IV.* v. iv. 28, "Well, of sufferance comes ease."

a 7. οἶμαι is a gentle expletive; Wagner's "nach meiner Meinung" makes too much of it, and too little of the strength of the opinion here expressed.—καί is *explanatory.* (The early printed texts altered ῥᾳθυμίας to ῥᾳθυμίαι, an erroneous assimilation like that of δικαστήρια to δικαστηρίων at 778 c 7.)

a 8. πάλιν: whereas the natural order is from toil and trouble to rest, an unnatural propensity to rest *first* will work *the reverse way*, and lead from rest to toil and trouble.—Jowett's "a renewal of trouble" introduces a wrong notion.—τι, "for any reason."

b 2. βάλλεσθαι: used (in the middle) like the Lat. *iacere* (*fundamenta, muros*).

b 3. ὁμαλότητί τε καὶ ὁμοιότησιν: instrumental datives describing the way in which security was to be gained. The houses were to be built on the same plan, and of the same size, so that they would fit together and present an impregnable front to the outer world. (Ficinus took the two datives with the previous clause—as if these characteristics made the city "one continuous wall.")—εἰς τὰς ὁδούς: this arrangement of the houses was apparently not to be confined to those on the edge of the city. The ὁδοί would cut the town up into blocks enclosed in continuous walls.

b 6. διάφορος: *superior*, that is, in safety, to an arrangement which would expose each house to be attacked on all sides.

b 7. MSS. ἕως ἂν μὲν ᾖ; Schneider corrected μὲν ᾖ to μένῃ, but, as Ritter says, ἕως ἂν μένῃ is unintelligible. Burnet has doubtless restored the correct reading by the suggestion that the first letter of the MS. εως is due to dittography of the ε of δέ.—I think it is possible that we ought to remove the comma after δέ and make τούτων depend on τὰ οἰκοδομηθέντα.

c 1 f. καί, "even to the extent of." ζημιοῦντας is subordinate to προσαναγκάζοντας, indicating the means of compulsion.

c 4. τῶν τῆς πόλεως . . . ἐπιλήψεται, "encroach on public property" (Jowett). It is possible that the words mean "interfere with the plan of the city."

c 7. οἰκεῖν, as Ast and Stallb. say, is *administrare.* (Ritter follows Susemihl in taking ὅσα . . . πρέπον ἂν οἰκεῖν εἴη to mean "which sites it would be proper to occupy with buildings"—lit.

"inhabit." His objection that the province of the *ἀστυνόμοι* did not extend outside the city-walls would apply still more to his own interpretation. Such matters, however, as e.g. the introduction of water-courses, and the places where the country roads were to enter the city, were naturally the concern of the city authorities.) [F.H.D. and A.M.A. suggest that *ὅσα* may be *ὅσα ὕδατα.*]—*συνιδόντες ταῖς χρείαις* : *ταῦτα πάντα* is not directly governed by *συνιδόντες*, but by *ἐπινομοθετούντων* ; the dat. *χρείαις* is governed by the *συν-* in *συνιδόντες*, "considering them in the light of experience"—"usu docti" Fic.—"usu cognita" Schn.—There is some analogy in construction with 965 b 10 *πρὸς ἐκεῖνο συντάξασθαι πάντα συνορῶντα* ; there *πάντα* is directly governed by *συντάξασθαι.*

d 2. *δι' ἀπορίαν* : there are many such points which the statutory law is incapable of foreseeing.—*ὅτε*, "now that."

d 4. *περιμένει*, "are ready for."

d 8. *ἔστωσαν γεγονότες* : so at 736 b 7 *ἔστω συμβεβηκυῖα*, where there was the same invitation to *imagine* that a certain stage had been reached ; cp. too 712 a 4.

d 9. *δίαιτα* : rather *vitae spatium* (Schn.) than *vivendi regula* (Fic.) ; *ἥν* in the next line is *temporal*, like *τὴν ἡμέραν* at 780 a 4.

e 2. *διαφερούσῃ ἐσομένῃ* : this, and *ὧν διαφέρων* at 963 b 5, may, as Stallb. says, be added to Porson's list in his note on *Hec.* 358 beginning "Rara participii substantivi cum alio participio conjunctio."—Schneider, Zürr., Herm., Wagner, and Schanz all follow Bekker in printing a mark of interrogation after *ἐσομένῃ*. The early edd. up to Steph. put a full stop after it. Ficinus, however, had already seen that *τίνα τρόπον χρὴ ζῆν* depends on *εἰπεῖν*. Ast (in his text), Stallb., and Burnet rightly follow Ficinus, and Burnet makes the construction rather more clear by marking off *τὸ δὴ . . . ἐχόμενον* (which Fic. neglects altogether) as a parenthesis. This parenthesis means : "the natural sequel to our previous injunctions"—the injunctions, i.e., given above and interrupted at 776 b 5, on the subject of choice of a wife, and the marriage ceremony. The above-mentioned majority of interpreters take *τῶν νῦν εἰρημένων* to be the immediately preceding words. But why should Plato call the problem that faces him one that *springs from* the previous one, when it *is* the previous one—the question, i.e., how the married pair are to spend the first year of married life?

e 4. *τοιούτων* : i.e. *δυσκόλων* or *δυσχερῶν*, which is the equivalent of the ironical *οὐ πάντων εὐκολώτατον.*

780 a 2. Fähse proposed to alter *πράττοντας* to *τάττοντας*; but we want *πράττοντας* to govern *τὰ δημόσια καὶ κοινά* more than we want something for *πῇ χρὴ ζῆν* to depend on; for this depends very easily, as a *πρὸς τὸ σημαινόμενον* construction, on *πόλεσιν ἀποφαίνεσθαι νόμους*. Ast finds a reason for *τάττοντας* in the fact that *τὰ δημόσια καὶ κοινά* go with *ζῆν* below at a 6. Rather should we see in the explicit construction at a 2—as the MSS. have it—an excuse for the looser construction when the phrase is afterwards repeated.

a 3. Ast, comparing *Phaedo* 64 e 1 *καθ' ὅσον μὴ πολλὴ ἀνάγκη μετέχειν αὐτῶν*, thinks a *μή* has fallen out before *ἀνάγκη* here; but this would suggest that the legislator in question *did* conceive that there might be cases where private life ought to be interfered with, and that is just what Plato at a 5 says he does *not*. Schneider takes *ὅσον ἀνάγκη* to be "as far as necessity goes"; his translation is "privata vero ab omni necessitate liberanda," and so Wagner—"insoweit die Nothwendigkeit in Betracht komme."—A further difficulty arises about *τῶν ἰδίων*: does it (as neuter) depend on *ἀνάγκη*, or is *τῶν ἰδίων* (*νόμων*) governed by *δεῖν*? I think it is best to follow Schneider, and to take the genitive with *ἀνάγκη*: "so far as compulsion in private life goes." (Apelt p. 12 would read *ἂν ἄρχῃ* for *ἀνάγκη*—"whatever rules over private life."—Ast, who keeps a store of prepositions up his sleeve for use in such cases, says *τὰ δημόσια* "est" *κατὰ τὰ δημόσια*, and *τῶν ἰδίων* "est" *περὶ τῶν ἰδίων*.) [F.H.D. would make *τῶν ἰδίων* (neut.) depend on *ὅσον*.]

a 4. The *δεῖν* in a 5 goes with *εἶναι* as well as with *γίγνεσθαι*. —*πάντα*: i.e. *both* public and private life.

a 6. *τά γε κοινὰ καὶ δημόσια*: an irregular sort of acc. of inner object. See above on a 2.—*ἐθελήσειν*, "will be likely to"; or perhaps "will be willing to." In either case the implication is that, if the one province is left unregulated, lawlessness is likely to invade the other as well. (Cp. below d 7.)—*αὐτούς* is the same *αὐτούς* as at a 2, i.e. *τοὺς πολίτας*. (Schneider takes it to be emphatic: "*ipsos sua sponte* usuros legibus.")

a 8. *διαφερόντως*: Ficinus, Schneider, and Wagner are wrong, I think, in taking this to be *aliter*. Plato seems always to use the word in the sense of either "*specially*," or "*more*," never in that of "*otherwise*."—In the two passages cited in L. & S. for the meaning differently from, it certainly means *more* (*than*).—Here *μηδὲν διαφερόντως μηδὲ ἧττον* is used like our "neither more nor less," in the sense of "just as much." (Those who make *διαφερόντως*

mean *aliter* do not take it with *ἐν συσσιτίοις*, only with *τὴν δίαιταν ποιεῖσθαι*. Besides doing violence to *διαφερόντως*, this enlargement of the reference to life in general is quite out of place; the following context shows that the *συσσίτια* alone are in question here.—*τοῦτο* in b 2 is *the institution of the συσσίτια*.)

b 2. *τοῦ . . . χρόνου*: by brachylogy for *ἢ ἐν τῷ . . . χρόνῳ*.

b 3. *θαυμαστὸν ὄν*: i.e. to the rest of Greece.—(Ast would reject *ὄν* as due to dittography of the last syllable of *θαυμαστὸν*, supplying *ἦν* as the verb; but the anacoluthon in the *δέ* in b 7 is natural in a conversational style.)—*κατ' ἀρχὰς πρῶτον*: a pleonasm of the same nature as *κατὰ δύναμιν ὅτι μάλιστα*.—*παρ' ὑμῖν*: i.e. in the countries of both his hearers.

b 4. *νομοθετεῖν*: used figuratively, like our "dictate"; when the verb is repeated below at c 6 it is used in its natural sense. The first institutor was not a real lawgiver, but a *special need*—at e 2 he calls it a *providential* one—the implication being that no human lawgiver could have ventured to enforce such a custom.

b 5 f. *ὑμῖν*, from b 4, has to be supplied in thought with *νομοθετήσαντος*, and with this *ὑμῖν ἐχομένοις* agrees; the words *ἐν ὀλιγανθρωπίαις* and *ὑπὸ πολλῆς ἀπορίας* describe two attendant circumstances which conspired to compel the adoption of *συσσίτια*: (1) the population was small, and (2) it was threatened by a great danger. (A.M.A. cps. the "National" or "Communal Kitchens" started during the war.)

c 1. Schanz suggests that possibly we ought to read *φέρειν* for *διαφέρειν*.

c 2. *ἐπιτήδευμα*: as at 638 c 2, "practice."

c 4–d 1. "What I wanted to explain was, that, though this institution was once viewed with amazement, and was one which no lawgiver would have dared to impose on people, to-day there would be no such difficulty in the way of the lawgiver who wanted to enact it. But that which is the logical consequence of this institution, a thing which, like the former (*τε*), is by nature adapted to succeed if tried, and which, *because* it is tried nowhere, as good as makes the lawgiver, as the saying is, card his wool into the fire and lose his labour in countless other such ways—this is one which it is neither easy to propose, nor for the proposer to put in practice."

c 7. The *τε* after *πεφυκός* and that after *νῦν* seem right enough, and there is no need to change the second into *δὲ* with Hermann (followed by Stallb., Bdh., Wagn., and Schanz); but I think that Badham is certainly right in removing the comma

after the second γιγνόμενον and the τε after ὀλίγου. It is not the institution in question that makes the legislator's work fruitless, but *the fact that the institution is nowhere adopted.* The τε after νῦν connects the first γιγνόμενον with ποιοῦν, to which the second γιγνόμενον is subordinate.—There are two spheres where "law and order" (d 5) ought to be introduced; its absence in the second vitiates its action in the first. This is explained in what follows.—Another conjecture I would unhesitatingly accept in this passage is Ast's change of ποιοῦντα to πονοῦντα. He cps. *Rep.* 486 c ἀνόνητα δὴ πονῶν.—ἀνήνυτα is an adverb.

c 8. "The phrase τὸ τῶν παιζόντων in Plato seems always to mean "as they say in the proverb" or "proverbial saying." Adam on *Rep.* 422 e.

d 3. ἀποκνεῖν: this word reminds us of Socrates's expressions of reluctance to deal with the regulation of the position of women at the beginning of Bk. V. of the *Republic.*

d 4. ἀκούοιτ' ἄν . . . μάτην, "I will explain, for fear that this very subject may involve us in much useless discussion." (Fic., Ast (*Lex.*), and Schneider take διατριβή to be simply *delay*: "ne frustra in hoc ipso diu vos teneam," Schneider.)

d 6. τῶν δὲ ἀτάκτων . . . ἄλλα ἕτερα, "while most of what is unregulated or ill-regulated weakens the effect of something else that is well regulated."

d 8. ἄλλα ἕτερα, "others besides"; a tautological expression—something like our "safe and sound"—sufficiently familiar to be used where the sense of rhythm demands weight of phrase. Cp. Eur. *Or.* 345 οἶκον ἄλλον ἕτερον ἢ τὸν ἀπὸ θεογόνων γάμων, *Suppl.* 573 πολλοὺς ἕτλην δὴ χατέρους ἄλλους πόνους, Dem. *De Rhod. lib.* p. 198 Κῶν καὶ Ῥόδον καὶ ἄλλας ἑτέρας πόλεις Ἑλληνίδας, Plato, *Crat.* 438 d 4 οὐ γάρ που ἐπὶ ὀνόματά γε ἕτερα ἄλλα τούτων, and *Laws* 875 d 7, 894 e 5, and 933 e 6 (acc. to the MS. reading).—οὗ δὴ καὶ νῦν ἐφέστηκεν πέρι τὸ λεγόμενον, "it is just as an instance of this that the subject under discussion now presents itself to us." A partial analogy to this is presented by Arist. *Metaph.* ii. 999 a 24 ἀπορία . . . περὶ ἧς ὁ λόγος ἐφέστηκε νῦν; cp. also Arist. *Pol.* 1287 a 1. τὸ λεγόμενον then would be the position of women, and the whole sentence would mean, "the position of women is a case in point." (It must be admitted that this explanation is somewhat strained. If we could be bold enough to adopt Badham's rather violent change (p. 20) of πέρι to πείρα, all difficulty of interpretation would vanish: "and we have in this very thing a case in point, as the saying is."—It would also

be perhaps too bold to imagine the existence of such a phrase as *περὶ τούτου ἐφέστηκεν* in the sense of "that is the matter in hand"—*ἐφέστηκεν* being impersonal.—Ast, Schn., and Wagner take *ἐφέστηκε*—here, and perhaps in the Aristotelian passage as well—to mean "*is at a standstill*"; but, though *ἐπιστῆναι* can certainly mean "to halt," "to come to a stop," it is doubtful whether the perf. was used in the sense of "to stand still"; besides, it is not clear that there *is* any *halt* in the discussion.—*τὸ λεγομενον*, acc. to these interpreters, is *oratio nostra*. [F.H.D. agrees with Ast and Schneider.]

e 1. *ὅπερ εἶπον*: i.e. at 780 b 3.—*θαυμαστῶς* is not *admirably* (Fic., Jowett and others), but "to the world's astonishment," "extraordinarily."

781 a 1. *ἀνομοθέτητον μεθεῖται*: the expression suggests that a charge of undue licence might be brought against the Spartan and Cretan women; and this seems to have been the case if we may trust Euripides (*Androm.* 595 ff.). Stallb. cps. Hoeckh, *De Creta ins.* iii. 124.—*εἰς τὸ φῶς ἥκται*: a poetical expression, used as at *Prot.* 320 d, *Theaet.* 157 d, *Tim.* 91 d, *Laws* 869 c, *Rep.* 461 c in the sense of "has come into being," "has been created"—*φῶς* being "*life*" as at Soph. *Phil.* 415 *ὡς μηκέτ' ὄντα κεῖνον ἐν φάει νόει*; whereas below, at c 6, as above at 722 e, and at *Parm.* 128 e, *Phaedr.* 261 e, *φῶς* is used for "*publicity*." Here, however, as in some of the other instances where *φῶς* means *life*, the secondary sense of *exposure to men's gaze* is suggested as well.

a 2. *ἀλλ' ὅ*: the MSS. and the early printed texts read *ἄλλο*, and some of them not only accepted the asyndeton, and slurred over the *ἄλλως*, but treated *ἀνθρώπων* as if it were *ἀνδρῶν*. Steph. was the first to see the true reading, though he printed *ἄλλο* in his text: *τοῦτο* in a 4 is the antecedent to this *ὅ*.—*καὶ ἄλλως* here = "to begin with"; we may transl.: "No; just that part of our human race which was, to begin with, clandestine and stealthy, as the result of its weakness—I mean the female sex—has most unwisely been suffered by the lawgiver to be free from law, because to bring it under law was hard."

a 3. The comparatives stand for strengthened positives; for the *μᾶλλον* thus used see on 729 e 7.—For *ἐπικλοπώτερον* thus applied cp. Hes. *Op.* 67 and 78 (*ἐν δ' ἐτίθει στήθεσσι*) *ψεύδεά θ' αἰμυλίους τε λόγους καὶ ἐπίκλοπον ἦθος*—of the first woman.

a 5. *εἴξαντος τοῦ νομοθέτου*: cp. Arist. *Pol.* ii. 1270 a 6 *τὰς δὲ γυναῖκάς φασι μὲν ἄγειν ἐπιχειρῆσαι τὸν Λυκοῦργον ὑπὸ τοὺς νόμους, ὡς δ' ἀντέκρουον, ἀποστῆναι πάλιν.—διὰ δὲ τούτου*

μεθειμένου . . . ἢ τὰ νῦν, "and, owing to your neglect of this sex, you lost control of much which would have been in a far better condition, if it had come under the Law, than it is now." The early texts, down to Ast, had *παραρρεῖ*, and this seems to have been Ficinus's reading—unless indeed, like Stallb., he took *παρέρρει* to be from *παρέρρω*; he also seems to have read *ἡμῖν* for *ὑμῖν*. He translated: "hoc enim praetermisso multa nobis corrumpuntur." L. & S. can hardly be right in giving *παρέρρει ὑμῖν* here the meaning "slipped from your memory"; it is rather "slipped from you," "got out of your control," but not as much as Schneider's "*depravata sunt.*" *ὑμῖν*—not *ἡμῖν*—is clearly right; the Ath. does not conceive that any state could have taken in hand the regulation of the private life of women, which had not already dealt with that of men.

a 7–b 4. *τό* (in b 1) does not go directly with *περιορώμενον* (as Stallb.) but with *περὶ τὰς γυναῖκας*; *τὸ περὶ τὰς γυναῖκας*, as above at 780 e 2, is a variety of *τὸ τῶν γυναικῶν*, and is a periphrasis for "the female sex."—The argument, rather fancifully thrown into a mathematical form, is this: "it might be thought that, as women are the half of the race, the effect of leaving them unregulated by law would be half as much as the effect of leaving the whole race unregulated; but it is not so, because their tendencies to evil are greater than those of men—so much so that the result would be more than twice as much mischief as would have resulted from so leaving men alone;—so that *ἥμισυ* and *διπλάσιον* do not apply to the same quantity: the former is half the mischief which would be effected by the whole race, if unregulated; the latter the double of the harm which either half would do if they had been equally bad."—*ἀκοσμήτως περιορώμενον* is "under a *laissez-faire régime*," lit. "passed over on the principle of non-intervention." (Ast would read *ἀκόσμητον*, taking *τὸ π. τ. γ. ἀκόσμητον* to be "*pravitas muliebris*," and translating *περιορ.* by "*si legibus non coerceretur.*" Stallb. cites from Gramm. in Bekker, *Anecd.* i. p. 369 *ἀτάκτως* as an explanation of *ἀκοσμήτως*—which not only confirms the adv. but shows that Ast has taken both *ἀκ.* and *περιορ.* wrongly.—Stallb., who takes *τὸ περιορώμενον* as the subject of *ἥμισύ ἐστιν*, has to supply *αὐτό* as the subject of *διαφέρει*.)

b 4. *ἐπαναλαβεῖν*, "revise."

b 6 ff. *οὕτως* qualifies *οὐδαμῶς εὐτυχῶς*; he has told us at 780 (b 4 and) e 2 that the syssitia owed their existence to a happy chance, and a providential interposition. No such chance has

intervened to lead men to the kindred reform now advocated; instead of that there is a likelihood that its proposer would be thought mad—at all events (γ') in states which have no syssitia for men.

c 1 f. *συσσίτια . . . δεδογμένα κατὰ πόλιν εἶναι*, "that syssitia are a recognized civic institution."—*ὑπάρχει* is impersonal.

c 2. *πόθεν*, as at *Gorg.* 471 d and *Symp.* 172 c, means "how is it possible that . . .?"—*ἔργῳ*, "*in real life*, as we know it in Greece," as contrasted with the *theoretical considerations* in which the political and social systems of the Laws are founded—referred to at d 3 f. in the words *λόγου γ' ἕνεκα*.

c 3. *γυναῖκας προσβιάζεσθαι τὴν σ. κ. π. ἀνάλωσιν φανερὰν θεωρεῖσθαι*: an awkward sentence: "to force upon women their consumption of food and drink's being publicly viewed." The *acc. c. inf.* clause is a sort of secondary object to *προσβιάζεσθαι*, like *ταῦτα* in *οὐ δεῖ ταῦτα προσβιάζεσθαι* at *Crat.* 410 a 7. (Stallb. translates *γυναῖκας προσβιάζεσθαι . . . ἀνάλωσιν* by "*mulieres cogere ad . . . consumptionem*," supplying *ὥστε* before *φανερὰν θεωρεῖσθαι*. Ast is said to have suggested—I cannot find where—that *ποιουμένας* has fallen out before *θεωρεῖσθαι*. Badham would change *γυναῖκας* to *γυναικῶν*.)

c 5. *χαλεπώτερον*: adv., "more reluctantly."

c 6. *δεδυκός*: cp. *Rep.* 579 b *καταδεδυκὼς δὲ ἐν τῇ οἰκίᾳ τὰ πολλὰ ὡς γυνὴ ζῇ*. O by a common mistake has *δεδοικὸς*, and this is the reading of the early printed texts, up to Ast, and of Ficinus, who translates *timide*. H. Steph. from a comparison of *Rep.* 579 b conjectured *καταδεδυκὸς*.—*ἀγόμενον*: *conative*; "when the attempt is made to drag her."—Ast would reject the δ' after this word; H. Richards would change it to *δὴ*.

c 7. *πᾶσαν*, like *πάσης* at d 2, *all kinds of*.—*πολὺ κρατήσει*, "will be far too strong for."

d 1. *τοῦτ'*: i.e. *τὸ γένος*, "this sex."—*ὅπερ* which is Bekker's correction of the MS. *οἷπερ*, certainly makes better sense than either the vulgate *ᾗπερ* or Stallb.'s *οὗπερ*; it would refer to b 8. At the same time, the vulgate *ᾗπερ*, which Schn., Zürr., and Herm. retain, is possible, and accounts better for the MS. *οἷπερ*. Stallb.'s *οὗπερ* would mean "(in the other places) to which I referred"; but he had not definitely referred to any particular states which had no syssitia.—*οὐδὲ . . . τὸν λόγον . . τὸν ὀρθὸν ῥηθέντα*, "not even the mention of the correct view."

d 3. *εἰ δὴ δοκεῖ κτλ.*: a practical application of the principle enunciated above at 739. If the circumstances of the case render

the theoretically best impracticable, the philosopher is even willing to sacrifice theoretical completeness, and leave the subject alone. "If you wish our discussion of politics as a whole to attain its end, as far as theory goes, I am quite willing to give reasons for thinking my view good and fitting, provided you like to listen to them; if you don't, I will drop the subject."—Fähse and Ast would, very plausibly, read ἀτελῆ for ἀτυχῆ. Ast thinks that Ficinus read ἀτελῆ because he translates the word by *manca*. This does not follow; e.g. at *Crat.* 420 c 7 he translates ἀτυχία by "*defectus quidam consequendi impos.*" (ἀτυχής means *unsuccessful* as well as *unfortunate*. The Ath. means "if you have it at heart to make our talk *a success.*"—λόγου γ' ἕνεκα is contrasted with the ἔργῳ at c 2. (Stallb., Wagner, and Jowett take εἰ δοκεῖ . . . τὸν λόγον γενέσθαι to be "*if it is your opinion* that the discussion *has been* etc.")

d 9. ἄνωθέν ποθεν ἐπιχειρεῖν, "to be starting from a long way back." ἐπιχειρεῖν is used absolutely, in the sense of *proceed, take a particular line* in an argument or investigation.

e 2. With πάντῃ πάντως, which occurs below at 801 a 1, cp. μηδαμῇ μηδαμῶς above at 778 a 1.

e 5. With Bk. III. begins the investigation of the true nature and correct form of the πολιτεία, and so he refers to what comes at the beginning of that book as τὰ πρῶτα λεχθέντα. We are not bound to suppose that when these words were written the treatise actually began at Bk. III.

e 6. χρόνος and χρή are both such common words that they are likely to have been signified occasionally by their first two letters. This would account for the fact that A has χρόνον where L and O (though in an erasure) and the margin of A have the correct χρή. Schanz thinks the mistake due to a misreading of an original χρεών.

782 a 2. As τὸ παράπαν qualified εἴληχεν and ἕξει, so πάντως qualifies both ἦν and ἔσται.—ἢ μῆκός τι . . . ἂν εἴη, "or else a space of time since its beginning—since it came into being—must have lasted an immeasurable age." A very awkwardly constructed sentence; it is doubtful if it is Greek. It looks like the "conflation" of two modes of expressing the same thing; fortunately there is no doubt what it means—i.e. that if the time of the world's existence is not infinite, at all events it is unthinkably long. [F.H.D. would asterisk μῆκός τι τῆς ἀρχης as spurious or hopelessly corrupt.]

a 5. ἐπιτηδεύματα means *practices, courses, measures adapted to*

influence character or habits; τάξεως and ἀταξίας are qualifying, adjectival genitives. We may perhaps render: "*régimes* of all kinds, some strict, some lax." ἐπιτηδεύματα ἀταξίας is almost an oxymoron; it seems to mean nothing more than "the principle of *laissez-faire*."

a 6. καὶ βρώσεως was rejected by Ast, and βρ. was emended to ἀβρότητος by Orelli, and to ἡμερώσεως by Hermann. Wagner would change βρωμάτων to δωμάτων. Schanz follows Ast. Though it is difficult I prefer the MS. reading. I would put a comma after βρώσεως and supply παντοῖα ἐπιτηδεύματα with it, taking the words to mean "*various fashions of feeding oneself*." The counterpart to this is *a variety of taste in articles of food*, and that is the variety next mentioned. I even think that the introduction of the second variety—by a ἅμα—would be too abrupt without the preceding καὶ βρώσεως. We shall see presently why he brings in the bodily appetites. (Cp. on d 7 below.)

b 1. αὐτῶν is "*of their previous selves*," i.e. "of their natures."

b 5. The τινα indicates that the Ath. does not insist on the historical truth of the myth of Triptolemus; someone, at all events, at some time introduced corn as a new food.

b 6. Many edd. have adopted Ald.'s unnecessary change of μὴ to μηδὲ.—The article with χρόνῳ after ᾧ is peculiar; I think we ought to read πω for the MS. τῷ.—As at 780 b 6 and e 1 (see Burnet's notes), the margin, by μον, shows what the original scribe's mistake for μῶν had been.

c 1. The argument is that the survival of human sacrifices proves the existence of cannibalism in the past. Further, the Orphic vegetarianism and the Orphic sacrificial offerings, on the other hand, are indications of very opposite feelings as to methods of feeding, and tastes in food, thus establishing the appositeness of the παντοῖα, and παντοδαπά at a 6 and 7.

c 3. For ὅτε cp. Porson's note on οἶσθ' ὅτε at Eur. *Hec.* 110. —Schanz's ἐτόλμων μὲν is clearly a better correction than Stallb.'s ἐτόλμων for the MS. ἐτολμῶμεν. The δέ after πέλανοι corresponds to the μέν after ἐτόλμων; there is an erasure over the ο of ἐτολμῶμεν in A.—The order is, as usual, chiastic; food, sacrifices: sacrifices, food.

c 5. ἁγνά is, so to speak, in quotation-marks; as if he had said "in Orphic language, *pure*." Cp. Horace, *A.P.* 392 *victu* foedo *deterruit Orpheus*; *foedo* being used, in the technical Orphic sense, for all animal food; not, as Orelli, "the food of beasts," nor, as others "cannibalism."

c 7. Ὀρφικοί τινες λεγόμενοι βίοι ἐγ. ἡμ. τοῖς τότε, "what is generally spoken of as the Orphic rule of life was followed by our race in those days." The ἡμῶν emphasizes the unity of human nature in all ages; the intimation is that modes of thought and taste which had once existed could quite possibly be recalled.

c 8. ἐχόμενοι, as the direct opposite of ἀπείχοντο and ἀπεχόμενοι, is "*insisting on*"—Schneider *sectantes*; they made it part of their religion to eat what was *not* animal.

d 2. ἅ τ᾽: MSS. Bekker's rejection of the ἅ gives us on the whole a better sentence than either Steph.'s ἅ γ᾽ or Winckelmann's ἅττ᾽ or Stalb.'s ἄττ᾽. The dittography of the α is more likely to have happened than the corruption of γ᾽ to τ᾽.—There remains, however, rather a superfluity of conjunctions; the first καί merely emphasizes σφόδρα.—καὶ σφόδρα λεγόμενα, "what is very widely current."

d 7. It is implied, though not said, that τὰ τούτοις ἑξῆς—the next step in his train of thought—would explain why the preceding one had been taken. As at 781 d 9, the Ath. shows a consciousness that the order of his mental processes is somewhat obscure. It has been suggested above that the Spartan and Cretan institution of the syssitia points the way by which a complete regulation of the home and family life may be secured in the interests of the state. The Ath. next turns to consider the things in human nature which want regulating. These turn out to be *the natural appetites*, which, in certain aspects, may become, or be attended by, νοσήματα (783 a 4). His solution is that all these appetites *must be enlisted in the service of the community*: otherwise there will be moral disease.

d 10. χρείας καὶ ἐπιθυμίας: a hendiadys, "imperative desire"; i.e. desire whose satisfaction is a necessity of existence.—πάντα τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ἠρτημένα ἐκ . . . means that these three desires are the cardinal factors in human nature—the two first, in its individual, the last in its racial aspect.

d 11. As in 728 c 4 with ὅ τε τυχὼν καὶ μὴ τυγχάνων, so here the variety between ἀγομένοις and ἀχθεῖσιν seems to have no special significance, but to be due to a desire for variety in sound and rhythm.

e 2. ἣν πέρι ἅπασαν, like περὶ ἅπαντα ταῦτα at e 5, stands for a simple genitive; here it depends on ἔρωτα, there on ἐπιθυμίας.

e 3. ἔμφυτον, like σύμφυτον at 771 b 7, is *instinctive*.—μεστὸν οἴστρου καὶ ἀνηκουστίας τοῦ λ., like the ὕβρει πλείστῃ at a 3 below, suggests the lines along which the possessors of these cardinal

instincts may be κακῶς ἀγόμενοι—in which case they become νοσήματα.—οἴστρου τε καὶ ἀνηκουστίας: a hendiadys again, "frenzied rebellion."

e 5. ἀποπληροῦντα: this construction supposes that a τινα is the subject to πράττειν.

e 6. λύπης: this is the way desire works—by *pain* which craves alleviation. δεῖν might no doubt be dispensed with, but it is more like an author's than a scribe's pleonasm. I am much attracted by Apelt's suggestion (p. 12) that ἀεὶ δεῖν—coming as it does after a final ς—is a scribe's error for σπεύδειν. σπεύδων, he notices, is just so used at *Timaeus* 86 c 1, in a passage very like this.—σφᾶς is the pleasures and desires which are thus half personified—an unusual use of the pronoun.

783 a 3. ὕβρει πλείστῃ καόμενος, "a reckless, wanton *flame* of passion."

a 4–b 1. ἃ δὴ . . . ἐπιρροήν: (1) I think the object to be supplied in thought with τρέποντα—which, and not the πρέποντα of L, I assume to be the right reading—is not the νοσήματα, but the people who are liable to them—i.e. the possessors of the appetites—the αὐτοῖς of 782 d 11, who were to be rightly guided. (2) Ritter glances at the possibility that, though the restraints are said to be *three*, the Ath. is really thinking of only *two*—i.e. *the terrors of the law* (cp. d 6 ἀπειλήσοντές τισιν νόμοις), and the sort of *persuasion* used in the προοίμια which accompany the laws; but he is right, I think, in rejecting this idea, and regarding νόμος here as *force of habit*. (3) I think it probable that σβεννύντων is a scribe's error, and that the Aldine and Vulgate σβεννύναι is the correct reading. The scribe probably did not intend it (as Stallb. and Herm.) for a gen. abs., but for an imperative, forgetting the previous construction. (As to the possibility of such a gen. abs. cp. on 755 d 6 above.) (Steph. *may* be right in reading τρέποντας, though the change of number is common in Plato in such cases, and the sing. is attested by the variant πρέποντα.) "In dealing with these three dangerous impulses, we must guide men's eyes, beyond what is called delight, towards their true advantage, and must try, on the one hand, to restrain the dangerous tendencies by the three most potent influences of *fear*, *habit*, and *philosophy*; and on the other, by calling in the aid of Music and Gymnastics, to quench their fire and allay the fury of their onset."—The μέντοι in a 7 corresponds to the μέν in a 5, thus adding, it seems to me, to the confirmation of the reading σβεννύναι.—Ritter is right in saying that ἀγωνίοισι is almost predicative; no

special presiding gods are meant, but the gods generally, in their capacity of patrons of gymnastic contests.

In the last few pages of this book we seem to have detached suggestions of lines of argument, which a final revision would have rearranged and worked up into a consecutive exposition. The chief points in it are: (1) The danger of leaving human nature to itself; (2) the great possibilities in the way of *moulding* human nature; (3) the mistake of confounding acquired habits and prejudices with laws of nature. The passage from παίδων δὲ δή in b 2 to καλῶς in d 4 occurs in L, but was originally absent from A and O. It begins in much the same way as Bk. VII. begins; this fact, and the detachment of the passage, are further indications that this part of the treatise has not received its final ordering.

b 2. θῶμεν is used of the *arrangement of topics* in their imaginary legislation.

b 5. We are bound, I think, to accept the reading ἡνίκα ἀφικόμεθα, though, as the text stands, it appears inexplicable. I would suggest that the corruption lies in the MSS. εἰς τὸ ἔμπροσθεν. This phrase is common, especially with προϊέναι—e.g. above, 755 b 4 προϊόντων τῶν νόμων εἰς τοὔμπροσθεν—and the neighbourhood of προϊόντων here may have influenced the scribe; but the phrase will not fit either περαίνοιτο ἄν or ἡνίκα ἀφικόμεθα. I would substitute ὡς for εἰς, and take ὡς as the correlative of the οὕτω in b 3: "while the discussion advances on the same lines as it did when we came on the subject of the syssitia before, possibly our full tale of regulations will be made up." The way the subject was reached above was through the question (779 d 5) "what has the legislator to say to men and women after they are married?"—I would, with Burnet, accept Ritter's arrangement of τὰς τοιαύτας . . . κατοψόμεθα as a parenthesis. (One Florentine MS. and most of the early texts read ἵνα καὶ ἀφικόμενοι εἰς for ἡνίκα ἀφικόμεθα, and this reading is retained by Stallb. and Herm. Schneider reads ὅτε for ὅ τε, ἀφικώμεθα for ἀφικόμεθα, and (like Zürr.) retains the spurious εἰς before τάς. Schanz abandons the passage as hopeless.)

b 8. The second great difficulty in this passage is the interpretation of τά τε ἐπίπροσθεν . . . ἐπίπροσθεν ποιησόμεθα. ἐπίπροσθεν ποιεῖσθαι occurs above at 648 d in the sense of *obtendere*. The τε seems to point back to the τε in ὅ τε νόμος at b 4. If so, αὐτῶν *may* stand for νόμων, but more likely for τῶν συσσιτίων, and τὰ ἐπίπροσθεν αὐτῶν are "the necessary steps leading up to them," which are to be made into *screens*, or *defences*, set up in

front of them. "And the preliminaries to the syssitia, which are (equally) unregulated at present, we will reduce to order, and place before them as a screen or shelter." The upshot of the passage then is this: "at the present stage of our inquiry we must be content to reserve the details of the regulation of private life, but I want you to remember what I said about the three cardinal impulses of human nature, for that is important."

c 2. *νυνδή*: i.e. at b 5 ff.

d 2. All recent editors except Schneider accept Steph.'s insertion of *ὧν* before *τὰ νῦν*. (Schneider prefers to read *ἃ* for *τὰ*.)

d 4. We are here brought back to the point from which we digressed in 779 e.

d 5. *αὐτούς*: i.e. *τοὺς νυμφίους*, implied in *τὰ νυμφικά*.

d 9. *ἀποδεικνῦσθαι*, like *ἀποφαίνεσθαι* at 780 a 1, is used for *to produce*.

e 1. *πάντες . . . πράξεως*, "all who take part in any kind of common work." *κοινωνοί* is the important word. As *union* increases efficiency beyond the proportion of mere numbers, so failure on the part of one of the united workers does more harm than if he were merely spoiling work of his own.

e 3. *μὴ ἔχοντες νοῦν*: ignorance, as well as carelessness, may cause failure. This furnishes one reason for the supervision practised by the committee of wise women—as to whom cp. *Theaet.* 149 d 6.

784 a 1. *ἃς εἱλόμεθα*: here, as in the *ἡνίκα ἀφικόμεθα* at 783 b 5, many interpreters unaccountably translate the aor. ind. as if it were a subj. with *ἄν*. It is possible that the past tense stands for "whom you are to assume that we have chosen," but more likely Ritter is right in seeing here an additional sign of the lack of revision. When writing these words the author thought he had spoken of these female officials before. On revision he would have discovered his error.

a 2. *τοῖς ἄρχουσιν*: who the magistrates are who are to determine the composition of this body of female officials we are left to guess; possibly a committee of the *νομοφύλακες*. (Stallb., after quoting Hermann's (*De vest.* ii. p. 7) extraordinary statement that the *custodes* of the married pairs were some men and some women, apparently, in his next note, takes *προστάττειν ἄρχουσι* to mean "add to the number of (male) officials." But, as Ritter says, *προστάττειν* never has this meaning in Plato.

a 3. *ὁπόταν*: i.e. at what intervals fresh elections were to take place.

a 4. *μέχρι τρίτου μέρους ὥρας*: the proceedings at this daily

gathering are also left mostly to our imagination. Among other things we may conclude that twenty minutes was the *minimum* time of attendance.

a 7. ὑπό (cp. *Rep.* 461 a 6, and *Laws* 917 d 8 *τῇ μάστιγι τυπτέσθω πληγὰς ὑπὸ κήρυκος ἐν τῇ ἀγορᾷ κηρύξαντος ὧν ἕνεκα μέλλει τύπτεσθαι*) : of the *circumstances accompanying* the laying of the injunctions on the wedded pair. It is the same use which occurs as a term of music to denote the instrument which accompanies a song.

b 2. δεκέτις : in the state of the *Republic*, where there were to be no husbands and wives, the time during which fathers and mothers were to produce children "for the state" was twenty years (*Rep.* 460 e).

b 3. ὅταν, "in cases where."

b 5. *βουλευομένους εἰς τὰ πρόσφορα ἑκατέροις* : for this use of εἰς for "as to," or "in" cp. 775 a 7 *τῷ μὲν εἰς χρήματα μεγίστῳ*. Interpreters all follow Ficinus—whose transl. is *prout commodum utrisque est disiungantur*—in taking the εἰς clause with διαζεύγνυσθαι—"be divorced for their mutual benefit," Jowett. But the following sentence supports the view that it goes with βουλευομένους. What the family conclave, with (if necessary) the help of the experts, had to decide was *the terms of the separation*, and in so doing to consider the interest of both parties.

b 7. At 929 e ten νομοφύλακες are called in to decide upon a divorce (for incompatibility of temper) along with ten of the female marriage officials.

c 1. The MSS. have *οἷς ἂν ἐπιτρέψωσιν οἵδε τάξωσι* : two violent assumptions have been made about this passage :—(1) that καί has dropped out before τάξωσι, and (2) that ἐπιτρέπειν here means *to order, to command*. Nearly every editor has followed Ald. in the former point. As to the second, Ast and L. & S. (who cite it erroneously) give Xen. *An.* vi. 5. 11 as a support for ἐπιτρέπειν in the sense of *iubeo*. But ἐπέτρεψεν there means "he gave it into their charge to . . .," "he assigned to them the duty of . . ." That is different from ταῦτα ἐπέτρεψεν—with no persons mentioned—used for "he gave these commands." (Cod. Voss. and a corrector of A altered τάξωσι to τάξουσι.) I believe that Burnet has restored the original reading by simply resolving οἵδε into οἱ δὲ. As he has kindly informed me, he takes τούτοις ἐμμένειν with both clauses : with the first it means "to abide by their reference to these arbiters," and with the second "and by their decision on the point referred to them"—the whole being

equivalent to the legal term *ἐμμένειν τῇ διαίτῃ* (e.g. Aristoph. *Wasps*, 524); the disputants i.e. are to *acquiesce in the court*, and *act upon its decision*. (It will be seen that Burnet's text would admit of the interpretation adopted by Winckelmann, who would read *ἃ οἷς ἂν ἐπιτρέψωσιν οἵδε τάξωσι τούτοις ἐμμένειν*, "to abide by the decision of those to whom these (ten *νομοφύλακες*) intrust it." But, as B. says, *the original disputants* are a much more appropriate subject to *ἐπιτρέψωσιν* than the ten *νομοφύλακες*; besides, it complicates the proceeding unduly, if we are to suppose a second delegation.—H. Richards would cut the knot by reading *οἷς ἂν ἐπιτάξωσιν οἵδε τούτοις ἐμμένειν* — the assumption being that [*καὶ*] . . . *τάξωσι* was a marginal variant.)

c 7. *ἀναγράφειν* corresponds to our "post," as used of defaulters.

d 2. For *ἐν* of the tribunal cp. above 754 e 8.—Steph. first recognized that *τῶνδε* goes with *ἄτιμος*, though in his, as in the earlier texts, it is written *τῶν δὲ*, and begins the next sentence.—Ficinus misinterpreted the next sentence in a curious manner, translating it "Nec nuptiis procreandisque liberis ulterius det operam: ac si id tentaverit" etc.

d 6. *ἐξόδων . . . καὶ τιμῶν*: the "distinction" probably consisted in being attended by a train of servants. Stallb. notes that Theophr. *Char.* 25 represents the mean man as unwilling to buy a proper maid to attend his wife *εἰς τὰς ἐξόδους*, and that Dem. *Adv. Olymp.* 1182 describes a *ἑταίρα* as *ἐξόδους λαμπρὰς ἐξιοῦσαν*.—A has (acc. to Schanz) *γενέσε**ων*, the third *ε* being in an erasure. Burnet says this is corrected from an original *γενέσια τῶν* (which J. G. Schneider conjectured); L and O have *γενέσεων* with *γενεθλίων* in the margin. From a comparison of *Alc. I.* 121 c 7—*ταύτῃ τῇ ἡμέρᾳ βασίλεως γενέθλια πᾶσα θύει καὶ ἑορτάζει ἡ Ἀσία*—where one MS. has *γενέσια*, B concludes, no doubt rightly, that *γενέσια* here is a mistake for *γενέθλια*. (Stallb. mentions this as a possible emendation, but rejects it.) It is not clear whether there was any difference between the *ἐπιτελειώσεις* and the *γενέθλια*. Both appear to have been celebrated on the tenth day after the child's birth. Cp. Aristoph. *Av.* 494 and 922. The former word, as Ast and Stallb. say, has a religious significance.

785 a 1. The subject to *σιγῇ κείσθω* is the regulations just recommended.

a 2. *πραττέσθω*, "they should be put in force."

a 5. Burnet retains the original *ἀρχή* of A, L and O, but differs from all other editors in putting a full stop after it. (Schanz adopts the early correction to *ἀρχὴν*, and inserts *ὡς* before *ζωῆς*.)

ζωῆς ἀρχή would thus stand as a literal quotation of the formal words used in the register.—Burnet also retains the MS. παραγεγράφθω, which many edd. have followed Orelli in changing to the inf.

a 6. The acc. τὸν ἀριθμόν remains a difficulty. It seems to be an acc. of inner object: "let there be added a writing giving the number." Perhaps we ought to accept Orelli's emendation.

b 2. γάμου δὲ ὅρον: see above on 721 b 1.—The addition of τὸν μακρότατον χρ. ἀφ. is an indication that some variety in the enactment is conceivable.

END OF VOL. I

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